international property rights index ipri and … ipri execsummary… · universality, exclusivity,...

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IPRI and Economic Outcomes Figure 3-6 shows the relationship between the IPRI scores (index and related components) and GDP per capita. Overall, the relationships are strong and significant. In particular, the correlation coefficient between IPRI values and GDP per capita values is 0.79 (p<0.001). With regard to the individual components, the strongest relationship is reported for LP, whose correlation coefficient is 0.80 (p<0.001). PPR and IPR correlate with GDP per capita with correlation coefficients of 0.70 (p<0.001) and 0.71 (p<0.001) respectively. We can conclude that there is a positive, strong, and significant relationship between fortitude of property rights system and individual level measure of country performance, such as GDP per capita. IPRI Case Studies Case study on Tunisia - The Arab Spring: A Massive Clamor for Access to Property and Business Rights by Dr. Ana Lucía Camaiora The study describes ILD’s research on the Arab Spring — especially in Tunisia — and shows the economic roots as well as the legal discrimination/exclusion behind the revolution. It was sparked by the self-immolation of a Tunisian street fruit vendor; the revolution then spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), toppling dictators and fighting for opportunities to provide the poor with the same rights as those people with formal property rights and businesses in those countries. The study shows the magnitude of informality in Tunisia, as well as the obstacles and costs of an inadequate legal system — in this and other countries in the region — that do not give the majority of its informal entrepreneurs access to the legal tools needed to succeed in the national and global markets. Additionally, the study assesses the reasons why the governments in these countries have not done what is necessary to remove the economic constraints affecting their citizens, and concludes that only those politicians, who understand that their informal entrepreneurs are already working in the market and comprise a huge constituency, will be able to change the status quo and channel the Arab Spring towards sustainable growth and peace for their nations. Case study on Venezuela - Status of Property in Venezuela by Prof. Luis Alfonso Herrera and Prof. Felipe Benitez Since roughly 2005, but with greater emphasis beginning in 2007 (when the Venezuelan government attempted to reform the Constitution), there has been a systematic state policy -- rather than general, continued, and gradual -- implemented which dismisses tangible and intangible property rights. This policy is expressed in actions such as: laws which reserve the State the ownership of agrarian lands; laws that declare urban lands in the public interest open for seizures; decrees on rescue of agrarian and urban lands; laws that declare all production goods in public interest; use of seizure as administrative penalty; discriminatory seizures without compensation; permanent exchange regulations and unlimited discretionary acts of government; decrees on takeover and use of private companies; and refusal to register and protect intangible property rights; among others. Due to the decrees, laws, and regulations issued between 2007 and 2012, Venezuela's legal system is ± 85% against property rights. For this reason, short and medium-term recommendations have been made based on endpoints to stop said policy, reassert ownership, and lay a legal framework based on respect for property rights. Case Study on China- Protection of Property Rights as a Key to Economic Success in China by Prof. Xingyuan Feng, Prof. Christer Ljungwall, and Prof.Yeliang Xia China is now the world’s second largest economy in terms of GDP and a new member of the middle-income economies. However, a number of political, economic, and social problems have created a bottleneck in maintaining sustainable economic growth. This can result in a “middle-income trap”. Since China’s reform and opening-up in 1978, the resurgence and development of the private sector has been the key to China’s economic success. Entrepreneurs in non-state enterprises were initially suppressed, but then gradually tolerated and ultimately recognized by the government. Another source of private sector development is the level of privatization that has taken place in China. Since 2006, renationalization sped up a government policy of creating mega SOEs by the merging of existing SOEs that could be global players. At the same time, the government has relied too much on increases in fiscal spending to maintain high economic growth. Renationalization and excessive fiscal spending not only led to the crowding out of private investment and private sector development, it also delayed the adjustment of ownership and industrial structures in the Chinese economy. In addition, Chinese urbanization is pressing forward at the expense farmers’ property rights. In summary, the only way out of an all-out crisis is to boost private sector development and better protect the property rights of farmers and private entrepreneurs. Case study on Thailand- Thailand’s Titles Project Seen from the Perspective of Economic Development by Prof. Kriengsak Chareonwongsak Property rights are fundamentally important to capitalism. However, when a property rights system is incomplete and property rights laws are enforced ineffectively, slow economic growth is the result. This leads to a higher incidence of poverty and there is a high incidence of poverty. This article aims to evaluate the completeness of the property rights system in Thailand and the impact of an incomplete property rights system. The framework of this article uses four components of efficient property rights structure; including universality, exclusivity, transferability, and enforceability. The result of this study shows that nearly all public land lacks complete property rights due to unclear boundaries of land ownership. Almost half of all private land titles assign no complete property rights to their landowners. Incomplete property rights to both public and private land impacts Thailand’s economic development with such problems as poverty among agriculturists, uneven land distribution, land under-utilization, and the problem of trespass. As to the problems of incomplete property rights, suggestions have been proposed. For example, integrate the country's land management system, change all land title documents to be of the same type, reform land taxation in order to distribute land, establish a National Land Bank for the poor, and other solutions. 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Average GDP Per Capita, PPP (Constant 2005 International $), 2007-2011 Average IPRI, 2009-2013 Average LP, 2009-2013 Average PPR, 2009-2013 Average IPR, 2009-2013 Average GDP Per Capita, PPP (Constant 2005 International $), 2007-2011 Average GDP Per Capita, PPP (Constant 2005 International $), 2007-2011 Average GDP Per Capita, PPP (Constant 2005 International $), 2007-2011 www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org Figure 3: Relationship Between IPRI and GDP Per Capita Figure 4: Relationship Between LP and GDP Per Capita Figure 6: Relationship Between IPR and GDP Per Capita Figure 5: Relationship Between PPR and GDP Per Capita INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX 2013 REPORT A Project of the Property Rights Alliance Study conducted by Francesco Di Lorenzo, 2012 Hernando de Soto Fellow The 2013 edition ranks 131 countries, representing 98 percent of world Gross Domestic Product and 93 percent of world population. With a special introduction on the Arab Spring and Property Rights by Hernando de Soto

