Memorandum to the Seventh Central Pay Commission

On behalf of the Officers of the Indian Police Service

Submitted by the Central IPS Association

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CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................5

1.1. The Indian Police Service- A Factsheet............................................5

1.2. Police Administration in India- The Structural Context....................5

1.3. Indian Police Service-Growing Citizen Expectation..........................6

1.4. Growing Citizen Expectation-Structural Changes:...........................6

1.5. Evolution of the Indian Police Service:.............................................8

1.6. Evolution of the Indian Police Service- Post Independence Developments........................................................................................11

2. Principles of determination of pay.......................................................19

2.1. Introduction...................................................................................19

2.2. International Practices...................................................................19

A. Lord Edmund-Davies Committee..........................................20

B. Sheehy Commission-...............................................................20

C. The Winsor Report......................................................................22

2.3. Comparison with Private Sector.....................................................24

2.4. Principles of determination of Pay.................................................24

3. Conditions of Service...........................................................................27

3.2 LONG WORKING HOURS OF POLICE IN THE ABSENCE OF SHIFT SYSTEM...................................................................................................27

3.3 Occupational and situational risks specific to Police......................30

3.4 Stress caused due to job uncertainties, unpredictable nature of job, hostile clientele, and frequent transfers.................................................31

3.5 Stress due to alienation from families...........................................33

3.6 Health hazards, psychological and emotional stress associated with Police job and their manifestations........................................................36

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3.7 Summing up of arguments for compensation of police personnel with extra pay and allowances for working under extremely challenging and stressful conditions..........................................................................39

4. Structural issues, Pay Parity and Career Progression Issues...............47

4.2 Parity of Pay with the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Foreign Service.......................................................................................47

4.3 Anomalies in Notifications issued for implementing the Sixth Pay Commissions recommendations on edge in the initial career to IAS/IFS:

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4.4 Misinterpretation of two years gap between IAS and other services to be rectified.........................................................................................60

4.5 Intra Service Parity........................................................................61

4.6 Removal of the Grade pay 8900/- in the PB4 Rs37400-67000/- in order to bring about uniformity in the career progression with the other civil services...........................................................................................61

4.7 Abolition of the HAG+ scale:..........................................................64

4.8 Reinforcing the Spirit of All India Character of the Service through facilitating adequate representation of IPS in the Central Deputations. 67

4.9 Removing inequities in the Central Staffing Scheme.....................67

5. Principles of determination of Allowances, advances and Incentives....73

5.2 Examples from the United Kingdom:.............................................73

5.3 Submissions IN RESPECT OF ALLOWANCES.................................74

5.4 Advances:......................................................................................75

5.5 Performance linked incentive scheme:..........................................75

5.6 ALLOWANCES SPECIFIC TO POLICE..............................................75

5.7 Comparison between defence forces and CAPF: How CAPF is working in equally challenging conditions but do not receive commensurate benefits..........................................................................78

6.Principles of determination of Pension...................................................81

6.3 Problems with the new Pension Scheme.......................................81

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6.4 One rank one pension....................................................................85

6.5 Irrational Pension Fixation Formula:..............................................86

6.7 Making Pension Tax Free...............................................................93

6.8 Raising the Family Pension:-..........................................................94

6.9 Gallantry Medal Allowance –..........................................................94

CONCLUSION.............................................................................................95

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE- A FACTSHEET

1.1.1. The officers of the Indian Police Service, being vested with the mandate to ensure ‘Rule of Law’, prevent and detect crime, and safeguard the country’s internal security, occupy an extremely significant place in the architecture of governance. With a cadre strength of 4720, organised into 24 State/Union Territory Cadres, the service provides leadership to a force of 31,93,808 police personnel spread across State and Central Police Forces. In the year 2012 (the last year for which statistics are available), it closely supervised investigations of 60,41,559 fresh criminal cases, handled multifarious agitations, and oversaw apprehension of 74,20,091 persons in the course of protecting and upholding the rule of Law. While these statistics are in themselves mindboggling, they constitute and capture only a minor part of the immense contribution of the Police. Their real impact, however, resting largely on intangible outcomes, are not amenable to statistics but fall within the nebulous realm of ‘citizen experience’. Officers of the service man 711 Police districts (of which 176 are terrorist/ LWE affected), as well as the higher formations in the Central and State Police Organisations. This mandate is discharged with a meagre strength of 106.79 civil policemen per lakh population, which stands barely half of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported global average. In the discharge of these duties, in the service of the nation, 30 IPS1 officers made the supreme sacrifice of laying down their lives, fighting terrorism, insurgency and organised crime.

1.2. POLICE ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA- THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT

1 The names of the officers of the Indian Police Service who laid down their lives, in the service of the nation, may be seen at Annexure A.

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1.2.1.The Police in India undertake its responsibilities under extremely challenging circumstances. India is today an evolving democracy, with a large citizenry, that is both conscious and assertive of their rights. She is home to a rare plurality-of ethnicity, religion and culture, and brings with it many issues of difference and dissent. The country is today an emerging economic powerhouse, and is subject to the resultant churnings, displacements and migrations. She has a large proportion of youth, with rising aspirations, who seek to dislodge the existing status quo of inequity and discrimination imposed by the weight of history. The globalised village that we live in has brought in considerable interconnectedness that governance must necessarily grapple with. India’s distinctive constitutional architecture, which is unitary in character, but federal in spirit, renders provision of uniform administration across the nation a serious challenge. All of the above, in multifarious ways, has made policing an extremely difficult, albeit rewarding experience.

1.3. INDIAN POLICE SERVICE-GROWING CITIZEN EXPECTATION

1.3.1.The Indian citizen has extremely high expectations from the Indian Police Service. Most importantly, (s)he expects the Service to set in place a mechanism to provide a ‘sense of security’-in both the physical and psychological senses, so as to freely go about their lives, without undue concern for one’s safety and security. (S)he expects that the Rule of Law is in place, and that if wronged, access to justice in a time bound manner is available as a matter of right. As the visible arm of government, the citizen expects the IPS to set in place a police system, which is an effective first responder in distress, of any kind. (S)he expects the Police to manage India’s unique diversity, allowing citizens to celebrate the differences, while bringing in ‘order’ and social cohesion to manage the dissonances. The citizen expects the Police to create an enabling environment to facilitate individual and collective growth, ensuring the fundamental rights of the citizen. Most importantly, (s)he expects the Police to ensure that India is secure from ‘within’ and ‘without’.

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1.3.2. In order to accomplish these critical responsibilities, the Indian citizen expects an IPS officer to be the repository of a daunting array of intellectual and administrative skills. The officer is expected to lead from the front, bringing to bear qualities of courage- both physical and moral, professional excellence, daring innovation and strategic vision to the tasks at hand. (S)he is expected to be a team builder, intelligently appraise crises and even negotiate at times. The citizen expects him/her to work extremely long workdays, display a high degree of industry, perseverance and unflagging enthusiasm, and be alert and available for him round the clock. The IPS officer is expected to bring about change in remote and difficult places, at times face real risk to life and limb, as well as meet the increasing, oft unrealistic public expectation.

1.4. GROWING CITIZEN EXPECTATION-STRUCTURAL CHANGES:

1.4.1.The growing citizen expectation has very often been perceived by the constitutional courts and has found voice through a series of their reform directives. These judgments have led to a slow but sure footed movement towards police reforms, aimed at converting the Indian Police into a People friendly and public service oriented Police. The most significant of these has been the seven steps towards a functionally independent and accountable Police, laid down by the Supreme Court of India in Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006)2. Amongst other things, it called for a State Security Commission, to lay down broad policy and evaluate Police functioning, Police Establishment Board to independently decide on transfers and postings in the Police Department, and Police Complaints Authorities as independent oversight mechanisms. The judiciary has been in the forefront of unfettering investigation, the latest example being the Supreme Court decision in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2014),3 in respect of curbs on initiating investigation, under the Delhi Special Police

2 The relevant extracts of judgement may be found at Annexure B.3 The relevant extracts may be seen at Annexure C.

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Establishment Act, 1946. Various State Governments, recognizing the need to have a more independent Police, have established Police Commissionerates in 47 cities of India (as on date)4. Internally, Police leaders have transformed themselves as change agents to improve internal sub-culture, better processes and meet emerging challenges. The all-round trend towards greater-community engagement, both as a tool of understanding citizen priorities, as well as in transforming law enforcement into a shared endeavor, between the police and the policed, has been a product of citizen expectation5. All of this brings us in line with progressive, mature democracies across the world the IPS plays a highly critical role in this transformation.

1.4.2.The enhanced citizen expectation has not only changed the way the IPS undertakes business, but has also substantially altered its roles and functions. While maintenance of internal security was a minor, specialised component in IPS charter, it has undergone considerable change in the post 9/11 era. Internal security has been considerably integrated with foreign policy, as well as across all the development sectors. The varied roles played by IPS officers in Indian establishments abroad, as well as the primacy of its role in development across theatres- urban/LWE/terrorism infested, all point to the same fact. There has also been a growing recognition of the necessity of the participation of the IPS officers in policy formulation. The regular appointment of IPS officers as Governors in strife torn areas, or as National Security Advisor/ Dy National Security Advisor6, indicates the considerable skill sets and experiences they bring to the task. The trend towards induction of IPS officers as Home Secretaries in various States7, as well as its greater

4 List of cities with Police Commissionerate system may be seen at Annexure D. Police Commissionerate system is a system envisaged under S.8, and S.20(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherein all or any of the powers of the executive magistrate in a metropolitan area, is vested in the Commissioner of Police.5 Community Policing, as an acceptable and effective method of policing has been recognised and adopted in various jurisdictions over the last three decades. In some states like Kerala, the system has been written into the new Police legislation.6 Out of the five National Security Advisors, two of them, including the incumbent is an officer of the Indian Police Service, as is the present Deputy National Security Advisor. 7 The list of states with IPS officers as Home Secretaries, is given at Annexure E.

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representation in the Ministry of Home Affairs, also indicates the necessity of engaging domain experts in internal security functions. The creation of specialised agencies, and new-age Central Police Organisations- like the National Investigation Agency (NIA), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), National Intelligence Grid(NATGRID), National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) etc, attests to the importance of the internal security dimension. Police Modernization plans have also endorsed these changes.

1.4.3.Besides the above, taking into account their unique skills of man management, execution etc, there is an increasing trend towards induction of IPS officers in departments like transport, tourism, sports, and in regulatory bodies at both the Central and State level. This is of course, not accounting for the core competence of IPS officers in discharging functions as Chief Vigilance Officers in Public Sector Undertakings. In a nutshell, the IPS today straddles the entire realm of governance from a police chowki to foreign policy!

1.5. EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE:

1.5.1. It is necessary in this context to dwell on the historical context of the evolution of the Indian Police. The modern Police system in India was introduced by Lord Cornwallis, but the first steps towards a unified police administration, under the British took roots in the mid eighteen hundreds in Sindh, Bombay, and Madras. However, it was the Indian Police Commission of 1860, which was the first effort to have a comprehensive look at the Police in India. Interestingly, while its constitution arose from a concern for a more efficient and effective Police force, its terms of reference8 were as follows:

i. To ascertain the numbers and cost of all Police and quasi-Police of every description, at present serving in each province throughout the British territories in

8 Griffiths, Percival, “To Guard My People- The History of the Indian Police”, Allied Publisher, Bombay, p.88.

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India, who are paid by Government from the general revenue.

ii. To suggest to Government any measure whereby expenditure may be economized or efficiency increased, in the existing Police forces.

1.5.2. In other words, the Police Commission, 1860 on which the Indian Police Act of 1861 was based, was not exactly an attempt to bring in police reform, but essentially an exercise to bring about savings in public finances. The transition from the military Police to the civil Police, based on the previous experiment in Madras presidency, was recommended by the Commission, as the method of achieving the same9. While affirming that the pay must be adequate, it laid down the following standards:

a. That the lower rank of the constabulary should be divided into three grades, the lowest of which should receive a pay equal at least to the average ordinary wages of unskilled labour, The pay of the head constables and sergeants should be sufficient to place them above temptation, and to make promotion to these appointments, an object of ambition, open to the inferior grades,

b. That the pay of the Inspectors of Police,….should be on such liberal scale, as will command the services of the Europeans and East Indians of respectability and education, or of the higher classes of natives, who now enter the public service.10

However, the Indian Police Act, 1861 created and constituted the Indian Police in the manner that we see today, with its uniform structure and regulation.

1.5.3.The Public Service Commission, 1886 (Aitchinson Commission), recommended an overhaul of the system of

9 Indian Police Commission, 1860, para 18.10 Indian Police Commission, 1860, proposition 42,43,44.

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recruitment to superior grades, so as to ensure that candidates with good educational qualifications, and habits of industry are recruited11. It also unanimously suggested that the abuses in the lower ranks were entirely on account of poorer pay.

1.5.4.The Indian Police Commission (1902-03) (Fraser Commission) is the next milestone in the history of Indian Police. Coming down harshly on the Police, the Commission identified five reasons for the same which include:

i. Unsatisfactory training and recruitment of superior officers of the department

ii. Undue interference with the Police by Magistrates and Commissioners

iii. Inadequate staff-both superior and subordinateiv. Insufficient remuneration of all ranks12

The Commission commenting on recruitment and training found fault with the system of nominations, as well as with the practice of sending men to India as Assistant Superintendents of Police, who were too young, without proper training in criminal law, languages and Indian history. It suggested that the pay and prospects of the superior police officers should be improved, as they were not adequate as compared to the other officers in other departments, and the initial pay was ‘too little for a young man to live on respectably’13.

1.5.5.However, when the suggestion of a common examination, and its variants were put forth, the Commission adopted a specious reasoning having no bearing on administrative requirements, and at variance with their earlier exhortations. It said: “The Commission have rejected both these suggestions partly because they are not prepared to say that precisely the same age or class of men is required for the Police as well as the civil service; and mainly because they think that men would not work contentedly in the police in the same district or province, alongside of their contemporaries in the Civil Service, unless the Government were prepared to make the former as attractive as the latter.”

11 Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886, para 116-117.12 Griffiths, p.98.13 Griffiths, p.100.

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1.5.6.The Royal Commission on Public Services, 1916 (Islington Commission), did not make considerable changes to the Police system, as the Fraser Commission had only recently put forth its recommendations. However, they recommended retention of the existing system of recruitment wherein candidates between 19-21 years, would appear for a competitive examination, to be selected to the Service.

1.5.7.The Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, 1924 (Lee Commission), was of the view that the best type of Indian is not being obtained for the Indian Police Service, partly out of the inadequacy of emoluments, and partly because of the hardships of a career in the Police Services14. It recognised that conditions have changed, and that ‘whilst …more specialised training is now necessary to equip the present day police officer, for the efficient discharge of his duties, his responsibilities on the other hand, have become more onerous and irksome, and require greater intelligence and resource.’ Consequently, while it agreed to improve basic pay, ‘to avoid disturbing the relative position of the Service to other Services’, they did not alter the maximum basic pay. They also recommended differential overseas pay to the detriment of the Indian Police Service, on account of the fact that they are recruited at a lower age, and hence, are likely to be married at a later date in their service life, than their peers in other services15.

1.5.8.During its initial years, the Indian Police Service, has very often been plagued by a lack of clarity on its structure, and organisation. The initial recruits to the service, were from the military, and later on involved a combination of nominated and selected candidates. The first open competition for the Police was held in England in June 1893, and the top ten candidates were appointed as probationary Assistant Superintendents of Police. They were characterised by various names- the Indian Imperial Police, superior grades of police force etc, but were not backed by any official promulgation for the same. In 1907, the Secretary of State’s officers were directed to wear the letters

14 Royal Commission on Superior Civil Services, p.1915 Ibid, at p.28-31.

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‘I.P’ on their epaulettes to distinguish them, from officers recruited otherwise. They were still however, referred to as the Imperial Branch of the Police Service. The Islington Commission referred to the Indian Police Service, where-after the name struck. In 1932, in deference to the wishes of the Indian Police Association, the word ‘Service’ was dropped, and the simpler designation of the ‘Indian Police’ was officially adopted16. Consequently, while the IPS traces its roots to the Indian Police Act, 1861 and its consequent developments, it never gained purpose and character in the manner it is today, till the advent of independence.

1.6. EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE- POST INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENTS

1.6.1.The advent of independence, the necessity to protect a nascent democracy, as well as its transformed role in the service of the people, brought in substantial changes to the Indian Police Service. The First Pay Commission (1950), recognizing the above changes, recommended ‘recruitment in the same manner and by the same standards’ in accordance with the standards of Class I service. Accordingly, recruitment and pay rules were modified, and the IPS was re-positioned in the Indian administrative framework, at par with other Class I Central Services17.

1.6.2.The framers of the Constitution, recognizing the significance of the Indian Police Service, introduced Article 312 in the Constitution of India, by which the IPS along with the IAS was deemed to be an All India Service, created by Parliament, and carried with it, various Constitutional protections. The necessity of the same was ferociously defended by Sardar Vallabhai Patel, in the Constituent Assembly when he said: “We have difficult times ahead. We are talking here under security kept in very difficult circumstances. These people are the instruments. Remove them and I see nothing but a picture of chaos all over

16 Griffith, at p.95-97.17 First Pay Commission, 1950, para 63

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the country.”18 In fact, contrary to the first draft, which only created an enabling architecture for the All India Services, reference to the IAS and the IPS was made in the Constitution, at the insistence of Sardar Patel19. Successive Pay Commissions as well as other Commissions constituted to go into the issue of police reform, have by and large, followed this progressive trend, and have provided strength to the IPS and the cause of police reform.

1.6.3.The Second Pay Commission (1957-59) did not discuss the pay structure of the All India Services, as the same did not fall within its ambit. However, pursuant to the revision of pay scales for the Central Services, the Government of India, looked into the matter and proposed pay scales for the IPS comparable to Class I Central Services.

1.6.4.The Study Team on Recruitment, Selection, Union Public Service Commission, the State Public Service Commissions and Training, under the aegis of the Administrative Reforms Commission, 1967, went into the issue of recruitment, and suggested that there must be integrated recruitment to the Higher Civil Services. They also suggested minimisation of the disparities between the services, and recommended that ‘totally identical pay scales for all the higher services would be the ideal solution’. They did not however recommend the same, merely for the reason that they did not want a situation, where a new entrant would prefer the easier jobs in the Central Services to the hazards, stresses and higher responsibility positions, of the IAS and the IPS20. The first Administrative Reforms Commission, also emphasised the importance of proper personnel planning, cadre management, and recommended that recruitment to all Class I services, must only be through a single competitive examination. They also recommended greater mobility in the services, with staff appointments in the

18 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol X, p.51. 19 Shiva Rao, B.(ed), The framing of India’s Constitution- A Study, Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1968, p.71120 Study team on recruitment, selection, Union Public Service Commission, State Public Service Commissions, and training, Administrative Reforms Commission, New Delhi, 1967, p.19-21.

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headquarters organisations in the Centre and State being filled up on the basis of a competitive examination, to ward against the tendency to compartmentalise careers21.

1.6.5.The Report of the Committee on Police Training, 1971 (MS Gore Committee), went to considerable lengths to assess the need for quality improvement in the IPS and said: “Officers of the IAS and the IPS who have to run the district administration, face the same difficult and complex situations, arising out of the problems of social and political confrontation and change, from the beginning of their career. They have to deal with the same crisis situations, and meet the same public criticism. They must have the same qualities of leadership, capacity to take decisions, and ability to rise to the occasion. The calibre, temperament and character of the members of the two services should therefore be of the same standard. We are convinced that this is not ensured in the present system of selection. For all these reasons, we recommend that the lower age limit for the IPS should be raised to 21 years, and the written examination and the marks should be the same as for the IAS.”22

1.6.6.The report also went on to say: “A change in the system of recruitment alone will not ensure that candidates of the required calibre are attracted to the service. The testimony of the witnesses who appeared before us and the replies that we have received show that the main factors which inhibit better quality candidates from entering the IPS, are the general unpopularity of the service due to an unattractive pay structure, not commensurate with the responsibilities and the arduous and hazardous nature of police duties, meagre promotion prospects, lack of social recognition vis-à-vis other services, and sense of uncertainty arising from political situations.”23

21 Ibid at p.9.22 Report of the Committee on Police Training, 1971, p.3623 Ibid at p.37.

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1.6.7.The Third Pay Commission (1973)24 deliberated at length on the need to attract capable talent for the IPS, and increased a host of allowances to ‘have the effect of reducing the existing disparity between the IAS and IPS scales of pay’.

1.6.8.The Kothari Commission (Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods) (1976), recommended a common examination for all civil services in all respects. Justifying the same, they said that ‘even though the professional expertise required of a general administrator, or a diplomat or a police officer or a member of any of the other Central Services vary, their general qualities of competence, traits of character and sense of commitment necessarily have a common denominator. The same applies to other qualities needed in an officer such as intellectual cohesion, articulation, sense of awareness and purpose, integrity, depth of understanding, courage of conviction and ability to respond to changing socio-economic and political situations’. In support of the above, they relied upon the Administrative Reform Commission’s Report on Personnel Administration (1969) and Committee on Police Training (Gore Committee) (1971)25. Accordingly, from 1979, the recruitment to the IPS as well as other Civil Services, including the IAS, was through a common examination.

