international crises mccormick

7/25/2019 International Crises Mccormick

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University of Utah

Western Political Science ssociation

International Crises: A Note on DefinitionAuthor(s): James M. McCormickSource: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1978), pp. 352-358Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447735 .Accessed: 18/10/2014 05:53

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INTERNATIONAL CRISES: A NOTE ON DEFINITION

JAMES M. MCCORMICK

Iowa State University

NE prominent eature f the recent postwar period s the occurrence finternational rises. WhileKorea,Berlin, uba, Vietnam, nd the MiddleEast immediately ome to mind, these few exampleshardly xhaust he

list of suchevents. Despitethe frequency f these rises n the urrent nternationalsystem, elatively ittle s known bout the crisis rocess. n fact, nly within helast ten to fifteen earshave there een efforts ogain systematic mpirical nowl-edge about this phenomenon, nd onlymore recently ave there een attempts osynthesize uch knowledge.1

Part of the reason or he ack of cumulative nowledgean be attributed o thecomplexity f the phenomenon nd the recency f its nvestigation. ut part ofthe difficulty lso lies n the failure f researchers n this rea to define learlywhatsituations onstitute nternational rises.Different ituations re labeled crisesby different cholars. Often researchers nly employ ntuitive otions f when acrisis xisted nd immediately roceedto analyze risis ehavior. Or, alternately,even when crisis riteria re spelledout, the standards re not wholly dequate orare not consistent cross researchers. f we are to obtain meaningful umulativeknowledge bout crises, his efinitional roblemmust e confronted. n an attemptto sensitize esearchers o this first tep n crisis nalysis, hispaper identifies he

two major approaches odefining n international risis, iscusses he problems nrelying olely n either ne, and arguesfor ombining oth pproaches n order oimprove dentification f crisis ituations or uture nalyses.

ALTERNATEAPPROACHES TO CRISISDEFINITION

In reviewing he crisis iterature, iener nd Kahn, Robinson, nd Hermannagree that the international risis oncept has no generally ccepted definition.2Their analyses urther uggest, owever, hat different heoretical rientations othe study f nternational olitics ave influenced heconceptual lements sed nvarious crisisdefinitions. n this ense,while t may not be possible o identifysingle risis definition, t is possible o identify wo different pproachesused byscholars o define he concept: (1) researchers ho define n international risisin terms f the decision-making rocesswithin nation, nd (2) thosewho definea crisis n terms f the nteraction rocess etween ations.3

To researchers nalyzing nternational ehavior from the decision-makingperspective, crisis ituation s defined n terms f the decision-makers' definitionof the situation. As the decision-makers' iewof the nternational nvironment saltered by the behavior f another ation, crisis ituation ets n and becomes n

NOTE: Thanks are due James Hutter, Charles Wiggins, and anonymous readers for severalconstructive omments n earlier versions. All errors re mine.

See, for example, Charles F. Hermann and Linda P. Brady, Alternative Models of Inter-national CrisisBehavior, n CharlesF. Hermann, d., International rises: nsightsfrom ehavioral esearch NewYork: FreePress, 972),pp. 281--307; amesA. Robin-son, Crisis Decisionmaking, in James A. Robinson, ed., Political Science Annual II,1969-1970 (Indianapolis: Bobbs, Merrill, 1970), pp. 111-48; and Oran R. Young,The Politics of Force (Princeton: Princeton University ress, 1968).

2 Anthony J. Wiener and Herman Kahn, Crisis and Arms Control (New York: Hudson Insti-tute, 1962); James A. Robinson, Crisis in International Encyclopedia of the SocialSciences (New York: MacMillan, 1968), pp. 510-14; and Charles F. Hermann, Crisesin Foreign Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs, Merrill, 1969).

3 For a discussion of the prevalence of these two approaches in conceptualizing nternationalcrises, see Robinson, Crisis in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences;Young, The Politics of Force; and Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy.

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International Crises 353

occasion for decision. 4 The definition evelopedby Charles Hermann s mostrepresentative f this decision-making pproach: Crisis s a situation hat (1)threatens he

high-priority oalsof the

decision-makingnit;

(2)restricts he

amount f time vailable for esponse efore he ituation s transformed; nd (3)surprises hemembers f the decision-making nit when t occurs. 5 Additionally,Hermann xplicitly tates hat his definition s formulated rom heperspective fthe decision-makers who are experiencing the crisis: . .. the situation threatenstheir goals, it surprises hem, nd it is they who are faced with short decisiontime. 6 Thus, the perceptions f the decision-makers and especially erceptionsof threat, s Hermann ater emonstrates7 are the rucial lements or dentifyingan international risis.Even though xternal vents may have been initially e-sponsiblefor altered perceptions, esearchers ho use the decision-making p-proachdo not mphasize uch vents n their risis efinitions.

