international relations theory meets world politicspeople.virginia.edu/~ga8h/bushdoctrine.pdf · 2...

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2International Relations Theory

Meets World PoliticsThe Neoconservative vs. Realism Debate

GeRARD AlexANDeR

TheBushDoctrinehasbeendefinedverydifferentlybydifferentscholarsandcommentators. The Bush administration itself has used the term narrowly,todescribe“thepolicythatnationsharboringterroristswouldbetreatedasif they were guilty of terrorist acts.”1 others define it almost exclusively intermsofpreventivewar.2RobertjervisandRobertlieberidentifytheDoc-trinewithfourmoreorlesscomparablecomponents:thebeliefthatdomesticregimes—democracyvs. authoritarianism—driveacountry’s foreignpolicyand thus a goal of democratizing other countries, especially in the Middleeast; theperceptionthatgravethreatsarebestdealtwithbyvigorousmea-sureslikepreemptiveandpreventivewar;acommitmenttomultilateralismconditionalonefficacy,assuch,astatedwillingnesstoactunilaterally;andagoalofmaintainingu.S.primacybasedon thebelief thatAmerica hasauniqueroleincausinginternationalpeaceandstability.3Forthepurposesofthisvolume,theBushDoctrineconsistsoffoursimilarthemes:themainte-nance of u.S. primacy, selective multilateralism, stand-apart alliances, anddemocratization,especiallyintheMiddleeast.Thedoctrinewaslaidoutintheadministration’s2002nationalSecurityStrategy(nSS),PresidentGeorgeW. Bush’s 2002 speech at West Point, and his 2003 speech at the nationalendowmentforDemocracy(the2006nSSamplifiesandupdates,ratherthanrevises,the2002nSS).4

howeveritisdefined,theBushDoctrineandneoconservativethinkingaresaidtodivergesharplyfromtheothermajorschoolsofforeignpolicythought,especiallyrealism.5Thischapterargues,incontrast,thattheBushDoctrineisnotnearlysoradicaladeparture.TheBushDoctrineforeignpolicysharescore ontological assumptions with major streams of realist thought, variesinseveralsubassumptions,andaddsaverysmallnumberofsupplementaryassumptionstothemix.Asinall theoreticalmatters,devilscaneasily lurkinthesedetails,butdetailsarethemeasureofthedistanceseparatingtheseapproacheswithinthebroadrealisttradition.Specifically,theneoconservative,

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�0 • GerardAlexander

foreignpolicythinkingembodiedintheDoctrineisavariantofrealism,spe-cificallyavariantofavariantofrealism,“balance-of-threat”realism.

Mounting this rebelliousargument ismadedifficultby the fact that theDoctrinehasbeenthetargetofmuchoverheatedanalysis.AndanimpressionofrupturewiththepastisencouragedbyanunderstandablefocusonthoseaspectsoftheBushadministration’sforeignpolicythatareespeciallyinnova-tive,afocusthatobscuresorignoresoutrighttheoverwhelmingcontinuitiesinu.S.foreignpolicy.Themajorcontinuitiesincludethepersistentemphasisontraditionaldeterrence,basicpost-1945immigrationpolicy, foreigntradepolicy,foreignaid,membershipandactivisminnumerousinternationalorga-nizations,andthebroadcontoursofworkadaypolicytowardRussia,China,India, South east Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and latin America (countriesrepresentingmorethanhalftheworld’spopulation).Muchofthetalkabouta“revolution”inforeignpolicyismuchadoaboutnothing.Inparticular,thedeparturefromtherealisttraditionisoverblown.

The Varieties of RealismRealismisapowerfulanalyticperspective,madeupofaseriesofassumptionsabouthowstatesand the international systemwork.Byvaryingmajorandminor assumptions, scholars have produced many distinct variants of thisintellectualtradition.Afewmajorassumptionsseemdefinitionaltorealism.6First,realistsassumethatthe internationalsystemlacksacentralauthorityand that individual states are the system’s primary actors. Second, in thisanarchiccontext,allstatesarecentrallyconcernedwiththeirsafetyandsur-vival,andsetabouttryingtosecuretheminthemostefficientwaytheyknowhow.Third,whetherforthatsecurity-seekingreasonorastheresultofpreda-toryagendas,statessometimeshaveterritorialambitionsonotherstatesandarepreparedtouseforcetoactonthem.

Thesecoreassumptionsgoalongwaytoestablishingawayofseeingtheworld.Buttheydonotspecifyanumberofthings.Amongotherissues,this“minimalist realism” does not specify exactly how countries do or shouldmeasure levels of threat to their safety or survival. It does not identify themost effective strategies for addressing a given level of threat. It does notspecifyexactlyhowstatesdoor should feelabout interstatecooperation. Itdoesnot identifyall theeffectsof international institutions,concerningforexamplewhethertheycansolvecoordinationproblemsorcandevelopemer-gentproperties.Andminimalistrealismexplainsvirtuallynothingaboutthebehaviorofnonstateactors.

Differentvariantsofrealistthinkingaredistinguishedbythesupplemen-taryassumptionstheyaddtominimalistrealismtoaddresstheseandotherissues.Themostfamiliardebatesarebetweenneorealists,liberalinstitution-alists, balance-of-threat realists, and neoconservatives. variations in sub-assumptions ensure that many thinkers are not easily contained by one or

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InternationalRelationsTheoryMeetsWorldPolitics • ��

another of these schools. But we can usefully, if crudely, summarize majorcleavagelinesontheissuesofthreatassessmentandregimetype;deterrenceandpreventiveuseofforce;andu.S.primacyandinternationalinstitutions.

Neorealism.neorealistslikekennethWaltz,johnMearsheimer,andRob-ertGilpinaddseveralassumptionstominimalistrealism.7Theyassumethatstatesbestjudgethreatsbymeasuringtherelativepowerofotherstates.Stateswilltrytodeterpotentialexpansionistsbybalancingagainstpower,throughmobilizationoralliances,orboth.Becausestatesfearpower,theyfearpow-erful states regardless of domestic regime characteristics. no “democraticpeace”istobeexpected,andevenfellowdemocraciesarepronetobalancingagainst theunitedStates (thoughWaltzandMearsheimerdiffer somewhatontheu.S.caseforreasonsdiscussedbelow).Becausestatesjealouslyguardpowerandsovereignty,internationalinstitutionscanprovideausefulforumforstatesalreadycommittedtocooperation,butcannot,ascreaturesofstates,becomereliableindependentsourcesofsecurity.8Finally,neorealismdoesnothave“awholeheckofalot”tosayaboutterrorismbecauseitiscarriedoutbynonstateactorsonwhomrealismshedsnoparticularanalyticlight.9

Balance-of-Threat Realism.StephenWaltcraftedavariantofrealismwhenhearguedthatthreatstoagivenstatearebettermeasuredbymeasurementofotherstates’intentionsaswellastheircapabilities.10Thisbalance-of-threat(asopposedtobalance-of-power)assumptiongeneratesthedistinctivepredictionthatstatesmaybalanceasmuchagainst,say,theaggressiveagendaofamid-dling state as the less threateningbehaviorof a largerone.Sinceperceivedintentionsmatter,astatemightinfluencehowitisperceived,forexample,byconvincingothersthatitharborsnoexpansionistambitions.likeneorealism,balance-of-threatrealismoffersnoanalytictoolsfordeducingwhatgeneratesthreatsfromnonstateactors.

Balance-of-threatrealismiscompatiblewithcertain“liberal”andinstitu-tionalclaimsaboutinternationalrelations(thoughmuchliberalandinstitu-tionalistthoughtisnonrealistinnature).First,theempiricalrecordappearsto indicate that states governed democratically manifest less threateningintentionstowardoneanother,creatingthebasisforthe“democraticpeace.”11Bythisstandard,democraciesshouldbeunlikelytobalanceagainstafellowdemocracylikeAmerica.Similarly,internationalinstitutionsmightinfluenceoutcomesbyhelpingtocreateorsignallessthreateningintentions.Forexam-ple,Walt andG. john Ikenberryargue that institutionscanbeaneffectivemethodofrestraining—andsignalingtherestraint—evenofpowerfulstateslikethepost-ColdWarunitedStates,reducingthechancesthatotherswillfearandbalanceagainstthem.12

Neoconservatism.Finally,neoconservativesalsobelievethatthreatsarisefrom intentions as well as capabilities. For this reason they steer securityconcernsawayfromstatesthatarepowerfulbutdeemednonhostile(japan,Westerneurope,India)andtowardstateswithperceivedhostileintentions,

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�� • GerardAlexander

whetherlarge(China)ormiddling(Iran).Specifically,neoconservatismadoptstheassumptionthatdomesticregimetypeisthebestindicatorofintentions,withdemocraciesjudgedmorepeaceful.After9/11,neoconservativesaddedtheclaimthatnondemocraciesthreatenotherstatesnotonlydirectlybutalsoindirectly, by incubating terrorism. to deal with threats, neoconservatismadoptsneorealistassumptionsaboutinternationalinstitutions.Andneocon-servativesargue,distinctively,thatnotonlynonstateactorsbutalsocertainstatesmaynotberesponsivetotraditionaldeterrence.13

Insum,neoconservativesarebalance-of-threatrealistswithseveralsup-plementaryassumptions:thatinstitutionsexertnegligibleindependenteffects(shared with neorealists); that domestic regime type profoundly shapes astate’s intentions (shared with democratic-peace liberals); that regime typeaffectswhetherastategeneratesterrorists;andthatcertainstatesmightnotbeeasilydeterrable(thelattertwobeingclaimsonwhichtheotherapproachesdonotpronounce).Theremainingsectionsdrawfourmajorthemesfromthissummary:howtheBushDoctrinemeasuresthreats;howitproposestodealwiththreats;whatroleinternationalinstitutionsplayinitsstrategies;anditslong-termstrategyofdemocratization.

Measuring Threats by Regime Type

Measuring Threats and Risks

TheBushDoctrineissaidtoassessthreatstou.S.securityinwaysthatsharplydivergefromtraditionalmethods,aboveallbytracingthreatstonondemo-craticregimes.ThissectionelaboratestheDoctrine’sapproachtothisfounda-tionalaspectofnationalsecuritypolicy.

Forallvariantsofrealism,howtoidentifyandmeasurethreatsisanon-obviousandcontroversialtask.neorealistsmeasurepotentialthreatsbymea-suringeachcountry’spower.AsWaltzputsit,“Statebehaviorvariesmorewithdifferencesofpowerthanwithdifferencesinideology, ininternalstructureofproperty relations,or ingovernmental form.”14Buthowshouldwemea-surepower?Wecouldmeasureastate’smobilizedmilitaryforces,butmoreoftenscholarsmeasuretotal latentpowerresources. Inmanystudies, latentresources are measured parsimoniously by each country’s population andeconomicwealth.15Soagivenstatecouldbelessthreatenedbyalargepoorcountry thanbyamedium-sized richone.Mearsheimeraddsageographicfeature to this short list of measures of latent power, on the grounds thatpower-projection is profoundly affected by the “stopping power of water.”16

Inthisthinking,astatecouldbemorethreatenedbyanearby,medium-sizedpoorcountrythanbyalargerichoneanoceanaway.

