is america under siege?

Running head: AN EXAMINATION OF VIOLENT ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

Is America Under Siege?

An Examination of Violent Islamic Extremism

Denise A. Scelsi

University of California, Irvine

AN EXAMINATION OF VIOLENT ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 2

Abstract

Over the past decade, the threat of violent Islamic extremism has continued to grow throughout

the United States and has become an increasing concern of United States residents. The

widespread influence of Islamic radicalization amongst U.S. citizens and naturalized American

individuals continues to add to the rising fear in society. This paper will evaluate the legitimacy

of such fears and develop an understanding of the pathways leading up to the individual who is

radicalized. It will also explore possible connections between Jihadist beliefs and the Muslim

religion of Islam, and then make a determination as to whether or not the United States should be

concerned about homegrown terrorism.


Is America Under Siege?

An Examination of Violent Islamic Extremism

Introduction

The recent terror attack by Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik, in San

Bernardino, struck fear in the hearts and minds of many Americans throughout the country. This

devastating event in a small bedroom community in California was the pinnacle of hate crimes.

Certain radicalized Muslims seek to harm Americans, because they disapprove of the American

beliefs and values that oppose their own beliefs and values and that go against Sharia law. Terror

groups such as Al Qaeda have existed for decades, and ISIS, a terror group that is far more

sophisticated than Al Qaeda, has recently been surging throughout the world, including Western

countries. The life of a Jihadist continues to attract the disenfranchised individual as well as

those who are in the middle class, have an education, and are from a younger demographic.

Kreiger & Meierrieks (2011) disagree with this, following the finding from their empirical

research that there is no indicator that terrorism is influenced by education.

The recent event in San Bernardino confirms the continued threat of Islamic

radicalization in the United States. The media professed this attack as the largest attack on

American soil since 9/11, and once again, it took center stage in the media. America was

outraged to hear the news of an Islamic radicalized married couple that would sacrifice an

opportunity to raise their infant child, abandoning their parental responsibilities for the

opportunity to kill Americans. The casualties in San Bernardino included 14 innocent county

workers who were killed and an additional 25 people who were injured (Schmidt et. al., 2015).

The attack contributed to the increasing Islamist-inspired terrorist plots committed against the

homeland since 9/11. This paper will attempt to answer the following questions: Is there a


specific pathway leading to radicalization that can be identified? Is domestic violent terrorism on

the rise in the United States? Is there a connection between the Muslim religion and Jihad?

The Department of Homeland Security defines domestic terrorism as: “Any act of

violence that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key

resources committed by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United

States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group” (dhs.gov,

2015).

America has learned much about domestic terrorism, and although it is not the subject of

this paper, it is usually associated with arson, assassinations, gunfire, and mass shootings.

Examples of mass shootings in the United States are: Colorado Springs Planned Parenthood, the

school shooting in Roseburg, Oregon, and the shooting at the Emanuel African Methodist

Church in Charleston, South Carolina. There is no one set definition for the term radicalization.

Each definition evokes a purpose and has a specific meaning associated with it.

What has become the subject of debate are the varying degrees of the radicalized

individual. For example, the modern Jihadist is no longer necessarily an individual who resides

in a marginalized community and feels socially disconnected. A new type of terrorist is on the

rise in the United States and in many European countries; this is the homegrown terrorist who is

self-recruited without leadership and who is globally connected through the Internet. These

individuals who seek to harm Americans have infused themselves into society, only to then turn

around and launch an attack on the American people. Although there are a substantial number of

academic articles that report no connection between the Muslim religion and Jihadist actions,

sufficient evidence shows that terrorists who resort to violence claim that they are motivated by

Islamic teachings.


Research in the field of terrorism and radicalization is vital, due to mechanisms of the

ever-changing society, cultural developments, and technological advances. Failure to continue to

adequately research will leave many countries and their citizens vulnerable to terrorist attacks

and indoctrination of radical beliefs. There is no one clear theory or idea that concretely explains

the radicalized individual or the most recent phenomenon, homegrown terror. A great number of

studies exist today, exploring the varied elements of the jihadist. However, there is a need in the

academic and research community to conduct additional empirical research in order to fill in the

knowledge gap caused by the absence of such studies.

Research in this field has practical concerns and problems. First, there are considerations

of safety issues that must be examined. Traveling overseas to investigate the mindset of a

radicalized individual is truly a deadly undertaking. Since 1992, there has been 1186 journalist

murdered while traveling outside of the country (CPJ.ORG, 2015). The data to support social

science researchers in this particular field of study is absent. Thus, based on the threat to a

journalist, one can easily surmise that the threat level is quite high. Second, to study the

radicalization process and homegrown terrorism is difficult because this field of study is fluid,

continually changing and adapting as those who commit terrorist acts find new ways to conceal

their identity and intentions. Research that was relevant two years ago is irrelevant today. Third,

the use of the Internet can be done in private, making it increasingly difficult to pinpoint

individuals who are subject to the radicalization process. Identifying and studying these

individuals prior to an act of violence are virtually impossible. Many times, those who are caught

following an attack do not survive the event, making the interview process completely

impossible. For these reasons, empirical research is lacking, and the relevant issues will have to

be explored by researchers to fully and effectively develop radicalization pathways.


The findings in this literature review will evaluate the long-standing debate to determine

the validity of threat concerning the radicalized jihad, discuss the nature of terrorism that appears

to be changing in the United States, and examine the parameters that affect society as a whole.

This will be done through the critical and careful examination of current quantitative and

qualitative research. To date, there are few studies that empirically examine the radicalization

path that is most frequently journeyed by terrorists.