In sharp contrast o this definitional pproach s the one used by researcherswhoexamine nternational olitics rom he ystemic erspective. o these cholars,an international risis s usuallydefined s a situation n which there s somesig-nificant hange in the normal interaction atterns between nations. CharlesMcClelland nd Oran Youngprovide xamples f this risis efinition. cClellanddefines n international risis s a 'change of state' n the flow of internationalpolitical ctions... or, alternately, s when... a succession f extraordinary n-puts begetting ew outputs egetting ew nputs, tc., between ompeting artiespassessome point n volume and intensity, he whole phenomenon egins o becalled an international risis. 8 Young generally grees with McClelland's defi-

nition:An international risis s a set of rapidly unfolding vents which raisesthe mpact of destabilizing orces n the general ystem r any of ts sub-systems ubstantially bove normal i.e., average) levels nd increasesthe ikelihood f violence ccurring n the ystem.9

Thus, this definitional pproach emphasizes heactual decisions akenby nations,and the resultant ehavior between hem, ormarking he occurrence f a crisissituation. Researchers ho use this pproach do not ndicate oncern or heper-ceptions f the policymakers although on at least one occasion McClelland hasalluded to their

mpact'0);rather

heyre

primarilyoncerned with behavior

changefor risis dentification.

4Ibid.,p. 29; Robinson, Crisis, . 511.6Hermann, rises n Foreign olicy, . 29.

bid.,p. 34; emphasis n original.7Ibid., pp. 108, 202-3.8The first uotation ppears n Charles A. McClelland, Access o Berlin: The Quantity nd

Variety of Events, 1948-1963, n J. David Singer, d., Quantitative nternationalPolitics New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 160, while the secondone is from harlesA. McClelland, The Acute nternational risis, World Politics14 (October 1961):199.

9Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: hird Parties n International rises Princeton:Princeton niversity ress, 967),p. 10.In commenting n the argument hat crisis nd non-crisis ehavior re markedly ifferent

only n a psychologicalense,McClelland n Access o Berlin .., pp. 164-65,statesthat:... a given ct committed t one moment nd in a certain ontext s provocative,while at another ime and in a different etting t may be merely rritating.statement y the head of state on one occasionwill be dismissed n other overn-ments s bluster irected trictly o the home audience,while at another ime t

willbe taken s a serious hreat.In a sense, hen, e seems o recognize hisperceptual ideof crisis. However,McClel-land continues y saying hat f the psychologicalomponent s the essential haracter-istic of crisis, ny prospect t crisismanagement r crisis nderstanding s unlikely aposition hathe doesnot ccept.



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354 Western olitical Quarterly

Too often, owever, hese woapproacheshave been used n virtual solationof one another n identifying rises or nalyses. ne researcher ayexamineper-

ceptual change amongthe decision-makersoearmark

crisis,while another

mayuse behavior hange mong nations. Whilesomemay argue that both pproachesare sufficiently elated oone another o ustify hereliance pononly ne approachfor risis dentification i.e., perceptual modification ithin he decision nit eadsto behavior hange etween ations, nd behavior hange n turn eads to perceptualmodification), e demonstrate everal erious onceptual nd empirical roblemsin adopting such a strategy. Then we argue that a crisis ituation hould belabelled s such onlywhen the conditions f both pproaches re satisfied.

SOMECONCEPTUALANDEMPIRICAL ROBLEMSWITHTHESEAPPROACHES

The fundamental conceptual problem in relying olely on either approach isthat situations dentified s crisesby one group of researchers aynot be recog-nized as such by the other. By employing he decision-making pproach, for x-ample, one could identify situation as a crisis n which altered perceptions oc-curred but which resulted in little or no change in the actions between nations.One might be justified n labeling the situation as a crisis within the bureaucracy,but it hardly seems to qualify as an international crisis. A well-known examplefrom previous research underscores this possible confusion in crisis recognition.When applying the decision-making criteria, Khrushchev's ultimatum over Berlinin November 1958 seemed to initiate a crisis for the Western nations. For example,Eisenhower dmits hat he was

surprised ythe

belligerencef the Soviet

messageover Berlin, but that he put less credibility n Khrushchev's threat to move inthe following May than he [Khrushchev] possibly expected. Eisenhower also in-dicated, however, that the time for decision-making was compressed: But everytick of the clock brought us nearer to the moment when we had to be ready to meethim [Khrushchev] head on, if necessary. Though six months can sometimes eemlike an age, there was little nough ime operfect ontingency lanningwith ourallies. l In his interaction nalyses of East-West encounters over Berlin, however,Charles McClelland fails to confirm he occurrence of this Deadline Crisis. Ac-cording ohis data results, hesequence f events uring his eriodfailed oreachthe threshold he had set for armarking crisis ituation.'2