Whilemanyrealiststakeitforgranted,thisfocusonpoweraloneisastrik-inganalyticchoice.It is informedbytheassumptionthatacountryshouldbaseitssecuritystrategyonanassessmentofhowdangerousanothercountry

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would be were the two to find themselves at war, without explicit concernfor the probability of war breaking out. In this, realism is very differentfrommostotherapplicationsofrationalchoicetheory(ofwhichrealismhasbecomeakind).Theseotherforms(whetherparametricorgametheoretic),assumeinsteadthatactorsbasestrategiesontheirassessmentofrisks,whicharemeasuredbyboththeeffectsofagivenevent(say,awar,drought,orelec-tion defeat) were it to occur and the probability that that event will occur.Appliedtothecaseathand,thiswouldmeanthatastate,toassessthethreatposedbyanother,wouldassessbothhowpowerfulthatpotentialadversaryisandthelikelihoodthatthetwostateswillcometoblows.Thelatteratleastpartlyinvolvestheotherstate’sintentions,thoughthetwoarenotcotermi-nous.neorealistsassumethat“statescanneverbecertainaboutotherstates’intentions.”17Theimplicationisthatstatesshouldaccordinglypreparefortheworstatalltimes,virtuallyregardlessoftheshort-andmedium-termcostsofthisformof“insurance.”Butuncertaintycharacterizesmostofpolitical,social,andeconomiclife,andyetmostrationalchoicetheoristsnonethelessassumethatactorsselectstrategiesinpartbymakingtheirbestguessesaboutwhatothersarelikelytodo.Ifactorscouldnotanddidnotmakesuchguesses,gametheorywouldmakenosense,atleastoutsidegamesofchancewithfixedodds.18

Thisalternativeandcommonpracticewithintherationalchoicetraditionis more consistent with balance-of-threat realism’s measurement of threatsbasedonamixofastate’sintentionsandcapabilities.Butcantheintentionshalfof thismixbemeasured,andcanitbemeasuredasparsimoniouslyaspower?Waltdoesnotprovidesimplemeasuresofintentions,arguinginsteadthatcontextsvary in thedegree towhichcredible informationaboutotherstates’intentionsisavailableandofferingadhoccodingofcertainregimes(likenasser’sinegypt)asthreatening.19Suchcodinghasalengthyhistory.Manyhave traced security threats disproportionately to a subset of governmentsdistinguishedby expansionist militarism.This approach hasanalytic risks.Ifweidentifyregimesas“threatening”basedontheirexpansionistbehavior,we cannot know whether this behavior is better explained by domesticallyderived“intentions”orby the systemic factorsproposedbyneorealists (forexample,an imbalanceofpower favorable toabid for regionalhegemony).Thebestwayofsortingthesecompetingpredictionsistocontrolfordistribu-tionsofpowerandthenaskifagivencountrybehavessubstantiallydifferentlyundersuccessivedomesticregimes.Balance-of-threatrealismismeaningfulonlyiftheansweris“yes,”atleastsometimes.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Democratic PeaceIf domestic factors help explain why some countries are more threaten-ing thanothers, thenwhichdomestic factorsmatter?TheBushDoctrine isunderstood to distinctively emphasize domestic regime types. But in fact,

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regime-basedanalysesofthreatshavebeeninvokedrepeatedlyinthemakingofmodernu.S.foreignpolicy.20u.S.policyinbothWorldWarIIandtheColdWarwasnotcentrallytoreducethelatentpowerofGermany,japan,ortheSovietunion(say,bydismemberingthem)buttochangetheirintentionsbytransformingtheirdomesticpoliticalorders.Thisassumedthatnewregimescouldbelessthreatening,includingbecausedifferentregimeswouldmobilizelesslatentpower.Thus,majorColdWardocumentstracedthethreatposedbytheuSSRatleastasmuchtothenatureofitsregime—“ideology”forGeorgekennan;“fanatic faith” innSC-68as toRussia’s innatecapabilities. Inthisspirit,laterColdWarriorsgenerallycodedthreatsbydistinguishingbetweenstateswithtotalitarianregimesandallothers,withthe“freeworld”contain-ing many authoritarian regimes. For example, jeane kirkpatrick famouslywarnedoftotalitarianregimeswhilesuggestingthattheu.S.couldviewmanyothernondemocratic regimesrelativelybenignly.AndRonaldReagan’scel-ebrated1982Westminsterspeechcasttheglobalstrugglenotasbetweenalldemocraciesandallnondemocracies,butasonebetween“free”countriesandexpansionisttotalitarianisminparticular.21

AftertheColdWar,theunitedStatesunderGeorgeh.W.BushandBillClinton continued to scrutinize countries by their intentions as much astheircapabilities.Thistooktwoforms.Thefirstinvestedspecialconcerninanespeciallyviolence-pronesubsetofnondemocracieslabeled“roguestates.”Thesecondwasquitedifferent.Claimsofa“democraticpeace”shiftedthreatassessmentregardinginterstateconflictstoanewcut-point:theoneseparat-ingalldemocracies fromallnondemocracies.This,alongsidedeeperphilo-sophicalroots, isthemostimmediateancestorofneoconservativethinkingaboutmeasuringthreats.22

of course, u.S. foreign policy since 2001 makes important short-termdistinctionsbetweenlessvs.morehostilenondemocraticregimes,asseeninAmerica’santiterroristcooperationwithnondemocraticPakistan,SaudiAra-bia,kuwait,andnorthAfricancountriessuchasAlgeriainthetrans-SaharaCounter-terrorismInitiative.Butmoregenerally,neoconservativesadoptthesamecut-pointasdemocraticpeacetheorists,andtheBushDoctrinereflectsthis.Itdoessoinpartbyechoingthedemocratic-peacethesisaboutthesourcesof interstate threats. But al-Qaeda’s 2001 attack also elevated threats fromnonstateactors,andneoconservativesandsomeneoliberalshaveproposedacomplementarythesisthatmightbecalledthe“authoritarianradicalization”thesis.23Thisarguesthatnondemocraticregimesareadditionallyproblematicto u.S. national security because they, often inadvertently, incubate violentextremismamongtheircitizens.24Ina2003speech,Bushsaidthatnondemo-craticregimesintheMiddleeastbred“stagnation,resentment,andviolencereadyforexport.”25his2004Stateoftheunionspeechwasevenmorespecific:“AslongastheMiddleeastremainsaplaceoftyrannyanddespairandanger,itwill continue toproducemenandmovements that threaten thesafetyof

AQ: EN 21: Dead URL; please provide alternative.Response: Use this URL: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm


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regime-basedanalysesofthreatshavebeeninvokedrepeatedlyinthemakingofmodernu.S.foreignpolicy.20u.S.policyinbothWorldWarIIandtheColdWarwasnotcentrallytoreducethelatentpowerofGermany,japan,ortheSovietunion(say,bydismemberingthem)buttochangetheirintentionsbytransformingtheirdomesticpoliticalorders.Thisassumedthatnewregimescouldbelessthreatening,includingbecausedifferentregimeswouldmobilizelesslatentpower.Thus,majorColdWardocumentstracedthethreatposedbytheuSSRatleastasmuchtothenatureofitsregime—“ideology”forGeorgekennan;“fanatic faith” innSC-68as toRussia’s innatecapabilities. Inthisspirit,laterColdWarriorsgenerallycodedthreatsbydistinguishingbetweenstateswithtotalitarianregimesandallothers,withthe“freeworld”contain-ing many authoritarian regimes. For example, jeane kirkpatrick famouslywarnedoftotalitarianregimeswhilesuggestingthattheu.S.couldviewmanyothernondemocratic regimesrelativelybenignly.AndRonaldReagan’scel-ebrated1982Westminsterspeechcasttheglobalstrugglenotasbetweenalldemocraciesandallnondemocracies,butasonebetween“free”countriesandexpansionisttotalitarianisminparticular.21

AftertheColdWar,theunitedStatesunderGeorgeh.W.BushandBillClinton continued to scrutinize countries by their intentions as much astheircapabilities.Thistooktwoforms.Thefirstinvestedspecialconcerninanespeciallyviolence-pronesubsetofnondemocracieslabeled“roguestates.”Thesecondwasquitedifferent.Claimsofa“democraticpeace”shiftedthreatassessmentregardinginterstateconflictstoanewcut-point:theoneseparat-ingalldemocracies fromallnondemocracies.This,alongsidedeeperphilo-sophicalroots, isthemostimmediateancestorofneoconservativethinkingaboutmeasuringthreats.22

of course, u.S. foreign policy since 2001 makes important short-termdistinctionsbetweenlessvs.morehostilenondemocraticregimes,asseeninAmerica’santiterroristcooperationwithnondemocraticPakistan,SaudiAra-bia,kuwait,andnorthAfricancountriessuchasAlgeriainthetrans-SaharaCounter-terrorismInitiative.Butmoregenerally,neoconservativesadoptthesamecut-pointasdemocraticpeacetheorists,andtheBushDoctrinereflectsthis.Itdoessoinpartbyechoingthedemocratic-peacethesisaboutthesourcesof interstate threats. But al-Qaeda’s 2001 attack also elevated threats fromnonstateactors,andneoconservativesandsomeneoliberalshaveproposedacomplementarythesisthatmightbecalledthe“authoritarianradicalization”thesis.23Thisarguesthatnondemocraticregimesareadditionallyproblematicto u.S. national security because they, often inadvertently, incubate violentextremismamongtheircitizens.24Ina2003speech,Bushsaidthatnondemo-craticregimesintheMiddleeastbred“stagnation,resentment,andviolencereadyforexport.”25his2004Stateoftheunionspeechwasevenmorespecific:“AslongastheMiddleeastremainsaplaceoftyrannyanddespairandanger,itwill continue toproducemenandmovements that threaten thesafetyof



Americaandourfriends.”26WhiletheBushadministrationalsoemphasizesthecausalimportanceofterroristorganizationsandtheiremergentproper-ties,theideaofradicalizationunderauthoritarianismisa“rootcauses”theoryofterrorisminallbutname.AstraditionalrealistsDavidhendricksonandRoberttuckerputit,“nowitisthe‘being’andnotthe‘doing’ofautocraticstatesthatcreatesthesecuritythreattotheunitedStates.”27

Thisversionofbalance-of-threatrealismbasicallycodesstates’intentionsbytheproxyofastate’sdemocraticvs.nondemocraticstatus.likeallmethodsof coding threats, this creates categoriesof statesdeemedboth threateningandnonthreatening.Forneorealists,lessthreateningstatesareoneswithlim-itedcapabilities,thatis,oneswithsmallpopulationsand/orsmalleconomiesandperhapsoneslocatedabodyofwateraway.Forbalance-of-threatrealists,nonthreateningstatesareoneswithstatusquointentions.Thepost-ColdWarversion of balance-of-threat realism, as expressed in the democratic-peaceandauthoritarian-radicalizationtheses, identifiesdemocraciesasthequint-essentialstatusquopowers.Thisisreinforcedbytheunusualpost-ColdWarspectacleoftheworld’smajorpowers—mostlydemocracies—beingdurablyatpeacewithoneanother.ItisinthatspiritthatSecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRicewrotein2005that“thefundamentalcharacterofregimesmattersmoretodaythantheinternationaldistributionofpower.”28Forthatmatter,terror-istsareconsideredthreateningonlybecausetheirverylimitedcapabilitiesareharnessedtoveryaggressiveintentions.And“failedstates”areofconcernnotbecauseoftheir(minimal)capabilities,butbecauseoftheviolentintentionsofsubstateandnonstateactorswhocanflourishinthem.

Bymeasuringthreatsbasedonactors’intentionsaswellastheircapabili-ties, and by using democratic status to code intentions, the Bush Doctrineadoptsthecentralinsightofbalance-of-threatrealismandaddstoitthesup-plementaryassumptionthatregimetypecruciallystructuresthebehaviorofbothstatesandnonstateactors.