1.6.9.The National Police Commission, headed by Shri Dharam Vira, and having as its members Justice NK Reddy, K. P. Rustamji, N. S. Saksena and M. S. Gore, was setup in 1977, and produced eight reports between February 1979 and May 1981. It was a watershed development in the history of Indian Police. The sixth report submitted in March 1981, dealt with the police leadership, particularly the Indian Police Service. It stated: “As the functions of the IPS officers have not only multiplied manifold, but are becoming more complex, hard and hazardous, calling for higher professional and technical skills and competence, special measures to attract some of the ablest officers from the lower echelons and also from the outside world are required. This means that the terms and conditions of this

24 Report of the Third Central Pay Commission, 1973, Volume 1, p.120.25 Report of the Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods, 1976, p.50

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service should be comparable with those of the best services. There appears, therefore, no justification for the emoluments and prospects of the IPS being in any way inferior to those of the IAS. The minor improvements in the various pay scales of the IPS did not adequately improve the career value of the service because the yawning gap with the IAS has remained. At present the country is facing such serious dangers that its very integrity and unity are threatened. Needed in the IPS are men whose calibre is not only equal to that of the IAS officers but who also profess certain mental qualities, courage and higher physical standards, that are specially needed for effective police work. Therefore, the present differentials are counter-productive and it would be cost-effective for the Government to improve the quality of recruitment, emoluments and career prospects of the IPS by bringing them on par with those of the IAS. This recommendation is made because of the importance of stability in society and, therefore, to improve the calibre and performance of this most essential service. This recommendation also flows logically from the recommendations of the Kothari Committee which should be implemented in full.”26

1.6.10. It went on to add: “There is persistent public criticism of the police and its role in society which is in contradiction to the glamour associated with some other services. A service which is thus associated with a high degree of personal risk and professional hazards, which suffers from lack of status because of the very nature of Its work and which does not have within its pay structure and service conditions an adequate element of compensation cannot be expected to be popular with young men while choosing a career from among a number of avenues open to them specially when, in some services, the hazards and risks are negligible, conditions of work are not so exacting, emoluments and benefits are greater and social status and recognition better. While the handicaps and drawbacks inherent in police work cannot be removed they can partially be compensated for, by putting them on par with officers of other

26 National Police Commission, Sixth Report, March 1981, Paras 44.14, 44.15 and 44.16

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services. That is why the equality in the pay scales and parity in prospects of the IPS with the IAS is recommended.27

1.6.11. Emphasising the needs for IPS management of the cadre, the report said: “The management of the IPS cadre should be by police officers, at the Centre, through the Central Police Establishment Board and in the States by similar Boards set up under the State Security Commissions. The High Powered Cadre Review Committee has no IPS officer on it and operates more or less mechanically with little scope for going deep into the cadre increase proposals. For purposes of expert advice, two heads of CPOs should by rotation be included in this Committee, in addition to its present membership. The Triennial Cadre Review must involve, in addition to the representatives of the State concerned, the IGP/DG also and go into the following matters :—

i. Review the performance of the State police against its IPS strength and the relative management by the IPS officers of the Civil and Armed Police.

ii. Analyse with reference to the current needs and problems of the cadre structure of the State, the Central Deputation Reserve, the Deputation Reserve, the Training Reserve, the Leave Reserve and the number of junior posts.

iii. Formulate plans for the pattern growth in the light of the future needs of the State police, the challenges it will have to face and its pattern of growth. To begin with the first stage plan should be made or at least a decade on the basis of the recommendations made from time to time in the Triennial Review28”

1.6.12. The National Police Commission, which was the first comprehensive national level inquiry into the Police in eight decades, also suggested various reform measures, like the appointment of a Criminal Justice Commission, State Security Commission, statutory tenure, norms for police stations, besides the enactment of a new Police Act. Unfortunately, most recommendations remained on paper.

27 Ibid, Paras 44.20, 44.21 and 44.2228 Ibid, Paras 44.33(7) and 44.33(8).

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1.6.13. The Fourth Pay Commission (1986) brought about measures to improve the career progression in the IPS by merging ranks, as well as by recommending induction of an IPS officer as member of cadre review committee29.

1.6.14. The Fifth Pay Commission (1994-96), emphasized the significance of the AIS, and made various recommendations to improve the backbone and quality of AIS officers. They also introduced the rank of ADG, recommended inclusion of non-IAS Secretary in the Civil Services Board, and brought in the concept of parity. However, the Commission in its recommendations, possibly on account of being misinformed, worked on the premise that there is a conventional edge of two years between the IAS/IFS and the IPS/ Central Services in respect of empanelment in the Central Staffing Scheme, while in fact there exists no such stipulation. Similarly, arguments for recognizing the rising role of the IPS vis-à-vis other services, was also not acceded to, without any deliberation30.

1.6.15. In 1998, a Committee was set up under Mr. Julio F. Ribeiro, with Ms. Nirmala Buch, Shri.Arun Bhagat, and Ms. Prabha Shankarnarayanan, as members. The Committee was to review action taken to implement the recommendations of the National Police Commission, National Human Rights Commission and the Vohra Committee, and to suggest ways and means to implement the pending recommendations of the above Commissions/Committee.

1.6.16. The Supreme Court also asked the Committee to review action taken to implement the recommendations of the NPC, particularly focusing on the need, relevance and practicability of setting up a Security Commission or Police Authority in each State and at the Centre on the lines suggested by the NPC, NHRC prescribing a procedure for the appointment of Police Chiefs which would be transparent and ensure that the best officers are selected and giving the senior incumbents a minimum tenure, and to insulate the investigative wing of the police from its law and order functions. It submitted two reports

29 Report of the Fourth Central Pay Commission, Part I, June 1986, p.21230 Report of the Fifth Central Pay Commission, 1994, Part IV, p.518-523

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in Oct 1998 and March 1999, providing a host of recommendations to further the cause of police reform. It recommended the formation of a Police Performance and Accountability Commission, a Police Establishment Board, and a Police Complaints Authority, amongst others.

1.6.17. The Padmanabiah Committee on Police Reform, (2000), continued on the lines of the earlier reform proposals, proposing a fixed tenure policy, admissibility of confessions of the Police, reform of the criminal justice administration etc.

1.6.18. A committee on the Criminal Justice system (2000) under Justice VS Malimath was constituted which evolved wide-ranging proposals for the comprehensive reform of the criminal justice administration. Besides this, a Review Committee on police reforms was set up by Ministry of Home Affairs in 2004, which zeroed in on 49 recommendations for implementation.

1.6.19. An Expert Committee was constituted under Soli J Sorabjee, in September, 2005 to draft a new Model Police Act which submitted its report on 30th October, 2006. The model Act provides for well-defined duties and responsibilities of the police and responsiveness, sensitivity of the police towards public especially the weaker and vulnerable sections, accountability to the rule of law Community policing through village police system, policing in urban areas through constitution of citizen policing committee, policing in Public Order & Internal Security challenges.

1.6.20. Prakash Singh v. Union of India, was the most significant step in police reform since the recommendations of the National Police Commission. Concerned over the poor pace of police reform, the Supreme Court directed the States to undertake the following:

i. Constitute a State Security Commission. ii. Select the Director General of Police of the State

from amongst three senior-most officers of the Department empanelled for promotion to that rank by the Union Public service Commission and once selected, provide him a minimum tenure of at least

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two years irrespective of his date of superannuation.

iii. Prescribe minimum tenure of two years to the police officers on operational duties.

iv. Separate investigating police from law & order police.

v. Set up a Police Establishment Board. vi. Constitute Police Complaints Authorities at the

State and District levels for looking into complaints against police officers.

1.6.21. The implementation of the same is being monitored by a Committee chaired by Justice KT Thomas31. To its credit, as on date, 15 states have enacted new legislations, and 14 states have issued executive orders, in deference to the orders of the Supreme Court.

1.6.22. The Sixth Pay Commission (2006-08), recognized the ‘pivotal role’ of the AIS ‘in upholding the rule of law, and the principles of democratic governance’. It went on to state that ‘they are expected to provide a uniformly high standard of administration and play a critical role in our federal structure.’ They recommended an Apex scale for DsGP in the Centre, which was subsequently extended by Government to all State DsGP. The Commission however, did not accede to demands for parity among the All India Services, and went on to justify the EDGE to officers belonging to the IAS 1.6.23. As can be evinced from the discussions above,

succeeding Pay Commissions, while attempting to further police reform, have often been found wanting in keeping with the scorching pace of police reform recommended by various Commissions and demanded by the people of India. It is upto the 7th Pay Commission to buck this trend, and render yeoman service to the cause of police reform.

2.

31 The status of the implementation may be seen at Annexure-

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2.PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PAY

2.1. INTRODUCTION

2.1.1.The first duty of the institutions of the state is the protection and the safety of the people. The police is the most important instrument by which this objective is attained as the police represents the executive power of the State. In the internal affairs of the state, the lack of efficient and effective policing – visible and otherwise would deny the public safety and conditions of anarchy would prevail. The police is therefore the most essential of public services of any form of government, and especially in a democratic form of government.

2.1.2. It follows that the resources of the police and the uses to which they are put are of the highest importance. The predominant resource of the police is its human capital. By extension, the quality of the senior leadership will define how well the human capital of the police is nurtured and utilized to deliver effective and efficient public service of the highest standards to its nation’s citizens.

2.1.3.The betterment of the police leadership today will beneficially and materially affect the police service and public interest for many years to come. It is therefore necessary that the government provides the police officers a system of remuneration and conditions of service which not only respects and values the unique nature of policing as a public service, its role in a nascent democracy and the commitment risks, demands and sacrifices that it entails; but also over a course of time embeds a culture of professionalism and high achievement across the police levels and raises the performance of the Indian policing to those of mature democracies; which is the right of every citizen of the country.

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2.2. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES

2.2.1.The police system in India, like various other organs of the government, is a legacy of the erstwhile British rule in the country. As such, there is a great degree of similarity in the job content, responsibilities and functions of the various civil services including the police operating in the two countries.

2.2.2.However, the high policing standards in mature democracies like the United Kingdom have not evolved on their accord. These have come about because of an early realization by the concerned governments that policing is a unique public service and hence must be appropriately compensated. The process of improving the police delivery system in the UK started in the late 1970s with a realization that better policing can be achieved only by improving the quality of human capital in the police by improving their pay and service conditions.

2.2.3.As a result of these reforms, the service conditions of the police in the UK gradually improved along with substantial improvements in police performance on both tangible and intangible factors. For example, not only has crime in UK has fallen by 50% since 1995 as per the British Crime Survey32, but UK Police is now universally recognized as one of the best police forces in the world.

2.2.4.Some of the key events / mile stones in this process of metamorphosis of British police are as below

A. LORD EDMUND-DAVIES COMMITTEE-In the United Kingdom as early as 1978, the Committee of Enquiry chaired by Lord Edmund-Davies recommended a substantial increase (of the order of 45%) in police pay and that police constables pay should be annually uprated in accordance with an index of private sector non – manual worker pay. The Edmund-Davies Inquiry concluded that police pay should be

32 Crime in England and Wales 2009/10, Home Office Statistical Bulletin 12/10, Ed. J. Flatley, C. Kershaw, K. Smith, R. Chaplin & D. Moon, London, Home Office, July 2010

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linked to “some general index” because of the special features of policing:

i. the police had no right to strike and one should not be granted;

ii. the risks of assault and injury;iii. disruption to family life;iv. the then manpower and recruitment problem;v. the increased responsibilities and workloads falling to

the police service since the previous review.vi. In doing so, the Edmund-Davies committee sought to

ensure that police officers should neither financially benefit nor suffer, in comparison with the community that they police.

B. SHEEHY COMMISSION-

The Sheehy Commission was appointed in July 1992 under the chairmanship of Sir Patrick Sheehy to examine the rank structure, emoluments and conditions of service of the police in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland which submitted its report in June, 1993. The recommendations of the Commission are reproduced below in their own words.

The police service and other professions

“Police officers are ordinary citizens with extraordinary powers. They have a special position under the law but many of the qualities and skills which are required by police officers of various ranks are common to a number of other professions and organizations. These include the ability to:

i. articulate clear and measurable objectives, gain internal and external support for them, and ensure that the organization and individuals within it are judged on achievement;

ii. identify priorities and plan coherently across a wide spectrum of activities;

iii. manage sometimes small, sometimes significant human and other resources so as to provide a quality service and achieve value for money;

iv. communicate and consult effectively at all levels within the organization, and with all sections of the community, not all of them necessarily well disposed towards the service.”

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“A number of features are particular to policing and require its officers to possess special qualities and skills…. These are:

i. the extraordinary nature of police powers, in particular police monopoly of the use of legitimate force;

ii. the exceptionally high level of integrity required by the nature of police functions;

iii. the sensitive, quite often dangerous and sometimes explosive situations in which police are expected to exercise control, often at considerable risk to themselves.”

Pay levels

“As Chapter 8 makes clear, we consider that there should be a formula approach to increases in police basic pay and that this should reflect private sector pay settlements. This is on the basis that, like the 1982 Megaw Commission on Civil Service Pay, we consider that private sector pay settlements provide a more accurate reflection of the economic climate and the market than pay settlements in public sector. They avoid the circular effect of comparing public sector pay settlements with one another. Our reasons for concluding that a private sector based formula approach is justified (which are set out more fully in Chapters 7 – 8) are:

i. to recognize, on grounds of equity, the absence of right to strike;

ii. to secure a smooth progression in pay rates reflecting the economic climate and the market;

iii. to avoid the management problems associated with pay-related inconsistencies between the caliber of officers recruited over time;

iv. to recognize the professional nature of the policing role and reflect the overall package we are recommending;

v. to recognize the importance of securing, as indicated in our Terms of Reference, the recruitment, retention and motivation of officers of the right quality, and

vi. to recognize the importance of policing to society, particularly in terms of powers that the police alone are able to exercise, including their monopoly of the exercise of legitimate force.”

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“ On this basis we conclude that police officers of high calibre are and will continue to be required and that this should be reflected in choosing the benchmark against which police pay level should be judged….”

The Commissioner of Police of Metropolis: external pay links

“We recognize that this recommendation will break the existing pay link between the rate for the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the rate for the Permanent Secretary of the Home Department. We recommend that the link should be broken; in our view the special features of policing mean that the jobs are not comparable. Since the link was established there has also been substantial reallocation of responsibilities within the Home Office and between the Home Office and other departments.”

Bonus levels

“Within this system, performance at constant level with no change to scope of role, circumstances or experience/skills will not achieve progression. We recommend, however, that one-off non-pensionable individual bonuses should be available as should team bonuses.”

“…the bonuses we have recommended will allow individuals performing satisfactorily to benefit not only from increases in the value of scale points as the basic scale is uprated (see Chapter 8) but also to be rewarded for special contributions they or their team have made during the year in question (Chapter 9 discusses bonus allocation).”

C. THE WINSOR REPORT

The Government of UK in 2010 commissioned the Independent Review of Police Officers and Staff Remuneration and Conditions. The report of this review, known as the Windsor report provides the best summary of the existing state of police pay in the UK and the developed world. As per the Report

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i. The pay scales of police officers in the UK are typically 10-15% higher than those of the emergency services and those of similar ranks in the armed forces33

ii. Earnings of police officers are comparable to those of many white collar and professional occupations.

iii. The position of police officers in the earnings structure has remained roughly constant in the last decade.

iv. The police pension scheme has remained the most generous of public pension schemes through a combination of early normal pension age and accelerated accrual of pension rights after 20 years of service. This has remained so even after the shift to the new police pension scheme in 2006 with one of the highest contributions into the scheme by both the employer and employee.

33 Independent Review of Police Officers and Staff Remuneration and Conditions - Part I Report, Government of United Kingdom, march 2011, Page 13

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v. Police officers pay the highest contribution rate of any public pension scheme, but contributions from employers to the scheme are also among the highest in public pension schemes. There are roughly 131,000 contributors to the 1987 pension scheme (and 13,000 to the 2006 scheme), but almost 125,000 pension recipients and a further 20,000 deferred beneficiaries. This high ratio of pensioners to contributors is a significant cost burden. Combined pension contributions as a percentage of earnings are over 35% in the 1987 scheme and almost 34% in the 2006 scheme.

vi. The report further states that the police pay in other countries with similar police structures like the Commonwealth countries of Australia, Canada and New Zealand lies at similar points in the earnings distribution in their country while the average police pay in the Northern European countries like Denmark, Germany and Sweden is closer to the national average earnings in the country, thus reflecting a lower positive differential.

vii. Comparisons with police pay in the US is difficult as police is locally recruited and its pay is locally bargained, leading to wide differences and incomparability of data.

viii. For Chief Police Officers, remuneration rises from just over £140,000 to over £226,000. In comparison, the pay of Permanent Secretaries in the Civil Service varies between £140,000 and £190,000. The table below gives the salaries of some senior police officers in UK.

2.3. COMPARISON WITH PRIVATE SECTOR

Policing today is far from the relatively simple occupation it was many years ago. The sophistication, intelligence and resources of some who are engaged in crime, the malignancy of their motives and methods, and the

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technology available to all citizens, mean that the profession of policing will continue to require people of the highest integrity, intelligence and skill. The needs of the police service for such qualities are intensified by the complexity and weight of the modern criminal law, and the demands and expectations of the public and other agencies of the state.

For these reasons, it is important that police officers with skills and competencies which are of importance in modern policing are rewarded appropriately for their development and use. Secondly, people should be paid for what they do, the skills they have and are applying in their work, and the weights of the jobs they do

At the same time, fairness is an essential part of any system of pay and service conditions. Fairness means not only fairness to the police officers but also to the public, and to the police service. As such it is essential that a scientific system of job evaluation is used to compare and determine the relative weights of a police officers job vis a vis private sector jobs and those in other public services.

Regrettably the previous Pay Commissions did not adopt Job evaluation as a method for comparing the different jobs / services, despite the fact that it is a universally accepted technique for comparing and evaluating disparate jobs. For example the Third Pay Commission did not adopt the job evaluation method as it considered the following limitations with the system,

1. that there was non-availability of required data 2. that it had “so far been applied mostly to industrial jobs” and rarely

to “highest paid jobs” 3. that it is “time-consuming” and 4. that the “subjective element is still there in any job evaluation”.

.,

However, these objections are not valid in light of the actual experience and practices all over the world in the field of job evaluation and the developments in technology that have made the collection and analysis of large volumes of data relatively easy.

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Infact, despite the unique nature of policing, in a survey of UK Police forces, 25 out of the total 43 forces responded that they use a job evaluation scheme to evaluate roles in the organization.34

However, it is accepted that such system in the police would need to be customised due to the unique nature of the police service. As such it is suggested that

1. Job evaluation be made one more input into the process of relative assessment of jobs rather than the only one

2. Instead of evaluating jobs, “job classes” may be evaluated

A scientific system of job evaluation would not only help objectively compare services and jobs within the government service but would also lead to an objective assessment of different government services like the police vis a vis the private and the public sector.

This is especially relevant in the present times when the chief differentiators of government service viz an assured pension and security of tenure have been negated. The new pension scheme has in a way removed the chief attraction of government service i.e. of an assured and defined pension. In addition, the pressures of service including the threat of suspension and the reality of frequent transfers have made government service particularly that in the IPS as stressful and uncertain as the employment in a private organization. At the same time, the fact that government salaries are significantly lower than private sector salaries needs no substantiating and has been well accepted by subsequent pay commissions themselves.

34 Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions – Final Report, Page 537

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2.4. PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PAY

2.4.1.Based on the above, the following basic principles for the determination of pay for the police in India are proposed.

A. Fairness – The system of pay should be fair in its procedure and conduct of the review, in its analysis and in arriving at its recommendations for the different section of employees.

B. Compensation for skills, experience and job complexity – Policing has over the years become a complex, onerous and intellectual exercise, a far cry from what the service used to be at the turn of the century. The role of a Superintendent of Police in a district is infinitely more complex than the role of a Lt Col in an Army battalion or a Superintendent of Post or a Manager in a private company. Similarly, there is little parallel in the current times between the role of a police constable and an Army sepoy, a postman or a clerk in a private company. In addition, the numbers of specialist roles, such as counter-terrorism, serious and organised crime, cyber-crime, forensics, VIP protection and fraud have significantly increased. As such, the changed role of the police officers must be recognized and they must be compensated for the job performed by them and its complexity.