Similarly, esearchers ho use the nteraction pproach may abela situationas a crisis because there has been a marked hange n the interaction atterns,even though the perceptual view of the decision-makers as not been alteredmarkedly. For example, in the recent period of detente between the Soviet Unionand the United States, undoubtedly a sharp change in behavior patterns has oc-curred without much apparent change in the perceptual views of one another.13

DwightD. Eisenhower,Waging Peace 1956-1961 (Garden City: Doubleday,1965), pp.336-37. But even on the perceptual evel, he dentification f this risis s not clear-cut. The accounts yJean E. Smith, he Defense f Berlin Baltimore:Johns opkinsUniversity ress, 1963) and by Jack M. Schick,The Berlin Crisis1958-1962 (Phila-delphia: University f Pennsylvania ress, 971), are mixed n terms f evidence orcrisis ituation mong the Western ations. Smith generally iews t as an immediatetest of resolve n the part of the West. He tries o show that the Western eadershipviewed t as such and acted on that basis. Schick,however, mplies hat the UnitedStates policy-makers id not regard he ultimatum s quite so threatening, ut ratherthey awit as a maneuver ore-open egotiations ver Berlin,Germany, nd Europeansecurity n general.

McClelland in Access to Berlin... p. 178, reports hat . . by the criterion f grossvolume, he Deadline Crisis was not a crisis.... Likewise, is relative ncertaintymeasure ails o reach the specified hreshold f 700 for 1958 or 1959 (p. 179). (Fora discussionf the measure, eefootnote 9.)3In fact, he aim of de6tente,ccording o official tatements f both Soviet nd Americanpolicy-makers,s the essening f behavioral onfrontations etween hem,without nylessening f their deological ispute.



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In this nstance, the interaction conditions for crisis are probably satisfied, ut thissituation would hardly merit being called a crisis. Furthermore, ontinual percep-tual

hostility mayexist between the Arab states and Israel, although there may not

be much behavioral change between the states. Would we thus be justified inlabeling the situation as an international crisis? In short, this kind of conceptualconfusion eems to exist whenever each approach is used separately.

A second problem also arises from this conceptual divergence: Current workon international crises strongly uggests that the varying definitions ave hindered,rather than helped, cumulative theoretical research. Consider a recent volumeedited by Charles Hermann.'4 A recurrent heme throughout everal of the articlesis that the different efinitions have been an obstacle to advancing crisis knowl-edge.15 This same problem is highlighted n the concluding essay by Hermann andBrady. From the earlier ten articles, they first dentified ome 311 crisis proposi-tions and suggested how several of them were contradictory. Then they suggestedpart of the reason why:

How can we account for these apparent contradictions? Various compet-ing explanations warrant examination. For one thing it is by no meanscertain that the same variable mentioned in two different tudies is con-ceptualized in identical fashion, nd even when the conceptualizations arethe same operationalization can differ. With no term s this point clearerthan with the basic term of crisis. n general, the authors of the ten studiesemploy one of two definitions f crisis... When one selects actual situa-tions n international politics that are consistent with each alternative defi-nition, a considerable number of the same events appear in both groups.Nevertheless, he differences n definition may account, for some contra-dictory hypotheses.16

Furthermore, ven when Hermann and Brady develop four separate models (andlater a fifth, ntegrated one) to accommodate the disparate propositions, he alter-nate approaches to crisis identification re still very much evident. In this sense,the fundamental problem continues to retard ntegrated esearch.17

Another unfortunate result which follows from these diverse research effortsis the paucity of crisis theory. As James Robinson has said: . . . [T]here is no such

thing as a theory of crisis or even theories of crisis. s1 In addition, Robinson is

hard-pressedto cite other social theories that

employthe crisis

conceptin their

formulations. While a number of reasons may be cited for the failure to developadequate theory, no doubt a central one must be the ambiguity of the conceptitself. As a consequence, until the concept assumes a more accepted definition crossresearchers, theory f crisis will not be developed, and the use of the crisis onceptin theories f social process will continue to be infrequent.

14Charles F. Hermann, International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research (New York:Free Press, 1972).