Deterrence, Preemption, and Prevention

Whatever the sources of security threats, the perennial question remains:WhatshouldtheunitedStatesdoaboutthreatsthatariseintheforeseeablefuture?neorealismandbalance-of-threatrealismprovideamplegroundsforrelyingontraditionalstrategiessuchaspower-balancinganddeterrence.ItisacommonperceptionthattheBushDoctrineinsteadproposestodealwiththreats preventively. Certainly the Bush administration’s discussion of pre-ventivewarhasbeentheDoctrine’smostcontroversialfeature.Atfirstblush,thepreventiveuseofforceseemstobeamajorinnovation.Butcloserinspec-tionshowsthattherolethattheBushDoctrineassignstopreventiondoesnotconstitutesucharadicaldeparturefromrealismafterall.Thisisthecasefortworeasons.

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The Durability of Deterrence

First,theDoctrinedoesnotsuggestthatall,most,orevenmanythreatsshouldbedealtwithpreventively.Somescholars,likeDaalderandlindsay,saythatBush’ssecuritystrategyelevatedpreventionasacentralnewtooland“effec-tivelyabandonedadecades-longconsensusthatputdeterrenceandcontain-mentattheheartofAmericanforeignpolicy.”29ButlindsayandDaalderhadearlierconcludedthat“[d]eterrencefeaturesprominently”inthe2002nSS,that “[p]reemptionhasa totalof threeparagraphs ina31-pagedocument,”andthat“thestrategy,forallthetalkpubliclyaboutpreemption,inadditionisafairlynarrowgoalforpreemption.”30Theseearlierobservationsareclosertothemark.The2002nSSnotesthatdeterrencebothhasworkedanddoesworkagainststates,solongastheyarerisk-averse,andtwicesaysspecificallythat theu.S.can“deter”certainstatesalready inpossessionofweaponsofmassdestruction(WMDs).ItconcludesonlythattheunitedStatescan“nolongersolelyrely”ondeterrence(orinthe2006nSS,“nolongersimplyrely”onit).The2002nSSthusproposesthatpreventiveforceisnotneededagainstallemergingthreats,onlyagainstrisk-tolerantroguestatesandstatelesster-roristgroups.31Ricehasinsistedthatthenumberofcasestowhichpreemp-tionorpreventionapplies“willalwaysbesmall,”whilemoretraditionaltoolsremainhighlyappropriate.So,sheinsists,the2002nSS“doesnotoverturnfivedecadesofdoctrineandjettisoneithercontainmentordeterrence.”32

Thisemphasisseemsnotsimplyrhetorical since it isconsistentwith thearchitectureofu.S.securitypolicysince2001.The2004u.S.“nationalMili-taryStrategy”refersovertwodozentimestothecoreu.S.strategyof“deter-ring”or“dissuading”aggression.33Americahascontinuedtoinvestheavilyin themilitarycapabilitiesrequiredbysuchastrategy. It is fairlyevidentlypursuing a policy of deterrence toward specific potential adversaries suchasnorthkorea(withu.S.troopsinSouthkorea)andChina(withtheshiftof u.S. forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the rapprochement betweentheu.S.andregionalcounterweightIndia,andtalkof“containing”China).Againstthisexpensiveandextensivebackdrop,theu.S.hasusedpreventivecoercioninonlyonecasesofar.Inalltheseways,theBushadministration’sworkadaypoliciesappeartorelyheavilyontraditionalpractices.

Thereisasecondreasontoconcludethatdiscussionoftheuseofpreventiveforceinaminorityofcasesdoesnotrepresentaradicaldeparturefromtradi-tionalrealistthought.Manyfindtheproposalofanypreventiveuseofforcecontroversialbecausetheybelievethatitiseitherunnecessaryorinadvisable.Theremainderofthissectionarguesthatevenarealistcanconcludethatthismight not be true under certain very limited circumstances. If deterrencemakescompellingsenseinmostcircumstancesbutnotinsomeverylimitedones,thenconsideringtheuseofpreventiveforceinthosefewexceptionsdoesnotseemespeciallyradical.

AQ: EN 30: Dead URL; please provide alternative. Response: This one works: http://www.brook-ings.edu/comm/events/20021004.pdf


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The Durability of Deterrence

First,theDoctrinedoesnotsuggestthatall,most,orevenmanythreatsshouldbedealtwithpreventively.Somescholars,likeDaalderandlindsay,saythatBush’ssecuritystrategyelevatedpreventionasacentralnewtooland“effec-tivelyabandonedadecades-longconsensusthatputdeterrenceandcontain-mentattheheartofAmericanforeignpolicy.”29ButlindsayandDaalderhadearlierconcludedthat“[d]eterrencefeaturesprominently”inthe2002nSS,that “[p]reemptionhasa totalof threeparagraphs ina31-pagedocument,”andthat“thestrategy,forallthetalkpubliclyaboutpreemption,inadditionisafairlynarrowgoalforpreemption.”30Theseearlierobservationsareclosertothemark.The2002nSSnotesthatdeterrencebothhasworkedanddoesworkagainststates,solongastheyarerisk-averse,andtwicesaysspecificallythat theu.S.can“deter”certainstatesalready inpossessionofweaponsofmassdestruction(WMDs).ItconcludesonlythattheunitedStatescan“nolongersolelyrely”ondeterrence(orinthe2006nSS,“nolongersimplyrely”onit).The2002nSSthusproposesthatpreventiveforceisnotneededagainstallemergingthreats,onlyagainstrisk-tolerantroguestatesandstatelesster-roristgroups.31Ricehasinsistedthatthenumberofcasestowhichpreemp-tionorpreventionapplies“willalwaysbesmall,”whilemoretraditionaltoolsremainhighlyappropriate.So,sheinsists,the2002nSS“doesnotoverturnfivedecadesofdoctrineandjettisoneithercontainmentordeterrence.”32

Thisemphasisseemsnotsimplyrhetorical since it isconsistentwith thearchitectureofu.S.securitypolicysince2001.The2004u.S.“nationalMili-taryStrategy”refersovertwodozentimestothecoreu.S.strategyof“deter-ring”or“dissuading”aggression.33Americahascontinuedtoinvestheavilyin themilitarycapabilitiesrequiredbysuchastrategy. It is fairlyevidentlypursuing a policy of deterrence toward specific potential adversaries suchasnorthkorea(withu.S.troopsinSouthkorea)andChina(withtheshiftof u.S. forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the rapprochement betweentheu.S.andregionalcounterweightIndia,andtalkof“containing”China).Againstthisexpensiveandextensivebackdrop,theu.S.hasusedpreventivecoercioninonlyonecasesofar.Inalltheseways,theBushadministration’sworkadaypoliciesappeartorelyheavilyontraditionalpractices.

Thereisasecondreasontoconcludethatdiscussionoftheuseofpreventiveforceinaminorityofcasesdoesnotrepresentaradicaldeparturefromtradi-tionalrealistthought.Manyfindtheproposalofanypreventiveuseofforcecontroversialbecausetheybelievethatitiseitherunnecessaryorinadvisable.Theremainderofthissectionarguesthatevenarealistcanconcludethatthismight not be true under certain very limited circumstances. If deterrencemakescompellingsenseinmostcircumstancesbutnotinsomeverylimitedones,thenconsideringtheuseofpreventiveforceinthosefewexceptionsdoesnotseemespeciallyradical.



The Presumption Against Preventive Use of Force

Several assumptions underpin the proposition that traditional securitystrategieslikedeterrencearepreferabletothepreventiveuseofforce.Theseassumptions rest on the durable realist language of costs and benefits. Insum,preventivewar isunderstoodtohaveseveral importantdisadvantagesandfewobviousadvantages.Preventionhasthreemaindisadvantages.First,thepreventiveuseofforcecouldinitiateawarthatwasunnecessary,sinceagivenadversarymightneverhaveendedupattackingafterall.Becausewarsarecostlyandrisky,unnecessaryonesareahighlyundesirabletype1error(a falsepositive).Second,even if anadversaryhas entertainedplans foranattack,itmightsuccessfullybedeterred.Sincedeterrenceappearstoberou-tinelyeffectiveininternationalpolitics,preventivewarseemsacostlyalterna-tive.Third,astatethatusesforcepreventivelyrisksanadditionalcostbeyondthatofthewaritself:itrisksbeingseen(ormistaken)asanaggressor,andthusrisksprovokingbalancingbehavioragainstitself.often,betterthattheothersidefiresthefirstshot.

Moreover,despitediscussionof“thecultoftheoffensive,”theadvantageof preventive war (being the first to strike) may not be especially valuable,especiallytoapowerassecureastheunitedStates.evenifanadversarydoeswishtoattackandcannotsuccessfullybedeterred,itmaystillbepreferabletoabsorbtheinitialblowsincethecostsofdoingsoareusuallylimited.Theattackedstateisusuallyabletorespond.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatitknowsagainstwhomtoretaliate.Andinitialattacksareunlikelytobedevastatingbecausetheyareunlikelytocomeascompletesurprises.Mostcountriescansufferamajorattackonlyatthehandsofarelativelysmallnumberofotherstates,whosepreparationsforwararetypicallyevidentevenifnottransparentineverydetail.InRichardBetts’words,“Pureboltsfromthebluedonothap-pen.Suddenattacksoccurafterprolongedpoliticalconflict.”34Forall thesereasons,itisusuallypreferabletoeschewpreventiveuseofforce.

Butwhatifcircumstancesarisesuchthatoneormoreoftheseunderlyingassumptionsdoesnothold?Inotherwords,howshouldacost-benefitanalysisjudgethepreventiveuseofforceiftwoactorsarealreadyatwaroranadver-saryismanifestlybentonattack;orifaspecificadversarydoesnotseemtorespondtonormalmethodsofdeterrence;orifothercountriesseemuninter-estedinbalancingagainstoneself;orifabsorbinganattackmightnotleaveastatefullycapableofrespondingeffectively?

let us consider these possibilities. First, concerns about initiating anunnecessarywararemootifaconflictisalreadyunderway.Thatnowappliestoanyattackdirectlyonal-Qaeda,evenifinanewformorvenue.TheBushadministrationarguesthatitmayalsoapplyinsomeformtoacaselikeIraq,becausethelinebetweenanewvs.already-existingconflicthasbeenunusu-allyblurredsince9/11.CertainlytheunitedStatesisinvolvedinanunusual

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conflict. Because of the stateless and loosely organized nature of violentlyanti-American Islamists, their attacks can emanate from a remarkably dif-fusegeography;suchattackscantakeonmanyforms,andtheycouldacquireweaponsandotherassistancefromaverywidearrayofsources,notlimitedonlytostates.ThisexplainswhyWesterncountrieshaveengagedinsuchanunusuallywiderangeofpoliciessince9/11,frommilitaryactioninAfghani-stanandthecontinuedsecuringofex-Sovietnuclearmaterialstoenhancedcomputersecurityandstepped-updefensesagainstbiologicalweapons.Sointhisunusuallydiffusestruggle,whatisanewconflict?Thisisnotanovelsitu-ation.ConsiderwhetherAlliedmilitaryactionagainstFrancoistSpainduringWorldWarIIwouldhaveinitiatedanewwarorwouldsimplyhaveopenedanewfrontinawaralreadyunderwayagainsttheAxis.Theanswerisnotself-evident.Inthatlight,wasanattackonSaddam’sregimeanentirelyinnovativeact,oranewfrontinanalready-initiatedwarbetweenAmericaandextrem-ismemanatingfromtheMideast,includingSaddam’sbrandofit?35Forthatmatter,whichwouldanattackonIran’snuclearfacilitiesbe?

