2/9/15

5

Justice, Liberty, and Basketball: A Critical Examination of Robert Nozicks Argument Against Distributive Theories of Justice

In Anarchy, State & Utopia, Robert Nozick argues against certain types of distributional theories of justice, on the basis that they necessarily interfere with individuals liberty.[footnoteRef:1] In particular, he is critical of distributional theories of justice, which hold that resources should be distributed according to some rubric, e.g., need, utility, or a far more economically complex pattern.[footnoteRef:2] Nozick refers to these conceptions of justice as patterned because they identify entitlement to resources according to some general pattern. He argues against patterned theories of justice in favor of his own entitlement theory of justice. Unlike patterned theories of justice, Nozicks view conceives of justice in terms of production and voluntary exchange. He argues that, if a distributive pattern of resources is established, it will inevitably be broken by the voluntary exchanges of resources between individuals. And moreover, he argues that maintaining a distributive pattern of resources would violate the liberty of individuals because it would require either preventing them from engaging in voluntary exchanges, or seizing some amount of resources from individuals in order to redistribute it to others. Thus, patterned theories of justice are necessarily unjust. The following analysis will explicate central features of Nozicks argument and the Wilt Chamberlain thought experiment, through which it is primarily motivated. It will then be argued that the intuitive appeal of Nozicks argument relies on isolating and simplifying features of the central thought experiment and ones acceptance of his questionable notion of entitlement to the products of ones labor. [1: Nozick, Robert. 2013. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books.] [2: An exemplar of a more complex distributional pattern is Rawls difference principle. See Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice. Revised edition. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press.p. 54]

Nozick begins his argument against patterned theories of justice by considering intuitions about what an individual deserves or what he or she is entitled to, and showing that simple patterned distributions violate these intuitions. For example, consider a crude egalitarian distribution according to which the distribution of resources amongst society is just, if each individual receives an equal share. Now, consider that the society consists of three individuals, A, B, and C, and that there is a fixed amount of fifteen resource-units. Then, one is tasked with choosing between the following distributions, on the basis of egalitarian distribution: (1) A=2, B=4, C=9 or (2) A=5, B=5, C=5. According to the egalitarian pattern, (2) is obviously the only just distribution, as (1) violates the pattern of equality. However, Nozick argues that one should intuitively be unsatisfied by this method of determining the justice of an economic distribution. Perhaps distribution (1) is just if C worked exceedingly hard or A was particularly lazy. Nozick claims, Most peoplethink it relevant in assessing the justice of a situation to consider not only the distribution it embodies, but also how that distribution came about. We think it relevant to ask whether someone did something so that he deservedto have a lower share.[footnoteRef:3] That is, evaluating the justice of an economic distribution requires considering the past actions of individuals, which establish their entitlement to a particular share of holdings. This view of evaluating justice, for which Nozick advocates, is called an entitlement theory of justice.[footnoteRef:4] [3: Nozick, Robert. 2013. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books. p.154] [4: ibid. p.150]

In the previous example, if C performs more labor and produces a greater amount of goods than A or B, then he or she is entitled to the fruits of his or her labor, and thus the distribution is just. This intuition forms a premise of Nozicks entitlement theory of justice, that individuals are entitled to the product and full fruits of their labor.[footnoteRef:5] Thus, an unequal distribution of goods is perfectly just, if some individuals have a greater share of goods as a result of their labor. The second way that the unequal distribution (1) could be just, according to the entitlement theory, is if A voluntarily chose to exchange some of his or her goods for, say, an exotic vacation. The second premise of Nozicks entitlement theory of justice is that economic inequalities, which emerge as a result of voluntary transfers between individuals, are just. From these two points, Nozick argues that any attempt by the egalitarian[footnoteRef:6] to maintain the equal distribution would require that individuals be prevented from engaging in voluntary exchanges or that some portion of an individuals holdings be seized and redistributed. Either of these would violate individuals liberties and, thus, be unjust. In order to provide additional intuitive support for his argument, Nozick employees a rather elaborate thought experiment, which is intended to demonstrate the tension between patterned theories of justice and individuals liberty to engage in voluntary transactions and reap the full fruits of their labor. [5: ibid. p. 155] [6: It should be noted that while Nozicks argument against patterned theories of justice is being discussed with respect to a particular egalitarian pattern, his argument is directed against a distribution of resources according to any pattern (strong enough to be disrupted by voluntary exchanges and unequal production). The egalitarian distribution merely provides a simple example. ]