C. Difficult conditions of work should be compensated - Proper weight must be given to the difficult demands which their occupation places on police officers and their families and the ways in which they live their lives, including the long working hours, risks of personal injury and death, and public responsibility and scrutiny if things go wrong. Successive studies have also shown that night working and rotating shift patterns can significantly and adversely affect an individual’s physical health.35 Similarly the effects of continued stress on

35 Quality of life, life satisfaction and happiness in shift and non-shiftworkers, K. Lipovcan, P. Larsen, N. Zganec, Revista de Saude Publica 38 (2004) suppl; pages 3-10.

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the health and longevity are well documented.

D. Merit and good performance must be rewarded – Progression up the pay scales based purely on length of service is unfair. High performers should be paid more than those who perform adequately, and higher again than those who perform poorly

E. Talent of high calibre should be attracted and retained - The pay and service conditions for the IPS will affect the type and the calibre of the people who wish to join the police, their motivation and retention in service through their career and consequently the effectiveness and efficiency of policing in India. A motivated and committed police leadership is the starting point for any attempt at reform of the police functioning and inculcating a culture of professionalism and high achievement across levels in Indian policing. Thus it is essential that pay and service conditions are such that the police system delivers service of a quality that the citizens of the country demand and deserve.

F. System to be simple to administer – Lastly, the system should be simple to administer and not be too rigid.

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3. CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

3.1 While the primary purpose of submitting this memorandum is to plead for the IPS officers, in this section as well as section 5 (on allowances and advances ) present facts, figures and submissions on behalf of the entire police fraternity. This has been done for two reasons: i) Non gazetted ranks of police are not allowed by statute to form associations and it is the responsibility of the IPS officers, as leaders of the force, to advance the cause of their subordinates; ii) Traditionally the IPS association has been presenting arguments on behalf of the non gazette ranks in addition to the separate memoranda submitted by the heads of respective CAPFs, and police departments of the Union territories, and the pay commissions encouraged positive interventions from the IPS association in this regard.

3.2 LONG WORKING HOURS OF POLICE IN THE ABSENCE OF SHIFT SYSTEM

3.2.1 The issue of long working hours of Police personnel is often discussed in various fora.  One of the earliest available empirical evidence on this issue is job analysis conducted by National Productivity Council in 1977. Para 2.19 of the 1st National Police Commission Report highlighted the fact that the job analysis conducted by the National Productivity Council has shown that the working hours of the subordinate police officers range from 10 to 16 hours every day of seven days in a week. It also revealed that a computerized survey conducted by Tamil Nadu Police during that period had shown that an average Constable worked for 14 hours every day without any respite.It points out: “....Long and arduous hours of work without facilities for rest and recreation, continuous employment on jobs under extreme conditions of stress and strain, both mental and physical, prolonged stagnation in the same rank without even one rank Promotion throughout their service for a majority of them, constant exposure to criticism and ridicule by a demanding public, a totally inadequate pay structure with no compensation for the handicaps and privation they undergo in their jobs, low status and lack of involvement in planning and executing field jobs with a full understanding of the objectives set by the police organization, etc., have all had their telling effect on the morale of the constabulary throughout the country. The increasing

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educational level of the Constables-a trend noticeable in the recent years-has sharpened the edge of their frustration with their existing lot within the police system. During our visits to several police stations and discussions with the constabulary, their highly demoralized state was strikingly noticeable. They have nothing to motivate them into meaningful and positive performance of police tasks with a full understanding of the implications and objectives of police action. They function as automatons in situations where they are required to exercise their discretion and judgment. They function rigidly in circumstances which require flexibility of approach and understanding of the opposite point of view. We are convinced that mere changes in their training schedule will not bring about the necessary improvement in their motivation or performance unless some serious deficiencies in their living and working conditions which have long been neglected are immediately taken up and remedied. We consider this exercise to be of primary importance in any attempt at police reform…..”

3.2.2 All the issues mentioned in this report of 1979 are still very much relevant even after more than 35 years. Moreover the challenges faced by police officers have increased manifold. The police officers working in the police stations and other field formations have to face the perennially growing challenges of terrorism, left wing extremism, threat to internal security from our hostile neighbours, increased crime, caste and communal strife, student and labour unrest, increasing use of police resources for law and order duties. This hypothesis has been substantiated by subsequent studies.

3.2.3 A survey conducted by McKinsey and Company in 2003 of approximately 1400 officers and constables across commissionerates and districts in Maharashtra identified a very demanding lifestyle driven by long working hours (average of 14 hours per day) and limited leaves (average of 35 days in a year against an entitlement of 90 days, including 52 weekly offs) as the prominent key factor responsible for low motivation and high stress levels.

3.2.4 A Human Rights Watch report in August 2009 titled – ‘Broken System, Dysfunction, Abuse, and Impunity in the Indian Police’, in its chapter ‘The Deteriorating State of the Indian Police’ highlights the poor working conditions of the police officers and the fact that low ranking police are over-worked and often exhausted due to

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requirement that they be available for duty for 24 hours a day. Page 29 of the Report reveals:“....police are required to be available for work 24 hours day, 7 days a week – a grueling cruelty for constables and other low ranking officers. As Government employees, police are allowed paid leaves. However, in practice, the police chief or district officials may order standing orders to recall officers on vacation and some- times no leave is permitted for a certain period or when there are exigencies or staff shortages. Superior officers often deny leave because of staff shortages.......”.

3.2.5 Another study of 286 police officers working in police stations in Karnataka has revealed that -many police officers stated that they work average of 12 to 16 hours a day without any weekly or monthly days off36.

3.2.6 While preparing this memorandum, a quick survey was conducted in 14 police stations spread over six districts in 4 different states to see as to whether the observations of NPC report of 1977 are still relevant or not. Since most of the police work is police station based, therefore data about the number of hours police officers work at police stations was collected from few police stations in districts/ cities- Lucknow, Bhiwani, Karimnagar, Adilabad, Khammam and New Delhi. After March 2014, there had been increase in police activity due to the General Election; therefore the data was gathered for the month of January 2014 (presumed to be a normal working month).  The number of hours of duty was calculated on the basis of arrival/departure information in General Diary (GD) maintained in the police station.  In all, the study captures data regarding the average working hours of 680 police personnel based at the police stations. The findings were, in average civil police staff in the police stations work between 12-13 hours a day. Quite often, they report to duty on Sundays. Moreover their duty hours are staggered duty to the nature of police work. A typical police officer in the police station may be working 4-6 hours in morning and 6-8 hours in evening. This clearly means that even if that officer may have actually worked for 12-13 hours, but adding up the time for commuting, actual time spent was more than that time.

36 A Profile of Junior Rank of Karnataka Police – A Survey of Their Attitude, Behaviour , Mental Make Up and Stress Levels- December 2008 (http://media.ksp.diqtech.com/files/Survey_of_attitudes.htm, accessed on 20/05/2014).

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3.2.7 Ever increasing responsibilities and perennial shortage of staff contribute to shouldering of additional burden by available hands. If we compare the relative availability of police officers per lakh of population, we find that in India we have 122.5 civil police officers (including armed and un armed)per lakh of population as compared to global average of 341.837. Nobody can dispute the fact that nature of job and responsibilities and challenges shouldered by police officers in India are significantly higher than police officers of several other countries. Indian police is not adequately equipped with force multipliers such as vehicles and technological tools compared with the police forces in developed countries is greatly enhanced by the extensive use of technology. Therefore in practical terms the shortage of staff is even more acute than what the figures indicate.

3.2.8 Xavier and Prabhakar (2013) reported that in Indian police force, policemen in higher ranks have increased work load and areas of jurisdiction. Further, there are conflicting job demands, responsibilities of subordinates, time pressure and deadlines, physical strain of work environment, long hours and having to cope with changes at work and expenses (monetary and career) of making mistakes. It is seen that since subordinates are incapable of performing their tasks properly, the senior officers tend to take on their responsibilities also. Increased accountability of any act within their area of jurisdiction, political interference, fear of explanation of any indiscipline or irresponsibility on the part of subordinates, fear of unknown, lack of communication and cooperation from other departments result in unresolved frustrations and personal conflicts which further lead to stress and anxiety among officers at higher levels.

3.3 OCCUPATIONAL AND SITUATIONAL RISKS SPECIFIC TO POLICE

3.3.1 As compared to several professions related to public service, police officers are exposed to a disproportionate risk of occupational hazards. Main categories of occupational hazards faced by the

37International data on crime and criminal justice: UN office on Drugs and Crime 201; http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/International_Statistics_on_Crime_and_Justice.pdf

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police include Risk of physical assault, accidents, stress and fatigue and risk of communicable diseases.

3.3.1.1 Risk of physical assault: Foremost amongst the occupational hazards faced by police officers is the risk of assault. Several professional situations which police officers face while performing their day to day Duties such as public disorder situations, dealing with disputes, arresting suspects, escorting prisoners, and conducting anti-militancy operations make them vulnerable to physical assault.

3.3.1.2 Risk of accidents: Police personnel face enhanced risk of accidents, while chasing of criminals, diffusing explosive devices, driving in extremely hostile weather conditions, performing border duties and managing traffic.

As per Crime in India, 2013 published by National Crime Records Bureau 3,714 police personnel (comprising 2,739 natural deaths, 740 deaths on duty and 235 suicidal deaths) died during the year 2013 as compared to 3,375 deaths in the year 2012 showing an increase of 10.3.% over the previous year.

Rank wise analysis of police causalities reveals that among 740 police personnel killed on duty, 3 were DSPs and above (gazetted officer), 55 were upper subordinates (Inspectors - 13 and Sub-Inspectors - 42) and 682 were lower subordinates (Assistant Sub- Inspectors - 66, Head Constables - 173 and Constables - 443).

As per data on Police organizations in India published by Bureau of Police Research and Development (2013) total 176 police districts in the country were Terrorists/ extremists affected in 2012. Number of police districts affected by Extremists/Terrorists during the last nine years 2004 to 2012 has manifested largely an increasing trend except 2006, 2009, 2011 & 2012 when it decreased as shown in the graph below. This is a disturbing trend and poses formidable challenge before the security forces.

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BOX 3. 1

Majority of the police casualties (80.8%)(598 out of 740) were due to ‘accidents’ followed by ‘anti-terrorist/ extremists operations’ and by 'other criminals' which accounted for 10.5% (78 out of 740) and 6.5% (48 out of 740) respectively of such deaths. However, 1.1% (8 out of 740) of police personnel were killed on border duties.

3.3.1.3 Risk of Fatigue induced Stress: Police personnel are obliged by law to be available for duty round the clock to meet emergencies, even when they are off duty. They suffer fatigue induced stress due to constant exposure to danger, traumatic events, short-staffed stations, and continuous work in isolated rural areas. Additionally persons stationed in armed guards, escorts and static pickets, where the nature of the work requires constant alertness but no physical action, coupled with uncertainty of facing the unforeseen threats. This group of personnel faces fatigue due to drudgery of the work. Excessive fatigue often has long term consequences for mental and physical health, which will be discussed in a later sub section)

3.3.1.4 Other risks: There are a wide variety of other risks that police personnel face during the performance of their duties. Police personnel working in the Traffic Police, in addition to facing greater risks of accidents, are also prone to contact lung and respiratory diseases due to the continuous exposure to toxic emissions. Police personnel deployed in long running agitations face the risk of contracting lung infections from continuous inhalation of tear-gas. Bomb squad and Investigation Officers personnel may inhale harmful vapors while scrutinizing crime scenes involving explosions. Such examples may be too many to compile an exhaustive list but there is no gainsaying that police personnel – given the nature of their jobs- are more susceptible to physical and internal injury than are most, if not all, other professions related to public service.

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BOX 3.2

3.4 STRESS CAUSED DUE TO JOB UNCERTAINTIES, UNPREDICTABLE NATURE OF JOB, HOSTILE CLIENTELE, AND

FREQUENT TRANSFERS

3.4.1 Police personnel deal on a regular basis with an assortment of unique situations and stressors. Unlike other jobs, the police officers start the day with bad news. There is only negative feedback in terms of how many murders and robberies have taken place the previous night. The job pattern of a policeman is not structured like his counterparts in other departments. His work life follows a sequence of unpredictable events with uncertain consequences - Crimes by their very nature do not follow a linear time cycle; Receiving a phone call at the in the middle of the night is a recurring, yet unpredictable experience which is invariably linked to a call of emergency; there is always a split second difference between a crowd turning into a mob, often he ends up disappointing members of the public who approach him, he being the visible symbol of the government, on matters on which he has no mandate to intervene. Agitations are collective expression of dissatisfaction with the state authorities and others on a variety of issues like education, essential services, transport facilities, wages etc. and a policeman who is on the forefront to perform his duty is often a target for venting the public anger and frustration. A policeman is always under public gaze -a momentary lapse of concentration due to fatigue and consequent error of judgement is captured and magnified through the lens of a 24X7 media and haunts him with a lifelong taint. The shock of each tragedy and violent event takes cumulative physical and mental toll on each police officer in some way or the other. Increased demands of work impinging upon home life, lack of consultation and communication with the higher authorities in the organization, lack of control over workload and inadequate support have been identified as the potential factors responsible for the stress in the policemen (Collins and Gibbs; 2003; Gisli et. al. 1985).

3.4.2 From the BPR&D data on police organisations 2013, it can be seen that police faced 78,444 agitations in the year 2012 which was 6.96% higher than the previous year. In these agitations, 13 civilians and 6 policemen were killed whereas 354 civilians and 863 policemen were injured.

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3.4.3 The hostile clientele with which police personnel deal and interact predisposes them to additional stressors. 38Sarason et al. (1979) proposed two types of stressors that police officers experience, and these are those that engender anxiety and those that arouse anger and hostility. Anger-related stress is particularly important in interactions with hostile clientele, and its negative effects are heightened because officers are prohibited by the decorum of their job from publicly expressing anger and hostility. The police subculture tends to protect the macho image of the police and informally teaches its members to follow a code of silence. They are conditioned to respond to a variety of situations and be under complete emotional control while doing so. Suppression of emotions like anger, fear, and grief has negative consequences on the immune system and deteriorate the physical health (Leal, 2006). To alleviate stress the police officers tend to go into maladaptive behaviours like drinking, smoking and overeating, which contribute significantly, to this deterioration.

3.4.4 Anger has also been found to have negative impacts on emotional as well as the physical well-being of the people (Sharma et al., 1996). Mearns and Mauch (1998) observed that anger and hostility predispose people to serious health problems. They also observed that police officers who reported more anger also reported more distress. For police personnel, the inability to effectively manage stress has its most dangerous consequences during the line of duty. Stress management programmes have been implemented successfully by police organizations in the west (Wagner, 1981).

3.4.5 Frequent transfers are another problem faced among various ranks, more prominently by the young IPS officers. Such transfers not only cause emotional disturbance to the entire family of the officer. The abovementioned BPR&D study reports that 221 District SPs were transferred in less than a year’s tenure and 173 in less than two years, which means that even after discounting some multiple transfers, nearly half the district superintendents in the country are unable to complete the minimum tenure rules stipulated by the government. The corresponding figures for the range DIGs is, as against 178 ranges, 35 range DIGs were transferred within one year and 38 were transferred within two years of posting. Reply to a Right to Information Act petition in 2013 disclosed that 43 officers

38 Can be accessed at http://bprd.nic.in/showfile.asp?lid=1216

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were transferred for more than 40 times in their career in the state of Uttar Pradesh alone, which was widely reported by the media39.

3.5 STRESS DUE TO ALIENATION FROM FAMILIES3.5.1 Both Civil Police and personnel of the CAPFs feel alienation from

their families for most of their career. The CAPF personnel are posted in non family stations and meet their family members only on a few occasions in a year. A significant proportion of the civil police also are unable to keep their families with them because of their rural postings. Even those who are fortunate to keep the family with them are unable to spend quality time with them because of the long hours of duty , including on weekends and holidays.

3.5.2 Umranikar (2009), consequent to the Mckinsey Mumbai study conducted in 2004, reported that on festive days, police force is on the streets rather than celebrating festivals. This means that police officers and other ranks in the commissionerate cannot avail holidays or leave due to this. For various reasons, police work in 12 hour shifts while the labour law provides for an 8 hour shift. In view of the shortage of man power heavy crime work and uncertain law and order duties, policemen have to work for 16 hours at a stretch. They also do not avail weekly holidays, casual leave, earned leave and the other gazetted holidays.

3.5.3 Insufficient time for the family has been among the top ranking stressors (Kumar, 1995. During festivals, constables often work for more than 24 hours at a stretch, away from their families, and while on duty they see the rest of the world celebrating and enjoying their holiday. The families of police personnel are often neglected when head of the family is out on duty. The classic model of a police line or a battalion can only partially take care of their burden, as only about 30% of the police personnel are fortunate to get government quarters. Therefore by and large , the families are unable to get the care and attention by the department in organized manner nor the individuals are able to do so themselves because of commitment of duty in terms of time and place. This keeps on hurting policeman internally (Nagar, 2009). He understand that he is neither able to fulfill aspirations of parents and spouse nor able to bestow love and guidance to their kids during their growing age. This results mostly

39 May be accessed at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/43-IPS-officers-in-UP-transferred-40-times-in-their-career/articleshow/20202799.cms

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in violent and insensitive manifestation in his behavior. It also results in many sorts of perversion and avoidable aggressiveness.

3.5.4 The work profile of CAPFs amalgamates the roles of both military and police. The working conditions in organizations like BSF, ITBP, SSB etc are extremely tough as the force has to physically guard the long and difficult borders which are mostly hostile. The personnel are present 24/7, 365 days a year at the border. The border areas are extremely backward, without basic amenities, and often without any population for miles. Jawans are isolated, without normal social interactions and away from their families (Chhabra and Chhabra, 2009).

3.5.5 Staying away from families is common to almost all the personnel except those posted in various head quarters and training centres. Even in the Army, field and family postings are rotated. However in the CAPFs, there is no such concept of family posting. He is located physically at Border outposts or Left wing extremism affected areas where families are not allowed. Very few jawans are able to get postings to head-quarter locations for a maximum 5 years in a career spanning 35+ years. While this is largely true of the Jawans, the other two ranks, i.e. SOs and Officers are also similarly placed, by and large. For a major part of their career they also stay away from their families. Many a times even if they are posted in the unit HQ, the locations are so remote that bringing the family means sacrificing good education for children, and many are forced to stay alone on this account. Unlike Army cantonments, there are very few central locations where the families can be left behind and good schooling & accommodation is available This separation is felt very acutely by the force. It is a constant source of worry and tension. The human needs for physical intimacy and companionship is denied to them. This is an unhealthy and unnatural situation to be in. Higher stress levels are the natural outcome. Jawans are the worst affected, followed by subordinate officers and then officers. There are many other issues related to the family which act as a stressor. These issues mainly include marital discord, illness of family member, education and upbringing of children and family welfare. In a sense, many of these issues are related to the nature of the job and their not being able to stay with their families.

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3.6 HEALTH HAZARDS, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL STRESS ASSOCIATED WITH POLICE JOB AND THEIR

MANIFESTATIONS

3.6.1 The Apex court acknowledged through various judgements that Right to health care is an integral part of right to life guaranteed under article 21 of the constitution of India. Stress is an important factor contributing to poor health of police personnel. The stressful nature of the police work affects the health and family lives of many officers which encourages alcoholism and other vices amongst them. A majority of police personnel suffer from various problems such as high blood pressure, heart disease, diabetes, mental stress disorder etc. due to job induced stress. Stress and related health and personal problems should therefore be the concern of every police administrator not only because of the humanitarian aspects but also because a failure to deal with them can have a profoundly negative effect upon the total operation of the police organization.

3.6.2 Carrying forward from the previous paragraphs where factors inducing stress among policemen have been identified and discussed, for the purpose of understanding the health hazards, stressors can be classified into four categories; viz. External, Internal, Task related and Individual.

3.6.2.1 External stressors include frustrations with the criminal justice system, discontent with un-favourable media coverage, resentment or dislike over decisions and interests of government and administrative bodies affecting the performance of police work.

3.6.2.2 Internal stressors cover a large number of problem areas, many of which are organizational including training that is felt to be inadequate, equipment, that is thought to be substandard or in a state of disrepair, poor pay and ambiguously defined reward structures, as well as inadequate career development guidelines, offensive departmental policies, excessive paper work and intra-departmental political favouritism.

3.6.2.3 Task related stressors include role conflicts, the rigors of shift work, boredom, fear, danger of being exposed to the miseries and brutalities of life, and work overload. Inter-role conflicts of law enforcement officers, especially the conflict between occupational

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and marital roles do affect marital relationships to some degree. The commitment to twenty four hour duty has a negative effect on marriages and their spouses report emotional detachment and repression of feelings by policemen.

3.6.2.4 Individual stressors include fears about job competence, individual success and safety. It also includes stressors arising out of performing police work, particularly health problems, alcoholism, marital problems, divorce and suicide. Confrontation with physical violence of citizens seems to nearly always generate significant stress in the police officers involved. Law enforcement officers perceive as stressful those incidents relating to violence, severe personnel/disciplinary matters and administrative issues, all of which may be considered as threatening because of their potential damage to an officer’s person, career or self-image.

