international relations theory

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORYTHEORY

Zhou QiujunZhou Qiujun

Private email: [email protected] email: [email protected]

Public email: [email protected] email: [email protected]

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ContentsContents1.1. INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

2.2. METHODS FOR STUDYING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORYMETHODS FOR STUDYING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

3.3. REALISM REALISM

4.4. LIBERALISMLIBERALISM

5.5. CONSTRUCTIVISM CONSTRUCTIVISM

6.6. THE ENGLISH SCHOOL THE ENGLISH SCHOOL

7.7. CRITICAL THEORIES OF WORLD POLITICS CRITICAL THEORIES OF WORLD POLITICS

8.8. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND GLOBALIZATIONINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND GLOBALIZATION

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Chapter 4: Chapter 4: LiberalismLiberalism

I.I. From Idealism to LiberalismFrom Idealism to Liberalism

II.II. Neoliberal InstitutionalismNeoliberal Institutionalism

III.III. Liberalist approach to international Liberalist approach to international cooperationcooperation

IV.IV. Conclusion: strengths and weaknessConclusion: strengths and weakness

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I.I. From Idealism to LiberalismFrom Idealism to Liberalism

During the 20 years’ crisis after the WWI, Idealism During the 20 years’ crisis after the WWI, Idealism showed its inability and gave place to the Realism. showed its inability and gave place to the Realism. However, since the late 1970s, several new features However, since the late 1970s, several new features have emerged: the tense confrontation of the two have emerged: the tense confrontation of the two great powers began to ease, world trade and great powers began to ease, world trade and economic exchanges became frequent, and some economic exchanges became frequent, and some international institutions survived and sustained international institutions survived and sustained with vigor.with vigor.

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Rational Choice Institutionalism

New Institutional Economics

Functionalism

NeofunctionalismStructural Realism

Complex Interdependence

Neoliberal Institutionalism

Interdependence

International Institutions

Hegemony Stability Theory

Politics Economics

Liberal institutionalism

II.II. Neoliberal InstitutionalismNeoliberal Institutionalism

1.1. Evolution of Neoliberal Institutionalism in IREvolution of Neoliberal Institutionalism in IR

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2.2. Representative scholar-1Representative scholar-1: : Joseph S. NyeJoseph S. Nye (1937- ), (1937- ), Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Power and Interdependence: World Politics in TransitionTransition 《《权力与相互依赖：转变中的世界政治权力与相互依赖：转变中的世界政治》》 (with (with Keohane, 1977). This book was considered as the Keohane, 1977). This book was considered as the manifesto of Neoliberalism.manifesto of Neoliberalism.

①① Although being greatly impressed by Realism, Nye found Although being greatly impressed by Realism, Nye found that that ideas, institutions and economic interdependenceideas, institutions and economic interdependence were all left out in the realist spectrum. With skepticism were all left out in the realist spectrum. With skepticism in mind and inspired by Ernst B. Haas (Neofunctionalism), in mind and inspired by Ernst B. Haas (Neofunctionalism), he began exerting himself to discover the functions of he began exerting himself to discover the functions of these neglected elements. In 1968 both Nye and these neglected elements. In 1968 both Nye and Keohane were included into the board of Keohane were included into the board of International International OrganizationOrganization. Later Keohane became editor and Nye . Later Keohane became editor and Nye chair of the board, making the journal a real base of chair of the board, making the journal a real base of institutional studies. institutional studies.

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②② ““soft powersoft power””

出处：出处： Nye coined the term in 1990 when he published Nye coined the term in 1990 when he published Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power Power and “soft power”and “soft power” in in Foreign PolicyForeign Policy. Since then, . Since then, “soft power” has been widespread and become a popular “soft power” has been widespread and become a popular term in the post-Cold War era. It was also elaborated in term in the post-Cold War era. It was also elaborated in Nye’s Nye’s Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Soft Power: The Means to Success in World PoliticsPolitics (2004). (2004).

涵义：涵义： opposite to “hard power” that compels others to do opposite to “hard power” that compels others to do what they are not willing to do, it uses its internal what they are not willing to do, it uses its internal attractions such as cultures and values to persuade attractions such as cultures and values to persuade others to do something.others to do something.