Literature Review

Wilmer & Dubuloz (2009) assert that terrorism should be defined according to the

specific concepts and ideologies of terrorism, such as the use of indiscriminate violence against

non-combatants by non-state actors with the purpose of generating fear in order to “signal,”

communicate, and advance particular socio-political objectives. Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) stress

that a radical is assumed to be a person that is harboring a deep-felt desire for fundamental

sociopolitical transformations and radicalization is understood as an increasing eagerness to

pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to,

the existing order. Although Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) offers a useful definition, it lacks a

necessary component; that is, in the name of Islam, a radicalized individual will pursue, in an

unrelenting manner to destroy society through the indiscriminate death of another human being.

In the years that preceded 9/11, terrorism was generally associated with acts in the

Middle East. Today, the homegrown Jihadi terrorist is far more destructive, and if the terrorist

act is not averted, the destruction involves mass-casualty bombings against civilians, has the

potential to kill and injure thousands, and is generally associated with broad transnational socio-

political injustices, whether legitimate or not (Wilne & Dubouloz, 2009). It is this inherent belief


that is frightening to the West, as the act of terrorism, could be carried out anywhere and at any

time.

Acts of Domestic Terrorism Since 9/11

According to the Global Terrorism Database, there have been more than 140,000 cases of

violent terrorist attacks (Start, 2013). There have been at least 50 Islamist-inspired terrorist plots

thwarted between September 11, 2001, and December 2012 (Zuckerman, et. al., 2013). Although

many terrorist acts are stopped in the planning stage, there are some planned attacks that are not

prevented. For example: In 2015 the Chattanooga, TN a military shooting killed 5, that same

year the San Bernardino shooting killed 14 people, and in 2014, Washington and New Jersey

killing spree, killing 4. From 2002 to 2015, there have been a total of 48 people killed on

American soil as a result of Islamic terrorism. The death toll for the number people killed by far

right-winged people killed is 48. Although the numbers of far right-winged murders are slightly

higher, the statistics do not include number of terrorist plots thwarted (NewAmerica.com, 20161)

There is an estimate of 63 homegrown violent jihadists plots or attacks since September

11, 2001 (Bjelopera, 2013). Since 9/11 Domestic Islamic Terrorist plots discovered by officials

have been increasing. According to Zuckerman, et al. (2013), 154 people have been arrested or

killed for plotting terror attacks, 77 had U.S. Citizenship. Thus, these statistics show that

domestic terrorism is a threat and should continue to be a topic of concern amongst policy

makers, Homeland Security, and researchers. Although the burden is great, once the pathways to

radicalization is discovered, new policies or programs can be implemented to squash this forward

movement of Islamic radicalization.

1International Security Data Site is a database website focused on providing evidence-based analysis of

internal security issues, including the rise of political Islam, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/.


What causes an individual to seek the path of radicalization?

Mitchel Silber & Arvin Bhatt, of the New York Police Department conducted exceptional

empirical research explaining and evaluating the radicalization process as a slow and ongoing

individualistic process (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), answering this over-aching question is ideology.

Ideology is the foundation of what drives recruitment, and responsible for nearly all of the

formation of homegrown terrorists groups, including Madrid 2004 bombers, the Hofstad Group,

London’s 7/7 bombers, the Australians arrested as part of Operation Pendennis in 2005 and the

Toronto 18, arrested in June 2006. Musa & Bendett (2010) agrees and asserts that there is an

evolving threat of domestic terrorism that is advocated and perpetrated by radical Islamic

ideologues. Musa & Bendett (2010) with the fundamental belief that examined terrorist attacks

were occurring in the United States surmising that the homegrown terrorist path to radicalization

moves quickly, from accepting extremist rhetoric to becoming a suicide bomber.

Silber & Bhatt (2007) explain the radicalization process as a four-stage process, of pre-

radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and Jihadization. A similar argument is

presented by Sageman (2008) who explains that the radicalization into terrorism is not caused by

poverty, rather, it is various forms of brainwashing, ignorance or lack of education, lack of

employment, lack of social responsibility, criminality, or mental illness. Ackbar (2013) points

out that the report generated by Silber & Bhatt (2007) is the most extensive and relied upon

resource that explains the radicalization process. However, the multi-step process introduced by

Silber & Bhatt (2007) does not impress Akbar.

First, Akbar argues that the definition explained by Silber & Bhatt as the

preradicalization process is flawed in its broad definition, because they assume that this stage


will attract those individuals who are unremarkable and ordinary. Akbar vehemently argues that

agreeing with Silber & Bhatt’s preradicalization pathway will only result in misdirected and the

intentional targeting of the immigrant Muslim neighborhood, which will become a site of

suspicion and harassment. Silber and Bhatt hypothesize that the ordinary individual will be

seduced into the preradicalization process. Akbar disagrees, arguing that Silber & Bhatt’s have

no foundational basis to argue that the most vulnerable group of individuals, such as middle-

class individual, including families and students possess this attribute. Altunbas & Thorton

(2011) agree with Silbert & Bhatt, asserting that there is a shift in recent terrorists that move

away from poverty, and are moving towards individuals who are well educated, middle-class or

high-income families.

Akbar continues to protest Silber & Bhatt’s (2007) collective arguments leading to

radicalization. For example, Akbar asserts that Silber & Bhatt (2007) explanation of “self –

identification” is flawed, as, in this stage, an individual gravitates towards Salafi Islam and a

mosque. Akbar argues that Silber & Bhatt (2007) misunderstands “Salafism” as in the United

States is an entire set of arguments and political positions. The third stage of Silber & Bhatt

(2007) ’s argument rests upon religious and political ideologies, which serves as a furtherance of

the radicalization process. Akbar (2013) concludes the review of Silber & Bhatt (2007) report

finding that “radicalization” as a reason to target the religious and political cultures of Muslim

communities.