3.6.3 Officers who experience high levels of occupational stress report a high incidence of physical ailments and psychological problems that affect their work performance. Specifically, they commonly have poor health (Cooper and Davidson 1987; Fletcher, 1988; Kirkcaldy et al; 1995), experience burnout (Brown et al; 1996; Burke and Deszca, 1986; Crank et al; 1995; Lord, 1996; Stotland and Pendleton, 1989), are dissatisfied with their jobs and because of weak organizational commitment, they may not fully invest themselves in their work or they may retire prematurely (Kop et al; 1999; Malloy and Mays, 1984). When individuals are overwhelmed by occupational stress they suffer from increased chronic stress, depression, heart disease, stomach disorders, alcohol and drug use and abuse, divorce, and even suicide attempts (Lord, 1996; Anshel, 2000; Biggamet al; 1997; Dietrich, 1989; Walker; 1997).

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Box 3.2: Vicious Cycle of Stress

According to Thoits (1996), stress is experienced when people are faced with undesirable life demands that disrupt their ability to engage in everyday activities. Stress is presumed to arise when this appraisal produces the judgment that demands are about to tax or exceed the individual’s resources for dealing with them, thus threatening well-being (Holroyal & Lazarus, 1992). The vicious cycle of stress induced patho-physiology is depicted below:

3.6.4 Saha et. al. (2010) evaluated cardio-vascular risk factors in police officers and reported comparative health complaints of police officers in relation to non-police personnel as depicted in table below. The risk of having a heart attack in fact doubles with each decade of law enforcement service (Jahnavi et al; 2012).

3.6.5.The police officers lead a physically inactive life, have irregular and spicy hotel made diet with limited choice of food while on duty, take overtime and shift work, suffer from sleeplessness, high rate of alcoholism, tobacco consumption and stress than the general people (Vila, 2006).

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Box 3.2: Vicious Cycle of Stress

According to Thoits (1996), stress is experienced when people are faced with undesirable life demands that disrupt their ability to engage in everyday activities. Stress is presumed to arise when this appraisal produces the judgment that demands are about to tax or exceed the individual’s resources for dealing with them, thus threatening well-being (Holroyal & Lazarus, 1992). The vicious cycle of stress induced patho-physiology is depicted below:

3.6.6.At the psychological level, the stress of police work may result in chronic negative emotions such as anger, anxiety or depression. Police officers operating under severe and chronic stress may well be at greater risk of error and over-reaction that can compromise their performance and public safety. The unrealistic expectations imposed by this occupational culture discourage officers from admitting feeling stressed and openly expressing negative emotions. The sleep-wake cycle, under the circadian control of endogenous regulators or oscillators, is disrupted by a misalignment between the external demands of police work and biological rhythms. This produces mood disturbances, decreased work performance, general physical malaise; sleep-wake complains and increased intake and addiction to alcohol and drugs and suicidal tendencies. MHA reports revealed that during the period 2009-11 CAPFs had lost 328 men fighting terrorists, North-East extremists and Maoists. Between January, 2011 and January, 2014 in CAPFs 368 personnel committed suicide which is almost equal to the number of personnel lost their lives in action which is 371.

3.6.7.From 2009-11 the deaths due to suicides and fratricides in the paramilitary forces are in fact higher than similar deaths reported in the Indian Army. As many as 375 men in the army committed suicide during 2009-2011 while the seven paramilitary forces together have reported 398 such deaths. This amounted to 16.58 cases per lakh CAPF personnel per year in comparison to 10.41 cases per lakh army personnel per year1. In the last 10 years, a total of 1,018 CAPF personnel, including some officers, have committed suicide.

3.7 SUMMING UP OF ARGUMENTS FOR COMPENSATION OF POLICE PERSONNEL WITH EXTRA PAY AND ALLOWANCES

FOR WORKING UNDER EXTREMELY CHALLENGING AND STRESSFUL CONDITIONS

3.7.1 Increased level of education of junior police officers, increased awareness and constant comparison with other similarly placed government servants has given rise to lot of resentment. This has a huge impact on the delivery of police services. A feeling has developed that despite working for longer hours, performing duty on holidays and festivals and many times not being able to avail leave due to nature of job, the police officers are not being suitably compensated.

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3.7.2 Non gazetted police officers in several police departments including the Delhi Police, are presently compensated for this extra work by giving them extra salary for one month (30 Days) in Delhi Police. However this is highly inadequate and does not compensate for the extra work done by the police. Moreover many police officers are not able to avail the leave because many times leave is temporarily stopped by the supervisory officers due to exigencies of duty. If one only considers the average 72 hours of work per week and not count the work done during the gazette holidays, which is much higher than the standard norm of 40 hours of work per week; and one month extra pay is far less compensator even by the aforementioned modest calculation. In addition, taking into account the stress in job due to constant threat to life and injury, unnatural working hours, difficult working conditions, staying away from family (as job expects them to stay in rural police stations, even if the family is urban based, unlike other government officials who commute daily), they deserve much higher increase in the compensation package.

3.7.3 A police officer, including starting level of a civil police constable, under various sections of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Penal Code, has the powers to stop and search person or premises; to arrest anyone under reasonable suspicion of his having committed an offence; to interrogate, to use force to disperse and even use force to refrain a person from evading arrest, even to the extent of causing death, in certain circumstances. A police officer, even at the non gazette ranks, apart from the negative powers of restraining people, needs to use immense amount of discretion, make quick and at times life saving decisions, act as a counselor, work as a judge to appreciate facts during an enquiry, be a doctor to be able to provide first aid to victims, be a scientist to be able to appreciate forensic evidence, be a lawyer to be able to weigh evidence against law, be a rescuer during disasters. . Successive pay Commissions missed the point that remuneration package to level of government functionaries who has the power to impact upon any person’s life and liberty has to be commensurate with the need to attract, motivate and retain right kind of talent.

3.7.4 Police reforms mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are lagging behind in many states in spite of the continuous court driven monitoring. Being leaders, the IPS officers are the prime movers for

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reforms but direct contribution of the cutting edge level police officers will be highly critical for the success of police reform agenda. As already submitted in the beginning commission can make a vital contribution and act as a catalyst for the much needed police reforms though its recommendations. Remuneration and allowances commensurate with the responsibilities of police will greatly help in intake of quality human resources and upkeep of their motivation levels throughout their career. Further, cardinal to success of the police reforms and turning the Indian police truly into a people’s police is shedding of the colonial vestiges, one of which is the fairly static status of the constable. While the primary responsibility for affecting structural reforms is the central government, attraction of right talent being one of its terms of reference, pay commission can play a proactive role in this regard.

3.7.5 Successive pay commissions have carried forward the legacy of equating a constable with a semi-skilled worker which is an anachronistic approach for the 21st century policing needs. In most of the states the basic qualification level for a civil police constable is now class XII and quite often majority of the successful candidates are graduate. After the recruitment the constables undergo two years of rigorous training where considerable enhancement of knowledge and skill that takes place ranging from. He is given inputs in Law (all three major Criminal Acts), Constitution, investigation techniques, managing law and order, forensic science and medicine, criminology apart from skills of weapon, explosive and riot handling, swimming, field craft, operations and survival skills.

3.7.6 Government of India constituted a Committee in September 2005 to draft a new Police Act to replace the Police Act of 1861. The Committee was chaired by Shri Soli Sorabjee, former Attorney General. The committee had submitted a Model Police Act in 2006 , which formed the basis of recommendations of the Apex court in the Prakash Singh case 9 already mentioned in a previous section) and also a guiding document for enactment of Police Acts in various states. As per the report, the rank structure of Group ‘C’ posts in the Civil Police shall consist of Civil Police Officer Grade II, Civil Police Officer Grade I, Sub Inspector and Inspector. The committee also proposed that, “Every Civil Police Officers Grade II will undergo three years intensive training before being posted to the Service as a stipendiary cadet, and will, upon successful completion of training,

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have a graduation degree in police studies. Their scales of pay and conditions of service shall therefore be commensurate with ranks in other services under the state, which require similar levels of educational qualifications and training”.

3.7.7 In view of the above discussion, the IPS association sincerely urges the pay commission to consider adopting a similar approach as the Soli Sorabjee committee and consider the following scales of pay, which essentially would involve stepping up by one level in the grade pay.

Existing Rank

Proposed rank

Mode of recruitment Proposed salary( as per the present scheme, subject to

Constable Civil Police Officer- Grade II

Direct Recruitment of class XII passed candidates. Will be imparted three years training after which a degree is awarded to them.

PB1- Rs. 5200-20020 + grade pay 2400/-

Head Constable

Civil Police Officer- Grade I

Time scale after 10 years of joining( the present stage of MACP)

PB1- Rs. 5200-20020 + grade pay 2800/-

3.7.8 Statistically, about 90% of CPMFs are constantly deployed in difficult duties, be it Guarding borders, fighting insurgency or Left Wing Extremism (today probably the most difficult conditions to work in), anti-riot duties, etc. About 50% of the Armed Forces have their peace time duties on a rotation. Therefore, so far as the armed police and the CAPFs are concerned, the association urges the commission that in the lines of armed forces, similar to Military Special Pay (MSP). Police should also be given Police Special Pay.

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4. STRUCTURAL ISSUES, PAY PARITY AND CAREER PROGRESSION ISSUES

4.1 One of the terms of reference before the Commission is “To work out the framework for an emoluments structure linked with the need to attract the most suitable talent to Government service, promote efficiency, accountability and responsibility in the work culture, and foster excellence in the public governance system to respond to the complex challenges of modern administration and the rapid political, social, economic and technological changes, with due regard to expectations of stakeholders, and to recommend appropriate training and capacity building through a competency based framework”. Keeping in view the complex governance challenges before the country and in recognition of the critical contribution of the Indian Police Service in ensuring good governance and effectively implementing police reforms, there is a need to identify and rectify the issues that are causing impediments to attracting and retention of right talent in the Indian Police Service and their career progression. The following paragraphs highlight some of the concerns of the service officers and suggest recommendations to set right the existing anomalies.

4.2 PARITY OF PAY WITH THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE AND INDIAN FOREIGN SERVICE

4.2.1 Parity of pay with the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Foreign Service has been consistently pleaded by officers of the Indian Police Service officers with successive pay commissions but the same has not found favour with them. Unfortunately, the reasons for turning down the request were never based on merit but through direct acceptance of flawed arguments made by the other side on the basis of specious premises. The approach was status-quoist, aimed at perpetuation of colonial practices. Instead of addressing legitimate concerns expressed by IPS, IFoS and the Central services on merits from an analytic perspective, the issue was often erroneously examined with a colored view from a ‘inter service rivalry’ perspective. Exclusive presence of officers only from the IAS among the members from the services background in successive pay commissions and denial of the status of member secretary

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to the secretaries of the commissions whenever non IAS officers were posted, has further contributed to the widespread perception of bias and influence from within. In view of the importance of the issue not only to the All India Services but across the entire group-A central services, the association sincerely urges this commission to examine threadbare the contentions being made and resolve it through a reasoned speaking decision.

4.2.2 Before venturing into the parity argument, certain historical facts are being presented below for the kind perusal of the Commission.

4.2.3 In the constituent assembly, when the clause for creating All India Services was moved it was accepted with the observations of the president that “All-India Services will be desirable, I take it, in cases where you wish to attract to the highest services the best material that may be available in the country, and you will have to transgress provincial boundaries for the purpose of attracting this material if you want such material to take service whether under the Provincial Governments or under the Federal Government40”. Further, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar had clarified to the Constituent Assembly on Thursday, the 4th November 1948, “India’s Constitution provides that there shall be an All India Service recruited on an all-India basis with common qualifications, with uniform scale of pay and the members of which alone could be appointed to these strategic posts throughout the Union41”. This underscores two points; that the makers of constitution considered all india services as a single class and supported the need to attract the best talent for all the All India Services and not just one service.

4.2.4 In the British India, the Secretary of State controlled the recruitment and service conditions of the “Indian Civil Service” and the “Indian Police” and the article 244 of the Government of India Act, 1935 reinforced the status and distinctively mentions the services in addition to a third service, “The Indian Medical Service”. The origin of the respective services, qualification requirements of aspirants

40 Debate of Tuesday, the 29th July 1947 which can be accessed at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol4p12.htm41 Debate of Thursday, the 4th November 1948 which can be accessed at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p1b.htm

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and the method of recruitment were different. Therefore there is a reason to support the argument that the two services formed separate classes. However, the situation was altered after adoption of the Constitution: Article 312 of the Constitution does not distinguish among the All India Services and laid down a uniform process for the creation, regulation of the recruitment, and laying down the conditions of service. Therefore in the absence of any specific constitutional sanction of the further classification of the All India Services, any such legal provision determining the service condition by virtue of any act or rule shall have to necessarily pass the doctrine of reasonable classification under article 14 of the Constitution. The All India Services Act 1951 was enacted for the purposes of creation and regulation of service conditions of the All India Services. Rules framed under section 3 of the said Act, which are amended for time to time, address issues concerning service conditions. While some of the rules, such as conduct rules and rules on allowances and benefits are common to all the three services, some others such as the pay and cadre rules are different with each service. Significantly, except the pay rules rest of the service specific rules are identically worded.

4.2.5 Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India lays down the principle of equal pay for equal work. The spirit of this article can be reasonably interpreted in the present context that services and posts whose duties and responsibilities are comparable should carry substantially same or comparable remuneration42.

4.2.6 After the adoption of the Constitution of India, since 1951 although officers for the civil services were recruited through the same process by the Union Public Service Commission, the services were divided , for the purposes of examination, into three categories as below:

S.No. Category Papers in Civil Services Examination

42 This argument finds support from the second pay commission report (Chapter X; Section I; Para 8; page 103) and the third pay commission report Chapter 11.

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1 Category I Services(IAS & IFS)

5 optional subjects & 3 compulsory subjects

2Category II Services(IPS & Police Service

Class II of Union Territories)

2 optional subjects & 3 compulsory subjects

3Category III Services\ (Central Services

Class I and II)3 optional subjects & 5

compulsory subjects

4.2.7 The Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods (1976), popularly known as the Kothari Commission recommended a common examination for all civil services in all respects. In support of the above, they relied upon the Administrative Reform Commission’s Report on Personnel Administration (1969) and Committee on Police Training (Gore Committee) (1971). The Government accepted the recommendations of the Commission and 1979 onwards, officers of the IAS, IPS and Central Services Group A are being recruited through a common examination.

4.2.8 The IPS has consistently, especially post 1979 been among the most preferred service in the Civil Service examination by the candidates. Statistics collected on the basis of the data from the recent batches of the civil services examinations (from the table below), indicates that these days candidates equally prefer IPS and the Indian Foreign Service. If the artificial edge provided to IAS/IFS is removed, some of the candidates who presently prefer to joining these services even though they have aptitude for Police will definitely change their preference.

Service Preference Trends 2005-12

Year Rank of the Last General Candidate

Intake in IAS General

No. of Candidates Opting for IPS in preference to

No. of Candidates Opting for Central Services

Rank of the Last General Candidate Opting

Intake in IFS General

No. of Candidates Opting for IPS in preference

No. of Candidates Opting for Other Central Service

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Opting for IAS IAS

(other than IFS) in preference to IAS for IFS to IFS

s in preference to IFS

2005 56 43 1 0 63 9 2 0

2006 50 35 0 0 75 10 9 1

2007 78 46 1 1 92 8 4 0

2008 81 50 1 1 103 12 7 2

2009 70 49 1 1 108 13 12 0

2010 83 56 0 0 140 17 21 2

2011 97 77 0 0 162 22 19 7

2012 116 76 0 0 134 14 4 1

4.2.9 Various commissions beginning from the Kothari Commission have consistently advocated the principle of aptitude based choice of service selection. The Kothari commission had recommended that the allotment of service may be done after the final stage of their three-stage sequential process, i.e. Prelims, Mains and Post Training exams.. The Alagh Committee, 2001 had also looked at the question of allotment of services. To help selected candidates to make an informed choice of service, it recommended that: “the selected candidates may be required to exercise their service preferences only on the completion of the Foundation Course at LBSNAA but the allocation would continue to be on the basis of the original merit list

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prepared by the UPSC.” The 2nd Administrative reforms Commission, 2008 also agreed with the recommendation of the Alagh Committee and recommended that allotment of services to the successful candidates should be done only on the completion of the Foundation Course, on the basis of the merit list prepared by the UPSC. The Hota Committee, 2004 also recommended that aptitude and leadership tests may be introduced for selection, and that probationer may be allowed one month’s time after commencement of training to exercise their option for Services.

4.2.10 Position taken by pay commissions in the pre Kothari commission era on relativities of pay scales among various services: For having a correct perspective on the parity issue, it would be worthwhile to divide the successive pay commission recommendations into two different periods, i.e. pre Kothari commission and post Kothari commission. The pre independence commissions and the first three pay commissions covered the pre Kothari Commission period and the position taken by the respective commissions on relativity of pay scales is as under:

4.2.10.1 Lee Commission

4.2.10.2 At Paragraph 66 (page 41) of the First pay Commission report it was acknowledged that the reasons for lower pay scales to the Indian Police Service in comparison was earlier age of entry and lower educational qualifications. The commission had advocated for common standards of recruitment with the Class-I services and in consequence of the same pay structure with the class I services but less than IAS/IFS, which were to be recruited through different standards.

4.2.10.3 While the Second Pay Commission (1957-59) did not discuss the pay structure of the All India Services, but pursuant to the revision of pay scales for the Central Services the Government looked into the matter and proposed pay scales for the IPS as compared to Class I Central Services43.

43 Para 39; Chapter 11 (Page 117) of the Third Pay commission report

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4.2.10.4 The Third Pay Commission (1973) deliberated at length on the need to attract capable talent for the IPS, acknowledged the job complexities and recommended parity with the IAS in the Junior Scale44. Although parity was not maintained with the senior scale onwards, the commission had recommended for increasing some allowances to ‘have the effect of reducing the existing disparity between the IAS and IPS scales of pay’45. As regards relativities between the IAS and the Class I services, the commission came to a conclusion that there was a case for gradual narrowing down of the difference over the years depending upon the prevailing circumstances46.

4.2.11 Flawed Justifications adopted by the Previous Pay Commissions to deny parity with the IAS/IFS: Post the Kothari Commission report; officers of the Indian Police Service from 1980 batch onwards are being recruited through a common examination under uniform criteria for selection. However, successive pay commissions thereafter have still denied the parity of pay among the services and continued to allow edge to the IAS/IFS officers in their initial career. Some of the reasons quoted for continuation of status quo are presented below, with the inherent flaws in the justifications offered therein.

4.2.12 The Fourth Pay Commission (1986) made a passing mention of the suggestions made by various services on the issue of parity47 but evaded a discussion on the subject. Instead, the commission recommended improvements in the career progression aimed at reducing disparities. This is a flawed approach, particularly since the third pay commission had elaborately dealt with the issue in an objective and highly analytical manner and set a platform for visiting the issue by the future commissions on the basis of relative importance of the respective services as per the prevailing situation of governance priorities. Specific to the IPS, the commission brought about measures to improve the career progression by merging

44 Para42-43; Chapter 11 (Page 118) of the Third Pay commission report45 Para 54; Chapter 11 (Page 120) of the Third Pay commission report46 Para 20; Chapter 11 (Page 113) of the Third Pay commission report47 Para 12.9; Chapter 12 (Page 212) of the Fourth Pay commission report

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ranks, as well as by recommending induction of an IPS officer as member of cadre review committee.

4.2.13 The approach of the Fifth Pay Commission was status quoist. Firstly the commission erroneously equated performance in the civil service examination as the criterion for pay determination and observed,“…It is not correct to compare the last man of the IAS with the first man of the Central Services… the fact is that there is a split-second difference between a gold medalist and the also ran in an Olympic race48”. In fact, just for preservation of the status quo, the commission went on to the extent of recommending scrapping of the common civil service examination system which was introduced with a public interest in mind49. If the commission’s logic of examination performance as a pay determinator is accepted, all the candidates higher on the merit list who joined the IPS in preference to IAS/IFS50 should draw pay equal to them and as a consequence their pay would be more than their other batch mates of the IPS and as a further consequence this defeats the concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’! In any case determination of emoluments is not an exercise of providing incentive for examination performance, but as the third pay commission had rightly approached issue, it should be based on the complexity and difficulty of the duties and responsibilities of the job. Without discussing merits of the other arguments placed by the service associations, the commission abruptly concluded by stating that “51As far as the edge enjoyed by the IAS and IFS over the other Services is concerned, we do not find any persuasive reason that would impel us to do away with the edge currently enjoyed by them…”. Curiously, on the question of parity between IPS and Indian Forest service the agument of parity were accepted.