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3.3. Representative scholar-2Representative scholar-2: : Robert O. KeohaneRobert O. Keohane (1941- ) (1941- )

①① 背景：背景： He was a Harvard graduate student under He was a Harvard graduate student under Stanley Stanley HoffmanHoffman, a great Realist who ever followed , a great Realist who ever followed Arnold WolfersArnold Wolfers and and Raymond AronRaymond Aron, two masters of Realism. However , two masters of Realism. However Keohane did not simply swallow the Realist opinions, he Keohane did not simply swallow the Realist opinions, he tried hard to study the role of institutions in influencing tried hard to study the role of institutions in influencing the interstate relations. His Ph.D. dissertation in which a the interstate relations. His Ph.D. dissertation in which a case study of the UN General Assembly was made can be case study of the UN General Assembly was made can be regarded as the early fruit of his efforts, which awarded regarded as the early fruit of his efforts, which awarded him the best Ph.D. dissertation in 1966.him the best Ph.D. dissertation in 1966.

President of the International Studies Association 1988-President of the International Studies Association 1988-19891989

President of American Political Science Association 1999-President of American Political Science Association 1999-20002000

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Chapter 4: Chapter 4: LiberalismLiberalism②② 1970s — 1970s — complex interdependencecomplex interdependence

Transnational Relations and World Politics Transnational Relations and World Politics (with Nye, 1972) (with Nye, 1972) emphases the importance of transnational relations, showing emphases the importance of transnational relations, showing Keohane’ special perspectives on IR studies.Keohane’ special perspectives on IR studies.

He paid much attention to IPE in writing He paid much attention to IPE in writing Power and Power and Interdependence Interdependence (1977). This book puts forward the famous (1977). This book puts forward the famous concept of “complex interdependence” and some other key concept of “complex interdependence” and some other key elements of the institutional theory, which paved way for him to elements of the institutional theory, which paved way for him to build his Institutionalist theory. Later, he read more economists build his Institutionalist theory. Later, he read more economists including including Charles P. KindlebergerCharles P. Kindleberger, , George AkerlofGeorge Akerlof, , Ronald CoaseRonald Coase and and Oliver WilliamsonOliver Williamson. He devoted to bridge the theories of . He devoted to bridge the theories of Economics in particular the Economics in particular the Institutional EconomicsInstitutional Economics with those of with those of the international relations, and he suddenly found that the international relations, and he suddenly found that international regimesinternational regimes could be accounted for in ways that are could be accounted for in ways that are parallel to the modern theory of the firm—that political market parallel to the modern theory of the firm—that political market failures result from transaction costs and uncertainty, and that failures result from transaction costs and uncertainty, and that these failures could be corrected, with benefits for all participants, these failures could be corrected, with benefits for all participants, through through international institutionsinternational institutions. .

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Chapter 4: Chapter 4: LiberalismLiberalism③③ 1980s — 1980s — institutioninstitution, , cooperationcooperation

““The Demand for International Regimes” The Demand for International Regimes” (1982) refined his (1982) refined his thoughts about institutions and cooperation. Another one is thoughts about institutions and cooperation. Another one is International Institutions and States Power: Essays in International Institutions and States Power: Essays in International Relations TheoryInternational Relations Theory (1989). (1989).

After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political EconomyPolitical Economy 《《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》》(1984) questioned directly the explanatory power of Neorealism (1984) questioned directly the explanatory power of Neorealism on the world governance without hegemony and examines the on the world governance without hegemony and examines the conditions under which cooperation can take place. [his conditions under which cooperation can take place. [his Neoliberal institutionalismNeoliberal institutionalism was established by this book] was established by this book]

再版再版 Power and InterdependencePower and Interdependence::22ndnd edn (1989) responded to the critics since its publication. edn (1989) responded to the critics since its publication. 33rdrd edn (2001) reconsidered the key concepts such as edn (2001) reconsidered the key concepts such as globalization globalization, ,

international institutionsinternational institutions and and interdependenceinterdependence in the 21 in the 21stst century. century.

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In short, Keohane sets up a “loose paradigm” for In short, Keohane sets up a “loose paradigm” for the contemporary world politics. With the contemporary world politics. With accepting accepting the core assumptions of Realismthe core assumptions of Realism, he focuses his , he focuses his research agenda on the issues of research agenda on the issues of institutions and institutions and cooperationcooperation..

