Rules of Evidence on Opinions of Market Value

in Court or Administrative Hearings

IPT Property Tax Symposium, Austin, Texas

Tuesday, November 3, 2015

Jon M. Ripans, J.D., M.B.A. Finance

Attorney, Appraiser, Arbitrator/Mediator

http://www.linkedin.com/in/jonripans

jripans@gmail.com

I. This session is a multi-jurisdictional survey of the rules governing the types of

witnesses who are deemed competent to give opinion of value evidence in courts

of record, tax tribunals, and administrative hearings. Individuals in roles such as

assessors, appraisers, property owners, real estate brokers, tax consultants, and

others will be discussed. Learn more about the requirements in place for multiple

jurisdictions and discuss how various jurisdictions across the country have treated

opinion of value in other cases. At the end of the session, the attendee will have

an understanding of:

a. Identify witnesses who can give opinion of value testimony;

b. Learn the various settings in which opinion of value testimony is presented;

and

c. Differentiate how courts in various jurisdictions treat opinion of value

testimony.

II. The Fundamental Assumption Underlying This Presentation

a. The rules of evidence are mostly exclusionary rules designed to prevent lay

jurors from being misled, prejudiced, or tainted by “bad” evidence.

b. Court proceedings, with or without a jury, have the strictest rules of evidence

in most jurisdictions.

c. The rules of evidence, if any, for administrative hearings, such as boards of

equalization, tax tribunals, property tax hearing officers, etc., are almost always

less strict than the rules of evidence in courts of record.

d. Therefore, if evidentiary rules or court cases in a given jurisdiction say that

certain persons may provide opinion of value testimony, then those categories

of persons are likely to be competent witnesses for opinions of value in

property tax appeals at all levels. Examples include, but are clearly not limited

to the following:

i. Appraisers

ii. Brokers

iii. Individual Property Owners

iv. Corporate Property Owners

III. The Key Distinction in Evidentiary Matters is Admissibility vs. Weight and

Credibility

a. The fundamental analysis in the use of evidence is a two-step process:

i. Step One is the Admissibility of Evidence

1. What types of evidence are admissible?

2. Who is a competent witness for each type evidence?

3. What evidentiary foundation is needed to admit the evidence?

ii. Step Two is what Weight and Credibility should the trier of fact give

the evidence.

b. Weight and Credibility is an infinite topic that is beyond the scope of this

presentation because it involves how the trier of fact – a jury or a judge sitting

without a jury – perceives the credibility of the evidence and what weight they

choose to give to it.

c. Similarly, it is far beyond the scope of a one-hour presentation to cover all

types of evidence that could be used to argue value, but we will go over some

of them.

i. Cost Approach

1. Land

2. Construction Costs

3. Depreciation

4. Deferred Maintenance

5. Functional Obsolescence

6. External Obsolescence

ii. Income Approach

1. Market Rents

2. Other Income

3. Market Vacancy

4. Expenses

5. Cap Rate

6. Lease-Up/Stabilization

iii. Sales Comparison Approach

1. Comparables

2. Adjusting the Comparables to Subject Property

IV. There are two types of witnesses

a. Fact Witnesses with first-hand knowledge of particular facts

b. Opinion Witnesses who can give an opinion on the ultimate issue in dispute

and who are one of three types:

i. Expert Opinion Witnesses

ii. Skilled Witnesses

iii. Lay Opinion Witnesses

V. Jurisdictions

a. Alabama

i. In eminent domain proceeding, lay witness is competent to give his

opinion as to value if he has had an opportunity to form a correct

opinion and testifies, in substance, that he has done so. State v. Central

of Georgia R. Co., 293 Ala. 675, 309 So. 2d 452 (1975).

ii. Witness who had owned and subdivided land was qualified to give his

opinion as to market value of such land as witness for landowner in

condemnation proceeding. Code of Ala., Tit. 7, § 367. State v.

Holloway, 293 Ala. 543, 307 So. 2d 13 (1975).

iii. The owner of land, by virtue of his ownership, is considered prima

facie qualified to testify to its value without any further showing.

Presley v. B.I.C. Const., Inc., 64 So. 3d 610 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), cert.

quashed, 64 So. 3d 627 (Ala. 2010).

iv. Homeowner rebutted the presumption that he was qualified to testify

as to the “fair market value” of his house as actually constructed, and,

thus, trial court acted was justified in excluding the dollar amount

offered by homeowner as evidence in trial on homeowner’s contract

and tort claims against construction company, where homeowner

indicated in his testimony that he did not have an opinion regarding the

fair market value of the house as actually constructed. Presley v. B.I.C.

Const., Inc., 64 So. 3d 610 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), cert. quashed, 64 So.

3d 627 (Ala. 2010).

b. Alaska: An owner opinion of value of his property is competent even

though it may not be very persuasive. Gregory v. Padilla, 379 P.2d 951 (Alaska

1963).

c. Arizona

i. Owner may generally estimate value of his real or personal property

whether he qualifies as an expert or not. Acheson v. Shafter, 107 Ariz.

576, 490 P.2d 832 (1971).

ii. Lack of membership in professional appraisers organization went

solely to weight of real estate agent and broker testimony as to value of

property, not to admissibility. Higgins v. Arizona Sav. and Loan Ass’n,

90 Ariz. 55, 365 P.2d 476 (1961).

iii. Trial court refusal to permit witness who had 14 years’ experience in

conducting roadside business in Gila Bend area but had examined

property in Camp Verde area only once, one week before eminent

domain trial, to testify as to value of the Camp Verde area property was

not abuse of discretion. Parker v. State ex rel. Church, 89 Ariz. 124,

359 P.2d 63 (1961).

iv. A real estate saleswoman, a real estate broker and land appraiser, one

who had acted as broker in purchase and sale of ranches in area and

had managed ranches and one who had devoted himself exclusively to

buying and selling lands in area on his own account were qualified

generally to testify to value of land in area. State ex rel. Morrison v. Jay

Six Cattle Co., 88 Ariz. 97, 353 P.2d 185 (1960).

v. In condemnation case, trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting testimony of witness as to value of property, even though

witness was not a technical expert, where he appeared to have had

peculiar means of forming intelligent judgment as to value of property

in question. State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 352 P.2d 343 (1960).

d. Arkansas

i. A landowner intimately familiar with her property is unquestionably

qualified to state an opinion about its value. City of Jacksonville v.

Nixon, 2014 Ark. App. 485, 442 S.W.3d 906 (2014).

ii. A non-expert witness, who is acquainted with the condemned land and

says he knows the market value, is competent to express an opinion as

to its market value. City of Springdale v. Keicher, 243 Ark. 161, 419

S.W.2d 800 (1967).

iii. Agent, who was in real estate business for five years and qualified as an

expert and who had viewed condemned property, was qualified to

express his opinion as to fair market value of land, in condemnation

proceeding. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Holt, 242 Ark.

287, 413 S.W.2d 643 (1967).

iv. Witness who lived three and one-half to four miles from property

taken, dealt in real estate and had done appraisal work for state and had

been familiar with property taken for 60 years was qualified to express

opinion as to fair market value of property before and after taking.

Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Sargent, 241 Ark. 783, 410

S.W.2d 381 (1967).

v. In eminent domain action, landowner is competent witness to testify as

to value of his land simply because he owns it, but landowner must

relate satisfactory explanation on cross-examination to justify his value

estimate. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Cook, 257 Ark. 98,

514 S.W.2d 215 (1974).

vi. Landowner opinion as to value of his land is admissible in evidence

whether he knows anything about land market values in area or not,

and opinion is admissible simply because he owns land and is qualified

to state opinion as to value of what he owns. Arkansas State Highway

Commission v. Jones, 256 Ark. 40, 505 S.W.2d 210 (1974).

vii. Where landowner is intimately acquainted with land and conditions and

its highest and best use, he may testify to value although opinion is not

based upon comparable sales or he lacks knowledge of property values,

but opinion is to be stricken when it is unrelated to any facts in record

and is apparently plucked from air and without fair and reasonable

basis. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Steen, 253 Ark. 908, 489

S.W.2d 781 (1973).

viii. Where it appeared that landowner estimate of before and after values

of land in condemnation action was based on value of property to him,

landowner testimony as to such estimate was improperly admitted.

Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Highfill, 248 Ark. 541, 452

S.W.2d 846 (1970).

ix. An owner of property is competent to testify as to value of his

property even though he has no knowledge of property values if he has

an intimate acquaintance with his property, but not every landowner

testimony constitutes substantial evidence. Arkansas State Highway

Commission v. Watson, 248 Ark. 422, 451 S.W.2d 741 (1970).

x. A landowner testimony is competent and admissible in eminent

domain proceeding as to value of his lands, regardless of his lack of

knowledge of property values, if a satisfactory explanation is given for

his conclusion; any infirmities in his testimony bear on weight rather

than admissibility. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Kennedy,

248 Ark. 301, 451 S.W.2d 745 (1970).

e. California

i. Market value may be proved by testimony of an expert such as an

appraiser and owner may testify as to value of his property without

qualifying as an expert. Buist v. C. Dudley De Velbiss Corp., 182 Cal.

App. 2d 325, 6 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1st Dist. 1960).

ii. The owner of property, whether generally familiar with such values or

not, is competent to estimate its worth, the lack of knowledge going to

the weight rather than admissibility of the testimony. City of Fresno v.

Hedstrom, 103 Cal. App. 2d 453, 229 P.2d 809 (4th Dist. 1951).

iii. In action by purchasers of motel against vendors for false

representations, it was within province of trial court to reject testimony

of real estate broker and appraiser as to value of motel at time of sale,

where such broker had never individually or as a broker bought or sold

a motel, although he had appraised a few motels. Hull v. Sheehan, 108

Cal. App. 2d 804, 239 P.2d 704 (2d Dist. 1952).

iv. To qualify a witness to testify as an expert to value of land, it is

necessary to show that he has peculiar means of forming an intelligent

and correct judgment as to value of the property in question because of

his familiarity with property in the neighborhood, his business

experience, and his familiarity with the market and sale of similar

property in the vicinity. Waters v. Lanigan, 137 Cal. App. 2d 268, 290

P.2d 370 (1st Dist. 1955).

v. The usual expert is qualified to give opinion as to value of property

being condemned by showing his familiarity with the property and with

other property in the neighborhood, his experience in the business, his

familiarity with the state of the market and with sales of similar

property in the vicinity. People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 264 P.2d

15 (1953).

vi. Farmers, farm appraisers and real estate brokers who were shown to be

familiar with value of farming land in community were competent to

give expert testimony on subject of value, and fact that some of them

had not seen farm for some time was not fatal, where there was

evidence that farm was then in substantially the same condition as

when last seen. Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 192 P.2d 935

(1948).

vii. Owner of property is allowed to estimate its worth whether or not he

has any special knowledge of such values, and credit and weight to be

given such evidence and its effect, as well as the resolution of conflicts

between such testimony and that of expert witness, is for trier of fact.

West Ann.Evid.Code, § 800. Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App.

3d 844, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1st Dist. 1970).

viii. Generally, officer of corporate owner of land being valued is not

qualified to testify as to his opinion of value in issue unless he is

otherwise qualified. City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church, 1 Cal.

App. 3d 384, 82 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1st Dist. 1969).

ix. The owner of real or personal property may competently testify to its

value. Newhart v. Pierce, 254 Cal. App. 2d 783, 62 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1st

Dist. 1967).

x. Even if letter from board of supervisors to condemnees were to be

construed as an admission that property was worth $40,000, it was

inadmissible as it was not the expression of a witness qualified to

express an opinion as to value. West Ann.Evid.Code, §§ 810 et seq.,

813, 822, 1152. San Joaquin County v. Galletti, 252 Cal. App. 2d 840,

61 Cal. Rptr. 62 (5th Dist. 1967).

xi. Real estate agent who sold lot on behalf of owner was competent to

give opinion as to value of lot. Doctor v. Lakeridge Const. Co., 252

Cal. App. 2d 715, 60 Cal. Rptr. 824 (2d Dist. 1967).

f. Colorado

i. Before a witness is qualified to give an opinion as to value of property,

it must be shown that he had the means to form an intelligent opinion,

derived from an adequate knowledge of the nature and kind of

property in controversy, and of its value. City and County of Denver v.

