International Negotiation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective

janice Gross Stein

Negotiation is one of the most important processes of international conflict management. When representatives of one state "negotiate" with others, they exchange proposals to reach joint agreements to achieve mutually satisfactory results. What distinguishes negotiation from other kinds of international action is the recognition by the parties that they are mutually dependent on one another, that they cannot achieve their purposes unilaterally, through independent action. It is this interdependence of interests among states that creates the opportunity for international negotiation.

The analysis of international negotiation has had a rich intellectual tradition. Almost from the onset of recorded history, long before the advent of the modem nation-state, commentators have provided detailed and nuanced description of the exchange of proposals among leaders as they attempted to reach mutually satisfactory agreements in a wide variety of interdependent situations. They frequently went beyond description to recommend negotiating strategies that would improve performance and produce better results. Historically, analysis of the past to provide better prescription for the future has been the central focus of much of the literature on international negotiation.

Most recently, scholars have attempted to systematize the study of interna­tional negotiation, to make it more rigorous theoretically, so that they can improve the quality of the prescriptions they offer to practitioners (Pruitt, 1986). To do so, analysts have drawn heavily on game theory to identify the best possible outcome in a situation of strategic interdependence (Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Snidal, 1985). Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic options among rational actors in competitive situations. It reduces the number of options it examines at any one time, models the preferences of the players deductively, posits hierarchical and consistent preference orderings by the players, and then assumes rational choice by the participants. By design, game theory simplifies

Janice Gross Stein is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, 100 St. George Street, Toronto, Canada MSS lAl.

074H-·1S26/88/0700-0221S06.()()/0 C· 1988 Plenum Puhlishing Corporation Negotiationjournal july 1988 221

negotiating problems so that the most rational outcome can be identified. Of necessity, it pays little attention to the larger political, social, historical, and cultural contexts in which international negotiation takes place, does not exam­ine the process of negotiation itself, ignores the constraints to rational choice, and concentrates exclusively on the outcome. Largely because of their rigorous theoretical structures, however, game theory models of international negotiation have become increasingly important.

Despite the unquestioned contribution game theory has made to the analy­sis of international negotiation, increasingly scholars have begun to question its usefulness as a theoretical model of international negotiation. They do so because, frequently, there is a demonstrably poor fit between the predictions of rational choice models and negotiating behavior and outcomes. Analysts suspect that their neglect of the processes of negotiation and of the context in which interna­tional negotiation occurs limits the usefulness of game theory and rational choice models even as heuristics.

In an effort to stimulate new thinking about international negotiation and, simultaneously, to move beyond the two dominant disciplinary perspectives of history and political science, an interdisciplinary colloquium was organized jointly by the Canadian Institute of International Mfairs and the Center for International Studies at the University of Toronto. Scholars drawn widely from the social and behavioral sciences were invited to "think" about international negoti­ation from the perspective of their particular discipline. Most had not previously written about international negotiation in their c_apacity as scholars. This we considered a decided advantage. We hoped that the wide range of disciplinary perspectives would provoke new kinds of thinking about appropriate analytical perspectives. We asked our guests to think not only about new perspectives but also about the implications of these perspectives for research on international negotiation. Despite these rather unfair conditions, a political linguist, a sociolo­gist and ethnographer, an anthropologist, a psychologist, a political psychologist, and a management specialist generously agreed to accept the challenge.

Each of the disciplines brings its own perspective to the analysis of interna­tional negotiations. Each brings its own set of lenses, its concepts, and assump­tions, which shape and define the relevant questions for investigation. Although each separate discipline, by definition, is partial and incomplete, surprisingly, a considerable degree of consensus on important new areas for research emerges in the six papers that follow.

Goal-Setting and Problem-Posing In essence, international negotiation is communication, and communication occurs largely, though not exclusively, through language. David Bell begins this collection of articles with a discussion of the importance of language in the crucial stage of goal-setting and problem-posing. Analysts of international negoti­ation have long recognized that the way a problem is diagnosed and framed can have a critical impact on subsequent strategies and outcomes. For example, whether a negotiating problem is defined as competitive or integrative is critically important both to the likelihood of an agreement and to the kind of agreement that is achieved (Raiffa, 1982 and Pruitt, 1981).

