iraq: empowering citizens, engaging governments, rebuilding communities series
TRANSCRIPT
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CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY STABILIZATION
International Relief & Development
in Iraq
20032009
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Copyright by International Relie & Development (IRD) 2012
All rights reserved.
The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reect the views o the US Agency or International
Development or o the US government.
IRD is a nonproft humanitarian, stabilization, and development organization whose mission is to reduce the
suering o the worlds most vulnerable groups and provide the tools and resources needed to increase their
sel-sufciency.
Design, editing, and production by Communications Development Incorporated, Washington, DC, and Peter
Grundy Art & Design, London, UK.
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Contents
Foreword v
Overview 1
Chapter 1 Building community trust 6
ICAP: The frst step to rebuilding civil society 8
Establishing services, assisting civilians, creating jobs 13
Insecurity: Operational limitations in an unstable environment 16
Chapter 2 A complete stabilization package 22CSP origins: A new approach or international development 23
Breaking down CSPs design 26
The complete package: Programmatic and military integration 28
Chapter 3 Successes and setbacks 34
Community inrastructure and essential services: CSPs entry point 35
Business development programs: Light at the end o the tunnel 40
Vocational training: A sustainable program when we let 44
Youth activities: Dierent rom everything else 49
Chapter 4 Converting roadblocks into a roadmap 54CSPs three-year lie cycle as a orce multiplier 56
Strategic recommendations or uture COIN programs 58
Epilogue 66
Acronyms 68
Notes 69
Boxes
1 ICAP: Program and results 9
2 Awni Quandour: IRDs original elder statesman 11
3 The evolution o ICAP, USAIDs longest-running program in Iraq 20
4 CSP: At a glance 25
5 CSP: Project development process 29
6 CSP: Results 36
7 Enhancing internal controls and program oversight 41
8 CSP and the changing perception o sustainability 46
9 Stabilization in Iraq: 20 tactical lessons 63
Figure
1 Sel-sustaining project work cycle 31
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In memory o Awni Quandour, whose
relationships with local communities in
Iraq were invaluable to making IRDs
programs work, and who was instrumental
in establishing IRDs presence in the
Middle East. His legacy lives on through the
organizational strategy he helped crat.
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Foreword
Recent civil stabilization successes can be traced to
eorts launched in the Balkans in the 1990s. There,
civil society groups became critical partners in sus-
taining and strengthening the peace. The community-
based model employed in that region is now being
applied in other conict and postconict zones,
including West Arica, Iraq, and Aghanistan.
A airly new development is that NGOs now cooperate
and coordinate directly with US and international secu-
rity orces, along with bilateral and multilateral donor
agencies. In places like Iraq and Aghanistan, the
coordination has been so close that the NGOs work
has been viewed as examples o eective counterin-
surgency. As military and civilian leaders have pointed
out, civilian agencies are best equipped to understand
and work directly with local communities, and they are
generally better received by local governments and
populations. While some development organizations
say civ-mil partnerships would compromise their
neutrality, benefciaries recognize the consistency o
such partnerships with the NGO communitys mission
to assist the worlds vulnerable populationseven
those caught in armed conict.
This publication explores the Community Stabilization
Program (CSP) in Iraq, a successul civ-mil partner-
ship. This cooperative agreement between USAID and
IRD initially unded stabilization activities in Baghdad
and then expanded nationwide. At the height o the
program, IRD had 1,800 sta (more than 90 percent
local employees) in 15 cities and was implementing
$21 million a month in programming. Where CSP went,
multiple USAID audits, military, and USAID experts say
that stability tended to ollow.
CSP relied on more than civ-mil partnership, however.
The program also built on the experience IRD gained
rom its Community Revitalization through Democratic
Action (CRDA) program in the Balkans. IRD applied
lessons about mobilizing war-weary populations to
reestablish sel-governance, community organization,
and democratic principles. CSP benefted rom IRDs
on-the-ground presence and record o success in Iraq,
as well as the earned trust o local communities. The
program supported basic training on principles o
governance, promoted civil society institutions, and
instituted a rapid participatory appraisal process to
get projects moving quickly. With this capacity devel-
opment, Iraqi community groups developed action
plans and implemented them in coordination with the
military and local provincial reconstruction teams as
well as local ministry ofcialshelping legitimize the
government and establish lines o trust and communi-
cation between leaders and citizens.
This publication oers an unvarnished examina-
tion o CSP and its precursor program in Iraqthe
approaches, challenges, results, and impacts. The
story is told in the voice o the many people who
implemented it as well as by the benefciaries who
appreciated its contributions to improving security,
government services, and the quality o lie in conict-
aected areas. In my view CSP provides evidence
to support the assertion that social and economic
development does help sustain peace and stability.
Dr. Arthur B. Keys Jr.
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General David Petraeus, commander o the International Security
Assistance Force, and IRD staers meet with members o the Ramadi
Womens Center
Overview
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Stabilization and reconstruction missions occur in a rangeo circumstancessometimes in hostile security environ-ments, sometimes in permissive ones, and sometimes inenvironments somewhere in between. The mission to stabilize
and reconstruct a nation is one that civilians must lead. John Negroponte
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
and subsequent US military operations in Aghanistan
and Iraq, traditional relie and development programs,
historically the province o a small group o civilian
and voluntary agencies, expanded dramatically in
scale and scope, touching nearly every government
department, including the US military. Whereas the
primary ocus o assistance operations generally had
been centered on providing humanitarian aid, rebuild-
ing services, and enhancing civil society, the evolving
eorts reached beyond basic relie measures, aiming
to stabilize and rebuild populations during a period o
conict and, in some instances, while military opera-
tions were ongoing.
At the same time that the US government was expand-
ing into stabilization operations, American military
leadership, inormed by the ongoing wars in Iraq and
Aghanistan, was recognizing its own needand current
structural limitationsin these areas. In 2006, the US
Army and Marine Corps released a new feld manual
covering counterinsurgency operations, the frst time
in more than two decades that either had addressed
counterinsurgency (COIN) exclusively in a manual. The
primary purpose o the document was to lay out a
blueprint or the militarys approach to a more contem-
porary orm o warare, an approach that General David
Petraeus, one o the manuals chie authors, recognized
as inextricably tied to nonmilitary resources.
A counterinsurgency campaign, Petraeus wrote,
requires soldiers and marines to employ a mix o
amiliar combat tasks and skills more oten associ-
ated with nonmilitary agencies and to be prepared
or extensive coordination and cooperation with many
intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agen-
cies. The second chapter o the manual is devoted
to integrating civilian and military activities, beginning
with a kind o acquiescence to the limits o industrial
might in unstable environments. Military eorts are
necessary to fght insurgents, the manual states, but
they are only eective when integrated into a larger
strategy intended to meet the needs o the local
population and win community support.
Testiying beore Congress in 2008, John Negroponte,
the US ambassador to Iraq (200405), noted there
had been 17 signifcant stabilization and reconstruc-
tion missions over the preceding 20 years in which
too much o the eort was borne by our men and
women in uniorm. Negroponte was lobbying or
State Department unding or what would become
the Civilian Response Corps, but the message was
cleardespite greater need, neither the military
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2
What made CSP stand out was the
close cooperation between the US
military and USAIDs implementing
partner, IRDa collaboration at both
the strategic and operational levels
nor the government had the necessary knowledge
or capacity in conict development and stabilization
methods to carry out an expanded civilian-military
partnership. Our civilian-military partnership is strong,
benefcial, and appropriate, he said. But, he added,
the mission to stabilize and reconstruct a nation is
one that civilians must lead.
Civ-mil cooperation: A new way orward
With the military actively involved in trying to win
hearts and minds in conict zones, civilian agencies,
such as the US Agency or International Development
(USAID), were coordinating among themselves and
with the military at unprecedented levels to push the
new approach orward. That intersection o overlapping
concerns is the centerpiece o civ-mil partnerships.
