interests vs. positions: a critique of the...

In Theory

Interests vs. Positions: A Critique of the Distinction

Chris Provis

Getting to YES has popularized the focus on interests rather than positions

in negotiation. However, somelimes an emphasis on interests, to the exclu-

sion o f the positions o f the parties, can be counterproductive. Among other issues, this article highlights difficulties s temming from: ambiguities in the

meanings o f the two words; the significant role that positions play in nego- t iat ion dynamics , par t icular ly in commun ica t i on and in intergroup bargaining; and negotiations that hinge partly on people's values and per-

ceptions rather than interests.

M a n y negot,!ation scholars have emphasized the distinction between "interests and "positions in the effort to reach agreement in nego-

tiation. The first to give the idea wide publicity were Fisher and Ury in Getting to YES (1981). They use the same distinction in a number of other works (Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 1988; Fisher and Brown 1989; Ury 1991). The literature contains occasional reservations about the idea (e.g., Lax and Sebenius 1986: 69) but, in general, the distinction is widely accepted. Many analysts who use or advocate the distinction refer to Getting to YES as its source (e.g., Rubin 1989: 203; Neale and Bazerman 1991: 19; Friedman 1992; Roloff and Jordan 1992: 23; Lewicki et al. 1994: 85-6; Bettinghaus and Cody 1994: 329). The advice is preserved largely unchanged in the revised edition of Getting to YES (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991). The key idea is that

Chris Provis is a senior lecturer in industrial relations in the Elton Mayo School of Management, University of South Australia, North Terrace, Adelaide, S.A. 5000, Australia. He is co-editor of the recent book The New Industrial Relations in Australia (Sydney: Federation Press, 1995).

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agreement will generally be facilitated by concentrat ing on parties' interests, rather than on their positions.

Getting to YES has been an important book, and a useful one, for many negotiators, but it was intended more as a handbook than a theoretical trea- tise. Because its idea about distinguishing positions from interests has been taken tip in so much of the literature, it is wor th considering that idea in more detail. While the approach r ecommended in Getting to YES may often be salutary, I believe the interests-positions distinction can somet imes be problematic and, in some important types of cases, the distinction can even mislead the negotiators. Some difficulties revolve arotmd the meaning of the distinction. Others relate to the important role that positions play in negotia- t ion dynamics, particularly in communicat ion and in negotiations be tween groups. Finally, there is the fact that some negotiation is centrally conce rned with cognitions and perceptions, rather than interests.

Underlying the critique presented here is the view that the distinction be tween interests and positions rests on an ou tmoded distinction be tween motivation and cognition. The idea that interests and positions can always be dis t inguished for the pu rposes o f negot ia t ion is re la ted to the idea that behavior can always be explained by assuming that humans have drives or instincts which impel them toward certain end-states, together with percep- tual-cognitive mechanisms that determine concre te behavior in light of those drives or instincts. That generalization is a doubtful one (cf. Weinberger and McClelland 1990), and raises problems in thinking about certain types of negotiation. Some recent articles have begun to identify related problems (e.g., Putnam 1994; Smyth 1994), but have not directly challenged the dis- t inction be tween positions and interests.

If the crit ique presen ted here is a sound one, the implication is that real-life negotiation is often not amenable to the nost rum of distinguishing be tween interests and positions. Instead, product ive negotiation requires us to use a variety of psychological concepts - - like moods, motives, interests, values, positions, beliefs, perceptions, and so on - - attending to whichever of these factors is most important to the dynamics of the particular negotia- t ion in which we are involved. In addit ion, there will be some types of negotiations wh e re positions are particularly important, such as those w h e re one party (or more) is a group which relies on positional consensus for its internal unity.

A m b i g u i t i e s i n t h e D i s t i n c t i o n

Although Getting to YES is regularly cited as the source of the distinction be tween interests and positions, the distinction is not clearly stated there. It has to be extracted from statements made at various points in this influential book. For example, positions are something parties tend to "lock themselves into" (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 5), and which p ro d u c e a "contes t of will" (p. 6). They often obscure what parties really want (p. 11). They are decided upon, whereas interests are wha t cause the decision (p. 42). It is

306 Chris Provts Interests vs. Positions

interests which "define the problem" (p. 42), and perhaps because of that "for every interest there usually exist several possible positions that could satisfy it" (p. 43). Positions are likely to be concrete and explicit, whereas interests tend to be abstract and intangible (p. 45). Nevertheless, interests include "basic human needs" (p. 49). While these comments are suggestive, they leave some important issues undetermined.

Subjective and ObJective Interests A key problem when considering interests is the ambiguity between objective and subjective interests (Swanton 1980; McCuUagh 1991). The former refers to whatever actually promotes an individual's well-being, whether or not it is known or preferred by the individual. The latter refers to what the individual prefers, whether or not it actually promotes the individual's welfare.

