irma kasri dan n. lukviarman
TRANSCRIPT
Governance and Corporate Disclosure:
A Study in Bank Muamalat Indonesia and Bank Syariah Mandiri
Irma Aulia R. Kasri Department of Accounting, Andalas University
Kampus Unand Limau Manis Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia Email: [email protected]
Niki Lukviarman Department of Accounting, Andalas University
Kampus Unand Limau Manis Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia Email: [email protected]
ABSTRACT This study analysis the governance implementation and disclosure practices in Bank Muamalat Indonesia and Bank Syariah Mandiri. The Bank Indonesia Regulation PBI No.8/4/PBI/2006 concerning the implementation of corporate governance for commercial bank and Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) Exposure Draft No. 4/2006 concerning the implementation of corporate governance in Institution Offering Financial Services are used as the indicators for compliance of regulation and practice in both bank. The result indicate that both bank already implement the corporate governance practice and have good tendency to disclose information regarding the corporate governance implementation.
Keywords: Governance, Disclosure, Islamic Bank
1. INTRODUCTION
Islamic banking is a worldwide phenomenon involving a variety of
instutitions and instrument, not one “project” or institution. Its all part of a trend
in which the financial products comply with the set of Qur’anic laws that govern
daily life, or Sharī`ah, are evolving from novelty to normal part in doing business
in much of developing world. Islamic banks were set up as an alternative to
conventional banks. Muslim depositors who believe that interest (riba) is
incongruent to their religious tenets have no choice but to resolve this conundrum
by depositing their funds into Islamic banks or banks which have services that
comply with Islamic law (Satkunasingam and Shanugam, 2004).
Islamic bank is defined as banking in consonance with the ethos and value
system of Islam and governed, in addition to the conventional good corporate
governance and risk management rules, by the principles laid down by Islamic
laws (Sharī`ah). Islamic banking, the more general term is expected not only to
avoid interest-based transaction which are prohibited in Sharī`ah, but also to
avoid unethical business practices and participate effectively in achieving the
goals and objectives of the Islamic economy.
Good governance is crucial to the ability of a business to protect the
interests of its stakeholders. In the case of an institution offering financial
products and services such as Islamic banks, the stakeholders expect that its
operation be carried out in compliance with the principles of Sharī`ah. A
corporate structure that enables such as institution to implement good governance
through Sharī`ah-compliant operations is therefore essential (Grais and Pellegrini
2006).
It is also recognized that good corporate governance reinforces sound
regulation and supervision. It contributes towards maintaining market confidence,
and strengthening transparency and accountability. Its emphasis is to be value
oriented and promote fairness and justice with respect to all stakeholders of the
banking institution. For corporate governance to work, good corporate practices
need to be instilled and embedded in all aspects of the operation and at all levels
within the organization.
Indeed, Islam strongly advocates all form of positive governance. These
values and ethical conducts have already been inbuilt and have become inherent in
the Islamic community. Islamic corporate governance serves through the
underlying principle of economic well-being of the Ummah, universal
brotherhood, justices, accountabilities and equitable distribution of income.
Therefore, while the virtues of Islam have always advocates good corporate
governance, the challenge to us lies in its application.
Closely linked to the corporate governance issue is the role of market
discipline. Transparency and disclosure are essential particularly in a rapidly
changing environment. While comprehensive and timely availability of financial
information will increase market discipline, the disclosure of information needs to
be complemented with the ability of the market players to analyze and
appropriately interpret the information. Transparency and disclosure are even
more relevant in multi-facet role played by the Islamic Financial Institutions in
dealing with Islamic banking customers. This is relevant as the Islamic financial
transactions are not merely based on lender and borrower relationship as is in the
case of conventional banking (Aziz, 2004).
With reference to principles of corporate governance and the greater need
for disclosure, the study will look broadly to the Good Corporate Governance
implementation in Islamic Bank. The study also examines the corporate disclosure
whether the Islamic Bank in Indonesia has have a good standard for general
governance and Sharī`ah governance disclosure.
The rest of the study is structured as follow. Section 2 reviews literature on
corporate governance in Islamic bank and governance disclosure. Section 3
discusses the research design of the study. Section 4 presents and discusses the
findings of the study and section 5 concludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Corporate Governance in Banking Institution
In between 1980 to 1997, over 130 countries, comprising almost three
fourths of the member countries of the International Monitory Fund (IMF) have
experienced important problems with their bank (Ciancanelli & Gonzales, 2000;
Lindgren & Garcia, 1996; Saal, 1996). The facts that this crises occurred after
implementation of far reaching reforms of the financial system revived long
standing debates in Economic and Finance on role of bank regulation (Ciancanelli
& Gonzales 2000; Mishkin 1992; McKinnon, 1993). Notably absent in the debate
is the consideration of the corporate governance of banks who recently growing
faster than before (Macey and O’hara, 2003; Caprio and Levine. 2002; Levine,
2003; Charkam, 2003).