Jenkins (2011) asserts a different position than Akbar (2013), believing that there is no

easily identifiable terrorist-prone personality, many people share the same views, and only a

handful radical will become Jihadist. More importantly, Jenkins (2011) asserts that the

radicalization process is more of happenstance than a possibility. Jenkins (2011) however, fails


to examine issues concerning the ‘Kids of ISIS’ that are brainwashed into Jihadists beliefs that

children that grow up with a strong desire to become a suicide bomber (Charters, 2015).

Bjelopera & Randol (2010) disagree with Silber & Bhatt (2007) asserting that there is no one

process that best defines the radicalization process. Bjelopera & Randol (2010) support their

argument by referring to a study of 2,032 foregoing fighters who joined Al Qaeda because they

identified with others and they sought revenge. This simplistic explanation offers no justifiable

reason to believe that these are exclusive elements that exist to warrant transformation.

Moskalenko & McCauley (2009) are suspicious of the findings explained by Silber &

Bhatt (2007); they argue that in their test to validate the conveyor belt metaphor used to explain

the radicalization path found mixed results. Moskalenko & McCauley’s (2009) attempt to

ascertain the validity of the conveyer belt metaphor used by the authors by conducting an

experiment using groups of university students in a stratified convenience sample. This study

did not pinpoint pathways it merely demonstrated differences between activism and radical

intentions underlying factors to radicalization. For example, as many people feel as if they do not

belong but don’t aspire to wage violent jihad.

However, Moskalenko & McCauley (2009) offer sufficient evidence to illustrate the

difference between beliefs in support of a cause and violent radicalization by offering evidence

of a survey done in the U.K. of Muslims following an attack of suicide bombings. The survey

reported that about 50,000 Muslims supported the suicide bombings, declaring them justified.

However, the number of Muslims arrested for suspected terrorist activity amount to just a few

hundred U.K. Muslims. This example illustrates that having radical or deviant beliefs does not

necessarily mean that a person will become radicalized.


Similarly, Musa & Bendett (2010), explain that the radicalization process occurs during

personal encounters between those who preach and propagate forceful action in the name of

religion. Thus, an individual may potentially undergo an initial and continued indoctrination

processing in their hometown with the potential recruiter who acts as the seducer for Jihadist

beliefs. Silber & Bhatt (2007) argue that the radicalization process is gradual and includes some

multi-steps, and may take months, even years, to fully develop, the radicalization process is

exacerbated when radical beliefs are introduced in school, prisons, and on the Internet.

Furthermore, the exact point when one becomes a jihadist is difficult to pinpoint. It may be the

day an individual is at a retreat, downloading literature, bomb making, or going to the Middle

East (Jenkins, 2011).

Brooks (2011) agrees with Silber & Bhatt (2007) and the critique of their study asserting

that radicalized individuals develop patterns that show a change in their pursuits and convictions.

Some commonalities include: viewing ideological propaganda, interacting with activities or like-

minded aspirant militants, embracing more conservative deviations of Islam, and exhibiting

politicization of their sacred and religious views. While the patterns developed are not identical,

they resemble a similar path of radicalization. Brooks (2011) does not believe that Silber &

Bhatt (2007) provide sufficient facts, beyond the belief that there is a distinct pattern, that

demonstrates a correlation between present-day Muslim American population and asserts that

there is insufficient evidence to “reliably indicate” its members would instigate terrorists’

activities. This argument fails because the author merely focuses on a play of words rather than

illustrating text from Silber & Bhatt (2007) ’s argument. Musa & Bendett (2010) disagree with

Brooks (2011) who reason that there is strong evidence that points to a sophisticated and

evolving indoctrination campaign targeting Americans of the Muslim faith. These tools are


aggressively used by terrorist organizations and have become essential as a modern tool, coupled

with the technological advances of the Internet.

Sources of Indoctrination. Brooks (2011) believes militant capabilities to execute deadly

attacks increase due to the accessibility of technical and training manuals to allow for the

fabrication of weapons and in the preparation of attacks. Sageman (2008) agrees and explains

that websites play a key informative function regarding delivering knowledge relevant to

carrying out terrorist attacks. Silber & Bhatt (2007) is similarly concerned about the Internet,

explaining that during the self-identification phase, the Internet provides a platform where the

mind can wander and possibly get influenced by unfiltered radical and extremist ideology. The

Internet also serves as an anonymous virtual meeting place, where like-minded individuals and

those who conflict can meet and share the message of a jihadist. The Internet enables the

radicalized seeker by providing information on targets, their vulnerabilities, and the design of

weapons. Silber & Bhatt (2007) poignantly argue that individuals that are radicalized may not

serve as a jihadist, but may act as mentors and agents to influence those who might become

terrorists in the future.

Brooks (2011) agrees with Silber & Bhatt (2007) in her critique of their study that

emphasizes the development of the radicalized individual, in particular, those people who

suddenly change their pursuits and convictions. Some commonalities include: viewing

ideological propaganda, interacting with activities or like-minded aspirant militants, embracing

more conservative deviations of Islam, and exhibiting politicization of their sacred and religious

views. While the patterns developed are not identical, they resemble a similar path of

radicalization. Most scholars agree that many of the jihadist recruits in the United States begin

their journey to radicalization on the Internet, as the it offers easy to find support and


corroboration of their own dissatisfactions and people who would legitimize and direct their

anger (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, Brooks, 2011, Musa & Bennett, 2010, and Jenkins, 2011).