The injunction to focus on interests may seem appropriate because it conjures up the idea that satisfying the interests people have is good for them, in addition to being what they want. Nevertheless, it is only sometimes that interests are what are good for people as well as being what they want. Interests sometimes mean things people want that are not good for them, and sometimes they mean things that are good for them that they do not want. This is a significant consideration in negotiation because attending to others' objective interests will promote agreement only if they are motivated to satisfy those interests. For example, it may be in my objective interest to buy a safe car rather than a fast one; but I may not accept this objective interest, which would have significant implications for a salesper- son negotiating with me. This paradox raises both tactical and ethical issues. When people's subjective interests diverge from their objective interests, attending exclusively to others' subjective interests leaves a negotiator open to charges of exploitation and selfishness.' On the other hand, what people do, and what they will agree to, is more directly a product of their subjective interests than of their objective interests.

Discussions of negotiation that emphasize the distinction between interests and positions usually refer to subjective interests. That idea most fully captures the idea of motivation, which has direct implications for the dynamics of negotiation. Objective interests may not, in any straightforward way, shape negotiators' behavior or readiness to agree. Much of the literature's emphasis on the distinction between interests and positions can be explained as an attempt to distinguish between what parties say they want and what their underlying motivation is. Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991: 42, emphasis in original) provide some examples and then write:

Such desires and concerns are interests. Interests motivate people; they are the silent movers behind the hubbub of positions. Your position is something you have decided upon. Your interests are what caused you to so decide.

Negotiation Journal October 1996 307

In fact, because of the ambiguity I have just noted , mot ivat ion may quite evade a focus on interests. It is certainly possible to be motivated by things that are not in one's objective interests, and not to be motivated by things that are in one's objective interests. Sebenius (1991: 205) suggests that "negotiation analysis is radically subjective in the sense that it is pre- sumed to be up to the parties to decide h o w they see their interests and h o w they forecast different events." While there is no object ion to such a mode of analysis if it succeeds, it would be misleading for it to gain suppor t f rom a covert appeal to the objective notion of interests as well as to the subjective notion. Such a covert appeal may be encouraged by the use of the term "interests" rather than by, say, "motives."

P o s i t i o n s a n d C o m m i t m e n t What of positions? In much of Getting to YES, a position seems to be what a party states at a particular time that it would be willing to accept as a settlement . That defini t ion is cons is ten t wi th the way the t e rm is of ten used elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Pruitt 1981: 23; Dunlop 1984: 13-15; Walton and McKersie 1991: 82). Some authors use the term "proposal" with a similar meaning ~ r u i t t 1981: 169; Tutzauer 1992: 69). However, there are o ther meanings that can be attached to position. Consider, for example, Rojot's cormnent (1991: 78) that "the success or failure in reaching one's objectives depends to a considerable extent on the amount of information available - - both about one's own position and that of the o ther party:' Here, the position is not what is overtly stated; there is no information problem about that. In this case and in many others, position refers to something the party is commit ted to, wi thout the commitment necessarily having been made public. The connec t ion be tween positions and commitment is clear in Walton and McKersie's definition of commitment as "the taking of a bargaining posi- t ion wi th some implici t or expl ic i t p ledge regarding a fu ture cou r se of action" (1991: 82). Man), points in Getting to YES, such as the tendency for positional commitment to result in a "contest of will" follow just f rom the fact of commitment .

There are different kinds and degrees of commi tment . For example, position sometimes refers to a value s tatement or a belief about what ought to happ en (e.g., Walcott, Hopmann , and King 1977: 194). On the o t h e r hand, commi tment sometimes means just a willingness to agree, or to reject o the r possible agreements (e.g., Lax and Sebenius 1986: 70, foo tno te 7; Rojot 1991). The dynamics of negotiation may be affected by the nature of the commitment , and commitments based on values may be part of an articulated ideology. Such situations may require an approach different from that used w h e n commitments are based on interest alone.

Nevertheless, in ei ther case, if "position" means what a party is commit- ted to, and means only that, there is room for the party to dissimulate about its real position. The fact that that is possible emphasizes that there are two important meanings for position: one, a public s ta tement by a party about what it will agree to; two, a commi tment to some possible outcome.-" These

308 Chris Provls Interests vs. Positions

two meanings are found together, but they are in pr inciple two separate things: what a party is commit ted to and what it publicly offers. Either can be referred to as a position.

P o s i t i o n s a n d I n s t r u m e n t a l I n t e r e s t s

T h e ambigu i ty o f "pos i t ion" is par t icu lar ly i m p o r t a n t if o n e cons ide r s another point about interests. As no ted earlier, interests may be const rued to be e i ther subjective or objective, and those w h o advocate distinguishing positions from interests probably are talking about subjective interests. In addition, there is a difference be tween ultimate and instrumental interests. Interests in the sense used by Fisher, Ury, and Patton cannot mean only "ulti- m a t e in te res t s . " Lax and S e b e n i u s n o t e tha t i n t e r e s t s may be e i t h e r instrumental or intrinsic (1986: 70-74), but their definition of these relates the distinction only to negotiators' percept ions about effects on subsequent dealings. There is a broader sense of ultimate as opposed to instrumental interest?