One o the largest and most important examples
o this new type o partnership was the Community
Stabilization Program (CSP) in Iraq, a sweeping $644
million initiative awarded to International Relie &
Development (IRD) and designed to support quick-
impact projects, a nonlethal counterinsurgency
program that reduces the incentives or participation
in violent conict by employing or engaging at-risk
youth between the ages o 17 and 35, according to
the agreement language.
CSP was a landmark investment in both time and
resources. Not only did it mark USAIDs frst large-
scale commitment to a stabilization program in an
active conict zone, it was also the largest USAID-
unded cooperative agreement ever to date. The
scale o this was unusual, said Jeanne Pryor, USAIDs
deputy director o Iraq reconstruction, at a 2009 US
Institute o Peace symposium on CSP. Pryor noted that
the amount o money devoted to CSP was otentimes
appropriated or an entire continent, let alone one
program in three years.
Aside rom the unding, what made CSP stand out was
the close cooperation between the US military and
USAIDs implementing partner, IRDa collaboration at
both the strategic and operational levels that helped
bring economic development and community stabiliza-
tion in a conict environment squarely within the US
governments COIN strategy. Unlike traditional relie
and development programs where security may be one
o many equally important actors, CSP operations
depended wholly on some level o security to succeed.
Collaborative decisionmaking among the many parties
involved was crucial. Provincial reconstruction teams
(PRTs) and local government entities oten generated
ideas that then became CSP projects, such as a
un-run sporting event or youth or the reconstruction
o the Abu Ghraib Old Market in Baghdad, but that
collaboration relied on a secure operating environ-
ment. In most situations, though, once the military
had cleared an area in a city and secured its relative
saety, CSP projects would begin immediate imple-
mentation by rebuilding the communitys physical and
economic inrastructure.
In short, CSP provided the fnal component o the mili-
tarys clear-hold-build strategy. That very popular
phrase, that was the sort o concept that drove
the interrelationship between the military and what
ollowed, said James Kunder, a ormer senior ofcial
with USAID and now an advisor to IRD. The CSP
program kind o wove in through the hold and build
phases. It was part o the hold, that people would
have something to do and wouldnt start fring at the
orces that were trying to maintain security. But also,
it could be the beginning o a longer term development
program that might actually change the place.
CSP launched in Baghdad, but ater only six months
its early success led to a rapid rollout in other cities
across Iraq, 15 in all. With the program quickly under
way, CSP began ocusing on Iraqi communities with
the specifc purpose o helping the military stabilize
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Through its ICAP work, IRD had an
established base o operations in
Baghdad and an important logistical
springboard or launching the much
larger and more complex CSP
them. IRDs rapid response or relie and reconstruc-
tion work, in both kinetic and nonkinetic environments
and oten alongside military personnel, exemplifed the
changing ace o development and the role o nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs).
Earning local trust
IRD was able to launch and expand CSP quickly
because it had been operating in Baghdad or three
years implementing the Iraq Community Action
Program (ICAP). By going into some o Baghdads most
dangerous and at-risk neighborhoods when no other
relie agencies were around, IRD began to gain local
avor as it assisted a war-weary population to rebuild
civil society.
ICAP began operations in May 2003, as a way to mobi-
lize Iraqi communities ater decades o repression and
to help communities identiy, prioritize, and address
their most pressing civic needs. Projects ocused on
rebuilding economic and social inrastructure, boost-
ing business development, and providing assistance
to civilian victims o war. Most important, the projects
werent decreed by IRD, but decided in conjunction
with locally organized community action groups.
In Baghdad neighborhoods, where no legitimate sense
o grassroots activism or democratic engagement
had existed or years, community action groups gave
ordinary citizens a direct role in a kind o decentral-
ized decisionmaking that had been mostly missing
rom Iraq. With the help o these community groups,
IRD completed almost 2,400 ICAP projects between
2003 and 2006, at a value o more than $73 million.
The program required an in-kind Iraqi contribution
o 25 percent o project unds, but that number was
exceeded by almost $10 millionanother sign o
Iraqis eagerness to be involved in their planning and
development processes. Through community action
groups, IRD helped put individual citizens directly
in touch with government leaders during a time o
upheaval and uncertainty. Even tenuous links between
public and private interests, IRD believed, would help
citizens regain some sense o trust in their local
political system and open doors to broader improve-
ments in their communities physical and social
inrastructure.
IRDs close working relationship with the community
continued throughout the evolution o ICAP, which
ran concurrently with CSP and continued or years
aterward as an even more robust mobilization and
participatory program. Ater three years o ocused
community interaction with civilians and local leaders
under ICAP, IRD had enough credibility among Iraqis to
take on a program as large and military-dependent as
CSPand to make it work.
Stabilizing communities
CSP kicked o in June 2006, a ew months ahead o a
highly publicized military surge by US and international
orces. It ended more than three years later, in late
2009. Throughout implementation, IRD sta ound
themselves under pressure, pulled in a variety o
directions by competing and sometimes contradictory
demands rom multiple stakeholders. But they also
implemented hundreds o projects that brought order
and economic revitalization to an oppressed popula-
tion in the middle o a war zone.
CSPs main goal can be summarized in one statement:
reduce or eliminate incentives or individuals to par-
ticipate in insurgent activities by creating employment
opportunities and ostering community engagement. In
Iraq, people were desperate or jobs, so employment
is where CSP ocused its fnancial muscle. More than
90 percent o the programs unds were geared toward
short- and long-term employment. As the implementing
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4
By the end o the program, the
business development component had
generated 74 percent o the 57,109
long-term jobs documented by CSP
agency, IRD was responsible or the civilian-led eort
to reach CSPs goal. IRD strove to provide a complete
package o services that optimized the natural overlap
between the our program components that made
up CSPs operational design: creating short-term
jobs through community inrastructure and essential
services, creating long-term jobs through business
development grants, establishing robust vocational
training and apprenticeship services, and engaging
Iraqi youth through community and cultural programs.
The IRD approach and program components linked
CSP projects with military strategy and community
needs.
The Community Inrastructure and Essential Services
(CIES) program component was divided into two
general project areasinrastructure rehabilitation
and essential services work, which required unskilled
labor on quick-impact projects such as trash collec-
tion and rubble removal. CSP supported scores o
these projects during the programs frst year. By
the middle o the second year, IRD began to transer
oversight o projects back to municipal governments.
Approximately 1,600 CIES projects generated more
than 525,000 documented person-months o short-
term employment20 percent above the target. Given
the high value placed on providing some kind o job to
as many Iraqi men as possible, as ast as possible,
person-months o employment was a critical indicator
o immediate impact. By this calculation, CSP suc-
ceededthe program exceeded this target during
every year o operation.
However, there were unavoidable challenges in
implementing a rapid, cash-or-work component like
CIES, including documentation. Generally, laborers
were paid in daily fnancial transactions, but payments
were not always possible to track or ully account or.
Subsequently, the trash collection projects became
a lightning rod or CSP critics. Some o IRDs early
administrative missteps also created obstacles.
With the business development program, IRD aimed to
provide long-term jobs, business training to grantees,
and assistance to vocational training and apprentice-
ship graduates to transition into regular employment.
O the more than 10,000 grants awarded, 97 percent
were classifed in the micro and small categories,
most commonly to amily-owned businesses. By
the end o the program, the business development
component had generated 74 percent o the 57,109
long-term jobs documented by CSP. Once the program
was up and running in the dierent cities, the grants
program produced most jobs airly quickly, and about
25,000 jobs were created during the frst two years.
Trade and service sector grants were ound to be the
most efcient: quick-impact but longer term employ-
ment opportunities proved extremely supportive o the
COIN strategy.
The primary goal o CSPs vocational training and
apprenticeship program, also reerred to as employ-
ment generation, was to stimulate economic stability
by providing Iraqis with employable skills that could
lead to long-term jobs. That goal was reached, with
more than 41,400 graduates completing course
training in construction and nonconstruction trades.
Through the innovative methods IRD used to link
training courses to market demand and unemployed
citizens to employment opportunities, more than
8,000 vocational training graduates landed long-term
jobs as a direct result o their training. Yet the voca-
tional training program accomplished much more than
reaching a benchmark. It also had a proound eect
on Iraqs institutional capacityone o CSPs most
notable achievements.
