Encyclopedia.com -- Online dictionary and encyclopedia of facts, information, and biographies Search Research categories International relationsHome Social Sciences and the Law Political Science and Government Political Science: Terms and ConceptsInternational Encyclopedia...International Encyclopedia...The Columbia Encyclopedia,...Further readingTOOLS International RelationsInternational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences | 1968COPYRIGHT 2008 Thomson Gale.International RelationsThe articles under this heading deal with international relations as a field of study. Major elements of international politics are covered in Foreign POLICY; International INTEGRATION; International LAW; International MONETARY ECONOMICS; International ORGANIZATION; International POLITICS; International TRADE. Methods for the study of international relations are discussed in Communication, POLITICAL; Conflict; Geography, article on POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY; Power; Simulation, article on POLITICAL PROCESSES; Systems ANALYSIS, article on INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS. Major concepts and policies are analyzed in Alliances; Balance OF POWER; Collective SECURITY; Containment; Crisis; Deterrence; Disarmament; Disengagement; National INTEREST; National SECURITY; Neutralism AND NONALIGNMENT; Peace; Power TRANSITION; Trusteeship. Instruments of international politics are dealt with in Diplomacy; Foreign AID; International CULTURAL COOPERATION; Negotiation; Sanctions, INTERNATIONAL; Technical ASSISTANCE; War. Other relevant material may be found under Military.I. THE FIELDChadwick F. AlgerBIBLIOGRAPHYII. IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTSJohn H. HerzBIBLIOGRAPHYIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTSHerbert C. KelmanBIBLIOGRAPHYI. THE FIELDInternational relations is a human activity in which persons from more than one nation, individually and in groups, interact. International relations are carried on by face-to-face contact and through more indirect communications. Usage of the term international relations by scholars in the field is not consistent. Some use international relations and international politics interchangeably, but many prefer to reserve international politics for relations between governments and use international relations as a more inclusive term. They consider international politics and subjects such as international economics, international communications, international law, international war, and international organization to be subcategories of international relations.In more popular discourse international relations is often used to refer to phenomena about nations that do not involve relations between them. Sometimes the study of foreign nations and foreign governments is called international relations, but this broad usage is diminishing. The study of international relations includes certain aspects of nations and their governments, particularly foreign-policy-making activity. But the more restricted usage that is evolving includes only those characteristics of nations that have the greatest effect on interaction between nations. Advancing knowledge is making possible more explicit boundaries for the field as research more clearly identifies which characteristics of nations cause the greatest variation in their relations with each other.HistoryAlthough men have written about international relations for thousands of years, only in this century has the field begun to have some of the characteristics of an academic discipline. The publication of World Politics by Paul Reinsch in 1900 is often cited as an early landmark in this development. Before World War I, courses in the field were confined largely to diplomatic history, international law, and international economics. The war stimulated the development of courses in international organization, international relations, and international politics. Often these courses were devoted (and some still are) to the study of current events and to preaching about how the world ought to be organized. By the outbreak of World War II a reaction to these modes of study had developed.E. H. Carrs The Twenty Years Crisis, 19191939 (1939), which was highly critical of research and teaching in the field, and F. Schumans International Politics (1933) indicated the beginning of the realist (also sometimes called empirical) emphasis in the study of international relations. This trend included both an effort to overcome idealistic bias in research and teaching and an aspiration toward more systematic study. A precursor of future systematic work was Quincy Wrights monumental study of war from 1500 to 1940, published in 1942.After World War II the realist position was stated persuasively by Hans Morgenthau in a highly successful and very influential textbook, Politics Among Nations (1948). Morgenthau emphasized the importance of power in the attainment of national objectives. Arguing largely against those who deprecated power politics, Morgenthau asserted that the struggle for power occurs in all social relations and that international politics is not excepted from this general proposition. Morgenthaus book brought on widespread debate between the realists and the idealists. Although Morgenthau had defined power as the ability to influence the minds and actions of men exercised by political, psychological, and military means, there was a tendency for realists to emphasize the importance of military power. Idealists, on the other hand, stressed the importance of assuring that ideological ends not be subverted through the pursuit of tangible instruments of power.To a considerable degree the realistidealist debate subverted the initial contribution of the realist school to the development of an empirical science of international relations. For many, realism became a goal toward which they believed policy makers should aspire, rather than an enterprise devoted to the explanation of actual international behavior. But the realist emphasis has left significant legacies. One is the section devoted to the elements of national power that appears in most international relations textbooks. Morgenthau lists the following components of national power: geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, quality of diplomacy, and quality of government. Some writers, Organski, for example, tend to treat national power as something that can be represented by a single measure, through combining measurements of its components (1958).As power tended to become the central concept in the international relations literature, concern developed about the analytic effectiveness of subsuming so much under one concept. There was particular difficulty in accounting for occasions when smaller nations influenced the behavior of larger nations, thus revealing the limitations of a single measure of national power. The tendency for the concept to become a fad rather than a useful analytic tool was underlined when Denis Sullivan, in an analysis of international relations textbooks (1963), found 17 different usages. The fact that individual authors use the concept in a number of ways compounds the confusion. [SeePower; Power transition.]As a moderately cohesive discipline of international relations was developing in the first half of the twentieth century, rapid social, technological, and scientific changes that would make much of this effort obsolete were already under way. The number of independent nations has doubled since 1900, reaching some 135 in 1966. By 1964 the number of international organizations had increased to some 1,900 (not including international business enterprises). Approximately 180 of these organizations are intergovernmental. Communication and transportation developments greatly changed the character of international relations and stimulated regional economic integration. Nuclear weapons altered the role of violence as an instrument for carrying out international relations. These changes so dramatically transformed the character of the international system that even the vocabulary of international relations rapidly became obsolete.The horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and contemplation of the next generation of nuclear weapons greater killing capacity brought a dramatic extension of interest in international relations. As a result, men of virtually all academic disciplines began contributing to the study of international relations.Scientific change has not only affected the study of international relations through the impact of technological change on the data of international relations but also directly affected analytic techniques. While the twentieth-century world was self-consciously pondering the significance of rapidly developing knowledge in the physical sciences, changes of potentially equal importance were taking place in the social sciences. A new generation of international relations scholars, armed with the contributions of an increasingly rigorous social science and aided by new norms for interdisciplinary collaboration, began making significant progress toward the development of a science of international relations. (See, e.g., Sprout & Sprout 1962 and the successive issues of World Politics, founded in 1948.) The concepts and techniques employed in analyzing such topics as decision making, conflict, game theory, bargaining, communication, systems, geography, attitudes, etc., were applied to problems in international relations. Machine data processing and computers extended the range of manageable problems, and mancomputer and all-computer simulations permitted for the first time controlled experimentation in international relations.The state of the fieldDecision makingAdvances in social science are facilitating the handling of some of the problems that for a long time have troubled international relations scholars. One such problem is discovering the links between the gross characteristics of nations, such as measures of national power, and the specific behavior of individuals acting for nations. While most contributors to the literature on national power would not deny that variation in the individuals and groups making foreign policy decisions sometimes has significant effects, they have not provided analytic tools for assessing these effects.In 1954 Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin published an influential monograph, Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, that provided an analytic scheme suggesting the relevance of work in various areas of political science, sociology, social psychology, communication theory, and organizational behavior to the study of international relations. Their approach conceives of the actions of nations as resulting from the way identifiable decision makers define the action situation. It