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IPRI and Economic Outcomes

Figure 3-6 shows the relationship between the IPRI scores (index and related components) and GDP per capita. Overall, therelationships are strong and significant. In particular, the correlation coefficient between IPRI values and GDP per capita values is0.79 (p<0.001). With regard to the individual components, the strongest relationship is reported for LP, whose correlation coefficientis 0.80 (p<0.001). PPR and IPR correlate with GDP per capita with correlation coefficients of 0.70 (p<0.001) and 0.71 (p<0.001)respectively. We can conclude that there is a positive, strong, and significant relationship between fortitude of property rights systemand individual level measure of country performance, such as GDP per capita.

IPRI Case Studies

Case study on Tunisia - The Arab Spring: A Massive Clamor for Access to Property and Business Rights

by Dr. Ana Lucía Camaiora

The study describes ILD’s research on the Arab Spring — especially in Tunisia — and shows the economic roots as well as the legaldiscrimination/exclusion behind the revolution. It was sparked by the self-immolation of a Tunisian street fruit vendor; the revolutionthen spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), toppling dictators and fighting for opportunities to provide thepoor with the same rights as those people with formal property rights and businesses in those countries. The study shows themagnitude of informality in Tunisia, as well as the obstacles and costs of an inadequate legal system — in this and other countries inthe region — that do not give the majority of its informal entrepreneurs access to the legal tools needed to succeed in the nationaland global markets. Additionally, the study assesses the reasons why the governments in these countries have not done what isnecessary to remove the economic constraints affecting their citizens, and concludes that only those politicians, who understand thattheir informal entrepreneurs are already working in the market and comprise a huge constituency, will be able to change the statusquo and channel the Arab Spring towards sustainable growth and peace for their nations.

Case study on Venezuela - Status of Property in Venezuela

by Prof. Luis Alfonso Herrera and Prof. Felipe Benitez

Since roughly 2005, but with greater emphasis beginning in 2007 (when the Venezuelan government attempted to reform theConstitution), there has been a systematic state policy -- rather than general, continued, and gradual -- implemented which dismissestangible and intangible property rights. This policy is expressed in actions such as: laws which reserve the State the ownership ofagrarian lands; laws that declare urban lands in the public interest open for seizures; decrees on rescue of agrarian and urban lands;laws that declare all production goods in public interest; use of seizure as administrative penalty; discriminatory seizures withoutcompensation; permanent exchange regulations and unlimited discretionary acts of government; decrees on takeover and use ofprivate companies; and refusal to register and protect intangible property rights; among others. Due to the decrees, laws, andregulations issued between 2007 and 2012, Venezuela's legal system is ± 85% against property rights. For this reason, short andmedium-term recommendations have been made based on endpoints to stop said policy, reassert ownership, and lay a legalframework based on respect for property rights.