The CSP design, like the COIN strategy in general,
presumed that the strength o Iraqs cultural and
community network was at least equal to employ-
ment as a actor in the countrys overall stability and
social cohesion. Organizing sae and secure com-
munal activities was perceived to be a critical step
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Most important, citizens were impressed.
A sizable number o Iraqis, regardless
o whether they were directly involved in
the program, credit CSP with improving
security and government services
in reducing sectarian strie. Thereore, CSPs youth
activities component aimed or something more per-
sonal than jobsit aimed to help young Iraqis connect
to their identity, culture, and community and to give
them enhanced opportunities to orm social bonds
that would be stronger than the pull o the insurgency.
Altogether, IRDs youth activities engaged more than
350,000 participants through soccer matches and
tournaments and a wide range o other activities.
A legacy o positive perceptions
IRD sta, rom feld workers to leadership, exude
pride when talking about CSP, but the program had
many other ans as well. Former Deputy Secretary o
State Jacob Lew said CSP was considered one o
the most eective counterinsurgency eorts in Iraq.
Arizona Senator John McCain, Connecticut Senator
Joe Lieberman, General Petraeus, and others made
visits to CSP project sites frsthand. And Ryan Crocker,
during his 200709 tenure as the US ambassador
to Iraq, repeatedly lauded CSPs track record o job
creation. Ive had discussions with the [Iraqi] govern-
ment, Crocker said in late 2007, midway through
CSPs implementation. What they want, they want
jobs. They want something that looks like a stable
uture. . . . Theyre saying, I want gainul employment.
And we know how to do this because weve done it
with community stabilization.
Perhaps most important, Iraqi citizens were
impressed. At the programs conclusion, evaluators
worked with two independent Iraqi polling companies
to survey almost 1,400 CSP participants and nonpar-
ticipants about the perceived eectiveness o CSP
activities, how well community needs were addressed,
and the local support or those activities. While
economic and security variables make it impossible
to establish direct causality between CSP activities
and a reduction in violence, the poll results show that
a sizable number o Iraqis, regardless o whether they
were directly involved in the program, credit CSP with
improving security and government services:
84 percent o CSP-type program participants said
their community was saer in 2009 than in 2006
because o CSP, an assessment shared by 70
percent o nonparticipants.
69 percent o program participants said CSP
helped improve government services.
60 percent o participants credited CSP with
bettering relations between religious and ethnic
groups.
According to USAIDs Jeanne Pryor, the results showed
that It worked. All our components worked. Polling
data, in addition to the outputs that had been mea-
sured, reported that benefciaries did notice a positive
impact in their community.
* * *
This report revisits IRDs work in Iraq rom the begin-
ning o ICAP in 2003 to the close o CSP in 2009.
It is not a project perormance assessment but an
examination o the approach and the results, inormed
primarily by the people who carried it out. In consider-
ing the impact o ICAP and CSP, its important to
consider actors in addition to outcomes and indica-
tors, to grasp the weight o individual moments that
made up the collective whole. These observations
are important, because they put a human ace on the
anonymous benefciary and the generic staer.
For an endeavor like CSP, heavily debated and contro-
versial, they also oer a complete way o seeing the
programits accomplishments, its shortcomings,
and, more importantly, its lasting impact.
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ICAP oered Iraqi women new skills to support their amilies
1Building community trust
through action, empowerment, and commitment
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Local leaders were not paying attention to everyday people.They would ocus on their relatives or close riends. It wasntthe real people in need. And with ICAP we went directly to thepeople in need.
Iqbal al-Juboori
Economic sanctions against Iraq ollowing the 1991
Gul War meant ewer economic and political opportuni-
ties, while decreasing quality in public education led to
a surge in adult illiteracy among Iraqi womenas high
as 45 percent by 2000, according to United Nations
(UN) estimates. Ater the US-led invasion in 2003, the
Coalition Provisional Authority was charged to advance
womens rights and to leverage womens skill and
knowledge in the revival o their country. But in
atermath o the occupation, the reality on the ground
was that huge numbers o Iraqi women had to support
their amilies, and they had to do so ater decades
o diminished educational opportunities had severely
thwarted their technical skills and capabilities.
Early on, I met a widow who was responsible or
eeding her two sons and one daughter, her ather,
her mother, and her two sisters, said Iqbal al-Juboori,
who at the time was an IRD business development
program ofcer in Baghdad. She was the head o the
amily. Her parents were too old to work, her children
too young, and her sisters couldnt. Her husband was
killed during the war, and she didnt know what to do.
Then she heard about IRD.
Al-Juboori, who is Iraqi, joined IRD in July 2005,
two years ater IRD had established its presence in
Baghdad with ICAP. One o ICAPs cross-cutting objec-
tives was to encourage the inclusion and empowerment
o women in all activities. The community action groups
at the center o ICAP emphasized ensuring the equality
o mens and womens voices, while program grants
and employment programs gave women an opportunity
to engage in the local economy. Internally, IRD hired,
trained, and promoted women employees or nontradi-
tional management roles with ICAP, including al-Juboori.
IRD sta would oten concentrate on widows, treat-
ing them as people in need. When determining grant
awards, program ofcers would make home visits to
meet them and assess the individual circumstances.
When al-Juboori visited this particular widow, she
ound a home no larger than a shelter, a single room
with little urniture housing the ull amily. The widow
was receiving nominal help, such as used clothes and
ood, but as she met with al-Juboori, she remained
defantly prideul. I dont believe anyone can help us,
she said. What makes you so special? What makes
you so dierent? All I need is a decent income or my
amily. As an Iraqi woman, al-Juboori knew that she
had an exceptional opportunity to relate to this widow,
standing there in the middle o her home. Youve got
nothing to lose, she said. So try us.
As with many Iraqi women, the widow had no discern-
ible skills or earning power. Al-Juboori described
one o ICAPs business development opportunities,
a home-based sewing program in which IRD would
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8
BUILDING
COMMUNITYTRUST
1
The community believed in what wewere doing and in our ability to helpIqbal al-Juboori
supply equipment as long as the recipient maintained
consistent production. You have to learn to be a
tailor, she told the widow. I youre good, and i you
learn, then were going to come back and monitor
you, and were going to ask you how much youre
selling. This process was an established par t o the
ICAP program. But a more immediate problem quickly
became apparentthe house was so small, there
was no place to put the equipment. All I have is this
house, the widow said. And its only one room. So
where am I going to do this?
IRD had access to revenue-generating equipment, pro-
cedures in place to disburse grants, and a results-based
system o accountability to maximize a benefciarys
chance at success. I an issue required a programmatic
solution, IRD had an answer. But overcoming the physi-
cal limitations o poverty and an overcrowded one-room
house? That was another issue entirely. Still, IRD ound
a solution. Once the widows riends and neighbors
learned o her plight, they got together and ound a
workspace to donate, provided IRD ollowed through with
giving her the grant. The community believed in what
we were doing, al-Juboori said, and in our ability to
help. She got the grant, and then she learned to sew.
The widow began selling coats, and over the course o
the grants process, IRD workers delighted in watching
her grow proessionally and personally. The frst time
she received actual money rom one o her coats, she
came to me, crying, and she hugged me, al-Juboori
said. And she looked at me and said, Ive struggled or
my whole lie, and no one has ever helped me like this. I
dont eel alone anymore.
ICAP: The rst step to rebuilding civil society
Oten called the cradle o civilization, modern day Iraq
is a country steeped in rich cultural and historical
heritage. Ancient Mesopotamia gave rise to some o
the worlds earliest cities, including Hatra, the capital
o the frst Arab kingdom, and its where agriculture
was born. The region boasted accomplishments in the
arts, agriculture, architecture, law, and medicine. But
Iraqs rich heritage proved o little value or much o
the twentieth century, as political turbulence and war
took a severe toll. Ater post-World War I British rule
ended, 58 separate governments ruled Iraq over 37
years, until a 1958 revolution overthrew the monar-
chy.1 Ater the Baath party took power in a 1963 coup,
a brie period o stability and prosperity produced a
secular state with a thriving oil economy, a rising GDP,
and a burgeoning education system. Ater Saddam
Hussein seized power in 1979 and almost immediately
launched a war with Iran, the countrys economic and
social inrastructure began to deteriorate.