Hinsey, 177 Colo. 178, 493 P.2d 348 (1972).

ii. Permitting of landowner’s appraisers to arrive at their opinions of fair

market value of property taken for highway purposes by hypothetically

carving it into residential building sites, estimating the value of each

site, and then adding estimated values of all the sites together was

improper and highly speculative and the admission of such evidence

into eminent domain proceeding was prejudicial error. C.R.S. 3,

50”1”17, 50”1”18. Department of Highways v. Schulhoff, 167 Colo.

72, 445 P.2d 402 (1968).

iii. It is proper for an owner to testify as to value of his own property.

Frankfort Oil Co. v. Abrams, 159 Colo. 535, 413 P.2d 190 (1966).

iv. Owner may testify as to his own estimate of value of land in

condemnation proceedings. Board of Directors of Baker Metropolitan

Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Calvaresi, 156 Colo. 173, 397 P.2d 877

(1964).

v. In action in eminent domain, former and current county assessors were

competent to testify concerning value of lands taken. 5 C.S.A. c. 142, §

2. McNulty v. Bobson, 117 Colo. 336, 187 P.2d 590 (1947).

vi. Husband, as owner of realty, was entitled to give his opinion as to its

value in divorce case involving property settlement. Stover v. Stover,

491 P.2d 1393 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).

g. Connecticut

i. Whether purchaser’s expert witness specifically should have made

study of comparable sales of other property similar in nature was

question of judicial discretion in purchaser’s action against real estate

developer for misrepresentation. Richard v. A. Waldman & Sons, Inc.,

155 Conn. 343, 232 A.2d 307 (1967).

ii. Owner of property is competent to testify as to its market value.

Misisco v. La Maita, 150 Conn. 680, 192 A.2d 891 (1963).

iii. In determining value of residential realty for taxation, trial court was

entitled to consider and give some weight to testimony of real estate

agents, qualified as experts as to value of entire property and of

dwelling house based on replacement costs, though their estimates did

not include depreciation in one instance and in another failed to show

real cubic content of house. Thaw v. Town of Fairfield, 132 Conn. 173,

43 A.2d 65, 160 A.L.R. 679 (1945).

iv. Owner of franchise of oyster grounds could testify to value of his

franchise based upon prices paid by him for other oyster grounds in

the vicinity, even without his long experience as an oyster grower.

Lovejoy v. Town of Darien, 131 Conn. 533, 41 A.2d 98 (1945).

v. Homeowners are permitted to testify concerning their opinion as to the

fair market value of the property. Martin v. Martin, 101 Conn. App.

106, 920 A.2d 340 (2007).

vi. An owner of property is competent to testify as to its market value.

United Builders, Inc. v. Hala, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 508, 258 A.2d 115 (App.

Div. 1968).

h. Delaware

i. Admissible evidence of comparable sales falls into three categories: (1)

on direct examination as independent substantive evidence of value; (2)

on direct examination as a factual basis to substantiate opinion of

expert witness; and (3) on cross-examination to impeach an expert

witness by testing his preparation, accuracy and knowledge. State ex rel.

Price v. 0.0673 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Baltimore Hundred,

Sussex County, 224 A.2d 598 (Del. 1966).

ii. Evidence of income and expenditures of business carried on in

leasehold premises is admissible in fixing fair market value of lease on

condemned land. Improved Parcel of Land, Known as No. 400

Maryland Ave. in City of Wilmington, New Castle County v. State ex

rel. State Highway Dept., 57 Del. 454, 201 A.2d 453 (1964).

iii. Generally, owner may express opinion as to fair market value of

property, but where it plainly appears that owner has no knowledge of

value, presumption of knowledge is overcome, and owner opinion is

generally inadmissible. State ex rel. Smith v. 0.15 Acres of Land, More

or Less, in New Castle Hundred, New Castle County, 53 Del. 372, 169

A.2d 256 (1961).

iv. The owner of property is deemed qualified by reason of such

relationship as owner to give estimates of value of what he owns.

Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262, 92 A.2d 311

(1952).

i. Florida

i. An owner of property may testify in condemnation proceeding as to

value of property, although owner is not qualified as an expert.

F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 6(a). Hill v. Marion County, 238 So. 2d 163 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1970).

ii. Testimony as to fair market value of property by taxing authorities’

expert, who based appraisal on potential future use of property which

would necessitate rezoning, was based on such speculation and

conjecture as to make testimony incompetent as basis for

determination of proper valuation, and admission of such testimony

violated statute requiring use of method of assessment so as to secure

just valuation. F.S.A. § 193.021. Bal Harbour Club, Inc. v. Dade

County, 222 So. 2d 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1969).

iii. It was not an abuse of discretion to hold a witness qualified to testify as

an expert as to value of condemned land where person stated he had

been appointed by a probate court to make appraisals, made appraisals

for a lending institution, a lumber company, and for attorneys, and had

been called as a witness in a public housing authority condemnation

suit as an appraiser, even though he did not testify as to having made

appraisals of or as to having familiarized himself with values of

property in vicinity of condemned land in question. State Road Dept.

v. Outlaw, 148 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1963).

iv. Witness who testifies as to value of realty must have had adequate

opportunity to apprise himself of worth of realty and should know

particular property to be valued and value of land in vicinity or of same

class. Harbond, Inc. v. Anderson, 134 So. 2d 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2d Dist. 1961).

j. Georgia

i. New Statute Effective January 1, 2013: OCGA § 24-7-701(b): “A

witness need not be an expert or dealer in an article or property to

testify as to its value if he or she has had an opportunity to form a

reasoned opinion.”

ii. Old Statute: O.C.G.A. § 24-9-66: “Direct testimony as to market

value is in the nature of opinion evidence. One need not be an expert

or dealer in the article in question but may testify as to its value if he

has had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion.” The owner of

property is qualified to state his opinion as to value. Maddox v. State,

157 Ga. App. 696 (1981).

iii. Witness tendered an affidavit and was deposed. In his deposition, he

testified as to the value of the Ballybunion property based on tax

appraisals and recent sales that he had seen. In his affidavit, he opined

as to the fair market value of five of the properties at different relevant

points in time based on a "thorough knowledge of sales in the area,

having experience in buying and selling real estate, and reviewing the

tax valuations for [the property]." Thus, Safari showed that he had an

"opportunity to form a reasoned opinion" as required by OCGA § 24-

7-701 (b). Cf. Maree v. ROMAR Joint Venture, 329 Ga. App. 282, 295

(6) (a) (763 SE2d 899) (2014) (witness's testimony that she based her

opinion as to value on "rental rates in the area, information from

appraisals, and (her) knowledge of the commercial real estate market in

the area," was sufficient to show that she had an opportunity to form a

correct opinion as to value, the standard under the law prior to the

effective date of the new Evidence Code — July 1, 2013)[2]; In re

Estate of Hubert, 325 Ga. App. 276, 286 (6) (750 SE2d 511) (2013)

(testimony that witness "was familiar with the properties at issue, in

which he had an ownership interest, and that he also was familiar with

comparable properties, which he had considered in reaching his

opinion" provided a sufficient foundation under former law). Safari v.

Res-Ms Bayfront, LLC, Citation Pending (Ga. App., July 14, 2015)

iv. A person need not be a licensed real estate broker, appraiser, or

salesman to qualify as an expert sufficiently qualified to give his

opinion on the value of property. Wilson v. Wilson, 277 Ga. 801, 596

S.E.2d 392 (2004).

v. Witness who testified that he had sold some land in the community,

that he knew of other property that had been sold and that he was

about as familiar with market value of land in community as anyone

else was qualified to testify as to value of landowner’s property

allegedly rendered useless by defendant which operated stone quarry

and crushing business on its leased property adjacent to landowner’s

property and which allegedly had raised height of dam it had previously

constructed on its land for purpose of impounding water from stream

which flowed through landowner’s property so as to cause water to

back up and flood landowner’s property and which allegedly had

caused residue from crushed stone to settle thereon and thereby turn

property into a quagmire. Code § 38”1709. Gainesville Stone Co. v.

Parker, 224 Ga. 819, 165 S.E.2d 296 (1968).

vi. Objecting joint venturer’s testimony that she had based her estimated

rental value of joint venture’s property on rental rates in the area,

information from appraisals, and her knowledge of the commercial real

estate market in the area, was sufficient to create a foundation for the

jury to consider her opinion as to the property’s rental value, in

proceedings on breach of contract claim against managing joint

venturer. West’s Ga.Code Ann. § 24–9–66 (Repealed). Maree v.

ROMAR Joint Venture, 763 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).

vii. Witness for state Department of Transportation (DOT) was qualified

to render expert opinion as to just and adequate compensation in

condemnation proceeding involving property whose highest and best

use was commercial development; witness held master’s degree in real

estate, witness had been licensed as real estate appraiser for 15 years,

witness had specialized in appraising commercial properties, witness

held real estate broker’s license and owned brokerage company, and

witness provided his opinion of just and adequate compensation in

approximately 35 condemnations. Woodland Partners Ltd. Partnership

v. Department of Transp., 286 Ga. App. 546, 650 S.E.2d 277 (2007),

cert. denied, (Sept. 24, 2007).

k. Hawaii: Owner of land is generally qualified to give his opinion as to

value of land and weight to be given such testimony is for jury. Territory by

Sharpless v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.2d 979 (1961).

l. Idaho

i. Owner of property is competent witness as to its value. Bratton v.

Slininger, 93 Idaho 248, 460 P.2d 383 (1969).

ii. Where taking of 20-foot strip of land for highway improvement

purposes would require porch steps situated on land taken to be built

in some other place, value of steps taken could have been considered

either as severance damages or as damages for improvement taken; but

any error in failure of findings to delineate specifically whether various

items of damages constituted valuations for property taken or

severance damages was rendered harmless where findings specifically

stated each item of property taken and valuation thereof and double

damages did not result. I.C. § 7”711, subds. 1, 2. State ex rel. Burns v.

Blair, 91 Idaho 137, 417 P.2d 217 (1966).

iii. One who had lived in the community for 32 years and who had

engaged in the garage, service station and wholesale petroleum business

and who was a director of a bank in the community and had served on

the bank loan committee and who was familiar with tract used for

service station, tavern and novelty shop and one who was an insurance

broker and in the real estate business and who had previously appraised

property on a number of occasions and who had dealt with all types of

property and had personally inspected the subject tract were qualified

to express an opinion concerning the market value of the subject tract;

the determination of the weight to be given to their opinions was for

the jury in condemnation case. State ex rel. Rich v. Halverson, 86

Idaho 242, 384 P.2d 480 (1963).

iv. As a general rule, the owner of property may testify as to its value.

Taysom v. Taysom, 82 Idaho 58, 349 P.2d 556 (1960).

v. An owner is competent to testify to value of property without further

qualification; however, the weight of his testimony is to be determined

from a consideration of his knowledge and experience in regard to the

value in question and unless his want of qualification is so complete

that his testimony is entirely worthless, it is for jury to assess its value.

Bancroft v. Smith, 80 Idaho 63, 323 P.2d 879 (1958).

m. Illinois

i. A witness who is familiar with the property at issue and has direct

knowledge of real estate values in the vicinity is competent to offer an

opinion about value. Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106,

284 Ill. Dec. 360, 810 N.E.2d 13 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 943, 125

S. Ct. 354, 160 L. Ed. 2d 256 (2004).

ii. Witness is competent to testify as to value of realty if it appears that he

has some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct

judgment as to value of land in question beyond what is presumed to

be possessed by men generally. Department of Public Works and

Bldgs. v. Oberlaender, 42 Ill. 2d 410, 247 N.E.2d 888 (1969).

iii. Professional real estate appraiser, who had for many years valued

properties throughout country and in Illinois, and who had spent

considerable time in examining premises and investigating facts on

which to base opinion, was competent to testify in condemnation case,

although he had no previous knowledge of land values in locality.

Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Divit, 25 Ill. 2d 93, 182

N.E.2d 749 (1962).

iv. Anyone who is acquainted with property and has knowledge of value,

either in sale or ownership of property nearby, is competent to testify

in a condemnation case. Department of Public Works and Bldgs. v.

Pellini, 7 Ill. 2d 367, 131 N.E.2d 55 (1955).

v. Anyone who is acquainted with realty and has knowledge of values

either in sale or ownership of realty nearby is competent to testify in

condemnation proceeding, and the question of the degree of his

experience is one of weight and not of competency of his testimony.

Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County v. Kercher, 394 Ill. 11, 66

N.E.2d 873 (1946).

vi. Trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to permit certain

witnesses owning property in area covered by challenged zoning

ordinance to testify as to valuations of land in area where there was an

absence of preliminary showing of factors upon which their opinions

as to valuation were based and testimony of certain witnesses could be

considered self-serving because they were plaintiffs. Tarala v. Village of

Wheeling, 25 Ill. App. 3d 349, 323 N.E.2d 454 (1st Dist. 1974).

vii. As a general rule, a witness may express his opinion as to market value

of real estate where it appears that witnessopinion is based on some

competence not possessed by general public. Stirs, Inc. v. City of

Chicago, 24 Ill. App. 3d 118, 320 N.E.2d 216 (1st Dist. 1974).

viii. An assessor is not per se objectionable as a witness in a condemnation

proceeding since he may well testify as to his judgment concerning

value of land, but he is not permitted to testify as to its assessed

valuation for taxation purposes. Department of Public Works and

Buildings v. Cohen, 9 Ill. App. 3d 85, 291 N.E.2d 883 (3d Dist. 1972).

ix. Witness is competent to testify as to value of land if it is shown that he

is acquainted with land and has knowledge of real estate values in

vicinity. Department of Business & Economic Development v.

Baumann, 9 Ill. App. 3d 1, 291 N.E.2d 213 (2d Dist. 1972).

x. Competency of a valuation witness in a condemnation proceeding is

established by showing that he is acquainted with the property

involved. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, Cook and Will

Counties v. Wagner, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 279 N.E.2d 754 (1st Dist.

1971).

n. Indiana

i. Witness who was owner of land adjoining that of defendants and who

was a contractor of many years of experience and was familiar with the

land of the defendants and had a detailed knowledge of other

commercial property in the immediate area was competent to testify to

the value of the defendant’s land. State v. Vaughan, 243 Ind. 221, 184

N.E.2d 143 (1962).

ii. Owner of trailer park, who had experience in dealing and fixing up

such parks and who had served as chairman of advisory board on

mobile home mapping and had done some work in the trailer park

owned by husband and wife, was competent to give his opinion as to

the value of the trailer park in a divorce proceeding. Tomchany v.

Tomchany, 134 Ind. App. 27, 185 N.E.2d 301 (Div. 1 1962).

o. Iowa

i. Witness was competent to testify in condemnation case as to value of

tract in industrial district along railway line, where witness was officer

and managing director of corporate landowner, was experienced in

development of other industrial districts along railway lines, was

familiar with tract and had knowledge of sales of industrial property in

the community. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway

Commission, 255 Iowa 292, 122 N.W.2d 323 (1963).

ii. Ordinarily the owner of property is deemed qualified by reason of his

ownership to express an opinion as to the value of his property for

purposes of determining its value for taxation, but the officer of a

private corporation which owns the property, unless he is a managing

officer, is not thereby qualified to testify as to its value, but it must be

further shown that he has knowledge of such value as qualifies him in

fact. Appeal of Dubuque-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 237 Iowa 1314, 25

N.W.2d 327 (1946).

iii. Consulting engineer, who was university graduate and licensed civil

engineer, geologist with college degree, and professional farm manager

and appraiser were properly permitted to give expert testimony on

value in proceeding for condemnation of property underlaid with sand

and gravel subject to removal by lessee. Comstock v. Iowa State

Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963).

iv. In proceeding to determine value of farmland condemned, witness

who stated that he was familiar with land values of farms in

neighborhood and general farmer living in neighborhood were

qualified to give their opinions as to value of land condemned and

permitting witnesses to testify that farm in area sold at auction for $200

per acre was not prejudicial. Harmsen v. Iowa State Highway

Commission, 251 Iowa 1351, 105 N.W.2d 660 (1960).

p. Kansas

i. Given landowner’s admission that he did not have appraisal expertise,

landowner was not qualified to perform a cost appraisal, and therefore,

trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding this evidence in

eminent domain proceeding. In re Eminent Domain, 320 P.3d 955

(Kan. 2014).

ii. In divorce proceeding, it was error to reject testimony put in form of

opinion on market value of real estate awarded to husband, where such

testimony was that of adjoining landowner claiming familiarity with

land sales in area. Gechter v. Gechter, 216 Kan. 360, 532 P.2d 1089

(1975).

iii. A landowner is a competent witness in a condemnation action to

testify as to value of his property. K.S.A. 26-201 et seq. McCall Service

Stations, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 390, 524 P.2d 1165

(1974).

iv. Owner of ranchland and former owners thereof and neighbors who

were thoroughly familiar with ranch were competent to testify as to

value of ranch. Fox v. Wilson, 211 Kan. 563, 507 P.2d 252 (1973).

v. Landowner is competent witness to testify as to value of his property.

State Highway Commission v. Lee, 207 Kan. 284, 485 P.2d 310 (1971).

vi. Landowner is competent witness to testify as to value of his property

in condemnation proceeding. Urban Renewal Agency of Wichita, Kan.,

Metropolitan Area v. Tate, 196 Kan. 654, 414 P.2d 28 (1966).

vii. The value of condemned property for a special use to which it is

adapted or put may be shown by persons familiar with such use, even

though they are not familiar with land values generally. Eisenring v.

Kansas Turnpike Authority, 183 Kan. 774, 332 P.2d 539 (1958).

viii. In a condemnation proceeding, opinion evidence is usually admitted

from persons who are not strictly experts, but who, from residing and

doing business in vicinity, familiarize themselves with land values. Mai

v. Garden City, 177 Kan. 179, 277 P.2d 636 (1954).

q. Kentucky

i. To be qualified to give opinion testimony about the value of property,

a lay witness must know the property to be valued and the value of the

property in the vicinity, must understand the standard of value, and

must be possessed of the ability to make a reasonable inference.

Summe v. Gronotte, 357 S.W.3d 211 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

ii. In dissolution proceedings, when determining the fair market value of

real property with improvements and without improvements, expert

opinion is ordinarily necessary; to be qualified to express an opinion

upon fair market value of real property, a witness, including the owner

thereof, must possess some basis for a knowledge of market values.

Jones v. Jones, 245 S.W.3d 815 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

iii. Unlike lay witness, expert valuation witness need not be acquainted

first hand with real estate values in the vicinity. Com., Dept. of

Highways v. Citizens Ice & Fuel Co., 365 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1963).

iv. Generally, owner of real property is a competent witness as to its value.

Barron v. Phelps, 238 S.W.2d 1016 (Ky. 1951).

v. In eminent domain proceeding, valuation expert knowledge or lack of

knowledge as to other real estate transactions affects only weight of his

testimony and not its admissibility. Com. Dept. of Highways v.

Tackett, 498 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1973).

vi. Landowner who testified to knowledge of some recent sales which he

regarded as comparable and who professed to know market value was

qualified to give expert testimony as to value of condemned tract.

Com., Dept. of Highways v. Castle, 467 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1971).

vii. Witness to be qualified to testify as to value of realty must know

property to be valued and value of property in vicinity, must

understand standard of value, and must be possessed of ability to make

reasonable inference. Whitesburg Municipal Housing Commission,

Urban Renewal Section v. Bates, 412 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1967).

viii. Condemnee and his witnesses were qualified as expert valuation

witnesses, where condemnee had dealt in real estate in community for

over 30 years, one witness had participated in board of education

purchase of several school construction sites, one of which was 1000

feet from condemnee property, and had appraised property in

neighborhood for loans and had bought and sold property in area, and

the other witness resided in community and owned land adjoining

condemnee land and had observed the local real estate market for 12

years. Com., Dept. of Highways v. Parsons, 383 S.W.2d 360 (Ky.

1964).

ix. Witnesses actively engaged in real estate business and acquainted with

property taken and familiar with land values in the area were qualified

to give competent testimony as to value of farm and damages to it.

Com., Dept. of Highways v. Merrill, 383 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1964).

x. An expert valuation witness need not be acquainted firsthand with land

values in vicinity of property under consideration, and if expert witness

establishes his qualifications, states he has studied the real estate market

and has seen the property condemned, his opinion will support a

verdict unless obviously unreasonable or shown to be without any

supporting basis. KRS 177.081 ”177.089. Robinette v. Com., Dept. of

Highways, 380 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1964).

xi. Condemnee, who, as speculator, had bought and sold 15 farms within

county, witness who had been engaged in real estate appraisal work for

28 years and witness who was real estate appraiser with 18 year’s

general experience, were qualified to give evaluation of interchange

property. Com., Dept. of Highways v. Coleman, 451 S.W.2d 636 (Ky.

1970).

xii. Co-owner of condemned land who was a teacher of general science

and agriculture and who professed to be familiar with sales of other

property in neighborhood of condemned land and considered himself

sufficiently informed by reason of his observation, background,

training, and experience was competent to express an opinion as to his

farm market value. Com., Dept. of Highways v. Villines, 445 S.W.2d

880 (Ky. 1969).

xiii. Real estate appraisers who were highway department employees

acquainted with property values in the area, and where condemnee,

president of local bank, local realtor, and part-time realtor, all of whom

had lived in local county for most of their lives and were familiar with

local land values were qualified to testify as to value of land. Com.,

Dept. of Highways v. White, 421 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1967).

xiv. Condemnee opinion as to market value of his property was

incompetent where condemnee did not affirmatively show that he had

some knowledge of property values. Com., Dept. of Highways v.

Horne, 418 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1967).

xv. Refusal to allow owner of condemned motel property and licensed real

estate dealer to cite prices at which other motel properties in county

had sold was prejudicially erroneous although other properties had

substantial physical dissimilarities from condemned property, and sales

of other properties included more than real estate alone. Bennett v.

Com., Dept. of Highways, 417 S.W.2d 143 (Ky. 1967).

xvi. Witnesses who were unfamiliar with evaluation of property located at

highway interchange were not qualified to testify as expert appraisal

witnesses in condemnation proceeding involving such property. Com.,

Dept. of Highways v. Dale, 421 S.W.2d 864 (Ky. 1967).

xvii. Witness who testified for landowner in condemnation case, who had

worked for United States Department of Agriculture where witness

served as an appraiser of farm real estate, farm dwellings and as an area

supervisor, was qualified to testify to values in issue, and it was proper

for jury to consider such testimony. Com., Dept. of Highways v.

Sellers, 421 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1967).

r. Louisiana

i. A person need not be a professional real estate appraiser to give expert

testimony on value of land in expropriation proceedings. State

Through Dept. of Highways v. Menefee, 266 So. 2d 226 (La. Ct. App.

2d Cir. 1972).

ii. A witness may be considered an expert in valuing land for a specific

use if he is familiar with land so adapted. Lafayette Airport Com’n v.

Roy, 265 So. 2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1972).

iii. Landowner two appraisal witnesses who were experienced in

development of property on same side of lake as property expropriated

for pipeline purposes and who both had experience in buying and

selling lands were qualified as experts even though witnesses were not

well versed or schooled in technical approaches used in making

appraisals. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Roy, 249 So. 2d 587 (La. Ct.

App. 2d Cir. 1971).

iv. In condemnation proceedings, discarding valuation by real estate

brokers was not an abuse of discretion, where one broker testified that

this was his first appraisal in the parish and the other testified that he

made no adjustments for such things as location, condition of the land,

and size. State Through Dept. of Highways v. Henry, 192 So. 2d 801

(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966).

v. Landowner witnesses, who have experience with local real estate and

who are actively engaged in real estate appraisal work, are qualified to

appraise and evaluate owner property. State Through Dept. of

Highways v. Singletary, 185 So. 2d 642 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966).

vi. Landowner witnesses, who had experience with local real estate and

who were actively engaged in real estate appraisal work, were qualified

to appraise and evaluate owner property with which they were familiar,

and their testimony was properly considered in determining award.

LSA”R.S. 48:443. State Through Dept. of Highways v. Lumpkin, 147

So. 2d 80 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1962).

vii. Real estate dealers in locality of expropriated land were capable of

expressing expert views on valuations of property in locality. State

Through Dept. of Highways v. Addison, 136 So. 2d 545 (La. Ct. App.