Banks are in the unique position of effectively collecting and allowing the
use of fund in given manner or enterprises as well as engaged in the business of
financial intermediation between savers and investors. Bank is not similar with
other financial institutions, and indeed from all sectors, due to the possibility of
bank system instability leading to credit contraction for all other sectors.
Charkham (2005) wrote that “Banks are different from the generality of
companies in that their collapse affects a far wider circle of people and moreover
may undermine the financial system itself, with dire effect for the whole
economy.”
According to Levin (2003), the need for a separate analysis of the
corporate governance of bank is not self evident and requires justification. Caprio
and Levine (2002) and Levin (2003) identify three characteristic of bank. They
argue that banks are generally more opaque than other financial institution, which
fundamentally intensifies the agency problem. Although information asymmetries
plague all sectors, evidence suggests that these informational asymmetries are
larger with banks (Furfine, 2001). Second, banks are exposed to heavy regulation.
Because of the importance of banks in the economy, because of the opacity of
bank assets and activities, and because banks are a ready source of fiscal revenue,
government impose an elaborate array of regulations in banks. Third, the
widespread government ownership of banks raises specific governance issue.
Corporate governance of banks is of fundamental importance for those
who are concerned with or have the responsibility for financial regulation and for
developing market and economies. Banking supervisors have long recognized the
importance of good governance; supervision can not function properly if sound
corporate governance is not in place. The focus of it is mainly of those elements
that relate to the manner in which the business and affairs of an organization are
governed by its board and managers. This means the decision making process
within the bank, the respective responsibilities and accountabilities of the board
and managers, the control functions that provide assurance to the monitoring
processes and the structures that support all these function (Caruana, 2005).
The control function is also done through their monitoring function of
their client: evaluating the creditworthiness of new projects; monitoring of
ongoing performance of the project and the company; and assisting in
restructuring of client firm in distress. Effective monitoring requires that the bank
be independent of the borrower, and also of government pressures, so as to make
objective lending decisions. It must have sufficient access to information about
the borrower’s capabilities and performance; collateral alone is not enough. The
bank itself must also engage in good corporate governance practices, including
disclosure rules and transparency.
2.2 Corporate Governance in Islamic Bank
The Corporate Governance (CG) for Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) is
assuming growing significance with the steep growth in Islamic Finance system
both regionally and now globally. This industry has become a major source of
wealth creation and financing of investment projects world wide and cumulative
worth of its transactions are reaching a trillion dollar. IFIs provide a viable option
to savers and investors who are inclined to deal with exclusively Islamic financial
system given their religious and ideological stance (Aziz, 2006)
In the context of an Islamic bank, good corporate governance should
encompass:
• A set of organizational arrangements whereby the actions of the
management of Islamic bank are aligned, as far as possible, with the
interest of its stakeholders
• The provision of proper incentives for the organs of governance such as
board of directors, the Sharī`ah board and management, to pursue
objectives that are in the interests of the stakeholders and facilitate
effective monitoring, thereby encouraging Islamic banks to use resources
more efficiently
• Compliance with Islamic Sharī`ah rules and principles.
In place of interest-bearing deposit, Islamic bank mobilize funds through
profit-sharing and loss-bearing investment accounts whose return are, as a matter
of Sharī`ah jurisprudence (that is, that of the mudaraba concept), based on
performance of the assets portfolios in which their funds are invested. In the
majority of Islamic banks, such investment accounts contribute the preponderant
amount of funds available to the bank for investment. However, investment
account holders (IAHs) lack rights of governance such as shareholders enjoy,
although like shareholders they are (legally speaking) a type of equity holder with
residual claims to their share of the bank’s assets (Archer et al., 1998). While debt
holders, with fixed contractual claims to the firm’s cash flows and are met,
residual claimants by definition have no such contractual rights and thus require a
governance structure to protect their interest (Williamson, 1996). As Williamson
points out, the law typically provides a governance structure for debt holders in
case of default. In case of IAHs, neither the Sharī`ah nor secular law make any
such provision (Archer, 2007).
The absence of any governance structure in the case of IAHs is thus an
anomaly, and raises fundamental corporate governance issues – for example,
possible conflicts of interest between the two classes of equity holders, disclosure
of adequate information to enable IAHs to protect their interest, and so on. It also
draws attention to market discipline, which is emphasized for the first time by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in its new capital adequacy
framework (2004), and raises the issue of the extent to which IAHs have the
necessary mechanism to exercise effective discipline on the management of the
bank, given their lack of governance rights. Furthermore, the mobilization of
funds through IAHs highlights the need to examine the approach adopted by
central banks to regulate Islamic banks in order to help sustain the soundness and
stability of the financial systems in the countries in which these banks operates.