Bjelopera (2013) asserts that the radicalization process is done through intermediaries,

social networks, the Internet, and Prisons. Although these avenues play a useful role, they do act

as a furtherance of radicalization until Stage 2 of the radicalization process according to Silber &

Bhatt (2007). Bjelopera (2013) accurately describes the radicalization process as acquiring and

holding extremist, or jihadist beliefs. Violent extremism also referred to as violent jihadist or

jihadist terrorist, is defined as when a person moves from ideas to violence. Although Bjelopera

(2013) explains the path to jihadist actions is different for each, asserting that no single path

exists to becoming a full-fledged terrorist.

The Internet provides homegrown terrorist cells with a remarkable shared connection of

al Qaeda and ISIS training manuals, terrorist audio and video recordings, Internet chat rooms,

twitter, blogs, and the like. Thus, no formal contact is required to develop and form a terrorist

cell organization. Homegrown terrorist cells become virtual partners of al Qaeda and ISIS.

According to Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman (2009) of the 117 individuals studied, there

were only seven that showed a connection between time-spent in prison for conversion to Islam

that leads to radicalization. Borum (2011) agrees that there are very few factors that connect

radicalization to those individuals’ who had spent time incarcerated. This argument seems to be a

subject of debate, with opposing views to this assertion. For example, Bjelopera & Randol

(2010) report that the research regarding the radicalization of the prisoner in the United Kingdom

the facts are unclear, suggesting however, that there are scholars who assert that there is a

correlation, but their article provides no data or empirical evidence to support this belief. Most

researchers who discuss the ‘jailhouse jihadist’ refer to the study conducted by Gartenstein-Ross


& Grossman (2009). Relying on one study alone, thereby failing to replicate the study, is a clear

indication that further empirical research needs to be done to verify that validity and

generalizability of Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman’s study conducted in 2009.

Radicalization of a the Next Generation of Terrorist

Prior to 9/11 Bid Laden swore that America would not enjoy their safety. Croft & Moore

(2010), explain that terrorist today are different from those in the past and provide an example of

the Irish terrorist which gave warnings to individuals prior to an attack and connected each act to

a political strategy. What researchers are finding is that individuals who become radicalized

seem to be joining the ranks of jihadist at a younger age and will conceal their actions making

intelligence and discovery more difficult.

There are two primary concerns in discussing the next generation of terrorist. First, it is

hard to predict exactly how long the radicalization process will take and second, the next

generation terrorist want to kill as many civilians as possible. This argument is supported by a

recent publication by Hegghammer & Nesser (2015), who provide clear-cut evidence using

qualitative data to determine the intent of ISIS. Specifically, the scholars use investigative tools

to discover the extent of the threat posed to Western countries (from early 2011 to mid-2015) in

three ways: (1) Examination of ISIS communications about planned attacks on the West,

including 200 audiovisual productions, and statements by foot soldiers; (2) Examination of

terrorists plots in the West; and (3) Assessment of the degree of involvement by ISIS-linked back

to the organization. Thus far, the evidence presented here is for time periods that begin after 9/11

to 2011.

For these youngsters, Sageman (2008) explains, they sacrifice themselves for a better

world, in the name of God. Alain Bauer (2007) agrees with Sageman (2008) in his article; he


explains that new terrorist organization has emerged, they are hybrid groups, are opportunistic,

and capable of rapid transformation. Sageman (2008) continues to warn readers of the potential

threat, referring to, as the next generations of terrorists are even more frightening and impulsive

than its predecessors; this next generation of terrorist feels marginalized which is the springboard

to violence.

The underlining question for policy makers is: Will ISIS seek to expand their efforts

globally and embark on a campaign to attack citizens in the West? The public is reminded of the

lurking threat in one recent headline entitled “Islamic State planning sophisticated attacks on the

West.” In this article Alexander Evans, coordinator of the United Nations expert group on

terrorism is quoted saying, “The scale of the threats is changing; because of the sheer number of

global foreign terrorist fighters — more than 25,000 in more than 100 countries — and because

of the variety of operating spaces these fighters are in” (Green, 2015).

Hegghammer & Nesser (2015) overall found that the four and a half-year period, they

were able to identify 69 plots; 37 in Europe, 25 in North America, and seven in Australia. The

total number of terrorists involved in these incidents was about 120 (80 in Europe, over 30 in

North America, and nine in Australia). Of the 69 plots, ISIS was connected to 30. Most of the

plots discovered occurred from July 2014 to June 2015, a total of 33 plots, 26 were linked to ISIS

(79%). The remaining plots were connected to al-Qaida aspirations. This data suggests that the

threat of ISIS to cause harm to Westerns is continuing. It is important to note that this article

illustrates that a greater number of ISIS attacks were done so without direct connection with ISIS

leaders. A total of 17 cases were found to be sympathizers of ISIS. Although the greater

percentage of terrorism is occurring throughout Europe, the United States is experiencing a

number of “homegrown” plots. What is most concerning is as the religion spreads along with


leaders who spread the message of jihadist rather than peace, the United States will,

unfortunately, join Europe, witnessing an increased number of terrorist attacks. Musa & Bendett

(2010) with the fundamental belief that examined terrorist attacks were occurring in the United

States surmising that the homegrown terrorist path to radicalization moves quickly, from

accepting extremist rhetoric to becoming a suicide bomber.

