irr news · said they observed him before the minicab continued towards tottenham, still being...

As the family of Mark Duggan launch ajudicial review of the inquest verdict, IRRNews examines the wider context of thedeath.

On 4 August 2011, Mark Duggan got out of ataxi on Ferry Lane in Tottenham and was shotdead by armed police: within hours, storiesabout a dramatic ‘shootout’, a ‘violent gang-ster’, and gangland ‘revenge killings’ began tocirculate. Two years later in September 2013,the inquest jury was told1 that they were on a‘quest to find the truth’,2 a process that lastedfor three months and involved ninety-threewitnesses.

In January 2014, after several days of delib-erations, the jury eventually delivered theirverdict of lawful killing, and the public galleryerupted in disbelief and outrage. All ten jurorsagreed that there had been a gun in the taxiwith Mark Duggan. Eight of them disbelievedthe evidence of the police marksman who shothim, and were sure the gun was not in hishands when he was shot dead. But despitethis, an 8-2 majority concluded that he hadbeen killed lawfully. Their explanation for thewhereabouts of the gun was that he musthave thrown it from the taxi before it was sur-rounded – but no witnesses gave evidence tosupport this idea. Immediately, the family’s

legal team asked the high court to quash theverdict as perverse, arguing that Judge Cutler,presiding over the inquest, should have pro-vided clearer direction to the jury. The inquestalso raised questions about the possibility ofpolice officers conferring as they producedtheir statements, and the family was givenpermission3 to challenge these practices inMarch 2014. Despite the lengthy inquest andthe long wait, there are still many unansweredquestions.

What is known is that the death of MarkDuggan will go down in history as the eventthat ‘sparked’ the August 2011 riots. As well asunderstanding this important connection, wealso need to be aware that the wider politicalcontext of the riots has had implications forthe subsequent investigation of the shootingof Mark Duggan. Right from the beginning, thepolice, Independent Police ComplaintsCommission (IPCC) and judiciary, as well asthe media, have played important roles indetermining how the shooting was framed,long before the jury sat down in the court-room.

Trident and the secret evidence regime

The policing operation that led to MarkDuggan’s death was run by Trident, a unitwithin the Metropolitan Police specialising ingun crime within London’s black community.Trident was set up in 1998 following a seriesof shootings and murders in Lambeth andBrent. At the time, there was widespread con-cern within the black community about theseshootings, and so there was support for adedicated unit to tackle gun crime. AnIndependent Advisory Group (IAG) was set upto ensure community oversight and accounta-bility in this most sensitive area of policing.The IAG was often very vocal in its criticism ofTrident’s operations, particularly its mostlywhite workforce.4 Over the years Trident oper-ations shifted. As well as ‘reactive’ investiga-

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IRR NEWSFraming the death of Mark Dugganby Betsy Barkas17 April 2014

The family of Mark Duggan at the High Court following the inquest verdict

tions of shootings, it began using ‘proactive’teams5 conducting covert investigations ofparticular individuals suspected of havingconnections to gun crime.6

Legislation passed over the last fifteen yearshas progressively increased the use of secretevidence, which has significantly underminedthe accountability of policing operations. In2008 legislation was passed enabling the useof evidence in court from ‘anonymous witness-es’ to secure convictions.7 And eight yearsbefore that, the Regulation of InvestigatoryPowers Act (RIPA) 2000 was passed, protect-ing so-called ‘intercept evidence’ (phone taps,for example) from being heard in court. It wasthe use of secret evidence under RIPA powersthat caused the collapse of the inquest intothe death of Azelle Rodney, a black man whowas shot dead by police officers in April 2005in north London. During the original inquestthe Rodney family demanded to hear evidenceabout the police pursuit that the police werewithholding. The inquest could not continue,and it was eventually decided to hold anInquiry that had greater powers to close hear-ings, restrict attendance and withhold sensi-tive evidence.

The suppression of some of the evidencerelating to Azelle Rodney’s death, and the dif-ficulties that ensued, were cited by the gov-ernment as a reason to extend the use ofsecret evidence to civil proceedings, includinginquests. These proposals were eventuallybrought in with the Justice and Security Act,which came into law in 2013, although due towidespread objection they excluded inquests(see ‘Secret justice = injustice’, IRR News 23February 2012).8 However, the Azelle Rodney

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Jury’s key findings

• Did the Met police and SeriousOrganised Crime Agency do enough togather and react to intelligence? Thejury decided unanimously that morecould have been done to gather intelli-gence on both Mark Duggan and KevinHutchinson-Foster, the man later con-victed of supplying the gun to Duggan. • Did Mark Duggan have the gun withhim in the taxi immediately before thestop? The jury decided unanimouslythat Mark Duggan did have the gunwith him in the taxi immediatelybefore the stop. • Did Mark Duggan have the gun inhis hand when he was shot? Themajority (eight) were sure that he didnot have a gun in his hand. They dis-believed the evidence of the officerwho shot him dead, who claimed hefired in self-defence. • How did the gun get onto the grassarea where it was later found? Themajority (nine) concluded that Markthrew the gun onto the grass. Eight ofthem thought that he had thrown itfrom the minicab as soon as it came toa stop. (There had been no evidenceheard to support this theory.) • Conclusion of the jury as to thedeath: The majority (eight) concludedthat Mark Duggan had been lawfullykilled. This finding was described asperverse by the family’s lawyers, giventhat the jury had found that he wasunarmed when shot dead.