2.3 Transparency and Governance Disclosure
Transparency as well as corporate governance became a highlight issue in
Asian market following the Asian Financial crisis in 1997. Since that time, foreign
investors and regulators have become wary of corporate financial reporting in
these countries, and the OECD (2004) has obliged increased transparency, a better
framework for financial market integrity and greater accountability in the region
(Aksu & Kosedag, 2005).
A good standard of transparency and market discipline are closely
interlinked with good standards of corporate governance (Vicary, 2007).
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) define corporate transparency as the
availability of firm-specific information to outside investors and stakeholders.
Transparency is an intuitively appealing idea. It should assist investors in making
better decisions regarding their investments and therefore, result in better resource
and capital allocation. Transparency also regarded as a corporate governance
mechanisms and therefore essential for the development of emerging economies
(Leung and Morris 2005).
The expected benefits of transparency and disclosure are more important
in emerging market because they are dire need of external capital as their
economies are growing faster than that of more developed nations. Transparency
of financial information is vital components of the corporate governance
framework (OECD, 1999) and is regarded as an important indicator of corporate
governance quality (Aksu & Kosedag 2005).
Beeks and Brown (2005) find that firm with higher corporate governance
quality make more informative disclosures. Advantages of good transparency and
disclosure practices are:
1. Minimize information asymmetry in the firm and probability of fraud
2. Increase investor awareness which will reduce the uncertainty of the
returns to the capital suppliers, which again is expected to reduce the
firm’s cost of external capital and hence increase its value.
Mitigates the political cost of non-compliance and hence reduce the risk of
litigations.
In Basel Core Principle 21 also asks for better disclosure by banks and to
allow the counterparties of the banks to price and deal appropriately. More
disclosure should reduce information asymmetry between those with privileged
information and outside small investors, and facilitate more efficient monitoring,
because sufficient information is necessary for market participants to exert
effective disciplinary roles (Huang, 2007).
2.3.1 General Governance Disclosure
The implementation of corporate governance in Indonesia is supervised by
central bank (Bank Indonesia). Bank Indonesia has issued some policies to
support the regulations related to bank operational and corporate governance.
Bank Indonesia has its own division for Islamic Banking that supports the
implementation of Sharī`ah governance in Islamic bank in Indonesia should
follow the regulations and policies that set by Islamic Financial Service Board
(IFSB).
As a banking regulator and banking supervisor in Indonesia, Bank
Indonesia found that there is increasing risk complexity faced by banks demands
an increased need for good corporate governance practice by banks. Whereas in
order to improve Bank performance, protect stakeholders’ interests and increase
compliance to prevailing regulations and general code of conduct in the banking
industry, good corporate governance implementation is considered necessary.
Improvement in the quality of good corporate governance implementation is
among the efforts to strengthen the internal condition of national banks pursuant
to the Indonesian Banking Architecture (IBA). Based on considerations above,
Bank Indonesia has issued Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) Number
8/4/PBI/2006 concerning good corporate governance implementation by
Commercial Bank, include Sharī`ah based Bank.
This regulation should be followed by Commercial Bank as referred to in
Act Number 7 Year 1992 concerning Banking as amended by Act Number 10
Year 1998, including branch offices of foreign banks. It’s stated that Good
Corporate Governance shall be Bank governing procedures through the
application of transparency, accountability, responsibility, Independency, and
fairness principles. And its focus to give information for the stakeholders includes
all parties having direct or indirect interests in Bank business activities. This
implementation of corporate governance in this study will refer to this regulation.
2.3.2 Sharī`ah Governance Disclosure
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) was launched in 2002 by a
consortium of central banks and the Islamic Development Bank (with the support
of IMF) with the mandate including the provision of prudential standards and
guideline for international application by banking supervisors in the supervision
of Islamic banks.
In December 2006 the IFSB issued two prudential standards for Islamic
banks that are designed to help supervisors of such banks meet the challenge of
implementing Basel II, one on guiding principles on corporate governance for
institution offering only Islamic financial services and an Exposure draft for
disclosures to promote transparency and market discipline for institution offering
Islamic financial services.
Guiding principles on corporate governance designed to facilitate IIFS in
identifying areas where appropriate governance structures and processes are
required, and to recommend best practices in addressing these issues. The Guiding
Principles are divided into four parts: (i) general governance approach of IIFS; (ii)
rights of investment account holders (IAH); (iii) compliance with Sharī`ah rules
and principles; and (iv) transparency of financial reporting in respect of
investment accounts.
General Governance Approach of IIFS shall establish a comprehensive
governance policy framework which sets out the strategic roles and functions of
each organ of governance and mechanisms for balancing the IIFS’s
accountabilities to various stakeholders. IIFS shall ensure that the reporting of
their financial and non-financial information meets the requirements of
internationally recognized accounting standards which are in compliance with
Sharī`ah rules and principles and are applicable to the Islamic financial services
industry as recognized by the supervisory authorities of the country.