In a short time, Iraq descended rom auence to a
country in which the standard o living was reduced to
a subsistence level, according to the UNs Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.2 As a closed
society, Iraqs GDP plunged by more than $50 billion
in less than 10 years, ood and agricultural production
slowed, and 60 percent o the population depended on
government rations. Malnutrition, a leading contributor
to rising inant mortality rate, grew rampant.3 Essential
services slowed due to years o poor maintenance or
outright neglect. Approximately hal the population did
not have regular access to potable drinking water, and
even ewer households were connected to a unction-
ing sewage system. Iraq was a ailing state even beore
the Hussein government ell in March 2003.
In April 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority was
established as a transitional government. One month
later, USAID awarded cooperative agreements to fve
American NGOs to implement ICAP, a central element
o USAIDs overall relie and reconstruction mission
in Iraq. ICAP was conceived as a community action
and mobilization initiative to oster civic pride in Iraqis
and to try and reconnect them to an operational civil
society (box 1). IRD, chosen to implement the program
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Under the initial ICAP intervention, IRD
completed 2,381 projects benefting
more than 20 million people and
worth more than $73 million
ICAP began in May 2003 as a mechanism to mobilize Iraqi communities to identiy, prioritize, and address their
most pressing civic needs. IRD oversaw operations in Baghdad; the rest o the country was divided among our other
implementing agencies.
IRD helped establish locally organized community action groups to drive project work, which was ltered through
three broad program components: economic and social inrastructure to build and repair roads and public buildings;
business development to provide grant support to micro, small, and medium businesses; and the Assistance to Civil-
ian Victims Fund, which provided social and nancial aid to innocent individuals and communities injured or aficted
by military orces.
Under the initial ICAP intervention (200306), IRD completed 2,381 projects beneting more than 20 million people
and worth more than $73 millionalmost 40 percent o which was covered by Iraqi communities and the government
through in-kind contributions. ICAP laid the oundation or the larger and more complex development and stabiliza-
tion projects to come, and it
yielded a number o positive
perormance measurements.
At its conclusion, ICAP had:
Generated more than 5,600
short-term jobs and almost
23,000 long-term jobs.
Employment generation
steadily rose or both short-
and long-term jobs or each
year o the program.
Established 441 community
action groups with approxi-
mately 5,500 membersa
third o whom were women.
Completed more than 700
inrastructure projects,
including the construction or
rehabilitation o 278 schools,
75 health centers and hospi-
tals, 65 water and sewage acilities, 60 roads, and 38 sports and recreation acilities.
Invested $8 million in more than 1,100 business development projects, covering competitive grants, technical
assistance, vocational and managerial training, marketplaces, cooperative grants, and handicap activities.
Aided more than 760,000 Baghdad residents through 515 projects assisting civilian victims.
Box 1 ICAP: Program and results
Al-Madan
Mahmoudiya
Taji
Al-Tarmiya
Abu Ghraib
Adhamiya
Al-Istiqlal
9 NissanTaji
SadrCity
Kadhmiya
Al-Rasheed
Karada
Karkh
Baghdad governorate districts and city districts
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Community action groups stood at the core
o ICAP. They were ormed in conjunction
with community mobilizers that IRD deployed
in districts in and around Baghdad
in Baghdad, began operations immediately, ewer than
two months ater the countrys government structure
had been completely wiped away.
Community action groupsa common thread or IRD
IRD drew rom some relevant experience in ormulat-
ing its ICAP implementation strategy. At the time,
IRDs Community Revitalization through Democratic
Action (CRDA) program in Serbia was nearing the end
o its second year, and the organization had learned
many lessons about mobilizing war-weary populations
to reestablish basic concepts o sel-governance,
community organization, and democratic principles.
As part o the CRDA design, IRD at the outset estab-
lished community committees, chosen entirely by a
larger population, to serve as implementation part-
ners, beore later establishing even larger municipal
working groups to aid in the critical development o
public-private partnerships. IRD succeeded under
trying conditions during CRDAs earliest months, and
that record o accomplishment in postconict Serbia
played a role in USAIDs decision to award ICAP
to IRD.
Community action groups, the primary organizational
tool o ICAP, bore a close resemblance to the com-
munity groups IRD helped organize under CRDA. The
community groups, known locally as CAGs, stood at
the core o ICAP. They were ormed in conjunction with
community mobilizers that IRD deployed in districts in
and around Baghdad. The mobilizers provided basic
training on civil society, rules o order, and a rapid
participatory appraisal process to get ICAP-unded
projects moving quickly. Using these newound skills,
the community groups worked to develop action plans
based on their own prioritized needs. Like CRDA, the
ICAP plan called or a rapid startup to show quick
results, not only to the donors but to local citizens.
Additional unding rom the US PRTs aided in the
ability to make a quick impact.
Another commonality between CRDA and ICAP was the
guiding principle that success depended on mutual trust
between IRD and the community. In Serbia, IRD worked
to build social capital among people who, due to a
variety o actors, were predisposed to distrust. In Iraq,
IRD aced a similar sociopolitical structure, albeit with
a gaping dierence: Iraq was not postconict. Rather, it
was an unstable, occupied country with rapidly shiting
political and religious alliances. Still, in each setting,
relying on community groups to build strong relation-
ships proved productive in moving projects orward.
In Baghdads local communities, where no legitimate
sense o grassroots activism or democratic engage-
ment had existed or years, community action groups
gave ordinary citizens a direct role in a decentralized
decisionmaking process that had been missing
rom Iraq or years. Oered this opportunity, citizens
responded. Within our years, 5,500 Baghdad citi-
zens were members o community action groups.
Altogether, IRD helped organize 441 o these groups
during the initial program phase that ran between
2003 and 2006. (ICAP had been extended multiple
times and continued to grow and evolve as a commu-
nity empowerment program.)
As the organizational engine o ICAP, the community
groups were critical to project implementation. In
the beginning, however, they were not easily ormed.
Each group had to have a minimum o nine members
along with the community mobilizer, who typically
lived in the local neighborhood as a show o commit-
ment and, ideally, to win the confdence and trust o
local leaders. Program design was easier said than
done, since Baghdads political structure was still
in a transitional state and many leaders viewed the
community groups as a political threat. At the time,
there was some rudimentary selection process by
Baghdad leadership or the city council members
across all the districts, said Awni Quandour, who
flled numerous roles on ICAP, including chie o party
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Quandour joined IRD in June 2003, or the
beginning o ICAP. He took a leap o aith with
IRD, an organization barely 5 years old but
under intense pressure to show quick results
It was June 2009, and Gary Kinney had spent almost two months in Baghdad on temporary assignment, anxious
to get home. Neither sandstorms nor aulty documentation would have been welcome delays, Kinney wrote in
an email, detailing his bumpy exit rom Iraq via Jordan. Kinney, who at the time was IRDs contracts and grants
manager, avoided a sandstorm, but his documentation proved more troublesome. Passport control ocers at the
Baghdad airport fagged his visa or being incomplete or incorrect. Whatever the reason, Kinney ound himsel
stuck.
Two ocers were in the booth, handing my passport back and orth, without any ability to solve the problem, he
said. Eventually, the men called or their supervisor, who came and led Kinney to a private airport oce.
Do you have a CAC card? the ocial asked, reerring to the Common Access Card issued as a standard identica-
tion by the Department o Deense. No, Kinney replied, he did not. Do you have an MNF-I card? he then asked,
reerring to another type o identication issued to workers entering and leaving Iraq. Kinney didnt have one o those
either.
What he did have, however, was his IRD identication badge, which he pulled rom his wallet. The Iraqi ocial gave it
a quick glance and then, ater veriying that Kinney was traveling to Amman, promptly returned the ID. Then, without
urther delay and in one brisk motion, he approved the visa, stamped the passport, and cleared Kinney to leavewith
a parting message: Tell Mr. Awni that Captain Zain sends his regards.