“Nondeterrability”Second, what if an adversary is bent on attack and seemingly cannot bedeterred? The arguments that follow concerning “deterrability” have beenrehearsedelsewherebyothers,butareworthrepeatinganddeveloping.Inter-nationalrelationsscholarshavelongdebatedwhatisrequiredfordeterrencetobeeffective.36Attheveryleast,itrequiresacrediblethreatofcostlyretali-ation and a sufficiently cost-sensitive adversary. Realism generally assumesthesecondconditionisfulfilled,andattributesanyfailures(todeter)totheabsenceofthefirst.37Thisappearstodescribeaccuratelyagreatmanysitua-tions.Butsince9/11,bothassumptionsmaybeexperiencingnotgeneralbut“spotty” failures. Recognizing this merely updates rather than repudiatesrealism’sanalyticassumptions.

Thefirstconditionforeffectivedeterrence—thatastate liketheu.S.cancrediblythreatenretaliation—maynotbeholdinginallinstances.ThisisnotbecauseAmericalackssufficientmilitaryresources,butbecauseitcouldnowbeattackedandnotknowagainstwhomtoretaliate.Thisisrarelyaproblemwhenonecountrydirectlyattacksanother.Ithasalsonotbeenaproblemwithterroristswholeavefingerprintsorclaimcreditforattacks.Butithasalreadyprovenproblematicwhenterroristsstrikewithoutleavingmuchofatrail.Al-Qaedaappearstohaveapolicyofnotclaimingcredit.Thisdoesnotnecessar-ilypreventitsactionsfrombeingtraced.Butthepossibilityofanonymityisnotfanciful.The2001anthraxattackinAmericalacksasinglepubliclyidenti-fiedsuspect,andanumberofmajorbombingsremainnotjustunclaimedbutunattributed.ConsiderthenumberofgroupsthatmighthappilydetonateanucleardeviceintelAvivwithoutclaimingcredit.Proliferationlengthenedthe list of actors potentially armed with WMDs to more states and also to

AQ: Spellout ok? Response: PerfectAQ: Spellout ok? Response: Perfect

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conflict. Because of the stateless and loosely organized nature of violentlyanti-American Islamists, their attacks can emanate from a remarkably dif-fusegeography;suchattackscantakeonmanyforms,andtheycouldacquireweaponsandotherassistancefromaverywidearrayofsources,notlimitedonlytostates.ThisexplainswhyWesterncountrieshaveengagedinsuchanunusuallywiderangeofpoliciessince9/11,frommilitaryactioninAfghani-stanandthecontinuedsecuringofex-Sovietnuclearmaterialstoenhancedcomputersecurityandstepped-updefensesagainstbiologicalweapons.Sointhisunusuallydiffusestruggle,whatisanewconflict?Thisisnotanovelsitu-ation.ConsiderwhetherAlliedmilitaryactionagainstFrancoistSpainduringWorldWarIIwouldhaveinitiatedanewwarorwouldsimplyhaveopenedanewfrontinawaralreadyunderwayagainsttheAxis.Theanswerisnotself-evident.Inthatlight,wasanattackonSaddam’sregimeanentirelyinnovativeact,oranewfrontinanalready-initiatedwarbetweenAmericaandextrem-ismemanatingfromtheMideast,includingSaddam’sbrandofit?35Forthatmatter,whichwouldanattackonIran’snuclearfacilitiesbe?

“Nondeterrability”Second, what if an adversary is bent on attack and seemingly cannot bedeterred? The arguments that follow concerning “deterrability” have beenrehearsedelsewherebyothers,butareworthrepeatinganddeveloping.Inter-nationalrelationsscholarshavelongdebatedwhatisrequiredfordeterrencetobeeffective.36Attheveryleast,itrequiresacrediblethreatofcostlyretali-ation and a sufficiently cost-sensitive adversary. Realism generally assumesthesecondconditionisfulfilled,andattributesanyfailures(todeter)totheabsenceofthefirst.37Thisappearstodescribeaccuratelyagreatmanysitua-tions.Butsince9/11,bothassumptionsmaybeexperiencingnotgeneralbut“spotty” failures. Recognizing this merely updates rather than repudiatesrealism’sanalyticassumptions.

Thefirstconditionforeffectivedeterrence—thatastate liketheu.S.cancrediblythreatenretaliation—maynotbeholdinginallinstances.ThisisnotbecauseAmericalackssufficientmilitaryresources,butbecauseitcouldnowbeattackedandnotknowagainstwhomtoretaliate.Thisisrarelyaproblemwhenonecountrydirectlyattacksanother.Ithasalsonotbeenaproblemwithterroristswholeavefingerprintsorclaimcreditforattacks.Butithasalreadyprovenproblematicwhenterroristsstrikewithoutleavingmuchofatrail.Al-Qaedaappearstohaveapolicyofnotclaimingcredit.Thisdoesnotnecessar-ilypreventitsactionsfrombeingtraced.Butthepossibilityofanonymityisnotfanciful.The2001anthraxattackinAmericalacksasinglepubliclyidenti-fiedsuspect,andanumberofmajorbombingsremainnotjustunclaimedbutunattributed.ConsiderthenumberofgroupsthatmighthappilydetonateanucleardeviceintelAvivwithoutclaimingcredit.Proliferationlengthenedthe list of actors potentially armed with WMDs to more states and also to

AQ: Spellout ok? Response: PerfectAQ: Spellout ok? Response: Perfect

nonstate actors. historically, attacks could be (relatively) unexpected; nowtheycouldbemysterious.

Relatedbutdistinctisthemuch-imaginedscenarioinwhicharoguestate“hands off” aWMD, especially anuclear or radiological weapon. Then, anattacked country might retain ample retaliatory capacities and identify itsterroristattackers,butnotknowwithahighlevelofconfidencewhichstateprovidedtheweapon.AsthecolumnistCharleskrauthammerhassaid,deter-rence“doesnotworkagainst…undetectables:nonsuicidalenemyregimesthatmightattackthroughclandestinemeans.”38SomeconsideraWMDhandoffunlikelybecauseitwouldbehighlyriskyfortheroguestateinvolved.39Thisskepticismassumes,first,thataweaponwillbetraceabletoitssource.Butwearestillasking:wheredidthe2001anthraxcomefrom?Italsoassumesthatrulersare,broadlyspeaking,risk-averse.Isthatthecase?

Thesecondconditionforeffectivedeterrenceisadversarieswhoaresensi-tivetocostsandrisks.Thisconditionmightusuallybeborneoutandyetfailincertainnarrowinstances.Inthatminorityofcases,deterrencecouldfailnotbecauseofthe(inadequate)credibilityorpreparationsofthewould-bedeterrerbutbecauseofthenatureoftheattacker.Itisobviouslynotclearthat“cost-sensitivity”describesallterroristgroups.Itsurelydescribessome,whocanbedeterredatleastsometimesandinsomeregards.40Butitmaywellnotdescribeothers.evena traditional realist likeowenharries says that compared, forexample,tothecautious,calculatingrulersoftheSovietunion,“[f]lyingtwoaircraftintothosetowersinnewyorkisananimalofadifferentbreed.”41

Some“roguestates”mayalsobeofadifferentbreed.Theclaimhereisnotthatroguestateleadersarepsychoticorsuicidal,onlythatthereisnoapriorireason toassume that leaders arehomogenous in their cost-sensitivity andrisk-tolerance.Theymaywellvaryonthosedimensions.Stalin,hitler,kimjong-Il, and Saddam hussein seem especially unpreoccupied by the deathsofhundredsofthousands(ormillions)oftheirowncitizens.Andnapoleon,hitler,andsomeotherrulersmanifesthigh-risktendencies intheir foreignpolicies.42Thismightbebecausetheyarepronetoperceivingotherstatesasunlikelytodisplayresolveorasunlikelytoprevailinaconflict.Andtyrantswithsuchproclivitiesmayhavefeweffectivechecksontheirpersonaldecisionmaking.lieberarguesthatsuchhighrisk-tolerancemaymakeasmallnum-berofregimesnoteasilysusceptibletodeterrence.43

Wecanbrieflyconsidertwocases.ThemostextensivelydebatedisSaddamhussein.44Theclaimthathusseinwasdeterrableisdifficulttoreconcilewithseveralofhismajordecisions.WhywashealoneintakingmilitaryadvantageofIran’svulnerabilityin1980andkuwait’sin1990?Regardlessofwhathus-sein stood togain throughcontrolofkuwait, includingpossiblydeflectingdomesticchallengestohisregime,whywasheconfidenttheworldwouldnotreactwithoverwhelmingforcetohis1990threattomajoroilsupplies?Whydidherefusetowithdrawfromkuwaitoncethatreactionbecameapparent?

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Withdrawal at that time may have posed risks to his rule, but why was heconfidenthisregimecouldbettersurvivetheconfrontation?Andaboveall,regardlessoftheoriesabout1980and1990–91,whywashusseinunwillingtodowhateverwasneededtosavehisthronein2002–03,whateverdomesticandinternationalriskshewouldhavehadtoruntodoso?Manyprofferedanswerstothesequestionsremainunpersuasive.45

Another,woefullyunderstudied,caseisthetaliban.Ifthatregime’srulerswerebenton survival,whydid theyallow the9/11plotagainst theworld’smostpowerful state toproceed fromtheir territory?Andwhydid theynotaccepttheultimatumofferedbyBushimmediatelyaftertheattack?46Conceiv-ably,thetalibandidnotknowaboutthe9/11plotbeforehandand/orlackedthecoercivecapacityeithertostopitthenortoturnoveral-Qaeda’sleadersafterward.Inanyofthosecases,though,classicdeterrencefacesanewprob-lem:howisdeterrencesupposedtoworkifsomestatescannotcontrolthreat-eningeventsoriginatingintheirterritories?47

jervismakesthemoregeneralpointthattheBushadministration’sstrat-egy(ofcoercivediplomacyagainstroguestatesthatmighthandoffWMDs)isbasedontheassumptionthattheu.S.understandshowitsadversariesthink.hearguesthatthisassumptionisflawed,sinceadversariesoftenmakedeci-sionsthatu.S.decisionmakersfindpuzzling.Thisisafairpoint.Butitspre-scriptiveteetharedrawnthemomentwerealizethatitappliesjustasmuchtoastrategyofdeterrence,astrategythatalsoassumesweknowhowouradver-sariesthink.Iftheadversariesareunpredictableorpuzzling,thendeterrencemaybeasriskyorineffectiveastrategyasamoreintrusiveone.Intheend,deterrenceappearstobeeffectiveagainstmostactors.Buttherearelegitimatequestionsabouthoweffectiveitisagainstaverynarrowsetofthem.

Againstsomeoftheseactors,apolicyofdeterrencemaybedoomedfromthestart.Ifcertain“rogue”rulersareespeciallyrisk-tolerantorconvincedoftheweaknessorlackofresolveofmajordemocracies,thenstatusquostatesmayhavetoresorttostrategiesotherthandeterrence,atleastdeterrenceastraditionallypracticed.Thismightmeanpreventiveuseofforce.Butitcouldinsteadmeanflamboyantdisplaysofresolve,ostentatiouslyandoverwhelm-ingly favorable constellations of forces or, as jacques Chirac’s France hasmounted,threatstorespondwithhighlydisproportionateforce.48

Let Them Fire the First Shot?But even if certain adversaries can’t be deterred, wouldn’t it still be wiserfortheunitedStatestoabsorbaninitialblowthantoengageinprovocativebehavior thatmight scareothers?neorealistsandbalance-of-threat realistshavearguedthatAmerica’spowerandmuscularbehaviorcouldeasilyorwillinevitably provoke—or indeed already have provoked—balancing againstitself. It hardly furthers u.S. national security goals to provoke balancingbehavioragainstitselfbypersuadingotherstatesthatAmericaisanaggressor.