postulates that national decision-making behavior takes place in a complex organizational setting and can be accounted for by interrelations of three clusters of variables: organizational roles and relations, communication and information, and motivation. Four years later Snyder and Paige (1958) applied the scheme to the United States decision to intervene militarily in Korea in June 1950. This effort stimulated some refinements in the analytic scheme and helped to develop hypotheses linking the variables.The work on decision making enriched the literature of international relations by demonstrating the relevance of concepts from other areas of social science. However, the collection of data on variables describing a specific decisional group presents methodological difficulties of a different order from those encountered in measuring national power. Documentary materials may not even reveal the membership of a decision-making group, requiring the decision-making researcher to move from the library to field work in governmental agencies in his quest for data. Thus, decision-making analysis has stimulated the application of the field-research techniques of social science to the study of international relations. Problems in gaining access to foreign policy decision makers, because of the secrecy that traditionally surrounds their activity, require the international relations researcher not only to borrow field-research techniques of other social sciences but also to adapt them and to develop his own. [SeeDecision making.]Systems analysisIn 1955 Charles McClelland urged the application of general systems analysis, developed by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, to the study of international relations. This followed applications in physics, physical chemistry, and the social sciences. Bertalanffy developed his general systems approach as a result of perceiving similarities in conceptual schemes developed in fields of knowledge commonly considered to be widely separated McClelland asserted that the application of the concepts and hypotheses of general systems analysis to international relations provides insights beyond those generally afforded by more traditional international relations approaches. For example, he stated that a general systems approach leads inquiry away from a concern with the accumulation of power, that its emphasis is instead on adaptive action. McClelland also believes that a systems perspective draws attention to quiet processes of growth, adjustment, and adaptation, thus overcoming tendencies to give too much attention to spectacular international events as causal factors (1955).Morton Kaplan (1957) used a radically different method of systems analysis developed by W. Ross Ashby. This approach employs closed and simple systems, rather than general ones, and does not imply either the probability or the improbability of gradual change. Kaplan constructed six possible international systems and specified the environmental circumstances under which each is likely to persist and those under which it is likely to be transformed into one of the other kinds of systems. Kaplan did not provide historical examples of all of his systems, since it is his goal to develop an analytic perspective that can handle all possible kinds of international systems, not just those that have occurred already. In Action and Reaction in World Politics (1963) Rosecrance also cites Ashby as he applies systems analysis to an examination of nine international systems that existed after 1740. From these historical cases he generates nine models.Theories generated by the application of systems analysis move the study of international relations closer to rigorous comparative study. They provide concepts that can be applied across diverse geographic regions and in numerous historical periods. The propositions embedded within the theories invite refinement or rejection, thus encouraging researchers to move beyond description and on to the development of explanatory theory. [SeeSystems analysis.]IntegrationSome taking an international systems perspective have focused on international integration. The development of integration as a major focus of international relations research has been spurred by regional integration, particularly in Europe in the post-World War II period. International relations scholars have a variety of usages for the term integration. It is frequently used to mean (1) a specified state of an international systeme.g., a system where nations expect to have no war with each other or where citizens feel a strong sense of community; and (2) a system with certain kinds of central governmental institutions. Common in much of the integration literature is self-conscious concern with development of theory applicable to all international systems, universal and regional, through the study of systems more limited in scope. There also is a wide interest in discerning both the necessary and sufficient conditions for certain kinds of international governmental authority and the processes whereby such authorities can be established.Case studies have provided the raw material for important integration work, but in contrast to most earlier work in international relations, the cases have not been ends in themselves but tools for the generation of general theory. In a pioneering work Karl Deutsch and Richard Van Wagenen, both political scientists, and a team of historians (Deutsch et al. 1957) examined ten cases of successful and unsuccessful integration in the North Atlantic area, ranging from the formation of England in the Middle Ages to the breakup of the union between Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1921. From these case studies they generated a list of conditions necessary for both amalgamated and pluralistic security communities. This effort borrowed a great deal from communications research.Ernst Haas has preferred to study integration through firsthand depth research of one international organization at a time, using the organizations as whetstones for sharpening theory. His work on the European Steel and Coal Community (1958) and the International Labour Organisation (1964) has given much attention to the process whereby integration in one governmental function spills over into another area. The theoretical framework developed by Etzioni (1965) is influenced importantly by his native discipline, sociology. He has worked primarily with secondary sources in applying this framework to the European Economic Community, the Nordic Council, efforts to unite Egypt and Syria, and to the attempted Federation of the West Indies.While the styles and interests of these contributors to the study of international integration vary a great deal, their efforts to build explicitly on the work of each other, although yet limited, is characteristic of a growing trend among international relations scholars. As they become more interested in general theory and less concerned with the uniqueness of individual cases, the possibilities for cumulative and cooperative development of knowledge are increasing in the whole field of international relations.The work on integration is affecting traditional perspectives of the role of international organizations in the control of international violence and in the development of world order. Work such as that of Deutsch and his colleagues (1957) on pluralistic security communities (i.e., international systems in which nations do not expect to war with each other) raises serious questions about the validity of the often repeated proposition that world order can come only after the establishment of a world government. Furthermore, their hypotheses about necessary conditions for amalgamated security communities (e.g., mutual predictability of behavior, mutual responsiveness, and mobility of persons in politically relevant strata) have encouraged scholars to supplement traditional concern for ideal constitutional forms believed necessary for world order with empirical research on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of international governmental apparatus.An earlier alternative to the more grandiose world government schemes had been provided by functionalism, whose best-known advocate was David Mitrany in the 1940s. The key element in functionalism is the belief that international conflict can be diminished by the establishment of international welfare agencies manned by experts who, it is presumed, would be devoted to the achieving of their tasks on the basis of expert criteria, rather than to the acquisition of power. The work on integration, particularly that of Haas, who explicitly builds on the thought of the functionalists, offers some support for and a critique of functionalist theory, particularly in the development of more sophisticated theory linking international welfare activity and national political organization. [SeeInternational integration and International organization.]SimulationPerhaps controlled experimentation in international relations is the most vivid indicator of ferment generated by borrowing from other disciplines. Formerly limited to the study of individual behavior and the study of small groups, experimental techniques have now been extended to decision making in business organizations, community conflict, and international relations. Simulation of international relations has also developed out of military war games. This heritage is recognized by Lincoln Bloomfield and Norman Padelford (1959) and others, who use the term political gaming to refer to their simulation efforts.Some simulations of international relations have used human subjects, under quasi-laboratory conditions, who act for nations that are replicas of either actual nations or nations designed by the experimenter. There are also machine simulations, in which computers are used to simulate both the mental processes of decision makers and the social processes of international relations. Some simulate a specific situation, such as a crisis, whereas others simulate international systems that represent years of real-world time.Like experimentation in other realms, simulation of international relations permits the student to have more control than he has in the study of the real world. It also permits the study of problems for which data are not available, possibly because the world has not yet produced the situation being studied. For example, in 1960 Richard Brody and Michael Driver ran 16 simulations of a two-bloc cold war international system, identical except that each simulation had different decision makers. Each of the 16 simulations began with two nuclear powers and each experienced nuclear proliferation at an identical time (see Brody 1963). This experiment permitted investigation of widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons before it occurred