1st Cir. 1961).

viii. Men of long experience in real estate, who were familiar with lands in

the community, could give a fair appraisal of condemned property

based on their experience and knowledge of real estate in the

community, and such men could testify as experts, even though they

did not have the same qualifications as an expert offered by

condemnor. State Through Dept. of Highways v. Ebrecht, 135 So. 2d

630 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961).

ix. Witnesses, one who was farmer, property owner, builder and lender,

one who was builder and vendor of homes, one who was bank

executive, and one who was licensed real estate broker were qualified

to testify to property values in expropriation proceeding and it was

proper to receive their evidence based on common sense approach or

conservative banker approach, though they did not use market data

approach by employing comparable sales or rest their conclusions on

cost less depreciation approach or any such theoretical formula. LSA

Const. art. 6, § 19.1; LSA”R.S. 48:441 to 48:460. State Through Dept.

of Highways v. Rooks, 131 So. 2d 125 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961).

x. Property owner’s witnesses, who together had 59 years’ experience in

real estate business and who were engaged in that business at time of

trial, were qualified as experts to give their opinion as to value of

ownersproperty and damage resulting from expropriation of a portion

thereof. State Through Dept. of Highways v. Milam, 130 So. 2d 145

(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961).

s. Maine

i. Property owners, by reason of their ownership alone, may state their

opinion as to the fair market value of their property. Hutz v. Alden,

2011 ME 27, 12 A.3d 1174 (Me. 2011).

ii. In Maine owner of real or personal property may testify as to value

thereof. Simmons v. State By and Through State Highway

Commission, 234 A.2d 330 (Me. 1967).

iii. In determining value of limestone under strip of land taken by State

Highway Commission, opinion of president of corporate owner of

mineral rights under strip as to valuation was admissible, where he

showed considerable familiarity with limestone deposits of area and

market conditions, and he demonstrated familiarity with property in

question, its capacity to produce, and general market values in vicinity,

and values and capacities of competing quarries. Knox Lime Co. v.

Maine State Highway Commission, 230 A.2d 814 (Me. 1967).

iv. In vendor’s action for breach of contract for purchase of resort

property sold to different party after date set for performance for price

less than contract price vendor could properly testify as to fair market

value of the property on date set for performance. Towne v. Larson,

142 Me. 301, 51 A.2d 51 (1947).

t. Maryland

i. Owner of land being condemned is presumptively competent to testify

to his estimate of its value. Greater Baltimore Consol. Wholesale Food

Market Authority v. Duvall, 255 Md. 90, 256 A.2d 882 (1969).

ii. An individual owner of property is presumptively qualified to give his

opinion as to its value without qualification as an expert. M. A. Realty

Co. v. State Roads Commission, 247 Md. 522, 233 A.2d 793 (1967).

iii. Knowledge of real estate witness of comparable sales in vicinity of

condemned land is not the only test as to the qualification of witness to

give his opinion as to value of condemned land, but such knowledge is

certainly helpful in determining competency. Turner v. State Roads

Commission, 213 Md. 428, 132 A.2d 455 (1957).

iv. Owner of property, without other qualification, may estimate its value

and testify thereto. Jackson v. Linthicum, 192 Md. 272, 64 A.2d 133

(1949).

v. In action for damages to plaintiff garage allegedly caused by excavation

by defendants on adjoining land, one who had been a contractor for 40

years and was familiar with building values and also with the

construction of plaintiff building was properly allowed to express an

opinion as to the damage to the building although the hypothetical

question put to him did not describe the condition of the building in

full. Mullan v. Hacker, 187 Md. 261, 49 A.2d 640 (1946).

u. Massachusetts

i. Ordinarily, a real estate dealer or appraiser may testify as to value of

realty, whether or not he has seen it or sold realty in the neighborhood,

if he possesses sufficient experience and knowledge of values of other

similar realty in the particular locality, but it is not sufficient that he

may have a general knowledge of real estate values, and he should

possess knowledge and experience regarding the particular type of

realty involved, so as to enable him to form an intelligent and fairly

accurate estimate of diminution in actual market value occasioned by

takings. Lee Lime Corp. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 337

Mass. 433, 149 N.E.2d 905 (1958).

ii. A nonexpert owner of property may testify to its value upon the basis

of his familiarity with the characteristics of the property, his knowledge

or acquaintance with its uses, and his experience in dealing with it.

Epstein v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 752, 933

N.E.2d 972 (2010).

iii. Owner and operator of cranberry bogs, who had acted as broker for

sale or purchase of some 50 bogs, was entitled to state his opinion as to

adequacy of water control system of bog in reaching his appraisal of

diminution in value of property partially taken for highway purposes,

and he was entitled to consider previous testimony of civil engineer as

to existence of drainage problem on the bog. Wing v. Com., 359 Mass.

286, 268 N.E.2d 658 (1971).

iv. Where owner of locus seeking abatement of real estate taxes was

familiar with the property and knew what he had paid for minor

improvements and what rent he had received from building, and owner

was in the real estate investment business, appellate tax court was

warranted, in its discretion, in receiving owner testimony as to value.

Board of Assessors of Ipswich v. Smith, 357 Mass. 778, 260 N.E.2d

175 (1970).

v. In eminent domain proceeding, there was no error in allowing real

estate expert, who had considerable background in the field and had

reviewed appraisals on nearly 200 parcels taken by Commonwealth

some years previously, to testify, over objections, to fair market value

of parcels taken. Dorsyl Realty, Inc. v. Worcester Redevelopment

Authority, 357 Mass. 777, 258 N.E.2d 926 (1970).

vi. Broker and appraiser who had personally examined land, its

boundaries, and route of projected road was not destitute of the

necessary qualifications as expert as to value before and after taking.

Burchell v. Com., 350 Mass. 488, 215 N.E.2d 649 (1966).

vii. Witness, who had extensive experience for many years as owner,

manager, broker, developer and appraiser of realty of all kinds

throughout Commonwealth, was not disqualified, as matter of law,

from testifying as to value of parcel of realty, part of which was taken

for construction of expressway, by reason of fact that he had never

bought, sold or appraised realty in town where parcel was located and

had not viewed locus until shortly before trial. George v. Com., 348

Mass. 780, 203 N.E.2d 392 (1964).

viii. Corporate officer who knew plant and was also tannery expert was

properly permitted to express opinion as to value of tanning plant

buildings in action on fire policy for loss of buildings. M.G.L.A. c. 175

§§ 95, 96, 99. Agoos Leather Companies v. American & Foreign Ins.

Co., 342 Mass. 603, 174 N.E.2d 652 (1961).

ix. In proceeding to assess damages for taking of portion of petitioner

land on which existed a stream and partially usable dam, trial judge

erred in striking petitioner testimony on market value of land which he

had owned for some 20 years and had known more or less all his life.

Southwick v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 339 Mass. 666, 162

N.E.2d 271 (1959).

x. Where proceeding was brought for assessment of damages to

petitioner sand and gravel pit, a part of which was taken by

commonwealth, the value of the sand and gravel was not the measure

of damages, and it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude value of

separable material as a confusing and speculative factor in determining

the market value of property as real estate. Joseph De Vries & Sons,

Inc. v. Com., 339 Mass. 663, 162 N.E.2d 269 (1959).

v. Michigan

w. Minnesota

i. Testimony of an owner as to value of his property may be received on

issue of damages, and lack of foundation goes only to weight of

testimony and not to its admissibility. Jackson v. Buesgens, 290 Minn.

78, 186 N.W.2d 184 (1971).

ii. Tax assessor qualifications to express a valid appraisal of value of land

were supported by his knowledge of land values in particular area.

Alstores Realty, Inc. v. State, 286 Minn. 343, 176 N.W.2d 112 (1970).

iii. Person living in vicinity of land used for farming purposes is not, by

virtue of that fact alone, qualified to give expert testimony as to value

of part of such farm site for residential development. Vierling v.

Independent School Dist. No. 720, Scott County, 268 Minn. 304, 129

N.W.2d 338 (1964).

iv. In condemnation proceedings, testimony of value of property by the

owner is competent and a denial of his competence and a denial of his

right to testify constitutes reversible error even though the owner lays

no particular foundation for his opinion. Housing and Redevelopment

Authority In and For City of Minneapolis v. Zweigbaum, 257 Minn.

233, 100 N.W.2d 719 (1960).

v. The owner of property is competent to express his opinion as to value

of his property. H.P. Droher and Sons v. Toushin, 250 Minn. 490, 85

N.W.2d 273 (1957).

vi. Owner of property either real or personal is presumptively acquainted

with its value and may testify as to its value. Lehman v. Hansord

Pontiac Co., 246 Minn. 1, 74 N.W.2d 305 (1955).

vii. Opinion of a witness other than owner as to value of property need

not be based on any particular sales which witness has made or

observed, but his knowledge must be the result of observations he has

made or become aware of in the course of his business and not the

result of a special inquiry. Bartl v. City of New Ulm, 245 Minn. 148, 72

N.W.2d 303 (1955).

viii. A person engaged in appraising real estate over a number of years was

sufficiently qualified to give an opinion as to value of residential

property with water seepage in the basement even though he had not

actually bought and sold such property. Hafner v. Ritzinger, 256 Minn.

196, 97 N.W.2d 839 (1959).

x. Mississippi

i. Landowner may testify as to before and after value of his land but his

testimony should have some basis expressed in evidence on which to

substantiate his opinion. Bynum v. Mandrel Industries, Inc., 241 So. 2d

629 (Miss. 1970).

ii. Landowner was entitled to give her estimate of values in condemnation

proceedings. Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Spencer, 209

So. 2d 821 (Miss. 1968).

iii. Laymen can testify as to value of condemnee land provided they are

familiar with it before and after taking and are cognizant of land values

of comparable property as to quality, use and location, which is

adjacent, near or reasonably close to subject land so that same

comparison, favorable or unfavorable, can clearly be made, based upon

sales they have made or about which they have direct personal

knowledge. Pearl River Val. Water Supply Dist. v. Wood, 252 Miss.

580, 172 So. 2d 196 (1965).

iv. Witnesses, who had neither bought nor sold real estate in county in

which brick manufacturing plant was located but who were thoroughly

familiar with brick business and what such a plant should be worth,

were qualified to testify in condemnation proceeding as to value of

manufacturing plant before condemnation of portion of land and value

after such condemnation. Mississippi State Highway Commission v.

Meridian Brick Co., 245 Miss. 349, 147 So. 2d 302 (1962).

v. Owner of land was entitled to testify to its values before and after

closing of street. Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Fleming,

242 Miss. 402, 135 So. 2d 821 (1962).

vi. Witnesses were qualified to give their opinions as to the before and

after taking value of the land for whatever their opinions may have

been worth in light of their admitted lack of knowledge of certain

factors relating to such value. Mississippi State Highway Commission

v. Windham, 241 Miss. 1, 128 So. 2d 577 (1961).

vii. Witness must be acquainted with property sought to be condemned

before witness can give opinion as to fair market value of property.

Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Strong, 240 Miss. 756, 129

So. 2d 349 (1961).

viii. Admission in condemnation proceeding of opinion evidence of witness

concerning fair market value of property before taking was error,

where witness was not familiar with all property taken before taking.

Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Rogers, 240 Miss. 529, 128

So. 2d 353 (1961).

ix. Landowner was not precluded from testifying that in his opinion his

property was worth $10,000 an acre, in an eminent domain action

brought by the Transportation Department, even if his opinion was

based in part on offers from others to purchase portions of the land,

and which would not have constituted competent evidence to establish

the fair market value of the property, where his opinion was also based

upon what several neighbors paid for their lots. Rules of Evid., Rule

702. Mississippi Transp. Com’n v. Buchanan, 99 So. 3d 230 (Miss. Ct.

App. 2012), cert. denied, 98 So. 3d 1073 (Miss. 2012).

x. In eminent domain practice, a landowner may give his opinion of the

fair market value of his property; however, the landowner must be

familiar with the land and cognizant of land values of comparable

property as to quality, use, and location. Davidson v. Tarpon Whitetail

Gas Storage, LLC, 90 So. 3d 691 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).

y. Missouri

i. Owner is generally allowed to testify as to reasonable value of his

property, although ownership in itself does not qualify one to express

opinions on matters not falling within one experience. Coach House of

Ward Parkway, Inc. v. Ward Parkway Shops, Inc., 471 S.W.2d 464 (Mo.