Read the full conclusions here:http://dugganinquest.independent.gov.uk/docs/Jurys_Determination_and_Conclusion(1).pdf

Azelle Rodney

Inquiry9 chair Sir Christopher Hollandappeared to undermine this assertion whenhe said that much of the secret evidence didnot need to be secret.10 The Inquiry eventuallyfound in 2013, nine years after his death, thathe had been unlawfully killed.

By the time the circumstances surroundingMark Duggan’s death came under the spot-light, the secret evidence regime had becomeestablished, and for some time it was uncer-tain whether there would be an inquest at all.Intelligence for Trident’s operations came from‘intercept evidence’ obtained by the SeriousOrganised Crime Agency (SOCA, merged intothe National Crime Agency since October2013), and so was protected under RIPA legis-lation. The inquest had to be stopped and re-started, with the original coroner replaced byJudge Cutler, who could consider the secretevidence.

Facts and conjecture

According to evidence given by its seniorinvestigating officer11 at the inquest, OperationDibri was a Trident investigation that had beenrunning since November 2008, focused on‘dismantling’ Tottenham Man Dem (TMD), agroup the police said was involved in the sup-ply of guns and Class A drugs. Dibri focusedon around 100 people, with a ‘core’ of aroundforty-eight people.

While giving evidence about the subjects ofOperation Dibri, including Mark Duggan, offi-cers made assertions about crimes theythought he had committed, and about his

being a ‘senior’ member of the gang. Due tothe fact that the intelligence was exempt frombeing scrutinised in court (due to the RIPAlegislation), most of the assertions remainuntested. What is known is that Mark Dugganhad never spent time in prison, and that hiscriminal record consisted of two minor convic-tions, one for receiving stolen goods and onefor possession of cannabis, the most recent in2007. Both had attracted only small fines.Although police made a variety of other asser-tions,12 about drugs being stored at MarkDuggan’s home, that he had fired shots in acar park, that they had a ‘wealth’ of intelli-gence that he had ready access to guns, theyalso admitted that until 4 August, they did nothave evidence necessary to arrest him. Someof the intelligence, they said, was of very poorquality, equivalent to something being said toCrimestoppers by an anonymous caller whohad overheard something in a pub. The claimsabout Mark Duggan being a ‘senior member’of a gang were made time and time again bythe police, during the trial of the man convict-ed of supplying the gun (Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, see box), up to and during the inquest,and on each of these occasions were repeatedby the media as fact13.

The shooting

According to evidence heard at the inquest,15

Trident’s Operation Dibri planned a four-dayoperation from 3-7 August 2011 to recoverguns from around six people, including MarkDuggan. This operation involved officers fromTrident working together with specialist

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Trial of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

Following the shooting of Mark Duggan, Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was convicted of supplyingthe gun to him. Two trials took place, which featured important evidence about the shoot-ing, and were covered extensively in the press. It was the first time that the family had heardthe police accounts in detail, including the account by V53, the officer who shot Mark, whoclaimed he had seen a gun in Mark’s hand. However, the Duggan family was not representedat the trial and were not able to counter or challenge the police version of events. As Mark’sbrother Shaun Hall said in a statement: ‘It feels like this has been the Mark Duggan trialexcept his family has had no representation and without being able to defend himself.People have been able to say things in court about Mark and what happened that day with-out being challenged. We heard things that we had never heard before.’ Media reports fromthe trial widely repeated the police’s (in that trial, completely untested) claim that he hadbeen holding a gun.14

firearms officers (CO19) and armed surveil-lance officers (SCD 11). The CO19 officers wereplain-clothed officers armed with two gunsand a taser, who had responsibility for carry-ing out the operation to recover the guns.16

The operation had planned to target night-clubs,17 so most of the activity was due to takeplace in the evening. Surveillance officers hadtracked Mark on the evening of 3 Augustbefore losing him. On the afternoon of 4August at around 5.15pm, the police receivedintelligence that suggested he planned to takepossession of a gun from an acquaintancethat evening. He was followed to an addressin Leyton by the surveillance officers, whosaid they observed him before the minicabcontinued towards Tottenham, still beingtailed. More intelligence was then receivedthat confirmed Duggan had collected a gun.Meanwhile, Trident officers attended a brief-ing and then deployed towards Tottenham in aconvoy of cars to intercept the minicab,accompanied by CO19 and SCD11. At 6pm,‘state amber’ was called by the TacticalFirearms Commander (known as Z51), mean-ing there was enough intelligence to arrest,and responsibility for carrying out the opera-tion passed to the leader of the firearms team,known as V59. Thirteen minutes later, the offi-cer leading the interception, W42 called ‘statered’ over the radio,18 and the order ‘strike,strike’. The hard stop itself was carried out onFerry Lane, Tottenham, next to a bus stop andnot far from Tottenham Hale tube station.