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4.4. AssumptionsAssumptions

①① 关于关于 RealismRealism 的假设的假设

summarized by Keohane:summarized by Keohane: the state-centric assumptionthe state-centric assumption the rationality assumptionthe rationality assumption the power assumptionthe power assumption

added by Waltz:added by Waltz: the international system is anarchic rather than hierarchicthe international system is anarchic rather than hierarchic it is characterized by interaction among units with similar it is characterized by interaction among units with similar

functionsfunctions the system is defined by the distribution of “power” the system is defined by the distribution of “power”

across the unitsacross the units

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②② Changes in the late 1960sChanges in the late 1960s

The bipolar confrontation saw detente, with increasing The bipolar confrontation saw detente, with increasing contacts and cooperation between the two camps. From a contacts and cooperation between the two camps. From a wider context, movements of materials and goods between wider context, movements of materials and goods between and within national boundaries occurred frequently, in and within national boundaries occurred frequently, in which countries became more interrelated and which countries became more interrelated and interdependent than ever before. An information revolution interdependent than ever before. An information revolution furthered such trends. Meanwhile, the US hegemony was in furthered such trends. Meanwhile, the US hegemony was in decline while the other state and non-state actors decline while the other state and non-state actors (multinational companies, international organizations, (multinational companies, international organizations, international regimes, etc.) in rise. international regimes, etc.) in rise.

Under these circumstances, the Under these circumstances, the “high politics“high politics” topics in ” topics in international relations were gradually given way to the international relations were gradually given way to the “low “low politicspolitics”, including the global problems such as 4P. ”, including the global problems such as 4P.

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③③ Neoliberal institutionalismNeoliberal institutionalism 与与 RealismRealism 的假设之别的假设之别 (Keohane):(Keohane):

差别之一：差别之一： Neoliberal institutionalism agrees that the Neoliberal institutionalism agrees that the international system is anarchic, but it argues that “lack of international system is anarchic, but it argues that “lack of a common government” does not necessarily imply “lack of a common government” does not necessarily imply “lack of organization”. An international society exists there. organization”. An international society exists there. “Relationships among actors may be carefully structured in “Relationships among actors may be carefully structured in some issue-areas, even though they remain loose in others. some issue-areas, even though they remain loose in others. Likewise, some issues may be closely linked through the Likewise, some issues may be closely linked through the operation of institutions while the boundaries of other operation of institutions while the boundaries of other issues, as well as the norms and principles to be followed, issues, as well as the norms and principles to be followed, are subject to dispute. Thus, anarchy remains a constant; are subject to dispute. Thus, anarchy remains a constant; but the degree to which interactions are structured, and the but the degree to which interactions are structured, and the means by which they are structured, vary.” As an analytical means by which they are structured, vary.” As an analytical framework, anarchy is applicable for both military-security framework, anarchy is applicable for both military-security issues and political-economic ones. issues and political-economic ones.

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差别之二：差别之二： Neoliberal institutionalism agrees that states are Neoliberal institutionalism agrees that states are the principal actors in world politics, but more attention the principal actors in world politics, but more attention should be paid to non-state actors, intergovernmental should be paid to non-state actors, intergovernmental organizations, and transnational and transgovernmental organizations, and transnational and transgovernmental relations.relations.

差别之三：差别之三： Neoliberal institutionalism agrees that states are Neoliberal institutionalism agrees that states are rational egoist actors. They make sensitive calculations to rational egoist actors. They make sensitive calculations to maximize their expected gains in a given set of consistently maximize their expected gains in a given set of consistently ordered objectives. However, some important variables ordered objectives. However, some important variables such as perfect information, consideration of all possible such as perfect information, consideration of all possible alternatives, or unchanging actor preferences are omitted alternatives, or unchanging actor preferences are omitted here. With these variables, state actors may alter their here. With these variables, state actors may alter their behaviors to reduce discord and produce cooperation.behaviors to reduce discord and produce cooperation.

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差别之四：差别之四： Neoliberal institutionalism agrees that states Neoliberal institutionalism agrees that states seek power, and calculate their interests in terms of power. seek power, and calculate their interests in terms of power. However, this seems to simplify the function of power. In However, this seems to simplify the function of power. In fact, under different systemic conditions states will define fact, under different systemic conditions states will define their self-interests differently. Over the long run, whether their self-interests differently. Over the long run, whether an environment is malign or benign can alter the standard an environment is malign or benign can alter the standard operating procedures and sense of identity of the actors operating procedures and sense of identity of the actors themselves.themselves.