4.2.14 The Sixth Pay Commission attempted to give a functional justification for retaining the edge, but again the logic was flawed. The commission observed, “The role of IAS is still very important in

48 Para 47.30 Chapter 47(page 519) of the fifth pay commission report49 Para 47.36 (i)Chapter 47(page 520) of the fifth pay commission report50 There a significant number of such candidates as the table in the following paragraph 3.7 would indicate51 Para 47.36 (ii)Chapter 47(page 520) of the fifth pay commission report

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the overall scheme of governance. They have an important coordinating, multi-functional and integrating role in the administrative framework with wide experience of working across various levels in diverse areas in Government. They hold important field level posts at the district level and at the cutting edge at the start of their careers with critical decision making and crisis management responsibilities. The leadership function, the strategic, coordinating and integrative role at this level requires the best talent available. The existing position would, therefore, need to be maintained. It will ensure that IAS officers near the beginning of their career are given slightly higher remuneration vis-à-vis other services and act as an incentive for the brightest candidates to enter this service. This is essential as the initial postings of IAS officers are generally to small places, they face frequent transfers and the pulls and pressures they have to stand upto early in their career are much more intense. The slight edge in the initial stages of their career would, to an extent, neutralize these problems52”. It essentially laid down three principles, i.e. i) The functions of coordination, integration and experience of working across various levels in diverse areas in Government are considered superior within the administrative framework; ii) Slight edge in the initial career helps in attracting the brightest talent which is required for performing such roles; and iii) Sight edge mitigates the hardships faced by the IAS officers in their initial careers and also rewards the leadership roles exercised. The flaws in this line of argument will be dealt with in the following paragraphs.

4.2.15 Arguments in support of parity in the initial career: As per the sixth pay commission, the edge of pay between IPS and the IAS/IFS extends from senior scale to the selection grade , i.e. from the fifth to fifteenth year of service. As explained above the arguments behind the recommendations of the previous pay commissions are flawed, they do not satisfy the test of reasonable classification in favour of IAS /IFS and are liable to be rejected for use by the present pay commission. The following are some arguments in favour of a full parity, for the kind consideration of the commission which find strength from the extensive discussion made above.

52 Para 3.2.7 (Page 167) of the sixth pay commission report

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4.2.16 For achieving objectives of governance, the multi dimensional specialist’s role of an IPS is as important the multi dimensional generalist’s role of an IAS officer: Ensuring Rule of Law, Public Order and Internal Security rank among top governance priorities of any country, as absence of the same can threaten the very existence of the nation. As already explained in chapter-I, the Police in India currently undertake these responsibilities under extremely challenging circumstances. Successive pay commissions have failed to recognise the importance of these issues, more often accorded primacy to the departments concerned with the general administration, development, revenue collection, finance and audit activities, and successively ignored the fact that the working mandate of Police is highly complex and it occupies a multi dimensional specialist’s role as compared to the multi dimensional generalist’s role of an IAS and uni-dimensional specialized roles of an IFS officer. Country needs best talent in equal measure in each of these services for achieving its governance objectives.

4.2.17 It is incorrect to state that the Central Government attaches a premium to the functions of coordination, integration and experience of working in diverse areas, as a matter of policy: The 6th CPC succeeded in propagating a misconception that it is the government’s policy that functions of coordination, integration and experience of working across various levels in diverse areas in government are considered superior within the higher echelons of the administrative framework, and therefore it is necessary to attract the best possible talent towards the IAS, the job profile of which matches the aforementioned description. On the contrary, the policy of the Central Government for selecting officers for manning the senior posts is through the Central Staffing Scheme53 and the stated policy of selection to the CSS posts has been expressed as, “The raison d'etre is the Centre's need for fresh inputs at senior levels in policy planning, formulation of policy and implementation of programmes from diverse sources, viz., the All-India Services and the participating organised Group 'A' Services”.

53 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES AND PENSIONS

DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL AND TRAINING O.M. N0.36177194-EO(SM-I) dated the 5th January, 1996

65

Therefore, no such premium is attached to a particular service by the government as a policy.

4.2.18 Persons recruited through the same examination for the comparable jobs should be treated at par: Justifying the recommendation for having a common examination, the Kothari Commission said “even though the professional expertise required of a general administrator, or a diplomat or a police officer or a member of any of the other Central Services vary, their general qualities of competence, traits of character and sense of commitment necessarily have a common denominator. The same applies to other qualities needed in an officer such as intellectual cohesion, articulation, sense of awareness and purpose, integrity, depth of understanding, courage of conviction and ability to respond to changing socio-economic and political situations”. With the acceptance of recommendations of the Kothari commission, Government had long back accepted the principle of common denominator of traits for a civil service aspirant, and implemented a system uniform examination with equal opportunity to the selected candidates to choose a particular service as per their aptitude. Inducement into two specific services through offer of extra increments goes against the policy.

4.2.19 Complete parity would spur the candidates with right kind of aptitude and inclination to opt for the service: The requirements of modern day policing are different from the conventional policing. While the erstwhile regimental police administration model may, to some extent, still serve the needs of the conventional policing requirements of maintaining Law & Order and handling of localized crime, the same is highly inadequate to handle complex organised and economic crimes, cyber crimes, transnational organised crimes and terrorism, human rights issues, mega city policing, crimes against women and weaker sections etc. There is an increasing need for attracting persons with right kind of aptitude and inclination to opt for the service. The edge factor is driving even those candidates having aptitude for police into the IAS, as a result not only is police at a loss but IAS is also saddled with persons without any special aptitude for generalized administrator’s work. The service preference trend table at para 3.1.2.6 demonstrate that in spite of adverse pay conditions there are still some persons every year opting for IPS out of their passion

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and special aptitude in preference to the other services , but instead of getting rewarded they are being unfairly discriminated throughout their career. As already submitted, if the impeding factors are removed, candidates will choose services as per aptitude and will be motivated to perform better.

4.2.20 Adequate Compensation to mitigate the hardships and risks: IPS officers face more risks in their career than any other civil service: As the table enclosed in Annexure- shows, since Independence 30 members of the IPS have made the supreme sacrifice in the service of the nation across all corners of the country. The job of an IPS officer is not becoming any safer by day. In fact the young officers at the level of SDPOs and SPs are increasingly being called upon to lead their men from the front at grave risk to their life and well being. The government needs to have a comprehensive HR policy in place that provides adequate incentives for those fighting India’s domestic wars but this issue was sidelined by the 6th CPC. The arguments of posting to smaller places, frequent transfers, pulls and pressure etc. are more prominent in the case of IPS compared to IAS. Also, IFS officers, who are posted either in foreign countries or in New Delhi, do not face such difficulties at all but they are rewarded with same pay scales as IAS.

4.2.21 Changed dynamics of district administration has altered the traditional relativities of DM and SP: The role of a district Magistrate in relation to District Policing has witnessed a paradigm change over a period of time. As per the 1861 police act, the District Magistrate was the executive head of the administration and administration of the police was vested in a Superintendent of police under the general control and direction of such Magistrate. However, in the past decade, after the model police act of the Soli Sorabjee committee was circulated by the government and after the directives of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were significantly based on the model act, 15 states have so far enacted their respective police acts and a majority of them are drafted on the basis of the model act. Remaining states are at various stages of legislative process. In these acts, the role of the district magistrate is that of a coordinator and does not wield general control and direction on police, and as such justification of an edge as a symbol of superior authority does not exist any longer. These changes have taken place after the implementation of the recommendations of the 6th cpc and

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therefore highly relevant for the consideration of the 7th cpc. As for the argument of whether DM as a coordinator should draw more pay than all the others posted in the district, the same was rarely the case even in the past, as it was a fairly common experience that some of the ADMs and almost all of the district heads of the technical departments were many a time drawing higher pay by virtue of their longevity in service, and that had never affected the efficiency of coordination functions.

4.3 ANOMALIES IN NOTIFICATIONS ISSUED FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SIXTH PAY COMMISSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS ON EDGE IN THE INITIAL CAREER TO IAS/IFS: While a discussion has been made in the previous paragraphs regarding the edge allowed to two services in an unjustified manner by the previous pay commissions, the association submits to the commission that glaring anomalies were created in the fitment tables prepared for implementation of the government decisions made in this regard, which caused greater benefit than what was allowed to these services. In spite of representations from several services which found support from the DOPT, the Ministry of finance, department of Expenditure has so far resisted to set right the anomalies. The matter therefore deserves attention of the present pay commission not only for prevention of carry forward of the irregularly awarded inflated edge, but also to set right the previous pay commission fitment tables with a retrospective effect.

4.3.1Pursuant to the cabinet resolutions on the recommendations of the sixth pay commission, the Government of India issued a Gazette Notification No 470 dated 29 August, 200854 notifying the Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008. In continuation, an Office Memorandum (F.No.1/1/2008-IC) dated 30th August, 200855 has been issued for fixation of salaries. As per the Gazette notification, two increments were allowed in three grades, viz. senior time scale, junior administration grade and the non functional selection grade (NFSG) in the form of two increments @3% which will be adjusted in the pay band.

54 May access at http://finmin.nic.in/6cpc/6cpcdecision.pdf55 May access at http://finmin.nic.in/6cpc/6cpcmemo.pdf

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4.3.2However, the actual implementation had resulted extra benefits, because the 2 additional increments given to the IAS at the STS grade in the running pay band PB3 and at the NFSG grade in the running pay band PB4 continue to get carried forward to JAG grade in PB3 and SAG grade in PB4, respectively. In effect, IAS has been given at least 2 additional increments over other services throughout their career. This is against the Cabinet decision to limit the edge to middle levels and that too limited to two increments.

4.3.3 In addition, certain further anomalies had crept in due to wrong fitment tables. Following table shows the anomaly in fixation of pay in respect of pre-revised scale of Rs.14300-400-18300 (S-24) which is Non Functional Selection Grade (NFSG) of all services vis-à-vis pre-revised pay scale of Rs.15100-400-18300 (S-25) which is NFSG of IAS:

Pre-revised basic pay

Revised Pay in the Pay Band in case of all other services

Revised Pay in the Pay Band in case of IAS

14300 37400

14700 37400

15100 38530 39690

15500 38530 39690

15900 39690 40890

4.3.4 From the above chart, it is clear that IAS had been given 2 extra increments over and above the 2 year edge they already had built into the scale S-25. Hence, if an IAS officer got into the NFSG on 1.1.2006, his pay in pay band was fixed at 39690, whereas the pay of an officer of other service gets fixed at Rs 39690 after completion of four years of service,. Thus, the edge increases to 4 increments at the start of PB-4. This was not the decision of the Cabinet. An IAS officer drawing a basic pay of Rs 15100 will get Rs 39690 as per the fitment table, whereas officers of other services drawing the same basic pay of Rs 15100 will get Rs 38530. There cannot be any difference in fixation of equal pay of

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the two NFSGs with equal grade pay. It may be noted that in PB-3, the pre-revised pay of Rs 10650 in S-20, which is 2 increments ahead of starting pay of Rs 10000 in S-19, has been fixed at the same level that is indicated by the fitment table of S-19 at Rs 19810. Similarly, the pre-revised pay of Rs 12750 in S-22, which is 2 increments ahead of starting pay of Rs 12000 in S-21, has been fixed at the same level that is indicated by the fitment table of S-21, Rs 23720.Thus, in PB-4, a pay of Rs 15100 in S-24 must be fixed at the same level that is indicated by the fitment table of S-25, i.e. 39690. In order to fix pay in compliance of the decision of the Cabinet, the fitment tables should be modified as suggested at Para 3.3.5 below.

4.3.5The following table shows the relativities in fixation of pay in respect of pre-revised scale of Rs.16400-450-20000 (S-26) for Conservator of Forests for IFS/DIG of Police for IPS and other CPMFs/Brigadiers of Armed Forces/SEs of Engineering Services/Scientific Officers Grade ‘F’, etc vis-à-vis pre-revised NFSG of IAS pay scale of Rs.15100-400-18300 (S-25):

Pre-revised basic pay in the pay scale of Rs.15100-400-18300 (S-25) for NFSG for IAS

Revised Pay in the Pay Band for NFSG for IAS

Pre-revised basic pay in the pay scale of Rs.16400-450-20000 (S-26) for Conservator/ DIG/Brig/SE, etc

Revised Pay in the Pay band for Conservator/ DIG/Brig/SE, etc

15100 39690

15500 39690

15900 40890

16300 40890 16400 39690

16700 42120 16850 40890

17100 42120 17300 40890

17500 43390 17750 42120

17900 43390 18200 42120

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4.3.6 From the above chart, it is clear that the basic pay of Rs.16400/- for IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc has been fixed as Rs.39690/- whereas the basic pay of Rs.15100/- for IAS has been fixed at the same stage though there was a difference of Rs.1300/- at initial stage itself in the pre-revised scales. The basic pay of Rs.16400/- for IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc has been fixed as Rs.39690/- whereas the lower basic pay of Rs.16300/- for IAS has been fixed as Rs.40890/-. In the pre-revised pay, officer in NFSG of IAS, even after three increments, was at a lower basic pay (Rs 16300) than IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc (Rs 16400). However, in the new fitment table, the officer of IAS on entry to NFSG will get the same pay of Rs 39690 as a Conservator of IFS/DIG of IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc. This has adversely impacted the existing relativities between the services. Thus, the Super time Scale-I of IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc has been downgraded even below NFSG of IAS. This was neither the recommendation of the Pay Commission, nor decision of the Cabinet. Thus, the fitment tables should be modified as suggested at Para 3.3.5 below.

4.3.7 Suggested Fitment table: The following fitment table is suggested to be worked by the seventh pay commission as a starting point of working out the recommendations, instead of compounding the patent errors committed by the earlier pay commissions.

Pre-revised basic pay in the pay scale of Rs.15100-400-18300 (S-25) NFSG for IAS

Revised Pay in the Pay Band

Pre-revised basic pay in the pay scale of Rs.14300-400-18300 (S-24) Selection Grade for other services

Proposed Revised Pay in Pay Band

Pre-revised basic pay in the pay scale of Rs.16300-450-20000 (S-26) for IFS /IPS/SE/ Brigadier, etc

Proposed Revised Pay in the Pay band

14300 37400

14700 38530

71

15100 39690 15100 39690

15500 39690 15500 39690

15900 40890 15900 40890

16300 40890 16300 40890

16700 42120 16700 42120 16400 42120

17100 42120 17100 42120 16850 42120

17500 43390 17500 43390 17300 43390

17900 43390 17900 43390 17750 43390

18300 44700 18300 44700 18200 44700

18700 44700 18700 44700 18650 44700

19100 46050 19100 46050 19100 46050

19500 46050 19500 46050 19550 46050

20000 47440

20450 47440

4.4 MISINTERPRETATION OF TWO YEARS GAP BETWEEN IAS AND OTHER SERVICES TO BE RECTIFIED

4.4.1 In order to mitigate the hardships due to slow promotions in some of the Group-A services, the sixth pay commission has provided that; “The Government should, accordingly, consider batch-wise parity while empanelling and/or posting at Centre between respective batches of IAS and other organised Group A services with the gap being restricted to two years. Whenever any IAS officer of a particular batch is posted in the Centre to a particular grade carrying a specific grade pay in pay bands PB-3 or PB-4 , grant of higher pay scale on non-functional basis to the officers belonging to batches of organised Group A services that are senior by two years or more should be given by the Government56”. The facility was subsequently extended to IPS and IFS in the states and the centre. What was introduced as stagnation mitigation measure has

56 Para 3.3.12 page 173 6 cpc report

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in practice being misinterpreted as a mandatory gap of two years between IAs and the rest of the services. It has been experienced many a time that even when vacancies exist and the officers of a particular batch meet the minimum qualifying service requirement, the promotions are stalled unless two years junior to them in the IAS get first promoted. This has no only created demoralization among the officers, but such a practice is against the public interest since vacancies remain unfilled. The commission should address this issue and clarify that the two years gap is the maximum and not the minimum gap , and further clarify that if the vacancies exist and the pool of officers meeting the eligibility criteria are available, promotions should not be stalled showing the two year gap.

4.5 INTRA SERVICE PARITY

4.5.1As per the existing policy of cadre allotment, IPS officers are allotted different state cadres. While the conditions of pay and service are uniform across the cadres, in some cadres promotions are delayed compared to others and the gap sometimes extends to more than two years. The delays are often caused due to faulty cadre management, sluggish response of the state home departments etc. on which the officers do not have any control .This results in demoralization of the officers of the affected cadres, who suffer because of no fault from their side. In the sixth pay commission the concept of grant of higher pay scale on non-functional basis to reduce the inter service gap, extending the same principle, the commission may recommend that Whenever any IPS officer of a particular batch is posted in a state cadre to a particular grade carrying a specific grade pay in pay bands PB-3 , PB-4 or HAG , grant of higher pay scale on non-functional basis to the IPS officers of the same batch belonging to the other cadres or those serving in the centre.

4.6 REMOVAL OF THE GRADE PAY 8900/- IN THE PB4 RS37400-67000/- IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT UNIFORMITY

IN THE CAREER PROGRESSION WITH THE OTHER CIVIL SERVICES

4.6.1 The super time scale for the IAS/IFS and Central Services has been uniformly fixed at Pay-Band - 4: Rs.37400-67000; plus Grade Pay

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Rs.10000, where as in the case of IPS and the IFoS the same has been split into two levels, i.e. Grade pay Rs 8900/- (DIG/Conservator of Forests) and the Grade pay Rs 10000/-(IG/Chief Conservator of forests). Historically this factor was a major impediment in the promotion prospects of IPS/IFS officers.

4.6.2 The Police ranks were traditionally equated with the corresponding ranks. The rank of DIG was equated with the rank of Brigadier in status, and his duties in the states primarily included supervision of policing in the ranges. Earlier there were two levels of DIGs, and in their endeavor to reduce the total number of pay scales, the fourth pay commission had amalgamated the levels, but the exercise was of adverse consequence to the service, as the amalgamation was into the lower of the two levels. On the contrary, the SAG grades of the Central Services, which had also existed in two levels, were merged into a single level, which was at higher of the two. The fifth pay commission had formally given approval for creation of the Additional Director General rank raising the supervisory ranks above the SP into four, i.e. DIG.IG.ADG and DG. Rank proliferation continued with the sixth pay commission, when the DG rank was split into two levels, i.e. HAG+ level and Apex scale.

4.6.3 From time to time, IPS association has been demanding for abolition of the rank of DIG. When the matter came up before the fifth pay commission, the commission has declined the request on the grounds of l) functional utility of the scale as head of the range; and ii) traditional relativities between the armed forces and the police57. The matter again came up before the sixth pay commission. The Commission, accordingly, recommends that the grade o be retained on similar grounds as mentioned in the fifth pay commission report. However, the commission had left the option for reconsideration on the issue, by stating that, ” the government may, however, review the position in future in case functional justification for continuing with this grade ceases to exist completely58”.

4.6.4 The association recommends for abolition of level-I of the suppertime scale of the IPS having grade pay of Rs 8900/- and direct promotion from the NFSG to the Super time scale having grade pay Rs 10, 000/-, as is the case with the IAS/IFS

57 Para 47.46 page 523 of the 5th cpc report58 Para 3.2.9 page 1686th cpc report

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and other central Services. In order to achieve parity among the All India services, the scale should be started at 16th year of service as in the IAS. For implementing this recommendation, half of the existing cadre posts of DIG can be upgraded to the rank of IG and the rest half can be downgraded to the rank of SP (NFSG). Typically IPS officers spend four years time as DIGs, and for the purpose of avoiding reversions, a gradual up gradation /down gradation exercise may be undertaken over a period of time. The justification for the abolition of scale is presented below:

4.6.5 Reduction of levels in Police does not adversely affect the functionality: In the IPS, majority of the posts (more than 80%) are with the states. In a democracy charter of responsibilities of the armed forces and the civil police are vastly different and their mutual interaction is very minimal, except in the Border States or disturbed states. Therefore relativity argument with the armed forces does not stand the scrutiny of ground realities. Coming to the aspect of functional utility, range level supervision is an important component of the state police functioning. In the distant past, IGP was head of state police and DIG was the only intermediate rank between the district superintendent of police and the IGP. Therefore only a DIG rank officer could have head the police range. However, at present there are three intermediate ranks between the head of the state police, i.e. DGP and the District Superintendent of Police- These are ADG, IG and the DIG. Therefore, it is not mandatory that only a DIG rank officer should head the range- the function can be performed by the IG as well. In fact such a system has already been successfully implemented in various states, as observed by the commission itself. Further, the IAS counter part of DIG is the Divisional Commissioner, who is an officer equivalent to IG in police. Usually, the District Collector and the Superintendent of Police are of comparable seniority and most of the time they would be at similar stages of the time scales. Therefore, it is logical to extend similar working relation at the division /range level.

4.6.6 Abolition of DIG posts in the states will provide more hands for the field level posts: At present the eligibility level for promotion to the rank of DIG is 14 ears. IPS officers typically serve for more than 30 years and 14 years is not even the mid-point of their career. Therefore, allowing them to serve as SsP for at least

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two more years will benefit the system, with more number of experienced officers available for field postings.