Fisher, Ury, and Patton offer the following as examples of things that are objec ts of desires and concerns : cash, peace and quiet , having at least $100,000 to settle with one's ex-wife, and sticking to what one has said to one's family about not paying more than $95,000 for a house (1991: 42). At least some of these are clearly instrumental interests; someone would have them as interests only because they are instrumental in attaining objects of o ther more fundamental desires and concerns. Such interests can be con- trasted with ultimate or intrinsic interests: objects that are items of desire or conce rn for their own sake.

In some cases, parties' positions in negotiation are just s tatements of what they see as their instrumental interests. For example, my stated need for cash stems from my belief that cash will enable me to satisfy other, more basic interests. Here my position is just a public s tatement of my subjective instrumental interest. There are many cases in which subjective interests, the things people are actually moved to attain, stem from the beliefs they have about what is instrumental in attaining o ther goals. The things people aim for in negotiation are often based on beliefs that those things will best serve their ultimate interests. The o u t c o m e that a party states it will accept , its "position" in that sense, may just be a statement of what it sees as its instrumental interests.

For example, consider the illustrative case given by Fisher, Ury, and Pat- ton of the 1978 Camp David negotiations involving Israel and Egypt. One of Israel's "positions," they write, was to keep some of the Sinai; they contrast that posi t ion wi th Israel's underlying interest in securi ty (1991: 42). The authors suggest that interests were reconci led wi thout reconciling positions, t h rough the plan that a l lowed Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai whi le demilitarizing large areas. However, it would be misleading to suggest that its position was something that Israel just "decided on:' Rather, Israel's position

NegotiationJournal October 1996 309

that it had to keep some of the Sinai s temmed from its percept ion that control over the Sinai was necessary for its security?

In such situations as this case, it is quite correct to say that we ought to try to discern parties' underlying motivation. What a party says it will agree to is based on its beliefs about the best way to satisfy the party's ultimate interests. There may be al ternat ive ways to satisfy its ul t imate interests, which will bet ter harmonize with other parties' interests. Insofar as a party's s ta tement of what it wants consti tutes a position, it is quite correc t to distinguish the posi t ion f rom the underlying interests. However , I believe two factors limit the effectiveness of this approach.

First o f all, such an app roach oversimplif ies. If negot ia tors identify another party's stated aim as a "posit ion" on that approach they may tend to disregard or discount the position. However, that position may be justified by the o ther party as a means to its underlying interests. Discounting the position is likely to be perceived by the o ther party as denigrating ei ther its interests or its beliefs about h o w to attain its interests. Dealing effectively wi th ano the r par ty of ten requires an unders tand ing of the o the r party 's beliefs and motives, and the link be tween them - - not an exclusive concen- tration on the o the r party 's interests. At the same time, interests may be instrumental in attaining o ther instrumental interests, which may themselves be instrumental in attaining yet fur ther instrumental interests, and so on.

Thus, it may be misleading to concentrate on interests as a single, unified category. If negotiators identify things as interests, they can as a result be dis- couraged from looking further, even though those interests may be only instrumental interests. It still may be possible to look further and see what lies beneath the interests which have so far been identified; it is not only positions that need scrutiny. To overcome this, Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991: 49) suggest particular attention to "bedrock concerns which motivate all people," but it is not clear that these can be identified in a straightforward way.

The second limitation o f the interests-vs.-positions approach is that it can confuse two kinds of meaning. For instance, on the one hand, there are cases whe re a party's stated posi t ion simply articulates wha t it sees as its ins t rumenta l interest; on the o the r hand, the re are cases w h e r e a par ty adopts a position because of its beliefs about the effect that will have on the dynamic of the negotiation. In the first case, a party may be commit ted to its posi t ion to some extent , bu t not necessari ly more than to any subjective instrumental interest. If a party is motivated to achieve some goal, and has a genuine belief about h o w to attain it, then that implies some degree of commi tment to the perceived means. A position in the sense o f a public offer may involve no commi tment beyond that. This type of case needs to be con- trasted with others where a party's posi t ion is "decided o n " in that it results f rom a conscious decision that a party takes based on its expectat ions about the dynamics of the negotiation to follow (for example, it believes that by making high demands it will achieve higher eventual gains).

310 Chris Provts Interests vs, Positions

Earlier, I noted the ambiguity of what is meant by position, be tween public s tatement and genuine commitment . That reflects but does not coin- cide wi th the relat ionship b e t w e e n posi t ions and ins t rumental interests. There are three dimensions along which positions may vary: the extent to which they are publicly stated; the extent to which parties believe their posi- t ions to be ins t rumental in attaining fur ther interests; and the ex ten t to which the parties are commit ted to the positions. It seems clear that changes along one dimension may effect changes along another. For example, public statements may influence degree of commitment (Cialdini 1993: 58). How- ever, it also seems c lear tha t no sys temat ic c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n such variables exists. In particular, commitment may arise f rom factors o ther than beliefs about instrumentality. For example, consider the case of a party w h o decides on its position for reasons of negotiation dynamics.