in the real world.The most sustained effort in international relations simulation was begun by Harold Guetzkow in 1958 (see Guetzkow et al. 1963). His InterNation Simulation is an operating model of prototypic, rather than actual, nations. The model has been utilized in the experimental runs of Brody, as well as others. A variety of techniques is being used to validate the evolving model, including participation of diplomats in the simulation. The Inter-Nation Simulation and modifications of it have been used in research and teaching by a number of institutions in the United States, Latin America, Europe, and the Far East. The rapid spread of simulation activity suggests that controlled experimentation and the construction of operating models have a permanent place in the methodology of international relations. [SeeSimulation.]Military strategyThe advent of nuclear weapons has stimulated more-widespread attention to military strategy and diminished the gulf that had developedfor both scholars and policy-makers between military and political factors in international relations. As the destructive power of nuclear weapons increased, intense concern developed over the risks of nuclear war, particularly over the possibility of accidental nuclear war and the escalation of limited conventional wars into nuclear war. [See Limited WAR and Nuclear WAR.] In response, political scientists, psychologists, and economists began applying a wide range of social science knowledge to problems of military strategy. Thomas C. Schelling, an economist, called attention to the mixture of mutual dependence and conflict in relations between international adversaries. In his Strategy of Conflict he saw enlightening similarities between, say, maneuvering in limited war and jockeying in a traffic jam, between deterring the Russians and deterring ones own children, or between the modern balance of terror and the ancient institution of hostages (1960, p. v).Fear that nuclear-weapons delivery systems, ostensibly developed to deter aggressors, might cause war encouraged the development of a literature on deterrence that enriched international relations discourse [seeDeterrence]. As military planners and scholars attempted to discern how weapons systems could offer a credible deterrent to aggressors and at the same time not cause the war they were intended to prevent, the interdependence of national weapons systems became more apparent. Scholars became concerned not only with actual military capability of nations but also with the perceptions decision makers have of this capability and their inferences about its future use. These perceptions were seen to be influenced importantly by communications systems linking decision makers in different nations. Research on deterrence stimulated the application of social psychology, communications theory, and game theory to military strategy problems.As deterrence of national military action came to be treated as one of many efforts to influence by discouragement, some began to ask why strategic planning did not include efforts to influence by encouragement. Thomas Milburn (1959) is one who called attention to the findings of psychological research that indicate that reward for desired behavior is sometimes more efficacious than punishment for undesired behavior in influencing human conduct. This kind of thinking encouraged an integration of research on military policy and research on policy utilizing other means of influence. [SeeMilitary policy; National security; Strategy.]DisarmamentThe overwhelmingly destructive power of nuclear weapons brought renewed interest in disarmament and arms limitation. Similar concern had been manifested at the time of the Hague Peace Conference at the turn of the century and also in the late 1920s and early 1930s. But the complex military technology of the nuclear age encouraged greater participation of physical scientists in disarmament discussion. Their involvement was partially a result of the obligation they felt to help control the destructive power they had created. The pages of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists provide evidence of increased participation of physicists in arms-control and disarmament research and discussion. Their contributions to the technology of nuclear-test detection and nuclear-armament inspection began the development of a technology of nuclear control.Disarmament study in the nuclear age also came to be concerned more with research into the relationship between societies and the organizations for waging war that they create. Machines of war had come to consume such a high proportion of national product in some nations that the economic consequences of disarmament were studied. The realization that disarmament would not bring an end to conflict fostered consideration of alternatives to violence that could be used for waging conflict in a disarmed world (e.g., Millis et al. 1961). This line of inquiry gradually brought a subtle but profound evolution in the interests of some international relations scholars, from concern with the causes of war to study of the causes of peace. [SeeDisarmament.]Peace researchAt the outbreak of World War II one of the pioneers in the scientific study of international relations, Lewis F. Richardson, asserted, There are many anti-war societies, but they are concerned with propaganda, not research. There is a wide public interest in the subject provided it is expressed in bold rhetoric, but not if it is a quantitative scientific study involving statistics and mathematics. There is no appropriate learned society (1960, p. 284).In the 1960s Richardsons statement would be less true because of the development of the peace research movement. Aspiring to equal the rigor of the physical sciences in the study of the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace, the movement was started primarily by social scientists outside the traditional field of international relations, and physical scientists, also, have been prominently involved. Examples of the better-known products of the peace research movement are Conflict and Defense (1962), by Kenneth Boulding, an economist; The Peace Race (1961), by Seymour Melman, an industrial engineer; and Strategy and Conscience (1964), by Anatol Rapoport, a mathematical biologist.The peace research movement set up conferences and associations separate from the meetings of established professional societies. Peace research organizations, in the form of both professional associations and research institutes, have been created in a number of nations, primarily in Europe and North America. These developments have taken place in nations in which social science is developed most highly. Within the peace research movement considerable effort has been devoted to the establishment of international collaboration in developing a science of international peace free from national bias. [SeePeace.]Limited perspective of researchAlthough international relations research has focused primarily on recent intergovernmental relations of a few great powers, there are tendencies toward more-inclusive interest, partially because of increasing interest in the development of general theory. Work on current regional international systems has made possible modest efforts at comparative international relations. Historical resources also provide opportunity for comparison (e.g., Rosecrance 1963). In Politics and Culture in International History (1960) Adda Bozeman overcomes the customary preoccupation of international relations scholars with Europe and North America. In a work that is global in scope, she assesses historical experience in international relations up to a.d. 1500. Despite these efforts at comparative inquiry, the attention of international relations researchers is still focused largely on a limited number of current intergovernmental relationsthose with a high degree of conflict.International relations research and theorizing has also tended to neglect nongovernmental international relations. There is considerable justification for the neglect, because of the degree to which governments dominate international relations and often exercise great control over nongovernmental international relations. On the other hand, the efforts of governments to control and to influence nongovernmental international relations suggest that officials may consider them more important than do scholars. There are numerous cases in which business investment has had an important effect on international relations, for example, United States business investment in Latin America. As former colonies have achieved independence, the actual and perceived influence of business interests of former governing nations has had a vital effect on intergovernmental relations. Some important research has been done on nongovernmental international relations, for example, Pools recent work (1965) on the effect of international travel on national and international images and research by Herbert Kelman (1963) on the reactions of participants in exchange programs. But nongovernmental international relations tend not to be incorporated into the more general theoretical work in the field.Nongovernmental international organizations also have been neglected, although some seventeen hundred of the approximately nineteen hundred international organizations (excluding international businesses) are nongovernmental. Studies of European integration have indicated the importance of international labor and management organizations in European integration. There are numerous anecdotal accounts of the effects of church organizations and business corporations on intergovernmental relationships. But there has been no concerted effort to study the consequences of variation in the number or character of nongovernmental international organizations on intergovernmental relationships in specific international systems.Conceptual issuesThe neglect of nongovernmental relations is partially a result of the traditional presumption that nations are single actors. The tendency to reify nations is diminishing; many writers now assert that when they say that nations act, this is only a shorthand way of indicating that human beings act for nations. But it is still customary for scholars to study the activities of all actors for a specific nation as if they were those of a single actor and to treat instances of contradictory behavior of different actors, when they are recognized at all, as aberrations.As more national government departments have become involved in international relations and as participation in international organizations has increased, the number of sites at which a nations representatives simultaneously interact with their counterparts from other nations has greatly increased. The ability of foreign offices to control or even to