1971).

ii. An owner of property is qualified to give an opinion as to the value of

the property. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1970).

iii. Real estate broker who was familiar with motel which plaintiffs

purchased in reliance upon false statement of income from property

and who had listed property for sale and had been in business of

appraising and brokering hotels and motels was qualified as expert to

testify as to difference in values of property as represented and its

actual value. DeBow v. Higgins, 425 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. 1968).

iv. It is general experience and observation of expert witness that qualifies

him to testify as to value of land condemned. State ex rel. State

Highway Commission v. Barron, 400 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1966).

v. Witnesses qualified as experts on value of condemned property as

farmland are not necessarily qualified as experts on value of farmlands

for commercial purposes. Shelby County R-IV School Dist. v. Herman,

392 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965).

vi. An agent of owner of land, in charge of its management, who for years

had been familiar with the property, its location, etc., and is sufficiently

familiar with market value of property in the neighborhood, is

competent to testify to its value. City of St. Louis v. Vasquez, 341

S.W.2d 839 (Mo. 1960).

vii. Expert witness had proper foundation to testify as to diminution in

value of landowner’s property as well as the cost to cure the damages

which occurred to his property in trespass action involving cutting of

trees; expert discussed the land in question with the landowner and the

neighbors, expert’s testimony was based upon comparable sales by way

of property cards showing valuation of properties, expert had 22 years

of experience appraising property, and expert provided specific details

as to how she arrived at her valuation of landowner’s property.

V.A.M.S. § 490.065(3). Lau v. Pugh, 299 S.W.3d 740 (Mo. Ct. App.

S.D. 2009).

viii. An owner is presumed competent to testify to the value of his real

property even though he does not qualify as an expert. Atkinson v.

Corson, 289 S.W.3d 269 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2009).

ix. Permitting witnesses, who all had lived in area of farm in question in

condemnation proceeding for easement for power line, were engaged

in farming or owned farms, were familiar with such farm both before

and after taking, and crops produced thereon, kept abreast of farm

prices in general, discussed farm and land values with real estate men

and others in county, subscribed to and read various farm publications,

and some of whom had bought and sold farms in county, to express

their opinions of value of farm before and after taking was not abuse

of discretion, notwithstanding contention that such witnesses were not

qualified as experts. Northeast Missouri Elec. Power Co-op v. Cary,

485 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).

x. Admissibility of testimony of opinion of owner of real property who is

not an expert rests upon the assumption or record showing that owner

is particularly familiar with the property and knows the usages to which

the property is adapted and when assumption of special knowledge is

negated by owner own testimony his opinion loses its probative value

and should be rejected. Ward v. Deck, 419 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App.

1967).

xi. Proprietress of sandwich shop and beer tavern was competent to

testify to value of condemned land where it appeared that she had been

resident for several years and owned and dealt with land and was

familiar with condemned land. State ex rel. State Highway Commission

v. Henderson, 381 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).

xii. Persons familiar with land in neighborhood of which they lived for

number of years were competent witnesses to prove value thereof in

owner action against railroad company for damages to land by flood

waters of river flowing through highway underpass in defendant right-

of-way embankment. Buschelberg v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 289

S.W.2d 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).

xiii. Witness who had had thirty-two years’ experience in the real estate

business, including ten years as a professional appraiser, was well

qualified to testify as expert regarding value of farm owned by

applicants for state old age assistance. V.A.M.S. § 208.011. Bollinger v.

State Dept. of Public Health & Welfare, 254 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App.

1953).

xiv. Witnesses testifying as to value of property are not required to be

expert or skilled in strict sense of the term in order to express an

opinion on the value, and their testimony is admissible where it appears

that they had and utilized means superior to those of the trier of fact

for forming an intelligent opinion. Dyer v. Standard Fire Ins. Co. of N.

J., 227 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950).

z. Montana

i. Landowner’s testimony regarding the value of his property which

exceeded testimony about its value pursuant to its current use as a

restaurant and casino was inadmissible in inverse condemnation action

absent any basis or foundation for such expertise; landowner’s

testimony included the value of a bowling alley, a bank, and a dental

office, and landowner merely talked about consulting with real estate

agents and getting comparables and using a computer to run analysis

without indicating any foundation of peculiar knowledge. K&R

Partnership v. City of Whitefish, 2008 MT 228, 344 Mont. 336, 189

P.3d 593 (2008).

ii. Owner of property is competent witness to testify as to reasonable

value of property for use to which he is putting it, but to go beyond

that field he must possess qualifications required of general witness as

to value. State Highway Commission v. Marsh, 165 Mont. 198, 527

P.2d 573 (1974).

iii. One who knows real property condemned and is familiar with uses to

which it may be put may testify as to its market value. State By and

Through State Highway Commission v. Bennett, 162 Mont. 386, 513

P.2d 5 (1973).

iv. Admission of testimony of landowner who had been property owner

for 15 years, lived on property for 5 years, and refurbished house inside

and out, who was familiar with nature of fertile soil on property, knew

and valued weather conditions at location of property, grew crops,

testified to uninterrupted and undisturbed convenient access, had

knowledge of sales of other property and knew that after state took

part of property property would have no value, as to his opinion of

value before taking, over objection that he did not have some particular

means of forming intelligent and correct judgment, was not abuse of

discretion. State Highway Commission v. Wilcox, 155 Mont. 176, 468

P.2d 749 (1970).

v. An owner of property can testify in a reasonable way as to its value for

use to which he is putting it, and this is particularly true where he is

shown to have some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and

correct judgment as to value of property in question beyond what is

presumed to be possessed by men generally. Dooling v. Casey, 152

Mont. 267, 448 P.2d 749 (1968).

vi. In order to give an opinion on value of property witness must have

some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct judgment as

to value of property beyond what is presumed to be possessed by men

generally, and one who knows real property and is familiar with the use

to which it may be put may testify as to its market value. State Highway

Commission v. Barnes, 151 Mont. 300, 443 P.2d 16 (1968).

vii. Condemnee’s value witness, who had been real estate man in area

involved for more than 20 years, who specialized in development of

residential property, who was familiar with property in question and

market for such property in area, and who testified to facts within his

own knowledge and observation, was qualified to give his opinion as

expert in case involving condemnation of portion of undeveloped land

for highway construction purposes. Montana State Highway

Commission v. Jacobs, 150 Mont. 322, 435 P.2d 274 (1967).

aa. Nebraska

i. An owner who is shown to be familiar with the value of his or her land

shall be qualified to estimate the value of such land for the use to

which it is then being put, without additional foundation; such owner is

not qualified by virtue of ownership alone to testify as to its value for

other purposes unless such owner possesses, as must any other witness

as to value, an acquaintance with the property and is informed as to the

state of the market. American Cent. City, Inc. v. Joint Antelope Valley

Authority, 281 Neb. 742, 807 N.W.2d 170 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S.

Ct. 525 (2011).

ii. A resident owner who is familiar with his property and knows its worth

is permitted to testify as to its value without further foundation.

Brenner v. Banner County Bd. of Equalization, 276 Neb. 275, 753

N.W.2d 802 (2008).

iii. For the testimony of an expert or lay witness to be admissible on the

question of market value of real estate, the witness must be familiar

with the property in question and the state of the market. Liberty

Development Corp. v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. of Ohama, 276 Neb.

23, 751 N.W.2d 608 (2008).

iv. Where real estate salesman had acquaintance with property and was

informed as to state of market and had some experience in rental of

similar properties, foundation was sufficient to permit him to testify as

to reasonable rental value of property involved in action for specific

performance, whether salesman be regarded as lay or expert witness.

Harre v. White, 189 Neb. 404, 203 N.W.2d 99 (1972).

v. Either lay or expert witnesses may testify as to the value of property if

it is shown that they have an acquaintance with the property and are

informed as to the state of the market. Chudomelka v. Board of

Equalization of Dodge County, 187 Neb. 542, 192 N.W.2d 403 (1971).

vi. Owner of realty taken in condemnation may testify as to its value if he

is familiar with its value. Deitloff v. City of Norfolk, 183 Neb. 648, 163

N.W.2d 586 (1968).

vii. Witness need not be an expert to testify to value of land taken in

eminent domain case, and admission of such testimony rests in court

sound discretion. First Baptist Church of Maxwell v. State, Dept. of

Roads, 178 Neb. 831, 135 N.W.2d 756 (1965).

viii. Condemnee should have been allowed to testify to value of strip

condemned for highway widening without laying of foundation.

Swanson v. State, Dept. of Roads, 178 Neb. 671, 134 N.W.2d 810

(1965).

ix. Persons shown to be familiar with particular land in question may

testify as to value of tract immediately before and immediately after

appropriation. Pieper v. City of Scottsbluff, 176 Neb. 561, 126 N.W.2d

865 (1964).

x. It is not necessary that a witness testifying as to value of condemned

property be familiar with every possible element that goes into

determination of market value. Dawson v. City of Lincoln, 176 Neb.

311, 125 N.W.2d 908 (1964).

xi. Under circumstances, staff appraiser for foreign bank who testified,

without impeachment, to his experience and knowledge of land and

property values was qualified to give his opinion of reasonable market

value of condemned property. Evans v. State Dept. of Roads, 176 Neb.

156, 125 N.W.2d 541 (1963).

xii. Real estate owner who is familiar with value of his real estate can testify

as to its value in condemnation proceedings. State Dept. of Roads v.

Wixson, 175 Neb. 431, 122 N.W.2d 72 (1963).

xiii. Either lay or expert witnesses may be used to establish the reasonable

value of land if proper foundation is laid showing that witnesses are

acquainted with the particular land and are informed as to the state of

the market, the weight and credibility of their testimony being for court

or jury. Knouse v. Knouse, 157 Neb. 748, 61 N.W.2d 388 (1953).

xiv. Generally, either lay or expert witnesses may testify as to value of land

taken by condemnation or value of land affected by condemnation

immediately before and immediately after condemnation if proper

foundation is laid showing that they have an acquaintance with the

property in question and are informed as to the state of the market,

and the weight and credibility of their testimony is for the jury.

Medelman v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 518, 52 N.W.2d

328 (1952).

bb. Nevada

i. Chief executive officer who had purchased for corporation property

being taken by eminent domain and was individual owner of adjacent

lands was qualified to testify as to value of property taken. N.R.S.

37.020, subd. 2. State ex rel. Dept. of Highways v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 82

Nev. 82, 411 P.2d 120 (1966).

ii. Condemnee, as owner, was competent to testify as to value of land

taken and severance damages. State ex rel. Dept. of Highways v.

Campbell, 80 Nev. 23, 388 P.2d 733 (1964).

iii. Where owner had held land to be taken for ten years, had owned other

business properties in city, had leased the same, had been aware of

values of her own and surrounding properties and had compared

recent sales of nearby lands, owner was a competent witness to testify

as to value of property taken. N.R.S. 37.110. State ex rel. Department

of Highways v. Olsen, 76 Nev. 176, 351 P.2d 186 (1960).

iv. Where a witness in an eminent domain proceeding was chairman of the

board of directors of a bank which owned and operated realty, and

such person had been associated with the bank for approximately five

years, and was a member of the trust department of the bank and

chairman of its loan committee which appraised properties and

determined the amount of money that could be loaned on them, such

person was qualified to testify as an expert on value of the condemned

property. State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Shaddock, 75 Nev.

392, 344 P.2d 191 (1959).

cc. New Hampshire

i. Expert witness was qualified to testify as to fair market value of

property, where he was a self-employed appraiser of property with

approximately 11 years’ experience in that field, he was a college

graduate and had done work as a civil engineer, he had been city

assessor for a 10-year period, presently he was president of state society

of real estate appraisers, he was a member of international association

of assessing officers and held a certified assessment evaluation degree.

RSA 516:29. Brewster v. State, 107 N.H. 226, 219 A.2d 706 (1966).

ii. Fact that real estate experts had had little or no courtroom experience

did not make their testimony inadmissible on issue of damages in

condemnation proceeding. RSA 233:17 (supp). Parkinson v. State, 104

N.H. 534, 191 A.2d 361 (1963).

iii. Subdivider realty condemned for highway purposes was entitled to be

valued at its most advantageous use to which it could be placed on day

it was condemned. Roy v. State, 104 N.H. 513, 191 A.2d 522 (1963).

iv. A civil and construction engineer, who had a practical knowledge of

characteristics of industrial properties, was qualified to testify as to

estimates of damages in condemnation proceedings, and fact that

another engineer had been found not qualified to express an opinion

on market value did not show inconsistency or error in trial court

admission of opinion of first witness. Edgcomb Steel of New England,

Inc. v. State, 100 N.H. 480, 131 A.2d 70 (1957).

dd. New Jersey

i. In tax assessment proceeding, an expert witness can testify as to his

opinion as to sale value of the property. N.J.S.A. 54:4 “23; N.J.S.A.