P o s i t i o n s , C o n c e s s i o n s , a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

A good deal of evidence already exists to suppor t the belief that concessions - - particularly exchanges of concessions - - play a significant role in negotiation, including a role in coordinative behavior (see, e.g., Rubin and Brown 1975: 272-278; Pruitt and Lewis 1977: 165, 179; Pruitt 1981: 16, 116-118;

Jensen 1984; Patchen 1987; Lawler and Yoon 1993; Lewicki et al. 1994: 32). Jensen (1984: 535-536) writes that:

Perhaps no proposition related to bargaining behavior has been better documented in both experimental studies and real life situations than the one suggesting that concessions tend to be reciprocated. Without such reciprocal concession-making, it is unlikely that negotiations will be successful or that problems will be solved.

However, a position, in the sense of a party's s tatement about what it would be willing to accept, may be necessary for a concession to be identifi- able as such. In his o w n study of strategic arms control , the definition of concess ion Jensen used was: "a move toward the posit ion of the o ther side, as defined at the time of the move, is regarded as a concession" (1984: 537).

Lewicki and his coauthors cite Pruitt as saying that "when one party accepts an alteration in its position, a concession has been made" (1994: 31). In fact, however, Pruitt 's definition reads: "a concession is a change of offer in the supposed direction of the o ther party's interests that reduces the level of benefi t sought" (1981:19 , emphasis added). That definition suggests that in principle, concessions might be defined ei ther by reference to positions or by reference to interests. It seems clear that if we define concessions by reference to positions then it is possible to identify processes of concess ion exchange. Is there any way we can do so if we concentra te on interests?

Suppose that concessions were taken as concessions to another party's interests, at the expense of one 's o w n interests. For the concessions to have the effects that various writers suggest, they must be recognizable as conces-


sions. But that means that the interests must be k n o w n and recognizable, and in many cases they are not. There are many cases w h e r e negotiations o p e n in the absence of trust and mutual knowledge. In such cases, parties may reasonably decide not to reveal their interests. On the o ther hand, if a posi t ion is wha t a par ty says at a given t ime it will accep t u one of the stan- dard meanings of "posit ion" identified above - - a posi t ion is explicit and relatively well defined. Because such a posit ion is explicit and well defined, it can figure in a series of recognizable mutual concessions. Jensen (1984: 537) somet imes fotmd some difficulty in identifying a concess ion or a retrac- tion, but was able to p roceed by reference to positions:

Some moves were not so apparent as in the case of a state drop- ping a demand, but ult imately even these moves could be identified by comparing past and present proposals or past positions and the fmaI position as found in the treaty or agreement negotiated.

Because of their open, explicit nature, positions per form functions that interests cannot. Many authors have noted that concessions may function to assist bargaining through their expressive or communica t ive role, pe rhaps even overshadowing other forms of communica t ion (Tutzauer 1992: 81). Wal- ton and McKersie (1991: 88) point out that "the alternation of concessions is not a mechanical process. Each side is alert to the meaning of the other 's concession." They give an example of a strike that resulted w h e n a " company missed the tenor of the union's concess ion and failed to respond in kind:' Their discussion clearly assumes that the communicat ive function of concessions is bound up with positions and commitment ; they go so far as to refer to "the communicat ive acts referred to as commitments" (1991: 82).

The same general point is ref lected in the two functions that Rubin and Brown suggest for concessions. First, "concessions convey vital information about a bargainer 's subject ive utilities." They add that concess ions "allow each par ty to gauge the other 's preferences and intentions and, in turn, per- mit each par ty to present or misrepresent information about his own" (1975: 276). Second, concess ions convey impor tan t information about one party 's pe rcep t ion of another, in part icular about h o w capable and effective the first par ty perceives the o ther to be (1975: 276-7). Concessions may also indicate w h a t a par ty perce ives ano the r ' s in tent ions to b e (see Rubin and Brown 1975: 266, 276; Pruitt 1981: 33-40; Patchen 1987). Presumably, concess ions may also convey information about a wider range of the party 's cognitions, as well as its percept ions of the other. Israel's posi t ion on the Sinai may have conveyed information about its pe rcep t ion of military possibilities, as well as its impress ion of Egypt. That possibility is important ; it will of ten be very wor thwhi le to k n o w h o w ano the r par ty sees things.

It is impor tant that posi t ions serve to c o m m u n i c a t e just because they indicate commi tmen t . The s ta tement of a posi t ion may be in tended to com- m u n i c a t e s o m e t h i n g , b u t d e m a n d s s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n b e c a u s e o f t h e

312 Chris Provls Interests vs. Posit ions

commitment it makes (rather like bidding, at contract bridge), and may com- municate more effectively because of that commitment . This is an example of the fact that "the same ut terance may perform multiple functions, ' which Womack notes is "a major difficulty in studying negotiation communicat ion" (1990: 79).