Case Study on China- Protection of Property Rights as a Key to Economic Success in China

by Prof. Xingyuan Feng, Prof. Christer Ljungwall, and Prof. Yeliang Xia

China is now the world’s second largest economy in terms of GDP and a new member of the middle-income economies. However,a number of political, economic, and social problems have created a bottleneck in maintaining sustainable economic growth. Thiscan result in a “middle-income trap”. Since China’s reform and opening-up in 1978, the resurgence and development of the privatesector has been the key to China’s economic success. Entrepreneurs in non-state enterprises were initially suppressed, but then graduallytolerated and ultimately recognized by the government. Another source of private sector development is the level of privatization thathas taken place in China. Since 2006, renationalization sped up a government policy of creating mega SOEs by the merging of existingSOEs that could be global players. At the same time, the government has relied too much on increases in fiscal spending to maintainhigh economic growth. Renationalization and excessive fiscal spending not only led to the crowding out of private investment and privatesector development, it also delayed the adjustment of ownership and industrial structures in the Chinese economy. In addition, Chineseurbanization is pressing forward at the expense farmers’ property rights. In summary, the only way out of an all-out crisis is to boostprivate sector development and better protect the property rights of farmers and private entrepreneurs.

Case study on Thailand- Thailand’s Titles Project Seen from the Perspective of Economic Development

by Prof. Kriengsak Chareonwongsak

Property rights are fundamentally important to capitalism. However, when a property rights system is incomplete and property rightslaws are enforced ineffectively, slow economic growth is the result. This leads to a higher incidence of poverty and there is a highincidence of poverty. This article aims to evaluate the completeness of the property rights system in Thailand and the impact of anincomplete property rights system. The framework of this article uses four components of efficient property rights structure; includinguniversality, exclusivity, transferability, and enforceability. The result of this study shows that nearly all public land lacks completeproperty rights due to unclear boundaries of land ownership. Almost half of all private land titles assign no complete property rightsto their landowners. Incomplete property rights to both public and private land impacts Thailand’s economic development with suchproblems as poverty among agriculturists, uneven land distribution, land under-utilization, and the problem of trespass. As to theproblems of incomplete property rights, suggestions have been proposed. For example, integrate the country's land managementsystem, change all land title documents to be of the same type, reform land taxation in order to distribute land, establish a NationalLand Bank for the poor, and other solutions.

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Figure 3: Relationship Between IPRI and GDP Per Capita

Figure 4: Relationship Between LP and GDP Per Capita

Figure 6: Relationship Between IPR and GDP Per Capita

Figure 5: Relationship Between PPR and GDP Per Capita

I N T E R N A T I O N A L P R O P E R T Y R I G H T S I N D E X

2013REPORT

A Project of the Property Rights Alliance

Study conducted by Francesco Di Lorenzo, 2012 Hernando de Soto Fellow

The 2013 edition ranks 131 countries, representing 98 percent of world Gross Domestic Product

and 93 percent of world population.

With a special introduction on the Arab Springand Property Rights by Hernando de Soto

2 0 1 3 I P R I PA R T N E R O R G A N I Z A T I O N S

Afghanistan’s Economic and Legal Studies Organization (AELSO), Afghanistan ▪ Albanian Socio Economic Think Tank (ASET), Albania ▪ Fundación Atlas 1853, Argentina ▪ FundaciónLiberdad y Progreso, Argentina ▪ Fundación Libertad, Argentina ▪ Institute for Public Affairs (IPA), Australia ▪ Austrian Economics Center, Austria ▪ F.A. v. Hayek Institut, Austria ▪ TheNassau Institute, Bahamas ▪ Populi, Bolivia ▪ Instituto Liberdade, Brazil ▪ Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria ▪ Centre Des Affaires Humaines (CEDAH), Burkina Faso ▪ Frontier Centrefor Public Policy, Canada ▪ Fundación para el Progreso, Chile ▪ Libertad y Desarrollo, Chile ▪ Cathay Institute of Public Affairs (CIPA), China ▪ Unirule Institute of Economics, China ▪

Asociación de Consumidores Libres, Costa Rica ▪ IDEAS, Costa Rica ▪ Adriatic Institute for Public Policy, Croatia ▪ Centre de Analisis para Políticas Públicas (CAPP), Dominican Republic ▪

