iran’s nuclear deal - an analysis on the political negotiations for power

Ricky Shah

Iran’s Nuclear Deal: An Analysis of Political Negotiations for ‘Power’

Intro

The main issue at the forefront of nuclear talks before 2013 between Iran and P5-plus-1 were

that because of Iran’s deception, “it should forfeit its right to enrich [uranium]”1 and allow more

robust inspections by the IAEA. Iran disputed that as a signatory to the NPT it has the “right to

enrich uranium for civilian uses” 1 and it will not give this right up. These strong positions caused

a stalemate in the many attempts to negotiate an agreement as the negotiations did not address

the underlying interests. After 10 years of effectively no headway, it was the understanding of key

interests of Iran and basing an argument and concessions around it, which would make way for

the framework for a final agreement. This was the result of efforts by both sides to rebuild trust,

facilitating communication and information exchange – of significance were the secret

negotiations between Iran-US and the first communication between Presidents in 34 years. In

this essay I will analyse the key negotiations, significant events and negotiation tactics employed

to understand how this framework deal was reached. 1

Synopsis

2002-2004: A dissident group reveals previously undeclared nuclear sites in Iran, whilst the US

claims they have established a nuclear weapons program. Iran later makes a first offer in a

comprehensive proposal of negotiations to the US, who refuses it with contempt on the basis

that “Iran has to answer to the international community”2. Negotiations ensue after Iran admits

to continuing to develop centrifuges. The IAEA, the UN’s nuclear watchdog, wants Iran to

“sustain the suspension” of uranium enrichment, and concessions are offered. During this period

the Supreme Leader issues a fatwa against nuclear weapons, although it legitimacy is contested.

2005-2008: Tensions escalate as the IAEA votes to report Iran to the UN Security Council

(UNSC). Iran ceases voluntary co-operation with the IAEA and resumes the enrichment of

1 “Iran: Where we are today” (2009, May 4) http://fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/iran.html 2 “In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran's Offer of Dialogue” (2006, June 18) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-‐dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700727_pf.html

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uranium. The UNSC threatens and subsequently issues sanctions for failure to suspend all

uranium enrichment. Further sanctions are extended on Iran including financial and travel bans

to individuals.

2009-2012: Obama is inaugurated as President of US with intentions for nuclear talks to resume.

Negotiations breakdown as Iran grows its enrichment program; sanctions are put fully in effect.

2013: Secret negotiations take place between US and Iran, whilst the latter elects the new

President, Hassan Rouhani. Obama announces his historic conversation with Iran’s President and

months later a Joint Plan of Action (JPA) is signed between Iran and P5-plus-1 countries (5

permanent members of the UNSC: China, France, Russia, UK, US, plus Germany).

2014: Several rounds of negotiations ensue and two extensions to deadlines are granted.

2nd April 2015: A general framework for a final agreement is announced, with final details to be

worked out by June 30 2015.

Foundation I: Relationships

In a 2009 Congress report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, it is described in

heavy detail how Iran’s intentions are not clear with regards to the nature of their nuclear

program. The fundamental reason for this is trust, which is severely deteriorated since the 2002

revelation of a clandestine nuclear program and undeclared nuclear facilities, and is also the main

reason for why negotiations have been so difficult. As Shell points out, trust is “at the core of

human relationships” and that “trust and confidence…eases anxiety and facilitates

communication”3.

The relationship between Iran and US over the previous 30 years (1979-2009) had

been seriously affecting the terms on which they had bilateral talks– the lack of trust caused for

the previous ineffective bargaining and stalled negotiations. This emulated a situation where the

high stakes were all that mattered i.e. Shell’s ‘Situational Matrix’ describes the parties treating this

as a ‘Transaction’, where ‘Integrative Bargaining’ should be used to trade between issues and

3 Shell, R. (2006) Bargaining for Advantage. New York, NY: Penguin Group.

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‘packages’, making small concessions to gauge interests, yet this “logrolling” did not happen4 5.