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Thisisnotaconcernforneorealism,whichpredictsthatotherswillinevitablybalanceagainsttheu.S.becauseofitspowerandregardlessofitsbehavior.49Butbalance-of-threatrealismsuggeststhatapowerwouldbewisenottobeseenasthreatening,andWaltandRobertPapearguethatu.S.behaviorafter9/11risksjustthat.50

Buttobepersuasive,thesecritiqueshavetopasstwotests.First,itisacorerealistpropositionthatavoidingbalancingbehavior isnotastate’soverrid-inggoal.Consideranactionthatadvancesastate’ssecurityvis-à-visagiventhreatbutprovokesacertainamountofbalancingbythirdparties.Whethertheactionisadvisableisstillupfordebate,subjecttothecost-benefitanaly-sisemphasizedbyrealism.Differentmembersoftherealistfamilycanlegiti-matelyassesssuchasituationsomewhatdifferently.51

Second,whetheragivenstrategyisevenprovokingbalancingbehaviorisanempiricalquestion.Asithappens,claimsthattheBushDoctrineisthreat-ening to other states and provoking them to balance against the u.S. areunpersuasive.Since9/11,mostmajorpowers,althoughtheyhavethemate-rialresourcestodoso,havenotrespondedtou.S.policieswiththedefensivemilitarybuildupscharacteristicallypursuedbystatesthatperceiveanacutethreat.Instead,theyhavemaintainedpre-9/11spendinglevelsorevencontin-uedtoreducethem.Alliancepatternshaveremainedsimilarlystableratherthan rearranging into new coalitions designed to block Washington. Andclaimsof“softbalancing”havesofarnotrevealedtrulynewbehaviorbeyondhistoricallyroutinediplomaticfriction.Forexample,displaysofanti-Ameri-canismdonotseemmuchdifferentfromthoseoftheearly1980s,whenschol-arsareagreedthatotherstateswerenotbalancingagainsttheu.S.ThislackofbalancingmightbebecauseAmericaisan“offshorebalancer”anoceanawayfromothermajorpowers,orbecausethevastmajorityofstatesseemtobelievethattheunitedStatesharborsnoaggressiveintentionstowardthemtobeginwith.Whicheveritis,theevidencesuggeststhatbalancingbehaviorisbeingforegoneexceptbyisolatedstateslikeIranandnorthkorea.52

Iamnotarguingherethatothermajorpowersoughtnottoseetheu.S.asthreatening.Iamsayingthattheyareactingasiftheydonotseeitasthreaten-ing.Itisastrangehegemonthatregularlyurgesothergreatpowerstospendmore,not less,ontheirmilitaries.It isanevenstrangersetoffearfulotherstatesthatspendnomore,andoftenless,ontheirmilitariesastimegoeson.

Finally,itisnormallytolerabletoabsorbaninitialattackratherthanactpre-ventivelybecausetheattackedstatetypicallyretainsretaliatorycapabilities.torevisittheissue:Whathappensifthisisnotthecase?torepeat,thiswouldnotbebecauseAmericawouldbeoverwhelmed.tinyIsraelrisksbeingannihilatedbyasurpriseattack,explainingwhyithasresortedtopreventiveandpreemp-tivestrikes.ButasFrancisFukuyamainsists,“unlikeIsrael,theunitedStateshasasubstantialmarginofstrategicdepth.”53Indeed,the2002nSSnotedthatroguestatesandterroristsdonot“rivalthesheerdestructivepowerthatwas

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arrayedagainstusbytheSovietunion.”54IslamistextremistsdonotpossesstheabilitytooccupyevenasliverofWesternterritory.Andwenowknowthatevenanattacklike9/11leavesintactAmerica’scapabilitiesofresponse.

Instead,thenewriskistwofold.Wehavealreadyconsideredthefirst:thepossibilitythatterroristscouldstrikeanonymouslyorwithuntraceableweap-ons.Whenthisisthecase,absorbinganinitialblow,evenacatastrophicone,couldbethepreludenottoeffectiveretaliationbutinsteadtosimplyabsorb-ingfurtherblows.Thesecondcompellingdangeristhatanattack,insteadofmimicking9/11,willinvolveabiologicalorespeciallynuclearweapon.Waltzargues that one of “the two biggest changes in international politics” afterWorldWarIIwasthedramaticshiftin“theextentandrapiditywithwhichsomestatescanhurtothers”asaresultofthedevelopmentofnuclearweap-ons.55Thatchangehasonlyacceleratedwithfurtherproliferation,andjohnlewis Gaddis observes that “terrorists can now inflict levels of destructionthatonlystateswieldingmilitarypowerusedtobeabletoaccomplish.”56WecanconsiderscenariosinwhichcitieslikeChicagoorWashington,DC,areseverelydamagedbyactorsagainstwhomtheu.S.didnotactsufficiently.

Whilefalsepositivesinthesematters(unnecessarywars)arecostly,type2errors(falsenegatives)havebecomemuchmorecostlywiththedevelopmentof nonconventional weapons. This has hardly gone unnoticed by the Bushadministration: “weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophicpowertostrikegreatnations.”57ItisnocoincidencethattheleadingpreviousexampleofAmericanpreventiveuseofforce,the1962“quarantine”ofCuba,wasdirectedagainstnuclearweapons.Thedownsidetolettingtheothersidetakethefirstshot,then,isthattheshotmightbemuchmoreseverethan9/11andleavetheu.S.toretaliateagainstanunknowntarget.

If anyof theseexceptional circumstancesarise,or somecombinationofthem,thenevenarealistperspectiveemphasizingthecautiouscalculationofcostsandbenefitsmightconcludethatinoneormoreofthesenarrowcircum-stances,preventiveuseofforceisinfactadvisable.Inotherwords,thebroadrealist tradition does not seem to offer grounds for rigorously eschewing ahighlyselectivepreventiveuseof force ifanadversaryhasalreadyattackedyou,isexceedinglydifficulttodeter,andcoulddoseveredamageinwaysthatmakeretaliationdifficult,andbalancingbehaviorisunlikelytoresult.Inthatsense,theBushDoctrine’sproposalthatpreventionbeusedinjustsuchcir-cumstancesdoesnotobviouslyrepresenttheviolationofrealistthinkingthatsomeofitscriticssuggest.Aboveall,theDoctrinesuggeststhatdeterrenceisappropriatewhenconventionalcircumstancesarepresent.Gaddis’conclusionappearsapt:the“BushDoctrinedoesnotrejectdeterrenceandcontainment.Itdoes,however,insistupontheneedtosupplementthesefamiliarstrategieswithpreemption.”58Ifneoconservativesdepartfromrealistsinthesematters,itisprimarilyatthelevelofareaoffocusratherthanofanalyticprinciples.For example, neoconservatives do not consider possible deterrence failures

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inwaysthatrepudiaterealistassumptionssomuchastheyconsiderwhetherdeterrencemightfailforreasonsthatmostneorealistshavenotfocusedon.

American Primacy, Multilateralism, and Unilateralism The Bush Doctrine’s emphasis on the maintenance of u.S. primacy and itsorientationtowardinternationalinstitutionsbothfitwithintherealisttradi-tion.TheBushDoctrinesharesgroundwithmany,notall,realistsregardingu.S.primacy.Mostobviously,realismassumesthatacountryinapositionofprimacywillwanttomaintainit,andtheBushDoctrineprescribesasreal-ismpredicts.As for thedesirability ofu.S. primacy,neorealists areunusu-allydivided.Waltzandsomeothersassumethatanystatewithprimacywillprovokebalancingandislikelytobecomedomineeringtoboot.59Incontrast,MearsheimeremphasizesthatAmerica’soceanicseparationfromothergreatpowers makes any u.S. territorial ambitions implausible and thus makesAmericabothobjectivelyandsubjectivelylessthreateningtoothers.neocon-servativessharethislastcharacterization,buttraceittodomesticu.S.sourcesofbenevolencesuchasdemocracy.

The result is that neoconservatives differ with those neorealists who seetheu.S.asbroadlyinterchangeablewithothergreatpowersinhistory,whileconvergingwithotherneorealistswhocharacterizetheu.S.roleintheworldnotmerelyasunusuallybenevolentbyhistoricalstandardsbutevenpacifyinginitsbroadestbrushstrokes.Specifically,boththesecampshavearguedthattheunitedStatesplaysabroadlypacifyingroleby(1)maintaining“offshore”supportforalliedstatesinnortheastAsiaandWesterneurope,deterringbidsforregionalhegemonythere,and(2)merelybeingsorelativelypowerful,sinceothermajorstatesdonotbothertocompeteforprimacy,avoidingarmsracesandotherpotentiallydestabilizingaspectsofactiverivalry.60Parallelclaimscan be made about America’s stabilizing and progressive role in the worldeconomy.Theneoconservativeassumptionisnotthatotherstateswillband-wagonwiththeunitedStatesoutofadesiretoshareinitsloot.ItisthatotherstatusquostateshavenothingtofearfromAmericaandthushavenoincen-tivetobalanceagainstitbutinsteadhavemanyreasonstocooperateinthecraftingofmutuallybeneficialinterstatepeaceandgrowingworldtrade.

TheBushDoctrine’sstanceoninternationalinstitutionshassimilarlyscantdisagreementswithneorealists,thoughsharponeswithliberal-institutional-ists.Mostnoticeably, theDoctrine isnotbeholdentothenotionthat inter-nationalcooperation isdesirable inandof itself.This isvisible in theBushadministration’s disregard for the International Criminal Court, the kyotoclimateaccord,andothertreaties.ThisisprobablyrelatedtothefactthattheDoctrine shares neorealists’ skepticism that international institutions andtreatiescanreliablydeliversecurity,notonlybecausetheseentitieslogicallydependontheuncertaincomplianceofsignatorystatesbutalsobecauseoftheampleempiricalrecordofnoncomplianceandlackadaisicalenforcement.61In

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this,theDoctrineandneorealismareconsistentwithagreatdealofu.S.for-eignpolicyhistory.InGaddis’succinctconclusion,evidenceofa“unilateralist‘turn’”aftertheColdWarandafter9/11“reflectsareturntoanoldposition,nottheemergenceofanewone.”62

Aswithneorealists,however,theDoctrine’sstrategyisnonethelesstoseekalliesformanyinitiatives,eveniftheresultingcoalitionsfallshortofworld-wideorevenall-Westernunanimity.63ThusBush’sAmerica remainsactiveinsuchinstitutionsastheorganizationofAmericanStates,theWorldtradeorganization, the united nations and its affiliates, and durable alliances,especiallynAto.Since9/11theBushadministrationhaslaunchedtwonewsecurity-relatedinternationalorganizations,theProliferationandContainerSecurity Initiatives. Itspolicies towardnorthkorea, Iran,libya, and Syria(especiallyregardinglebanon)havebeenconsistentlymultilateral.Inmattersoftrade,Americaarguablyhasremainedmoreconsistently“multilateralist”thanmanyof itseuropeanallies.64 It isnot a reach,despite the skepticismofsome,forkeirlieberandRobertliebertosaythatthe2002nSS“isclearaboutthenecessityandbenefitsofmultilateralcooperation,especiallywithothergreatpowers.”65

Perhapstheneoconservativeposition ismostdistinctiveconcerningtwoimplicationsofu.S.primacyandinternationalcooperation.First,unlikemostneorealists,neoconservativesfrequentlydetectinu.S.primacyaconcurrentresponsibilitytointerveneinhumanitariancrises,especiallygenocides.But,toadegreemany liberal-institutionalistsarenot, theyhavebeenwilling tointervenewithforceandmultilaterallyifpossiblebutunilaterallyifnecessary,especially when international institutions seem ineffective.66 Second, manyneoconservativessharerealists’preferencetoapproachrisingChinawithcau-tionanddeterrence.ButthismaylargelybebecauseChinaisnondemocratic;werethattochange,neoconservativesmightconvergewith“liberaloptimists”onthissubject.67

DemocratizationIn one way more than any other, the Bush Doctrine strategy and the neo-conservative thinking it is said to instantiatearedistinct fromothermajorapproaches tou.S. foreignpolicy.neorealismassumesthatsecurity threatsemanatefromparticulardistributionsofpower,andmutualfearsaboutthosedistributions,inthecaseof“securitydilemma”thinkingwithinneorealism.Astatecan largelyaddresssuchthreatsbyengaging inbalancingbehavior:mobilizingmilitaryresources,seekingallies,andofferingassurancesthatitdoesnotharboraggressiveagendas, in thecaseof securitydilemmas.Asaresult, neorealism offers a country only two avenues for addressing threatsof war: either changing the objective balance of power (through a militarybuilduporalliance-formation)orofferingafearfuladversaryassurancesthatyoudonotharboraggressiveintentions.