coordinate foreign policy seems to be declining. [SeeForeign policy.] Assuming that nations are single actors inhibits investigation of the effects on international relations of variation in the number, location, and roles of actors that a nation has in the international system. Such variation may importantly affect the capacity of nations to adjust to and control external change.Acknowledging that nations have multiple actors in international relations leads one to ask whom individual actors represent. Wilson was recognized as the representative of the United States at the Paris Peace Conference, but whom did he actually represent? What portion of a nations attention and resources can individual national actors or all of a nations actors command? What portion of a nations attention and resources are commanded by actors not involved in international relations? These questions lead to the conclusion that nations comprise a variety of international and domestic actors, both governmental and nongovernmental, all acting in the name of the nation. Because some of these actors are domestic, they are part of the environment of the international system. Treating them as environment inhibits the misleading tendency to subsume total populations, resources, and activities of all nations under the rubric of international relations simply because virtually all mankind lives within nations. It is clear that variation in this environment affects the capacity of international actors to adjust to and control changes in the international system.The futureThe study of international relations will continue to be affected by the urgency of war and peace problems and by increasing belief that research can contribute to the understanding and solution of these problems. International relations research will in the near future be even more affected by the twentieth-century revolution in social science than it has been in the past. It is probable that a separate body of international relations theory will not be developed and that international relations will be a part of the broader theoretical framework of intergroup relations.It is likely that aspects of international relations will be increasingly incorporated into the concerns of each of the social sciences. This development can be observed already, for example, in the pages of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, an interdisciplinary quarterly devoted to research related to war and peace. It can also be seen in the growing number of sessions devoted to international relations at the meetings of professional societies of the different social sciences. The various kinds of human behavior which scholars have traditionally classified as diplomacy will be dissected and studied as cases of negotiation, legislative behavior, representative behavior, political socialization, communication, organizational behavior, etc. [See Diplomacyand Negotiation.] These developments will tend to inhibit the growth of a coherent discipline, but there will be pressures toward coherence as members of different disciplines collaborate. This tendency is manifest in a volume edited by Kelman, International Behavior (1965), with contributions by political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, and an anthropologist. It is also revealed in the founding of the multidisciplinary International Studies Association in 1959.As the field of international relations is integrated into the main stream of social science, it may be expected that the generalizations that international relations scholars advance will be subjected to rigorous testing through systematic data collection. High-speed computers already have made possible significant efforts to marshal data on hundreds of national social, political, and economic attributes and to analyze their relationship to international relations (see Russett et al. 1964). Quantitative International Politics (Singer 1967) reveals the growing tendency of scholars to use rigorous social science techniques for gathering and analyzing data. Scholars will probably also increase their efforts to gather data through field-research techniques, as a supplement to documentary sources and statistics provided by governments and international agencies. (See, e.g., Alger 1965.)Continued change in patterns of international relations will, of course, intensify the conceptual problems of the field. The number, size, and importance of intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations will grow. The increased importance in international activity of social units other than nations will require scholars to develop conceptual schemes and theories that take them into account. This development will be encouraged by the increasing participation of social scientists other than political scientists in international relations research. It will be stimulated also by the increasing interest of political scientists in the relationship between societal characteristics and governmental organization.It is likely, therefore, that future prescriptions for world order, in contrast to those of the past, will be concerned more with the development of nongovernmental international relations: What kind of international society is needed to support certain kinds of central institutions? Can an international society with certain attributes provide desired restraints on violence and offer mechanisms for peaceful change, perhaps without highly developed central institutions? Insight into these questions is likely to be provided by theories of social control generated by research on intergroup relations in a variety of settings. The pursuit of data to test these theories in international systems will require the international relations scholar to extend his vision to phenomena often neglected: tourism, student exchange, trade, cultural exchange, international nongovernmental organizations (business, religious, philanthropic, professional), international media, etc.Diligent application of mans scientific skills and resources to the problems of international relations in the concluding decades of the twentieth century could increase mans capability for international construction to the point where it will more nearly approximate his highly developed ability for international destruction.Chandwick F. AlgerBIBLIOGRAPHYAlger, Chadwick F. 1965 Personal Contact in Inter-governmental Organizations. Pages 521547 in Herbert Kelman (editor), International Behavior: A Social-psychological Analysis. New York: Holt.Bloomfield, Lincoln; and Padelford, Norman J. 1959Three Experiments in Political Gaming. 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Kelman (editor), International Behavior: A Social-psychological Analysis. New York: Holt.Rapoport, Anatol 1964 Strategy and Conscience. New York: Harper.Reinsch, Paul S. (1900) 1918 World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century as Influenced by the Oriental Situation. London: Macmillan.Richardson, Lewis F. 1960 Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War. Edited by Nicolas Rashevsky and Ernesto Trucco. Pittsburgh: Boxwood. ? Published posthumously.Rosecrance, Richard N. 1963 Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective. Boston: Little.Rosenau, James N. (editor) 1961 International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. New York: Free Press.Russett, Bruce M. et al. 1964 World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.Schelling, Thomas C. 1960 The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.Schuman, Frederick L. (1933) 1958 International Politics. 6th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.Singer, J. David 1962 Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament. Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press.Singer, J. David (editor) 1967 Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence. International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research, Vol. 6. New York: Free Press.Snyder, Glenn H. 1961 Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security. Princeton Univ. Press.Snyder, Richard C. 1962 Some Recent Trends in International Relations Theory and Research. Pages 103172 in Austin Ranney (editor), Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press.Snyder, Richard C.; Bruck, H. W.j and Sapin, Burton 1954 Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics. Foreign Policy Analysis Series, Vol. 3. Princeton Univ., Organizational Behavior Section.Snyder, Richard C.; Bruck, H. W.; and Sapin, Burton (editors) 1962 Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics. New York: Free Press.Snyder, Richard C.; and Paige, Glenn D. 1958 TheUnited States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme. Administrative Science Quarterly 3:341378.Sprout, Harold H.; and Sprout, Margaret 1962 Foundations of International Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand.Sullivan, Denis G. 1963 Towards an Inventory of Major Propositions Contained in Contemporary Textbooks in International Relations. Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern Univ.Wolfers, Arnold 1962 Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.Wright, Quincy (1942) 1965 A Study of War. 2d ed. With a commentary on war since 1942. Univ. of Chicago Press.Wright, Quincy 1955 The Study of International Relations. New York: Appleton.II. IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTSIn order to understand the role of ideology in international affairs it is important to distinguish between ideologies in and theories of international relations. Ideology is the more or less coherent and consistent sum total of ideas and views on life and the world (belief system, doctrine, Weltanschauung) that guides the attitudes of actual or would-be power holders: leaders of political units, such as nation-states or city-states, or of major organizations or movements, such as churches or political parties. Theory, on the other hand, refers to the more or less systematic entirety of concepts and ideas about international relations held and developed by individuals (such as political philosophers). Yet the connection between theories and ideologies can be close. Leaders, power holders, and movements are often influenced by theorists whose concepts and ideas (although frequently in modified, especially in vulgarized, form) become the basis of their doctrine. In these instances, ideology can be denned either as the Idea (in the Hegelian sense) that tries to obtain or succeeds in obtaining Power or, in pragmatic terms, as theory that has become effective through the medium of social movements or power groups.Movements or power holders are related to the international environment in two major ways: either their ideas and attitudes concerning the structure and nature of the world and concerning their status in the world