ion sri lanka - dane: the future of tls

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DANE: The Future of Transport Layer Security (TLS) ION Sri Lanka January 18, 2015 Dan York Senior Content Strategist Internet Society [email protected]

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Page 1: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

DANE: The Future of Transport Layer Security (TLS)

ION Sri LankaJanuary 18, 2015

Dan YorkSenior Content StrategistInternet [email protected]

Page 2: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

TLS vs SSL

Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) originally developed by Netscape in the mid-1990s

"Transport Layer Security (TLS)" evolved from SSL 3.0, although "SSL" remains commonly used term

TLS version 1.3 in active development:

• https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13

• https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec

1/18/2015

1996 SSL 3.0 RFC 6101

1999 TLS 1.0 RFC 2246

2006 TLS 1.1 RFC 4346

2008 TLS 1.2 RFC 5246

2014/15? TLS 1.3 draft-ietf-tls-tls13

Page 3: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

TLS – Not Just For Web Sites

TLS / SSL originally developed for web sites

Now widely used for many other services, including:

• Email

• Instant messaging

• File transfer

• Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)

• Voice over IP (VoIP)

• Custom applications

Page 4: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

What Does TLS Do?

• Creates an encrypted tunnel between two applications

• Protects from eavesdropping

• Can be used in client/server or peer-to-peer

• Uses TCP (DTLS uses UDP)

App 1 App 2

App 1 App 2

With TLS

Without TLS

Page 5: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

TLS and Certificates

• How do you obtain the encryption keys?

• Typically uses PKIX / X.509 certificate

• Certificate signed by a Certificate Authority (CA)

• The client application initiating the connection checks the certificate:

• Does the certificate match the site/service being visited?

• Does the app trust the CA who signed the cert?

Page 6: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

The Problem With Certificate Authorities

• There are too many of them!

• Apps like web browsers may “trust” 1,300 Cas

• Any CA can issue a certificate for any domain

• Attackers can trick a CA into issuing a certificate

• “Middleboxes” can issue certificates to intercept traffic

• Ex. Gogo inflight WiFi service

• Several different solutions being explored

Page 7: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

A Quick Overview of DANE

1/18/2015

Page 8: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

The Typical TLS (SSL) Web Interaction

Web

Server

Web

Browser

https://example.com/

TLS-encryptedweb page

DNS Resolver

example.com?

10.1.1.1231

2

5

6

DNS Svrexample.co

m

DNS Svr

.com

DNS Svr

root

3

10.1.1.123

4

Page 9: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

The Typical TLS (SSL) Web Interaction

Web

Server

Web

Browser

https://example.com/

TLS-encryptedweb page

DNS Resolver

10.1.1.1231

2

5

6

DNS Svrexample.co

m

DNS Svr

.com

DNS Svr

root

3

10.1.1.123

4

Is this encrypted

with the

CORRECT

certificate?

example.com?

Page 10: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

Problems?

Web

Server

Web

Browser

https://www.example.com/TLS-encrypted web pagewith CORRECT certificate

DNS

Server

www.example.com?

1.2.3.41

2

Firewall

https://www.example.com/

TLS-encrypted web pagewith NEW certificate(re-signed by firewall)

Page 11: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

DANE

Web

Server

Web

Browserw/DANE

https://example.com/TLS-encrypted web pagewith CORRECT certificate

DNS

Server

10.1.1.123DNSKEYRRSIGsTLSA

1

2Firewall(or

attacker)

https://example.com/

TLS-encrypted web pagewith NEW certificate(re-signed by firewall)

Log

files or

other

serversDANE-equipped browsercompares TLS certificatewith what DNS / DNSSECsays it should be.

example.com?

Page 12: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)

• Q: How do you know if the TLS (SSL) certificate is the

correct one the site wants you to use?

• A: Store the certificate (or fingerprint) in DNS (new TLSA

record) and sign them with DNSSEC.

An application that understand DNSSEC and DANE will

then know when the required certificate is NOT being used.

Certificate stored in DNS is controlled by the domain name

holder. It could be a certificate signed by a CA – or a self-

signed certificate.

Page 13: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

DANE – Different operation modes ("certificate usage" field)

• 0 – CA specification• The TLSA record specifies the Certificate Authority (CA) who will provide TLS

certificates for the domain. Must be a valid CA included in browser/app.

• 1 – Specific TLS certificate• The TLSA record specifies the exact TLS certificate that should be used for the

domain. Note that this TLS certificate must be one that is issued by a valid CA.

• 2 – Trust anchor assertion• The TLSA record specifies the “trust anchor” to be used for validating the TLS

certificates for the domain. Allows for the use of a CA not included in application.