The framing of the problem is, of necessity, in part a function of the language and culture of the participants. The phrasing and rephrasing of the problem by

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each of the participants, the meaning of the language they use, its cultural and symbolic significance, all have an important impact on the way the problem is defined. Goals are not givens, as game theory assumes, but variables that are shaped by language, culture, and context. Understanding the context and the meaning of a problem definition is the crucial first step for the analyst of international negotiation.

In his discussion of the contribution of anthropology to the analysis of international negotiation, Philip Gulliver similarly argues that many analysts have been too narrowly concerned with the particulars of the processes and tech­niques by which disputes are handled and outcomes achieved. Negotiation, he suggests, is deeply enmeshed in the ongoing wider social processes that consti­tute its essential environment. Consequently, a comprehensive analysis of interna­tional negotiation must include the "pre-history" of the dispute and its manage­ment, the past relationship among the parties, and the genesis and emergence of disagreement and conflict that led to the acknowledgement by the parties of the dispute. Very often, he suggests, the wholesale neglect of a great deal of the serious interaction that precedes and affects the end-game of negotiation seri­ously limits the capacity to explain its final outcome. It is in the crucial "pre­negotiation" phase that problems are framed and defined, goals are shaped and reshaped, and preferences are formulated. Like Bell, Gulliver argues that the analysis of international negotiation must begin long before the negotiations themselves start.

Communication in Context The strategies negotiators use are, as David Bell points out, in their essence linguistic. It is through language that negotiators formulate offers, make commit­ments, attempt to persuade, and issue threats and promises. Very little systematic analysis, he notes, has been done on the impact of different kinds of linguistic strategies on the process and outcome of negotiation.

Bell distinguishes between strategies of power and influence, and speculates that the language of influence may be more effective in permitting the reformula­tion of the negotiating problem that is necessary to promote agreements in situations of competitive interdependence. Similarly, in a review of competitive and problem-solving approaches to negotiation, Murray ( 1986, p. 180) differenti­ates between the language of confrontation or power that characterizes the former and the language of persuasion that is typical of the latter.

Aaron Cicourel extends the argument further. He notes that the analysis of discourse, conversation, and text is misleading if it is done out of context. Ethnographers, he suggests, locate conversation in the broader social, political, and organizational context that is critical to an understanding of the meaning of language. Within this tradition, he notes, it is not only what is said and how it is said but who the speaker is that is essential in determining meaning. For instance, an examination of a negotiating text outside its political and organizational context denudes the document of much of its essential meaning. How the document is produced, the setting and the process, are essential components in the analysis of what the text means both to negotiators and to observers.

Context is as important to the analysis of international negotiation as it is to other kinds of discourse. In international negotiation, it is the political and organizational context that structure the patterns of discourse. As Cicourel

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notes, the rights and entitlements of international negotiators are part of a broader institutional setting with formal and informal norms. These norms establish the rotation of speakers, the appropriate forms of discourse, and the vocabularies that participants encode and decode. Similar kinds of norms permit negotiators to construct official versions of what "happened" during the process of negotiation. The text that emerges cannot be understood outside the political and institutional context that governed its formulation.

Analysis of the context is important not only to establish the norms of discourse but, more importantly, to assess the power of the negotiators. The power of the participants, embedded in institutional settings, is essential to an understanding of the meaning of what is said. In the large, complex bureaucracies typical of many international negotiations, power is embedded partly in institu­tional and political settings and partly in access to expert knowledge relevant to the negotiating problem.

The power of special knowledge can be an important resource in negotia­tion, both to those who have it, and to those higher-level officials who have special access to expertise and can manipulate its use. Often, privileged access to expert knowledge is critical in establishing what is said, the language that is used, the vocabulary that is developed, and how reality is subsequently constructed and interpreted. In arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, the lexicon of "national security," "balance," and "sufficiency," shaped largely by experts, establishes the meaning of proposals negotiators present and consider.

