invalidating the claim that it is unhelpful to refer to violence by state actors as terrorism

Invalidating the Claim that it is Unhelpful to refer to

Violence by State Actors as Terrorism

James Peters 14905640

11/4/2014

Invalidating the Claim that it is Unhelpful to refer to Violence by

State Actors as Terrorism

When considering whether or not to classify violence inflicted by states/state agents

that causes destruction whilst instilling fear on a targeted –or wider– audience as “terrorism”,

there are several factors that need to be taken into account. Firstly, as a collective unit

endowed with the mandate to protect its members, can a state illegitimately use its monopoly

on the use of force? Secondly, if there is a limit on the use of force as jus in bello prescribes,

then when is the line crossed by which a state’s actions can be labeled “terroristic”? This then

begs the question of agency versus intent of action and requires this to be juxtaposed against

an accepted definition (or at least a concrete definition for the purpose of this analysis) of

terrorism. Once these three factors have been analyzed and it is determined that there is a

possible category of state violence outside the realm of acceptable use of force, the question

remains should the violence be labeled as state committed terrorism, and if not, then how

should it be claimed? As will be shown, this violence is not existentially different than

terroristic acts committed by non-state organizations and terror groups, thus invalidating

claims that there should be a distinction in applying a terrorist label to actions committed by

states. However as will be shown through the usage of historical examples, the near universal

usage of this kind of force by a wide variety of states in the twentieth century and in our

contemporary world raises the questions, if state powers, great or not, engage in terroristic

activity, then does it fall into yet another acceptable use of state power and are states

normatively wrong for their use of terroristic force?

To answer these questions, one must briefly consider the scope of the theory of

statecraft in justifying state use of force. While it is generally accepted that states have a right

to legitimately use force,1 there is disagreement among political philosophers and theorists as

to how much force can be considered a legitimate use of force. A realist like Kenneth Waltz

would argue that because the international system is dominated by anarchy2, a state needs to

use enough force to maintain a balance of power in the international system.3 And if strong

state coercion is used, then that is what the state needs to do to maintain its place in the

international order.

1 Waltz (p. 103, 1979)

2 ibid

3 Waltz (p. 117, 1979

If one took the nature of the political as far as Carl Schmitt does, there would be no

violence that falls outside the usage of legitimate state force. As violence equals the ultimate

expression of political action,4 and the state is the “one political community”

5 upon which the

friend-enemy distinction is defined, it is state action that defines the community. By engaging

in state violence, a state is expressing the extreme of the friend-enemy distinction6. Even

when that violence is expressed against an internal faction of the state, it reveals that a

politically polarizing domestic friend-enemy distinction has been created within the state

itself, thus the creation of a new antagonistic political group to the mother state.7

While Schmitt does represent an extreme of the legitimate use of force, it can be

observed through his text that he starts with the same pessimistic view of human nature as

other classical realists by name.8 It can then be argued that his argument is an extreme

evolution of the realist narrative. His focus on state power throughout The Concept of the

Political as being defined and justified by the Political9fully manifests the realist focus on

state power being central to political authority and the use of violence as being always

justified when used by the state to maintain its authority.

While it would be easy to write off the question of expressible state terrorism here as

being a nonsensical question, the problem of focusing solely on the state’s right to use force

overlooks the factor of scope mentioned in the piece State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and

Measurement. Scope looks beyond whether the state has the right to use force. The scholarly

focus on scope evaluates the nature of a state’s activity and the level of harm inflicted upon

the intended victims and audience.10

Is the nature of the state action proportionate to the

threat to the acting state’s security or interests?

That question of scope can be measured against Just War Theory –jus ad bellum and

jus in bello— and international agreements like the Geneva Convention. If a state has unjustly

used force before all options have been exhausted, if the violence is not sanctioned by a

legitimate authority (the UNSC)11

, if it is not being used in an instance of self-defense (if the

state action is “pre-emptive”), and if it is being fought by the normatively “wrong” intentions,

4 Schmitt (p.33, 2007)

5 Schmitt (p. 45, 2007)

6 Schmitt (p. 33, 2007)

7 Schmitt (p. 32, 2007)

8 Schmitt (p. 61, 2007)

9 The friend-enemy distinction

10 Mitchell, et al. (p. 14, 1986)

11 (UN Charter, Article 7)

then it is in violation of jus ad bellum and is therefore overstepping the post-WWII

international systems accepted jus cogens on the use of force.12

Additionally, if the state’s

actions violate the principles of discrimination13

or proportionality,14

then the scope of

violence can be measured as being a step further from traditional state usage of force and

more akin to the violence of politically motivated non-state actors.15

Hand in hand with jus in bello, is the intensity principle in measuring the qualification

of state violence as terroristic in nature or not.16

Intensity expands beyond scope to include

the ‘frequency of occurrence’17

of violence against a target group. And as is argued by

Blakeley in Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice, it is not the victims of the

immediate violence that help to create a qualitative distinction between the void of simple

state repression and state sponsored terrorism, but it is the fear of the compliant observers

within the state –the target audience that matters when assessing the frequency of

occurrence.18

If a climate of fear already exists, then a state does not need to commit repeated

offenses in order to ensure order and compliance via terror tactics.