This is because of the low trust between parties, low value placed on relationships and ‘the norm

of reciprocity’ not being pursued, which were all fundamental requirements for moving forward

in this sensitive situation. The use of confidence building measures were illustrative of the need

for P5-plus-1 and Iran to create a level of trust in their nuclear program through making

reciprocated concessions and there was the realization that this would lead to the possibility of

reaching an agreeable deal.6 In this case the ‘norm of reciprocity’ did not fully develop as these

confidence measures, which included Iran voluntarily allowing more stringent inspections from

the IAEA i.e. the so-called ‘Additional Protocol’, were ended in protest to continued demands

that Iran ceases to enrich uranium, whilst sanctions were still being upheld.

The use of a mediator, Sultan Qaboos, was instrumental in establishing productive

communication and developing a relationship based on reciprocity whilst pursuing mutual

interests. The secret talks held in Oman in 2013, which had the “the specific goal of advancing

the stalled nuclear talks,” transformed the deal closer towards a Balanced Concerns situation, in

which the disparity between the value placed on stakes and relationships narrowed.7 [BBC] Richard

Shell points out that it is when there is higher trust and “genuine conflict between people over

their legitimate goals…[this] actually helps energize the collaborative problem-solving process in

a Balanced Concerns situation”5.

The improved focus on relationship was also a result of a strategic public message

from President Obama as well as Mr. Rouhani’s election campaign stating a willingness to engage

with the West8. Obama’s well-delivered speech was instrumental in motivating all parties to work

towards coming to a resolution; it touched upon the two sides differences, the challenges they

faced, and most importantly the basis for a solution; the need for renewed trust and cooperation.

Obama’s administration shows an understanding of the situation through the concern of

4 “Iran offers nuclear 'concession'” (2004, Nov 28) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4049967.stm 5 Shell, R. (2006) Bargaining for Advantage. New York, NY: Penguin Group. 6 “Inspections: The Weak Link in a Nuclear Agreement with Iran” (2014, June 11) Vol. 14, No. 19 http://jcpa.org/article/inspections-‐nuclear-‐agreement/ 7 “Secret talks set stage for Iran nuclear deal” (2013, Nov 25) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-‐middle-‐east-‐25086236 8 “Secret US-‐Iran talks cleared way for historic nuclear deal” (2013, Nov 24) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10471030/Secret-US-Iran-talks-cleared-way-for-historic-nuclear-deal.html

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maintaining a good working relationship to facilitate effective communication and information

exchange and enable P5-plus-1 to understand intimately the other party’s interests so they “can

reach a comprehensive solution.”9 What is less obvious is whether the Republican majority

Congress understood that ‘norm of reciprocity’ could not envelop with their favoring of heavier

measures still.10

The negotiation that takes place here is package bargaining, since there are multiple

interests at stake and all relate to each other. Since November 24 2013, when the JPA was

established there have been two extensions to the initial deadline and fourteen rounds of

negotiations in total. This lengthy process can be attributed to the long development time for

highly sensitive relationships, the issues at hand as well as the time for trust to build, to establish

underlying interests and to test the expectation based on the parties’ relative leverage.11

Foundation II: The Other Party’s Interests

As the crisis group put it in 2014, the deal will “ultimately be sustainable only if the

parties…recognize that their rival’s legitimate interests need to be respected”. [CRISIS GROUP] This

view is confirmed by Shell who says that “understanding what the other party really wants is

critical to Information-Based Bargaining.”11

For example, in negotiations pre-2013, the P5-plus-1 insisted on Iran halting its

enrichment of uranium on the basis that their clandestine nuclear facilities meant the

international community could not trust their nuclear program. Iran perceived the US as having

leverage during 2003, which resulted in Iran yielding to pressure and cooperating. Once this

perceived leverage was diminished, however, Iran quickly reversed any concessions made, which

illustrates the previous understanding was not agreeable under ordinary circumstances and thus

did not respect Iran’s fundamental interests. One could speculate that Iran’s legitimate interests

were unclear and therefore the US thought it was better than their BATNA to use its leverage to

9 Barack Obama, White House Speech, (2013, Sep 27) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-‐press-‐office/2013/09/27/statement-‐president 10 “Where’s the deal?” (2013, Feb 2) http://www.economist.com/news/middle-‐east-‐and-‐africa/21571142-‐even-‐if-‐direct-‐negotiations-‐between-‐united-‐states-‐and-‐iran-‐ensue-‐few-‐predict 11 Shell, R. (2006) Bargaining for Advantage. New York, NY: Penguin Group.