8 See, for example, Charles F. Hermann, Some Issues in the Study of International Crises,in Charles F. Hermann, ed., International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research(New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 3-17; Charles F. Hermann, Editor's Introduction:Chapter Two, in Charles F. Hermann, ed., International Crises: Insights from Be-havioral Research, pp. 18-19; and James A. Robinson, Crisis: An Appraisal of Con-cepts and Theories, in Charles F. Hermann. ed., International Crises: Insights fronBehavioral Research (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 20-35.

'6 Hermann and Brady, Alternative Models of International Crisis Behavior, in Hermann.International Crises.. ., p. 282; emphasis added.

It is only fair to note that Hermann and Brady argue that their models are generally ap-plicable to either definitional pproach. Despite this contention, however, each model-- the individual stress, rganizational response, hostile nteraction, nd cost calculation-seems to suggest the continued influence of differing efinitions or hypothesizingabout crisis process.

' Robinson, Crisis: An Appraisal of Concepts and Theories, in Hermann, InternationalCrises... p. 27.



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Finally, mpirical roblems xist n relying olely n only ne definitional p-proach. Neither the decision-making esearchers or the interaction cholars

identifyhe

degreef

perceptualr behavioral

hangehatmust xist o

qualifys

a crisis. ' The decision-making pproach does not dentify he evelof perceivedthreat necessary or the onset of a crisisnor does it suggestwhen threat asbeenreduced to a non-crisis ondition. Similarly, he interaction pproach does notidentify he thresholds f behavior hat mark hebeginning nd the end of a crisissituation. nstead, ne must etermine he normal ehavior etween ations ndthen pecify he non-normal ehavior. As a result, oth approaches ely n arbi-trary pecificationsf crisis hresholds. Moreover, uchthresholds re often ifficultto defend n theoretical rounds.

TOWARD CONCEPTUAL CLARITY: COMBININGTHE Two APPROACHESBecauseof theseproblems, t s now necessary oseek omeconceptual losure

in defining he international risis erm. Moreover,we believe hat a combiningof the two approacheswould best erve heoretical nd empirical fforts oanalyzeinternational risis ituations. pecifically, n international risis houldbe definedas a situation etween wo (or more) nations hat s characterized y perceptualconditions f high threat, urprise, nd short decision time, nd by behavioralconditions f marked hange n their nteraction atterns. n other words, nlywhen both ets of crisis onditions re satisfied hould he ituation e identified san international risis ituation.

Any discussion f conceptual losure for the crisis erm undoubtedly aisesquestions mong some researchers. s it feasible o seek closure between wo ap-proaches hat seemingly o not dentify he same underlying henomenon orde-fining crisis ituation? Are not such efforts remature n light f the researchknowledge ained through eparate ines of inquiry? And, is such closure con-sistent with the openness f scientific nvestigation, specially n its early tages?These are mportant uestions nd deserve ome omment.

The answer o the first uestion ies in the fact that the two approachesdoattempt o tap the same underlying henomenon. Both approaches ttempt omeasure he degree f threat resent n a particular ituation;20 owever, ach one

uses conditions or indicators) hat are incomplete y themselves. or example,the conditions rom he decision-making pproach seemto focuson threat s re-flected n the perceptions f the policy-makers hile he onditions f the nteractionapproach eem ofocus n threat s reflected n behavior hanges. As we suggestedin our earlier discussion, owever, either et of conditions s fully atisfactory nidentifying heunderlying hreat roperty. n essence, hen, ecause hedefinitional

Instead, both approaches make research design decisions on how to operationalize thepresence of a crisis or its intensity. For example, the principal means to determine theintensity f a threat for researchers who use the decision-making pproach has been tocontent analyze statements r messages of the decision-makers. See, for example, Ole R.

Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).An alternate strategy within this approach has been to simulate high threat, hort de-cision time, and surprise. See Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy. With the interactionapproach, McClelland's Access to Berlin... is an example of employing operationalthresholds f behavior change to identify he presence of a crisis. He arbitrarily ses arelative uncertainty ndex score of .700 as the beginning point for a crisis ituation. Therelative uncertainty ndex measures the variety of action by one nation toward anotherand ranges from 000 (highly patterned and repetitive behavior) to 1.000 (disorderedand irregular behavior). McClelland states that he chose the .700 threshold because itshows that a measurable change of state takes place in the transition rom non-crisissituation to a crisis ituation.

20For another discussion that identifies hreat as an underlying phenomenon in both defini-tional approaches, see Hermann and Brady, Alternative Models of International CrisisBehavior, in Hermann, nternational Crises. . p. 284.