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Balance-of-threatrealismbringsintotheequationvariationinotherstates’intentions,andamajorvariantofittracesthatvariationtotheotherstates’domesticregimetypes.Thisaddsanadditionalpossibleavenueforaddressingasecuritythreat:acountrycanseektoalterthedomesticpoliticsofadver-sarystates.Aswehaveseen,theunitedStatespursuedjustsuchastrategyinWorldWarIIandtheColdWar.TheBushDoctrine,bytracingbothinterstateandterroristthreatstonondemocraticregimes,identifiesanevenmoreambi-tious transformative agenda of this kind: Western security through globaldemocratization.

The democratic-peace thesis inspired the Clinton administration to talkabout “democratic enlargement.” That thesis and especially the post-9/11authoritarian-radicalizationthesisinspiredtheBushadministrationactivelytopursuethatgoal.The2002nSSseeks“moderngovernment,especiallyintheMuslimworld”tounderminethe“fertileground”thatexistsfor“thecon-ditionsandideologiesthatpromoteterrorism.”68Criticsanddefendershavedebatedtowhatextentthisprojectisfeasibleorreckless.69ItisworthnotingthattheBushadministrationhasnotpursuedthestrategysingle-mindedly.Itrhetoricallychampionsthecausesofpro-democraticdissidents,hasdramati-cally increased the national endowment for Democracy’s budget, and hassupporteddemocraticinitiativesinIraq,Afghanistan,lebanon,thePalestin-ianterritories,andformerSovietrepublics.ButithasusedforceonlyintwocountriesandworkscloselyinthewaronterrorwithnondemocraticregimessuchasSaudiArabia,kuwait,andPakistan.

Whatismorecontroversialaboutthedemocratizationstrategyistherea-soningunderpinningit,whichconcernscomparativepoliticsmorethaninter-nationalrelations.Thestrategyposestwoquestionsconcerningfeasibilityandefficacy:Doesdemocraticpracticeeffectivelydiminishviolentanti-Westernintentions?Andcanstabledemocracybeinducedinallsettings?Democra-tizationisapressingnationalsecuritystrategyifnondemocraticregimesaredetermined to be an important generator of aggressive state behavior andanincubatorofterrorists.Simplyput,therecordismixed.Regardinginter-statesecurity,itistruethatthegreatesttwentiethcenturysecuritythreatstoWesterndemocracieshavebeennondemocraticstateslikenaziGermanyandtheSovietempire.Butmanynondemocraticregimeshavealsobeendurableallies,includingthoseinnAto.ItissymbolicthattheunitedStatesshareddemilitarizedbordersthroughmostofthetwentiethcenturywithbothdemo-craticCanadaandauthoritarianMexico.Asforthreatsfromnonstateactors,themajorityofal-Qaedarank-and-filecomefromnondemocraticstates,andmanyauthoritarianregimeshavearecordofprovokingextremistopposition.Butmanynondemocraticregimes,includingmanyinmajority-Muslimcen-tralAsiaandsub-SaharanAfrica,haveproducedlittleextremism.

Insum,thedemocratic-peacethesissuggestsatmostthatnondemocraticregimesaremorelikelytobeinterstatethreatsthandemocraciesare,notthat

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many of either category are. And for now, the authoritarian-radicalizationthesis lacks the level of empirical support enjoyed by the democratic-peacethesis.70 Perhaps nondemocratic regimes are a necessary but not sufficientconditionforgeneratingsecuritythreats:whilenotallnondemocraciesposethreats, only nondemocracies do so. one option then is to focus securityconcerns on some subset of nondemocratic regimes. Another is the bluntbutpotentiallyeffectiveinstrumentofgradual,globaldemocratization.Thisseemstobethelong-termstrategyoftheBushDoctrine.Inthewordsofthe2006nSS,the“advanceoffreedomandhumandignitythroughdemocracyisthelong-termsolutiontothetransnationalterrorismoftoday.”71

Isthisfeasible?Realistsareoftenportrayedasskeptics,thoughitisworthnotingthatrealistassumptionsoffernotheoreticalgroundsforanyparticularstandonthissubject;realismassumesnationalism,notauthoritarianpredi-lections.Therecordismixedonthisscore,too.Democracyhasflourishedinpreviouslyhostilecontextssuchaspost-1945japanandGermany.AndeventsinIraqcouldhavea“contagion”effectonothercountries,asBushenvisions.72Butdemocracyhasalsoseriallyfailedinmanycountries,includinginseveraleuropeancasespre-1945.Thissuggeststhatcertainstructuralconditionsarerequired fordemocracy to stabilize, even ifnot theculturalones thatwereoncethefocusofresearchanddespair.externalassistancemightbestbetar-getedatencouragingpropitiousconditionsfordemocracy.73

Does the Bush Doctrine Have Staying Power?ThischapterhasarguedthatBushDoctrineneoconservatismisavariantofrealism, specifically balance-of-threat realism, characterized by the supple-mentary assumption that nondemocratic regimes generate interstate, andincubate nonstate, threats to Western democracies in general and Americain particular. In these ways, the strategy outlined by the Doctrine is bet-terunderstoodnotasaradicaldeparture frommodernu.S. foreignpolicy,whichissubstantiallyrealistinnature,butasanadaptationofthattraditiontothenovelcircumstancesofthepost-9/11world.Forexample,thesuppos-edlyradicalinnovationofpreventiveuseofforcecan,andIthinkshould,beunderstoodnotasarejectionofdeterrencebutsimplyasasupplementarytoolintendedforverynarrowcircumstancesinwhichdeterrencemightbepronetofailatgreatcost.

Thispointhasoneimportantimplication.IfthecoreelementsoftheBushDoctrinearenottheprecariousproductofasingleforeignpolicyteam,theyarelikelytoendureundersuccessoradministrations.observersshouldexpectwholesaleabandonmentonlyiftheyconceiveoftheDoctrineincaricaturedterms,forexampleasallergictoallinternationalcooperationandbentonapolicyofconstantpreventivewar(oreven“periodicpreventivewars”).74Suchastrategywouldbeunsustainable.ButthatdoesnotaccuratelyrepresenttheDoctrine.Wecanconsidersustainabilityregardingthepreventiveuseofforce,

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periodically“narrow”coalitionsofthewilling,threatassessment,anddemoc-ratization.ThepointoftheanalysisbelowisnotthateachoftheseelementsislikelytoremainunalteredaftertheBushadministration,onlythattheirbroadfeaturesareunlikelytobeabandoned.

Thereislittleevidencethatanyu.S.governmentislikelytorenouncetheoptionofpreemptiveforceasasupplementtoAmerica’sdurablerelianceondeterrence, though it might return discussion of that option to a classifiedannexofitsnationalSecurityStrategy.75Clintoncertainlydidnotrenouncethisoptionwhenpresident.Andinthe2004presidentialcampaign,theDem-ocratic party platform promised action if an attack with WMDs “appearsimminent”(thatis,beforeitmaterializes)andjohnkerrypointedlyretainedthe“righttopreemptinanywaynecessarytoprotect”theu.S.76It isadis-tinctquestionwhetherfutureadministrationswouldexercisethepreventiveoption.Incomingu.S.governmentsofbothpartiesmaywellbechastenedbyhowdifficultIraqproved.Manynowconcludethatfurtherpreventiveuseofforceishighlyunlikely.

Butsubstantialevidencesuggestsotherwise.BothofAmerica’smajorpolit-icalparties,andforthatmatter,theeuropeanunion,haveidentifiedastheirtopsecurityprioritytoensurethatterroristsdonotacquireWMDs—ataskthatisentirelypreventiveinnature.77TheBushteamisnotuniqueindoubtingwhetheralladversariescaneffectivelybedeterred.78Moreover,whatappearsmostchasteningaboutIraqhasbeentheexperienceoftheu.S.-u.k.projectafter theoriginalmilitarystrike,aprojectofpolitical reconstitutionthat isnotanecessaryfeatureofapreventiveattackonWMDs.ThismayexplainthestrikingfactthatevenamidstproblemsinIraq,Americans(andeuropeans)havebeencalmlydiscussingtheprosandconsofpreventivemilitaryactionagainstIran’snuclearfacilities.Anditissuggestivethatthetwou.S.politi-cians leading inpublicopinionpolls for the2008presidential race,hillaryClintonandjohnMcCain,bothcontinuetoinsistthatthepreventiveactionagainstIraqwasappropriate.Thereisagoodcasetobemadethattheideaofthelimitedpreventiveuseofforcehasbeenmainstreamedratherthanmadeanathema.79

Futureu.S.governmentsareespeciallyunlikelytoabandontheBushDoc-trine’semphasisonmaintainingu.S.primacy,eitherbydeliberatelysquan-dering the u.S. lead in mobilized military resources or by ending a policyof seeking to deflect China, the most plausible peer competitor in comingdecades,fromachievingmilitaryparitywithAmerica.TheDoctrine’s“uni-lateralism”ismorelikelytobecontested,butquitepossiblyrhetoricallymorethan operationally. Alongside the u.S.’s extensive ongoing engagements ininternationalinstitutions,severalBushpolicieshavebeenmostheatedlydis-cussedonthismatter: relationswitheurope; thekyotoProtocol,Anti-Bal-listic Missile (ABM) treaty, and other treaties; and the willingness to useforcewithoutunSecurityCouncilapproval.oneachcount,aDemocratic

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administrationislikelytoactmoremultilaterallythanaRepublicanone.ButasStephenWaltnotes,post-ColdWardiplomaticrelationsbetweenAmericaandeuropebegantofrayinthe1990s,notafter2001.80AmericaunderClin-tonjoinedakosovooperationthatlackedunapproval.BothDemocratsandRepublicansunderClintonmadecleartheywouldnotratifythekyotoclimatechange treaty. leading Democrats even now do not call for kyoto’s imple-mentationnorforrestorationoftheABMtreaty.leadingDemocraticforeignpolicy intellectualsdiscussmultilateralism,butat the same timechampionu.S.primacy,describetheunasfrequentlyineffectual,andsupportaggres-siveanti-WMDpolicies.81Thedebatesbetweenthesethinkersandmanycon-servativesarenotdistinctionswithoutadifference.Buttheyaredifferencesofdegreeandnotofkind.Certainlymainstreamu.S.Democraticapproachesdonotapproximatetheprincipledandstrictmultilateralismtowhichmanyeuropeansocialdemocratsareatleastrhetoricallycommitted.