The power of negotiators is rooted also in their institutional position, in the constituency they represent, and in their relative autonomy to negotiate. In the ongoing, informal negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, for example, what is important is not only what is said, or even how it is said, but who says it and in what context. When proposals of mutual recognition are put forward by individual Israelis and Palestinians outside the formal hierarchy, they have limited impact both on the definition of the negotiating problem and on the negotiating process. On the other hand, when far more limited proposals are put forward by senior Israeli leaders or officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization, they carry much greater significance and meaning. Even then, their meaning is quali­fied by the context in which they are made and by the audience that is listening. The meaning of these kinds of proposals cannot be understood outside their context and independent of the power, influence, and authority of the speaker. A useful model of the process and outcome of negotiation must include the meaning of language in context and represent the power and entitlements of those who speak.

Communication and influence in a process of negotiation, as Bell, Cicourel, and Robert Rosenthal all note, is not only verbal. In his research, Rosenthal has examined processes of social influence, usually in the context of a power imbalance, that are primarily unintended, subtle, covert, and to a great extent, nonverbal. Rosenthal finds that one person's expectation of another's behavior frequently becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Teachers, for example, who expect certain levels of intellectual performance are more likely to obtain those levels of achievement from their students. Extrapolating from the laboratory and studies in the field, Rosenthal suggests that participants in a process of negotiation similarly may influence one another in quite unintended ways through their interpersonal

224 janice Gross Stein A Multidisciplinary Perspectil'e

expectations. lbis process of influence is very often tacit rather than explicit. Much of the

research suggests that the impact of interpersonal expectations may depend in large part on processes of nonverbal communication. There are important indi­vidual differences in the clarity of people's nonverbal communication through different channels and in their receptivity to these kinds of cues. Different kinds of nonverbal communication may also be appropriate in different kinds of cul­tural contexts. Rosenthal suggests that receptivity to nonverbal cues can be assessed and negotiators sensitized to important tacit processes of influence.

Nonverbal communication, as psychologists acknowledge, is especially diffi­cult to analyze. President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt, for example, tended to separate phrases by long pauses and repeated thumping of his pipe, both in public conversation and in private negotiation. One of the frequent participants in negotiation with the late Egyptian president suggested that the frequent pauses reflected a careful calculus of phrasing ideas but that the cadence allowed Sadat to set the tone and sequencing of the conversation (Weizman, 1981, p. 66). Political psychologists looking at the same pattern note that this kind of nonverbal communication may be an attempt by negotiators to control their speech in order to avoid basic misunderstanding or to overcome basic problems in communica­tion (Wiegele, 1979, p. 73-75; and Maoz and Shayer, 1987, p. 578). Examination of the negotiating text alone would obscure both the intended and unintended effects of Sadat's process of communication.

The context in which nonverbal communication takes place is likely to be just as important as it is in formal negotiation. As Morley and Stephenson point out, some systems of communication restrict the number of social cues that one person can transmit to another while others do not ( 1977, p. 133-35, cited in Bell, 1988). Informal settings, off-the-record conversations, and a walk in the woods facilitate nonverbal communication while formal, structured negotiating ses­sions are likely to restrict its impact.

The cultural context is also likely to be important. Cultures ritualize nonver­bal communication differently; but, as semioticists and anthropologists have observed, the meaning of these rituals is often clearly understood by the partici­pants. In his analysis of negotiations between the United States and Egypt, for example, Cohen ( 1987, cited in Bell, 1988) finds that failures to communicate were grounded in important cultural incompatibilities between the two socie­ties. These incompatibilities were evident not only in different styles and use of language, but in negotiating rituals as well.