The complex i ty of such c o m m u n i c a t i o n adds to the complex i ty of negotiation, and that makes negotiation more demanding. For example, parties should take a balanced approach to offers and concessions; to be most effective, offers and concessions need to be supplemented by verbal interchange (Putnam and Wilson 1989; Womack 1990; Keough 1992). However, verbal interchange alone will seldom be enough (Putnam and Wilson 1989; Roloff, Tutzauer, and Dailey 1989). In general, "bargainers rely on both the content and the function of messages to provide information about proposals as well as reveal clues about their opponents ' preferences and interests" (Putnam and Roloff 1992:3-4)2

Concentrat ion on parties' interests rather than on their positions may conceal the relationship that exists be tween the two. Interests - - in the general sense of underlying motives - - may be fundamental in determining what agreement is possible. However, it frequently is not possible to discern what those interests are except through attending to parties' positions. The suggestion that one attend to interests rather than positions is like an injunction to attend to people 's meaning rather than to the words they actually use. It is normally an error to attend to the words to the exclusion of their meaning, but that does not imply that we can concentrate on meaning without attending to the words. To concentrate on interests rather than positions implies that we ought to concentrate on what people really want, rather than on what they say they want. That is reasonable, but what people say they want may be a major source of information about what they really want.

P o s i t i o n s , I n t e r e s t s , a n d I n t e r n a l U n i t y

In addition, posi t ions play a major role in maintaining internal s t ructures within parties. In material added to the second edit ion of Getting to YES, Fisher, Ury, and Patton write:

Positional bargaining is easy, so it is not surprising that people often do it. It requires no preparation, it is universally understood • . .and in some contexts it is entrenched and expected. In contrast, looking behind positions for interests, inventing options for mutual gain, and finding and using objective criteria take hard work and, when the other side seems recalcitrant, emotional restraint and maturity (1991: 157).

They suggest that:

In many labor-management and other contexts the parties have a long history of hard-fought and almost ritualistic positional bargaining. Each side sees the other as "the enemy" and the situation


as zero-sum, ignoring the enormous costs of strikes, lockouts, and bad feelings (1991: 159).

However, there are factors about positional bargaining in the labor rela- t i o n s c a s e t h a t a r e n o t u n i q u e to t h a t c a s e b u t e m e r g e f r o m s u c h negotiations wi th particular clarity. In my opinion, these factors suggest that Fisher, Ury, and Patton oversimplify in their opposi t ion to positional bargaining in labor relations and some other similar cases.

It is quite true that history often plays a major role in these cases, as Fisher, Ury, and Patton write. But there is really no reason to assume that ei ther side is "ignoring the eno rm ous costs of strikes, lockouts, and bad feelings" The situation is partly explained by history, but not in the sense that the sides have simply fallen into bad habits that they can easily correct . His- tory in the labor-management contex t has created mutual expecta t ions that reinforce one another, and have led to a lack of trust (see, e.g., Hunte r and McKersie 1992). Importantly, though, each party 's not ion of the o the r as the e n e m y results f rom more than history and a lack of trust. In addition, there is opposi t ion be twee n the posit ions to which bo th sides are commi t t ed simply for reasons of internal unity.

It is clear that internal unity may have a major effect on bargaining success. Morley (1992: 204) notes that:

• . .considerable attention has been paid to the possibility that internal conflict is a major cause of impasse in external negotiations, frequently leading to industrial disputes which are won by the other s i de . . .The re are three main reasons for this. When internal conflict "spills over" into negotiations between the sides, it becomes much harder to see what each regards as minimum acceptable terms. Negotiators also fred it harder to see whether commitments made at the "bargaining table" will be approved by those whom they represent. Finally, a side which cannot agree a policy is likely to find that internal divisions are exploited fully by other parties.

However, internal unity in the sorts of case men t ioned consists of the side having and mainta ining a c o m m o n posi t ion. Maintaining a c o m m o n posi t ion may be impor tan t to allow group m e m b e r s to attain their interests. For example , if t w o p e o p l e are negot ia t ing for the sale of s o m e p r o p e r t y they o w n together, it may be impor t an t for t h e m to mainta in a c o m m o n posit ion. This is hardly a revelation," but is a poin t that is basic to understanding the dynamics of labor relations. Pu tnam (1994: 341) has suggested that "treating the individual as the driving force of negotiat ion is current ly being challenged." However, it does not seem to have been recognized that parties which are groups may rely for their unity and exis tence on positional consensus. Where they do, it may not be possible to distinguish b e t w e e n posi t ions and interests in any useful way.

314 Chris Prov l s Interests vs. Positions

For labor unions in partictflar, unity and solidarity are a s i n e q u a n o n

for thei r con t inued existence• Union m e m b e r s v iew themselves as having certain collective interests, wh ich are bound up wi th a c o m m o n position. Encouraging peop le to turn away f rom posit ions to concent ra te on interests may encourage at tention to individual interests at the expense of collective interests. To that extent , the work of Fisher, Ury, and Patton may uninten- tionally serve a s trong and long-established vein of anti-union sent iment in United States business and legal culture (Atleson 1983). 7

Unions are more d e p e n d e n t than m a n a g e m e n t on the deve lopmen t of par t icular bargaining posi t ions to sustain their exis tence. Even so, unified posi t ions can also be impor tan t for employers in labor-management negotiations. Kochan and Katz (1988: 254-5) c o m m e n t that:

It is true that the political structure of unions makes it more difficult for them than for most managements to resolve conflicting goals, priorities, and internal power struggles. Nonetheless, in firms where the locus of decision-making power is unclear or widely dispersed within management, open conflicts are also likely to occur and carry over into the negotiations process•

For bo th unions and management , the requi rement of a c o m m o n position may arise simply f rom the need for unity. In addition, that need may be exace rba ted because the negot ia t ion takes place th rough agents• Ancona, Friedman, and Kolb (1991: 170) note that in labor relations "balancing internal and external demands is among the mos t difficult tasks facing the team engaged in mutual gains bargaining." Perhaps the central p rob lem is that:

• . .people are required to commit themselves to forms of collective action which they can justify to those whom the), represent. To justify our actions we have to show that they may be seen as following a particular line (Harr6 1979; cited in Morley 1992: 216).

In some cases, it is a major oversimplification to suggest that the expla- nat ion for posi t ional bargaining is that it is "easy;' or that it "requires no prepara t ion" Walton and McKersie provided an extensive discussion of the "intraorganizational bargaining" that may be required for a par ty to develop its negotiat ing posi t ion (1991: Chapters 8 and 9).

Fisher, Ury, and Patton at one point c o m m e n t that "the m o r e peop l e involved in a negotiation, the more serious the drawbacks to posit ional bargaining" (1991: 7). Tha t is also an ove r s impl i f i ca t ion in l abor re la t ions particularly. One wel l -known form of labor relations bargaining w h e n there are many part ies involved is pa t te rn bargaining. One pair of the many part ies involved works out an agreement , which is then a "pattern" for o thers to follow. The fact that this agreement has been worked out in one case creates a salient op t ion for others , and the exis tence of such a mode l for negotiators makes it more likely that they can find ag reement ~ r u i t t 1981: 57-70). What


is salient is a common, agreed-on position, and to that extent the subsequent negotiation process is positional bargaining.

To some extent, pattern bargaining in labor relations has fallen into dis- repute because of its association with inflationary outcomes. However, such outcomes are not a necessary consequence of pattern bargaining (Bluestone and Bluestone 1992: I03), and it is well known that "pattern followers are less likely to experience a strike than are pattern setters and other units negotiating omside of any accepted patterning arrangement" (Kochan and Katz 1988: 252). There may be disadvantages, and it may be desirable for a pattern bargain to be adapted to the circumstances of a particular firm or plant. However, the costs and benefits of positional bargaining need to be assessed on their merits in each specific case.

The same need to weigh costs and benefits is evident in cases where a position is important for group cohesion. It has been suggested that Japan- ese negotiators put significant time into reaching consensus on a common position, which promotes group cohesion but decreases flexibility during the negotiation process (March 1989: Chapter 8). There is some recognition of this tradeoff in Getting to YES (1991: 102-3), but a clear suggestion that flexibility is generally preferable. In fact, though, the relative importance of those two factors will vary from case to case. For example, it will depend partly upon the internal structure of the two parties. In general, labor unions rely more strongly on a common position than business firms do, because the unity of the latter is more strongly sustained by Institutional and legal structures.

I n t e r e s t s , P o s i t i o n s , C o g n i t i o n s , a n d Va lue s

In labor relations, the fact that a party's view of the world is important for its internal unity is related to the fact that opposed parties may have different views of the world. Druckman and Zechmeister (1973: 454) point out that "the extension of conflicts from immediate issues to political and ideological spheres is dramatically illustrated in the labor movement." That may be because of the significance of positions for effecting unity in labor unions, which means that positions become articulated within systematic ideologies.

Recent work in psychology has stressed the relationship between people's social identity and their membership of social groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986), but many years ago Hoxie already discussed the relationship between union members' solidarity and their shared interpretation of the world (Dun- lop 1984: 55-6). Collective interests and collective action go along with shared cognitions in many other areas also. Sometimes, negotiation is largely about such group beliefs (Brown and Brown 1983; Bar-Tal and Geva 1986; Smyth 1994).

In those cases, what is opposed seems very much more to be parties' positions rather than the~ interests. Certainly, it is hard to see how there are necessarily interests which underlie the positions. Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991: xiii) write that:

316 Chris Provt$ Interests vs. Positions

Negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed.

However, there is no clear boundary be t ween processes of that sort and processes whe re sides are separated by differences of belief. Religious disputes are one clear case; ano ther is whe re conflicts have revolved around Marxist doctrine. Walcott, Hopmann , and King (1977: 194-5) cite Rapopor t ' s point that:

• . •conflict is often grounded in misunderstanding. Such misun- d e r s t a n d i n g is not (or is not l imi ted to) me re ly factual disagreement, nor is it simply a result of ambiguous communication. It stems from basically different images of reality held by the parties to a dispute or negotiation.