• 3 – Domain-issued certificate (“End-Entity Certificate”)• The TLS record specifies the exact TLS certificate that should be used for the

domain, BUT, in contrast to usage #1, the TLS certificate does not need to be signed by a valid CA. This allows for the use of self-signed certificates.

Page 14: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

DANE – Not Just For The Web

• DANE defines protocol for storing TLS certificates in DNS

• Securing Web transactions is an obvious use case

• Other uses also possible:

• Email

• VoIP

• Jabber/XMPP

• PGP

• ?

Page 15: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

DANE Success Stories

SMTP

360+ SMTP servers with TLSA records

http://www.tlsa.info/ - testing service

XMPP (Jabber)

255 servers

client-to-server & server-to-server

https://xmpp.net/reports.php#dnssecdane

Advertisements!

Page 16: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

3 Steps To Use DANE On Your Server / Service

1. Use TLS on your application/service!

2. Generate and publish a TLSA record in DNS

Separate TLSA record for each specific service. For example:

– _25._tcp.example.com.

– _443._tcp.example.com.

Tools available (ex. hashslinger) to help generate records

3. Sign your domain with DNSSEC

Page 17: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

2 Steps To Use DANE In Your Client Application

1. Have access to a DNSSEC-validating DNS resolver

Security of DANE relies on DNSSEC validation

DNSSEC validation can be easily enabled on BIND, Unbound or Windows Server

Some developers have performed validation within actual application

2. Use a DNS application library that supports DNSSEC

GetDNS API – http://getdnsapi.net/ - C, python, node.js and java

http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/resources/dnssec-developer-libraries/

Page 18: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

DANE Resources

DANE Overview and Resources:

• http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/resources/dane/

IETF Journal article explaining DANE:

• http://bit.ly/dane-dnssec

RFC 6394 - DANE Use Cases:

• http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6394

RFC 6698 – DANE Protocol:

• http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698

Page 19: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

DANE Resources

DANE and email:

• https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane

• http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-smime

DANE Operational Guidance:

• https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-ops

DANE and SIP (VoIP):

• http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-johansson-dispatch-dane-sip

• https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-srv

Other uses:

• https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey

• https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-rawkeys

Page 20: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

Why Deploy DNSSEC and DANE?

1/18/2015

Page 21: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

Reasons For Deploying DNSSEC/DANE

• TRUST – You can be sure your customers are reaching your sites – and that you are communicating with their servers.

• SECURITY – You can be sure you are communicating with the correct sites and not sharing business information with attackers, ex. email hijacking.

• INNOVATION – Services such as DANE built on top of DNSSEC enable innovative uses of TLS certificates

• CONFIDENTIALITY – DANE enables easier use of encryption for applications and services that communicate across the Internet

Page 22: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

Email Hijacking – A Current Threat

• CERT-CC researchers have identified that someone is hijacking email by using DNS cache poisoning of MX records

• Could be prevented by DNSSEC deployment

• CERT-CC (Sept 10, 2014):

– https://www.cert.org/blogs/certcc/post.cfm?EntryID=206

• Deploy360 blog post (Sept 12, 2014):

• http://wp.me/p4eijv-5jI

Page 23: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

Resources

1/18/2015

Page 24: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

Start Here Pagehttp://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/start/

Easy method of finding resources for

specific audiences, including:

• Network operators

• Content providers (ex. web site

owners)

• Developers

• Governments

• Consumer electronics vendors

• Enterprises and campus networks

• Registrars

• Internet exchange points (IXPs)

Page 25: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

The Two Parts of DNSSEC

Signing Validating

ISPs

Enterprises

Applications

DNS Hosting

Registrars

Registries

Page 26: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

DNSSEC Signing - The Individual Steps

Registry

Registrar

DNS Hosting Provider

Domain Name Registrant

• Signs TLD

• Accepts DS records

• Publishes/signs records

• Accepts DS records

• Sends DS to registry

• Provides UI for mgmt

• Signs zones

• Publishes all records

• Provides UI for mgmt

• Enables DNSSEC

(unless automatic)

Page 27: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

DNSSEC Deployment Maps

• DNSSEC deployment maps:

• http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/maps/

• Mailing list to receive weekly maps:

• https://elists.isoc.org/mailman/listinfo/dnssec-maps

Page 28: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

DNSSEC Deployment Maps – Asia Pacific

Page 29: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

https://twitter.com/deploy360

https://www.facebook.com/Deploy360

http://gplus.to/deploy360

http://www.youtube.com/user/Deploy360

http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/feed/

http://soundcloud.com/deploy360/

Social Media Channels

Page 30: ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS

Thank You!Dan York

Senior Content Strategist

[email protected]