4.6.7 Uniformity of ranks across the civil services is in the interest of harmonious working relations in the states: Although officers of the rank of DIG are placed at a lesser grade pay than their IAS counter parts in the Super time scales and end up getting promoted later to the equivalent rank of IG, the fact that the post is termed as super time scale and the IPS officers usually get promoted in their 14th year of service to that scale, a lot of heart burn is experienced by their IAS counterparts and in the past this had triggered a race for reducing the qualifying service. In fact, in the year 2008 the qualifying service for super time scale was reduced to 14 years for the IAS, but after realizing the folly that officers are getting promoted at a very early stage of their career which is depriving the system of the capable hands for field postings, the earlier position of 16 years eligibility criterion was restored. Uniformity of ranks between the IAS and IPS therefore, is in the interest of harmonious working relations in the states.

4.6.8 Functionality in the Central Armed Police Forces(CAPF) can be maintained by retaining the rank of DIG at grade pay of Rs. 8700/-: IPS being an All India Service, it is expected that an appropriate number of posts are created at the centre for enabling officers to come on deputation. At present there are about 120 posts of DIG earmarked for IPS officers in the CAPFs. As the CAPFs are organized similar to Army pattern, relativities with the armed forces have a functional utility in maintaining inter organizational coordination. Therefore the rank of DIG may be allowed to remain intact for the purposes of central deputation.

4.6.9 Retention of DIG posts in centre with lesser grade pay does not conflict with the service rules: The practice of IPS officers of the rank of DIG and even the IAS officers already promoted in their cadres to the grade pay of 10,000/- join as directors (for which the qualifying service is 14 years, same as for DIG), in the central staffing scheme with a reduced grade pay of Rs 8700/-. Having IPS officers join CAPFs with grade pay of Rs 8700/- does not set any new precedent in the government of India. All of the central deputation posts are non cadre posts and their pay is regulated by schedule II under rules 10 and 11 of the IPS (pay) rules as amended from time

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to time. Therefore a simple amendment of the schedule II-B would suffice to implement the changes, and that is not a big issue since the pay rules any way get amended after every pay commission. Now coming to inter personal relations between the IPS officers with Rs 8700/- grade pay and their CAPF colleagues with Rs 8900/- grade pay, firstly the difference is very minimal, and secondly, there are precedents available in the states where IAS and IPS officers posted in the districts get lesser pay even compared to not only their state service colleagues but even their subordinates.

4.6.10 There will be no additional financial burden on the exchequer: At present the level jump between DIG and IG is Rs 1100/- . Also, it is being proposed to upgrade only half of the existing posts of DIG, which are roughly 250 cadre posts and 26% more state deputation reserve/ex-cadre posts. Therefore the financial burden of the exercise is miniscule minimum.

4.7 ABOLITION OF THE HAG+ SCALE:4.7.1 The DG rank in the IPS now carries two pay scales; i) Apex Scale of

Rs.80, 000 (fixed) which is allowed to DGs of most of the CPOs, IB, CBI, RAW etc. and one DG in each State who is HoPF (Head of Police Force); and ii) HAG+ Scale of Rs.75, 500-80,000 for other DGs in the States and some CPOs.

4.7.2 Due to the classification of DGs into Apex scale and the HAG+ scale several difficulties have arisen while implementation in the states resulting in several petitions in the courts/tribunals. Quite often selection to the post of HoPF is not done on the basis of seniority, selection process is not transparent and HoPFs are sometimes transferred out without adhering to the two years tenure rule. The legal challenges arise when: an apex scale DGP (HoPF) is removed to a post carrying the inferior HAG+ scale and his pay scale is reduced from apex to HAG+. This technically amounts to demotion without disciplinary proceedings; and when a junior DG is posted to the apex scale post, ‘superseding’ the senior DG who languishes in the inferior scale. This results in subversion of the NBR (Next below Rule). The aforementioned situation has resulted in a plethora of litigations all over the country against the Govt as well as against the ‘superseded’ officers. Government has so far not one a single case.

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4.7.3 The Government erroneously insists that grant of apex scale to one of the DGs is not a promotion though it is a superior scale. It ignores the fact that the status/rank of an officer is defined solely by the Pay Scale. The following facts clearly prove the superiority of Apex Scale over HAG+ scale:

i. In the ‘Order of Precedence’, an Apex Scale holder precedes all the others;

ii. In respect of official residential accommodation, Apex Scale officers are entitled to the highest category type houses in Delhi. No such priority is given to the HAG+ officers who are placed in the general waiting list;

iii. CPOs like CRPF and BSF are headed by a DG in the Apex Scale. Under him are two more DGs designated as special DGs to distinguish them from the head DG. They are placed in the HAG+ scale. They are directly subordinate to the DG holding the Apex Scale;

iv. Officers who retire from the HAG+ scale draw significantly draw fewer pensions compared to their colleagues who retire in the Apex scale.

4.7.4 Vide Notification No. G.S.R 692(E) dated 27th September, 2008 of Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions regarding the recommendations of the 6th Central Pay Commission dealing with Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 2007, the post of Director-General of Police as head of police force was identified and given a higher pay scale [the Apex Scale of Rs 80,000/- (fixed)] while the rest of the DGs were given a lower pay scale of HAG+ of Rs 75,500-80,000, as extracted below:-

Rule 3(D) (iii) Apex Scale: Rs 80000 (fixed), Grade Pay: nil (by up gradation of one existing post of Director General of Police as head of police force in each State cadre [with effect from the date of issue of notification of the Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 2008].

Thus, on the one hand, the Govt says DGP (HoPF) is not a promotion/up gradation while, on the other hand, it clearly describes the post as ‘up gradation’. These contradictions remain unexplained by the Govt till date and no corrective action has been taken so far.

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4.7.5 Factually speaking, the use of the word “up gradation” in the above amendment is legally untenable, as it goes against the Cabinet decision taken vide GOI Gazette Notification No.1/1/2008-IC dated 29.8.08. This notification is regarding the implementation of the accepted Recommendations of the Sixth CPC. It mentions about "up gradation" to the Apex Scale of Rs. 80,000/- (Fixed) only of the additional posts of two DGs of CPOs, namely, DGs of SSB and ITBP. There is no mention of the "up gradation" of the posts of DGPs of States / HoPF to the Apex Scale. In the Schedule, it specifically mentions that in each State, one of the DGPs, who is the HoPF, will be placed (as against upgraded) in the Apex Scale. It is to be noted that the GOI (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961, particularly Schedule II, clearly forbids any Ministry, Minister and/or Department etc from superseding, amending, modifying or changing any decision of the Union Cabinet. Only the Union Cabinet is empowered to do so. It clearly proves that the use of the word “up gradation” in the above DOPT Notification is illegal.

4.7.6 After the revision of the pay scale of the post of DGP (HoPF), there is no additional qualification added for appointment to that post nor there is any change at all in the responsibilities, powers and functions of the post which the previous incumbents did not exercise. The so called up gradation is absolutely illusory, a mere re-designation of a particular post in the rank of DGP with a higher pay scale. Whenever there is change in the power structure in the State Government, very often, the incumbent DGP (HoPF) is removed to an innocuous post. If the argument of the Government about up gradation is accepted, then how can an officer holding a superior post are transferred to an inferior post without framing charges against him for disciplinary action? How can a person be demoted without any departmental proceedings? This only confirms that all posts of DG are equal and they exercise/draw powers from an equivalent post. What logic, therefore, can there be to discriminate between DGs and allow the benefit of higher pay to only one DG? The facts are clear: there is no up gradation of the post but merely up gradation of the pay scale of the same post.

4.7.7 In view of the above reasons, and also keeping in view the fact that government has been consistently losing all the cases on this issue, the commission may consider confirming the principle that

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discrimination between DGs is arbitrary and all the DGs are entitled to the same Apex Scale.

4.8 REINFORCING THE SPIRIT OF ALL INDIA CHARACTER OF THE SERVICE THROUGH FACILITATING ADEQUATE

REPRESENTATION OF IPS IN THE CENTRAL DEPUTATIONS

4.8.1 As per the scheme of the All India Services, officers serve both in the states and the centre. For facilitating such movement, a central deputation reserve at the scale of 40% of the cadre posts has been created in the state cadres. As per the present strength of IPS, there is a requirement of 1022 posts for fulfilling the central deputation obligations as per the cadre rules. At present there are only 569 posts (just a little more than 50% of the CDR quota) available with the CAPFs/CPOs for deputation of IPS officers. Therefore there is a need to identify more posts where IPS officers can be inducted at the centre. It is also relevant to mention here that between the years 1999- 2003, intake in the service was drastically reduced to 30-35 officers per year implement a downsizing strategy. Therefore states were highly reluctant to spare the officers for central deputations since there was huge shortage of officers at the field level, and as a consequence there was not much pressure on the central deputation posts in the ranks of SP and DIG. However, subsequent cadre reviews had realized the need to increase the number of officers in order to tackle the difficult internal security challenges, and as a result the intake in the past 10 years has sharply increased. Between the years 2005-2013 was as much as 1189. These trends indicate that in the near future there will be significant pressure on the central deputation posts. Also, the profile of the officers inducted into the IPS indicates that most of them are highly educated with professional degrees59. This, added with the exposure to complex governance challenges which they receive in their initial career in the state police grooms them to develop a rich domain knowledge on public order, security, human resource management, regulatory and enforcement functions, handling natural disasters, elections and major events etc. will make them suitable candidates for competing to the central staffing scheme posts. Therefore, in addition to maintaining the present strength of

59 The education profile of the IPS Probationers who received training at the SVP National Police Academy in the recent past has been:

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earmarked posts in CPOs/CAPFs there is also a need to create a level playing field for enabling IPS officers to compete in the open competition posts, including the Central Staffing Scheme for reinforcing the spirit of All India Service character of the IPS as well as gainfully utilizing the domain expertise of the IPS officers in the Central Government Ministries/departments.

4.9 REMOVING INEQUITIES IN THE CENTRAL STAFFING SCHEME

4.9.1 The central staffing scheme has been existing for almost the past 50 years in the present form. Postings under the central staffing scheme are done as per the instructions contained in the DOPT office memorandum no. 36/77/94 – EO (SM I), dt. 5th January, 1996. As already submitted earlier, as per the stated policy, “The raison d'etre is the Centre's need for fresh inputs at senior levels in policy planning, formulation of policy and implementation of programmes from diverse sources, viz., the All-India Services and the participating organised Group 'A' Services”. If one goes by the letter, it provides equal opportunity for selection to 37 participating services and is mutually beneficial to service cadres and Government of India. However, in operation the system secures neither. The sixth pay commission aptly summed up the situation in its report as “While the system appears to be very equitous on paper, it is non-transparent and does not inspire confidence amongst the concerned officers about its fairness60”.

4.9.2 In addition to the opaqueness of the process, there is ample evidence to suggest that it is highly iniquitous and does not value domain expertise of various competing services. The following table explains the breakup of the officers at various points of time.

Level 1972# 1984# 1995# 2010@

AIS* Centr

CSS

AIS* Central

CSS

AIS* Central

CSS

IAS IP

IFS

IFtS

Central

60 Para 6.1.7 page No. 355 of the 6th cpc report

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al _Group A

_Group A

_Group A

S _Group A and

CSS

Secy. 30 15 0 36 25 0 71 21 0 69 2 5 1 13

AS 20 11 1 27 38 1 72 12 0 44 0 0 0 3

JS 86 60 23 135 50 1 285 44 4 198 7 3 3 60

# Based on the fifth CPC report (page 470); @Based on the Centre for Good Governance Report61.

4.9.3 Although no separate figures are available in respect of the IPS and IFoS for the years of 1972, 1984 and 1995 it will not be inaccurate to assume that they had accounted for less than 10% . The trends clearly indicate that there is a skewed distribution in favour of a single service, and that over a period of time, instead of becoming more egalitarian, the distribution is getting more skewed.

4.9.4 Much of the unfairness of the system could be attributed to a flawed Process of Empanelment. Annual exercise of drawing suitability lists of eligible officers from the participating services, known as ‘empanelment’ has been the biggest bottleneck for non-IAS officers to get appointments under the Central Staffing Scheme. The following table shows the service wise status of empanelment. Huge gap among services in empanelment is highly unusual and this causes serious doubts in the minds of the officers regarding the fairness of the system.

Junior most Batch empanelled for Secretary, Special Secretary & Secretary Equivalent

Level 1972# 1984# 1995# 2010@

AIS* Central

CSS

AIS* Central _Gro

CSS

AIS* Central _Gro

CSS

IAS IPS

IFS

IFtS

Central _Grou

61 survey on Status of the civil services in India, conducted by the Centre for Good Governance in 2010, commissioned by the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Administrative Reforms & Public Grievances

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_Group A

up A up A p A and

CSS

Secy. 30 15 0 36 25 0 71 21 0 69 2 5 1 13

AS 20 11 1 27 38 1 72 12 0 44 0 0 0 3

JS 86 60 23 135 50 1 285 44 4 198 7 3 3 60

4.9.5 Unfairness of the present system has been a matter of scrutiny of several commissions in the past. The 2nd Administrative Commission has remarked, “The Commission is of the view that the present procedure for empanelment of officers to the level of Joint/Additional Secretary and above needs to be replaced by a transparent, objective and a fair placement system62.” The Commission recommended that an independent ‘Authority’ should deal with matters of assignment of domains, preparing panels for posting of officers at the level of SAG and above, fixing tenures for various posts, deciding on posts which could be advertised for lateral entry63 etc. Similar recommendations were also made by the Surindernath Committee (2003) to review and make recommendations with regard to the present systems of performance appraisal, promotions and lateral movement in respect of the All India Services and other Group A services; and by the P.C.Hota Committee on Civil Service Reforms (2004). The sixth pay commission observed that, “ The Commission is fully aware that in theory these posts are already open to all AIS as well as Central Group A Services., However, in practice, the selection procedure for these posts has been made so non-transparent that the credibility of the entire selection procedure is now being questioned. The pressing need is to ensure a selection process that is open, transparent and gives equitable chance to all the eligible officers64”.

4.9.6 After comprehensively dealing with the issue, Sixth pay commission recommended a new system of appointment, vide paras 6.1.8 to 6.1.12 of the report as per which all the posts filled by deputation in

62 Chapter 9, para 9.3.8, page 20463 Chapter 9, para 9.7, pages 210-1164 Para 6.1.9 page 356 6 cpc

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the Senior Administrative Grade and Higher Administrative Grade should be filled through an open selection process conducted by an independent agency. The function of the independent agency should be done by the UPSC by involving few outside experts in the relevant field. The commission has also recommended for doing away with preparation of panels and observed that, “for officers belonging to AIS, appointment of any one officer of the service in any State cadre in the scale attached to the posts in SAG or HAG, as the case may be, would be a sufficient condition for consideration of all the officers of a particular year of allotment”.

4.9.7 Unfortunately, the DOPT did not act further on the recommendations, and continued with the earlier system. As a consequence, huge frustration has set in the cadres of IPS, IFoS and Group A central services. This pay commission may therefore address this important issue.

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ANNEXURE List of IPS martyrs who laid down their lives in the line of duty

Sl No

Name of the Martyr IPS Officers

Batch

Cadre

1 G.S. Arya 1950

UP

2 L.B. Sewa 1958

A&M

3 K Panchapagesan 1974

UT

4 A.S. Atwal 1964

Punjab

5 V.K. Mehta 1971

WB

6 A.K. Arora 1984

RAJ

7 A.S. Brar 1979

Punjab

8 K.R.S. Gill 1982

Punjab

9 Sital Dass 1976

Punjab

10 Vandan Malik 1987

M/T

11 Gobind Ram 1975

Punjab

12 Daulat Singh 1976

A&M

13 R.P. Verma 1974

Bihar

14 Ajit Singh 1968

Punjab

15 K.S. Vyas 1974

A.P.

16 G. Paradesi Naidu 1987

A&M

17 Ved Prakash 1989

Nagaland

18 Raman Prakash 1990

Gujarat

19 R.N.Hopingson 1992

M/T

20 Ravi Kant Singh 1987

A&M

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21 C. Umesh Chandra 1990

AP

22 Ajay Kumar Singh 1995

Bihar

23 KC Surendra Babu 1997

Bihar

24 A.P. Thang Thuam 1979

M/T

25 PK Lohia 1993

A&M

26 Jaswinder Singh 1990

Orissa

27 Mohammad Amin Bhat 1990

J&K

28 T. Harikrishna, 1983

Karnatak29 SK Deb 197

3A&M

30 Narendra Kumar 2009

MP

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5. PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF ALLOWANCES, ADVANCES AND INCENTIVES

5.1 Submissions being made by the association in respect of Allowances , Advances and Incentives for police personnel are based on following basic principles:

Reasonable expenses incurred in the course of police work should be promptly reimbursed.

Police duty often places officers in extenuating and difficult circumstances. In such cases, the Government should attempt to provide relief to the affected officer through appropriate monetary compensation.

Police officers should neither benefit nor suffer a loss from the payment of allowances.

Allowances should remain stagnant and net value should not erode with inflation

Advances should be realistic with respect to market trends Incentives should be paid to police officers to attract right talent

and motivate them to perform better5.2 EXAMPLES FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM: Before discussing

the issue it is submitted that two practices that are followed in the United Kingdom and not yet adopted in India in India deserve some attention.

5.2.1 Overtime Allowance: Unpredictable demands on a police officer’s time mean that he may have to work beyond his ordinary scheduled hours. A police officer is subject to restrictions on his private life, one of which is the obligation to obey an order to return to duty. In UK, the Sheehy review of police pay in 1993 resulted in the buy-out of overtime from the inspecting rank that is a rise in the basic pay of inspectors and chief inspectors in exchange for the abolition of their entitlement to overtime pay. But, the Winsor report (2011-12) concluded that it is important to ensure that police officers are being adequately paid for the role they undertake, which in some cases requires the regular working of overtime. The report also recommended for police staff double over time rates for working on public holidays while recommending plain over time rates for additional working on Sundays.5.2.2 Allowance for Un-Social Hours: The Winsor report also concludes that working unsocial hours (8:00pm to 6:00am) is an accepted part of life for a police officer, depending on the type of role to which he has been deployed. To offset this effect, based on the 1978 recommendation of Edmund-Davies a supplementary amount of nine per cent was initially incorporated into the basic pay of all officers up to

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and including chief inspectors. Winsor report (2011-12) recommended additional 10% in pay for each unsocial hour worked by officers while recommending payment to police staff at the rate of 100% uplift in pay (double time) for each unsocial hour worked.5.2.3 On-Call Allowance: The unpredictable nature of policing requires forces to ensure the availability of their workforces to enable them to respond to events and other operational requirements. This generally translates into a requirement for a certain percentage of officers, whilst off-duty, to remain on-call in case they are needed. Officers may be put on-call during their rest days, on public holidays or on annual leave, depending on the needs of the force. When an officer of any rank or role receives notification that he must return to duty, during rest period or leave, he is required to comply. In UK, Winsor report (2011-12) recommended for a nationally determined on-call allowance of £15 per day for all officers in Federated ranks who are placed on-call following 12 preceding instances in the year.

5.3 SUBMISSIONS IN RESPECT OF ALLOWANCES 5.3 A number of allowances are payable to Central Government

employees at present, which can be categorized into those which are common to all the services, and those which are specific to the police service. submissions in respect of the commonly granted allowances, in the context of police officers, are presented below:

5.3.1As per 6th CPC recommendations all allowances automatically increase by 25% for every 50% increase in DA. This increase is not commensurate with inflation to retain the value of allowances granted. Hence, it is proposed that all allowances should be neutralized with the DA, and enhanced whenever DA crosses 25%.

5.3.2Travelling Allowance – The food bills component of Daily Allowance should be uniform across all slabs (based on grade pay) as the nutritional requirements of individuals are similar irrespective of pay scales / grade pay.

5.3.3Special Duty Allowance (in all the districts declared as affected with Militancy/ LWE areas??-write up needed)

5.3.4Children Education Allowance – As the cost of education is considerably higher in metros and other cities in comparison to smaller towns, it is proposed that CEA should be granted based on classification of various cities/ towns (as is the case of HRA) where the employee is posted. CEA initially granted by 6th CPC was Rs. 12000 per annum, which has increased to Rs. 18000 per annum now, consequent to two increases in DA by 50% between 2006 and 2014. This increase is insufficiently keeping pace with increase in cost of education especially in metros and bigger cities. Hence it is proposed for CEA to be granted as a percentage of pay of the employee. It can initially be pegged at 10% ,7%, and 5% of the basic pay +grade pay of employee per month per child up to two

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children in class X,Y, and Z cities respectively , subject to a minimum of 20,000/- per year per child.

5.3.5Transport Allowance: Entire amount of transport allowance should be exempted from taxation and the allowance should be indexed with petrol prices and not with the D.A. rates, to render it realistic.