Subsequent studies have gone some way toward confirming that conflict may be related to cognitive differences and not just to conflicting interests. Brehmer and Hamm ond cite results which suggest in ter al ia that "cognitive factors are, in themselves, sufficient to cause conflict, motivational explana- tions of interpersonal confl ict are not mandatory, contrary to wha t Freud, folklore, and a contemporary, motive-oriented social psychology would lead us to believe" (Brehmer and H a m m o n d 1977: 92, emphasis in original; see also Bar-Tal and Geva 1986; J6nsson 1991; Rothbart 1993; Smyth 1994).

The relation b e t w e e n cognit ion and motivat ion has recently b e e n a mat- ter of con t rove r sy in psychology, and it seems reasonable to bel ieve that motivat ion is not comple te ly reducible to cognit ion (Weinberger and McClel- land 1990; Rothbar t 1993)• When different p e o p l e have o p p o s e d motives, that may lead to conflict. However, it also t rue that confl ict may result f rom p e o p l e ' s dif ferent cogni t ions: d i f ferent ways o f see ing the world . Pfeffer (1992: 43) gives the example of confl ict at Ford Motor Company, and says tha t " the conf l i c t at Ford (and at o t h e r a u t o m o b i l e c o m p a n i e s as wel l ) b e t w e e n finance and engineer ing was, at its heart , a confl ict about h o w to see the world." In those sorts of case, it is hard to see wha t may be mean t by focusing on interests ra ther than on positions: the two seem to be inextrica- bly entwined. In such cases, peop le ' s identities and interests are bound up wi th the posi t ions they take on issues•

In many cases, too, w h a t will be at issue are matters o f value that do not s eem to be easily reducible to ei ther cognit ions or interests. In the 1970s, D r u c k m a n and Z e c h m e i s t e r c o n d u c t e d several s tudies of conf l ic t w h i c h s t e m m e d not only f rom conflicts of interest but also f rom conflicts o f values o r ideology. 8 T h e y s ugges t tha t s o m e t i m e s " e x a m p l e s o f the i n t e r p l a y b e t w e e n values and interests give rise to the not ion that the two sources of confl ict are in te rdependen t and that one derives f rom or causes the other,"


and that "ideologies and vested interests are in ter twined as sources of preferences for p r o g r a m s and pol ic ies" ( D r u c k m a n , Rozelle, and Z e c h m e i s t e r 1977: 109). They note some examples, and it is not hard to think of others.

O n e such e x a m p l e w o u l d be the rise of P ro t e s t an t i sm and re la ted events around that time. Matheson (1972: 5) says that "by the t ime of the Diet o f Regensburg in 1541 doctrinal and sociopol i t ical quest ions were inex- tricably bound up with one another." Bailey (1969) gives an account of h o w combina t ions of doc t r ine and self-interest f igured in conf l ic ts p layed out over the caste system o f India. Closer to home, Elster (1989: 216) gives a detailed discussion of the ways in which "norms interact wi th self-interest and wi th o ther norms" in bargaining generally and wage bargaining in partictflar, while Ball-Rokeach and TaUman (1979) note the interplay of interests and values in the politics of civil rights. In cases like those, interests, ideas and values are bound up together in an ideological conflict, and trying to address the conflict may involve at tending to ideas and values, as well as to interests. In their discussions of symbol ic politics theory, Lau (1990: 304) says that "self-interest in fact appears to have very little to do with mos t political responses" and Brysk (1995: 56 I ) notes the linking o f "ideas and values" in br inging abou t peop le ' s collect ive action. Cogni t ion and value may be linked in an ideological f ramework, distinct f rom interests.

In some cases, confl ict may be almost comple te ly cen te red on differ- e n c e s in bel ief . S t e p h e n Jay G o u l d (1991 ) p o r t r a y s s eve ra l s c i en t i f i c controversies from the relatively recent past which can be conceived as negotiation-type processes. Similar kinds of issues come up nowadays in areas like eco logy and bioethics. They revolve a round c o n c e p t i o n s abou t wha t the world is like in certain fundamental ways, and w h e n there is conflict over such issues it is difficult to see h o w we might concentrate on interests rather than positions. Issues like religious salvation or the nature of life often span the boundaries be tween motivation and cognition, be tween belief and desire, be tween interest and position. Rubin (1989: 197) suggests that:

The focus of negotiation is not attitude change per se, but an agreement to change behavior in ways that make settlement possible. Two people with underlying differences of beliefs or values (for example, over the issue of a woman's right to abortion or the existence of a higher deity) may come to change their views through discussion and an exchange of views, but it would be inappropriate and inaccurate to describe such an exchange as "negotiation:'

But t he re m a y b e no c lear o r final d is t inc t ion b e t w e e n in te rac t ion a imed at att i tude change and interaction which seeks to alter behavior. Pntitt and Rubin offer a similar v iew (1986: 5), and Avruch and Black c o m m e n t that "when you consider wha t is left o u t . . , you find that it is the very stuff o f conflict: differences in power , passionate differences o f opinions, argu- ments over the facts" (Avruch and Black 1990: 226; cf. Rothbart 1993: 96).