There are two principles related to IAH in this guide. First, IIFS shall
acknowledge IAHs’ right to monitor the performance of their investments and the
associated risks, and put into place adequate means to ensure that these rights are
observed and exercised. Second, IIFS shall adopt a sound investment strategy
which is appropriately aligned to the risk and return expectations of IAH (bearing
in mind the distinction between restricted and unrestricted IAH), and be
transparent in smoothing any returns.
IIFS shall have in place an appropriate mechanism for obtaining rulings
from Sharī`ah scholars, applying fatāwā and monitoring Sharī`ah compliance in
all aspects of their products, operations and activities. IIFS shall comply with the
Sharī`ah rules and principles as expressed in the rulings of the IIFS’s Sharī`ah
scholars. The IIFS shall make these rulings available to the public. It’s a part of
the compliance of corporate governance with Islamic Sharī`ah rules and
principles. Transparency of financial reporting in respect of investment accounts
for IIFS shall make adequate and timely disclosure to IAH and the public of
material and relevant information on the investment accounts that they manage.
The exposure draft states that disclosure of general and Sharī`ah
governance are designed to provide information on the structure, processes and
functioning of such governance in an IIFS to ensure transparency regarding
Sharī`ah compliance by IIFS (Appendix 4.B). Such disclosure shall include the
rights of IAH compliance with Sharī`ah rules and principles, and transparency of
financial reporting in respect of investment account.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
This study is qualitative in its form. It is a descriptive study which
emphasized more on estimating rather that testing. There are two general reasons
why the writer chooses the descriptive study, namely (1) to provide information
regarding this issue and (2) to identify areas for further research since the
application of the regulation will start being implemented on 2007.
In this study, the writer investigates Islamic Commercial Banks that have
already published their annual report to the public. The banks chosen for this
study are required to have a published annual report where the implementation of
corporate governance is being mentioned. The population of the research is the
Islamic Commercial Banks in Indonesia that have already implemented the
corporate governance principles since 2002. To answer research questions of this
study, the writer takes two banks as sample: Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI) and
Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM). The principles of this study are Bank Indonesia
Regulation No. 8/4/2006 concerning Good Corporate Governance Implementation
by Commercial Bank and IFSB Standard concerning General Governance and
Sharī`ah Governance Disclosure.
3.1 Variable Identification and Measurement
This study analyzes the implementation of corporate governance in two
Islamic banks in Indonesia i.e. BMI and BSM and the banks’ governance
disclosure practices. The analysis of the implementation is based on the corporate
governance implementation list in Bank Indonesia Regulation Number
8/4/PBI/2006 concerning Corporate Governance Implementation by Commercial
Bank. Independent variable in this study is governance disclosure practices. It is
analyzed by using the disclosure indicators from Bank Indonesia regulation and
the indicators used by the Islamic Financial Services Board for Sharī`ah
governance disclosure.
Based on appendix 4.A disclosure of the issues above are examine:
A. Share ownership
1. Whether Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors have share
ownership at the bank and other banks and companies domiciled
domestically and abroad
2. Whether Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors have financial
relationship and family relationship with other members of the Board of
Commissioners, members of the Board of Directors and /or Bank
Shareholders.
B. Remuneration Package
3. Procedure of remuneration package/policy and other facilities for the Board
of Commissioners and the Board of Directors
C. Share Option
4. The share option owned by Commissioners, the Board of Directors, and
Executive Officers
D. Ratio of Highest Salary to the Lowest Salary
5. The ratio of highest salary to the lowest salary
E. Frequency of Board of Commissioners Meeting
6. Whether the Board of Commissioner have held meeting at least 4 (four)
times a year
7. Whether Board of Commissioners physical meeting attended by all
members of the Board of Commissioners no less than 2 (two) times a year.
F. Internal Fraud
8. Number of internal fraud and Bank’s efforts to handle them
G. Legal Problem
9. Number of legal problems and Bank’s settlement efforts
H. Conflict of Interest
10. Transactions containing conflict of interest
I. Buy Back Share/Bond
11. Buy back of Bank shares and /or bonds
J. Provision of Fund for Social Activities
12. Provision of funds for social activities and political activities, stating both
the nominal value and the recipients
This study also examines disclosure of Sharī`ah compliance in Islamic
Bank (Appendix 4.B):
A. Qualitative Disclosure
1. Governance Arrangements, System and Control Employed to Ensure
Sharī`ah Compliance
2. Non- Sharī`ah Compliance Earning and Expenditure Occur
B. Quantitative Disclosure
3. The Nature, Size and Number of Violations of Sharī`ah Compliance
4. Annual Zakat Contribution
5. Remuneration of Sharī`ah Board Members
4. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Bank Overview
4.1.1 Bank Muamalat Indonesia
PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk (BMI) was established in 1991,
endorsed by the Indonesian Council of Ulamas (MUI) and the Government of
Indonesia, and commenced operations in May 1992. On October 27, 1994, barely
two years from its founding date, Bank Muamalat Indonesia received its license to
operate as a Foreign Exchange Bank. This recognition strengthened the Bank’s
position as the first and leading Sharī`ah (Islamic) bank in Indonesia with a
growing array of products and services. The vision of BMI is to become the
premier Sharī`ah bank in Indonesia, dominant in the spiritual market, admired in
the rational market. Moreover, the mission is to become a role model among the
world’s Sharī`ah financial institutions, emphasizing in entrepreneurial spirit,
managerial excellence, and innovative investment orientation to maximize value
to stakeholders (BMI, 2007)
4.1.2 Bank Syariah Mandiri
PT Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM) was established as PT Bank Susila Bakti
on August 10th 1973. Due to the changes of Government regulation No. 1 year
1995 concerning the limited company (PT), the basic regulation of the bank has
reviewed. In 1999, the bank agreed to change their operational from conventional
bank into Sharī`ah based and followed with the change of the bank name into PT
Bank Syariah Mandiri. The vision of BSM is to be a reliable Sharī`ah bank
chosen by the partners.