Officers in three cars surrounded the mini-cab, forcing it to stop, then got out and sur-rounded it on foot, shouting and pointing theirloaded weapons at Mark Duggan and theminicab driver, a tactic designed to ‘shock andawe’ suspects into submission.19 It didn’t

work: Mark Duggan got out of the car onto thepavement, at which point he was shot twice,once in the right arm, causing a minor wound,and also in the chest, which was fatal. One ofthe bullets passed through his body andstruck a police officer (W42), who was notinjured because it hit his radio. CPR was per-formed on Mark, but he was pronounced deadon the scene at 6.41pm.

Aftermath

In the immediate aftermath of the death, thefamily were not officially informed by thepolice, in contravention of statutory obliga-tions. As a result, there was confusion on thepart of the family over whether the dead manwas actually Mark. His sister, brother andSemone Wilson (his fiancée) had attended thescene, but said they left unsure whether thedead man was Mark, as they had been toldthe dead man was Asian (see the IPCC reportinto the complaint).20 At least one member ofthe family drove to Whitechapel hospitalbelieving that he had been taken there aliveby air ambulance, only to find that it was actu-ally the injured firearms officer who had beentransported, statements read out at theinquest revealed.21 Because they had not beenformally told, it was difficult for them to com-prehend what had happened. Pamela Duggansaid: ‘A mother’s worst nightmare is the policecoming to your door to tell you that your childis dead. Because this did not happen, Ibelieved the worst had not happened.’22

Frustrated with the lack of engagement, on 6August the family arranged a march to thepolice station to demand that someone comeout to speak to them. Around 300 peoplegathered: they were there for several hours,and continued to demand a senior officercome to speak to them. Later that night, riot-ing broke out across Tottenham, which overthe next few days spread across London andseveral other cities in England.

The police apologised for the lack of com-munication23 several days later, on 8 August,partially blaming the IPCC: ‘I think both theIndependent Police Complaints Commission(IPCC) and the Metropolitan Police could havemanaged that family’s needs more effectively’,said Deputy assistant commissioner StephenKavanagh. The IPCC responded defensively,saying, ‘I am very clear that their concerns

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Demonstration outside Tottenham police stationfollowing the inquest verdict

were not about lack of contact or support fromthe IPCC … It is never the responsibility of theIPCC to deliver a message regarding some-one’s death.’24 Police stated they had not visit-ed the home of Mark Duggan’s parents toinform them because the family liaison offi-cers at the scene had been told not to by hissister and partner because it would have beentoo upsetting; family members categoricallydenied this. Police subsequently offered tomeet with the family in person, and eventuallydid so on 2 September. The Met repeated itsapology in February 2012 when a family com-plaint was upheld by the IPCC.25

Misinformation

Meanwhile, misleading information was beingfed to the media, resulting in widespread ref-erences to a ‘shootout’, and statements thatshots had been fired at police by MarkDuggan. At least some of this misinformationappears to have come from the IPCC. Its initialwritten statement made no reference to any‘shootout’, but several media reports that didquoted the IPCC as the source, indicating thatat least one spokesperson had verbally misledjournalists. The Guardian made reference toan ‘apparent exchange of fire’ and a ‘con-frontation’.26 The Telegraph went further, stat-ing that ‘gunman Mark Duggan opened fire’,quoting the IPCC as saying: ‘We understandthe officer was shot first before the male wasshot’. The Evening Standard said that an IPCCspokesman had stated the suspect had firedfirst. The Mirror (5 August 2011) and the

Independent27 also both said that it appearedthe police officer had been shot first, andquoted the IPCC as the source. (See ‘MarkDuggan killed in shooting incident involvingpolice officer’, Telegraph 4 August 2011;‘Father dies and policeman hurt in ‘terrifying’shoot-out’, Evening Standard 5 August 2011).

It wasn’t until several days later that the truthbegan to seep out, as media outlets reportedon 8 August that ballistics examinations hadproved that the bullet lodged in the radio waspolice issue. (For example: ‘Did bullet fired atofficers belong to police’, Daily Mail 8 August2011; ‘Tottenham riot: bullet lodged in officer’sradio at Mark Duggan death “was police issue”‘Telegraph 8 August 2011; ‘Doubts emerge overDuggan shooting as London burns’,28 Guardian8 August 2011). The IPCC refused to comment29

on the ballistics reports, then issued a state-ment on 9 August30 confirming that the bullethad been police issue.

The following week, following pressure fromthe Guardian,31 the IPCC issued another state-ment32 that conceded it may have ‘inadvertent-ly given misleading information to journalists’following the shooting. It said:

‘[H]aving reviewed the information theIPCC received and gave out during the veryearly hours of the unfolding incident,before any documentation had beenreceived, it seems possible that we mayhave verbally led journalists to believethat shots were exchanged as this wasconsistent with early information we

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Meeting to launch Tottenham Defence Campaign in September 2011, with (seated, from left to right): Sean Hall, SheilaSylvester, Stafford Scott, Myrna Simpson and Michael Jarrett; (standing, from left to right) Semone Wilson, RupertSylvester, Patrick Jarrett and Floyd Jarrett.

received that an officer had been shot andtaken to hospital. Any reference to anexchange of shots was not correct and didnot feature in any of our formal state-ments, although an officer was taken tohospital after the incident.’