Monitoring of this kind of communication, although extraordinarily difficult, enriches the understanding of the processes of negotiation and their impact. Here, as Gulliver suggests, studies of small face-to-face negotiation may be helpful. Understanding of complex negotiations can be facilitated through their analysis in simpler contexts where it is easier to record and monitor the multiple kinds of formal and informal, tacit and explicit processes of communication that occur simultaneously

The Limits to Rational Choice Rational choice is the central theoretical assumption of strategic and game theory models of international negotiation. A large body of literature in psychology and in political science challenges this assumption and demonstrates the serious

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constraints to rationality across a wide variety of decision-making problems, both in the laboratory and in the field. Cognitive psychologists have demonstrated the constraining impact of a series of heuristics and biases, motivational psychologists have emphasized the distorting impact of human needs and emotions, and political psychologists have drawn from both to document the impact of con­straints to rational choice in a large number of important foreign policy decisions Qervis, 1976; Lebow, 1981; Larson, 1985; Lebow and Stein, 1987; Stein, forthcom­ing; and Lebow, Stein, and Cohen, under review). Deborah Larson extends these arguments to the analysis of the choice of negotiating strategies.

Reciprocity has long been an important strategy in international negotiation. Recently, reciprocity has been explained both by game theory and simple learn­ing models (Axelrod, 1984 and Keohane, 1984). Larson asserts that neither game theory nor simple learning models can explain why parties choose to reciprocate in international negotiation because both ignore how leaders understand and interpret the actions of others and the way they assess the motives of other parties to the negotiation. These processes of attribution are a crucial determinant of the choice whether or not to reciprocate.

As do Bell, Gulliver, and Cicourel, Larson contends that divergent interpreta­tions of the history of an international dispute shape perceptions of the other side's motivations and intentions. The Soviet Union and the United States, for example, explain the decline of detente in the 1970s very differently. These differences in interpretation of the meaning of the past shape expectations and frequently block recognition of future gains from agreements in areas of mutual interest.

It is not only the interpretation of past behavior that shapes processes of attribution. In part because of the ambiguity of most actions in an unstructured international environment, interpretation and evaluation of the action of another is rarely obvious. In controlled studies in the laboratory. experimenters define cooperation and defection for the participants. In international negotiation, as Larson notes, although the parties often know what others have done, they are rarely certain about what the action means.

Larson suggests that whether or not negotiators choose to reciprocate depends in part on the motives and intentions they attribute to the other party. Experimental studies suggest that people will not reciprocate gifts if they attri­bute ulterior motives to the giver (Schopler and Thompson, 1968 and Brehm and Cole, 1966, cited by Larson, 1988). On the other hand, they are more likely to reciprocate favors which they think were given freely and represent a sacrifice to the donor (Greenberg and Frisch, 1971, cited by Larson, 1988). These propositions are consistent with evidence of the proportionality bias in attribution, where people make inappropriate inferences about the intentions of others based on the apparent costs and consequences of their actions (Komorita, 1973 and Pruitt, 1981, p. 124-125).

More generally, psychological theories of attribution suggest that people attach meaning to the actions of others in an effort to control their environment. They concur with sociologists, anthropologists, and linguists on the importance of meaning in an explanation of behavior. Moreover, they consider the propensity to construct causal explanation as a basic human need to control uncertainty. The emphasis, however, is on the distortions in processes of attribution.

In constructing explanations of their own and others' behavior, people

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consistently demonstrate a number of important biases that distort their attributions:

• the fundamental attribution error, whereby people exaggerate the importance of dispositional over situational factors in explaining the undesirable behavior of others, but explain their own behavior as a result of situational rather than dispositional factors (Ross, 1977);

• the egocentric bias, which leads people to exaggerate the likelihood that others' actions are the result of their own prior behavior and to overestimate the extent to which they arc the target of those actions (Ross and Sicoly, 1979); and

• the self-serving attributional bias, or the tendency to take credit for success and deny responsibility for failure (Arkin, Appleman, and Burger, 1980).

All these biases can, to varying degrees and under different conditions, distort the attributions people make of the motives, intentions and behavior of their negotiat­ing partners. These biased attributions then become critical inputs to a choice of negotiating strategies. Insofar as they do, they challenge the expectations of models grounded in rational choice.

Max Bazerman and Harris Sondak draw on behavioral decision research and cognitive psychology to delineate additional constraints to rational choice in international negotiation. As they point out, these biases are not random but occur systematically. Four biases are particularly relevant:

• the failure to consider the intended decision of one's negotiating partners;

• nonrational escalation of a commitment once a strategy has been chosen;

• overconfidence in the validity of one's own estimates and attributions, espe-cially in situations of uncertainty; and

• the assumption that the opponent is a unitary actor.