In 2002, BSM established Bangun Sejahtera Mitra Ummat foundation
(BSM Ummat) which controlling the Lembaga Amil Zakat (LAZ). BSM Ummat
is established as the bank’s commitment to have good zakat, infaq and shadaqah
management. It is also a part of the bank’s corporate responsibilities. The bank
has given the collectable zakat to the LAZ division, so bank is do managing zakat,
infaq and shadaqah and qardhul hasan function indirectly.
4.2 Governance Standard in Islamic Bank
Understanding of governance standard is important in implementing the
good corporate governance in an institution. Islamic bank as part of Islamic
financial institution has separated governance standard to ensure the compliance
of corporate governance implementation with the Sharī`ah rules and principles.
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institution
(AAOIFI) has been stated the Governance Standard for Islamic Financial
Institution (GSIFI) in 1999. The standard classified into 3 (three); first, GSIFI
No.1 concerning Sharī`ah Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and
Report. Second, GSIFI No. 2 concerning the Sharī`ah Review; and third, GSIFI
No. 3 concerning Internal Sharī`ah Review.
A Sharī`ah Supervisory Board (SSB) as stated in GSIFI No. 1 is the organ
of governance for ensuring compliance of the Islamic Financial institution in all
its dealings and transaction with Islamic Sharī`ah Rules and Principles. It is an
independent body that specialised jurist in fiqh almua’amalat (Islamic commercial
jurisprudence) who entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing, and
supervising the activities of the Islamic Financial institution. Every Islamic
financial institution, including Islamic Bank, shall have a Sharī`ah Supervisory
Board to be appointed by shareholders in their annual general meeting upon the
recommendation of the board of directors taking into consideration the local
legislation and regulation. Shareholders also may authorise the board of directors
to fix the remuneration of the SSB.
The Sharī`ah Supervisory Board shall consist of at least three members
who expertise in business, economics, law, accounting and/or other. The SSB
should not include directors or significant shareholders of the Islamic financial
institution. The SSB should give a report to explain the confirmation that Sharī`ah
Supervisory Board has performed appropriate test, procedures and review work as
appropriate. The SSB should also state whether the example Islamic Financial
Institution’s contracts and related documentation are in compliance with the
Islamic Sharī`ah Rules and Principles. This report shall be published in the annual
report of Islamic Financial Institution.
Governance Standard for Islamic Financial Institution (GSIFI) No. 2 is
the standard and guideline that purpose to assist SSB of Islamic Financial
Institution (IFI) in performing the Sharī`ah review to ensure compliance with
Islamic Sharī`ah Rules and Principles as reflected in the fatwas, ruling and
guideline issued by IFI. Sharī`ah review is an examination of the extent of an
IFI’s compliance, in all its activities, with the Sharī`ah. This examination includes
contracts, agreements, policies, products, transactions, memorandum and articles
of association, financial statement, report (especially internal audit and central
bank inspection), circulars, etc. The SSB shall have complete and unhindered
access to all records, transactions, and information from all sources including
professional advisers and the IFI employees.
The procedure of Sharī`ah review are planning review procedures;
executing review procedures and preparation and review of working papers; and
documenting conclusion and report. The SSB shall implement adequate quality
control policies and procedures to ensure that the review is conducted in
accordance with this standard. The report to shareholder shall be based on GSIFI
No. 1.
The purpose of GSIFI No. 3 is to establish standard and provide guideline
on the internal Sharī`ah review in institutions which conduct business in
conformity with Islamic Sharī`ah rules and principles. The standard covers the
objectives, internal Sharī`ah review, independence and objectivity, professional
proficiency, scope of work, performance of the internal Sharī`ah review work,
management of the internal Sharī`ah review, quality assurance and elements of an
effective internal Sharī`ah review control system. The standard also covers
responsibility for its implementation.