Const. art. 4, § 7, par. 12. North Bergen Tp. in Hudson County v.

Bergen Blvd. Holding Co., 133 N.J.L. 569, 45 A.2d 623 (N.J. Ct. Err. &

App. 1946).

ii. Expert testimony as to value of five-story apartment building

containing 126 apartments based on capitalization of income actually

received therefrom and replacement cost less depreciation was

insufficient to overcome presumption as to correctness of assessment

of building by State Board of Tax Appeals at $270,000 for purposes of

local taxation. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Division of Tax

Appeals, 133 N.J.L. 153, 43 A.2d 271 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1945).

iii. Under circumstances, court in proceeding to condemn orchard land

properly excluded expert testimony concerning value of trees added to

value of bare land, particularly since there was proof of sales of other

orchards in vicinity and evidence that farm lands were giving way to

more profitable economic use of residential development. New Jersey

Highway Authority v. Ackerson, 73 N.J. Super. 183, 179 A.2d 521

(App. Div. 1962).

iv. Error in permitting landowner’s real estate expert in condemnation

proceeding to use third person appraisal was prejudicial error, where

jury verdict was higher than value set by State experts and must have

been influenced to some extent by testimony of landowner’s expert

and his reference to third person appraisal. State by State Highway

Com’r v. Lichtman, 66 N.J. Super. 386, 169 A.2d 184 (App. Div. 1961).

v. Permitting witness to testify as expert on value of easement

condemned for electric line was discretionary where he had made

thousands of appraisals, notwithstanding his use of alleged hearsay as

to comparable sales. N.J.S. 2A:83”1, N.J.S.A. Rockland Elec. Co. v.

Bolo Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 171, 168 A.2d 817 (App. Div. 1961).

vi. While previous experience in purchase and sale of realty or knowledge

of comparable sales may qualify a witness as an expert in eminent

domain proceeding, lack of it does not necessarily disqualify him, and

witness is required only to have peculiar and uncommon knowledge or

experience which renders his opinion of some aid to court or jury.

State by State Highway Commissioner v. Williams, 65 N.J. Super. 518,

168 A.2d 233 (App. Div. 1961).

vii. In action for value of defendant use and occupation of portion of

plaintiff land, plaintiff, who was owner and manager of apartment

house and garage on adjoining and nearby property, and who had been

in the real estate business for 35 years, and who had occasionally rented

the land involved for automobile parking, was qualified to testify as to

what the use and occupation were reasonably worth. Monaco v.

Jackson Engineering Co., 45 N.J. Super. 313, 132 A.2d 548 (App. Div.

1957).

viii. In proceeding to condemn part of dairy farm, admission of testimony

of nearby dairy farmer, who had no knowledge of real estate values

even in limited field of sales of dairy farms, that before the taking the

reasonable value of instant farm on the open market was a certain

amount, was error, and such error required reversal where the

testimony was an important factor in resolution of issue of value. New

Jersey Highway Authority v. Rue, 41 N.J. Super. 385, 125 A.2d 305

(App. Div. 1956).

ix. Only experts on a given subject can express their estimates of the value

of anything, real or personal, and there must be proof to satisfy trial

judge that witness has special knowledge of subject matter upon which

he is to express his opinion. Dawson v. Holcomb, 4 N.J. Super. 563, 68

A.2d 281 (App. Div. 1949).

ee. New Mexico

i. Lack of formal training and experience of condemnee does not make

his testimony, as to his estimate of value of property, unacceptable or

deprive it of its character as substantial. State ex rel. State Highway

Commission v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 394, 456 P.2d 868 (1969).

ii. Witness engaged in real estate and insurance business for many years

and who had been appraiser for a loan association and who personally

inspected the properties, was competent to express an opinion as to

real estate values and his testimony was not based upon mere surmise,

guess, speculation or conjecture. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 70 N.M. 11,

369 P.2d 398 (1962).

iii. Where there were no offsetting benefits or damages to remainder of

land, correct measure of damages was reasonable market value of land

taken. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. v. Crabtree, 69 N.M. 197,

365 P.2d 442 (1961).

iv. Owners and qualified experts are competent to give opinion as to value

of property. Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., Inc., 86 N.M. 405, 524

P.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1974).

ff. New York

i. Ordinarily opinion of expert, supported by actual sales, is regarded as

substantial evidence in condemnation case. In re Clearview

Expressway, City of New York, 9 N.Y.2d 439, 214 N.Y.S.2d 438, 174

N.E.2d 522 (1961).

ii. The qualification of a witness giving opinion testimony as to property

values need not be very great; he need not be a professional broker and

even lack of experience as to actual sales in vicinity does not disqualify

him but merely bears on weight to be given his testimony as long as he

has some knowledge of value of property in the general area. Broward

Nat. Bank of Fort Lauderdale v. Starzec, 30 A.D.2d 603, 290 N.Y.S.2d

112 (3d Dep’t 1968).

iii. Real estate broker was not qualified to testify to sound value of

building, and his testimony as to structural valuation on basis of

reconstruction costs less depreciation was without probative force in

review of property tax assessment. Kalski v. Fitzgerald, 25 A.D.2d 573,

266 N.Y.S.2d 620 (3d Dep’t 1966).

iv. Witness, who described himself as real estate broker, and operator and

builder of garages and gasoline stations, was prima facie qualified to

state an opinion as to value of gasoline station and of factors which

might be expected to affect its value. Rein v. Mottola, 6 A.D.2d 57, 174

N.Y.S.2d 714 (1st Dep’t 1958).

v. An owner may be permitted to testify as to value of his property, but

ownership alone does not qualify one who has no knowledge of value

or who is not familiar with location, quality and value of his real estate,

and it is for trial court to determine, in condemnation case, if witness is

sufficiently familiar with property to be entitled to express an opinion.

Besen v. State, 17 Misc. 2d 119, 185 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Ct. Cl. 1959).

vi. In proceeding to reduce tax, in determining proper assessment of land

and buildings thereon for taxation, court should apply the requirement

of Tax Law that property shall be assessed at the full value thereof,

applying the interpretation of full value as being the price at which the

property would sell under ordinary circumstances, considering all

elements together with the opinion of experts. Tax Law, § 8. In re

Malajo Realty Corp., 60 N.Y.S.2d 15 (Sup 1946).

gg. North Carolina

i. Landowner who made a positive assertion that he knew land values in

the vicinity of his property and had an informed opinion, satisfactory

to himself, as to the value of his property on the date of taking, was

entitled to testify as to the value of his property in condemnation

proceedings. North Carolina State Highway Commission v.

Helderman, 285 N.C. 645, 207 S.E.2d 720 (1974).

ii. Where witness testified he had lived on two tracts of land for about

four years previous to time conveyance involved in proceeding was

made and knew both tracts of land and had an opinion satisfactory to

himself as to their value and gave such opinion, evidence was

competent and its probative value, subject to being tested on cross-

examination, was for jury. Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N.C. 654, 50

S.E.2d 901 (1948).

iii. Defendant shareholder in New York corporation was qualified as lay

witness to give opinion as to value of real property owned by

corporation, in plaintiff shareholder’s action for breach of fiduciary and

other claims; defendant had extensive real estate background and

specific knowledge of specific properties owned by corporation. Rules

of Evid., Rule 701, West’s N.C.G.S.A. § 8C–1. Bluebird Corp. v.

Aubin, 657 S.E.2d 55 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).

iv. A witness who has knowledge of value gained from experience,

information, and observation may give his opinion of the value of

specific real property. Department of Transp. v. Haywood Co., 604

S.E.2d 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).

v. Court did not err in permitting plaintiff’s expert witness to testify as to

his opinion of fair market value of residence immediately prior to being

struck by defendant’s tanker truck, where there was evidence that

witness had been in real estate and insurance business for many years,

that he was familiar with prices of real estate in county, and that he had

been in the house. Huff v. Thornton, 23 N.C. App. 388, 209 S.E.2d

401 (1974).

vi. Son of property owner whose land was taken in condemnation had

sufficient opportunity to become familiar with the property and thus

could give an opinion as to its value where, inter alia, son managed his

mother property, he visited the land approximately four times per year,

and he spent about a day there upon each visit. State Highway

Commission v. Fry, 6 N.C. App. 370, 170 S.E.2d 91 (1969).

hh. North Dakota

i. Real property owner may testify as to the value of land without any

further qualification or special knowledge. Wolt v. Wolt, 2010 ND 26,

778 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 2010).

ii. An owner of an existing building and parking lot was qualified to

testify as to its value, but mere fact of ownership did not qualify her as

an expert on matters other than the value of her property. Alm Const.

Co. v. Vertin, 118 N.W.2d 737 (N.D. 1962).

iii. Opinion evidence in eminent domain actions is usually admitted from

persons who are not strictly experts but who from residing and doing

business in the vicinity have familiarized themselves with land values

and are more able to form an opinion on the subject at issue than

citizens generally, and this rule is liberally applied in case of farm lands

as other evidence is often not easily obtained. Otter Tail Power Co. v.

Malme, 92 N.W.2d 514 (N.D. 1958).

iv. When owner of property offers himself as expert witness on matters

other than value of his property, he is subject to same rules as any

nonexpert witness giving opinion evidence, and, being a nonexpert,

must give facts upon which his opinion is based. In re Heart River Irr.

Dist., 78 N.D. 302, 49 N.W.2d 217 (1951).

ii. Ohio

i. As exception to general rule that testimony as to property value is not

competent and admissible unless it is the professional opinion of an

expert, an owner may testify concerning the value of his property; an

owner is presumed to be familiar with his property from having

purchased or dealt with it. Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v.

Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 140 Ohio St. 3d 248, 2014-Ohio-3620,

17 N.E.3d 537 (2014).

ii. In appropriation proceeding, refusal to allow an architect and a

consultant primarily on commercial areas to testify as to his estimate of

the value of the owner appropriated land for a shopping center, where

the witness had a limited knowledge of the value of real estate in the

area, was not an abuse of discretion and was nonprejudicial in any

event where his testimony would have been cumulative. In re Ohio

Turnpike Commission, 164 Ohio St. 377, 58 Ohio Op. 179, 131

N.E.2d 397 (1955).

iii. Under the owner-opinion rule, an owner of real property, by virtue of

his ownership and without qualification as an expert, is competent to

testify to his property’s fair market value. Rapport v. Kochovski, 185

Ohio App. 3d 309, 2009-Ohio-6880, 923 N.E.2d 1212 (5th Dist. Stark

County 2009).

iv. The owner-opinion rule, under which an owner of real property, by

virtue of his ownership and without qualification as an expert, is

competent to testify to his property’s fair market value, is based on the

presumption that the owner of real estate possesses sufficient

acquaintance with it to estimate the value of the property, and his

estimate is therefore received although his knowledge on the subject is

not such as would qualify him to testify if he were not the owner.

Rapport v. Kochovski, 185 Ohio App. 3d 309, 2009-Ohio-6880, 923

N.E.2d 1212 (5th Dist. Stark County 2009).

v. A city official who has negotiated a purchase agreement with

condemnee and who is an experienced realtor and appraiser and

familiar with property is competent to testify for condemnee as to

value fixed at that time by city with assistance of other appraisers.

Const. art. 1, § 19. In re Appropriation for Hwy. Purposes of Lands of

Goldflies Storage & Moving Co., 18 Ohio App. 2d 116, 47 Ohio Op.

2d 181, 247 N.E.2d 315 (2d Dist. Montgomery County 1969).

vi. Broker who had been such for close to twenty years and had done

business in area contiguous to property in question for about twelve

years was sufficiently qualified to give testimony as to difference in

value of house as three-family house and as two-family house with

roomers. Zander v. Blumenthal, 1 Ohio App. 2d 244, 30 Ohio Op. 2d

266, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 155, 198 N.E.2d 93 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County

1964).

vii. Condemnee witness, who was a city planner, consultant, and architect

primarily regarding commercial areas and had surveyed property for

four commercial developments in city in which condemned land was

located, was qualified to testify as to highest of best uses of condemned

property and its maximum value for which its use was available. Ellis v.