A ew months later, Awni Quandour, 56, died o lung cancer at a hospital in Amman. Instrumental in helping IRD set
up its initial operations in the Middle East, Quandour at the time was serving as IRDs country director in Jordan,
where his amily had lived or more than 100 years and where he had built a respected reputation doing community-
based economic development work, including or the Noor Hussein Foundation. During a 2008 Capitol Hill ceremony
celebrating IRDs 10-year anniversary, Jordans Queen Noor publicly commended Quandour or his work. Awni was a
great man, said Dr. Arthur B. Keys, IRDs ounder and president, and a major source o insight and inormation to
many, many key decisionmakers.
Quandour joined IRD in June 2003, or the beginning o ICAP. He had already spent a lot o time in Iraq, working or
Catholic Relie Services during the 1990s, and he had an in-depth knowledge o the country and its people. He took
a leap o aith with IRD, an organization barely 5 years old but under intense pressure to show quick results in an
unstable country where it had no organizational ootprintor local sta. Quandour came on board anyway.
He rst met Keys in Amman, at a USAID organizing meeting or ICAP implementing agencies. IRD volunteered to
work in the capital, where the needs were most widespread and immediate. Awni and I traveled across the desert in
a ast, unarmed convoy to set up IRDs initial ICAP program in Baghdad, Keys said. We went out into the neighbor-
hoods, visited amilies in their homes, visited mosques and universities.
Box 2 Awni Quandour: IRDs original elder statesman
(continued)
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Many colleagues have told methat Awni gave IRD a lot o credibilityin that region o the world
Dr. Arthur B. Keys
(box 2). According to Quandour, as the community
groups ourished, tension developed between IRD
and local political leaders, some o whom accused
Quandour o causing problems and subsequently
used their power to delay the approval o projects.
There was some rivalry between the council
members and the community action groups, he said,
because the CAGs suddenly had the ability to create
projects that werent part o the councils administra-
tive structure.
At the time, aside rom oreign military, they were the only non-Iraqis around. Quandours experience and amiliarity
with the country, however, proved crucial in getting ICAP and IRDs regional operations established quickly. Dr. Keys
said that he wanted to go to the poor areas o Baghdad rst, beore the others, Quandour said. I told him that all
the areas were poor.
Quandour and Keys knocked on doors and talked to the residents, and they learned that in some areas people were
sleeping on their rootops because their houses were fooded with sewage. With trash and debris everywhere, and
with sewage backed up as high as a oot or more on some roads, we determined that just cleaning the streets
would be our rst project, ater listening to people talk about how they were living.
In the matter o a ew weeks, Quandour and ICAPs chie o party, Terry Leary, hired their sta, created a training
plan, began street-cleaning and trash-removal operations, and started organizing ICAPs rst community action
group. People were desperate and wanted some type o sign that lie would improve, Quandour said. We gave
them hope.
Quandours rst position with IRD was as ICAPs community outreach director. Beore long, he became the pro-
grams deputy chie o party beore assuming the chie o party role. He hired and trained IRDs initial Iraqi sta,
many o whom still work with IRD almost a decade later. He played a critical role in adapting the ICAP model on a
wider scale-up when IRD began implementing CSP in 2006.
In Aghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, and other locations, Quandour helped hone IRDs project work in unstable
environments, and many current sta credit him with being the ounding ather o IRDs community development and
stabilization programs.
Many colleagues have told me that Awni gave IRD a lot o credibility in that region o the world, Keys said. His
relationships with local communities were invaluable to making the Iraq programs work. Local sta looked up to
Awni as an elder statesman. He was ready to go back to Iraq, saying that when he regained his strength, he would
return to that country.
While Quandour never had the opportunity to return to Iraq, his legacy and his work live on through the organizational
strategy he helped crat and through his own personal tieshis daughter Zain and his niece Farah both work on IRD
projects in Jordan.
Box 2 Awni Quandour: IRDs original elder statesman (continued)
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The frst ew years o ICAP projects
directly benefted more than 20 million
Iraqis and generated 23,000 long-term
jobs and 5,600 short-term jobs
With the help o these community groups, IRD com-
pleted almost 2,400 ICAP projects over 200306,
at a value o more than $73 million. The program
required that 25 percent o project unds be in-kind
donations rom local Iraqi communities, but this
number was exceeded by almost $10 million
another sign o local citizens eagerness to be
part o the planning and development o their
communities.
Establishing services, assisting civilians,creating jobs
Once a community action group ormed, IRD mobi-
lizers would provide basic training on rules and
procedures and a condensed orm o the appraisal
process. With this introductory training complete,
members began writing bylaws to guide their work.
Again, the mobilizers oversaw and helped run this
activity. Throughout the program, IRD provided train-
ing to community groups on computer skills, core
business skills, frst aid, and conict mitigation. This
training incentivized members to continue their par-
ticipation while bolstering the groups ability to create
quality reports and applications and recommend grant
candidates to IRD.
Once trained, group members helped shepherd com-
munity projects through three main program areas:
Economic and social inrastructure projects to build
and repair roads and public buildings as well as
restore essential services.
Business development grant support to micro,
small, and medium businesses.
Assistance to civilian victims and communities
injured, impaired, or otherwise negatively aected
by coalition orces.
The frst ew years o ICAP projects directly benefted
more than 20 million Iraqis and generated 23,000
long-term jobs and 5,600 short-term jobs.4 ICAP was
a unique program, at least in Iraq because it was
community-based, al-Juboori said. Wed reach out
to the grassroots level, and at that time, no one was
representing anyone. There was no eective local
government. Even though neighborhoods had a lot
o needs, nobody was reaching out to those people.
There was no government. There was nobody.
According to al-Juboori, even ater the rudimentary
Baghdad councils had been established, the basic
needs o ordinary citizens were oten overlooked
due to the rampant nepotism or avoritism that
had become ingrained in Iraqi political and social
structure. Local leaders were not paying attention
to everyday people, she said. They would ocus
on their relatives or close riends. It wasnt the real
people in need. And with ICAP we went directly to the
people in need.
A chance or citizens to rebuild basic services
Many o those people in need lived in the Sadr
district, one o the poorest and most violent neigh-
borhoods in Baghdad. With little access to basic
services, residents in two districts encompassing
roughly 25,000 people ormed the Al Bir community
action group. In its frst year, the group completed
15 projects ranging rom the administration o small
business grants to the creation o public parks and
playgrounds on vacant lots. The group also organized
neighborhood cleanups and public health campaigns.
In a very short time, the Al Bir group became a vocal
advocate or its citizens, and, in doing so, ormed a
critical link between individuals and their municipal
government leadership.
As part o its eort to boost the local inrastructure
and business environment, the Al Bir community group
reached out to create a dialogue with its neighborhood
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IRDs health advisor reerred Omar
Mohammad Abas to a hospital that specialized
in treating amputees, where he was ftted
with an artifcial leg and underwent an
intensive fve-week physical therapy program
advisory council, the local governing authority. In doing
so, the group learned o an eort to provide needy
amilies with cooking oil and propane. But that eort
had not been extended to Al Bir due to the lack o
municipal capacitysimply put, the local government
had no way to distribute the goods. So the citizen
group responded, frst by conducting a house-by-house
needs assessment, then organizing a distribution
network consisting o donated warehouse space and
vehicles staed by volunteers. Once the network
was in place, the community action group developed
a distribution schedule and a publicity campaign to
inorm residents about the program.
Through the community action group, IRD helped put
individual citizens directly in touch with government
leaders. Even tenuous links between public and
private interests, IRD believed, would help citizens
regain trust in their local political system and open
doors to broader improvements in the physical and
social inrastructure. The Al Bir group, or instance,
had a broad impact. In addition to helping distribute
cooking materials, it also helped coordinate a public
health campaign to provide sae and sanitary cir-
cumcisions or young boys. IRD assisted the group in
organizing qualifed practitioners and nurses to come
directly to amilies homes and perorm the operation
ree o charge. The program proved very popular in
the community: it was both low cost, and it improved
local capacity to deliver health and social services,
especially or children.
