irri vs nlrc

8/10/2019 Irri vs Nlrc

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 97239 May 12, 1993

INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND NESTOR B. MICOSA, respondents.

Jimenez & Associates for petitioner.

Santos & Associates for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

Posed for determination in this petition for certiorariis the question of whether a conviction of a crimeinvolving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment and corollarily, whether a conviction of

a crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization recognized by the Philippine

government and accorded privileges, rights and immunities normally granted to organizations of universal

character. In 1977, it hired private respondent Nestor B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby became bound by

IRRI Employment Policy and Regulations, the Miscellaneous Provisions of which states viz:

C. Conviction and Previous Separation

l. . . .

2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense involving moral turpitude

may be dismissed from the service.1

On February 6, 1967, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house in Los Baos,

Laguna.

On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of homicide. During the pendency of the

criminal case, Micosa voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI's Special Separation Program. However, on

January 9, 1990, IRRI's Director General, Klaus L. Lampe expressed deep regret that he had to disapprove

Micosa's application for separation because of IRRI's desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like

him possess.2

On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision fending Micosa guilty of homicide, but

appreciating, however, in his favor the presence of the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance.

Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the Probation Law.

On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote Micosa that his appointment as laborer was

confirmed, making him a regular core employee whose appointment was for an indefinite period and who

"may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine

Labor Code.3

On March 30, 1990, IRRI's Human Resource Development Head, J.K. Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to

resign from employment in view of his conviction in the case for homicide.


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On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office No. II wrote IRRI informing the latter that said office

found Micosa's application for probation meritorious as he was evaluated "to possess desirable social

antecedents in his life."4

On April 6, 1990, Micosa informed J.K. Pascual that he had no intention of resigning from his job at IRRI.

On April 22, 1990, J. K. Pascual replied to Micosa's letter insisting that the crime for which he was convicted

involves moral turpitude and informing him that he is thereby charged of violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2of the Institute's Personnel Manual.

On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega on February 6, 1987

arose out of his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression; that his conviction did not involve moral

turpitude and that he opted not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of probation,

which the trial court granted to him.

On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's Grievance Committee who recommended to the

Director General, his continued employment. However, on May 21, 1990, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to

Micosa that the latter's employment was to terminate effective May 25, 1990.

On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.

On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered judgment finding the termination of

Micosa illegal and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages from the date of his dismissal up to actual

reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the same is hereunder quoted:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are hereby entered:

1. Finding the termination of complainant's services illegal;

2. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to reinstate complainant Nestor

B. Micosa to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privilegesappurtenant, thereto immediately upon receipt hereof;

3. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to pay complainant Nestor B.

Micosa his full backwages computed from the date of his dismissal on May 25, 1990 up to

actual reinstatement based on his latest salary rate of P41,068.00 per month.

4. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute, to pay complainant's counsel

the amount of Five Thousand Pesos P5,000.00, representing his attorney's fees; and.

5. Dismissing the claim for damages for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.5

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission was basically in agreement with the findings and

conclusions of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, in a resolution dated January 31, 1991, it affirmed the appealeddecision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification deleting the award ofattorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.6

Accordingly, petitioner filed this instant petition raising the following issues:

1. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT IRRI HAD NO RIGHT NOR AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE ANY OTHER

CAUSE/S FOR DISMISSAL IF THE SAME IS NOT AMONG THOSE ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE OF THE

LABOR CODE.


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2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN HOLDING THAT "THERE IS NO BASIS TO APPLY PETITIONER'S INSTITUTE PERSONNEL MANUAL IN

DISMISSING THE COMPLAINANT ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT HIS CONVICTION OF HOMICIDE

CONSTITUTE MORAL TURPITUDE.7

The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of homicide, which is a crime

involving moral turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's

Employment Policy Regulations.

In addition to its claim that it has the prerogative to issue rules and regulations including those concerning

employee discipline and that its employees are bound by the aforesaid personnel manual, petitioner

justifies its action as a legitimate act of self-defense. It admits that Micosa's interests in his employment

and means of livelihood are adversely affected; that a convict should not be discriminated against in

society and that he should be given the same opportunities as those granted to other fellow citizens but

claims that at times, one's right is deemed superior than that of another. In this case, petitioner believes that

it has a superior right to maintain a very high degree or standard not only to forestall any internal problem

hampering operations but also to prevent even the smallest possibility that said problems could occur

considering that it is an international organization with concomitant obligation to the host country to avoid

creating disturbance or give occasion for such disturbance.

It should be recalled, however, that Micosa was issued an appointment with an assurance from the IRRI's

Director General that as regular core employee he "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as

defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code."8Thus, IRRI could not remove him from his

job if there existed no justifiable cause as defined by the Labor Code.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an

employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes.

Neither may said ground be justified under Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by analogy. Fraud or willful

breach by the employees of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative

under Article 282 (c) refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the employee in the discharge of his duty

rendering him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. It cannot be

gainsaid that the breach of trust must be related to the performance of the employee's function. 9On theother hand, the commission of a crime by the employee under Article 282 (d) refer to an offense against

the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative.

Analogous causes must have an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated under

Article 282. Clearly lacking in the ground invoked by petitioner is its relation to his work or to his employer.