5.3.6Deputation Allowance: At present deputationists transferred from the same station are paid a reduced allowance of 5%. In some of the central police organisations like CBI/NIA, induction of officers on deputation with local police works to the advantage of the organisaiton and reduced Deputation Allowance works to the mutual disadvantage of the employee and the organisation. Therefore same rate of deputation allowance should be applied in all the cases.

5.3.7Deputation Allowance for the All India Service Officers: CDTA as a percentage of the minimum basic pay of the post has considerably diminished over a period of time for the IPS officers. Between 1948 to 1986 it came down from 50% to 16% of the basic pay,, in case of officers of the rank of SP and in almost similar proportion in case of the rest. As already explained earlier, in order to reinforce the All India Service character of the IAS,IPS and IFS and to ensure that the Central Deputation reserve is filled up, the government should create sufficient incentives to attract officers to serve in the central deputation. At present the comparative incentive structure in the states and the centre discourages officers to come on deputation. Keeping this in view, it is recommended that CDTA rates for All India Services may be enhanced to 20% subject to the ceiling that the aggregate of pay in the pay band and Deputation (Duty) Allowance/Central (Deputation on Tenure) Allowance does not exceed the starting point of the HAG scale.

5.4 ADVANCES: Some of the advances extended by government to its employees like HBA and Conveyance Advance are not realistic and in tune with present day requirements. Besides, many of these advances are usually not granted for lack of fund allocation leaving the employee with the only option of availing bank loans at higher interest rates. Public sector banks extend soft loans to their employees towards their requirements of housing, conveyance etc.. Hence, it is proposed that the government extend to police personnel interest subsidy of 2% in respect of advances and loans availed through public sector banks towards requirements of housing, car, and other basic amenities.

5.5 PERFORMANCE LINKED INCENTIVE SCHEME: (Yet to be added)

5.6 ALLOWANCES SPECIFIC TO POLICE

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5.6 The association would like to make the following submissions in respect of the allowances specific to police.

5.6.1Uniform Allowance – The following rates of Uniform Allowances are presently payable to the personnel and officers of CPMFs/CPOs /IPS.

Grant Rate

Initial grant Rs. 14000

Renewal grant Rs. 3000

(payable after every three years)

As per the IPS (uniform) rules 1954 mention 39 different uniform related items, particularly summer uniform items, have a life cycle of less than a year because of the weather conditions. In view of the high rate of inflation, initial grant of Rs. 14000/- is highly inadequate and the officers are compelled to meet the expenses from their pocket. The grant therefore needs to be enhanced. As a minimum, it needs to be doubled. The renewal grant of Rs. 3000/- after every 3 years is also highly inadequate. Cost of getting a summer uniform stitched in the market is approx. Rs. 1800/- and that of a winter uniform is Rs. 3000/-. At the rate of four summer uniforms and two winter uniforms every 3 years, the renewal cost comes to Rs. 13200/-. The uniform allowance, therefore, may be revised as under: -

Grant Rate

Initial grant Rs. 28000

Renewal grant Rs. 13200

(payable after every three years)5.6.2Kit Maintenances Allowance (KMA) – Police personnel are

presently paid KMA at the following rates: - Constable Head

ConstableAssistant

Sub Inspector

Sub Inspector

Inspector Dy. SP IPS Officer

Rs. 90 Rs. 90 Rs. 90 Rs. 450 Rs. 450 Rs. 450 Rs. 450

As evident, the amount of KMA is highly inadequate. The DA as on 1.1.2014 stands at 100%, meaning thereby that the cost of living has doubled since 1.1.2006. The 7th CPC recommendations are likely to be

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implemented w.e.f. 1.1.2016, which is still two years away. The inflation over the next 2 years is going to further increase the cost of living. Therefore, the KMA needs to be enhanced as below:Constable Head

ConstableAssistant

Sub Inspector

Sub Inspector

Inspector Dy. SP IPS Officer

Rs. 200 Rs. 200 Rs. 200 Rs. 1000 Rs. 1000 Rs. 1000 Rs. 1000

5.6.3 Training Allowance – Deputationist trainers working as faculty members in National/Central Training Academies and Institutes are paid training allowance @ 30 % of the basic pay. On the other hand, those working in Police Training Academies and Police Training Colleges are paid training allowance only at the rate of 15% of the basic pay. There is a strong need to attract and retain the best talent in Police Academies/Colleges. Therefore their training allowance should also be increased to 30% of the basic pay. Similarly, the Sumptuary Allowance in Police Training Academies/Colleges should also be paid on the same scale as is being done in National/Central Training Academies.5.6.4Mobile Phone Allowance – Police officials use their personal mobile phone for communication while on official duty. They, therefore, need to be duly compensated for the cost incurred by them on this account. Mobile Phone Allowance may therefore be introduced @ 250/- for all Head Constables/Constables, Rs. 500/- for SIs/ASIs and Rs. 1000/- for Inspectors.5.6.5Conveyance Allowance – Transport Allowance is presently being paid to all Central Government employees as per their entitlement to take care of transport expenses to and from their place of work. However police officials, particularly those posted on operational duties like in police stations, are required to travel a lot in their area of responsibility for discharging their official duties. Since there is an acute shortage of official vehicles, they are forced to use personal vehicle for official purposes. For example, a typical police station has only one vehicle which is used by the officer-in-charge of the police station. All other investigating officers and police personnel have no choice but to use their personal vehicles for government work or ask the complainant for help. It is, therefore, proposed to introduce Conveyance Allowance for police personnel posted in operational duties. The amount of conveyance allowance may be equal to the prevailing cost of 20 litres petrol rounded to the nearest Rs. 10. 5.6.6Allowance to the medal holders: At present, monetary allowance is limited to the holders of the President Police Medal for Gallantry and Police Medal for Gallantry at the rate of Rs 3,000 and Rs 2,000

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respectively. No monetary allowance is provided to the recipients of the President’s Police Medal for Distinguished Service and the Police Medal for Meritorious Service, which are awarded at the national level to a select few on the basis of their outstanding track record over a period of decades. Hence, it is proposed that recipients of President’s Police Medal for Distinguished Service and Police Medal for Meritorious Service be granted at the rate of Rs 2,000/- and Rs 1,500/ respectively per month and the rates need to be inflation adjusted like other allowances.5.6.7Special Compensatory Earned Leave Surrender facility to subordinate police officers: Presently, Cash Compensatory Allowance equal to 30 days pay and allowances in a calendar year is admissible to the executive police officials from the rank of constable to Inspector in lieu of working late hours and on holidays. As explained in chapter III, 30 days pay is highly inadequate to compensate for the extra hours of work and working under stress and is insufficient to compensate for the alienation from families and duties performed on gazetted holidays/ festival days. As explained earlier, the United Kingdom has introduced overtime allowance, unsocial hours allowance and on-call allowance for its police. Firstly, the 30 days cap should be increased to at least 45 days and this should apply to all ranks of police working in field duties. Also, police officers should be eligible to earn two-days of additional EL per each day of duty performed on gazetted holidays/ festivals, and allow encashment on yearly basis subject to a maximum of 30 days per financial year. Police officers of all ranks should also be allowed to accumulate EL up to 450 days in their career. 5.6.8 Insurance cover to Police personnel: As discussed in Chapter-III, Police personnel and their families are exposed to a great degree of occupational risk in comparison to any other class of government servants except defence forces. In case of death in action or permanent total disability, the police officer and his family would be left to fend for themselves till a dependant is enrolled in government service as per the existing policy of central/ state government. This issue would be of greater concern to post-2004 batches of policemen and officers covered under the New Pension Scheme; without any provision for family pension. It is worth mentioning that even if an individual police officer wishes to avail life/ risk cover, insurers normally do not cover occupational risk of police personnel in term policies and often charge additional premium towards occupational risk cover in other life insurance policies. Hence, it is proposed that police personnel be provided by the government with term insurance cover for their life and against permanent total disability through public sector insurers. (Some more material to be added after compiling information from the states)

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5.6.9Health Insurance shemes: (Some material can be added from the good practices in the states)5.7 COMPARISON BETWEEN DEFENCE FORCES AND CAPF: HOW CAPF IS WORKING IN EQUALLY CHALLENGING CONDITIONS BUT DO NOT RECEIVE COMMENSURATE BENEFITS Though CAPF personnel perform almost the same duties and suffer the same or even more severe hardships as those of defence forces, they receive significantly less perks and emoluments. This fact is substantiated by comparative data on number of combat/ work related fatalities and injuries per capita in CAPF and defence forces, percentage of force deployed in IS duties/ border areas etc. Hence the following proposals are made for enhancement of emoluments, perks and social security of CAPF personnel.5.7.1Fixed benefit pension scheme for post-2004 appointees and 70% pension: Keeping in view of the fact that CAPFs are Armed Forces of the Union and nature of working condition/ risk to life, fixed benefit pension scheme (old pension scheme) should be restored for post-2004 appointees in CAPFs and the pension amount should be enhance from 50% of last pay drawn to 70%.5.7.2One rank, one pension: As considered for the defence personnel for grant of one rank one pension, it should also be extended to the CAPF personnel to boost their morale and to attract new generation to join the CAPF.5.7.3Grant of MACP: The modified Assured Career Progression to CAPF personnel is being considered after completion of 10 years, 20 years and 30 years of continuous service. The same should be 8 years at par with the defence personnel being Armed Forces of the Union. Further, it should be granted 4 times in service instead of 3 MACP i.e. after completion of 8 years, 16 years, 24 years and 32 years of continuous service.5.7.4 Special pay for CAPF: At present defence personnel are getting Military Special Pay. It should be extended to the CAPF personnel being Armed Forces of the Union and while calculating the pension of CAPF personnel this amount must be taken into consideration as is being done in the cases of military personnel for calculating pension.5.7.5 Ration Allowance:Ration allowance should be extended to all officers/ men of CAPFs at par with the defence personnel.5.7.6 Medical facility at defence hospital:CAPF personnel and their families may be allowed to avail the medical facility/ treatment at any defence hospital all over India.

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5.7.7Creation of school/ medical colleges:Schools, medical colleges and engineering colleges should be set up for the benefit of CAPF personnel at par with defence personnel like army school, AFMC etc.5.7.8Operation allowance: Operation allowance like field area or peace area allowable may be given at par with the defence personnel.5.7.9 High altitude allowance: The CAPF personnel posted at high altitude may be given high altitude allowance par with defence personnel.5.7.10 Hard area allowance and island special duty allowance: Such allowance should be given to all CAPF posted at these regions at par with the defence personnel.5.7.11 Special compensatory (Remote locality allowance): Such allowance should be given to all CAPF at par with the defence personnel.5.7.12 Grant of 100% HRA to CAPF personnel: It is the preamble that whoever joins central government service in connection with the affairs of the Union, shall be entitled to rent-free accommodation or HRA in lieu thereof. The personnel of CAPF are also Central government employees performing their duty mostly in tough areas, dedicated towards safe-guarding the citizens and property of the country, posted at far-flung areas away from their native place. HRA forms a component of the total salary as part of condition of service. It is in nature of a compensatory allowance in lieu of accommodation. Thus, the objective of HRA is to compensate an employee for the amenities which are not available as provided to other employees. In case where a person is entitled to married accommodation, but is provided with unmarried accommodation (i.e. barracks), then he may also be entitled for compensation in lieu of married accommodation, irrespective and in addition to the allotment of barrack accommodation available for unmarried category if he wants to occupy the said barrack accommodation. The grant of HRA should not be dependent on a chance factor. The concept of joint family, with eventual changes in the political, social and economic spheres has been gradually wiped out in the present era, replacing it with the notion of nuclear family in this modern industrial society. As such, the employees of CAPF, notwithstanding the fact of eligibility of 45% marked accommodation, are forced to keep their families in the vicinity of their duty place or at a different location by paying a huge amount of house rent. Thus, they are being deprived of the basic amenity and the clause of pay, discriminating and hitting article 14 of the constitution of India having no relation with other government employees.5.7.13 Social Security Deposit (SSD) scheme for widows and minor children of the deceased members: Social Security Deposit (SSD) scheme should be introduced with the aim to safeguard the interest

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of the widows and minor children and ensure security of their deposits under the scheme Armed Police General Insurance on the line of Defence establishment. Under the scheme APGI, insurance benefits of widows or minor children of deceased personnel are invested by the CAPF in nationalized banks in cumulative or non-cumulative account to the extent of amount and period stipulated by the member in his nomination.5.7.14 Post-retirement Extended Insurance Scheme: A compulsory Group Extended Insurance (EI) scheme should be introduced with the aim of providing insurance cover for the death without any maturity benefits for eligible members after retirement/ release up to a specified period. It will be a term insurance scheme under which in case of death of a

Member within the period of cover, the nominee will be paid the amount of insurance cover and it has no survival benefits. For this scheme, one-time non-refundable single premium will be deducted from the maturity amount at the time of retirement/ discharge/ release from the eligible members. Premium will be reviewed periodically based on experience of mortality and interest rates and revised when considered necessary for future retirees.

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6.PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PENSION

6.1 Retirement benefits, particularly in Government, are essentially deferred wages for work done today, rightfully due to an employee. Unfortunately in public perception, they have very often been characterised as doles, which encourages Governments to adopt a step-motherly treatment to its pensioners. The CIPSA believes that the pensioner must be given his rightful due, and that pensions must be inflation adjusted and linked to a basket of basic goods and services necessary to maintain a certain basic quality of life in the non- productive years. In today’s time, there are grave issues across the spectrum in respect of pensions, both as regards the existing pensioner as well as the existing and prospective employee. The Government must desist from adopting short run solutions of addressing issues of fiscal constraint through reduced emoluments and pension, without takings hard steps to improve productivity. In other words, CIPSA requests that the Pay Commission require that the government must remain a model employer.

6.2 The terms of reference vests the Seventh Pay Commission with the mandate to examine issues relating to pension as below:

“To examine the principles which should govern the structure of pension and other retirement benefits, including revision of pension in the case of employees who have retired prior to the date of effect of these recommendations, keeping in view that retirement benefits of all Central Government employees appointed on and after 01.01.2004 are covered by the New Pension Scheme (NPS)”.

The recommendations of CIPSA in so far as the above is concerned are as below:

6.3 PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW PENSION SCHEME

6.3.1 The NPS started by the Government of India for employees joining government service after 1/1/2004 is an ill-conceived scheme, whose

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deficiencies have been compounded by its poor implementation. As the affected parties are junior government employees, who further form a minority, little attention has been paid to the plight of these affected officers. CIPSA strongly urges the 7th CPC to conduct an in depth evaluation of the NPS as grave injustice is being done to these budding officers, especially in cases where the officer dies in harness or resigns for some reason.

6.3.2 The deficiencies in the NPS are enumerated belowi. Retirement benefits are essentially deferred wages for work done

today, rightfully due to an employee. By paying two employees doing the same job (A pre 2004 and a post 2004 employee), a different net present value of wages (current salary plus pension), the Government is violating the fundamental right to equality. SC judgment of D.C. Nahar & Others Vs. UOI (1982) has upheld that under article 14 of the constitution, Pensioners forms one class.

ii. Further, all categories of Central Civil pensioners are not included in NPS viz. President, Vice-President, MPs, Armed forces which is against the fundamental right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Infact, the Government has taken a step in the opposite direction in case of the Armed forces by committing to a One Rank One Pension Scheme, which has significantly increased its pension liability for the Defence personnel in one stroke.

iii. The current scheme does not take care of employees belonging to backward classes. Because as per the existing rules, candidates from SC/ST category can enter the services as late as 35 years in central Government and 45 years in some of the state Governments. This late entry has adverse impact on the rate on return. For central Government employees their contribution will accrue for only 25 years (if they enter at the age of 35 and for only 15-20 years if they enter in State Government). This does not ensure that they will be get basic minimum pension suitable to sustain themselves or family after retirement. Thus NPS does not ensure social security to this strata, after retirement.

iv. NPS was implemented in a hurry through a presidential ordinance. NPS should have been implemented only after framing the rules and getting inputs from the stakeholders. Scheme should be implemented after it gets proper legislative

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sanction & with prospective effect only i.e. it should be made applicable to the batches coming after this Act has come into force. As per the OM of Government of India, Rules under any legislation need to be framed within 2 years of the enactment of the Act or personal responsibility is to be fixed. In the instant case, Act itself was passed after about ten years of ordinance.

v. NPS modelled defined contribution pension scheme has been in force in Latin American & African countries, where it has failed miserably.

vi. In discussion paper of PFRDA, it has been stated that there has been increase of total pension liability of the government over the past decades. But having a close look at the figures, we can see that total liability of the government on account of pension of Central government employees has increased from 0.6% of GDP in 1993-94 to 1.66% of GDP in 2002-03. This increase was with respect to the total pension liability of Government and not only for Central Civil employees. However report has not given any bifurcation of the increase due to armed forces and that on account of central civil employees, who are the only target group under NPS. Figures at point no. 2.5 of the paper give details of number of employees under various categories for the year 2002-03. Analysis of this data brings out that ratio of pensioners to the total employees is 0.55% for civilian & 1.68% for defence. Thus, the amount of financial burden of pension is much higher for defence personnel as compared to the civilian employees and that too without adding the additional burden due to One Rank One Pension. The data unequivocally brings out that the civilian government employees have been discriminated against and a grave injustice done to them.

vii. State Governments have adopted NPS, but at different points of time , which has already caused inequality/disparity w.r.t. the amount credited for investment to NSDL. This will have long term impact in return, which NPS subscribers will get after investment of mandatory contribution. Further, for majority of NPS subscribers, deductions have been started by the State governments after 2010. No directions have been provided on contribution and rates to be applied on the contribution from 1.1.2004 till the NPS is notified by the State governments.

viii. Return promised by PFRDA was 14-29% p.a. (as per lecture details of chairman of PFRDA), while in the past 4 years, return given by PFRDA averaged at 9% p.a. for central government

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employees & approx. 6-7% for state government employees. At this rate of return, it is unlikely that NPS subscribers will get intended returns, which will reduce the amount of pension annuity that an individual will receive on retirement on purchase from the PFM.

ix. No disclosure has yet been made by PFRDA for the amount of pension that NPS subscriber will get, category/grade pay wise. If they come out with any data in future, it should convey factors like Net Present Value of future pension, what is the rate of inflation they have taken into consideration etc. It is doubtful if PFRDA/Market forces can assure minimum 50% pension & dearness relief thereon for normal pension & 30% family pension as applicable to all pensioners at present.

x. Though selection of fund managers has been proposed to be based on their track record and ability to offer guaranteed returns, however, Indian stock markets have seen a history of scams and failure of the regulatory agencies to monitor financial sector agencies. Any major market shock at the time of retirement will expose the subscriber retiring at that time to market risk which will cause disparity in the pension of subscribers.

xi. Performance snapshot of fund managers given on page 24 of SFC report (2010-11) give glaring picture of diminishing returns every year as against the promises made by PFRDA, which is worrying. The same has been highlighted by SFC also.

xii. As per details in Standing Finance Committee Report shortfall in the return needs to be made up by the government from the yearly budget. Modalities of the same have not been spelt out and is also not being done at present. In addition, in case of major market crash in any year, or recession which may last for more than a year, the total government liability in that particular year/years can be exceptionally high.

xiii. The Act provides for a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh per day by the Insurance Company with the maximum penalty of Rs. 1 crore for violation of the provisions of the Act. This amount is insignificant when compared to the quantum of monthly contribution which runs into thousands of crores.

xiv. Under NPS, option has been given to subscribers to invest in tier-II contribution. But this contribution is taxable and average returns on this investment has been less than 7 %. It is requested that, instead of this possibility may be explored for continuation

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of GPF facility to NPS subscribers. This will ensure that at certain exigencies, NPS subscribers will have at least one secured source of finance. Further no withdrawal option should be there for Tier I. This will ensure at least basic minimum pension to the pensioner on retirement as withdrawal from Tier I will reduce the total contribution based on which NPS subscribers are liable to get Annuity.

xv. 6th CPC recommendations of additional pension are not applicable to NPS subscribers. Their pension is based on annuity purchased for Annuity Service Providers which will not take into consideration effects of inflation or additional benefits related to age.

xvi. Service gratuity given under Rule 49 of CCS Pension Rules 1972 is not given under NPS.

xvii. Death cum retirement gratuity under rule 50 of CCS Pension Rules not given under NPS, as their returns is totally dependent on market forces.

xviii. DA relief on pension for which government has taken full responsibility is not given to NPS subscribers.

xix. As per the existing CCS pension Rules, 1972, after completion of 10 years of service, minimum guaranteed pension is 50% of last pay drawn or average of 10 months, whichever is more beneficial. This kind of minimum guarantee can not be there, if the money is invested in the capital market.

xx. No advances admissible under NPS for educational/personal /house building purposes as available under GPF for the old pensioners (U/Rule 15 of GPF rules).

xxi. Investment return on NPS contribution has been between 8-9% for central government employees and it is 6-8% for state government employees.

xxii. The Government has not conducted any actuarial estimation of the proportion of its contribution required to obtain a certain pension payout level, but has arbitrarily fixed the Government’s contribution as a matching contribution of 10%, which is extremely low. The practice the world over with well run defined contribution pension schemes is that the government assures a level of pension based on the salary earned over an employees service and then estimates the yearly contribution required to reach this pension level. Typically the employee’s contribution is fixed at 10% of the salary and the balance (in the range of 25%)

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is contributed by the Government. The Government also commits to make good any unfunded liability as and when it arises.

xxiii. The Government’s problems with respect to the NPS have occurred as it has tried to shirk its responsibility and has attempted to give an impression of fiscal consolidation through unrealistic means. The current NPS is presently significantly unfunded and poorly managed. The outcome would be that either the future governments would have to make a significant addition of cash to make good the unfunded liability or the government would shirk its responsibility to the pensioners under the NPS.

xxiv. CIPSA urges the 7th CPC to study some of the well run international defined contribution schemes so as to adopt their best practices. In this respect the New Police Pension Scheme of the UK Government deserves mention. Some of the salient features of this scheme which was introduced in 2006 are as below.

xxv. The New Police Pension Scheme 2006 (NPPS) allows officers to earn one 70th of final salary for each year of service for 35 years. This provides a target pension of half final salary. Officers also earn four 70ths of final salary for each year of service for 35 years, to provide a target lump sum of twice final salary. Officers in the NPPS currently pay contributions of 9.5% of their pensionable pay; Police Authorities pay the employer contribution of 24.2%.

xxvi. The scheme has been open to new entrants since 6 April 2006. The normal minimum pension age under NPPS is 55. It also provides a more modern range of benefits, including survivor pensions for nominated unmarried partners.

xxvii. In addition to ordinary pensions paid on normal retirement, the scheme provides for compulsory retirement on the grounds of ill-health, age or in the interests of the effectiveness and efficiency of the police force. In the case of ill-health retirement, an ill-health pension will be paid, as an officer is required to retire when permanently disabled for police duty. In case of compulsory retirement on other grounds, the appropriate ordinary pension is payable.

xxviii. There is also a system of police injury benefits, which is separate from the pension schemes and funded from forces’ operating accounts. This provides additional payments to former officers who have left the police and are permanently disabled as a result

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of receiving an injury in the execution of duty. In the event of an officer’s death as the result of such an injury, the scheme provides for certain payments to be made to the deceased officer’s surviving family.