form part and parcel of their original ideology or they find themselves subsequently involved in world relations and thus compelled to take a stand. To illustrate from the history of religious movements: Christianity, at first otherworldly and without its own international ideology, subsequently developed one (the doctrine of bellum justum, etc.), whereas Islam, possessing one from the outset, became an expanding, crusading movement right away.In regard to the specific character of international ideologies, we may distinguish between world-revolutionary ideologies and all others. Great political movements, in initial stages of success, often develop ideas and expectations of the complete and imminent transformation of the world, including the international environment. The ideologies of both the French and the Bolshevist revolutionaries had such chiliastic expectations during the early phase of their respective revolutions. When these expectations fail to materialize, the world-revolutionary ideology usually changes into an ideology more or less closely tied to the power requirements of the respective units.Examples of both types of ideology, the world-revolutionary and the more pragmatic, will occur in the survey of historical development that follows. From the vast number of internationally relevant ideologies this survey will select significant ones in three different areas: that of religious movements and churches (Islam, Christianity), that of democratic movements and attitudes (pacific democracy, democratic nationalism, economic liberalism, and internationalism), and that of (in the Western sense) undemocratic or antidemocratic doctrines and movements (integral nationalism, imperialism, and communism).Historical developmentA definition of ideology as a system of thoughts and beliefs that becomes effective in movements or power units implies a connection between ideology and masses. We hardly speak of ideology in reference to the motivations of a ruler in the age of monarchical absolutism, even where he is motivated by certain theories (such as that of raison d tat) in his foreign policy. But we speak meaningfully of ideology where nationalism or socialist ideas imbue entire populations. Ideology thus seems to have emerged when, in an age of modernization and the spread of literacy, masses were being mobilized for the support of movements and policiesthat is, in Europe, approximately with the French Revolution. Prior to the rise of the masses to political influence, publics were usually passive followers of elites, which, in turn, were little affected by ideology. However, where efforts are made to instill over-all ideas and attitudes even into passive publics, or where both elites and masses are equally imbued with ideas leading to action, we may also legitimately speak of ideology. Such, in premodern times, was often the function of religious movements.IslamA prime example of the tremendous effect ideology can have on world affairs is offered by Islam. In contrast to more otherworldly religions, Islam from the outset regarded its function as this-worldly, proselytizing, and crusading. Its aim was to spread its creed over the entire world. The world was ultimately to be ruled by one ruler, the imam, whose authority was at once secular and religious. Until this goal was reached, a ceaseless holy war of conquest (jihad) was to be the instrument of the universalization of religion as well as of the expansion of secular control.This universalism and exclusivism gave the early expansion of Islam its explosive force. The jihad was a just war to transform the Dar ul-Harb (the world of war, outside Islam, inhabited by unbelievers) into the Dar ul-Islam (the world controlled by Islam); participation in it guaranteed the believer paradise. This ideology is the prototype of all doctrines of universal causes, where the world has to be saved and mankind is divided into those saved and those damned. It cannot recognize, as Islam did not, the equal status or coexistence of other communities. Therefore, a state of war, not peace, was the normal relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, and even when the initial expansion of Islam had reached its limits, only short intervals of nonwar (up to ten years) were permitted. Subsequently, during what the Western world came to call the Middle Ages, an uneasy coexistence was established among the two Islamic empires and the two Christian empires, complete with balances of power, negotiations, treaties, and even a good deal of mutual toleration. Ideologically, however, nonrecognition of the dar al-harb continued to be a principle of Muslim doctrine [seeIslam].ChristianityChristianity, like Islam, aimed at converting all mankind to its creed. But its efforts were less concentrated in time and space, warlike expansion or attempts at expansion occurring only intermittently (for example, Charlemagnes conversion of the Saxons, the Crusades, some aspects of the expansion of European powers into the non-European world during the age of discoveries). This universalist and proselytizing ideology had a lesser impact for two reasons. One was that Christianity, like Hinduism, arose as an otherworldly creed, concerned with the inner man and the salvation of his soul rather than with establishing the millennium in this world. Thus, even after the Christianization of the Roman Empire, when an ideology of the political and spiritual unity of Christendom became established, the Christian polity was conceived as one of peace, even in its relation with the world at large, and war was considered justified on specific grounds only (bellum justum, for example, as defense against an inflicted injury). Under these categories, wars against infidels, crusades to recover the Holy Land, were at times found to be just wars, but the idea of an incessant state of holy war with the non-Christian world remained alien to Christianity even at the height of its universalist phase. The second reason Christianitys universalism remained less potent, in ideology as well as in practice, was that Western Christendom split into secular and spiritual contenders for supremacy. Two universalist ideologies, that of the empire and that of the papacy, neutralized each other, the result being a decline in the universalist idea and in the universalist powers in favor of the rising territorial state.There remained aftereffects of Christian ideology, the most lasting, perhaps, being its pacifist, nonviolent component. Although never fully accepted into the main churches, Christian pacifism remained an undercurrent in more or less esoteric sects and denominations through the Middle Ages and modern times, coming to the fore in nineteenth-century peace movements as well as in twentieth-century integral or nuclear pacifism (for example, the unilateralists in the British disarmament movement). Here it often merges with secular ideologies of similar nature and purpose [seeChristianity].Pacific democracyThe modern European state, established on the ruins of medieval Christian universalism, did not at first develop an international ideology of its own. The idea of civitas maxima, of a common bond encompassing all mankind, paled before the interests and conflicts of sovereign powers, which, run by small elites of rulers and their aristocratic and bureaucratic aides, could afford to be unconcerned about the ideas and attitudes of people at large. The doctrine of raison d tat, according to which each unit should consider its specific national interests as guideposts for action, determined the policies of these rulers without the intervention of significant ideology, unless one discerns such an ideology in the attenuating idea that some European equilibrium, or balance of power, should be maintained in the chaos of power politics.With the rise of the European middle classes, however, ideas concerning the role that the people should play in the affairs of their countries came to the fore. Democratic ideology, the claim of the people to be the ultimate power in a given unit, produced two ideologies of international affairs, that of democratic nationalism and that of pacific democracy.The latter arose from a contrasting of democratic aims and ideals with what are thought to be the results of nondemocracy in foreign affairs. Nondemocratic systems and their policies are said to result in perpetual conflict and war, since their elites are interested in their own prestige, glory, and the aggrandizement of their domain, and not in the welfare of the people. The ideology of pacific democracy considers this the deepest cause of the ancient and tragic story of warring mankind. Once the people take over the control of their destiny, all this will change radically: the people at large can only suffer from war, their basic common interest being in peace, and thus universal peace will result from the spread of democratic government over the world. This antinomy of warlike authoritarianism and peace-loving democracy was announced by a spokesman of the first great modern republican revolution, Thomas Paine, was taken up by Jefferson, and can be followed through to Woodrow Wilson (World War I fought to make the world safe for democracy and, in this way, to end all wars); it is still an important part of Western democractic ideology [see Pacifism].Democratic nationalismEarly nationalism is closely related to democratic ideology. Indeed, it may be said to arise logically from democratic premises: exactly as under domestic democracy individuals become self-determining on a basis of equality, internationally, the groups in which individuals are said to congregate naturallynationalitiesassert the right to become self-determining, free, and equal nation-states. Accordingly, the right of each nationality to establish itself as an independent political unit is proclaimed as the decisive principle of a new world order. Past systems and policies, under which dynastic rulers disregarded ethnic groups, cut them up, shifted populations hither and thither regardless of their wishes, are said to have led to constant conflict and war. With the recognition of national self-determination and the rise of nationalities to state-hood, international relations will be radically trans-formed. According to the ideologists of early nationalism (Herder, Fichte, Mazzini), nations organized ethnically will live in peace and harmony with one another because none need aspire to anything the others have. Such nations are endowed each with its peculiar traits (souls, according to political romanticism); they blossom when free and not interfered with; they are diverse but not superior or inferior, equal in their right to cultural fulfillment. Early nationalism, in intent and ideology, thus is pacific, humanitarian, equalitarian, and adverse to national expansionism and domination.In