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Neoliberal Institutionalism and Neorealism: Neoliberal Institutionalism and Neorealism: Comparison of assumptionsComparison of assumptions

Assumptions Assumptions Neorealism Neorealism Neoliberal InstitutionalismNeoliberal Institutionalism

Anarchy is the foundation of international system

Yes Yes; but an international society exists

States are the principle actors in world system

Yes Yes; but international institutions play a major role

States are rational egoist actors

Yes Yes; but international institutions can adjust the states’ behaviors

States maximize power as the only way to ensure interests

Yes No; states define self-interests according to the environment

Institutions are independent variable causing cooperation

No Yes

Attitude on prospects for cooperation

Pessimistic Optimistic

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Different from Realism, Neoliberal Institutionalism holds an Different from Realism, Neoliberal Institutionalism holds an optimistic attitudeoptimistic attitude on the nature of interstate relationship. It on the nature of interstate relationship. It argues that interstate cooperation can take place with argues that interstate cooperation can take place with “properly designed institutions”.“properly designed institutions”. InstitutionsInstitutions——principles, principles, norms, rules and procedures—are an independent variable norms, rules and procedures—are an independent variable causing cooperation. A well arranged institution can alter causing cooperation. A well arranged institution can alter the states’ behaviors and “help egoists to cooperate even the states’ behaviors and “help egoists to cooperate even in the absence of a hegemonic power.” in the absence of a hegemonic power.”

What Keohane intended to do is “to synthesize elements of What Keohane intended to do is “to synthesize elements of Realism and Liberalism in an attempt to create the basis for Realism and Liberalism in an attempt to create the basis for such a theory, whose core is a concern with how institutions such a theory, whose core is a concern with how institutions affect incentives facing self-interested states.”affect incentives facing self-interested states.”

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III.III. Liberalist approach to international cooperationLiberalist approach to international cooperation

1.1. Power and complex interdependencePower and complex interdependence①① PowerPower is the ability to do something or the influence is the ability to do something or the influence

over patterns of outcomes. Given the imbalance in the over patterns of outcomes. Given the imbalance in the distribution of resources among states, asymmetry distribution of resources among states, asymmetry exists in interdependence, which provides actors with exists in interdependence, which provides actors with different influence in their dealings with one anther. In different influence in their dealings with one anther. In this case, this case, interdependenceinterdependence itself can be conceived as a itself can be conceived as a source of power.source of power.

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②② Sensitivity & VulnerabilitySensitivity & Vulnerability SensitivitySensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a involves degrees of responsiveness within a

policy framework, that is, how quickly do changes in one policy framework, that is, how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?are the costly effects?

VulnerabilityVulnerability reveals the relative availability and reveals the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face, costliness of the alternatives that various actors face, that is, what would be the costs of adjusting to the that is, what would be the costs of adjusting to the outside change?outside change?

区别：区别： SensitivitySensitivity shows the impact of costly effects to a shows the impact of costly effects to a country imposed by the outside changes; country imposed by the outside changes; vulnerability vulnerability shows the ability of this country to suffer costs by altering shows the ability of this country to suffer costs by altering policies accordingly. (eg. two countries, each importing policies accordingly. (eg. two countries, each importing 35% of their petroleum needs, may seem equally 35% of their petroleum needs, may seem equally sensitive to price rises; but if one can shift to domestic sensitive to price rises; but if one can shift to domestic sources at moderate cost, and the other has no sources at moderate cost, and the other has no alternatives, the second is more vulnerable than the alternatives, the second is more vulnerable than the first.)first.)

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③③ Views on interdependence and power (interdependence Views on interdependence and power (interdependence should be seen as):should be seen as): an alternative to power relationsan alternative to power relations sensitivitysensitivity

a form of power relationsa form of power relations vulnerabilityvulnerability For those who focus on the sensitivity: international politics

has turned from a “billiard-ball” model—states crash against one another, and their final trajectory determined by the force behind each actor’s movement—to a “cobweb” model where interests are intertwined and state actions depend on the coordination with the others rather than showing their state power. (John Burton)

For those who focus on the vulnerability: interdependence is in essence dependence which implies the lack of power. If one state is more capable than the other to cope with the outside changes, it pays less cost than the other, which consequently enables it to translate the asymmetry into “political pressure and leverage.” (Baldwin, Hirschman and Nye)

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④④ The “complex interdependence” has three The “complex interdependence” has three scenarios different from the Realist model:scenarios different from the Realist model:

- the existence of multiple channels of contact among the existence of multiple channels of contact among societies in interstate, trans-governmental and societies in interstate, trans-governmental and transnational relationstransnational relations

- the absence of a clear or consistent hierarchy in state the absence of a clear or consistent hierarchy in state policiespolicies

- military force takes a minor role in the interactions of military force takes a minor role in the interactions of governmentsgovernments

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2.2. Constraints to cooperationConstraints to cooperation Game theory demonstrates that although there is an Game theory demonstrates that although there is an

outcome of Pareto-optimal resulting from mutual outcome of Pareto-optimal resulting from mutual cooperation, such outcome is seldom occurred. cooperation, such outcome is seldom occurred. Individualistic self-interested calculation always leads Individualistic self-interested calculation always leads actors to undesirable or suboptimal outcomes, which actors to undesirable or suboptimal outcomes, which means cooperation does not happen. means cooperation does not happen.