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come up with at least a temporary solution until a more long-term viable one was found.

However, it is clear that if the P5-plus-1 understood Iran’s needs intimately and concurrently with

“establishing trust in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program”, this would achieve a

sustainable agreement as the Western front reciprocated nuclear concessions.12

In ‘Getting to Yes’, one of the books main points is to ‘focus on interests, not

positions. “We will not surrender or suspend uranium enrichment in any situation…we will not

allow even a gram of uranium to go out of the country"; this is an illustrative example of Mr.

Araqchi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, taking a position – an attempt to increase the

perception of his bottom line. Behind this opposing position with the US, lies shared and

compatible interest (as well as conflicting ones)13. Colin H. Kahl described there being a need for

negotiators to trade-off issues, in particular, the number of centrifuges and stockpiles represent

interrelated constraints.14 We can observe how the negotiators were successful in finding shared

interests in this circumstance, by looking at the framework deal that stipulates reducing the

stockpile from 10,000 to 300kg for 15 years and reducing the number of installed centrifuges

from 19,000 to 6,104. These two parameters of the deal represents the creation of inventive

options to solve both parties’ interests such that the ‘pie is made larger’. This idea is fundamental

to an integrative bargaining process where the negotiator identifies the issues most important to

each side and then “logrolling” interests in exchange for reciprocal accommodations; Shell

describes this strategy as carrying a lower risk of impasse, which was key for the nuclear talks

after the JPA.15

The fundamental issue, as pointed out earlier, was that there was low trust in Iran’s

claim that its nuclear program was not military related. The mistrust was also directed at Iran’s

leaders, “the true intentions of which remained disquietingly unclear”.16 The new President

12 International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 152 (2014, May 9) http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-‐east-‐north-‐africa/iraq-‐iran-‐gulf/iran/152-‐iran-‐and-‐the-‐p5-‐plus-‐1-‐solving-‐the-‐nuclear-‐rubik-‐s-‐cube.aspx 13 Fisher, R; Ury, W; Patton, B. (2011) Getting to Yes. New York, NY: Penguin Group 14 In a video on Youtube of a event titled “The Rubik’s Cube of a Final Agreement” Colin H. Kahl discusses the idea of trading off issues. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9g_z8pDJ34s#t=6m54s 15 Shell, R. (2006) Bargaining for Advantage. New York, NY: Penguin Group. 16 Ben Cohen, “The Geneva deal and Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions” (2014) http://fathomjournal.org/the-‐geneva-‐deal-‐and-‐irans-‐nuclear-‐ambitions/

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Houssani is known to have boasted as a nuclear negotiator 10 years previous of how he used the

negotiations with the West to “buy time to advance Iran’s programme”. The US had two secret

meetings with the newly elected Mr. Rouhani; this is unambiguously a relationship-focused

strategy at establishing Iran’s intentions going forward with the nuclear talks. The secret nature of

the meetings, I believe, are significant because the goals going into such talks appear more

genuine; there will be a focus on the information exchange rather than a public relations effort

afterwards (in the secret talks this did not take place). Furthermore it signals to the other party

the expectation the P5-plus-1 (in particular the US regarding to the secret meetings) puts on the

relationship aspect, which is an important part of the cooperation effort moving forward.