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problem oesnot reside n the failure o dentify he ameunderlying henomenonbut rather n the failure ousewholly atisfactory onditions, fforts t conceptualclosure re warranted.

Furthermore, n the caseof incomplete oncept pecification, braham Kap-lan suggests hat hedefining onditions an be treated s an open setof ndicatorsto assist n specifying hen a term houldbe used.21As more ndicators re ob-servable n a given ituation, hegreater he ustification or heuseof a particularconcept. In the case of the international risis oncept, hen, the greater hepresence f the two crisis onditions, hegreater heprobability hat the situationmerits eing called an international risis. Moreover, his ttempt t conceptualclosure s consistent ith scientific ethodology.As researchers ain a greaterunderstanding f a concept, greater are should be taken n defining t. Thus,changes n definition re constant nd normal n the development f scientific n-

quiry a processwhichKaplan has aptly alled successive efinition. 22 n thissense, onceptual losurerepresents n integral art of the scientific ethod.Although ombining oth definitional pproacheswillnot fully liminate he

need to identify hresholds,t will make these ecisionsmuch easier. For example,the problem f dentifying hedegree f behavior hange hatmarks hebeginning(or end) of a crisiswillbe lessened ecause perceptual hangewillalsoneed to bepresent. Likewise, he difficulty f differentiating bureaucratic risis rom ninternational risiswill also be reduced becausechanges n behavior will also needto exist for complete risis dentification. n essence, hen, ach set of conditionswill have to reinforce ne another n order oidentify n international risis itua-

ton.If

both setsof conditions annot be

met,he situation houldnot be labeled

a crisis.Employing oth sets of conditions or dentifying riseshas been made much

easier with the increased vailability f empirical ata. On the decision-makinglevel,for xample, here eems obe both adequate analytic echniques nd suffi-cient ourcematerial o operationalize heperceptual onditions f crises. Contentanalysis rocedures ave been developed-including the use of computer-aidedmethods to analyzethe increasing olumeof speeches, tatements, nd biogra-phies of crisis articipants. Moreover, t least one large and comprehensive ataset has beencoded n a way that dentifies heprincipal erceptual ariables f the

decision-makers.he CREON

(Comparativeesearch n the Events f

Nations)Projecthas coded more than 11,000 nteractions or electedmonths f 1959-1968for he three ritical ariables f the perceptual efinition the degree f threat/opportunity n each situation, heamount f decision ime vailableto the policy-makers, nd the extent of surprise r anticipation n the occurrence f eachinteraction.

On the behavioral evel,too, systematic ndicators or ssessing he behaviorbetween ations re increasingly vailable. Such data availability s argely resultof the growth f nternational vents ata. This type f data identifies ome ctionor behavior y an actor Nation A) toward target Nation B) collected n some

regularized ay. Additionally, he behavior n each event s usually ategorized,scaled, nd weighted long somedimension most ommonly ythe degree f con-flict) n order o identify hanges n intensity etween ations. Some of the moreprominent vents data banks are WEIS (World Event/Interaction urvey),CREON, COPDAB (Conflict nd Peace Data Bank), and DON (Dimensionalityof Nations) Project, mong others. These data sets as well as numerous thersmaller ollections) re available to researchers ither hrough he nter-University

21Abraham aplan, The Conduct f nquiry San Francisco:Chandler, 964), p. 68.2Ibid., p. 77.



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Consortium or Political nd Social Research, he publication f data books23rdirect ccessfrom heoriginal ollectors.

CONCLUSION

The crucial first tep n doingresearch n crisis rocess s adequately dentify-ing an international risis ituation. he separate pproaches sedup to now,how-ever, have not been wholly atisfactory or everal mportant onceptual nd em-pirical reasons. Consequently, e believethat satisfactory risis dentification anbestbe achievedwhen researchers se definitional lements rom oth hedecision-making nd interaction pproaches. Moreover, uch a definition as several m-portant dvantages ver other ingular pproaches: (1) it would alleviatebothconceptual nd empirical rrors hat occur in delimiting risis ituations n the

basisof only ne approach; 2) it wouldprovide ome ommon ase for dentifyinginternational rises or cholarswith different esearch nterests; nd finally 3) itwould allow scholars oanalyze ehaviorwithin crisiswith greater ssurance hatit would be recognized s such by other nvestigators. lthough his trategy aynot resolve ll problems ssociatedwith dentifying nternational rises, everthelessit should reatly nhance umulative esearch n these ritical vents n nternationalbehavior.

2 For example, the data book by Edward E. Azar and Thomas L. Sloan, The Dimensions ofInteraction (Pittsburgh: International Studies Association, 1975).

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