At the pre-inquest hearing in December 2011the IPCC’s lead investigator, Colin Sparrow,apologised for the misinformation,33 saying ithad been ‘a mistake’.

The impression that is carefully implied inthese statements is that the ballistics exami-nations were able to clear up initial confusionover what had happened. The IPCC suggestedthat its ‘early information’ was incomplete andthis led to wrong inferences being made.However, according to evidence given at theinquest, there had been no confusion on thepart of the officers involved. V53 stated ‘Iknew Mark Duggan never fired at us … weknew that straight away’.34 W42, the one hit bythe bullet,35 concurred; Z51, the senior officeron the scene who was responsible for briefingsenior officers who were not present, hadmade notes at 6.30pm stating a bullet had ric-ocheted, and also vigorously denied convey-ing misinformation to anyone else.36 Even ifthere had been confusion over what had hap-pened, as the Met’s own report into the riotsacknowledged:37 ‘Experience informs both [thepolice and IPCC] that such early information isoften unreliable and should not form the basisfor press briefings’.

It is important to see all this in the contextof the riots, and the IPCC’s clear awareness ofits important political role in the control ofinformation. David Lammy, MP for Tottenham,had asked the IPCC to release information –he stated in the Guardian that very soon afterthe shooting he had spoken to them aboutaccelerating the ballistics report.38 When theIPCC did release this information on 9 August,the statement39 took the opportunity to com-ment on the riots:

‘I know this is an incredibly difficult timefor Mark Duggan’s family, who have madeit abundantly clear that they in no waycondone the violence that we have allseen…’

Other IPCC statements around this time tooka similarly conciliatory tone, ‘I understand the

distress … people need answers’40 … ’wewould request people are patient while weseek to find answers’.41

In November 2011, the IPCC took it uponitself to intervene even more directly in thepublic debate. Another IPCC statement wasmade42 that declared a Guardian article ‘mis-leading, speculative and wholly irresponsible’.The article originally carried the headline andsub-headline: ‘Revealed: man whose shootingtriggered riots was not armed; Mark Dugganinvestigation finds he was not carrying gunwhen killed in Tottenham’. The Met also com-plained to the Press Complaints Commissionand this was upheld. The Guardian concededthat the headline was misleading as it impliedthe investigation had concluded, and changedit. In its statement, the IPCC urged the public‘not to rush to judgment until our investigationis complete and they have the opportunity tosee and hear the full evidence themselves.’

Yet, after stating it was inappropriate tocomment on the sequence of events beforethey had been established, the IPCC made asecond statement43 the following week sayingthe minicab had not been moved from thescene before it should have been, and thatthey were sure evidence had not been com-promised. IPCC chair Len Jackson said:

‘I am taking the highly unusual step ofclarifying inaccurate, misleading and moreimportantly – irresponsible comment thathas appeared in recent days in relation tothe IPCC investigation into the circum-stances surrounding the death of MarkDuggan. I am doing so because, if theseinaccuracies continue to gain currency,they risk undermining the integrity of andpublic confidence in our investigation …’

The context for this later intervention wasthat Stafford Scott, a long-time campaigner forrights in Tottenham, had written a commentpiece in the Guardian44 about his resignationfrom the IPCC community reference group. Hemade a series of damning allegations aboutwhat he called a ‘shoddy’ investigation, sayingthat he wanted no part in it. (Many of Scott’sallegations stand to this day as unansweredquestions, although evidence of the IPCC’smishandling of crucial evidence emerged laterthat supported some of them – see‘Agreement or collusion’, below). This engage-

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ment of claim and counter-claim at the veryleast detracted from the IPCC’s important taskof establishing the truth about the death.

Meanwhile, police information apparently fedto the media focused on the portrayal of MarkDuggan as a ‘gangster’. The Telegraph quotedunnamed ‘police sources’ as saying that Markwas a ‘well-known gangster’ (‘Man killed inshooting incident involving a police officer, 4August 2011); and a ‘major player’, ‘heavilyinvolved in criminality’, who ‘lived by the gun’(‘London riots: Dead man Mark Duggan was aknown gangster who lived by the gun’, 8August 2011). It was also reported he was partof a gang linked to Jamaica’s ‘Yardies’, and thathe was associated with ‘Manchester gangsters’(‘Violence, drugs, a fatal stabbing and a mostunlikely martyr’, Daily Mail, 8 August 2011; ‘UKriots: Mark Duggan was nephew of Manchestergangster Desmond Noonan’, Telegraph, 12

August 2011; ‘Duggan and the mobster’, Sun,12 August 2011).