Whether violent Islamic Terrorist is a threat or not, some scholars say that radicalization

is a problem and should be put at the forefront of counterterrorism efforts. Although slightly

dated, Sageman (2008) appropriately argues that this new threat is identified as a pool of young

Muslims susceptible to the message of terrorists, in particular, those who defend Muslim interest

and honor who oppose western culture. More specifically, they are young people seeking fame

and thrills, a similar trait seen amongst other terrorists throughout the entire world for the past

130 years (Sageman, 2008, 151-152). Sageman (2008) is supported by Kohlman (2008) who

explained Al-Muhajiround, a radical faction told Muslims that they need to resist and if need be

to fight alone, encouraging the faction members to find a way to engage in jihad. Akbar (2013)

sheds new and refreshing light to this daunting task, explaining that (1) radicalization is an

observable event and often a process that is predictable, (2) the government has devised a

number of methods to combat terrorism, and is monitoring and countering radicalization, and (3)

radicalization is connected to particular religious and political cultures within Muslim

communities and actions by these communities are often aggravated by the radicalization of

individuals.

Thus, the factors attributable to radicalization vary and are spread to many different

individuals as described in the video messaging directed towards Americans and Europeans are


freighting and are achievable, the reach of ISIS alone warrants great concern to Westerners. Abu

Muhammad al-Adnani, IS’s lead spokesman, issues a verbal threat on September 22, 2014:

“If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and

filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the

disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a

coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any

manner or way however it may be. Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not

seek anyone’s verdict. Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for

they have the same ruling.”

In January of 2015, he repeated his announcement addition, “what lies ahead will be worse-

with Allah’s permission-for you haven’t seen anything from us just yet.” Whether it is a

coincidence or not, in 2014 and 2015, there was a significant increase in attacks on Americans in

the United States leading to numerous injuries and the deaths of 24 of the 45 Americans killed

since 9/11.

Is there a connection between Jihadist beliefs and the Muslim Religion?

To assign blame in relation to horrific acts of violence seems to be an egregious act

evoking racism and bigotry, to evaluate a particular race—connecting that race to a specific

behavior is ‘un-American’. Silber & Bhatt (2007) utilize resources available to their team of

researchers to explore those individuals who have been caught committing acts of terrorism.

However, this research brushes along the surface of the issue. The need for further empirical

research is missing from studies that explain jihadist and the radicalization process.

This fact is impressed by Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman (2009) reviewed data from 117

jihadists in the United States and the United Kingdom, concluding that religious ideologies play


a significant role in the radicalization process. As of 2011, there were more than 3 million

Muslims living in the United States, there are more than 100 documented incidents of Muslims

who have joined the jihad. These figures suggest that one out of every 30,000 American Muslims

hold jihadists ideology (Jenkins, 2011).

Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) argues that to truly understand the connection between Jihadist

beliefs and the Muslim religion one must understand the foundations that uphold Islamic beliefs

explaining that Islamism is centered on a narrative, which claims that Islam and Muslims are

continuously attacked and humiliated by the West, Israel, and immoral parochial regimes in

Muslim countries. The religion asserts that in order to return to a society of peace, harmony, and

social justice, Muslims need to unite and join together in their faith. To do so, the Muslims

believe that they need to fight the West and other corrupting influences. Viciousness through a

series of violent acts against civilians and the military is a necessary and is demanded to have

sufficient power to fight against the military strength of the West. The fight, which militant

Islamism claims is a religiously sanctioned fight, is an individual duty, and an emancipatory

journey, which brings the fighter closer to God. The underlying concept is a sense of solidarity

on the part of Muslims in Europe with those Muslims in conflict areas around the world. To

justify their beliefs, Muslims accept that there will be suffering, which is necessary for Islam to

achieve their goals Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010).

Zeidan (2003) agrees with Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) and elaborates his findings in his

comparative study, explaining that Islam is a revolutionary ideology, which seeks to alter the

social order of the entire world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenants and ideals.

‘Muslims’ is the title of that International Revolutionary Party’ organized by Islam to carry out


its revolutionary program. ‘Jihad’ refers to that revolutionary struggle and utmost exertion which

the Islamic Nation/Party brings into play in order to achieve this objective.

Saghaye-Biria (2012) argues that America is seeking to reproduce racism against Muslim

Americans in the Unites States, whose arguments are based upon the Homeland Security

Committee’s congressional hearing on March 10, 2011. The hearing was to examine a report

issued by Homeland Security on ‘The Extent of Radicalization in the American-Muslim

Community and That Community’s response asserting that the hearing was unjustified

stereotyping against an entire religious community, an action that is counterproductive and un-

American.

Saghaye-Biria (2012) argues that Muslim Americans have now found themselves the

targets of increased racial and religious profiling, asserting that it does nothing more than

encourage hate crimes and racism to foster. Although Saghaye-Biria’s article was published in

2012, the sources are for the most part, outdated; the academic sources cited by Saghaye-Biria

(2012) precede 911 and only focus on the writings of three academic researchers. Thus, the

writings mislead the reader into believing that the issues presented are relevant today.

Furthermore, the writer does not give a complete picture of the facts, solely relying on a meeting

that took place on March 10, 2011 by the Homeland Security Committee, and saw any measures

taken to examine a connection between Islamism and acts of violence against the United States

as an apparent act of racism and malicious generalization about the Islam religion. Saghave-Biria

(2012) concludes that Muslims as a minority group have been singled out by American society

and have been made a target of racial prejudices and investigations. Akbar lends creditability to

Saghaye-Biria’s (2012) allegations of the United States participating in discriminatory practices

against Muslims—asserting it as a necessity, a self-preservation technique explaining:


“While in some ways it offers only a thin veneer over suspicion of Muslim and

Islam (or conflations between Muslims, Islam, and terrorism), the veneer is thick

enough to change the terms of the debate. Law enforcement’s concern with

mosques, antiwar sentiments, hijabs, and niqabs is now cloaked in expertise about

the process by which Muslims become terrorists” (Akbar, 2013, p. 817).