its subsequent development nationalism has been beset by two major problems; one is the tendency to develop into the opposite of its original ideology, namely, an exclusivist and aggressive integral nationalism (see below), the other concerns the difficulty of agreeing on a simple and unequivocal criterion of what constitutes a nationality group, or nation. In particular, could the relatively clear-cut ethniccultural criteria of European nationality groups be applied to non-European populations? Or would racial, linguistic, religious, or other standards be controlling? With the rise of the new countries to independence, the problem has become of crucial importance. What defines an African nation? Is there an Arab nation? Or one of the Maghreb? Or a Malayan one? In this respect, no unequivocal ideology has as yet been developed by the leaders or populations of the new units. There is some tendency to substitute larger units for nationalities. Thus, in Africa, some advocate that entire continents should form the basic international units of the future, whereas others want to unite on the basis of race (ngritude), and still others (probably the majority) trust the development of an artificially established unit (based on colonial boundary lines) into genuine nationhood [seeNationalism].In general, the nationalism of the new nations still partakes of the characteristics of democratic nationalism, Even where expressed in negative terms (anti-imperialism, anticolonialism), its emphasis is on each nations right to a separate national identity. Indeed, through its opposition to ideologies and policies of racial or similar superiority, has made equalitarian nationalism into a truly niversalist ideology. Of this and other adaptations to twentieth-century conditions, the foreign-policy ideology developed by Jawaharlal Nehru in India is an outstanding example.Nehru believed that a peaceful world of diverse nations is attainable; indeed, it is necessary to attain it, because the new nature of weapons and war and the rising demands of all people for basic needs and services no longer admit of the old game of power politics. But two centuries of applied nationalism have also shown that the harmonious result expected by the earlier nationalist ideology will not materialize easily. Mutual fear drives even self-determining nations into conflict; fear feeds on fear. A radical change of attitudes is therefore demanded from leaders and people, in particular vis--vis ones opponent. Gandhis principles of toleration and avoidance of violence here influence Indian ideology. It assumes that in most situations violence can be avoided by the application of the five principles of Panchshila (mutual respect for territory, nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence). However redundant these principles are, they indicate the thrust of an ideology that insists on the desirability and feasibility of peaceful international relations even though it realistically recognizes the elements of conflict and strife. To cope with the latter, non-alignment is advisable for nations not desiring to be drawn into the competition between major powers and blocs; this will, so it is hoped, not only protect the neutrals but also contribute to the attenuation of conflicts and provide the world with conciliators [seeNeutralism and nonalignment].Economic liberalismIn addition to pacific democracy and nationalism, there was in the nineteenth century the rise of a third ideology of international peace and harmony, that of economic liberalism. The Manchester school (Cobden, Bright) and other free traders advocated the liberalization of world economic relations not only for its economic benefits but also because they were convinced that only in this way could the political conflicts of nations be eliminated. Thus, like pacific democracy and nationalism, this ideology is characterized by its monocausal nature; one major factor (in this instance, economic nationalism or mercantilism) accounts for the ills of the past: power politics, conflicts, wars. Abolish the cause (in this instance, eliminate the barriers in the path of free exchange of goods and free migration), and political boundaries will become less vital and people and nations the world over interested in peaceful relations rather than in conflict and aggrandizement.In more recent times, policies of foreign aid and development have often been connected with similar expectations: through such policies the emerging poor nations and populations of the world will be enabled to trade on an equal basis with the developed industrial countries; this way the gap between the affluent North and the destitute South will be closed and the otherwise threatening conflict between the impoverished and the rich turned into a beneficial common war against poverty.InternationalismAlthough a monocausal approach often leads to dogmatism and fanaticism (one has the key to the correct interpretation of world affairs; therefore, one insists that only this key be used to open the door to the worlds improvement), in the course of the nineteenth century many strands of the three pacific ideologies outlined above managed to unite in what may be called the mildly internationalist ideology of virtually all the more progressive forces in the Western world: the labor movement in its various groupings, portions of the trading and industrial (business) elites, Christian and other churches, and the general humanitarian peace movement. The aim of this ideology was, and still is, a world in which nation-states continue to be the primary units of international affairs; where, ideally, all are ruled democratically and all are nationally self-determining; and where they settle their disputes peacefully through mediation, arbitration, and the use of international law in a setting of growing contact and cooperation. The experience of two world wars added first the League of Nations and then the United Nations to the list of instruments for the maintenance or enforcement of the peace. The same experience has led other internationalists to advocate more fundamental changes in international relations. Regionalism seeks the federation or integration of the traditional nation-states into larger and more viable units on the pattern of the European integration movement, in order to overcome the increasing splintering of the world of the new countries into an ever larger number of nations still claiming sovereign equality. Still more radically, world federalists and others advocate the more or less complete subordination of national sovereignties to a world government, above all for the protection of world order in a disarmed world.This optimistic world rule of law approach, especially in its more moderate version, has characterized much in the attitudes of American, British, and other nations toward international affairs over the last hundred years. But it has been disturbed time and again by the shattering violence of opposite forces and contrary ideologies.Integral nationalism and imperialismIn the age of the masses, elements that were intent on domination and aggrandizement had to oppose ideologies of the peace and equality of nations with counterideologies of their own. It would no longer do merely to voice principles of power politics. People at large had to be convinced that what was done in their name was right. Thus, toward the end of the nineteenth century, there arose in the major Western countries ideologies that undertook to justify expansion, colonialism, and racism by asserting natural superiorities and inferiorities of nations or races and by proclaiming that ones own group (nation, race) was by nature the superior one and was therefore entitled to control, or at least to lead, others. This claim may be expressed in a doctrine of the white mans burden to raise the other races of mankind to his level of civilization or in a theory of the manifest destiny of the Anglo-Saxon variety of white man to control the North American continent. It may extol the role of the Japanese to shape the destiny of Asia or, in its most radical form, may proclaim an Aryan supremacy over the entire world.The last was the ideology of Hitlerism, whose social Darwinism was probably the only genuine belief system that underpinned the policies of conquest and extermination carried on by the Nazi regime. Social Darwinism, the application (or, rather, misapplication) of Darwinian principles to international relations, sees mankind divided into racial groups, all, like animal species, engaged in ceaseless struggle for survival; victory shows who is fittest and deserves to dominate. This emphasis on strife and glorification of war and victory in war became the hallmark of the ideology of that integral nationalism into which the earlier equalitarian and humanitarian nationalism was transformed in many countries, most significantly, perhaps, in the ideology of Italian fascism, which proclaimed that peace is a sheeps paradise where nations decay, whereas war brings out the virile virtues [seeFascism; National socialism].CommunismOf all recent ideologies, that of communism has, perhaps, had the most profound bearing on world affairs. Communist ideology goes back to Marx, although original Marxism had relatively little in the way of a theory of international relations, stating that all class societies produce wars, that wars represent conflicts, not of nations but of their ruling classes, in which the ruled are used for mere cannon fodder, and that the classless society to be established through the solidarity and the world-wide struggle of the proletariat will do away with war, merging nations in socialist brotherhood.This ideal, as an expectation, was shared by all inheritors of the Marxian doctrine. They split, however, over the question of how to attain it. Democratic socialism, by and large, came to share the tenets of moderate internationalism (see above); communism condemned this approach as bourgeois illusion, substituting for it Lenins doctrine of imperialism.Lenin held that imperialism, the expansion of capitalist countries and interests all over the world, marks the final phase of the capitalist system. The conflicts imperialism produces derive from competition over markets, investment opportunities, sources of raw material, and cheap labor; they are, therefore, inherent in the system that thus, sooner or later, results in world-wide wars among the imperialist powers. These wars will afford the proletariat, allied with the exploited masses of the colonial and semicolonial world, a chance for world revolution and for the transformation of capitalism into socialism.Lenins theory, by way of self-fulfilling prophecy, became the ideology of victorious Bolshevism. But the Soviet rulers were soon confronted with a novel question: when, contrary to their initial