The internal Sharī`ah reviewers shall plan each internal Sharī`ah reviews
assignment. They shall collect, analyse, interpret and document information to
support their internal Sharī`ah review result. The head of internal Sharī`ah review
shall discuss conclusions and recommendations with appropriate levels of
management before issuing final written report. On completion of internal
Sharī`ah review, at least a quarterly written report addressed to the board of
directors and copied to the SSB and management.
The internal Sharī`ah reviewers shall follow up to ascertain that
appropriate action is taken on their reported internal Sharī`ah review findings. In
addition any other recommendations relating to Sharī`ah shall also be followed
up. The management is responsible for rectification of non-compliance,
prevention of non-recurrence of no-compliance and ensuring that the agreed upon
action were carried out including their timing and extent follow up
These governance standard should applied in all Islamic financial
institution including Islamic bank to ensure the compliance with the Sharī`ah
rules and principles. The implementation of corporate governance itself is depend
on the country regulation, in this study the implementation is based on the Bank
Indonesia regulation which will discuss in next section. Also by knowing the
governance standard of Islamic financial institution, the study will examine the
importance of disclosure in Islamic bank.
4.3 Identification of Corporate Governance Implementation in Islamic Bank
A bank with Sharī`ah basis has an obligation to follow the Bank Indonesia
regulation as the regulator including the regulation Number 8/4/PBI/2006
concerning the Good Corporate Governance Implementation by Commercial
Bank. Both Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI) and Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM)
have been implemented the corporate governance since 2002.
BSM has started the commitment to implement the good corporate
governance to their majority shareholder based on the guideline issued by the
Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI). Following the industry
regulation, on March 2004 BSM adopted the guideline issued by Komite Nasional
Corporate Governance concerning the guideline of Corporate Governance for
Indonesian Banking Industry (Indonesia Banking Sector Code). With the new
regulation from Bank Indonesia, Number 8/4/PBI/2004, BSM has to complete the
entire requirement needed before the end of year 2007.
BMI started the implementation of Good Corporate Governance in 2002.
In 2003, the bank implemented some policies for risk management as a part of
corporate governance in BMI. The risk management practices followed include
financing risk, market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk, reputation,
strategic and compliance management. To support the implementation process,
Management Risk division of BMI created the Code of Conduct to serve as
guidance for all the bank’s personnel on how to interact with consumer, business
partner and vendors. The code of conduct clearly states that all of its employees
are not allowed to receive gifts from customers or other parties since that would
be considered as conflict of interest. The code of conduct also includes guidance
on the prevention of misuse of authority and information.
Furthermore, the BMI established the Corporate Governance Principles
which represent regulations, principles and policies that should be complied with
by all the bank’s employees, to maintain responsibility and un-deviated work, and
at the same time motivate the employees to perform effectively and efficiently, to
produce continuous economic value for the stockholders and stakeholders using
the guidelines of justice, principles, transparency, accountability and
responsibility. To strengthen the implementation of corporate governance, BMI
also follow the Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 8/4/PBI/2006 concerning the
implementation of corporate governance for commercial bank.
4.4 Analysis of Corporate Governance Implementation in Islamic Bank in
Indonesia
According to article 2 of Bank Indonesia Regulation PBI No.
8/4/PBI/2006, the implementation corporate governance principles must at least
be realized in seven items. The items are:
a. Implementation of tasks and responsibilities by the Board of Commissioners
and the Board of Directors;
b. Completeness and implementation of the tasks of committees and the work
unit performing bank internal audit function;
c. Performance of compliance, internal auditor and external auditor functions;
d. Risk management implementation, including the internal control system;
e. Provision of funds to related parties and provision of funds in large amount
(large exposures);
f. Strategic plan of the Bank;
g. Transparency in Bank financial and non financial conditions.
Table 4.1 Governance implementation of both banks
Bank
BMI BSM Note
Board of Commissioner and
Board of Director V V
Internal Audit Committee V V
External Audit V V
Risk Management
Implementation V V
Large Exposure V V
Bank Strategic Plan V V
Bank Financial Transparency V V
Report and Self Assessment
X V
Report
obligation is
for the end
of 2007
4.5 Governance Disclosure in Islamic Bank in Indonesia
4.5.1 General Governance Disclosure
The disclosure of corporate governance implementation is a main issue in
corporate governance report. As mentioned earlier in previous section regarding to
report and self assessment of corporate governance implementation in bank, the
governance disclosure could be the right measurement. The measurement for this
study is the completeness of bank disclosure practices with the requirements
obligated by the Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 8/4/PBI/2006. This study
classifies it as general governance disclosure.