There is a stark difference between the arguments made by Zeidan (2003) and Dalgaard-

Nielsen (2010) compared Saghave-Briria (2012), as mentioned previously, to argue that

ideologies of one religion specifically is to blame for the deaths of thousands of people is

audacious. It is important to follow qualitative and quantitative data to direct those researchers in

making clear and unbiased conclusions in their researcher. Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman (2009)

best explain the analysis and conclusion connecting their study of 117 arrested terrorist, who

were selected not because of their religious beliefs, but because they were terrorists. In their

study, they inquired how they got there, thus determining clusters of indicators pointing to the

development of the jihadist and Islam.

Kingston (2001) vehemently argues views that oppose those expressed by Saghave-Biria

(2012), affirming a connection between Islam and state, describing Islam as an orthoprax, as

opposed to orthodox religion, that revolve around acts of worship rather than belief. Kingston

attempts to dissect the Islamic faith, but falls short, explaining Islam is s a "medium for

collective violence" than as an "antidote for healing such violence" (p. 293). It 's hard to

determine the root of Kingston’s (2001) argument, as his essay does not articulate a precise

point, other than his beliefs that the Islamic religion is a container for violence. Silverman

(2002) evaluates vision of Islam as a militant organization that is both reactionary and violent.

Presently, the U.S. perceives the Islamic state as suicide bombers, hostage takers, harsh capital


punishment, and the slave trade. Not to mention that all nineteen hijackers involved in the attack

on the World Trade Center and Pentagon attack have been positively identified as Arab Muslims

with ties to Islamic revivalist movements, allows for sufficient cause for Americans to take a

new interest in protecting themselves from the atrocities committed by those individuals of

Islamic identities. To maintain political correctness and avoid offending an entire race, America

must be mindful not to develop stereotypical behaviors.

Bakircioglu (2010) explicitly argues a central problem akin to the Muslim religion that

relies upon the Qur’an to define and interpret its readings, that is, there is no central religious

authority (caliph) to assist its leaders in the real meaning of each passage. For the Roman

Catholic, the Pope provides guidance to its followers who depend on him to interpret the

contradictory or ambiguous passages. To date, many passages in the Islamic jurisprudence from

all periods remain unstudied or unpublished; or those that are published have not been

unequivocally interpreted. The message of Islam has been universally spread, and its passages

have proved to be persuasive. Bakircioglu (2010) goes on to explain that the Qur’an speaks of

peace, however, for those who claim to follow it, simply ignore its readings and move forward to

their own political and military desires. Islamic law has developed cultural, political, militarist,

and religious factors, all of which play a role in the formation of their legal contours.

Akbar continues to disregard Silber & Bhatt’s methodology in a systematic manner,

ignoring their claims that meeting places, frequented by Muslims are “incubators” that serve to

facilitate radicalization, thereby inviting law enforcement to keep a watchful eye of Muslim

religious and political cultures. Akbar argues that Silber & Bhatt’s report is unreliable as it

makes conclusions based on a small number of cases (eleven cases total, with five American

cases as the focus). Although this assertion is accurate, Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman (2009)


surveyed 117 homegrown “jihadists” terrorists from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, finding

similar conclusions made Silber & Bhatt (2007).

To elaborate, Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman (2009) offer an overview of factors that are

attributable to terrorism and provide a realistic plan to avert terrorist activities in the future, for

example: (1) there is a connection to understanding their religion and was a significant factor in

the radicalization process, (2) there is no single terrorist profile, (3) international connections,

such as, terrorists training camps in foreign countries, (4) prisons are not seen as a top priority in

address the threat of terrorism, and (5) promoting civic engagement in Muslim community are

beneficial as they will move towards integration and social cohesion, which play a significant

role in addressing the threat of homegrown terrorism.

Homegrown Terrorism – Is it a threat to the American people living in the U.S?

Before 9/11, Americans felt safe in their homeland. Untouchable. The shock following

the horrific events of 9/11 was more profound because most Americans believed they were

immune from such a terrible attack on the most powerful country in the world, including

terroristic attacks. What was alarming to many in the San Bernardino terrorist attacks that

Americans who are integrated into American society, turn their backs on their countrymen to kill

individuals in the name of Allah.

To examine whether an actual threat does exist we look at several journal articles

discussing this point. Brooks (2011) argues that the threat of homegrown terrorism is overstated

and in her article she writes that Muslim homegrown terrorism is not a threat to Americans, nor

is there any analytical or evidentiary basis for this occurrence happening. Brooks (2011)

correctly asserts that the terrorist attempt of Richard Reid in 2001 was not “homegrown” since

Reid was a British Citizen. Brooks, however, believes that Americans should not be concerned


about attacks from American Muslims because there are few attacks planned; they lack

sophistication and are usually detected in the early planning stages. Like Brooks, Geneve Mantri

(2011) agrees that homegrown terror is not a major threat to the United States. Although Mantri

(2011) systematically explains a series of attacks that he calls a new wave of terrorist recruitment

that incite Americans to target Americans, such as the U.S. recruiting station in Little Rock, the

Fort Hood shooting, and Christmas Day bombing. Martini further explains terrorist attacks are

not new phenomena, providing historical evidence to support his assertions. Such as in May

1886, a revolutionary bombed at Haymarket killing eight police officers and in 1901 William