Media coverage painting Mark Duggan as ahigh-profile and dangerous criminal continuedover the next two years. Even the funeral,attended by over a thousand people, was por-trayed as a sinister tribute to a gang leader.The funeral procession went from his parent’shome in Tottenham through the BroadwaterFarm estate, where crowds gathered. The Mailfeatured a picture of mourners stretching theirhands out to the coffin under the headline

‘Gangsta salute for a “fallen soldier”’ (10September 2011), and the Express featured asimilar description (10 September 2011) andsuggested that they were making ‘gang-land’salutes (‘Gangsta salute for ‘fallen soldier’Mark Duggan who sparked riot’, Express, 10September 2011). In fact, the mourners wereresponding to a call by Bishop KwakuFrimpong-Mason for people to ‘stretch [their]hands towards the casket and thank God forMark’s life as he begins his heavenly journey’.The Mail later printed an apology and slightlyamended its article; the Express did not. Animage of Mark with a set, unsmiling expres-sion was widely used to accompany articlesabout his supposed gangster background.This expression was grief – the image hadbeen cropped from a larger photograph of himholding a tribute to his dead daughter at hergrave (see both images here).45

The reporting of the Kevin Hutchinson-Fostertrial (see Box) had repeated untested claimsmade by the police about Mark Duggan’s sup-posed criminality. In the months before theinquest, it was also widely reported thatDuggan intended to kill someone with thegun, and that the inquest jury would be con-sidering this. The Telegraph went into particu-lar detail about a ‘tit-for-tat’ murder in revengefor the death of Mark’s cousin Kelvin Easton(‘Revealed: gang rivalry, Mark Duggan and theunavenged murder behind the London riots’,

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Telegraph, 31 January 2013; See also ‘Jury todecide on ‘gangster’ claim’,46 BBC News, 31January 2013). In fact, this question was notput before the jury at all.

But when the jury sat down to consider theirquestions, the spectre of a violent gangsterhad become firmly attached to the name ofMark Duggan. The first thing most peopleheard about him was that he had probablyfired at a police officer. The IPCC’s statementsdid too little, too late to dispel these myths,although it intervened with alacrity whenreports started to emerge about an unarmedman being shot. Furthermore, stories of gang-land killings may have discouraged witnessesfrom coming forward. The only civilian witnessto actually see the shooting (Witness B) stat-ed he had been reluctant to come forward, nottrusting the police but also ‘not wanting to bebothered with’ any gangs[47

Inquest in detail

The inquest involved ninety-three witnesses,many of whom were granted anonymity,including most of the police officers. The juryalso heard evidence from experts, and non-police witnesses. They were asked to reachconclusions on the surveillance and policeoperation, the hard stop itself, and the vitalquestions about whether Mark Duggan wasarmed when he was shot, and whether he hadbeen killed unlawfully.

One of the central questions was whether ornot the firearms officer who fired the fatal shot,known as V53, had actually fired in self-defence, as he had claimed. Another officer(W70) also testified48 that he had seen MarkDuggan holding a gun. (However, questionswere raised about this account: see ‘Agreementor collusion?’ below). None of the other wit-nesses claimed to have seen a gun in his hand.

V53 described in detail what he called a‘freeze-frame moment’:49

‘As he’s turned to face me, he has anobject in his right hand … Mark Duggan iscarrying a handgun in his right hand …[Y]ou can make out the shape outline of it,the handle of it, the barrel, you could makeout the trigger guard, not visually, but againif you image it going as a L-shape, the sock,there’s like a little bit of give in it, so that’swhere the trigger guard would have been.’

Significantly, despite being trained to ‘followthe gun’, none of the police officers said theysaw it go flying through the air – on a clearsummer’s evening. Expert evidence from thepathologists and Professor Jonathan Clasper(an expert in bioengineering) considered itwas not credible that Mark threw the gun afterhaving been shot. Nor could any involuntarymovement have accounted for the gun endingup five metres away from where he fell. Nordid the forensic evidence positively supportthe account that a gun was in Mark Duggan’shand when V53 fired at him – no gunshotresidue was found on the gun or sock, despiteMark Duggan’s clothes and face being coveredwith it. Neither was there was any forensic evi-dence to suggest he had ever opened theshoebox or touched the gun or sock.

There were two civilian witnesses to theshooting. One of them, Witness B, said that hesaw what was ‘definitely a phone’50 in MarkDuggan’s hand. He described seeing him look‘baffled’, with his hands up in the air as if sur-rendering, attempting to run, and describedseeing the shiny BlackBerry in his right hand.

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2012 United Families and Friends (UFFC) annualremembrance procession for those that have died incustody

The other civilian witness was the taxi driver.He stated that he did not see Mark Dugganopen or close the shoebox51 during the jour-ney, that he had a good view of him when heleft the minicab and he did not see him withanything in his hands, raising his arm or mak-ing any threatening movements towards thepolice.