By analysing the action/communication coming from Iran’s leadership, much akin to

active listening, key elements of their interests are noticeable, such as their justifiable claim “to

preserve a substantial part of its nuclear infrastructure, in view of the enormous cost it has paid

for it”. The influential International Crisis Group pointed out in mid-2014 that what should be

achieved is “compromise that satisfies both sides’ irreducible, bottom-line requirements” and

thus falls within the ZOPA, and would produce a win-win outcome. Once the ZOPA is

established, a creative and comprehensive agreement can be achieved through the rounds of

negotiations. As a negotiator it is important to understand that the way in which issues are

perceived are key to what they think will be possible; focusing on interests rather than positions

such as the time it takes to “break out” – an analysis which produces plastic numbers - is

important.17

A key interest that Iran’s leadership have communicated is a mutual interest, is

increased transparency, which many experts and critics believed is more likely to get approved.

This has been voiced by President Rouhani, “what we can offer the world is greater

transparency”, and with an aim to legitimise the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, the

resulting trust will have far reaching ramifications and help on the front of other issues. However,

it is important to be cautious from the negotiator’s point of view, as US Secretary of State says,

17 International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 152 (2014, May 9) http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-‐east-‐north-‐africa/iraq-‐iran-‐gulf/iran/152-‐iran-‐and-‐the-‐p5-‐plus-‐1-‐solving-‐the-‐nuclear-‐rubik-‐s-‐cube.aspx

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“words must be matched with actions” effectively pointing out to the vague words of the Iranian

President. The extent to which Iran could follow through with agreeing to “unprecedented levels

of transparency” should be evaluated i.e. the credibility of their claims are important in building

trust.18

Dr. Heinonen, a Senior Fellow at Harvard University, who spent 30-years working for

the IAEA was concerned that President Rouhani is not the final decision maker on nuclear

policy. Shell says identifying the decision maker and negotiating directly with them will be

instrumental in understanding the other party’s needs more intrinsically and bargaining more

effectively.19 Heinonen belief and Shells view that negotiations are hindered by not talking

directly with the decision maker, is somewhat proved by Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei saying a

week after the framework deal was created, that he neither accepts nor rejects it and that he

considers the deal not passable unless all sanctions are lifted immediately, in conflict with the

prospective terms and with President Rouhani’s statement saying, “will live up to our

promises.”20 This highlights the importance of negotiating directly with the decision maker; it will

have an impact on the terms negotiated and the commitment to the deal once reached.

Foundation III: Authoritative Standards & Norms

President Obama announced the historic conversation he had had with President

Rouhani in September 2013, detailing how he is “mindful of all the challenges ahead” but he

“believes [Iran and the P5-plus-1] can reach a comprehensive solution”. In addition, he mentions

the Supreme Leader – who has ultimate authority on Iran’s nuclear and foreign policy – Ali

Khamenei’s “fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons” also stating that “President

Rouhani has indicated that Iran will never develop nuclear weapons”. This is a powerful message;

this tactic, where he publicly announces what the US and now the entire international community

18 “Inspections: The Weak Link in a Nuclear Agreement with Iran” (2014, June 11) Vol. 14, No. 19 http://jcpa.org/article/inspections-‐nuclear-‐agreement/ 19 Ben Cohen, “The Geneva deal and Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions” (2014) http://fathomjournal.org/the-‐geneva-‐deal-‐and-‐irans-‐nuclear-‐ambitions/ 20 “Iran Supreme Leader Speech” (2015, Apr 10) http://www.businessinsider.com/irans-‐supreme-‐leader-‐just-‐gave-‐a-‐speech-‐that-‐could-‐put-‐a-‐nuclear-‐deal-‐out-‐of-‐reach-‐2015-‐4

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expects of Iran, uses a large international audience to pressurize the opposite party into acting

consistently with their previous statements, and puts P5-plus-1’s in a better bargaining position as

well as helping to move talks forward.21

An interesting authoritative standard of significance is the issuance of a fatwa – a

ruling by a religious authority, often with judicial implications – by Supreme Leader Ali

Khamenei, against the development of nuclear weapons. This is particularly of significant

meaning because President Obama refers to it in his speech; the use of the audience is to