6.4 ONE RANK ONE PENSION

6.4.1 In addition, CIPSA strongly feels that as IPS is a uniformed service, it must also be brought under the One Rank One Pension scheme recently offered to the Defence services. As earlier mentioned, police in developed countries like the UK, Canada and Australia is typically receive remuneration which is 10-15% higher than other public servants including the armed forces. The practice in India on the contrary is the opposite, which must be rectified, particularly as the police in India perform not only the basic policing duties but also roles typically performed by the the armed forces due to high internal security threats that the country faces.

6.5 IRRATIONAL PENSION FIXATION FORMULA:6.5.1 Clause 4.2 of the Office Memorandum No. F.No. 38/37/08-P&PW(A)

dated 1.9.08 of the Department of Pension & Pensioners’ Welfare, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions, Govt of India, Lok Nayak Bhawan, New Delhi-110003 reads as under65:-“4.2 The fixation of pension will be subject to the provision that the revised pension, in no case, shall be lower than 50% of the minimum of the pay in the pay band plus the grade pay corresponding to the pre-revised pay scale from which the pensioner had retired. In the case of HAG+ and above scales, this will be 50% of the minimum of the revised pay scale”.

6.5.2 The above formula, as analysed below, is arbitrary and devoid of logic and rationale as it has led to ridiculous consequences in that the seniors draw less pension than juniors of not only the same rank but also of the lower rank:-

6.5.3 As per the formula, in case of HAG+ scale (applicable to DG rank in the IPS), basic pension cannot be more than 50% of the minimum of

65http://circulars.nic.in/WriteReadData/CircularPortal/D3/D03ppw/ pensiontable_sixthpc.pdf (Accessed on...)

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the revised pay scale (Rs.75,500-80,000), i.e. Rs.37,750 though no such rider has been placed on other ranks and pay scales. This renders the formula arbitrary and irrational because in the pre-revised scale (Rs.24,050-650-26,000), most of the DG rank officers had retired at the maximum of the scale, i.e. Rs.26,000. Their pension was fixed at 50% of their last pay, i.e. at Rs.13,000. Fixing their pension in the revised scale at the minimum, instead of the maximum, of the scale deprives them of the benefit of the increments they had earned and the number of years they had remained in DG rank while in service. A reasonable and logical fixation of pension should have been at the corresponding (maximum) level of the revised pay, i.e. 50% of Rs.80,000 = Rs.40,000 instead of Rs.37,750. Fixation of pension at the minimum of the revised scale makes pre-2006 retiree DGs inferior to the post-2006 retiree DGs most of whom retire at the maximum of the scale and draw Rs.40,000 as pension. Not only this, it makes pre-2006 retiree DGs inferior even to the post-2006 retiree ADGs whose HAG pay scale is Rs.67,000-79,000. Their maximum pay takes them to Rs.79,000, thus fixing their pension at Rs.39,500 against Rs.37,750 of pre-2006 retiree DGs. In effect, a pre-2006 retiree gets demoted to the level of a beginner in that rank. This reduction of Rs.2250 in basic pension becomes Rs.4275 p.m. on adding the current DA/DR of 90% (which is revised every 6 months).The sad truth is that this discrepancy is recurring, cumulative and life-long. The loss increases with every increase in Dearness Relief. This cascading financial loss is not confined to the present but will continue to operate in the future as well. It further has the evil effect of reducing the quantum of family pension also after the death of the Pensioner.

6.5.4 Specific instances of Seniors Drawing Less Pension than Juniors:

A junior officer who retired as DG on 1.1.2006 gets more pension than a senior officer who retired only a day earlier on 31.12.2005. Mr. P.V.Sumant (IPS-1967-Assam) and Mr. P.K.Senapati (IPS-1967-Orissa) are a few examples of officers who retired on 31.12.05 at the maximum of their scales but are now drawing pension at the minimum of the revised scale i.e. Rs.37,750. Almost all the DGs, who retired on or after 1.1.2006, are getting basic pension of Rs.40,000 per month. There is absolutely no change in duties, powers and functions of the Pre-2006 and post-2006 DGs which could justify the reduction in pension. Both the above officers and

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several others had stagnated at the maximum of the DG’s scale for several years when they were in service. But all these factors get ignored in fixing the pension in the revised scale which is prima facie unjust and needs to be corrected.

The posts of ADGs are the feeder posts for promotion to the rank of DG. Still, they have been granted more pension than their bosses. Some examples are given below:-

i. Mr. Hemraj Pannalalji Gahlot, Gujarat cadre, IPS-1974 batch. Retired as ADG on 31.12.07. Pension fixed at Rs.39,500;

ii. Mr. Sudhir Kumar Sinha, Gujarat cadre, IPS-1976 batch. Retired as ADG on 31.10.11. Pension fixed at Rs.39,500;

iii. Mr. K.Nityanandam, Gujarat cadre, IPS-1977 batch. Retired as ADG on 30.11.11. Pension fixed at Rs.39,500;

iv. Shri S.P.S.Yadav, Maharashtra cadre, retired on 31.1.11 as ADG. Pension fixed at Rs. 39,500.

This discrimination continues despite crystal clear Orders of the Supreme Court of India to the contrary in two cases: (i) D.S. Nakara & Others Vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 (at page 323), AIR 1983 SC 130 and (ii) Union of India Vs. Major General (Rtd) SPS Vains, (2008) 9 SCC 125. Light has been thrown on these rulings in subsequent paras.

6.5.5 Legal Analysis of the Irrational Formula 6.5.5.1 Last Pay and Not Last Pay Scale Relevant for Pension Fixation:

As per Rule 18 of the All India Services (DCRB) Rules, 1958, the pension of an officer is fixed on his retirement on the basis of the average of the pay drawn during the last 10 months or the last pay drawn, whichever is more beneficial to the retiree. The pension is thus fixed only on the basis of the last pay drawn and not on the basis of the last pay scale drawn. “Pay Scale” is relevant only for the serving officers, but is irrelevant for pensioners for whom the last “Pay” drawn is the only relevant issue and criterion to determine their pension. Obviously, the pay scale from which this pay is drawn has no relevance for fixation of pension. Pension once sanctioned can not be revised/reduced subsequently to the disadvantage of the

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pensioner except as a punishment or to correct a clerical error in calculation of the original pension.

6.5.5.2 Illegal Classification of Pensioners: Pensioners have been illegally divided into two classes: pre-2006 retirees and post-2006 retirees. This is contrary to the crystal clear Orders of the Supreme Court of India in two cases: (i) D.S. Nakara & Others Vs. Union of India and (ii) Union of India Vs. Major General (Rtd) SPS Vains. These cases will be discussed in subsequent paras. To elaborate the above point, if an officer X retired from the pre-revised running HAG+ scale of Rs.24050-650-26000 and his last pay drawn was Rs.26000, then, as per rule, his pension was fixed at Rs.13000 p.m. Likewise, if another officer Y retired from the pre-revised Apex Pay Scale of Rs.26000 (Fixed), then also his pension was fixed at an identical figure of Rs.13000 p.m. This created perfect equality between both types of pensioners, X and Y irrespective of their retiring pay scales which become irrelevant and only the last pay drawn matters for fixation of initial pension. This clearly implies that retired officers receiving the same basic pension belong to the same class and the principle of equality applies to them. Their pension revision to Rs.37,750 p.m. in the case of X and to Rs.40,000 p.m. in the case of Y after the 6th Pay Commission amounts to creation of two different classes of pensioners who were identical and belonged to the same class at the time of retirement.

6.5.5.3 Violation of Article 14 (Fundamental Right to Equality): The instance of X and Y quoted above contemptuously goes against the above cited Supreme Court orders, leading to an unwarranted disadvantage to X, in clear and patent violation of the principle of natural justice and the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 (equality before law). A fundamental principle of law settled in several cases is that Article 14 of the Constitution forbids class legislation. Equals have been made unequals and vice versa. Since Pension rules determine pension on the basis of last pay drawn (and not last pay scale drawn), pension so determined once cannot be later revised arbitrarily in a discriminatory way so as to create two different classes of pensioners who were earlier drawing identical

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pensions. Such discrimination is clearly a violation of the fundamental right to equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

6.5.5.4 Prejudicially Affecting Retrospective Effect Not Permissible: The pay revision notification certifies that its implementation would not adversely affect any pensioner but it clearly does. Section 3(1A) of the All India Services Act, 1951 deals with the rule making power of the Government and requires that “.... no retrospective effect shall be given to any rule so as to prejudicially affect the interests of any person to whom such rule may be applicable.” The All India Services (DCRB) Rules, 1958 have been framed under the aforesaid rule-making power under the All India Services Act. Therefore, it is not permissible to prejudicially affect the interests of the old pensioners by a subsequent provision that came into effect after their retirement.

6.5.5.5 Violation of Supreme Court Rulings : Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has laid down certain principles which are a settled law:-

6.5.5.5.1D.S. Nakara etc. Vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 (page 323), AIR 1983 SC 130:

The highlights of this case are given below:-i. Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the fixation of a

cut off date, as a result of which equals were treated as unequals, was wholly arbitrary. One of the questions posed in the aforesaid decision was whether a class of pensioners could be divided for the purpose of entitlement and payment of pension into those who retired by a certain date and those who retired thereafter. The question was answered by the Constitution Bench that such division, being both arbitrary and unprincipled, the classification did not stand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

ii. The question regarding creation of different classes within the same cadre on the basis of the Doctrine of Intelligible differentia having nexus with the object to be achieved was taken up in this case by a Constitution Bench. It was observed that the date of retirement of an employee cannot form a valid criterion for classification, for if

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that is the criterion, those who retired by the end of the month will form a class by themselves. It was held that Article 14 of the Constitution had been wholly violated, in as much as, the pension rules being statutory in character, the amended rules, specifying a cut off date resulted in differential and discriminatory treatment of equals in the matter of calculation of pension. It was further observed that it would have a traumatic effect on those who retired just before that date. The division which classified pensioners into two classes was held to be artificial and arbitrary and not based on any rational principle and whatever principle, if there was any, had not only no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by amending the Pension Rules, but was counter productive and ran counter to the very object of the pension scheme. It was ultimately held that the classification did not satisfy the test of Article 14 of the Constitution.

iii. Liberalisation in computation of pension effective from specified date divides pensioners so as to confer benefit on some while denying it to others. Such classification was held arbitrary, devoid of rational nexus to object of liberalisation and violative of Article 14.

iv. All pensioners entitled to receive pension under the relevant rules form a class irrespective of the dates of their retirement and there cannot be a mini-classification within this class. The differential treatment accorded to those who had retired prior to the specified date is violative of Article 14 as the choice of specified date is wholly arbitrary and the classification based on the fortuitous circumstance of retirement before or subsequent to the specified date is invalid.

HELD: Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It is attracted where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. The principle underlying the guarantee is that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike, both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation, their position is substantially the same. Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational

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nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. In other words, there ought to be causal connection between the basis of classification and the object of the statute.It is indisputable that pensioners for payment of pension form a class. When the State considered it necessary to liberalise the pension scheme in order to augment social security in old age to government servants, it could not grant the benefits of liberalisation only to those who retired subsequent to the specified date and deny the same to those who had retired prior to that date. The division which classified the pensioners into two classes on the basis of the specified date was devoid of any rational principle and was both arbitrary and unprincipled, being unrelated to the object sought to be achieved by grant of liberalised pension and the guarantee of equal treatment contained in Article 14 was violated in as much as the pension rules, which were statutory in character, meted out differential and discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of computation of pension from the dates specified in the impugned memoranda.

6.5.5.5.2Union of India Vs. Major General (Rtd) SPS Vains, (2008) 9 SCC 125: In this case, the issue was whether there could be a disparity in payment of pension between officers of the same rank who had retired prior to the introduction of the revised pay scales and those who retired thereafter. The dispute arose due to disparity in determination of pension of pre-1.1.96 and post-1.1.96 retirees who retired from Defence services as Major General or equivalent. The Pension of the pre-1.1.96 retiree Major Generals was fixed lower than the post-1.1.96 retiree Major Generals. The Court held that the date of retirement was immaterial. The highlights of this case are as under:- The judgement was rendered on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution and in consonance with the principle of administrative fair play. Differentiation between officers holding the same rank on the date of retirement is wholly erroneous and violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution.

“The said decision of the Central Govt does not address the problem of a disparity having created within the same class so that two officers both retiring as Major Generals, one prior to 1.1.96 and the other after 1.1.96, would get two different amounts of pension. While the officers who retired prior to 1.1.96 would now get the same pension as payable to a Brigadier on

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account of the stepping up of pension in keeping with the Fundamental Rules, the other set of Major Generals who retired after 1.1.96 will get a higher amount of pension since they would be entitled to the benefit of the revision of pay scales after 1.1.96. In our view, it would be arbitrary to allow such a situation to continue since the same also offends the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution”. It has to be kept in mind that the rank of Brigadier is a feeder post for the promotional rank of Major General having higher and more onerous responsibilities.

“The object sought to be achieved was not to create a class within a class, but to ensure that the benefits of pension were made available to all persons of the same class equally. To hold otherwise would cause violence to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. It could not also have been the intention of the authorities to equate the pension payable to officers of two different ranks by resorting to the step up principle envisaged in the Fundamental Rules in a manner where the other officers belonging to the same cadre would be receiving a higher pension”.

It was directed that the pay of all pensioners in the rank of Major General and its equivalent rank in the two other Wings of the Defence Services be notionally fixed at the rate given to similar officers of the same rank after the revision of pay scales with effect from 1.1.1996, and, thereafter, to compute their pensionary benefits on such basis with prospective effect from the date of filing of the writ petition and to pay them the difference within three months from date with interest at 10% per annum.

The principle laid down by the Supreme Court is squarely applicable to all the services. By this judgement, a principle has clearly been laid down that a senior shall not draw less pension than a junior. The Government’s view in GOI, DOP&PW F.No. 38/37/08-P&PW(A) dated 18/11/2009, stating that “the judgment dated 9-9-08 in CA No. 5566 of 2008 SLP (Civil) No. 12357/2006, UOI vs Maj. Genl. SPS Vains, would not apply in the case of civil pensioners” is misconceived and amounts to Contempt of the Apex Court. The Supreme Court has nowhere limited the

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principles propounded in this Order to the defence personnel and has not said anywhere that these will not apply to the civilians.

6.5.6 Suggested Pension Fixation Formula Briefly stated,i. The pension fixation formula should give due weightage to the

length of service in the last rank and to the number of increments one had earned in that rank. There is absolutely no justification in forfeiting the increments which should be kept intact in the replacement scale.

ii. The equivalent of the last pay drawn must not be diluted in the replacement scale.

iii. As per the settled law, the formula should clearly state that seniors (intra-service seniors as well as rank seniors) will not draw less pension than juniors.

iv. Keeping the settled law in view, the pension fixation formula may be modified as under:-a) “The fixation of pension will be subject to the provision that

the revised pension, in no case, shall be lower than 50% of the equivalent of the last pay drawn in the pay band plus the grade pay corresponding to the pre-revised pay scale from which the pensioner had retired, subject to the following conditions:-

b) The same number of increments which the pensioner had earned while in service in the last rank and equivalent of the last pay drawn before retirement will be taken into account for fixation of pension in the revised pay scale;

c) The revised pension will, in no case, be lower than the pension of the lower rank retirees;

d) Further, the revised pension will, in no case, be lower than the pension of the intra-service juniors as per the seniority list of the same/similar rank.”

6.6 Liberalisation of Quantum of Pension to Old Pensioners

6.6.1 After the 6th CPC, vide clause 5.7 of the Office Memorandum F.No. 38/37/08-P&PW(A) dated 2.9.08, the Government of India, Department of Pension & Pensioners’ Welfare, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions had increased the quantum of pension available to the old pensioners as under:-

Age of Pensioner Additional Quantum of

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PensionFrom 80 years to less than 85 years

20% of basic pension

From 85 years to less than 90 years

30% of basic pension

From 90 years to less than 95 years

40% of basic pension

From 95 years to less than 100 years

50% of basic pension

100 years or more 100% of basic pension

6.6.2 Government of Punjab has gone a step further in sanctioning the increased pension to senior pensioners (including those of the All India Services) as under:-

Age of Pensioner Additional Quantum of Pension

From 80 years to less than 85 years

20% of basic pension

From 85 years to less than 90 years

30% of basic pension

From 90 years to less than 95 years

40% of basic pension

From 95 years to less than 100 years

50% of basic pension

100 years or more 100% of basic pension

Similar benefit may be extended to the pensioners of the Central Government.

6.7 MAKING PENSION TAX FREE.

6.7.1 Pension is described in Section 60 of the CPC and Section 11 of the Pension Act as a periodical allowance or stipend granted on account of past service, particular merits, etc. It involves three essential features: firstly, pension is a compensation for the past service, secondly, it owes its relationship to a past employer-employee

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relationship or master servant relationship. Lastly, it is paid on the basis of earlier relationship or agreement of service as opposed to an agreement for service. Therefore, pension is on an entirely different footing and cannot be equated with salary. It was held by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in D.S. Nakara etc. Vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 (page 323), AIR 1983 SC 130 that “the pension payable to a Government employee is earned by rendering long and efficient service and, therefore, can be said to be a deferred portion of the compensation for the service rendered”.

6.7.2 By a general analogy and understanding, compensation is not taxable. The mischief is caused by Section 17(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act which defines salary to include pension as well though both are distinct. There is no justification to include pension in the definition of salary. Pension of UN personnel, pension of the recipients of medals like gallantry, Paramveer Chakra, Mahaveer Chakra etc. is exempt from tax under Section 10 of the Income Tax Act. Similarly, most of the retirement benefits like gratuity, leave encashment, GPF and commuted pension are tax exempt. On the same reasoning, pension of Govt employees (who earn their pension by way of compensation for the past service) should be delinked from salary and exempted from income tax as a social welfare measure for senior citizens.

6.8 RAISING THE FAMILY PENSION:-6.8.1 Family pension is calculated at the uniform rate of 30% of the basic

pay. Our submission is that the family pension be raised to 50% of the basic pay including the increments earned by the retiree. This is justified because the family pensioners, particularly the women, who become helpless after the death of the pensioner need more sympathy in supporting them financially and otherwise.

6.9 GALLANTRY MEDAL ALLOWANCE – 6.9.1 As per orders of the Secretariat of the President of India this

allowance for holders of Gallantry Medal is payable by the Government of the State to which state cadre an IPS officer is allotted. This causes problems to those who are drawing pension from the Central Govt. and not the State Govt. of the Cadre. It is suggested that the VII CPC may recommend that all those IPS pensioners who opt to draw pension from GOI may also get the Gallantry Medal Allowance from the GOI.

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CONCLUSION

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