With Iraqs essential services in poor shape even
beore the 2003 invasion, community action group
members placed their greatest priority on initiatives
that would, among other things, revitalize roads,
schools, medical acilities, sports acilities, sewage
systems, and electricity delivery. Even with the
improvements needed or services like water treat-
ment and power supply, more than a third o the
economic and social inrastructure budget was
directed to school rehabilitation. A total o 278 school
projects were completed through the inrastructure
component. But with so much work to be done and
so many people in need, program components oten
overlapped. Years into the conict, Iraqs Ministry o
Education built a school in the Sadr district or 500
children orphaned by the war. But the ministry did
not have money to purchase generators, computers,
or administrative supplies. Ater being contacted by
the local community action group, IRD urnished the
school with its missing equipment through ICAPs
Assistance to Civilian Victims (ACV) program.
Addressing the needs o innocent victims
Omar Mohammad Abas, an Iraqi university student,
was standing outside his amilys home in May 2003,
when a gunner on an American Humvee opened fre.
Abas was not the intended target, but the gunfre
struck him in the let leg. His injury was severe, and
doctors were orced to amputate above his let knee.
Almost two years later, in February 2005, the com-
munity action group representing Abass neighborhood
brought his story to the attention o IRD mobilizers.
IRDs health advisor reerred Abas to a hospital that
specialized in treating amputees, where he was ftted
with an artifcial leg and underwent an intensive fve-
week physical therapy program.
IRD fnanced Abass treatment and prosthetic leg with
ACV unds. Launched during ICAPs second year, the
civilian assistance program was conceived as a way
to provide relie or Iraqi civilians who were harmed as
a direct result o US military operations. The congres-
sionally earmarked unds were intended to beneft a
wide range o Iraqis, rom individual citizens to large
amilies to entire communities. Projects were divided
into a number o categoriescommunity-based activi-
ties included reconstructing or expanding local civil
services, such as orphanages, hospitals, or centers
or the disabled; rebuilding or reurbishing individual
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Ater being told o Marwa Naims
situation, IRD sta began working on
an assistance plan that ended with
Marwa being transported to the United
States or reconstructive surgery
homes that had been damaged or destroyed by the
military; and providing support and necessary equip-
ment, such as wheelchairs or prosthetics, or medical
procedures like the one that benefted Abas.
The program, which was not part o the original ICAP
design, enabled IRD and other ICAP implementers
to build trust with Iraqis. The unds were made avail-
able primarily through the eorts o international aid
worker Marla Ruzicka, who had successully petitioned
Congress to provide fnancial assistance to civilian
victims o war. Ruzickas relentless eorts to ocus
international attention on civilian hardships made her
something o a celebrity. She won over journalists,
diplomats, activists, and politicians, including Vermont
Senator Patrick Leahy, who pushed the victims com-
pensation package through Congress and said Ruzicka
was as close to a living saint as they come.
The ACV program began in 2004, but in April 2005,
Ruzicka was killed on a Baghdad road by a suicide
bomber. Her death drew greater attention to civilian
assistance eorts in generalRolling Stone called her
perhaps the most amous American aid worker to die
in any conict o the past 10 or 20 years. The organi-
zations implementing ICAP were charged with putting
the ACV unds to the most eective and efcient use,
and IRD ound no shortage o people in need. One
year ater Ruzicka died, the activist organization she
ounded, Campaign or Innocent Victims in Conict
(CIVIC), played an important role in assisting IRD with
one o its most high-profle benefciaries, the young
Marwa Naim.
Much like Omar Mohammad Abasand scores o
other IraqisMarwa benefted rom the commitment
o her local community action group. Her ather frst
learned o the civilian assistance program through
his neighborhood group. Nearly destitute, he received
a grant to open a small grocery store. As part o the
monitoring process, IRD workers visited Naim regularly
at his home. During one o these visits, someone
rom IRD asked about the shy girl who would always
hide when visitors arrived. The girl was his daughter;
she hid, Naim explained, because she was ashamed
o her severe injuries. When coalition orces entered
Baghdad in April 2003, an errant rocket struck the
Naim home with the amily huddled inside. Marwas
mother was killed; Marwa, 9 years old at the time, was
disfgured, losing part o her nose and her right thumb.
Local doctors treated the injuries, but little else could
be done to reconstruct her appearance. Sad and sel-
conscious, Marwa became withdrawn.
Ater being told o Marwas situation, IRD sta began
working on an assistance plan that started with a
series o medical assessments and ended with Marwa
being transported to the United States or reconstruc-
tive surgery. Working with two other nonprofts, the
Palestinian Childrens Relie Fund and CIVIC, IRD
located a surgical team at the UCLA Medical Center
willing to perorm the operations ree o charge. In
early 2006, doctors at UCLA reconstructed Marwas
ace in a series o surgeries conducted over our
months. IRD also arranged or Iraqi oster amilies
to host Marwa during her time in Caliornia. In 2009,
Marwa returned to Los Angeles or a ollow-up proce-
dure.5 Her story garnered international attention or
innocent civilian victims in need o help. In many o the
communities where the ACV program was established,
IRD and community action groups were the only ones
oering social services and assistance during most
violent period o the countrys insurgency.
Through the initial ICAP period, the number o ACV
benefciaries soared to 770,000a remarkable
achievement or a total cost o $5.1 million. ACV
continued to be a major part o ICAPs ongoing work
in Baghdad, and its impact grew even more. For
example, more than 200 hospital and clinic renova-
tions supported by ACV helped millions o Iraqi citizens
access more reliable healthcare.
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IRD placed a premium on diversity
not just gender diversity, but also a
diversity o business and geography
Small steps toward economic renewal
Civilian assistance cases like Marwas were instru-
mental in creating community trust. But social inra-
structure projects accounted or the bulk o IRDs early
work, totaling more than $31 million through ICAPs
frst phase. These projects also generated the largest
employment numbers, though ICAPs business devel-
opment program was designed specifcally to target
the need or jobs. The inrastructure and job compo-
nents carried their own operational designs, but they
clearly overlapped, which not only aided IRDs eorts
with ICAP but also served as a useul precursor to the
even more integrated program design o CSP.
IRD ocused on job creation through small and
medium enterprise development, such as giving
private enterprise grants, orming cooperative societ-
ies, establishing market links, and extending technical
assistance and business management training. Grants
would range rom a ew hundred dollars to help supply
a small shop to more than $100,000 to establish a
new actory. Most grants, like the one Bakir Moham-
med received, ell somewhere in between.
Bakir, a livestock armer in the rural but highly volatile
Taji district o Baghdad, received a $24,000 grant
in the orm o cattle. He personally put up another
$12,000 in acility rehabilitation costs to bring his
arm up to standards and make it ully operational.
Agriculture and livestock arms had always been
primary contributors to Tajis commercial engine, and,
with this grant, Bakir was able to reestablish his arm
as a local employer and as a sizable bee producer.
Within a short time, Bakir hired a dozen workers,
more than hal women, and began producing enough
meat products to meet the demand o nearly 15,000
people.
In working with community action groups to administer
business development grants, IRD placed a premium
on diversity. Not just gender diversity, though high
value was given to ensuring equal opportunity or
women, but also a diversity o business and geogra-
phy. A slate o business opportunities was necessary
to maximize employment generation. While sta took
pride in helping an unskilled widow learn a trade and
set up a small sewing business, larger agricultural,
manuacturing, and service sector investments
accounted or more than 80 percent o approved
grants. Those grants provided the highest probability
o large-scale economic renewal and, as a result, the
greatest opportunity or community impact.