On the contrary, Axelrod and Keohane outlined three On the contrary, Axelrod and Keohane outlined three situational dimensions that affect the propensity of actors situational dimensions that affect the propensity of actors to cooperate: to cooperate: mutuality of interestmutuality of interest, , the shadow of the the shadow of the futurefuture, and , and the number of actorsthe number of actors..

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①① D-1: D-1: the payoff structurethe payoff structure affects the level of cooperation. affects the level of cooperation. The greater the conflict of interest between the actors, The greater the conflict of interest between the actors, the more they are likely to defect. (PD model: fear, the more they are likely to defect. (PD model: fear, actors’ perception of interests…)actors’ perception of interests…)

②② D-2: success or failure of cooperation depends on the D-2: success or failure of cooperation depends on the actors’ perception of the future. When the players have actors’ perception of the future. When the players have an an indefinite number of interactionsindefinite number of interactions, things may be , things may be different. Players in an different. Players in an iterated PDiterated PD have to think over have to think over their decisions on each move because what they behave their decisions on each move because what they behave today not only determine the outcome of this move, but today not only determine the outcome of this move, but also influence that of the next move and even more in also influence that of the next move and even more in the future. By this means, the future casts a shadow upon the future. By this means, the future casts a shadow upon the present and hence affects the current strategic the present and hence affects the current strategic situation.situation.

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TIT FOR TAT StrategyTIT FOR TAT Strategy

Axelrod finds through computer tournaments that TIT FOR Axelrod finds through computer tournaments that TIT FOR TAT is an ideal model to put the future into the TAT is an ideal model to put the future into the consideration of current interactions. It follows the consideration of current interactions. It follows the reciprocal logic that begins with a cooperative move and reciprocal logic that begins with a cooperative move and then does whatever the other player has done on the then does whatever the other player has done on the previous move. It works under three rules:previous move. It works under three rules:

①① ““niceness”, which means never be the first to defect;niceness”, which means never be the first to defect;②② ““provocability”, which means always be ready to defect provocability”, which means always be ready to defect

immediately after an uncalled for defection by the opposite; immediately after an uncalled for defection by the opposite; ③③ ““forgiveness”, which requires the player to turn back to forgiveness”, which requires the player to turn back to

cooperation after having responded to a provocation of his cooperation after having responded to a provocation of his opposite.opposite.

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③③ D-3: cooperation is affected by D-3: cooperation is affected by the number of playersthe number of players in the in the game and the way they structure their relations. It is game and the way they structure their relations. It is recognized that reciprocity is an effective strategy to elicit recognized that reciprocity is an effective strategy to elicit cooperation in international relations, but this is right only cooperation in international relations, but this is right only when it meets three conditions:when it meets three conditions:

- players can identify defectors; players can identify defectors; - they are able to focus retaliation on defectors; they are able to focus retaliation on defectors; - they have sufficient long-run incentives to punish defectors.they have sufficient long-run incentives to punish defectors.

When the number rises, all these conditions will be uncertain. When the number rises, all these conditions will be uncertain. It may be impossible to identify defection and much less to It may be impossible to identify defection and much less to punish it; even if it is possible, punishment will be difficult to punish it; even if it is possible, punishment will be difficult to implement since all the players prefer to act as a free-rider implement since all the players prefer to act as a free-rider on the willingness of others to enforce the rules. This is what on the willingness of others to enforce the rules. This is what Axelrod and Keohane called “sanctioning problem”, or what Axelrod and Keohane called “sanctioning problem”, or what Kenneth A. Oye called “feasibility of sanctioning”.Kenneth A. Oye called “feasibility of sanctioning”.

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3.3. International institutions (International institutions ( 国际制度国际制度 ) & cooperation) & cooperation

①① Definition:Definition:International institutions areInternational institutions are the persistent and the persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.activity, and shape expectations.