McKinley was assigned by an anarchist, Leon Czolgoz, although sparse, violent displays killing

many is not new in society. It appears that most scholars agree that homegrown terrorism is not a

threat, rather an anomaly (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

The goal of the study researched by Silber & Bhatt (2007) was to define the

radicalization process. Naturally, there are limitations that a researcher faces in gathering such

data as entering into a Jihadist camp could prove to be dangerous for the researcher. Collecting

data following the filing of a criminal case or an arrest is a common method to determine fact

based. This methodology is used by UCR and NIBRS. Brooks (2011) argues that Silber & Bhatt

(2007) were limited by their research and their analysis of radicalization because the study was

solely based on the dependent variable, and as such, they could only analyze individuals charged

with terrorism. Akbar (2013) argues that Silber & Bhatt (2007) suggest that there is no fixed

trajectory for radicalization process; however, their suggestions and conclusion argue a

contrasting view, suggesting that there is predictability allowing for sound direction for terrorism

policing.


Sageman (2008) paints a very different picture; he explains that the radicalization process

is occurring right at home, and is done so in small groups of friends and relatives. Sagemen

(2008) asserts that although the threat is not as great as domestic terrorism that if left alone, may

develop into a greater threat. Similarly, Kohlman (2008) an eyewitness to “homegrown”

terrorism, found himself in the heart of downtown Manhattan face-to-face with a group of young

militants from the New York Metropolitan area, fully dressed in combat fatigues, rallying

outside the Israeli consulate, seeking to voice their support for suicide bombing attacks,

screaming “May the FBI burn in Hell! CIA burn in hell! Not long thereafter it became apparent

that radicalization in the West may be an issue for policy administrators and law enforcement

personnel. Kohlman (2008) asserts that terrorist cells that develop in the United States and in

Europe are at no cost to al Qaeda (and now ISIS) and result in the flourishing of additional loyal

terrorists cells throughout western civilization. Because the potential to develop and possibility

flourish, homegrown terrorism is a looming problem and should be recognized as a real security

threat to the United States. This factor may serve as a motivation for radicalized Islamic leaders

to seek out individuals to form cells as a furtherance of their global plan.

Although Brooks (2011) argues that the increase in terrorist plots is a result of external

factors leading to more arrest, the author asserts that the rise in law enforcement dedicated to

seeking out terrorist attacks is in fact, instrumental in aiding terrorist to move forward with their

plots. This evidence supports the writer’s assertion that homegrown terror is not a threat to the

United States. Brooks (2011) incorrectly misidentifies the claim that homegrown terror is not a

threat to the United States. Although the author uses statistics to develop her beliefs, the facts

presented fails to include information about the growing Islamic culture that exists and is

growing in our country and throughout the world.


Slootman and Tillie (2006) identify three major driving forces behind radicalization (1)

individuals radicalize because they search for meaning, stability, and respect. In their study, the

authors found that the desire for the purpose was related to a poor academic record and often

times were associated with petty criminal activities. Thus, once associated with a radical group

these individuals found that their meaningless life was suddenly filled with purpose and

determination. However, this feeling was often short-lived. (2) Other persons radicalize mainly

as a result of a search for community. These adolescents are often former outcasts, unobtrusive

and intense in their religious beliefs, and differing from other people of their age by insisting on

a spiritual lifestyle. These individuals will often have a strong sense of community and

acceptance by joining a close-knit group of “brothers.” (3) Some people radicalize as a reaction

to what they perceive as wrongdoings committed against Muslims. The assertions made by

Slootman & Tillie (2006) differ somewhat from those of Silber & Bhatt (2007) who have

developed a systematic four-stage process—from beginning to end—outlining the radicalization

process. Slootman & Tillie (2006) appear to focus more and the micro development of

individuals who radicalize, whereas Silber & Bhatt (2007) concentrate on the macro

development.

Conclusion

It is evident that the target and the actual threat of Islamic terrorist organizations and

homegrown terrorist acts are hard to predict. Although there is a known threat at the country’s

front door, the threat is sufficient to warrant the concern of policy makers and Homeland

Security to continue to actively protect the nation’s borders, to monitor Internet access, and to

ensure that sufficient financial resources are designated for keeping America safe. To follow


those scholars who do not perceive the actual threat is to walk away from the need to protect

America.

A necessary element of the pathway leading to violent radicalization appears to be

ideological beliefs, coupled with the motivation to use violence. To indoctrinate an individual—

someone who on the surface may appear to be well integrated—to seek violent action against

another is a phenomenon that has puzzled many scholars. There is much to discover about Islam,

Sharia law, and the true potential threat to democratic civilization. America must be mindful to

not further isolate those individuals of the Islamic faith, but rather to find ways to integrate

Muslims into understanding and accepting American values. That does not mean that Muslims

must adopt American values; it means simply that they must accept the fact that Americans are

different and that it is these differences that make America and its democratic values attractive to

so many people from different cultures from all over the world.

America is in a difficult position. On the one hand, the nation is colorblind, accepting all

individuals, despite their cultural and religious differences. On the other hand, we cannot be as

vulnerable as we were before 9/11 to similar catastrophic events. The bottom line is that violent

jihadist beliefs are a dangerous ideology fueled by religious and moral hatred against Western

culture and values. America must not forget the horrific acts of terror and war by radical Islam,

fueled by democratic values instilled in American culture and society.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Altunbas, Y., & Thornton, J. (2011). Are Homegrown Islamic Terrorists Different? Some UK

Evidence. Southern Economic Journal, 78(2), 262-272.

Akbar, Amna (2013) Policing “Radicalization” UC Irvine Law Review. Vol 3, Issue 4,

Reigniting Community, Strengthening the Asian Pacific America Identity. Retrieved on

March 6, 2016 from http://www.law.uci.edu/lawreview/vol3/no4/Akbar.pdf.