V53 also claimed that it was the first shotthat penetrated Mark Duggan’s chest (thefatal shot). He claimed that Duggan thenswung towards him, pointing the gun directlyat him, and then the second shot was fired,hitting his bicep. However, expert evidencealso raised questions about this aspect of theaccount. Pathologist Derrick Pounder was ofthe opinion52 that V53 had got the order of theshots wrong, and that the non-lethal arm shothad come first, then the fatal shot to thechest. The other pathologist, Simon Poole,maintained it was impossible to tell. However,the pathologists and Professor JonathanClasper (the bioengineering expert) agreedthat the bullet wounds on the arm suggestedthat the upper arm would have been rotatedtowards the body when the arm shot was sus-tained, rather than pointing outwards towardsV53. The experts also agreed that the chestwound demonstrated that Mark Duggan was-n’t in an upright position when he sustainedit, but bent forwards. The arm shot wound, onthe other hand, was consistent with beingupright. Taken together, the lawyers for MarkDuggan’s family suggested, these insightsindicated that Mark had been shot in the arm,staggered forward, and was shot in the chest.

The firearms officer claiming to have foundthe gun, known as R31, said he found it inbushes around five metres from the spotwhere Mark Duggan was shot dead. Z51, themost senior officer on the scene, also testifiedto having found the gun. Questions wereraised by the family’s legal team about theaccounts given by officers about finding thegun, as they did not appear to be consistentwith video footage provided by Witness B(known as the ‘BBC footage’). V59 (thefirearms team leader) gave several statementsand initial evidence at the inquest that statedthat he had directed another officer,53 R31, tolook for the firearm. According to V59, R31returned and told him he’d found it on thegrass; subsequently Armed Response Vehicle

(ARV) officers had arrived, whom V59 haddirected to go and secure the gun. All threeARV officers gave evidence to the same effect.However, this version of events was contra-dicted by the video evidence, that showedthat when the ARV officers arrived and wereapparently directed to secure the gun, actuallythe gun had not yet been found by R31 or byZ51. V59 later was recalled to the court toaccount for this discrepancy, and claimed hehad got the chronology wrong. This wouldhave meant that all three ARV officers’ evi-dence was also wrong. Leslie Thomas, barris-ter for the Duggan family,54 suggested that thegun had been planted, and that was why V59apparently informed the ARV officers to securethe gun before it had been ‘found’. The Judgenoted during his summing up that this wasnot a simple mistake, but a ‘direct contradic-tion … [a] stark problem’.55

Agreement or collusion?

Police statements raised concerns about thepossibility of collusion. The initial statementsmade by police on the evening of 4 Augustwere very sparse. Full statements were provid-ed several days later on 7 August. Importantdetails did not appear until these later state-ments – for example, the finding of the gun inthe bushes, and the specific number of shotsfired. W70’s claim that he saw Mark Dugganraising a gun, a crucial piece of evidence, wasnot mentioned in his initial report butappeared in his second report. When askedwhether this was a deliberate omission duringthe trial of Hutchinson-Foster, W70 said, ‘Idon’t know’.56

At the inquest, police officers also describedhow these longer statements were written57

over the course of eight hours, as officers sattogether in a briefing room at their LemanStreet base, with a flip chart at the front of theroom. V59 said:58

‘[W]e did them in segments […] as you fin-ish your section you then left the room,got a cup of coffee had a comfort break, etcetera. When everybody had finished theirsection 4, for example, 3 August, we allcame back into the room together wentthrough the flip chart process wrote thenext section and we all wrote that.’

The officers said that they agreed on details

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such as ‘times, places, locations, postings,sequence of events’, but denied that they haddiscussed the actual shooting, or their ‘hon-estly held beliefs’ about it. When questionedabout why they had omitted important infor-mation from initial statements, officers saidthat they were ‘deliberately brief’, and insist-ed that their statements had been made inline with Association of Chief Police Officers(ACPO) guidance. The IPCC did not have a staffmember present at the statement writingbecause there were ‘no resources’ available(according to IPCC deputy senior investigatorColin Sparrow, reported in the Telegraph, 28September 2012). Following the inquest,Pamela Duggan began court proceedings tojudicially review the ACPO guidance; in March2014 the Court of Appeal decided59 the chal-lenge could go ahead.

There were further concerns raised aboutthe IPCC’s handling of the investigation.During the Kevin Hutchinson-Foster trial, theIPCC’s Colin Sparrow said that he failed tograsp the significance of the shoebox60 thatcontained the gun until a week after theshooting. By the time he was told about theshoebox, he admitted, the minicab had beentaken to a police car pound and security sealson the car had been broken. Another IPCC

investigator told the court that he discoveredthe shoebox had been moved within the vehi-cle, apparently during searches. The minicabhad been moved from the scene the day afterthe shooting and then returned there that day,before being removed for a final time thatnight – a process which the recovery driverdescribed as ‘unusual’.

The IPCC was also criticised for ignoring thepossibility that the gun could have been plant-ed by police officers. Two civilian witnesses,Miss J and her daughter, gave evidence at theinquest that they had seen an officer moving agun from the minicab in the immediate after-math of the shooting. But the IPCC, despitebeing given this evidence early on in its inves-tigation, chose not to explore it further. Evenmore troubling, according to Stafford Scott,61

the community advisory group to the IPCC wastold that three police officers had given state-ments saying they had seen an officer throw-ing a gun away. These police statements werelater denied.

Even after the three-month-long inquest, thelegal wrangling, and the ongoing attention thecase has attracted, the family and the Justicefor Mark Duggan campaign face further strug-gles for the full answers.