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②② Main forms:Main forms:

Formal intergovernmental or cross-national Formal intergovernmental or cross-national nongovernmental organizations. They consist of nongovernmental organizations. They consist of bureaucratic organs, staffs and explicit rules to run the bureaucratic organs, staffs and explicit rules to run the organizations. (UN, WTO, NATO, EU) organizations. (UN, WTO, NATO, EU)

International regimes (International regimes ( 国际机制国际机制 ). Such institutions are ). Such institutions are usually made of international treaties agreed upon by usually made of international treaties agreed upon by governments; they provide a platform for their governments; they provide a platform for their participants to make decisions in front of the same world participants to make decisions in front of the same world settings or common crisis. (the Bretton Woods, 1944) settings or common crisis. (the Bretton Woods, 1944)

Conventions. They are informal institutions with implicit Conventions. They are informal institutions with implicit rules and understandings that shape the expectations of rules and understandings that shape the expectations of actors. They enable actors to understand one another to actors. They enable actors to understand one another to coordinate their behavior and limit actors’ incentives to coordinate their behavior and limit actors’ incentives to go to the opposite. They provide “spontaneous orders” to go to the opposite. They provide “spontaneous orders” to facilitate intergovernmental negotiations. In the process facilitate intergovernmental negotiations. In the process of interaction, states will spontaneously engage of interaction, states will spontaneously engage themselves to the conventional principles such as themselves to the conventional principles such as reciprocity and sovereignty. Anyone anticipates an easier reciprocity and sovereignty. Anyone anticipates an easier negotiation with others if abiding such underlying rules negotiation with others if abiding such underlying rules and a high cost if violating them.and a high cost if violating them.

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③③ International regimes are the means of coadjustment of International regimes are the means of coadjustment of cooperation. Lisa Martin divides cooperation into three forms: cooperation. Lisa Martin divides cooperation into three forms:

coincidencecoincidence, where common interests naturally lead to , where common interests naturally lead to cooperation; cooperation;

coercioncoercion, where divergent interests require the leading sender to , where divergent interests require the leading sender to use threats and promises to alter the preferences of others;use threats and promises to alter the preferences of others;

coadjustmentcoadjustment, where the mix of convergent and divergent interest , where the mix of convergent and divergent interest requires coordination. requires coordination. (Neoliberalism’s focus)(Neoliberalism’s focus)

④④ Functions of international regimes:Functions of international regimes: Once established, they act as “quasi-agreements”. They have no Once established, they act as “quasi-agreements”. They have no

power to enforce actors to conform, but they can power to enforce actors to conform, but they can help organize help organize their relations in mutually beneficial waystheir relations in mutually beneficial ways. They can also . They can also help help establish stable mutual expectationsestablish stable mutual expectations about each other’s patterns about each other’s patterns of behavior and develop working relationship that allows the of behavior and develop working relationship that allows the actors to adapt their practices to new situations. Those who obey actors to adapt their practices to new situations. Those who obey the regulations of international regimes will acquire good the regulations of international regimes will acquire good reputation, which helps them make agreements more easily. reputation, which helps them make agreements more easily.

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The prisoners in the PD game do not cooperate because The prisoners in the PD game do not cooperate because they have no idea of the decision that will be taken by the they have no idea of the decision that will be taken by the other prisoner. This is a typical case of the lack of other prisoner. This is a typical case of the lack of symmetrical information. It is also notable in symmetrical information. It is also notable in intergovernmental negotiations. To get a better intergovernmental negotiations. To get a better negotiation, one government needs not only information negotiation, one government needs not only information about the other’s resources and formal negotiating about the other’s resources and formal negotiating positions, but also accurate knowledge of their future positions, but also accurate knowledge of their future positions, so that all sides can understand one another. positions, so that all sides can understand one another. International regimes International regimes help reduce the risks and facilitate help reduce the risks and facilitate the outcomes in making agreements by providing reliable the outcomes in making agreements by providing reliable information in accordance with these two demandsinformation in accordance with these two demands. .

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International regimes also International regimes also reduce transaction costs of reduce transaction costs of legitimate bargains and increase them for illegitimate onelegitimate bargains and increase them for illegitimate one. . Through various forms of regimes, they not only prescribe Through various forms of regimes, they not only prescribe what is legitimate and what is illegitimate, but also what is legitimate and what is illegitimate, but also construct linkages between issues. Anyone who tries to construct linkages between issues. Anyone who tries to violate a certain rule will have to accept a potential violate a certain rule will have to accept a potential punishment with much wider impact. On the other side, punishment with much wider impact. On the other side, international regimes offer governments a convenient international regimes offer governments a convenient ground to negotiate agreements. They provide at the outset ground to negotiate agreements. They provide at the outset principles and rules for a variety of particular issues, so principles and rules for a variety of particular issues, so actors do not need to renegotiate them each time a specific actors do not need to renegotiate them each time a specific question arises. By such an approach, actors lower their question arises. By such an approach, actors lower their transaction costs including negotiation costs as well as transaction costs including negotiation costs as well as bureaucratic costs. Reversely, those who disregard the bureaucratic costs. Reversely, those who disregard the principles and rules will pay a high price on this.principles and rules will pay a high price on this.(eg. WTO’s “rounds” and it DSM.) (eg. WTO’s “rounds” and it DSM.)