Obama’s advantage as discussed before. However, in light of this, there is a cloud of controversy

surrounding the legitimacy of the fatwa and whether the Supreme Leader has the authority to

make one and critics argue whether it has had and should have any weighting on discussions and

trust going forward. Furthermore, as an expert on Khamenei at the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace (CEIP), Karim Sadjadpour suggests, “Obama is referencing the fatwa in

order to give the Iranians an easier route to compromise — because of their religious beliefs, not

because of U.S.-led sanctions.” This infers how Obama is using the power of authority – in this

case Khamenei – to rally support for working with the P5+1; perhaps then, with Iran claiming

the legitimacy of the fatwa and Obama referring to it as such, it’s validity does not matter.22

Previously, Iran has used the consistency principle to contend that it is being singled

out and treated exceptionally unjust, and that as a signatory of the Nonproliferation Treaty

(NPT), more over because it has mastered enrichment technology “Iran believes it has secured

the right to continue enrichment”. The US and other countries have used the supporting

argument that Iran’s past deception means that it “can no longer be trusted with the legal right to

enrich uranium”. This argument has rallied support amongst the international community

however “Iran’s leaders have maintained steadfastly that they will not bargain away their

enrichment capability,” and upholding this consistent position has seemed to have gained them

an important normative leverage in negotiating this right. Furthermore, there is a concern that the

21 Barack Obama, White House Speech, (2013, Sep 27) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-‐press-‐office/2013/09/27/statement-‐president 22 “Did Iran’s supreme leader issue a fatwa?” (2013, Nov 27) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-‐checker/wp/2013/11/27/did-‐irans-‐supreme-‐leader-‐issue-‐a-‐fatwa-‐against-‐the-‐development-‐of-‐nuclear-‐weapons/

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mastering of the enrichment process has already occurred, so the focus should not be on this but

instead in limiting what Iran can do with the process.23 24

Iran had also gained leverage through a standards based argument from an

authoritative figure, Ali Soltanyieh, former Iranian ambassador to the IAEA, who dispelled the

idea of a more robust inspection system “as a “full contravention” of the NPT and the Statute of

the IAEA.” The use of these authoritative figures in widely publicized negotiations are common,

particularly in this case, with many people voicing their thoughts; this magnitude of opinions on

either side could have a diminishing effect on the ability for the ‘power of authority’ principal to

come into play.

Foundation IV: Leverage

Iran makes the first offer in a comprehensive proposal of negotiations to the US, who

refuses it with contempt on the basis that “Iran has to answer to the international community”.

This large early-on concession seemed to reveal that Iran really wanted a deal, however Middle

East expert at CEIP, Trita Parsi saw how the US had threat-based leverage over Iran, forcing

their cooperation.25

Iran’s BATNA seemed weaker than the US’ in 2003, when it sent a proposal including

“full cooperation on nuclear programs”. The timing was just after Baghdad had been taken over

by US forces, which Parsi says frightened the Iranians who had not been able to defeat the Iraq

army in 8-years of bloody battle compared to the US who had overpowered them in three weeks.

The decision to walk away shows that US had more leverage, since they had the ‘least to lose

from no deal’. However, the perception of BATNA, is important too, and many authoritative

figures believed the rejected proposal, which had a comprehensive list of Iranian and US aims for

the talks, represented a major lost opportunity for the US, particularly because “it was an

authoritative initiative that had the support of then-President Mohammad Khatami and supreme

23 “Iran: Where we are today” (2009, May 4) http://fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/iran.html 24 International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 152 (2014, May 9) http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-‐east-‐north-‐africa/iraq-‐iran-‐gulf/iran/152-‐iran-‐and-‐the-‐p5-‐plus-‐1-‐solving-‐the-‐nuclear-‐rubik-‐s-‐cube.aspx 25 “In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran's Offer of Dialogue” (2006, June 18) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-‐dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700727_pf.html

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religious leader Ali Khamenei.” Paul Pillar, the former national intelligence officer for the Near

East and South Asia believes that the US position is “inherently weaker now” because of Iraq,

whilst the Foreign Relations report notes the “failure to find WMD in Iraq after its invasion

damaged its credibility on the issue”26. In addition, Parsi reveals that he believes that the US not

curtseying Iran with a response to the offer “strengthened the hands of those in Iran” as it had an

impact on the government. The action and also inaction by the US affected their leverage, as it

revealed the US underlying interests; they cared more about Iranian power than their politics and

so “the only way to compel the US to talk or deal with Iran is…by being a nuisance.”27