IsitregardingdemocratizationthatchangeismostlikelyafterBush?Arefutureu.S.governmentslikelytotracethreatstonondemocraticregimes?TheClintonadministrationcalledfor“democraticenlargement”;the2004Demo-cratic platform argued that “Americans will be safer in a world of democ-racies”;andjohnkerrybroadlyendorsedthenotionthatlackofdemocracyandpoliticalreformareamongtherootcauses“breedingthisvirulentnewformofanti-American terrorism.”82But thishasnotbeen translated intoacomparableemphasis inpolicymaking.Democratic“enlargement”wasnotamajorpriorityunderClinton.AndsincetheIraqinvasion,DemocratshavenotemphasizeddemocratizationtonearlythesamedegreeasBush.

Thiscautionregardingdemocratizationmaybetracednottoissuesofeffi-cacybutoffeasibility.Realistsarenottheonlyobserverswhohaveconcludedthatthecreationofstabledemocracies,howeverdesirable,isacomplexprocess,manyofwhosemovingpartsareunknowntous,at leastfornow.83IraqandAfghanistanhavebeenhumblingnotonlybecauserecalcitrantarmedadversar-ieshaveprovendifficulttodefeatbutalsobecauseithasprovendifficulttocreateeffectivedemocraticprocessesonwhosedurabilitywearereadytorely.ontheonehand,theBushadministrationhascontinuedtochampiondemocratizationinmanyothercountries.ontheother,timehasnotnoticeablydiminishedtheBushadministration’swillingnesstoworkwithmanynondemocraticregimes,includingapost-WMDlibya.Itistoosoontoknowifthisreflectsarealisticsenseofdemocratization’splausiblepaceoragrudgingconclusion thatnon-democraticregimesarepervasive,bothhistoricallyandtoday,forcomplicatedreasons. Perhaps America will seek more regime change through socioeco-nomicchange,asithasbeencrossingitsfingerswilloccurinChina.Therigor-ousassumptionthatnondemocraticregimesarethesourceofsecuritythreats,bothinterstateandsubstate,isthemost“radical”departureoftheBushDoc-trinefrompreexistingthinkingaboutinternationalrelations.Itmaybeunsur-

AQ: EN 82: Dead URL; please provide alternative.Response: This now on Kerry’s Senate website:http://kerry.senate.gov/low/record.cfm?id=189831


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administrationislikelytoactmoremultilaterallythanaRepublicanone.ButasStephenWaltnotes,post-ColdWardiplomaticrelationsbetweenAmericaandeuropebegantofrayinthe1990s,notafter2001.80AmericaunderClin-tonjoinedakosovooperationthatlackedunapproval.BothDemocratsandRepublicansunderClintonmadecleartheywouldnotratifythekyotoclimatechange treaty. leading Democrats even now do not call for kyoto’s imple-mentationnorforrestorationoftheABMtreaty.leadingDemocraticforeignpolicy intellectualsdiscussmultilateralism,butat the same timechampionu.S.primacy,describetheunasfrequentlyineffectual,andsupportaggres-siveanti-WMDpolicies.81Thedebatesbetweenthesethinkersandmanycon-servativesarenotdistinctionswithoutadifference.Buttheyaredifferencesofdegreeandnotofkind.Certainlymainstreamu.S.Democraticapproachesdonotapproximatetheprincipledandstrictmultilateralismtowhichmanyeuropeansocialdemocratsareatleastrhetoricallycommitted.

IsitregardingdemocratizationthatchangeismostlikelyafterBush?Arefutureu.S.governmentslikelytotracethreatstonondemocraticregimes?TheClintonadministrationcalledfor“democraticenlargement”;the2004Demo-cratic platform argued that “Americans will be safer in a world of democ-racies”;andjohnkerrybroadlyendorsedthenotionthatlackofdemocracyandpoliticalreformareamongtherootcauses“breedingthisvirulentnewformofanti-American terrorism.”82But thishasnotbeen translated intoacomparableemphasis inpolicymaking.Democratic“enlargement”wasnotamajorpriorityunderClinton.AndsincetheIraqinvasion,DemocratshavenotemphasizeddemocratizationtonearlythesamedegreeasBush.

Thiscautionregardingdemocratizationmaybetracednottoissuesofeffi-cacybutoffeasibility.Realistsarenottheonlyobserverswhohaveconcludedthatthecreationofstabledemocracies,howeverdesirable,isacomplexprocess,manyofwhosemovingpartsareunknowntous,at leastfornow.83IraqandAfghanistanhavebeenhumblingnotonlybecauserecalcitrantarmedadversar-ieshaveprovendifficulttodefeatbutalsobecauseithasprovendifficulttocreateeffectivedemocraticprocessesonwhosedurabilitywearereadytorely.ontheonehand,theBushadministrationhascontinuedtochampiondemocratizationinmanyothercountries.ontheother,timehasnotnoticeablydiminishedtheBushadministration’swillingnesstoworkwithmanynondemocraticregimes,includingapost-WMDlibya.Itistoosoontoknowifthisreflectsarealisticsenseofdemocratization’splausiblepaceoragrudgingconclusion thatnon-democraticregimesarepervasive,bothhistoricallyandtoday,forcomplicatedreasons. Perhaps America will seek more regime change through socioeco-nomicchange,asithasbeencrossingitsfingerswilloccurinChina.Therigor-ousassumptionthatnondemocraticregimesarethesourceofsecuritythreats,bothinterstateandsubstate,isthemost“radical”departureoftheBushDoc-trinefrompreexistingthinkingaboutinternationalrelations.Itmaybeunsur-



prisingthatitisonthisscorethattheDoctrinelooksmostvulnerable.Butthisonlybringsintosharpreliefthedurabilityofitsothermajorfeatures.

NOTES 1. FredBarnes,Rebel-in-Chief (newyork:CrownForum,2006),54.vicePresi-

dentDickCheneyhassaidthatthe“BushDoctrineassertsthatstatessupport-ingterrorists,orprovidingsanctuaryforterrorists,willbedeemedjustasguiltyofcrimesastheterroriststhemselves”;see“vicePresident’sRemarksattheu.S.Military Academy Commencement,” May 31, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-7.html.

In his january 2006 speech at kansas State university, President Bushthree times referred to the “doctrine” that “if you harbor a terrorist, you’reequallyasguiltyastheterrorists”;see“PresidentDiscussesGlobalWaronter-ror at kansas State university,” january 23, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060123-4.html.

2. Ivo Daalder and james M. lindsay, America Unbound (Washington, DC:BrookingsInstitutionPress,2003),15;PeterDombrowskiandRodgerA.Payne,“GlobalDebateandthelimitsoftheBushDoctrine,”International Studies Per-spective4(2003):395-408.

3. Robertjervis,“understandingtheBushDoctrine,”Political Science Quarterly 118(2003):365-88,365;Robertlieber,The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century(newyork:CambridgeuniversityPress,2004),43-44.

4. ThenationalSecurityStrategy,oftheunitedStates,September17,2002,p.4,http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdfpassim; hereafter, 2002 nSS. GeorgeW.Bush,“PresidentBushDeliversGraduationSpeechatWestPoint,”june1,2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html. GeorgeW. Bush, “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle east,”november 6, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html. The national Security Strategy of the united States, March 16,2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf; hereafter, 2006nSS.

5. Charleskrauthammerremarks that“theBushDoctrine is,essentially,asyn-onym for neoconservative foreign policy” in “The neoconservative Conver-gence,”Commentary(july-August2005):22.neoconservatismdivergessharplyfrom constructivist theorizing in international relations, but that analyticapproachfornowplaysnoprominentroleinpolicydebatesandisnotdiscussedhere.

6. Forabasicdefinitionofrealism,seejohnj.Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics(newyork:norton,2001),17-18.

7. kennethn.Waltz,Theory of International Politics(Reading,MA:Addison-Wes-ley,1979);Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics;RobertGilpin,War and Change in World Politics(newyork:CambridgeuniversityPress,1981).

8. johnMearsheimer,“TheFalsePromiseofInternationalInstitutions,”Interna-tional Security19(Winter1994/95):5-49.

9. john Mearsheimer, “Conversation with john Mearsheimer,” interviewed byharry kreiseler, April 8 p://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people2/Mearsheimer/mearsheimer-con5.html.

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10. StephenWalt,TheoriginsofAlliances(Ithaca,ny:CornelluniversityPress,1987).

11. See, forexample,johnowen,Liberal Peace, Liberal War (Ithaca,ny:CornelluniversityPress,1997).

12. G. john Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton, nj: Princeton university Press,2001);StephenWalt,Taming American Power(newyork:norton,2005).

13. Thereisasubstantialacademicliteratureidentifiableasneoconservative.Anal-ysisfruitfullyfocusesonsuchworksaslieber,The American Era;Williamkris-tolandRobertkagan,“towardaneo-ReaganiteForeignPolicy,”Foreign Affairs75/4(july-August1996);andotherworksdiscussedbelow.

14. kennethWaltz,“ReflectionsonTheoryofInternationalRelations:AResponsetoMyCritics,” ined.Robertkeohane,Neorealism and Its Critics (newyork:ColumbiauniversityPress,1986),329.

15. Itisworthobservingthatpopulationsandespeciallylevelsofwealthcanalsofluctuatesubstantiallyacrosstime.

16. Mearsheimer,Tragedy,chapters3-4. 17. Mearsheimer,Tragedy,3. 18. Intheeconomicanddecision-theoretictradition,“risk”referstoaneventwith

aknownprobabilityofoccurrence(asinagameofchance)and“uncertainty”toonewithnoquantifiedprobability.Butmanystudiesemphasizethedifferencebetweenuncertaintyasa totalunknownanduncertaintyas, ineffect, rangesof unquantified likelihood such as “highly unlikely” or “very likely,” rangesthatseemtoinformagreatdealofreal-worlddecisionmaking.Fortwoappliedexamples, seeDaleCopeland,The Origins of Major War (Ithaca,ny:CornelluniversityPress,2001)andGerardAlexander,The Sources of Democratic Con-solidation(Ithaca,ny:CornelluniversityPress,2002).

19. Walt,TheOrigins of Alliances;StephenWalt,“RevolutionandWar,”World Poli-tics44(April1992):321-368.

20. ThissectiondrawsonGerardAlexander,“TheAuthoritarianIllusion,”National Interest(Fall2004):79-83.

21. jeanekirkpatrick,“DictatorshipsandDoubleStandards,”Commentary(novem-ber,1979),http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archves/speeches/1982/60882a.htm.

22. For a different interpretation of the deeper roots, see Michael C. Williams,“WhatIsthenationalInterest?TheneoconservativeChallengeinIRTheory,”European Journal of International Relations11(2005):307-37.

23. Alexander,“TheAuthoritarianIllusion,”80. 24. Some states also deliberately encourage terrorist activity. See Daniel Byman,

Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism(newyork:Cambridgeuni-versityPress,2005).

25. George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middleeast,” november 6, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html.