These biases are likely to be aggravated in the context of large bureaucratic organizations at home and structural uncertainties abroad.

In examining the impact of these biases on American strategy toward Iran from 1978-1981, Bazerman and Sondak demonstrate consistent deviations from norms of rational choice. Although they do not say so explicitly, the implication of their argument is that, given the political fragmentation within Iran throughout much of this period, negotiation and the use of military force were both irrational strategic choices. Although the deep political divisions within Iran jeopardized the likely success of both diplomatic and military action, Bazerman and Sondak argue that leaders in the United States found it very difficult to acknowledge that they had limited control over events. Driven by the need to assert control, American leaders unconsciously biased their estimates of the likely consequences first of negotiation and then of military action. By implication, much of the time, patient inaction would have been the rational strategy. That American leaders did not choose this course of action can best be explained as bias motivated by psychological, bureaucratic, and political needs. Models of rational choice con­sider neither needs nor biases in their analysis of negotiating options.

Both the papers by Larson and by Bazerman and Sondak suggest that the limits to rational choice are at least as severe in decisions about appropriate negotiating strategies in the international environment as they are in other kinds of decisions. Both emphasize the importance of the subjective interpretations of

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the past, the significance of the meaning the parties themselves attach to the actions of the others, the distorting impact of cultural differences and bureau­cratic constraints, and the pervasive impact of cognitive and motivated errors on the choice of negotiating strategies. The thrust of both papers is the limited utility of models of rational choice as a central component of models of international negotiation.

The Outcome of Negotiation Bell and Gulliver both contest the classification of negotiating outcomes as either successes or failures. As Bell notes, the linguistic cloak that surrounds the outcome, the labelling attached to the results of the negotiation, frames these results with a set of prescribed meanings that carry strong messages for the participants in the negotiation. The language used to describe an outcome, rather than its "objective" attributes, can profoundly affect its evaluation by the constit­uencies of the negotiators. Whether, for example, the proposed free trade agree­ment between the United States and Canada is labelled as one of mutual benefit, as win and loss, or as mutual loss, will have an important impact on the political support it gets in both countries. As the agreement is debated in Congress and the House of Commons, negotiators in the United States and Canada speak of "mutual gain" when they address audiences across the border but tend to use the language of "win" when they speak to their own constituencies. This kind of language complicates immeasurably the difficult political process of building support for the agreement.

In addition to the labelling of an outcome, Gulliver argues, another impor­tant factor to consider is the broad social consequences of the outcome of any particular phase of a negotiation over time. Anthroplogists have examined the ways in which the relationships among the parties to the negotiation are modi­fied, redefined, weakened, or reinforced; the impact of the negotiation on the continuum of social life; the precedents created by the negotiation; and the impact of negotiation on important groups, interests, and resources. Particularly where the parties negotiate more or less continuously, a longitudinal analysis of negotiation as an extended social process over time is critical. For example, the relevance of this research to negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which engage in almost continuous negotiation over a broad spectrum of issues, is clear. An outcome of one subset of negotiations can have an important impact on the expectations that are created, the attitudes of both sides toward subsequent processes of negotiation, the coalitions that are created or destroyed, the interests that are promoted or frustrated, and on the broad fabric of the relationship itself. Models of negotiation that take "snapshots" of the process and arbitrarily designate outcomes as final for the purposes of analysis miss entirely the broad social, psychological, and political consequences of negotia­tion. In short, they treat the outcome out of context.