Ohio Turnpike Commission, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 438, 124 N.E.2d 441

(Ct. App. 6th Dist. Lucas County 1955).

viii. In condemnation proceeding, property owner, whether expert or not,

is entitled to state his opinion of the value of the condemned property

at time of taking. Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 70 Ohio L. Abs.

417, 124 N.E.2d 424 (Ct. App. 6th Dist. Lucas County 1955).

ix. The owner of real property is competent to testify as to its value. Brate

v. McDonald, 95 Ohio App. 448, 54 Ohio Op. 72, 120 N.E.2d 748 (2d

Dist. Franklin County 1953).

x. Nonexpert witnesses may testify as to value of real property when

witness states facts upon which he bases his opinion, although such

witness expressing an opinion does not have all-inclusive information

of every detail of elements entering into value. Bana v. Pittsburgh Plate

Glass Co., Columbia Chemical Division, 48 Ohio L. Abs. 594, 76

N.E.2d 625 (Ct. App. 9th Dist. Summit County 1947).

xi. A landowner may give opinion of market value of his land without

being qualified as expert, but cannot testify as to rental value unless

knowledge and experience upon which opinion is based are shown in

detail. Ludolph v. Tuel & Thoenen, Inc., 6 Ohio Misc. 117, 35 Ohio

Op. 2d 239, 214 N.E.2d 696 (C.P. 1965).

jj. Oklahoma

i. Owner of realty, living thereon and familiar with the value of the

property for oil and gas purposes, is a competent witness to testify as

to value of property for an oil and gas lease. Application of Harper,

1945 Okla. 141, 195 Okla. 386, 158 P.2d 472 (1945).

ii. Property owner is competent to testify as to his opinion as to value of

property which has been destroyed, and jury may consider such

opinion together with all other circumstances and facts. Poteete v.

MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 1974 Okla. 110, 527 P.2d 18 (Okla. 1974).

iii. Landowner who had been dealing in the buying and selling of real

estate for some eight to ten years and licensed realtor who in previous

years had transactions involving land in vicinity and who was familiar

with land involved in condemnation action were qualified to express an

opinion on value of land. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Maggi, 1965

Okla. 197, 409 P.2d 369 (Okla. 1965).

iv. Witness who had been in real estate business in city since 1944, second

witness who had been real estate broker and appraiser for seven years,

and third witness who had appraised condemned property 18 years

prior to condemnation and had kept up with its development were

qualified to testify as to its value when condemned. Swyden v. State ex

rel. Dept. of Highways, 1963 Okla. 276, 387 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1963).

v. In proceeding to condemn strip of land for roadway across defendant

ranch, permitting witness to testify that his opinion as to market value

of ranch after road went through ranch was based on land condition

after fences and ponds were constructed and to give his opinion as to

cost of those items to establish total amount of depreciation in value

caused by roadway was not proper manner in which to establish

damage, but testimony was not evidence of double damages, and its

admission was not prejudicial in view of other competent evidence

which amply supported jury verdict. State ex rel. Department of

Highways v. Weaver, 1956 Okla. 158, 297 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1956).

vi. Question of value of real property does not, ordinarily, involve

question of science or skill, upon which only expert possessed of

technical training can speak, and, where value of farming lands is in

issue, intelligent persons, living in vicinity of property involved, and

acquainted with market value of similar property in locality, and of

particular property in question, may express an opinion as to value of

land involved. H.D. Youngman Contractor, Inc. v. Girdner, 1953 Okla.

277, 262 P.2d 693 (Okla. 1953).

kk. Oregon

i. In action for fraud in which plaintiffs alleged that during their

negotiations for purchase of defendant house and lot defendant

represented that a septic tank could be installed on the lot, knowing

that that would not be permitted by county sanitation officials because

of lot small size, trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in

admitting evidence of market value based on opinion of appraiser

while working for county assessor office in 1965 where testimony

represented his opinion as an expert real estate appraiser and did not

purport to represent the assessed value of the land. Maley v. Palanuk,

264 Or. 325, 505 P.2d 336 (1973).

ii. Allowing husband of record owner of property damaged by trespass to

testify as to his opinion of reasonable value of his wife property,

assuming the absence of defendant pulp and paper plant, was

improper, he being neither owner nor expert, but harmless where fact

testified to must have been obvious to jury. Davis v. Georgia-Pacific

Corp., 251 Or. 239, 445 P.2d 481 (1968).

iii. Barbers whose testimony was limited to rentals paid for leases of other

barbershops in city and who had no knowledge of rental value of a

particular property leased for barbershop purposes or of property

similarly situated and who did not have knowledge or experience

necessary to make an appraisal of the property were not qualified to

express opinion as to value of leasehold in condemnation case. State

Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Stewart, 236 Or. 386, 388 P.2d 113 (1963).

iv. Fact that witness, a realtor, because of his experience, relied upon his

intuition for his judgment as to value of condemned building could

only go either to his qualifications to express opinion or to weight to

be given his testimony by jury. City of Portland, By and Through

Portland Development Commission v. Therrow, 230 Or. 275, 369 P.2d

762 (1962).

v. Expert witness was entitled on direct examination to identify and

describe properties in area, recently sold, having characteristics similar

to property under condemnation and considered by the appraiser in

arriving at his opinion as to value of the subject property. State By and

Through State Highway Commission v. Parker, 225 Or. 324, 358 P.2d

274 (1960).

vi. Offers to buy or sell comparable property are not admissible to

establish the value of the land under condemnation. State By and

Through State Highway Commission v. Morehouse Holding Co., 225

Or. 62, 357 P.2d 266 (1960).

vii. For witness to be competent to testify as expert on value of property,

witness must know market value of property, and this means he must

have knowledge of value in the vicinity. State By and Through State

Highway Commission v. Arnold, 218 Or. 43, 341 P.2d 1089 (1959).

viii. A litigant who had owned less than 40 acres since 1937 and who was

familiar with such land was qualified to express an opinion as to value

of land. Hanns v. Friedly, 181 Or. 631, 184 P.2d 855 (1947).

ix. A corporate officer is not, ipso facto, entitled to testify as to value of

corporate real property without a showing of special qualifications.

State By and Through State Highway Commission v. Carmel Estates,

Inc., 15 Or. App. 41, 514 P.2d 1124 (1973).

x. Contract purchaser of farm land across which water control district

sought to acquire two easements had sufficient knowledge of property

plus its potential uses, familiarity with adjacent properties, and

knowledge of price of two adjacent five-acre tracts to qualify as value

witness in his own behalf. Junction City Water Control Dist. v. Calvert,

8 Or. App. 107, 493 P.2d 76 (1972).

ll. Pennsylvania

i. Even if there are no comparable sales available, market value of

condemned property might be established by testimony of persons

acquainted with lands, and whose knowledge and experience qualified

them to form intelligent judgment as to its proper valuation. Porter v.

Com., 454 Pa. 461, 309 A.2d 709 (1973).

ii. It is only necessary that witnesses who testify as to value of real estate

have such knowledge of subject matter as can reasonably be expected

in view of circumstances of case. Hayes Creek Country Club, Inc. v.

Central Penn Quarry Stripping & Const. Co., 407 Pa. 464, 181 A.2d

301 (1962).

iii. Landowner was, in general, competent to testify to value of his

property but he was subject to rules of evidence and occupied no

special position as witness, and where he contended that property had

no market value, his testimony was not competent. P.S.Const. art. 1, §

10. Sgarlat Estate v. Com., 398 Pa. 406, 158 A.2d 541 (1960).

iv. Courts are not restricted to receiving only expert testimony to fix value,

and market value or damages may be established by owner of property,

by expert witnesses, or by persons with knowledge and experience

qualifying them to form a reasonably intelligent judgment as to value.

Walnut St. Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Bernstein, 394 Pa. 353, 147

A.2d 359 (1959).

v. Where witness testifying as to value of property condemned had

shown familiarity with the property over a course of years and made a

special intense examination of it shortly before trial, court properly

refused to strike out his testimony and properly left it to the jury to

place such reliance upon it as they might see fit. Stevenson v. East

Deer Tp., 379 Pa. 103, 108 A.2d 815 (1954).

vi. An owner of property, taken in exercise of eminent domain, may testify

generally and give his opinion for what it may be worth of value of his

property. Hencken v. Bethlehem Municipal Water Authority, 364 Pa.

408, 72 A.2d 264 (1950).

vii. Qualification of witness, who was not a licensed broker but who had

spent 30 years buying and selling real estate for himself, to testify as

market value of real estate on appeal from triennial assessment was a

matter for the discretion of the trial judge. Morris v. Board of Property

Assessment, Appeals and Review, 209 Pa. Super. 97, 224 A.2d 772

(1966).

viii. Refusal of testimony of expert witness, who admitted that he was not

familiar with condemned property for nearly year before taking, was

not improper, especially where testimony would have been cumulative

at most. Jerome v. Laurel Pipe Line Co., 197 Pa. Super. 131, 177 A.2d

150 (1962).

ix. Owner of realty may testify as to its market value, if he has personal

knowledge of realty, with reasonable opportunity to observe its area,

uses to which it may be put, and extent and condition of any

improvements thereon, and possesses sufficient knowledge from which

to form opinion. Appeal of Stanley Co. of America, Inc., 196 Pa.

Super. 616, 175 A.2d 903 (1961).

x. Real Estate Appraisers Certification Act did not apply to persons who

performed appraisals in condemnation proceedings, and thus, trial

court abused its discretion in excluding testimony of real estate

professional, who did not possess real estate appraiser license, about

the effect of the taking on the fair market value of the condemned

property. 63 P.S. § 457.3. King v. West Penn Power Co., 946 A.2d 184

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008).

mm. Rhode Island

i. In a condemnation action of portion of petroleum bulk plant and

distribution center refusal of trial justice to accept real estate broker as

expert witness on subject of value of property taken was not an abuse

of discretion where broker possessed very limited experience as a

broker, although he was greatly experienced in the type of business

conducted by petitioner. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Director of Public

Works, 102 R.I. 696, 233 A.2d 423 (1967).

ii. Opinion testimony of laymen that granting of special exception for the

establishment of a gasoline service station would increase traffic

hazards and decrease value of neighboring property was incompetent.

Gen. Laws 1956, § 45”24”19. Our Lady of Mercy Greenwich, R. I. v.

Zoning Bd. of Review of Town of East Greenwich, 102 R.I. 269, 229

A.2d 854 (1967).

iii. In suit to partition realty, where master after preliminary examination

of witness as to training and experience in appraising realty allowed

witness to testify and although witness did not have any prior

experience in appraising rural realty he was an experienced appraiser of

urban realty and was trained in principles and practices of appraising

realty generally, sustaining the master ruling that witness was

competent to testify as to value of realty involved, was not an abuse of

discretion. Baffoni v. Baffoni, 77 R.I. 232, 74 A.2d 857 (1950).

nn. South Carolina

i. Generally, landowner, who was familiar with his property and its value,

is allowed to give his estimate as to its value or damage thereto, even

though owner is not an expert. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v.

Wilson, 254 S.C. 360, 175 S.E.2d 391 (1970).

ii. Generally, the best available proof of what land is worth is the opinion

of those who know enough of the facts, which must be a basis of the

opinion, to express their judgment about it. South Carolina State

Highway Dept. v. Rural Land Co., 250 S.C. 12, 156 S.E.2d 333 (1967).

iii. Owner of either real or personal property has right to give his estimate

as to value thereof. Nelson v. Coleman Co., 249 S.C. 652, 155 S.E.2d

917 (1967).

iv. Refusal to permit witness to express opinion as to value of condemned

property was not error in absence of attempt to qualify witness as

expert on real estate values. Bagwell v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line

Corp., 246 S.C. 569, 145 S.E.2d 17 (1965).

oo. South Dakota

i. Although owners are generally permitted to give an opinion on the

value of their real estate, their method of valuation is subject to the

same standards as other experts. Steineke v. Delzer, 2011 SD 96, 807

N.W.2d 629 (S.D. 2011).

ii. In eminent domain proceeding, neighboring landowner is permitted to

testify as to value not because of qualifications as appraiser either by

background or experience, but rather to express such opinion on

theory that being an owner he is necessarily acquainted with value.