But what is a terror tactic? To paraphrase the definition of terrorism given by the

authors of the Mitchell piece, it can be detailed as a violent action by Actor A against Victim

B with the intention of striking fear in Target C to the extent that Actor A is able to influence

compliance, change or neutrality from Target C.19

One key element in discerning terror

violence from the standard state monopoly on force would be the intent with which the state

wields the force that is used. Meaning, ‘there must be an…element…affecting the behavior

of a target group.’20

As discussed in the Blakeley piece21

, it can be terroristic if it steps

beyond the rules of war outlined in Geneva Convention III (treatment of prisoners of war)22

and IV (treatment of civilians).23

12

(Ferraro, n.d.) 13

Only military targets should be targeted (ibid.) 14

Force should be limited in scope to only what is necessary to end the state of conflict (ibid.) 15

Blakeley (p. 13, 2009) 16

Mitchell, et al. (p. 14, 1986) 17

Ibid. 18

Blakeley (p. 14, 2009) 19

Mitchell, et al. (p. 5, 1986) 20

Mitchell, et al. (p.4, 1986) 21

Blakeley (p. 19, 2009) 22

(Gen. III., 1949) 23

(Gen. IV., 1949

One such example of a terror tactic expanding to a larger audience would be the

Prague Spring. Because the USSR so effectively crushed the rebellion of Prime Minister

Dubcek, a definite message with a terrorizing effect was sent to the other members of the

Warsaw Pact that dissidence would not be tolerated and would be swiftly and violently

ended. This same effect can also be seen at a national level in the example of the

effectiveness of the Stasi in East Germany (DDR). By using the Political Terror Scale of

Mitchell et al., the DDR could easy qualify in their lowest levels (D or E) in terms of

promoting domestic terror at a near national level; ‘murders, disappearances, and torture are a

common part of life…terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in…ideas.’24

This would lend to the thought that terrorism is not necessarily about the agent (non-

state actors as propagated by western media) but rather, it is about the action itself. When

classifying an action as a terroristic action, one must look at its qualitative distinctions. While

most scholars and legal codes will differ in their exact wordings of what terrorism is, they all

hold central themes25

: a violent act, intention to cause coercion of a wider audience, with the

threat of a possible future action of equal scale.26

Blakeley rightly claims that an act labeled

as an act of state terrorism must be consistent with the label used to declare acts committed

by non-state actors as terroristic.27

Therefore the focus of terrorism studies should focus away

from agency to observing the act itself.

This need to focus on the intended outcome of the action when it is committed is

especially stressed by Blakeley throughout her piece. This stands in direct contrast to the

state-centric pre-9/11 narrative that, ‘governmental violence could be so classified [as a

terrorist act].’28

But as she points out, it is nevertheless important to not exclude states from a

group that can be responsible for terrorist actions29

. In fact, because of the social and political

structure created by a state, it is in a far better position than many non-state terrorist

organizations in upholding ‘a pre-existing climate of fear.’30

As there are no major qualitative

differences between state sponsored terrorism and terrorism committed by non-state actors, is

it possible to look briefly at a range of historical examples and organize states into “good”

24

Mitchell, et al. (p. 21, 1986) 25

Blakeley (p. 12, 2009) 26

Chomsky (p. 13, 1991) 27

Blakeley (p. 12, 2009) 28

Becker (p. 91, 2006) 29

(Blakeley, 2009) 30

Blakeley (p. 15, 2009)

states that comply with jus cogens regarding the non-use of terrorism and “evil” states that

are complacent or active proponents of state sponsored terrorism.

To evaluate if such categorization can exist, the five permanent members of the

UNSC, as the five primary states charged with upholding international order and law in the

post-WWII system,31

will be judged on historical examples tested by the determined

definition of terrorism.32

As noted by Blakeley,33

there is no codified international law

officially condemning state terrorism, thus, defining it. Therefore we will use the tested

historical examples to determine if an un-codified jus cogens has been established in

contradicition to standing international law of the United Nations.

As one of five permanent Security Council members, it goes without saying that

Russia (and the USSR before 1992) has been an overt sponsor of state terrorism. Moving

beyond its four and a half decades of sponsoring mercenary client states in the Warsaw Pact

(the Deutsches Demokratic Republik was mentioned above and is one such example or

terroristic states sponsored by the USSR),34

it becomes overtly clear that the USSR itself was

a “terrorist state” in its reaction to the Hungarian Uprising in 1956.35

While the act itself can

be claimed by a realist like Waltz to be within the acceptable use of state power to maintain

the balance of power between the USSR and the Anglo-American led alliance in Western

Europe, when we look at the intentions of the invasion following the revolt, we can then

classify it as a terrorist act.

A major state actor used force against a dissident faction that opposed its power or

influence. The action was done with the intent of compelling a return of Hungarian obedience

to the Soviet model of governance. The swift reaction created an atmosphere of extreme

terror both in Hungary against further revolution and surely inspired fear in other potential

separatist/autonomy movements throughout the Eastern Bloc. This proved to instill a period

of unquestioned soviet control until the Prague Spring just over ten years later.