Nozick begins his example by conceding that any initial patterned distribution of resources, D1, is, by definition, just. This allows his example to apply to any particular distributive pattern and, thus, patterned theories of justice per se.[footnoteRef:7] Now, once this distribution has been achieved, legendary basketball star, Wilt Chamberlain, negotiates a lucrative contract with a team. The contract specifies, in each home game, twenty-five cents from the price of each admissions ticket goes to him [Chamberlain].[footnoteRef:8] So, for an entire season, each fan who attended a home game dropped an extra twenty-five cents into a box marked Wilt Chamberlain. They did so willingly, excited to see him play, and after an entire season, Wilt accumulated $250,000 from the ticket sales. It is assumed that this amount of income is greater than the average income and more, even, than anyone else possesses. Thus, after this season of voluntary transactions, a new distribution, D2, is produced, according to which Wilt Chamberlain possesses more resources than anyone else. [7: Nozick includes the minor caveat that some distributive patterns could be sufficiently weak as to not be disrupted by voluntary transactions. (p. 164)] [8: ibid. p.161]

According to his principles of entitlement (to resources produced or acquired through voluntary transfer), Nozick concludes that D2 is a just distribution. On the other hand, the advocate of patterned theories of justice would presumably judge D2 to be unjust because it differs from the pattern of a just distribution (D1). The crux of Nozicks argument is that maintaining D1 would require that one prevent the exchanges, which resulted in D2. But, as the example makes clear, each of these persons [the fans] chose to give twenty-five cents of their money to Chamberlain.[footnoteRef:9] So, maintaining D1 by preventing the exchange of goods would violate the liberty of the fans to exchange resources as they so choose. There is, however, another method by which D1 could be maintained without preventing the fans from entering into an exchange; a system of taxation could be established to maintain a patterned distribution. Nozick argues against this possibility on the basis of entitlement to the full product of ones labor. That is, taxing a portion of Chamberlains income for the purposes of maintaining a just distribution would necessarily violate his right to this entitlement, and thus be unjust. Chamberlains labor produced the intangible, but clearly desirable, product of sports-entertainment.[footnoteRef:10] And since he is the source of its production, he is entitled to it or anything he choses to exchange it forin this example, $250,000. It is this intuition about ones entitlement to the full products of labor that truly motivates the Chamberlain example; it is this intuition that underlies Nozicks related argument that, taxation is on par with forced labor, and it is this intuition that should be questioned. [footnoteRef:11] [9: ibid. p. 161] [10: Sports-entertainment is hyphenated in order to signify that it is a discrete product.] [11: ibid. p. 169]

As the thought experiment is constructed, it seem clear that Chamberlain is singularly responsible for the production of sports-entertainment and is therefore entitled to the wealth for which he exchanges it. Nozick offers very little analysis of this intuition, but simply assumes that most people would agree with it.[footnoteRef:12] It seems the most natural way to spell out this intuition would be to say that without Chamberlain, the sports-entertainment would not have existed, and for this reason, Chamberlain is uniquely entitled to it. That is, an individual is entitled to the goods that, in some sense, are existentially dependent on that individual. Because of the localized, simplified nature of Nozicks example[footnoteRef:13], it seems clear that the sports-entertainment was existentially dependent on Chamberlain, and him aloneafter all, it was him they were coming to see. However, simple cases like this, in which there exists some measure of production in isolation, are a convenient rhetorical tool but ultimately unreflective of reality. In any actual society there is no isolated production. To see this, consider what else is necessary for the production of sports-entertainment in addition to Wilt Chamberlain. There must exist a manufacturing industry capable of producing basketballs, athletic clothing, and sports stadiums, there must be reliable transportation and a communication infrastructure, such that fans know when a game is taking place and are capable of getting to it, and so on. The product for which each fan willingly exchanged twenty-five cents was not produced by Chamberlain alone and, therefore, he is not fully and uniquely entitled to it. It may still be the case that he is entitled to a larger portion, or even most of the product, but this entitlement is not absolute and does not preclude the possibility of taxation without the violation of liberty. [12: That is, it is an assumed premise for his arguments in Chapter 7. The justification of this intuition may be found elsewhere in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. ] [13: Another result of the isolation of the Chamberlain example is the appearance that no one is harmed in the transition from D1 to D2. If this example was situated in a society with a finite amount of resources, this transition could (and likely would) result in wealth inequalities that would prevent some individual from satisfying his or her basic needs. Unfortunately, a full argument for this point exceeds the present scope, but it will suffice to say that it is at least possible for a situation like the Chamberlain example to result in harmful inequalities. ]

Once one has identified the flaw in the intuition that one is completely and fully entitled to that which one produces, the initially overwhelming strength of Nozicks argument is mitigated. Production of goods within a society is necessary cooperative and, as such, no individual has an exhaustive entitlement to a particular good simply because he or she is featured in the causal chain that resulted in its existence. This fact does not rule out the legitimacy of privately held property, but it does allow for a system of taxation to be implemented that does not violate individuals liberty. Once production is understood as a necessarily cooperative enterprise, one can implement a system of taxation, which prevents the rise of pernicious wealth inequalities, while still respecting the liberties of individuals to engage in voluntary exchange.