State Highway Commission v. Beets, 88 S.D. 536, 224 N.W.2d 567

(1974).

iii. Owner of property was qualified to testify as to its value without

qualifying as expert. Geo. A. Clark & Son Inc. v. Nold, 85 S.D. 468,

185 N.W.2d 677 (1971).

iv. Owner of property, real or personal, is qualified to express his opinion

of value. Hannahs v. Noah, 83 S.D. 296, 158 N.W.2d 678 (1968).

pp. Tennessee

i. In action for damages resulting from surveyor negligence, owner of

real property is competent to state facts about property and give his

opinion as to that property’s value; owner does not have to be qualified

as expert. Whitelaw v. Brooks, 138 S.W.3d 890 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003),

appeal denied, (June 21, 2004).

ii. Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting landowner’s

witnesses to express opinions as to value of land condemned, where

they were property owners in county or were persons of long

experience as real estate dealers. State ex rel. Moulton v. Blake, 49

Tenn. App. 624, 357 S.W.2d 836 (1961).

iii. Witness who lived in adjoining county and who had been working for

state of Tennessee as appraiser in highway department for ten years

and who had been in this type of work for about 15 years and who

prior to that time was a real estate broker in Tennessee and who had

knowledge of sale of real estate in the county prior to this particular

project was qualified to testify as to value of condemnee’s property and

value of land taken and incidental damages. Parker v. Pack, 59 Tenn.

App. 49, 437 S.W.2d 251 (1968).

iv. Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting landowner’s

witnesses to express opinions as to value of land condemned, where

they were property owners in county or were persons of long

experience as real estate dealers. State ex rel. Moulton v. Blake, 49

Tenn. App. 624, 357 S.W.2d 836 (1961).

v. A witness who is familiar with the value of property of the same

character, although he has never seen the property in question, is

competent as an expert witness on such value. Reagan v. Wolsieffer, 34

Tenn. App. 537, 240 S.W.2d 273 (1951).

qq. Texas

i. A property owner may testify to the value of his property; however,

property owner’s testimony must be based on market value rather than

intrinsic or some other speculative value of property. Natural Gas

Pipeline Co. of America v. Justiss, 397 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2012).

ii. Employee of corporate general partner of limited partnership, in

condemnation action brought by municipal utility district relating to

land owned by partnership, was not qualified to testify about fair

market value of partnership property under rule of evidence governing

opinion testimony by lay witness; although employee’s affidavit

demonstrated his expertise in real estate matters, it did not set out facts

demonstrating that he was personally familiar with property and its fair

market value, employee’s damages opinion was based on his expertise,

not his personal familiarity with property, and employee was not timely

disclosed as expert. Rules of Evid., Rules 701, 702. Reid Road Mun.

Utility Dist. No. 2 v. Speedy Stop Food Stores, Ltd., 337 S.W.3d 846

(Tex. 2011).

iii. Agent of business organization could qualify to testify about fair

market value of organization’s property under “Property Owner Rule,”

which provides that a property owner who is familiar with the market

value of his property may testify regarding that market value even if he

is not qualified or designated as an expert witness; disapproving Mobil

Oil Corp. v. City of Wichita Falls, 489 S.W.2d 148. Rules of Evid., Rule

702. Reid Road Mun. Utility Dist. No. 2 v. Speedy Stop Food Stores,

Ltd., 337 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. 2011).

iv. To be admitted into evidence, a real estate appraiser’s expert opinion

must be relevant and reliable. Royce Homes, L.P. v. Humphrey, 244

S.W.3d 570 (Tex. App. Beaumont 2008), rule 53.7(f) motion granted,

(Mar. 5, 2008).

v. In actions concerning the fair market value of real property, the

property owner is competent to testify to the value of his own land

even if he may not otherwise qualify as an expert. State v. Central

Expressway Sign Associates, 238 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. App. Dallas 2007),

reh’g overruled, (Dec. 6, 2007).

vi. It is essential that expert witness have some acquaintance with

condemned land and its market value at time of trial. Blossman v.

State, 482 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus Christi 1972).

vii. In condemnation proceeding, permitting condemnee’s expert witness, a

bonded real estate broker, to testify as to comparable sales which were

in some ways similar to land being condemned and in other ways

dissimilar, for purpose of showing, in part, factual basis upon which

expert formed his opinion as to market value of condemned property,

was not an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. City of Wichita Falls v.

Rust, 468 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1971).

viii. Witnesses who lived in area and who were acquainted with land in

question and market value of real estate in vicinity were qualified to

testify on market value of condemned land. West Texas Utilities Co. v.

Bergstrom, 458 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. Eastland 1970).

ix. Witness who knows land under consideration and value of real estate

in vicinity and who states that he knows or has an opinion as to value

of land is competent to testify as to such value. West Texas Utilities

Co. v. Kittley, 447 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App. Eastland 1969).

x. Refusal, in condemnation proceeding, to strike testimony of president

of corporate lessee-condemnee as to value of leasehold interest was

proper, even though one element making up such valuation was gross

sales of lessee-condemnee business, where president testified that this

was just one element and leasehold had value stated by him regardless

of such element. Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Krueger, 441 S.W.2d 940

(Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1969).

xi. Owner of property can testify to his opinion of value of such property

though he may be unable to qualify himself as such witness to like

property belonging to another. Barstow v. Jackson, 429 S.W.2d 536

(Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1968).

xii. When witness gives evidence that he is acquainted with market value,

he is prima facie qualified to testify concerning value as expert, and his

testimony is admissible as such, and it then becomes question of

weight to be given it by jury. City of Houston v. McFadden, 420

S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1967).

xiii. In action involving value of house, experienced, licensed real estate

broker, who had made thorough inspection of house and who

considered material defects which jury found to have existed in house,

was qualified to give opinion of value. Bell v. Bradshaw, 342 S.W.2d

185 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1960).

xiv. Witness was qualified as expert on real estate values, where he had

been a real estate agent and broker for 17 years and had done a great

deal of real estate appraisal work. Topletz v. Thompson, 342 S.W.2d

151 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1960).

xv. It is not necessary for witness to be an expert in technical sense to be

qualified to testify as to value of land. Thompson v. Thompson, 380

S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1964).

xvi. In determining reasonable market value of realty, for taxation

purposes, a witness qualified to testify as to values may take into

accounts sales of similar property in the vicinity, but he must testify to

market value as a fact. Fannin v. Jacinto City, 331 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.

Civ. App. Houston 1960).

xvii. Before witness may be allowed to state his opinion of value of

property, he must show his qualifications, but he need not qualify as an

expert, although he must show that he has had opportunity to form an

intelligent opinion on subject, superior to those of jury, and such

showing should reveal that he had some knowledge of the property

and of its value at time and place in question. United Gas Pipe Line

Co. v. Smith, 232 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App. Texarkana 1950).

xviii. To qualify a witness to testify on issue of value, factual basis of his

opinion need not be of such direct character as would make it

competent in itself as primary evidence; and mere fact that opinion

may be based upon what is usually regarded as hearsay will not warrant

its exclusion in all cases. Cole v. City of Dallas, 229 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.

Civ. App. Dallas 1950).

rr. Utah: Familiarity with other sales may constitute source of knowledge of

witnesses who are qualified to give an opinion on value of property to be

condemned, and without this evidence jury is deprived of valuable source of

information on value of property, and is greatly handicapped in evaluating

new weight and credibility given to opinion evidence. State, By and Through

Its Engineering Commission v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953).

ss. Vermont

i. Owner of land condemned for highway purposes is competent witness

to testify as to value of land. 12 V.S.A. § 1604. Bissonnette v. State

Highway Bd., 124 Vt. 424, 207 A.2d 151 (1965).

ii. Value is largely a matter of opinion, and from the necessities of the

case much liberty is indulged in the admission of opinion evidence, and

any person who knows the property and has an opinion of its value

may give such opinion in evidence for what it is worth. Purington v.

Newton, 114 Vt. 490, 49 A.2d 98 (1946).

tt. Virginia: Permitting landowner witness to give his opinion, as an expert,

in eminent domain proceeding was not error, where witness lived a short

distance from land taken, was in business of building homes and had recently

bought and sold land in area and was owner of subdivision and familiar with

land development costs. Appalachian Power Co. v. Hayter, 212 Va. 11, 181

S.E.2d 615 (1971).

uu. Washington

i. An owner may testify as to the value of his property, and weight to be

given such testimony is for the trier of fact. Ingersol v. Seattle-First

Nat. Bank, 63 Wash. 2d 354, 387 P.2d 538 (1963).

ii. Property owner may testify in reverse eminent domain proceedings as

to value of his property, since he is familiar enough with it to know its

worth. Cunningham v. Town of Tieton, 60 Wash. 2d 434, 374 P.2d 375

(1962).

iii. In condemnation proceeding, property owner may testify as to its

value, without qualifying as an expert, upon assumption that he is

particularly familiar with it and, because of his ownership, knows of

uses for which it is particularly adaptable. State v. Larson, 54 Wash. 2d

86, 338 P.2d 135 (1959).

iv. Where expert appraiser, after inspecting property to be condemned by

school district and talking to buyers and sellers of other property in

area and comparing such property with property to be condemned,

considered prior sales in area, availability of similar sites, growth in

area, cost of development, and price range of homes in area to arrive at

value per acre of land to be condemned, he was qualified to evaluate

factors and express opinion of value based thereon, and hearsay nature

of some of facts he had learned by his investigation did not render his

opinion inadmissible in school district action to condemn the land.

Bremerton School Dist. 100-C, Kitsap County v. Hibbard, 51 Wash. 2d

226, 317 P.2d 517 (1957).

vv. West Virginia

i. Opinion evidence dealing with value and damage to land is admissible

if witness has some peculiar qualification or more knowledge that

jurors are ordinarily supposed to have. Ellison v. Wood & Bush Co.,

153 W. Va. 506, 170 S.E.2d 321 (1969).

ii. Opinion evidence dealing with value and damages to land is admissible

if witness has some peculiar qualifications or more knowledge than

jurors are ordinarily supposed to have. Moore, Kelly & Reddish, Inc. v.

Shannondale, Inc., 152 W. Va. 549, 165 S.E.2d 113 (1968).

iii. An owner may testify as to value of his own personal property, but he

must, in order to avoid speculation, have enough experience to know

values and be able to tell why, so the more frequent method of proof is

to have value testimony produced by persons experienced with the

type of property involved. Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490,

164 S.E.2d 710 (1968).

iv. Generally, anyone having more knowledge of real estate than jurors are

ordinarily supposed to possess may express opinion as to value.

Leftwich v. Wesco Corp., 146 W. Va. 196, 119 S.E.2d 401 (1961).

v. Opinion evidence as to market value of property being acquired in

condemnation proceedings is received with great liberality, but a

witness must show some knowledge of values and mere residence in

the immediate vicinity of the property of the witness, who has known it

for a considerable period of time does not show any such knowledge

and will not be received. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 137 W.

Va. 19, 69 S.E.2d 393 (1952).

ww. Wisconsin

i. A witness in a proceeding in eminent domain who is acquainted with

the land involved or who has recently visited and examined it and is

familiar with the market value of other land in the same locality or who

owns and has lived upon the land is qualified to give his opinion of its

market value and its weight and credibility are questions for the jury.

Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Fox, 134 W. Va. 106, 58 S.E.2d

584 (1950).

ii. Evidentiary value of expert appraiser opinion concerning fair market

value of condemned property was for the jury. Mancheski v. State, 49

Wis. 2d 46, 181 N.W.2d 420 (1970).

iii. Owner of real estate is competent to testify concerning its value. Trible

v. Tower Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 2d 172, 168 N.W.2d 148 (1969).

iv. A witness having but a general knowledge of the particular situation in

surrounding circumstances may testify as to the value of and damages

to real estate. Swedowski v. Westgor, 14 Wis. 2d 47, 109 N.W.2d 549

(1961).

xx. Wyoming

i. A witness who asserts an opinion of the value of property not

supported by facts is not competent, and an expert opinion is not

substantial evidence unless he can give a satisfactory explanation of

how he arrived at his opinion. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Hillard, 502

P.2d 189 (Wyo. 1972).

ii. Where there was no recent sale of property in vicinity that was identical

to that sought to be taken, opinion evidence as to valuation of

condemned property from persons familiar generally with values of

property of entire area was admissible, but even if extrapolation

method only was used, there was no abuse of discretion. W.S.1957, §

1”754. State Highway Commission v. McNiff, 395 P.2d 29 (Wyo.

1964).