26. GeorgeW.Bush,Stateof theunionAddress, january20,2004,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.

27. David C. hendrickson and Robert W. tucker, “The Freedom Crusade,” The National Interest81(Fall2005):12-13.

28. Condoleezza Rice, “The Promise of Democratic Peace,” Washington Post,December11,2005,B7.

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29. Daalderandlindsay,America Unbound,125. 30. IvoDaalderandjamesM.lindsay’scontributionsto“BrookingsForum:Brook-

ings Scholars evaluate and Analyze President’s national Security StrategyPaper,”http://www.brook.edu/comm/events/20021004.pdf.

31. 2002nSS,14-15;2006nSS,8;italicsadded.Inthesediscussions,“deterrence”oftenincludescompellanceandotherstrategies.

32. CondoleezzaRice,“Dr.CondoleezzaRiceDiscussesPresident’snationalSecu-rityStrategy,”october1,2002,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html.longbefore9/11,kristolandkagantookpainstonotethat“[d]uringtheColdWar,thestrategiesofdeterrenceandcontainmentworked…well”in“towardaneo-ReaganiteForeignPolicy,”22.

33. joint Chiefs of Staff, “The national Military Strategy of the united States ofAmerica,” 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf.

34. RichardBetts,Surprise Attack(Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitution,1982),95.Seealso,johnlewisGaddis,Surprise, Security, and the American Experience(Cambridge,MA:harvarduniversityPress,2004).

35. AstheBushadministrationalsopointedout,Iraqhadnotdefinitivelyresolvedthe1990–1991warandcontinued tofireatalliedplanespatrollingagreed-tono-flyzones.

36. For recentdiscussions, seelawrenceFreedman,Deterrence (Cambridge,uk:PolityPress,2004)andPatrickMorgan,Deterrence Now(newyork:CambridgeuniversityPress,2003).

37. Somestreamsofrealistthoughtalsotraceconflictstosecuritydilemmasthatspiralsufficiently.

38. Charleskrauthammer,“DemocraticRealism:AnAmericanForeignPolicyforaunipolarWorld,”IrvingkristollectureattheAmericanenterpriseInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch,February10,2004[emphasisinoriginal],http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.19912,filter.all/pub_detail.asp. The issue of uncer-taintyover theoriginsofanattackmightposeanewdilemmaforpreventiveaction:Ifastatedoesn’tknowwhotouseforceagainstafteranattack,howcanitpossiblyknowwhotouseforceagainstbeforeone?Theanswerhasbeenmadesimplerbythefactthatonlyasmallnumberofroguestatespossesstheprogramsofgreatestconcern:advancednuclearprograms.eliminating them,alongsidesecuringformerSovietweapons,mightdenyallterroristssuchweapons.

39. Forexample,seejohnj.MearsheimerandStephenM.Walt,“AnunnecessaryWar,”Foreign Policy137(january-February2003):58.

40. Foronepartialdiscussion,seeRobertF.tragerandDessislavaP.Zagorcheva,“Deterringterrorism:ItCanBeDone,”International Security30(Winter2005-06):87-123.

41. Interviewwithowenharries, “onPrudenceandRestraint inForeignPolicy,”Policy 18 (Autumn 2002): 32, available through http://www.policymagazine.com.

42. nikitakhrushchevmayhavebeenthemostrisk-tolerantSovietleader. 43. Robertlieber,“AreRealistsRealisticAboutForeignPolicy?”Paperpreparedfor

deliveryatthe2003AnnualMeetingoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssocia-tion,Philadelphia,August2003.

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44. kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm (new york: Random house, 2002),248-271;MearsheimerandWalt,“unnecessaryWar.”

45. u.S.AmbassadorAprilGlaspieissaidtohaveassuredSaddamhusseinin1990thattheu.S.wouldnotresisthisinvasionofkuwait.Buteveniftrue,howoftenhaverulerslaunchedmajorwarsontheunconfirmedassuranceofasingledip-lomat?Robert jervis reviews thevariouspossibilities thathussein refused tocapitulate in 2002–2003 (for instance by permitting absolutely unrestrictedinspections)becausehewasafraidoflossoffaceamongIraqis,ofassassinationattemptsbyAmericans,orofpossible invasionbyanIrannolongerdeterredbyhisallegedWMDs;orbecausehe suspected theu.S.was irrevocablybentonhisoverthrowregardless;orbecausehedoubtedtheu.S.wouldultimatelyattack,eventhoughmostobserversdidnot.Butinallthesecasessavethelast,husseinwouldhavebeentakingamassiveriskoflosingpowerinadirectmili-taryconfrontationwiththecoalitioninordertoavoidwhatseemlikesmallerrisksthathemightlosepower.Thelastscenariosuggestshewasill-informedinways thatmadehisdecisionsobjectivelyhigh-riskanyway.SeeRobert jervis,“WhytheBushDoctrineCannotBeSustained,”Political Science Quarterly120(Fall2005):364,366-367.AndevenifSaddamfaceddomesticchallengestohisregime in1980and1990 thatmight fruitfullybeaddressed throughsuccess-fulwarmaking,whywashusseinconfidenthiswarswouldbesuccessful?Andwhatdomesticrisktohisregimecouldhavejustifiedtheforeignriskhe(againunsuccessfully)ranin2003?SeeF.GregoryGauseIII,“Iraq’sDecisionstoGotoWar,1980and1990,”Middle East Journal 56(Winter2002):47-70.

46. George W. Bush, “Address to a joint Session of Congress and the AmericanPeople,” September 20, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

47. Forabriefdiscussionofsomeoftheseissues,seeDanielByman,Deadly Connec-tions: States that Sponsor Terror (new york: Cambridge university Press, 2005),210-15.

48. Arguably,the2003invasionofIraqmighthaveconstitutedjustsuchadisplayofresolve.AnothermightbeadmittingIsraelintonAto.onChirac,seeArianeBer-nard,“ChirachintsatnuclearReplytoState-Supportedterrorism,”january20,2006,http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/20/international/europe/20france.html.

49. kenneth Waltz, “The emerging Structure of International Politics,” Interna-tional Security18(Fall1993):44-79.

50. Walt,Taming American Power;RobertPape,“SoftBalancingAgainsttheunitedStates,”International Security30(Summer2005):7-45.

51. IthankStanleyRenshonforraisingthissubject. 52. keirlieberandGerardAlexander,“WaitingforBalancing:WhytheWorldIs

notPushingBack,”International Security30(Summer2005):109-139;WilliamWohlforthandStephenBrooks,“hardtimesforSoftBalancing,”International Security30(Summer2005):72-108.

53. FrancisFukuyama,“TheneoconservativeMoment,”National Interest74(Sum-mer2004):66.

54. 2002nSS,13. 55. Waltz,“ReflectionsonTheoryofInternationalRelations,”327. 56. johnlewisGaddis,“AGrandStrategyoftransformation,”Foreign Policy133

(november-December2002):52.

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57. Bush,“PresidentBushDeliversGraduationSpeechatWestPoint.” 58. Gaddis,Surprise, Security,86. 59. Robert jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (new york: Routledge,

2005). 60. William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a unipolar World,” International Secu-

rity24(1999):23-28;Mearsheimer,Tragedy,377,379-380;kristolandkagan,“towardaneo-ReaganiteForeignPolicy.”

61. For neorealist skepticism, see Mearsheimer, “False Promise”; and RandallSchweller, “The Problem of International order Revisited: A Review essay,”International Security26/1(Summer2001).

62. Gaddis,Surprise, Security,26. 63. Thenagain,given thewillingnessofmanyWestern liberals touse forcewith

substantially less than global unanimity, the policy debate seems to be notwhether“coalitionsofthewilling”areappropriate,butwhatnumberof“will-ing”issufficienttoendowlegitimacy.Foraprominentexampleofsuchwilling-ness (regarding kosovo), see Robert kagan, “America’s Crisis of legitimacy,”Foreign Affairs83(March-April2004):73-79.

64. ApointmadebyFrancisFukuyama,“Does the ‘West’Stillexist?” inBeyond Paradise and Power,ed.todlindberg(newyork:Routledge,2004).

65. keir lieber and Robert lieber, “The Bush national Security Strategy,” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda 7/4 (December 2002), http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4lieber.htm.

66. For example, William kristol and vance Serchuk, “end the Genocide now,”Washington Post, September 22, 2004, A31, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40121-2004Sep21.html.

67. AaronFriedberg,“TheFutureofu.S.-ChinaRelations:IsConflictInevitable?”International Security30(Fall2005):7-45.

68. 2002nSS,6. 69. Defenders insist its ambitiousness should not be exaggerated in either pace

or extent. For example, krauthammer, “The neoconservative Convergence,”25; and norman Podhoretz’s contribution to “The Bush Doctrine: What thePresidentSaidandWhatItMeans,”heritageFoundationlecture#881,june2,2005,http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/hl881.cfm.

70. Alexander,“TheAuthoritarianIllusion”;F.GregoryGauseIII,“CanDemocracyStopterrorism?”Foreign Affairs(September-october2005):62-76.

71. 2006nSS,11. 72. For example, George W. Bush, “President’s Remarks on Iraq from the Rose

Garden,” April 15, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2003/04/20030415-10.html.

73. GerardAlexander,“MakingDemocracyStick,”Policy Review(December2005–january2006):45-57.

74. Francis Fukuyama, “After neoconservatism,” New York Times, February 19,2006,http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/neo.html.

75. The2006nSSinsiststhatthe“placeofpreemption…remainsthesame”;23.

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76. The 2004 Democratic national Platform for America, “Strong at home,Respected in the World,” july 27, 2004, 6, http://www.democrats.org/pdfs/2004platform.pdf; kerry spoke during one of the presidential debates, Com-missiononPresidentialDebates, “TheFirstBush-kerryPresidentialDebate,”September30,2004,http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004a.html.

77. Forexample,seethe2004DemocraticPlatform,“Strongathome,RespectedintheWorld,”6;theRepublicancounterpart,2004RepublicanPlatform,“ASaferWorldandaMorehopefulAmerica,”August26,2004,http://www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf;andtheCounciloftheeuropeanunion,euro-peanSecurityStrategy, “ASecureeurope inaBetterWorld,”December12,2003,http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf.

78. AslateasSeptember2002,formervicePresidentAlGorebelievedthatSaddamhussein’ssearchforWMDs“hasprovenimpossibletocompletelydeter,andweshouldassumethatitwillcontinueforaslongasSaddamisinpower.”See“text:GoreAssailsBush’sIraqPolicy,”speechbeforetheCommonwealthClubofSanFrancisco, September 23, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/poli-tics/transcripts/gore_text092302.html.

79. Forexample,seejamesSteinberg,“TheuseofPreventiveForceasanelementofuSnationalStrategy,”aWorkingPaperofthePrincetonProjectonnationalSecurity,http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/papers/Steinberg_Preemption.pdf.

80. StephenM.Walt,“ThetiesthatFray:WhyeuropeandAmericaAreApproach-ingaPartingoftheWays,”The National Interest54(Winter1998-99):3-11.

81. For example, Progressive Policy Institute, “Progressive Internationalism: ADemocraticnationalSecurityStrategy,”october31,2003,http://www.ppionline.org/documents/Progressive_Internationalism_1003.pdf.Seealso,joshuaMicahMarshall,“kerryFacestheWorld,”Atlantic Monthly(july/August2004):108-14.

82. 2004DemocraticPlatform,“Strongathome,RespectedintheWorld,”7;http://kerry.Senate.gov/low/record.cfm?id=189931.

83. neo-conservatives are not immune; see Francis Fukuyama’s contribution to“DefendingandAdvancingFreedom:ASymposium,”Commentary(november2005):30.

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