world-revolutionary expectations, the revolution failed to sweep the world, the problem of the relation between the two worlds of socialism (communism) and imperialism became crucial. There was no doubt in their mindsas there is none todaythat the conflict was irreconcilable, that it would become global, and that it would end in the world-wide victory of communism. But communist ideology has been wavering and unclear about the strategy to be used for the attainment of this goal.Lenin had commented upon inevitable collisions between Soviets and encircling imperialists. Stalin harped variably on peaceful coexistence and the danger of capitalist aggression. Toward the end of his rule, although he reiterated, in Leninist fashion, the inevitability of wars among imperialist powers, he was inclined to consider war between the two camps avoidable in view of the increased strength of the Soviet camp. Khrushchev, claiming that Soviet nuclear might could now deter imperialist countries not only from attacking communist ones but also from warring among themselves, pronounced Lenins doctrine of the inevitability of war outdated by developments; there is no fatalistic inevitability; peaceful co-existence now and eventual nonviolent transition from capitalism to socialism are possible and, since major war threatens the survival of all, preferable. Class struggle on the international plane will continue in the form of economic and ideological competition.The Chinese communist leadership, on the other hand, while not adhering strictly to the thesis of the inevitability of war either, insists that imperialist aggression can be deterred only by firm, energetic policy. The Chinese claim that a low risk policy emphasizing peaceful coexistence merely threatens to encourage such aggression. On the issue of internal revolutions, especially in the underdeveloped world (colonial and similar wars of liberation), Mao Tse-tungs ideology stresses the necessity of violence and the responsibility of the communist camp to aid and assist revolutionary forces all over the world. Here, too, Soviet ideology asserts the possibility of peaceful transitions.Hence, contrary to the dogmatism with which the ideological dispute appears to be carried on, the chief differences between the Chinese and Soviet leaders actually concern issues of strategy and tacticsin particular, the degree of militancy needed to pursue their ideological goals. Both sides agree on the need for the doctrinal unity of the camp. As often before in the history of ideology, inability to agree on who decides in case of doctrinal disunity has led to the actual split, with the Chinese rejecting the Soviet leaderships claim to ideological primacy [seeCommunism; Marxism].The role of ideologyThe foregoing has made clear the impact of ideology on world affairs. Especially in recent times, there are few issues not carried on in an ideological framework; observerspractitioners as well as theoreticianshave, therefore, focused their attention on the problem of cause and effect. Are ideologies major causes of events and policies or are they secondary phenomena, slogans explaining, justifying, or veiling that which really underlies events, namely, strategic, economic, and other interests of nations and power groups? Marxism, for example, which itself has given rise to one of historys most powerful ideologies, plays down ideology as the mere superstructure of economic and class interests. Similarly disparaging attitudes have been expressed by such dissimilar actors as Hitler, Nehru, and de Gaulle.It is easy to discover interests behind ideology, and the realistic trend in recent theory of international politics, emphasizing power and national interest, may account for the prevalence of this interpretation. But it needs more study and refinement, for example, distinction between movements aspiring to power, where the impact of ideology seems often stronger than that of interest (accounting for the Utopian elements in such movements), and groups in power, which are more often and more strongly swayed by interests.Even there, however, policies are only rarely conducted in entirely unideological fashion. They proceed in an environment of ideas, if not ideologies, which shapes the outlook and action of leaders and/or people. All policy is affected by the way in which reality is perceived. There is usually no uniform perception; even the most realistic statesman sees the world through some prism, if not in blinkers, applying his own interpretative framework to foreign affairs. Thus communist leaders, however realistic and cold-blooded they may be in their approach to world affairs, see the world in terms of class conflict, divided into aggressive and peace-loving forces. Even supposing that Stalin at some point had come to free himself completely from ideological considerations, viewing the world in terms of power interests exclusively, he could not have helped communicating with party, people, and communists abroad through the concepts and in the parlance of communism. Ideology similarly has affected the present SinoSoviet conflict, which, obvious underlying conflicts of interests notwithstanding, would otherwise hardly be carried on in its peculiar acrimonious fashion, pulling into its vortex communist countries and parties all over the world.Research problemsAlthough a good deal of attention is being paid to specific ideological problems (for example, the SinoSoviet dispute), the general and fundamental study of the relation of ideology to interests and of ideologys impact on policy is undoubtedly on the agenda of needed analysis and research. In this connection, attention should be paid not only to the national interestthe overriding political interest of the whole nationbut also to economic, social, and other special interests of subgroups within a nation. Careful and detailed research into the relation of specific ideologies to specific class, group, or national interests at a given time and place would seem to be more fruitful than speculations about general causal connections between national interests and broad ideologies.More specifically, the following research areas might be explored: the impact of international events on ideologies (for example, the rise of new centers of power, bipolarity giving way to multipolarity in the international system and the influence of this transformation on the major ideologies); the interplay of different ideologies (for example, communism and the nationalism of the emerging nations); the difference in degree of the impact of ideologies on foreign policy (for example, in totalitarian as contrasted with liberaldemocratic regimes); the extent to which publics share in the ideologies of leaders and the ways in which leaders try to mobilize ideological support for foreign policies; the way in which ideology affects the leaders assessment of national interests. Also, a typology of international ideologies might be undertaken.Analysis of this sort could conceivably affect policies. Study of ideology enables one to understand other peoples blinkers and eventually, perhaps, ones own. This way the West might come to understand communist policy as based, in part at least, on fears rather than inherent aggressiveness; and communist countries might better understand the preoccupations of the West, particularly in the light of the gradual erosion of ideology that some observers see in the communist world. A resulting deideologization of foreign policies might dampen their emotional, crusading character, reducing tensions to conflicts over interest, where compromise is easier to achieve than in ideological struggle. The realization of the danger in which nuclear weapons have placed all mankind might contribute to deideologization (as apparently it has done in recent Soviet policy), thereby furnishing one perspective of reality common to all. With the dusk of ideology we might eventually witness the dawn of a true theory and practice of peace.John H. Herz[See alsoColonialism; Ideology; Imperialism; Revolution; Social movements.]BIBLIOGRAPHYBainton, Roland H. 1960 Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace. Nashville: Abingdon.Bentwich, Norman D. (1933) 1959 The Religious Foundations of Internationalism: A Study in International Relations Through the Ages. 2d ed. London: Allen Unwin.Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. (1960)1961 The Soviet Bloc:Unity and Conflict. Rev. ed. New York: Praeger.Burin, Frederic S. 1963 The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War. American Political Science Review 57:334354.Elbe, Joachim von 1939 The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law. American Journal of International Law 33:665688.Goodman, Elliot R. (1960) 1961 The Soviet Design for a World State. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.Harvard University, Center for International Affairs 1960 Ideology and Foreign Affairs. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy Study, No. 10. Washington: Government Printing Office.Hersch, Jeanne 1956 Idologies et ralite: Essai dorientation politique. Paris: Plon.Herz, John H. 1951 Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities. Univ. of Chicago Press.Khadduri, Majid (1941) 1955 War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. ? First published as The Law of War and Peace in Islam: A Study in Moslem International Law.Lange, Christian L.; and Schou, August 19191963 Histoire de Iintemationalisme. 3 vols. Nobel Institute Publications, Vols. 4, 78. Oslo (Norway): Aschehoug; New York: Putnam. ? Vol. 1: Jusqu la paix de Westphalie. Vol. 2: De la paix de Westphalie jusqu au Congrs de Vienne.Lowenthal, Richard 1964 World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith. Oxford Univ. Press.Range, Willard 1961 Jawaharlal Nehrus World View: A Theory of International Relations. Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press.Russell, Frank M. 1936 Theories of International Relations. New York: Appleton.Sigmund, Paul E. (editor) 1963 The Ideologies of the Developing Nations. New York: Praeger.Zagoria, Donald S. 1962 The SinoSoviet Conflict, 19561961. Princeton Univ. Press.III. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTSDuring the 1950s, a new and rather vigorous area of specialization emerged that might loosely be called the social psychology of international relations. The exact boundaries of this emerging field are hard to define, and it necessarily spans several disciplines. It is characterized by the systematic use of social-psychological concepts and methods in the development of theory, research, and policy analyses in international relations.The concern of psychologists with problems of international relations did not, by any means, originate in the 1950s. Research efforts in this general area go back at least to the early 1930s, when studies on attitudes toward war and related matters were initiated. During the following years came various studies on national stereotypes; on attitudes toward war, war prevention, nationalism, and international affairs; and on sources of aggressive attitudes (for reviews, see Klineberg 1950 and Pear 1950). The steady development of public opinion research during these years also led to an accumulation of data relevant to national images and attitudes toward foreign policy issues (for an integration of opinion data, see Almond 1950). In addition to these research efforts, there were various attempts to develop theories of war and peace in Psychological Aspects in psychological terms, using either psychoanalytic frameworks (e.g., Glover 1946) or general psychological frameworks, particularly the theory of learning (e.g., May 1943). Finally, psychologists and social scientists in related disciplines addressed themselves to the psychological barriers to peace and determinants of tension and offered recommendations for tension reduction and international cooperation (e.g., Society ... 1945).Despite this activity, one certainly could not speak of an area of specialization in the social psychology of international relations. The total volume of research on these problems was exceedingly small and touched only indirectly on the actual interaction between nations or their nationals. There was hardly any research designed to examine the interactions between individuals representing different nationalities on either an official or an unofficial basis, or to trace the psychological processes involved in international politics. Even the work on images and attitudes was largely done in the context of general attitude research or personality research, rather than in the context of internation behavior and the foreign policy process.It is not surprising, therefore, that much that was written by psychologists and psychiatrists on questions of war and peace tended to be at a level removed from the interaction between nations. It did not grow out of specialized study of the psychological aspects of international relations but, rather, involved the application to the international situation of psychological principles derived from other areas of work. Such applications are highly relevant insofar as they deal with general psychological assumptions that might influence international policy. An example of a relevant application of this kind is the conclusion that there is no support from psychological research for the assumption that war is inevitable because it is rooted in human nature (cf. Society ... 1945, p. 455). It is also possible to apply psychological principles derived from work in other areas to certain specific problems in international relationssuch as the effects of stress on decision-making processes. Any attempt, however, to conceptualize the causes of war and the conditions for peace that starts from individual psychology rather than from an analysis of the relations between nation-states is of questionable relevance.One might, therefore, question the assumption made by some psychological writers that one can understand the causes of war by examining the determinants of aggressive behavior in individuals. It is true that the behavior of states ultimately consists of the behaviors of individuals, but state behavior is the aggregation of a variety of behaviors on the part of many individuals who represent different roles, interests, and degrees of influence on final decisions and contribute in very different ways to the complex social processes that eventuate in a final outcome such as war. One cannot, therefore, expect that the behavior of a nation will be a direct reflection of the motives of its citizens or even its leaders. Although war involves aggressive behavior on the part of many individuals, it is not necessarily at the service of aggressive motives. Leaders may engage in aggressive behavior for strategic reasons, for example, and the population at large for reasons of social conformity. Even where aggressive motives are involved in predisposing national leaders to precipitate war and segments of the population to support it enthusiastically, their role in the causation of war cannot be understood without an examination of the societal (and intersocietal) processes that are involved in the decision to engage in war and of the way in which different elements of the society enter into these processes.The emphasis on personal aggression is the most obvious limitation of some of the conceptualizations of war and peace that use individual psychology as their point of departure. The problem, however, is of a more general nature. Even a more complex analysis which recognizes that a variety of motives play a part in individuals preferences for war or willingness to accept it is not a proper starting point for the study of war. War is a societal and intersocietal action carried out in a national and international political context. What has to be explained is the way in which nations, given various societal and political conditions, arrive at various international policies, including war. Part of this explanation involves motivations and perceptions of different individuals (including the public) who play various roles in the larger societal process. But only if we know where and how these individuals fit into the larger process, and under what constraints they operate, will we be able to provide a relevant psychological analysis. Thus, a psychological analysis can never be complete and self-contained and be offered as an alternative to other theories of war (such as economic or political theories). It can contribute to a general theory of international relations only when the points in the process at which it is applicable have been properly identified.The tendency, particularly in some of the earlier psychological and psychoanalytic writings on war and peace, to focus on aggression and other motives of individuals, without taking the societal and political context into account, has caused some specialists in international relations to question the relevance of psychological contributions. There is no inherent reason, however, why psychological studies cannot start from an analysis of international relations at their own level, and they are increasingly doing so. Relevant systematic contributions of this kind are particularly likely to come from social psychology, which tends to view individual behavior in its societal and organizational context and to take deliberate account of the institutional processes that shape the behavior of individual actors and are in turn shaped by it.Major approachesThe shortcomings of earlier work have not been entirely overcome, but there has been a change of such proportions since the 1950s that one is justified in saying that the social-psychological study of international relations has reached a new stage in its development. In absolute terms, the amount of research on these problems is still very small, and little dependable evidence has been accumulated. But the volume of work has greatly increased in recent years, and there has been a concomitant growth in quality and sophistication. There are now a number of research centers and research programs focusing partly or entirely on social-psychological aspects of international relations. The earlier work on international attitudes and public opinion continues at a greater rate and with greater methodological refinement, and attempts to link it to the foreign policy process have increased. In addition, there have been numerous studies of cross-national contact and interaction. There have been various mattempts to study international conflict and its resolution experimentally and thus to deal more directly with issues of foreign policy making. Many of the investigators are acutely aware of the problems of generalization that this kind of research entails, and they make serious attempts to explore the international situation to which they hope to generalize and the conditions that would permit such generalization. In recent theoretical formulations, there is a greater tendency to start with questions at the level of international conflict and the interaction between nations, and then to see where psychological concepts can contribute to answering these questions. This has meant a decline in global approaches to the psychology of war and peace, with greater attention to the psychological analysis of specific subproblems. Similarly, psychological contributions to policy questions have tended to be more specific and more directly related to concrete issues in foreign affairs.In short, we seem to be in the initial phase of a newly emerging area of specializationa social psychology of international relations that deals with the problems of interaction between nations and the individuals within them at their own level, rather than as extensions of individual psychology. This area must be seen in the context of a broader development: the emergence of the behavioral study of international relations, in which social-psychological concepts and methods play an integral part. It is neither possible nor desirable to draw sharp lines between a social-psychological approach and this larger field, which by its very nature is interdisciplinarynot only in the sense that it represents a collaboration of investigators based in different disciplines but also in the sense that its concepts and methods represent a genuine pooling of the resources of different disciplines. Thus, social-psychological approaches are used not only by psychologists and sociologists but also quite frequently by political scientists, sometimes by anthropologists, economists, and mathematicians, and occasionally by historians. To a very large extent, it is precisely because current psychological work on international relations is embedded in a larger interdisciplinary effort and has close ties with political science that it is qualitatively different from the work of earlier years.In addition to its interdisciplinary character, there are two other features that distinguish the behavioral study of international relations. One is the use of a variety of methodslaboratory experiments, simulation studies, surveys, observational studies, content analyses of historical documents, organizational studies, and interviews with informantsand the readiness with which investigators alternate the methods and combine them. The other is the combination of a variety of purposes and the absence of sharp divisions between concern with theory building and concern with practical application, between an interest in developing a methodology and an interest in dealing with policy issues.Social-psychological approaches to international relations are part of this developing field and contribute