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2013 United Families and Friends (UFFC) annual remembrance procession for those that have died in custody

Footnotes

[1] Transcript of the Hearing 16 September 2013.<http://dugganinquest.independent.gov.uk/tran-scripts/853.htm>

[2] The transcripts from the 2013 inquest are avail-able at:<http://dugganinquest.independent.gov.uk/hearing-transcripts.htm>. This article refers to evidence heardat the inquest.

[3] ‘Mark Duggan family given go-ahead to challengepolice practices after shooting’, Guardian, 7 march2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/07/mark-duggan-family-challenge-police-practice-officers-conferring-appeal>

[4] See Hugh Muir ‘Yard needs more black officers tosolve murders, civilian advisers say’, Guardian, 13October 2003.<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/oct/13/race.ukcrime>

In September 2013, 91% of Trident employees werewhite (328 of a total 360 employees), see Freedom ofInformation requests on Trident <https://www.what-dotheyknow.com/request/174446/response/432495/attach/html/3/Redacted Employees by Gender andEthnicity.xls.tif.pdf.html>


[6] Trident’s remit has since been expanded to dealwith all gun crime, regardless of background (see‘History of Trident’<http://content.met.police.uk/Article/History-of-Trident/1400014986671/1400014986671). In 2012 itwas relaunched as the Trident Gang Crime Command– a move that was condemned by former IAG ChairLee Jasper as an attempt ‘to co-opt London’s blackcommunity into [an] enforcement-led war on gangs’(see<http://leejasper.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/press-release-why-its-time-to-close.html>). The IAG wasalso changed: it is now chaired by the police, and theformer members of the IAG have been replaced by agroup of individuals nominated by the police and theorganisations contracted by the police to delivergang-related work. According to the outgoing chairClaudia Webbe, the former members were not givenany notice of the change, and were simply told they‘were no longer welcome’ when they turned up forthe regular meeting (‘Police replaces Trident AdvisoryPanel ‘Without Notice’’, The Voice, 8 February 2013.<http://www.voice-online.co.uk/article/police-replaces-trident-advisory-panel-without-notice>).

[7] The Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act2008 was a piece of emergency legislation rushedthrough parliament in a few days, after the Law Lordsoverturned a conviction reliant on anonymous wit-ness evidence (R v Davis [2008]). The Law Lords ruled

that the defendant had not had a fair trial, becausehis legal representatives had not been able to prop-erly challenge the anonymous evidence. The judg-ment was met by an impassioned response from thepolice, who said it would severely hamper their abili-ty to combat gun crime. The emergency legislationwas re-enacted in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

[8] Frances Webber, ‘Secret justice = injustice’, IRRNews, 23 February 2012.<http://www.irr.org.uk/news/secret-justice-injustice/>

[9] The Azelle Rodney Inquiry, all documents anddetails of hearings can be viewed at<http://azellerodneyinquiry.independent.gov.uk/>

[10] Vikram Dodd, ‘Azelle Rodney evidence should nothave been kept secret, says inquiry’, Guardian, 6October 2010.<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/06/azelle-rodney-police-shooting-evidence>



[13] See, for example: ‘Mark Duggan ‘among Europe’smost violent criminals’, inquest told’, BBC News, 23September 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-24210480>

[14] See for example: Shenai Raif, ‘Drug dealer KevinHutchinson-Foster jailed for supplying gun to MarkDuggan before death that sparked London riots’,Independent, 26 February 2013. <http://www.inde-pendent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/drug-dealer-kevin-hutchinsonfoster-jailed-for-supplying-gun-to-mark-duggan-before-death-that-sparked-london-riots-8511649.html>


[16] The ‘hard stop’ tactic is a planned operation thatinvolves armed officers deliberately intercepting avehicle in order to confront suspects. Hard stop wasalso used to apprehend Azelle Rodney in 2005,resulting in his fatal shooting by officers, found to bean unlawful killing at the Inquiry. Following AzelleRodney’s death the IPCC recommended a review ofthe hard stop tactic, saying that it was a ‘high riskoption’ – but this was never done. In January 2014 thepolice admitted they had been wrong not to review it.

[17] Transcript of the Hearing 1 October 2013.<http://dugganinquest.independent.gov.uk/tran-scripts/1026.htm>


IRR News 11


[20] Independent investigation final report: Report ofthe investigation into a complaint made by the familyof Mark Duggan about contact with them immediate-ly after his death, Independent Police ComplaintsCommission (IPCC), February 2012.<http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/investigation_commissioner_reports/Duggan_Final_Report_Foreword_29_Feb_2012.pdf_> (pdf file,256kb)


[22] ‘Statement by IPCC Commissioner RachelCerfontyne in relation to Duggan family complaint’,IPCC press release, 29 February 2012.<http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/statement-ipcc-com-missioner-rachel-cerfontyne-relation-duggan-family-complaint>

[23] Ibid.

[24] ‘IPCC update regarding the organisation's con-tact with the family of Mark Duggan since his death’,IPCC press release, 8 August 2011.<http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/ipcc-update-regard-ing-organisations-contact-family-mark-duggan-his-death>

[25] IPCC press release, 29 February 2012. Op. Cit.