Table 4.2 General Governance Disclosure
Disclosure of
General Governance
BMI BSM
Board of Commissioners V V Share
Ownership Board of Directors V V
Board of Commissioners V V Remuneration
Package Board of Directors V V
Board of Commissioners X V
Board of Directors X V
Share Option
Executives Officers X V
Ratio of Salary Ratio of Highest to Lowest Salary X V
Periodically Meeting X X Board of
Commissioner
Meeting
Physical Meeting attended by all
members
X X
Internal Fraud Number of Internal Fraud X V
Legal Problem Number of Legal Problem X X
Conflict of
Interest
Transaction Containing Conflict of
Interest
X V
Buy Back
Share/Bond
Buy back of Bank shares and /or
bonds
V V
Provision of funds for social
activities
V V Provision of
Fund for Social
Activities Provision of funds for political
activities
V V
4.5.2 Sharī`ah Governance Disclosures in Islamic Bank
Disclosures of Sharī`ah governance are designed to provide information
on the structure, processes and functioning of such governance in an Islamic bank.
An important objective of these disclosures is to ensure transparency regarding
Sharī`ah compliance by IIFS.
Table 4.3 Sharī`ah Governance Disclosure
Disclosure of
Sharī`ah Governance
BMI BSM
Governance Arrangements, System
and Controls Employed to Ensure
Sharī`ah Compliance
X X Qualitative
Disclosure
Non- Sharī`ah Compliance Earning
and Expenditure Occur
X X
The Nature, Size and Number of
Violations of Sharī`ah Compliance
X X
Annual Zakat Contribution V V
Quantitative
Disclosure
Remuneration of Sharī`ah Board
Members
V V
Based on data in table 4.1, the BSM has implemented all of the principles
stated in Bank Indonesia regulation No. 8/4/PBI/2006. The table also shows that
the BMI has no report and self assessment yet. It might be because when the time
this study is taken, the BMI still on progress in making it since according to
regulation all bank should implement it for 2007 year report.
General governance disclosure of both banks, in table 4.2, shows the BMI
only disclose 43.75 % where the BSM has disclose 81.25 % of all the item need to
be disclosed based on Bank Indonesia regulation No.8/4/PBI/2006. For Sharī`ah
governance disclosure, either BMI or BSM only disclose 40 % from the total item.
So, this study find that the BSM has better implementation and disclosure
practices of their corporate governance and its compliance with Sharī`ah principle
rather than the BMI.
5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Conclusion
This study comes with the purposes to identify the governance standard in
Islamic bank, to analyze the corporate governance implementation, to identify the
role of disclosure and the governance disclosure in Islamic bank. The governance
disclosure is stress to the indicator provided by the Bank Indonesia regulation No.
8/4/PBI/2006 concerning the implementation of corporate governance in
commercial bank and Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB) Exposure Draft No.
4 concerning the disclosure to promote transparency and market discipline for
institution offering financial services
The result indicates both banks in this study, Bank Muamalat Indonesia
and Bank Syariah Mandiri, have already implemented the corporate governance
practices. The implementation process is mainly stated in their annual report. Both
banks have shown a good tendency to disclose information regarding the
corporate governance implementation. It shows in governance disclosure check
box. As the bank operates based on Sharī`ah, the result shows that bank has fulfil
the Sharī`ah principle requires in this research.
5.2 Recommendation
Further studies can be conducted by increase the number of samples and
add the disclosure indicators such as from the financial aspect. The in-depth
analysis, from the first report of corporate governance implementation based on
Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 8/4/PBI/2006 to recent regulations will complete
the research of this study. Thus, further research findings are expected to support
current research findings and can contribute to the governance practices in
Indonesia.
5.3 Limitation of Study
This study found some limitation. They are:
1. Data limitation because this study examines the new regulation that started
to be implemented in 2007 and not all Islamic banks have already had the
report for the focus problem of this study
2. This study uses only two commercial Islamic banks, therefore it can not
stand as the generalization of the Islamic banking condition in Indonesia
3. This study has found limited reference regarding to Islamic banking
research in Indonesia and the governance disclosure literature.
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Appendix 4.A
Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 8/4/PBI/2006
Concerning Good Corporate Governance Implementation by Commercial
Bank
Article 2
(1) Each bank must implement Good Corporate Governance principles in any of
its business activity on all organizational levels or hierarchy of the. (2) Implementation of Good Corporate Governance principles as referred to in
Paragraph (1) must at least be realized in:
a. Implementation of tasks and responsibilities by the Board of Commissioners
and the Board of Directors;
b. Completeness and implementation of the tasks of committees and the work
unit performing bank internal audit function;
c. Performance of compliance, internal auditor and external auditor functions;
d. Risk management implementation, including the internal control system;
e. Provision of funds to related parties and provision of funds in large amount
(large exposures);
f. Strategic plan of the Bank;
g. Transparency in Bank financial and non financial conditions.
Every end of book year, starting for year 2007, each bank should prepare the
implementation report and result of self assessment on Bank Corporate
Governance Implementation.