Instituto Ecuatoriano de Economía Politica (IEEP), Ecuador ▪ New Economic School (NES), Georgia ▪ Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Germany ▪ Institute for Free Enterprise (IUF), Germany▪ IMANI Center for Policy and Education, Ghana ▪ CIEN, Guatemala ▪ The Lion Rock Institute, Hong Kong ▪ Centre for Civil Society, India ▪ Centre for Policy Research, India ▪ LibertyInstitute, India ▪ Iraq Institute for Economic Reform (IIER), Iraq ▪ Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies (JMS), Israel ▪ Columbia Institute, Italy ▪ Competere, Italy ▪ Institute for Developmentand Economic Affairs (IDEA), Kazakhstan ▪ Center for Free Enterprise, Korea ▪ Bishkek Business Club, Kyrgyz Republic ▪ Central Asian Free Market Institute, Kyrgyz Republic ▪ OHRIDInstitute for Economic Strategies and International Affairs, Macedonia ▪ Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), Malaysia ▪ Center of Research and Development (CIDAC),Mexico ▪ Fundación Idea, Mexico ▪ EBI Think Tank Institute, Mongolia ▪ Center for Entrepreneurship and Economic Development (CEED), Montenegro ▪ Center for Mozambican andInternational Studies (CEMO), Mozambique ▪ Limited Government, Nepal ▪ Samriddhi Foundation, Nepal ▪ Initiative for Public Policy Analysis (IPPA), Nigeria ▪ Civita, Norway ▪ InternationalResearch Foundation (IRF), Oman ▪ Alternate Solutions Institute, Pakistan ▪ Pal-Think for Strategic Studies, Palestinian Territories ▪ Fundación Libertad, Panama ▪ Institute for Liberty andDemocracy (ILD), Peru ▪ Instituto de Libre Empresa, Peru ▪ Minimal Government Thinkers, Inc., Philippines ▪ Ludwig von Mises Institute, Poland ▪ Polish-American Foundation for EconomicResearch and Education (PAFERE), Poland ▪ Forum Obywatelskiego Rozwoju (FOR), Poland ▪ Center for Institutional Analysis and Development (CADI), Romania ▪ Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies (CLDS), Serbia ▪ F. A. Hayek Foundation, Slovakia ▪ The Free Market Foundation, South Africa ▪ Civisimo, Spain ▪ Eudoxa, Sweden ▪ Timbro, Sweden ▪ LiberalesInstitute, Switzerland ▪ Institute of Future Studies for Development (IFD), Thailand ▪ Association for Liberal Thinking, Turkey ▪ The Ukrainian Reform Support Foundation, Ukraine ▪ Centerfor the Dissemination of Economic Knowledge (CEDICE), Venezuela ▪ Zambia Institute for Public Policy Analysis (ZIPPA), Zambia

For more information, or to be part of the partner organizations, please contact

Lorenzo Montanari, Executive Director of the Property Rights Alliance, at [email protected].

2013 IPRI Results

Figure 1: Ranking by IPRI Score

Executive Summary

The International Property Rights Index (IPRI) is the flagship publication of the Property Rights Alliance (PRA). Based in

Washington, D.C. (USA), the PRA is committed to promoting property rights around the world. In its effort to produce the

IPRI, the PRA has secured the support of 74 think tanks and policy organizations in 57 countries involved in research, policy

development, education and promotion of property rights in their countries.

The IPRI is an annual comparative study that aims to quantify the strength of the property rights – both physical and

intellectual – and to rank countries accordingly. The IPRI scores and ranks each country based on 10 factors reflecting the

state of its Legal and Political Environment (LP), Physical Property Rights (PPR) and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). The

2013 edition is based on 131 countries and it explores the last 5 years between 2009 and 2013. This edition represents 98

percent of the world Gross Domestic Product and 93 percent of the world population.

I N T E R N A T I O N A L P R O P E R T Y R I G H T S I N D E X

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2 013 R E POR T

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SLOVAKIA 40MAURITIUS 40BOTSWANA 40