For regional diversity, business grant opportunities
were given throughout Baghdad. The total business
development budget was spent disproportionately,
the result o a variety o actors such as the dearth o
viable entrepreneurs and dierent capacities between
community action groups. The main issue, however,
can be attributed to a lack o access due to insecure
or nonpermissive working environments. This hurdle,
unortunately, was a common thread throughout all o
IRDs work in Iraq. While IRD tried to balance business
development and spending as evenly as possible
across Baghdads districts, the task proved difcult
due to violence in some areas. Overall, IRD was able
to maintain signifcant activity throughout the lie o
the program in all but two districts. Yet, even in those
dangerous areas, community action groups unctioned
as intended, and the interrelated program components
worked together to provide relie and support.
Insecurity: Operational limitations in anunstable environment
In the Ibn Zuhr neighborhood o the Madaen district,
IRD held a town hall meeting in May 2004 to orm a
community group. From that initial meeting, 19 local
Iraqis were directly elected by their ellow citizens to
represent the neighborhood. Working with the local
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Regarded as Iraqs preeminent acility or
the treatment o communicable diseases,
the Ibn Zuhr Hospital was the countrys only
hospital with specialized equipment and sta
trained to treat patients with HIV or AIDS
mobilizer, the group set about identiying and ranking
needs to develop program proposals. They then
worked with IRD to put together a realistic implemen-
tation plan or projects that the group could organize
and und through their own resources. The projects
ranged rom small neighborhood cleanups to work on
a much larger scale, like the restoration o acilities
at their renowned but war-damaged neighborhood
hospital.
Regarded as Iraqs preeminent acility or the treat-
ment o communicable diseases, the Ibn Zuhr Hospital
was the countrys only hospital with specialized
equipment and sta trained to treat patients with HIV
or AIDS. During 2003, looters stole vital equipment,
supplies, and drugs. They also started fres, smashed
windows, and damaged equipment. Ater the looting,
some hospital sta set out on their own to restore the
acilitys capabilities by scrounging medical equip-
ment rom other Baghdad locations and, in some
cases, purchasing supplies with their own money.
The destruction o the hospital was a bitter blow to
the communitys residents, who not only viewed the
hospitals work as a source o pride but also relied on
the acility to provide emergency room services and
primary healthcare. The Ibn Zuhr community group
designated the restoration o the hospital, a vital
piece o the communitys inrastructure, as its top
priority.
Group members met with hospital sta to determine
the most urgent needs and worked with mobilizers to
develop a proposal. ICAP provided the hospital with
much needed equipment, such as diagnostic tools
and machinery or sterilizing medical instruments. For
the community contribution, the Ministry o Health
provided the hospital with additional equipment and
ofce urniture. At the same time, group members
developed their own project to dovetail with the
ICAP-backed project. Canvassing the neighborhood,
members raised donations and signed volunteers to
repaint rooms and make basic carpentry repairs. Using
equipment donated rom local businesses, volunteer
electricians repaired the hospitals damaged electrical
system, not only restoring its unctionality but also
bringing the wiring up to international standards.
The enterprising Ibn Zuhr community group, continu-
ing its independent work, soon created its own NGO
to provide assistance to the disabled. Relying solely
on community donations, the newly ormed NGO
began providing clothing, wheelchairs, and medical
care to hundreds o disabled children living in the
Madaen district. Members contacted IRD or ongoing
guidance on projects and undraising strategies,
while mobilizers continued to provide capacity devel-
opment support. Those residents didnt wait or
someone rom outside their community to tell them
what they needed or how to proceed, said Ernest
Leonardo, the chie o party or ICAP. They took the
initiative to organize themselves and to get to work.
This kind o grassroots activism is at the heart o
civil society.
The Ibn Zuhr community group exemplifed the posi-
tive outcomes that a program like ICAP, intended to
reengage citizens through stronger civil society, can
achieve. Just as impressive was the commitment
o the Ibn Zuhr group to restoring order even as the
larger societal abric in the Madaen district began
to unravel. On April 20, 2005, less than a year ater
the ormation o the Ibn Zuhr action group, 57 bodies
were fshed rom the Tigris River downstream o
Madaen; residents said that hundreds more were in
the water. Days beore that discovery, insurgents had
taken control o Madaen district streets, and the local
government reported 150 Shia men and women had
been kidnapped.6 The evidence pointed to a system-
atic killing believed to have taken place over several
months, during the same time that Ibn Zuhr residents
and IRD sta had been taking steps to rebuild the
areas civic pride and unctionality.
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Whenever harm beell a community action
group member, or a member o their own
team, IRD sta would cope by banding
together or encouragement and support
Perseverance in the ace o adversity
IRD was not immune to violent incidents. Also in April
2005, two community mobilizers were kidnapped
as they let a scheduled community meeting in the
Makasib neighborhood o the Rashid district. The IRD
employees were held or 15 days and released ater
their amilies intervened. The evidence pointed to
members o the community collaborating with the kid-
nappers. Ater the incident, IRD decided to terminate
operations in the village and the surrounding area.
While this incident came to a peaceul conclusion, this
was not always the case. Mushara Jabar Alwan, the
Iraqi chairman o a community action group in Rashid,
was executed along with his amily or working with
the Americans, according to local accounts. Alto-
gether, seven community action group members were
murdered or their involvement with community action
groups and ICAP.
As Iraqs sectarian violence ramped up, the worsening
security was a central concern or project manage-
ment, which took a number o steps to try and ensure
the saety o sta, participants, and benefciaries.
Security personnel were contracted and given
ongoing training, and sta members were inormed
daily o security events throughout the city. When
an area became too hot or project activity, work
was stopped, and feld sta were reassigned to less
dangerous areas. Some o the numbers detail the
danger:
115 inrastructure projects worth $9.3 million were
canceled or security reasons.
At least 40 employees resigned because o death
threats.
Five employees were kidnapped: three were
released, one was killed, and one was never
ound.
Five employees were killed outside work; our more
died in work-related incidents.
While working on IRD projects, fve contractors and
six laborers were killed; seven IRD employees were
shot or injured by shrapnel.
Baghdads increasing violence cost the program in
many ways. IRD spent $2.2 million or concrete blast
walls, razor wire, security lighting, communications
equipment, body armor, and guards and security
coordination. Many times, ofces had to be closed
due to security concerns and curews, with the longest
closure lasting 23 days. Security closures cost an esti-
mated $11,000 a day in salaries and other expenses.
Aside rom ofce shutdowns, individual sta members
oten had to take security leave days when circum-
stances prevented them rom traveling to the ofce.
During peaks in the violence, as much as 20 percent
o labor was lost to curews and security leave.
Less quantifable was the impact that ear and
depression had on morale. Once, a mock improvised
explosive device was placed adjacent to the IRD
compound, an example o the intimidation directed at
workers. Many sta were orced to move rom their
homes, sometimes in response to specifc death
threats. Nearly everyone lost a riend or relative to
violence. Whenever harm beell a community action
group member, or a member o their own team, IRD
sta would cope by banding together or encour-
agement and support. In December 2005, Iqbal
al-Jubooris house was attacked by militants, and they
let with her brother, part o a mass kidnapping that
day o men in her neighborhood. Dazed, shaken, and
scared, she ound hersel walking directly to the IRD
ofce, where she shared her ordeal with coworkers.
She was told to go home and rest, but she had no
desire to do that: I was already where I elt the
saestat work, with others. Her brother was never
ound.
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Even with the insecurity and growing
threats, signifcant reductions or
elimination o operations in neighborhoods
and districts were rare, and IRD
remained committed to the project
People had learned to trust us
In 2006, the fnal year o ICAPs initial program and the
beginning o CSP, sta turnover exceeded 25 percent.
The costs o recruiting, hiring, and training new workers,
in addition to operating without a ull sta, were high.
During one two-month period, ICAP lost six o its seven
monitoring and evaluation ofcers as well as its top
three fnance ofcers. Many sta members were called
upon to help launch CSP, but the insecurity drove many
others away. When CSP became operational, sta turn-
over and emotional distress became even larger issues.
For one reason, CSP was nationwide, not just Baghdad,
which, despite the insecurity, was still saer than many
o the countrys other cities and provinces.