Exclude the contents stated in article 2, PBI No. 8/4/PBI/2006 also arrange
bank to disclose all the following corporate governance aspects:
1. Share ownership by members of the Board of Commissioners and financial
relationship and family relationship among members of the Board of
Commissioners with other members of the Board of Commissioners, members
of the Board of Directors and /or Bank’s Shareholders. Members of the Board
of Commissioners must disclose:
a. Share ownership at the bank and other banks and companies domiciled
domestically and abroad;
b. Financial relationship and family relationship with other members of the
Board of Commissioners, members of the Board of Directors and /or
Bank Shareholders.
2. Share ownership by members of the Board of Directors and financial
relationship and family relationship among members of the Board of Directors
and members of the Board of Commissioners, other members of the Board of
Directors, and /or Bank Shareholders. Members of the Board of Directors
must disclose:
a. Share ownership at the bank and other banks and companies domiciled
domestically and abroad;
b. Financial relationship and family relationship with members of the
Board of Commissioners, other members of the Board of Directors and
/or Bank Shareholders, in the Good Corporate Governance
implementation report
3. Remuneration package/policy and other facilities for the Board of
Commissioners and the Board of Directors;
4. Share options owned by Commissioners, the Board of Directors, and Executive
Officers;
5. Ratio of the highest salary to the lowest salary;
6. Frequency of Board of Commissioners meetings as referred to in
a. Board of Commissioners meeting must be held periodically at least 4
(four) times a year.
b. Board of Commissioners meeting must be physically attended by all
members of the Board of Commissioners no less than 2 (two) times a
year.
7. Number of internal fraud and Bank’s efforts to handle them;
8. Number of legal problems and Bank’s settlement efforts;
9. Transactions containing conflict of interest;
10. Buy back of Bank shares and /or bonds; and
11. Provision of funds for social activities and political activities, stating both the
nominal value and the recipients.
Appendix 4.B
Exposure Draft No. 4
Disclosures to Promote Transparency and Market Discipline for Institution
Offering Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic Insurance Institution
and Islamic Mutual Funds)
Section 6 General Governance and Sharī`ah Governance Disclosure
67. Disclosures of general and Sharī`ah governance are designed to provide
information on the structure, processes and functioning of such governance in
an IIFS. An important objective of these disclosures is to ensure transparency
regarding Sharī`ah compliance by IIFS.
68. International standards, codes and best practices of corporate governance, such
as Principles of Corporate Governance by the OECD, Enhancing Corporate
Governance for Banking Organisations by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, and the AAOIFI’s governance standards, are congruent with
these aims and, where relevant, are complementary in terms of guidance for
appropriate disclosures.
69. The IFSB’s Corporate Governance Standard deals with four areas: general
governance; rights of IAH; compliance with Islamic Sharī`ah rules and
principles; and transparency of financial reporting in respect of investment
accounts.
70. Various corporate and Sharī`ah governance practices are adopted by different
IIFS in different countries. In particular, some countries have a national
Sharī`ah authority that issues or approves the applicable fatawa, while in other
countries, each IIFS has a Sharī`ah board which issues the applicable fatawa
for that IIFS.
71. An IIFS shall make disclosures of the structure, processes and functioning of
its general and Sharī`ah governance. Such disclosures shall include the rights
of IAH, compliance with Islamic Sharī`ah rules and principles, and
transparency of financial reporting in respect of investment accounts.
Table 16: General Governance Disclosure
1 Disclosure of any departure from complying with the
applicable financial reporting standard
2 Disclosure of the IIF’s corporate governance
arrangements and practices, including whether the IIFS
complies in full with the IFSB’s Corporate Governance
Standard, and if it does not so comply, an explanation of
any non-compliance.
3 Disclosure of any related party transaction and treatment
of material evens by the IIFS.
4 Disclosure of any investors/consumer education programs
for information on new products and services.
5 Information on mediation and advice bureaus for
investors and customers set up by the IIDS, including
clearly written procedures for lodging of complaints.
Qualitative
Disclosure
6 Disclosure of social functions and charitable contributions
of the IIFS, such as sadaqah, qard, etc.
Table 17 Sharī`ah Governance Disclosures Qualitative
Disclosure
1 A statement on the governance arrangements, systems
and controls employed by the IIFS to ensure Sharī`ah
compliance and on how these meet applicable national or
international standards, an explanation of the reasons for
non-compliance. In countries where national guideline
Sharī`ah governance in IIFS exist, and the related
governance requirements of the IIFSB’s Corporate
Governance Standard are followed, a statement of
compliance with these standard (and reasons for any non-
compliance) shall be provided.
2 Disclosure of how non-Sharī`ah-compliant earnings and
expenditure occur and the manner in which they are
disposed of.
3 Disclosure of the nature, size and number of violations of
Sharī`ah compliance during the year.
4 Disclosure of annual zakat contributions of the IIFS,
where relevant, according to constitution, general
assembly or national requirements
Quantitative
Disclosure
5 Remuneration of Sharī`ah board members, if applicable.