The Analysis of International Negotiation: Methodological Dilemmas All six articles in this collection argue the importance of context, meaning, and process, but simultaneously acknowledge the methodological difficulties inher­ent in their analysis. As the analysis of negotiation becomes richer, it becomes more difficult in theory and in practice. First and most obviously, access to the

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range of evidence required to reconstruct the context of negotiation is difficult to get. Analysts cannot rely on laboratory experiments or recorded texts but must get into the field to gain access to the participants and the data. Ideally, analysts would like records of negotiating sessions as they occur, the written documents and briefing memoranda prepared at every stage of the negotiation, and permis­sion to observe activities behind the scenes. Indeed, when conditions are right, field research can compensate for some of the threats to ecological validity of laboratory experiments (Pruitt, 1986, p. 240). However, as Cicourel, points out, conditions are rarely right.

Analysts can rarely observe important international negotiations as they occur, and all too infrequently gain access to briefing papers, memoranda, records of telephone conversations, and instructions to negotiators. Interviews of participants after the fact may suffer from the bias of hindsight and from moti­vated and unmotivated distortions in their processes of attribution (Fischoff and Byeth, 1975). As Cicourel notes, moreover, the structure of an interview imposes its own constraints through strategies of elicitation and unequal relationships of authority.

There are no easy solutions to these dilemmas. Interviews of as many participants as possible, sensitivity to context and process, to culture and to language, to relationships of power and influence, are prerequisite to a more valid reconstruction of the meaning of negotiation in all its phases. Interviewers must also be aware of their own "mental models," of the assumptions they bring to their reconstruction of negotiating sequences. Rosenthal warns that the expectations of an investigator in direct contact with a subject may unwittingly create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Field researchers in anthropology and sociology have long been sensitive to these threats to valid inference, as Gulliver and Cicourel note, when they tackle the messy reality of historical negotiations in widely different cultural and social contexts.

Field research and controlled laboratory experiments can be mutually rein­forcing in the effort to build better theories of negotiation. Because field research in natural settings generally permits much weaker causal inference than do controlled experiments, field research can be useful in generating hypotheses that can be tested more rigorously in a variety of controlled experiments. Field experiments, as Rosenthal suggests, can also involve the manipulation, or more modestly, the measurement of causal and moderator variables in naturalistic settings (Rosenthal and Rosnow; 1984; Pruitt, 1986, p. 240-1 ).

Analysis of the decision-making processes of negotiators outside the labora­tory also faces serious obstacles. As Larson notes, analysts who draw on psycho­logical theories and hypotheses confront difficult problems of evidence and inference. At best, analysts can study processes of choice only indirectly, since cognitive processes leave no direct behavioral traces. Like their colleagues in anthropology; sociology; and linguistics, they must attempt to establish the beliefs of political leaders, allowing for the possibility that officials may deliberately adapt what they say and write for particular audiences. Language, as Cicourel, Bell, and Larson all note, is often instrumental as well as representative.

Analysts can attempt to compensate for some of these difficulties. They can, as Larson suggests, look for consistency over time and across situations. When they find it, they can be more confident of the inferences that they draw. Similarly, predictions drawn from cognitive, motivational, and social psychology can be

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examined against the best available evidence of processes of decision making by the participants in international negotiation.

The exchange between students of international negotiation and psycholo­gists could be of benefit to both. This kind of study could benefit psychologists by assessing the validity of important hypotheses outside the laboratory and by suggesting the mediating conditions in an international context which affect the likelihood of different kinds of biases. Simultaneously, it could enrich the analysis of international negotiation by detailing the constraints to rational choice that affect practitioners under different kinds of circumstances. In both cases, greater attention to context, to the attributions negotiators make, and to the processes of decision making negotiators use in making their choice among negotiating strategies, would contribute to richer and more valid models.

A Wider Angle ofVision: Negotiation in Context It is striking that scholars coming from such widely divergent disciplinary per­spectives concur on the importance of context to analyze the goals, processes, strategic choices, and outcomes of international negotiation. They all contend that analyses that ignore the context in which negotiation takes place, the meaning of the language the negotiators use, and the impact of cultural, social, institutional, political, and psychological factors on processes of communication and choice, are inadequate as explanations of international negotiation.

The challenge of all six papers is clear: We must broaden our angle of vision and the scope of our research to examine the complex, rich, and often messy record of processes of international negotiation. This challenge can best be met by drawing as widely as we can on the theories and methods of the social and behavioral sciences.

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