31

(United Nations Security Council, n.d.) 32

Summed by Blakeley, the definition used in the test cases will be ‘State terrorism involves the deliberate targeting of individuals that the state has a duty to protect to invoke terror in a wider audience [and this can be expanded to an international scale by adding a clause that states can sponsor similar violence in a third state with the intent on coercing that state, its institutions and/or segments of its population to change its behavior]’ (ibid) 33

(ibid) 34

Similar to the US “employment of mercenary states” Chomsky (p. 15, 1991) 35

(Encyclopaedia Britannica, Hungary)

China too has quite prominently used terror tactics to force its populace into

compliance. Most prominently, the communist government’s brutal reaction to the protesters

at Tiananmen Square showcased a situation in which Actor A (the Chinese government) used

force against Victim B (the student protesters) to enforce continued compliance of the general

populace.36

The brutal crackdown by the government sent a message to the people of China

that the one-party system was to stay in China and that it would not accept any challenge to

that notion.

Likewise, the US has quite infamously used terroristic activities at home to dissuade

convergence from the official party line of the government. The most overt example of the

use of terror in the US would be the McCarthyism era and the Red Scare. The black list of the

House Committee on Un-American Activates stood in complete contrast to the liberal ideal

of free thought and free speech. By its use of the black list and closed door court cases, the

US government successfully created an environment of extreme terror during this period. It

targeted many high profile people throughout the entertainment industry and, like the reaches

of the Stasi, reached down to the average citizen. By prosecuting “communists” on largely

fabricated charges, the fearful frenzy created by “McCarthyism” proved an effective usage of

domestic state-sanctioned terrorism that coerced people into compliance with the government

narrative.

Domestic terrorism has also been used by the two remaining undiscussed UN Security

Council Members: the United Kingdom and France. The British fought fire with fire in North

Ireland. By not openly condemning and properly punishing police officers and members of

the armed forces who used torture as a means to extract information regarding “terrorist

activities” from Catholics during the Northern Ireland conflict,37

the British state condones

the action as a means to an end. This end harms the citizens of Northern Ireland that the

United Kingdom was mandated to protect, thus resulting in a case of state terrorism.38

As

Blakeley argues, state agency is present and an act is terroristic and not criminal if the ruling

government does not prosecute the offending agents of the state to the fullest extent of the

law.39

36

(BBC, 2005) 37

(Cobain, 2010) 38

Blakeley (p. 19, 2009) 39


The French too have used torture and kidnapping as a means of domestic control

during their attempted annexation of Algeria.40

The years 1956 and 57 were particularly

violent in the state violence propagated against the separatist groups that wanted Algeria to

become independent instead of a part of France.41

The authorization of the use of torture,

kidnappings and execution by officers as high as generals implicate the French in the usage

of state terrorism to regain control of Algeria.42

As discussed in the Blakeley piece, any use

of state force or violence that goes beyond the bounds of war laid out by the Geneva

Convention is a use of force that wanders into the category of state terrorism.43

As Algeria

was a region under French Colonial control, France had responsibility to the citizens beyond

the French settlers of Algeria to protect them. It violated this mandate by the use of extreme

force and terrorist tactics to wrestle military control over the country as its colonial empire

dissolved.

While these are five examples that hold an important political and historical relevance

to the five permanent members of the UNSC, they are a mere drop in the bucket when we

look at the long list of terroristic acts committed by these states. To name off five more quick

examples we could include Russian sponsored terrorism in Eastern Ukraine today, the

terroristic tactics employed by Mao during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural

Revolution a couple years later, America’s global network of client mercenary states44

and

global network of terror camps like Guantanamo Bay and those in Eastern Europe, the

terroristic tactics used by the British in their attempts to retain imperialist control over India,

and the French application of terroristic methods used in Algeria in their final attempts to

retain control over Vietnam. And this list clearly does not include the endless abuses of

medium and small states against their citizens that would qualify as terroristic: the

disappearance of Argentinian and Chilean citizens during the cold war,45

South Africa’s use

of terrorist tactics to uphold its Apartheid regime, and Iranian support for terrorist

organizations like Hamas.

40

(Thull & Arens, 2001) 41

(Encyclopaedia Britannica, Algerian War) 42

(Martin, 2013) 43

Blakeley (p. 20, 2009) 44

Chomsky (p. 15, 1991) 45


While this clashes with the normative values of international laws articulated via the

Geneva Convention and the UN Declaration of Human Rights,46

it would seem that state

actors great and small employ the use of terroristic tactics, thus forming a new jus cogens,

and this would seem to validate the claim that a different term should be applied to force used

by state actors or agents of states that engage in violent activities that escape the bounds of

codified use of force. However, this claim is invalid. Along with soft law created by terrorism

scholars and the codified international law, states should be held accountable for the use of

terrorist violence. It is the responsibility of citizens in industrial liberalized republics and the

rest of the world to governments to officially adopt treaties that condemn the use of state

practiced terrorism.

46

(Human Rights, 1948)

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invalidating the claim that it is unhelpful to refer to violence by state actors as terrorism

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