HUNGARY 40KOREA, REPUBLIC 37

PUERTO RICO (USA) 37SAUDI ARABIA 37

BAHRAIN 33SPAIN 33

MALAYSIA 33CZECH REPUBLIC 33

CYPRUS 31OMAN 31

ISRAEL 29ESTONIA 29

CHILE 26PORTUGAL 26

SOUTH AFRICA 26MALTA 25

TAIWAN (CHINA) 22UNITED ARAB EMIRATES …

ICELAND 22QATAR 20

FRANCE 20IRELAND 18BELGIUM 18

UNITED STATES (USA) 17GERMANY 14

JAPAN 14HONG KONG (SAR OF …

UNITED KINGDOM (UK) 12AUSTRIA 12

AUSTRALIA 11CANADA 9

DENMARK 9SINGAPORE 7

LUXEMBURG 7SWITZERLAND 5

NETHERLANDS 5NORWAY 4SWEDEN 2

NEW ZEALAND 2FINLAND 1

4.84.84.84.94.94.94.94.94.95.05.05.05.05.15.15.15.15.15.25.25.25.25.35.35.35.45.45.55.55.55.55.55.65.65.75.75.75.85.96.06.06.06.16.26.2

HONDURAS 87EL SALVADOR 87

SIERRA LEONE 87ZAMBIA 81

INDONESIA 81UGANDA 81

MACEDONIA (FYROM) 81TANZANIA, UNITED …

MALI 81PHILIPPINES 77

SRI. LANKA 77PERU 77BENIN 77

MALAWI 72BURKINA FASO 72MONTENEGRO 72

SWAZILAND 72THAILAND 72

GABON 68COLOMBIA 68

MEXICO 68CROATIA 68ROMANIA 65

MOROCCO 65LIBERIA 65

JAMAICA 63GREECE 63

CHINA 58GHANA 58

INDIA 58BULGARIA 58

TURKEY 58BRAZIL 56

PANAMA 56BRUNEI DARUSSALAM 53

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 53LATVIA 53

KUWAIT 52COSTA RICA 51

SLOVENIA 48LITHUANIA 48

JORDAN 48ITALY 47

RWANDA 44POLAND 44

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URUGUAY 44 4.84.8

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EGYPT 87

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VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN …

BURUNDI 127

HAITI 127

LIBYA 127

BANGLADESH 126

ALGERIA 125

ZIMBABWE 124

NIGERIA 122

CÔTE D'IVOIRE 122

CHAD 121

MOLDOVA, REPUBLIC OF 119

PAKISTAN 119

UKRAINE 113

GEORGIA 113

MADAGASCAR 113

LEBANON 113

ALBANIA 113

PARAGUAY 113

IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF …

CAMEROON 111

NICARAGUA 107

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA …

ETHIOPIA 107

SERBIA 107

NEPAL 102

KAZAKHSTAN 102

SENEGAL 102

AZERBAIJAN 102

RUSSIA 102

ECUADOR 96

KENYA 96

MOZAMBIQUE 96

ARMENIA 96

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 96

ARGENTINA 96

VIETNAM 91

BOLIVIA 91

GUATEMALA 91

MAURITANIA 91

GUYANA 91

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YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF 131

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Figure 2: Average Per Capita Income by IPRI Quintile

• Finland leads the 2013 ranking with a score of 8.6 out of 10. New Zealand and Sweden place second with a score of 8.4, followed by Norway at 8.3. Singapore shows the best score in the South East Asia area with 8.1 Canada enters in theranking at #9 with a score of 8.0, along with Denmark, with a distance of 0.4 from United States (7.6) that ranks #17.

• At the bottom of the 2013 ranking there are mainly countries from the Africa and Middle East regions; for example, Yemen(3.1), Burundi (3.4), Nigeria (3.9). However, non-African countries such as, Venezuela (#127), Haiti (#127) and Bangladesh(#126) also have very low IPRI scores.

• Figure 2 shows that, on average, countries in the top quintile of IPRI scores (i.e. top 20%) show a per capita incomeapproximately seven times that of the bottom quintile countries. Statistics for Figure 2 are based on the averages of theIPRI scores for years 2009–2013 and corresponding data on average GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)terms for the years 2007–2011. The same relationship is observed when using only the last year of the IPRI scores andhigh income per capita data.

To account for gender differences in access to property rights, the IPRI extends the standard index to include a measureof gender equality (GE). When accounting for gender, the IPRI specifically focuses the analysis on non-OECD countries.Data have been collected on Women’s Access to Land, Women’s Access to Credit, Women’s Access to Property Other thanLand, Inheritance Practices, and Women’s Social Rights. Results show that the top two countries are both in Asia. Singaporetops the ranking for the IPRI(GE) with a score of 9.9, followed by Hong Kong with a score of 9.7. The remaining countriesin the top 10 are more geographically dispersed with countries from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Burundihas the lowest IPRI (GE) score at 4.1.

IPRI Gender Equality Component