Another key development that changed the balance of leverage is the sudden break

out of North Korea in 2003 leading to the creation of a nuclear weapon 4 years later. Iran, by

following this example and “withdrawing from the NPT, throwing out the IAEA inspectors and

reconfiguring the centrifuges” could develop a nuclear warhead; this could represent a significant

boost to their BATNA (- if the motivation to break out) and therefore leverage.26

Iran has situational advantage, i.e. they have ultimate decision over the nuclear

program, which makes it harder to bargain with them. This is where the ‘power of coalition’ is

used – perhaps P5-plus-1’s most important leverage, which uses the relationships and strong

mutual interests of the 6 countries to support their bargaining position. The use of economic

sanctions as a negative deterrent to breaking away has been successful; a major issue for Iran in

2013 once sanctions had taken full effect, was a currency depreciated by 50% over the year,

depleted forex reserves, and a flat economy – “the sanctions are inflicting unprecedented

economic pain”28 29. This leverage to apply sanctions was somewhat reduced by China and Russia

not fully committed to supporting sanctions that were tough enough deterrents to Iran not

complying with inspections and other requirements because of the potential to “cause them

economic harm because of their trade ties with Iran,” further more China had veto power and

26 “Iran: Where we are today” (2009, May 4) http://fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/iran.html 27 “In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran's Offer of Dialogue” (2006, June 18) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-‐dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700727_pf.html 28 International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 152 (2014, May 9) http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-‐east-‐north-‐africa/iraq-‐iran-‐gulf/iran/152-‐iran-‐and-‐the-‐p5-‐plus-‐1-‐solving-‐the-‐nuclear-‐rubik-‐s-‐cube.aspx

29 “Where’s the deal?” (2013, Feb 2) http://www.economist.com/news/middle-‐east-‐and-‐africa/21571142-‐even-‐if-‐direct-‐negotiations-‐between-‐united-‐states-‐and-‐iran-‐ensue-‐few-‐predict

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threatened to use it over the sanctions pre-2009.30 Iran, in anticipation of the sanctions,

attempted to make their economy resistant to them by diversifying their imports and exports and

use “international trade relations for diplomatic goals.”31

Conclusions

The key lessons I think should be taken away from these negotiations are that trust and

relationships are of upmost significance when attempting to strike a sustainable deal. I enjoy

analysing political negotiations because of the multiple issues, high stakes and high relationship

focused nature of bargaining; analysing helped to distinguish key strategies used successfully in

these situations and gain an understanding of what must be done to negotiate a deal to your

advantage. I believe this type of negotiation, involving multiple issues is perhaps the toughest to

be successful at, and will have a recurrence in my future numerous times a year.

This essay has taught me the importance of the ‘norm of reciprocity’, how the perception of

leverage affects the outcome, that trust is fundamental to secure a long-term relationship and

sustainable deal, that finding out the other side’s underlying interests early on is paramount for

effective negotiating and that identifying and negotiating with the deal maker is important in

order to decrease the chances of impasse and increase commitment to any negotiated outcome.

On this last point, after all the multiple rounds of negotiation since the JPA, the P5-plus-1

must be cautious with the still fragile framework deal and Iran must realise that more action has

to be demonstrated to secure the trust of the West. With the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei

cautious to accept the deal, the West should maintain it’s BATNA and therefore that it’s leverage

is greater. Leverage appears to be with the US since Iran’s economy is weak as a result of the

isolation from international trade, and the West has threatened to implement sanctions in the

event of an impasse – and given P5-plus-1 and Iran’s history, it is a credible threat.

30 “Iran: Where we are today” (2009, May 4) http://fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/iran.html 31 “The cost of economic sanctions” (2006, May 5) http://www.payvand.com/news/06/may/1046.html

iran’s nuclear deal - an analysis on the political negotiations for power

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