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Besides, international regimes are easier to maintain than Besides, international regimes are easier to maintain than to create. Once created, they become an independent to create. Once created, they become an independent variable. They may be maintained and continue to foster variable. They may be maintained and continue to foster cooperation, even under conditions that would not be cooperation, even under conditions that would not be sufficiently benign to bring about their creation. (This is why sufficiently benign to bring about their creation. (This is why the decline of hegemony does not necessarily lead the decline of hegemony does not necessarily lead symmetrically to the decay of international regimes created symmetrically to the decay of international regimes created by it.) by it.)

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IV.IV. Conclusion: strengths and weaknessConclusion: strengths and weakness

““Now we are entering a new era. Old Now we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling; old international patterns are crumbling; old slogans are uninstructive; old solutions are slogans are uninstructive; old solutions are unavailing. The world has become unavailing. The world has become interdependent in economics, in interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations.”communications, in human aspirations.”

Henry A. Kissinger , “A New National Partnership,” speech, Jan. Henry A. Kissinger , “A New National Partnership,” speech, Jan. 24, 1975.24, 1975.

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I believe that international institutions are worth studying I believe that international institutions are worth studying because they are pervasive and important in world because they are pervasive and important in world politics and because their operation and evolution are politics and because their operation and evolution are difficult to understand. […] International institutions have difficult to understand. […] International institutions have the the potentialpotential to facilitate cooperation, and without to facilitate cooperation, and without international cooperation, I believe that the prospects for international cooperation, I believe that the prospects for our species would be very poor indeed. Cooperation is not our species would be very poor indeed. Cooperation is not always benign; but without cooperation, we will be lost. always benign; but without cooperation, we will be lost. Without institutions there will be little cooperation. And Without institutions there will be little cooperation. And without a knowledge of how institutions work—and what without a knowledge of how institutions work—and what makes them work well—there are likely to be fewer, and makes them work well—there are likely to be fewer, and worse, institutions than if such knowledge is widespread. worse, institutions than if such knowledge is widespread.

Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International International Studies QuarterlyStudies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec. 1988)., Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec. 1988).

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1.1. Realism has more explanatory power in the issue areas such as Realism has more explanatory power in the issue areas such as military security, ideology and territorial rivalry (military security, ideology and territorial rivalry (high politicshigh politics); ); Neoliberalism pales before them but talks more about the issues Neoliberalism pales before them but talks more about the issues of of low politicslow politics. .

2.2. Q: Why has NATO existed after the Cold War?Q: Why has NATO existed after the Cold War? Neoliberalism: an institution becomes an independent variable Neoliberalism: an institution becomes an independent variable

once created. With its own functioning mechanism including once created. With its own functioning mechanism including headquarters and staffs, NATO can survive itself for a period of headquarters and staffs, NATO can survive itself for a period of time even the hegemon who created it did no longer existed.time even the hegemon who created it did no longer existed.

Realism: NATO is first of all a treaty made by states. It is Realism: NATO is first of all a treaty made by states. It is the member states rather than international bureaucracy the member states rather than international bureaucracy that determine the fate of this organization; international that determine the fate of this organization; international institutions are subordinated to national purposes. NATO in institutions are subordinated to national purposes. NATO in the post-Cold War era is mainly a means of the US to the post-Cold War era is mainly a means of the US to maintain and expand its own power on the security order in maintain and expand its own power on the security order in Europe.Europe.