In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of the IRRI complex,

having been committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a non-IRRI employee. Thus, the

conviction of Micosa for homicide was not work-related, his misdeed having no relation to his position as

laborer and was not directed or committed against IRRI or its authorized agent.

Besides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa would be in consideration of the safety and welfare

of its employees, its reputation and standing in the community and its special obligations to its host country.

It did not present evidence to show that Micosa possessed a tendency to kill without provocation or that he

posed a clear and present danger to the company and its personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal

that Micosa's service record is unblemished. There is no record whatsoever that he was involved in any

incident similar to that which transpired on that fateful night of February 6, 1987. In fact, even after his

conviction, the IRRI's Director General expressed his confidence in him when he disapproved his application

for special separation in a letter dated January 8, 1990 and when he conveyed to him IRRI's decision to

promote him to the status of a regular core employee, with the commensurate increases in benefits in a

letter dated February 1990. Respondent IRRI derogates the letters' significance saying that they were

merepro-formacommunications which it had given to numerous other workers. But whether or not such

letters were "form letters, they expressed the message that were meant to be conveyed, i.e., that Micosa is

fit for continued employment. In addition, the employees at IRRI's Grievance Committee interceded

favorably in behalf of Micosa when they recommended his retention despite his conviction showing thatthe very employees which IRRI sought to protect did not believe that they were placing their very own lives

in danger with Micosa's retention.


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Likewise, noteworthy is the fact that Micosa, although found guilty as charged, was also found worthy of

probation. This means that all the information regarding his character, antecedents, environment, as well as

his mental and physical condition were evaluated as required under Section 8 of the Probation Law and it

was found that there existed no undue risk that Micosa will commit another crime during his period ofprobation and that his being placed on probation would be to the benefit of society as a whole.

In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and insisted on Micosa's termination. Certainly, said

termination cannot be upheld for it lacked not only a legal basis but factual basis as well.

Even under IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the dismissal of Micosa's on the ground of his

conviction for homicide cannot be sustained. The miscellaneous provisions of said personnel manual

mentions of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as a ground for dismissal. IRRI simply assumed

that conviction of the crime of homicide is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. We do not

subscribe to this view.

Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing10citing In Re Basa11and Tak Ng v. Republic12as

everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or

depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary

to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to

determine.13Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral

turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-

defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.

IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral turpitude as the killing of a man

is conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself not merely prohibited by law. It added thatMicosa stabbed the victim more than what was necessary to repel the attack.

IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on record show that Micosa

was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim

then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack

but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left

pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the

latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but

only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self- defense and

voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa'scharacter and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may

or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. 14Moral turpitude is not involved

in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any

particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the

surrounding circumstances.15While . . . generally but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude,

while crimes mala prohibitado not, it, cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does

not exist by classifying a crime as malum in seor as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which

are mala in seand yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude

and are mala prohibitaonly.16It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite

term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are

reached.

In fine, there is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the National Labor Relations

Commission in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa was illegally dismissed.

For certiorarito lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of

the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil and common traditions. 17The abuse of

discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or

despotically.18

WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.


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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant

vs.

ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the

Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision

of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.

On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a

total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent

would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February

1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then

amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the

amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check

dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90)

days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for

insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no

arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort

to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a)

one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,

docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the

trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentencedrespondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and

to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;


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to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to

indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to

indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and

to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in totothe decision of the trial courtbut, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the

decision read as follows:

For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the

judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.

It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the

offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered

suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action

from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of

Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by

Section 29 of the same Rule.

SO ORDERED. 1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of

Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to

address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989,respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal

and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory

upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In thatResolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorariwhen she posted with

this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorariunder Section 1, Rule 45 of

the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.

In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty

aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on

the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely

by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause

damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.

We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a

member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did

not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.

The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon

respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty

involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which

deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2the Court explained the nature

of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:

xxx xxx xxx

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a

worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The

thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks

and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the


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practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against

property but an offense against public order.

xxx xxx xxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties

directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The

mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public .The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a

thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking

system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 3(Italics supplied)

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of

crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as

follows:

Sec. 27.Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of

the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of

any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral

conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude , or for anyviolation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful

disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as

an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at

law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes

malpractice. (Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The

Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any

of the causes named in the last preceding section , and after such suspension such attorney

shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.

(Italics supplied)

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her

attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the

laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation

of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to

and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena,4thisCourt stressed that:

the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good

moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the

practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain

suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be

forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of

respondent.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes

and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.


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PEOPLE vs. TUANDA

(A.M. No. 3360. JANUARY 30, 1990)

FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension

from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda

received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on

commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3

checks. These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.

Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal

cases were filed, wherein she wasacquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-

Bouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further

suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude.Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension

was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned

law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is

not guilty of the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral

turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27.Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the barmay be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,

malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his

conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to

take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or

for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The

practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or

brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court

of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorneyfrom practice for any of the causes

named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his

profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a person

convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects

public interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private

interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large.


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Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the

channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and

the public interest. The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her

attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the

laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain

suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.

irri vs nlrc

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