IRD management continued to work to minimize risk by
adjusting protocol and activities, and, despite protests
rom sta in some instances, canceling projects
or ceasing operations in certain areas. When IRD
stopped working in the Makasib region o the Rashid
district ater the sta kidnappings, more than a dozen
home reconstruction projects had been completed and
sta had to abandon a good working relationship with
community members because one or two community
members were conspiring with insurgents against IRD.
Even with the insecurity and growing threats, signif-
cant reductions or elimination o operations in neigh-
borhoods and districts were rare, and IRD remained
committed to the project. When I talk about that
time, I compare IRD to the UN or Red Cross, said
Vigeen Dola, an Iraqi national who joined IRD as a
monitoring and evaluation manager ater CSP started
up. Beore that, he worked or the Red Cross while his
wie was working with the UN. Both were stationed
in Iraq. On August 19, 2003, Dolas wie was at work
when a suicide bomber drove a cement mixer into the
side o the UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing 23,
wounding more than 100, and collapsing three oors
o the acility.7 His wie was only wounded.
Following the attack, the UN withdrew most o its
Baghdad sta. Ater another attack in October let
12 more workers dead, the UN pulled out o Baghdad
completely. The UN dropped everything and let, Dola
said. They had no obvious activities in the conict-
zone areas. They had activities in the peaceul areas,
in the north. But people in these conict zones didnt
even have drinking water; they didnt have electricity.
Two months later, the Red Cross was bombed, and
they did the same thing; they pulled out. I was there,
working with them. I was not only conused, but angry.
Iqbal al-Juboori, who had not yet joined IRDs sta
and was working or the UN, was among the 50 or so
UN employees who remained in Baghdad ater the
frst attack. All UN operations had been suspended,
and she had to work rom home, conducting business
through email correspondence. Al-Juboori said she
understood why the UN had to pull out: It was not
a light decision or them to withdraw rom Baghdad.
A lot o people had died. However, like Dola, she
said the UN needed to at least maintain some kind
o public presence in Baghdad to send a message to
the Iraqi people as well as to those who intended
to do them harm. IRD, due in some combination to
its size, exibility, and organizational commitment,
stuck around, even i it had to adjust operations.
To local Iraqis and other aid proessionals, such as
Dola and al-Juboori, this commitment helped set IRD
apart in the eyes o citizens who might be naturally
disinclined to trust outsiders. I joined IRD in 2005,
and Ive seen some really bad days, al-Juboori said.
But whenever we encountered tragedy or trouble, IRD
would become more fxed and determined, no matter
what the obstacles or the challenges were. And there
were great, great challenges. But people had learned
to trust us.
IRDs close working relationship with the community
continued throughout the evolution o ICAP, which
was extended and which not only ran concurrently
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Scheduled to wind down in 2012 ater more
than eight years, ICAP is USAIDs longest
running development program in Iraq
with CSP but also continued or years aterward
as an even more robust mobilization and participa-
tory program (box 3). Through its ICAP work, IRD
had an established base o operations in Baghdad,
which proved an important logistical springboard or
launching the much larger and complex CSP. More
important, ater three years o ocused community
interaction with civilians and local leaders, IRD had
the credibility to take on a program as large and
military-dependent as CSP.
ICAP spanned the initial turbulence o postinvasion Iraq, the subsequent outbreak o sectarian violence and civil
war, the fow o oreign insurgents, the US military surge, and the uncertain rst steps o a new national government.
But it originally was scheduled to end December 31, 2006. At the time, 68 projects worth roughly $2.5 million had
not closed out, though some had ended operations. The others were near completion but had been prevented rom
closing out due to security problems. More than 90 percent o ICAP projects had been completed by the original
close-out date, despite the surging violence.
ICAPs achievements, particularly the successul ormation o community action groups (CAGs) and the groups
growing role in civil society, led USAID to extend the program, and IRD continued to play an important implementa-
tion role. USAID extended ICAP once, pushing its project total to more than 1,200 and the number o beneciaries
to more than 12 million. A second extension began in 2009 amid improving security conditions. Scheduled to wind
down in 2012 ater more than eight years, ICAP is USAIDs longest running development program in Iraq.
With that eight-year record o bringing together citizens to identiy their needs, mobilize resources, and lobby local
government representatives, Baghdads community action groups grew into a lynchpin o IRDs development legacy
in Iraq. At the end o 2011, Baghdad had more than 120 CAGs with a total membership exceeding 1,800 Iraqi
citizens across more than 100 residential communities. The organizational growth and development o the CAGs
as a civil orce is impressive. Since the original ICAP program began, the groups have evolved rom committed but
inormal collectives to elected membership bodies that are governed by bylaws, hold regular public meetings, and
abide by institutionalized processes that help give voice to millions o Iraqi citizens.
These groups are Iraqs largest and most organized network o local change agents, rom homemakers to proes-
sionals, said ICAP Chie o Party Ernest Leonardo. They understand local needs, and they advocate or those
needs at the neighborhood and district government levels. In the process, they do more than provide a vital link
between citizens and their governmentthey oster transparency, responsiveness, and, most critically, public
condence.
Box 3 The evolution o ICAP, USAIDs longest-running program in Iraq
(continued)
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Through ICAP, community groups havebecome a bellwether o democratic participation,giving everyday citizens an outlet to identiy
needs and the means to address them
Ernest Leonardo
CSPs operational design incorporated many elements
o ICAP, but, as a straight stabilization mission, it
was undamentally dierent. It was shaped by the
near total collapse o Iraqs internal political and
social inrastructure and the ensuing breakdown in
securitythe same elements that threatened ICAP
and other relie and development programs. But unlike
traditional relie programs, normally divided among a
group o implementers, CSP was given only to IRD to
manage and run.
The community action groups, which remain at the core o the ICAP design, were able to change because the overall
program mission changed. In the early days, with communities acing a critical lack o basic services, ICAP ocused
on quick-impact projects designed to stave o a range o impending crises, rom outbreaks o cholera to widespread
truancy. Thanks to the continuing dedication o group members, the CAGs moved rom stop-gap measures and toward
the kind o robust, participatory planning processes that create sustainable bonds between citizens and their leaders.
By the end o 2011, all community action groups had completed comprehensive community action plans to inorm
long-term district development strategies or Baghdads 15 governmental districts. At week-long planning work-
shops, under IRDs guidance, group members worked with government ocials at the neighborhood, district, and
province levels to outline long-term, districtwide strategies or improving basic services and livelihoods, especially
or women, youths, and the internally displaced. By the end o its program date, ICAP was expected to shepherd
more than 600 projects identied in the ocial action plans through completion.
ICAPs broader agenda not only sharpened the mission o community groups, it ostered more diverse program suc-
cesses, including better assistance outreach or Baghdads internally displaced population, and enhanced measures
to reach the estimated 5 million Iraqis who had Internet access by mid-2011. IRD worked with all 15 district
councils to build dynamic websites eaturing useul inormation on government services and contact details and
spearheaded technology and skills training or inormation technology specialists rom each council. And as part o
a very inventive and groundbreaking donor marketplace, representatives rom more than 20 international unding
agenciesincluding the UN, the International Organization or Migration, the US Institute or Peace, and groups
rom Japan, the Republic o Korea, and northern Europegathered with community action group members to discuss
unding priorities and local community needs. The ICAP-sponsored event was the rst time donors had the opportu-
nity to engage directly with community leaders around a locally owned plan or social and economic development.
Through ICAP, community groups have become a bellwether o democratic participation, giving everyday citizens an
outlet to identiy needs and the means to address them, said Leonardo. Their eorts, despite violence and limited
resources, have helped make responsive, bottom-up planning a respected and acceptable practice in Baghdad.
Box 3 The evolution o ICAP, USAIDs longest-running program in Iraq (continued)
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A CSP soccer league holds its grand opening ceremony
2A complete stabilization package
of programmatic and military integration
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That dramatic dierence that lie was getting better, it all hadto do with CSP. Neighborhoods were being cleaned up, soccerleagues were starting, and businesses were opening. It wasntall done by the military. The partnership with CSP made all
these things possible. Andrew Wilson
In his inuential work, political scientist John Kingdon
explored the sources o initiative that create unique
opportun