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““The ability of the United States to extend the life of a moribund The ability of the United States to extend the life of a moribund institution nicely illustrates how international institutions are institution nicely illustrates how international institutions are created and maintained by stronger states to serve their created and maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests.” The post-Cold War time perceived or misperceived interests.” The post-Cold War time witnessed this institution’s military operations under the witnessed this institution’s military operations under the leadership of the US. In Oct. 1992, NATO decided to establish its leadership of the US. In Oct. 1992, NATO decided to establish its first Rapid Reaction Force. From June 1993 to Oct. 1996, NATO first Rapid Reaction Force. From June 1993 to Oct. 1996, NATO carried out its first military operation in the former Yugoslavia. In carried out its first military operation in the former Yugoslavia. In 1999 the US-led NATO adopted a 78-day bombing to the Federal 1999 the US-led NATO adopted a 78-day bombing to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without the authorization of the UN Republic of Yugoslavia without the authorization of the UN Security Council, in which a building of Chinese embassy in the Security Council, in which a building of Chinese embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was also blown down. By those Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was also blown down. By those operations in the European continent where EU performed poorly operations in the European continent where EU performed poorly in uniting its own military forces, the US played a role of safe in uniting its own military forces, the US played a role of safe guarder and world police. Since 1999, NATO has stepped out for guarder and world police. Since 1999, NATO has stepped out for its enlargement while still “remains open to all European its enlargement while still “remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose wider inclusion the responsibilities of membership, and whose wider inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe.” Those would enhance overall security and stability in Europe.” Those newcomers will be required to improve their military infrastructure newcomers will be required to improve their military infrastructure and to buy modern weapons, and the American arms industry with and to buy modern weapons, and the American arms industry with ambition to hold a large share in this business has lobbies heavily ambition to hold a large share in this business has lobbies heavily in favor of NATO’s expansion. All these seem to illustrate NATO’s in favor of NATO’s expansion. All these seem to illustrate NATO’s subordination to satisfy the interests of the hegemonic powers. subordination to satisfy the interests of the hegemonic powers.

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Keohane: even in some security issues, states can realize Keohane: even in some security issues, states can realize their substantial mutual interests only through their substantial mutual interests only through institutionalized cooperation. Taking institutionalized cooperation. Taking international alliancesinternational alliances for instance, Neorealism regards them as the for instance, Neorealism regards them as the outcomes of outcomes of major antagonismmajor antagonism resulting from the system structure. resulting from the system structure. Keohane challenges this by several questions:Keohane challenges this by several questions:

- Are formal alliances more durable or stronger than alignments Are formal alliances more durable or stronger than alignments based on informal agreements?based on informal agreements?

- How much difference do executive heads of alliance organizations, How much difference do executive heads of alliance organizations, and their bureaucracies, make in terms of the durability or and their bureaucracies, make in terms of the durability or strength of alliances?strength of alliances?

- To what extent do alliances provide information to their members To what extent do alliances provide information to their members that facilitates cooperation, therefore contributing to alliance that facilitates cooperation, therefore contributing to alliance durability or strength?durability or strength?

- Do alliances ever develop norms that are not subject to Do alliances ever develop norms that are not subject to calculations of interest, and that are therefore genuine normative calculations of interest, and that are therefore genuine normative commitments for participants? If so, under what conditions commitments for participants? If so, under what conditions (domestic as well as international) do such commitments emerge?(domestic as well as international) do such commitments emerge?

- Do open democratic governments find it easier to maintain Do open democratic governments find it easier to maintain alliance ties than closed authoritarian regimes?alliance ties than closed authoritarian regimes?

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3.3. Justice of institutions:Justice of institutions:““whose institutions” & “institutions for whom”.whose institutions” & “institutions for whom”.

The US is the creator or one of the creators for many The US is the creator or one of the creators for many institutions in the world today; it has thus the most institutions in the world today; it has thus the most influences to the participants of those institutions. The influences to the participants of those institutions. The developing countries or emerging market counties have developing countries or emerging market counties have little voice. (eg. US has 16.77% the total voting weight at little voice. (eg. US has 16.77% the total voting weight at it; Germany 5.88%. Britain and France 4.86% each; Italy it; Germany 5.88%. Britain and France 4.86% each; Italy 3.19%, Netherlands 2.34%; Belgium 2.09%; as to China, it 3.19%, Netherlands 2.34%; Belgium 2.09%; as to China, it has only 3.66% and India 1.89%.) has only 3.66% and India 1.89%.)

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参考书目：参考书目：

秦亚青编：《西方国际关系理论经典导读》第二编“自由主义”部分。 Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University

Press, 1986. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International

Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1988) John A. Kroll, “The Complexity of Interdependence,” International

Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 1993) David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The

Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation:

Understanding the Debate,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999)

Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (3rd Edition), New York: Longman, 2001.

Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), 也可参阅苏长和的译本（上海人民出版社， 2006 年）。

David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

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