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Is Bigger Really Better? Moral Hazard Issues in Expanding Financial Safety Nets Global Solutions Summit Berlin 18-19 March 2010 Peter Bofinger Universität Würzburg and CEPR

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  • Is Bigger Really Better? Moral Hazard Issues in Expanding Financial Safety NetsGlobal Solutions SummitBerlin 18-19 March 2010

    Peter BofingerUniversität Würzburg and CEPR

  • Topics

    Ten years after: Where do we stand?

    Small is beautiful: The German „Three Pillar System“

    Moral hazard and safety nets: Better inventives for bank managers

  • What has changed since 2007? Private sector deleveraging, high public deficits

    -25

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    Private net financial balances (% of GDP)

    2007 2018

    Private net financial balances = Current account minus Fiscal balance (Source: IMF)

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    Fiscal balances (% of GDP)

    2007 2018

  • Bank lending stagnant with the exception of China

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    Bank lending to private non-banks (percent of GDP)

    Emerging markets All countries Advanced economies China G20 Euro area United States

    Source: BIS

  • Business models have become more conservative

    2 The height of each bar shows the aggregated capital shortfall considering requirements for each tier (ie CET1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2) of capital for the major internationally active banks monitored by the BCBS (BCBS (2018)).Source: BIS Annual Report 2018

  • NPL declining, but still high in Southern Europa

    Source: ECB, Financial Stability Review November 2018

  • Expanding Safety Nets?

    • Lender of Last Resort is already unlimited for countries indebted in their own currency

    • Global dimension: Presentation by Helene Schuberth• Considerable progress in extending the safety nets of the euro area:• ELA (Emergency liquidity) : Country specific lender of last resort• European Stability Mechanism (500 billion Euro): Lender of last resort for

    member state governments indebted in a „foreign currency“.

    • Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), backed by Single Resolution Fund (SRF). ESM serves as backstop for SRF

    • Work in progress: European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) with a targetsize 0.8 percent of deposits is grossly overrated

  • Small is beautiful: Germany‘s

    „3 Pillar System“

  • Is bigger better? The German „Three pillar system“

    23%

    12%

    10%16%

    12%

    3%5%

    16%3%

    Total Assets

    Big Banks

    Regional Banks

    Landesbanken

    Sparkassen

    Credit cooperatives

    Mortgage Banks

    Foreign Banks

    Banks with specialpurposes

    15%

    15%

    10%

    24%

    17%

    5%3%

    8% 3%

    Loans to non-banks

    Big Banks

    Regional Banks

    Landesbanken

    Sparkassen

    Credit cooperatives

    Mortgage Banks

    Foreign Banks

    Banks with specialpurposes

    Source: Deutsche Bundesbank

  • Smaller is more profitable

    Advantages of the smaller banksØLong-term orientation due to

    independence from capitalmarkets

    ØLocal anchoring combined withcentralized service centers

    ØSupport of social and culturalactivities at the local level

    1.852.88

    5.28 5.49

    9.18 9.3910.13

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    Return on equity (2017)

  • Who is saved by financial safety nets?

    Source: Presentation Edward J. Kane

  • Profits private, losses social?

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    Stock prices of German Banks and DAX (14 May 2007=100)

    DEUTSCHE BANK COMMERZBANK HYPO REAL ESTATE HLDG. DEAD - 14/10/09 DAX 30 PERFORMANCE - PRICE INDEX

  • Setting the right inventives for bank mangers(Dudley-Proposal)

    Compensation

    ImmediatelyDeferred

    (5-10 years)

    Equity Debt

    Unsecured Debt

    Performance bonds:

    Security deposit for

    fines

    William C. Dudley: Enhancing Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry, New York, October 2014

  • Summary

    The world has changed dramatically since 2007

    • Net private lending has almost vanished (China is the exception)• Bank business models have become more conservative• No obvious need for expanding safety nets

    The German experience: Diversified banking systems (“Three Pillar”) with small banks provide stability and to low costs for customers (=low profitability of banks)

    The problem is not that banks were safed, but that themanagers were not held responsible for their mistakes

    • Share holders made huge losses• Instead of increasing capital requirements to prohibitive levels,

    change the compensation of bank managers (Dudley Proposal)• Responsible divers are better than more and speed limits

  • Why we need strong banks