Bakircioglu, O. (2010). A Socio-Legal Analysis Of The Concept Of Jihad. The International And

Comparative Law Quarterly, 59(2), 413-440.

Bjelopera, Jerome (2013). American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating A Complex Threat,

Congressional Research Service; January 23, 2013 Accessed February 15, 2016.

Bjelopera, Jerome P., And Mark A. Randol. (2010). American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating A

Complex Threat. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Brooks, R. A. (2011). Muslim "Homegrown" Terrorism In The United States. International

Security, 36(2), 7-47.

Croft S., & Moore, C.. (2010). The Evolution Of Threat Narratives In The Age Of Terror:

Understanding Terrorist Threats In Britain. International Affairs (Royal Institute Of

International Affairs 1944-), 86(4), 821-835.

Charters, Justen (2015). While Most Kids Are Playing Outside, ISIS’ Children Are Brainwashed

To Commit Unspeakable Acts Of Terror, Accessed On March 1, 2016 From


Http://Www.Ijreview.Com/2015/01/232043-Young-Kids-Playing-Outside-Isis-Children-

Brainwashed/.

Committee to Protect Journalists (2015) 1186 Journalists Murdered accessed March 8, 2016

from https://cpj.org/killed/#.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. 2010. “Violent Radicalization In Europe: What We Know And What

We Do Not Know.” Studies In Conflict And Terrorism 33(9): 797–814.

Department Of Homeland Security (2015) Counter Violent Extremism, Homeland Security,

Accessed February 15, 2016 From Http://Www.Dhs.Gov/Topic/Countering-Violent-

Extremism.

Gartenstein-Ross, D. & Grossman, L (2009). Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K. An

Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process. FDD’s Center for Terrorism

Research, A Division of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Washington D.C.

April 2009.

Githens-Mazer, J. (2012). The Rhetoric And Reality: Radicalization And Political

Discourse. International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science

Politique, 33(5), 556-567.

Hegghammer, T., & Nesser, P. (2015). Assessing The Islamic State’s Commitment To Attacking

The West. Perspectives On Terrorism, 9(4). Retrieved From

Http://Terrorismanalysts.Com/Pt/Index.Php/Pot/Article/View/440/871

Hegghammer, T. (2015). “Should I Stay Or Should I Go? Explaining Variation In Western

Jihadists’ Choice Between Domestic And Foreign Fighting,” American Political Science

Review 107, No. 1 (2013): 1–15.


Hegghammer, T. (2010). The Rise Of Muslin Foreign Fighters: Islam And The Globalization Of

Jihad. International Security, 35(3), 53-94.

Hoffman, B. (2010). American Jihad. The National Interest, (107), 17-27.

Iannaccone, L. R., & Berman, E. (2006). Religious Extremism: The Good, The Bad, And The

Deadly. Public Choice, 128(1), 109-129.

Jenkins, B. (2011) Would Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the

United States Since September 11, 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation,

2010), p. viii. Hereinafter: Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors.

Kingston, Paul (2001) Reflections On Religion, Modernization, And Violence In The Islamic

Middle East, Method & Theory In The Study Of Religion, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2001), Pp. 293-

309, Published By: Brill, Http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/23549937

Kohlmann, E. F. (2008). "Homegrown" Terrorists: Theory And Cases In The War On Terror's

Newest Front. Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science,618, 95-

109.

Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2011). What Causes Terrorism? Public Choice, 147(1), 3-27.

Mantri, G. (2011). Amnesty International Presents Homegrown Terrorism: Is There An Islamic

Wave? Harvard International Review, 33(1), 88-94.

Moskalenko, S. & McCauley, C. (2009) Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction

Between Activism and Radicalism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 21:2, 239-260,

DOI: 10.1080/09546550902765508

Musa, S., & Bendett, S. (2010). Islamic Radicalization In The United States. New Trends and A

Proposed Methodology For Disruption. National Defense Univ Washington DC Center For

Technology and National Security Policy.


New America (2016) International Security Data, Accessed February 21, 2016, From

Http://Securitydata.Newamerica.Net/.

Sageman, M. (2008). The Next Generation Of Terror. Foreign Policy, (165), 36-42.

Sageman, M. (2008). A Strategy For Fighting International Islamist Terrorists. Annals Of The

American Academy Of Political And Social Science, 618, 223-231.

Saghaye-Biria, H. (2012). American Muslims As Radicals? A Critical Discourse Analysis Of

The US Congressional Hearing On 'The Extent Of Radicalization In The American Muslim

Community and That Community's Response'. Discourse & Society, 23(5), 508-524.

Silber M. & Bhatt, A. (2007). Radicalization In The West: The Homegrown Threat, New York

Police Department, August 15, 2007

http://www.nypdshield.org/public/sitefiles/documents/nypd_report-

radicalization_in_the_west.pdf.

Slootman, Marieke & Jean Tillie. (2006). Processes of Radicalisation. Why Some Amsterdam

Muslims Become Radicals. Amsterdam: Institute For Migrations And Ethnic Studies,

University Of Amsterdam.

Zeidan, D. (2003). The Resurgence Of Religion: A Comparative Study Of Selected Themes In

Christian And Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses. Leiden: Brill.

Zuckerman, J, Bucci, S, & Carafano, J (2013) 60 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons

In Domestic Counterterrorism. The Heritage Foundation, Washington DC Retrieved

February 15, 2016 Form Http://Report.Heritage.Org/Sr137

is america under siege?

Documents