[26] Sandra Laville, ‘Man shot dead by police in northLondon during attempted arrest’, Guardian, 5 August2011.<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/05/man-shot-police-london-arrest>

[27] Richard Hall, ‘Man left dead and officer woundedin rush-hour shooting’, Independent, 5 August 2011.<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/man-left-dead-and-officer-wounded-in-rushhour-shoot-ing-2332216.html>

[28] Sandra Laville, Paul Lewis, Vikram Dodd andCaroline Davies, ‘Doubts emerge over Duggan shoot-ing as London burns’, Guardian, 8 August 2011.<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/07/police-attack-london-burns>

[29] Cahal Milmo, ‘A dead man, a crucial question:should police have shot Mark Duggan?’,Independent, 9 August 2011. <http://www.independ-ent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/a-dead-man-a-crucial-question-should-police-have-shot-mark-duggan-2334133.html>

[30] ‘Update on Mark Duggan investigation includingdetails of ballistic tests’, IPCC press release, 9 August2011. <http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/update-mark-duggan-investigation-including-details-ballistic-tests>

[31] Paul Lewis and Sandra Laville, ‘Mark Duggan

death: IPCC says it inadvertently misled media’,Guardian, 12 August 2011.<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/12/mark-duggan-ipcc-misled-media>

[32] ‘Release of information in early stages of MarkDuggan investigation’, IPCC press release, 12 August2011. <http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/release-infor-mation-early-stages-mark-duggan-investigation>

[33] ‘Duggan family's “breakdown in confidence” inIPCC’, BBC News, 12 December 2011.<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-16141820>




[37] 4 Days in August: Strategic Review into theDisorder of August 2011, Metropolitan Police, March2012. Available to download at<http://content.met.police.uk/News/MPS-report-into-summer-disor-der/1400007360193/1257246745756>

[38] Simon Hattenstone, ‘David Lammy: “There is ahistory in Tottenham that involves deaths in policecustody”’, Guardian, 14 August 2011.<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/aug/14/david-lammy-tottenham-mark-duggan>

[39] ‘Update on Mark Duggan investigation includingdetails of ballistic tests’, IPCC press release, 9 August2011. <http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/update-mark-duggan-investigation-including-details-ballistic-tests>

[40] ‘IPCC statement on fatal shooting of MarkDuggan’, IPCC press release, 7 August 2011.<http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/ipcc-statement-fatal-shooting-mark-duggan>

[41] ‘Additional line on death of Mark Duggan’, IPCCpress release, 7 August 2011.<http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/additional-line-death-mark-duggan>

[42] ‘IPCC statement re story published in TheGuardian in relation to the investigation into thedeath of Mark Duggan’, IPCC press release, 19November 2011. <http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/ipcc-statement-re-story-published-guardian-relation-investigation-death-mark-duggan>

[43] ‘Clarification of recent reports regarding investiga-tion in to shooting of Mark Duggan’, IPCC pressrelease, 24 November 2011.<http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/clarification-recent-reports-regarding-investigation-shooting-mark-duggan>

IRR News 12

[44] Stafford Scott, ‘The investigation of MarkDuggan's death is tainted. I want no part in it’,Guardian, 20 November 2011. <http://www.the-guardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/20/investi-gation-mark-duggan-tainted>

[45] View image at:<http://thesocietypages.org/socimages/files/2014/01/42-500x269.jpg>

[46] Danny Shaw, ‘Mark Duggan inquest: Jury todecide on “gangster' claim”’, BBC News, 31 January2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lon-don-19960244>

[47] Transcript of the Hearing 4 December 2013.<http://dugganinquest.independent.gov.uk/tran-scripts/1667.htm>





[52] Transcript of the Hearing 14 November 2013.<http://dugganinquest.independent.gov.uk/tran-scripts/1549.htm>




[56] ‘Mark Duggan “pulled gun from waistband”’,BBC News, 20 September 2012.<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-19662526>



[59] ‘Mark Duggan family given go-ahead to chal-lenge police practices after shooting’, Guardian, 7March 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/07/mark-duggan-family-challenge-police-practice-officers-conferring-appeal>

[60] ‘Mark Duggan police shooting: Death was“karma”’, BBC News, 28 September 2012.<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-19765652>

[61] Stafford Scott, ‘The investigation of MarkDuggan's death is tainted. I want no part in it’,Guardian, 20 November 2011. <http://www.the-guardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/20/investi-gation-mark-duggan-tainted>

Related links

Justice for Mark Duggan Campaignhttp://justice4mark.com/

Inquest into the death of Mark Dugganhttp://dugganinquest.independent.gov.uk/index.htm

Azelle Rodney Inquiryhttp://azellerodneyinquiry.independent.gov.uk/

Tottenham Rightshttp://tottenhamrights.org.uk/

Betsy Barkas volunteers at the Insitute of RaceRelations.

© Insitute of Race Relations.

This article was first published online at IRR News:http://www.irr.org.uk/news/framing-the-death-of-mark-duggan/

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