318 Chris Provfs Interests vs. Positions

Sometimes, cognitive conflict seems to be excluded from being considered as negotiation by a definition of negotiation that refers exclusively to a "conflict of interest" (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: xiii; Lewicld et al. 1994: 4). At the same time, because such a definition threatens to narrow unduly the scope of study, the idea of interest is simultaneously broadened. Hence, Sebe- nius's characterization of an interest as "anything that concerns a negotiator" (1991: 207). That extends "interest" far beyond needs, even to mood and any other temporary affect that may influence behavior and decision. When Lax and Sebenius suggest that "the venture capitalist had a strong intrinsic interest in psychic gratification from acknowledgment of his role" the point might be made more accurate ly by saying that "what the ven tu re capitalist really wanted was acknowledgment of his role." Forcing the point into one about interests only obscures it. In fact, the effort to fit everything into an "interests" straitjacket remains a problem in the discussion by Lax and Sebenius, even though they go some way toward acknowledging the possibility of "ideological" conflict (see Lax and Sebenius 1986: 68-9, 73, 239).

The injunction to concentra te solely on interests may be related to the utilitarian idea that "what ought to be done" always reduces to h o w people 's interests are affected. Utilitarians from Bentham onwards have always argued that concentrat ing on utilities - - or interests w enables us to resolve moral dilemmas and avoid intractable disputes over principle (e.g., Mill 1968: 19, 24). It may be that Getting to YES can be placed in that line of thought. It is a wor thy aim to satisfy people 's interests and avoid fruitless confrontation.

However, there is a wide literature on utilitarian views and the difficulties that confront them. One problem for such views has always been their tendency to ignore or denigrate disputes they cannot deal with. The idea that in negotiation we ought to concentra te on interests rather than positions dis- tracts attention from disputes where not only interests are at stake. There are many disputes where interests will be the crucial factor for solution, and a utilitarian approach will be appropria te . It is even possible that peop le may accept a utilitarian approach as the result of persuasion (Young et al. 1991: 291). If such persuasion can avoid heated conflict, it may be a good thing. But there are many cases where not even persuasion will lead parties to accept a definition of confl ict solely in terms of interests. In those cases, attending solely to interests may not only fail to solve a conflict but exacerbate it, if parties come to feel that their views are not being taken seriously?

There is no clear line be tween pure conflicts of interest and conflicts that also involve differences of belief and value. If w e try to reserve "negotiation" for a limited use, we are likely to lapse into fruitless semantics: we may bet te r say that somet imes parties are a t tempting to "negotiate reality" (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1967; Swann 1987; Snyder and Higgins 1990; Smyth 1994). Druckman, RozeUe, and Zechmeister (1977: 129) note findings which "suggest that the relative impor tance of interests and values varies with con- text: ' Often, in addressing some conflict, we need to examine its specific


dynamics and consider wha t can be done to mitigate them, w h e t h e r they be conflicts of motivation, cognition, or a mixture of both. In some conflicts, part ies ' interests may hold the key to a resolution; but in others, their positions have to be considered in order to achieve set t lement. In many cases, the quest to discover parties ' underlying interests will be chimerical, and dis- tract at tention f rom wha t is really important .

C o n c l u s i o n

In some c i rcumstances , the injunct ion to concen t ra t e on interests ra ther than posit ions may be a useful reminder to seek out the underlying causes of conflict. However, the approach may also be misleading: It is somet imes difficult to apply, often oversimplifies or conceals the real dynamics of conflict, and in some cases carries a bias against one party, whe re the par ty 's unity is especially dependen t on a unified position.

The attractiveness of the search-for-interests idea can be explained by several factors, chief of which is the genuine meri t of seeking out parties ' motivation. The emphas is on interests may gain additional force by conflat- ing object ive and subjective interests. It seems desirable to concent ra te on peop le ' s objective interests, if we are conce rned about their welfare, and it seems desirable to concent ra te on their subjective interests, if w e are con- c e r n e d abou t thei r mot ivat ion. The idea loses that extra force w h e n w e realize that it may not be possible to do bo th at the same time. Further, the distinction may appeal to the v iew that the meri ts o f a course of action can derive only f rom its consequences , in particular f rom the interests it serves. There are many doubts about that utilitarian sort of view. Overall, the desire to avoid c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f p o s i t i o n s in f avor o f in te res t s a lone m a y be founded on a reasonable desire to avoid a contes t of will.

The drawback is that it may also avoid the sort of deba te and discussion about posit ions that is impor tant for real consensus in many situations whe re posit ions reflect underlying values or world views. Rather than emphasiz ing the distinction be t ween interests and positions, it may be be t te r s imply to alert negotiators to any "underlying issues" in the c o n ~ c t wi th wh ich they are dealing (cf. Pruitt and Carnevale 1993:15).

NOTES

The author received helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper from Ray FeUs, John Kleinig, Margaret Patrickson, Byron Sharp, Andrew Stewart, Bet Roffey, from several anonymous reviewers for N e g o t i a t i o n J o u n ~ a l , and from the editor.

1. Sometimes, individuals thus exploited are even protected by law, as in cases of contracting with minors.

2. ~Position" may also be used in another different sense, like "position" in a game of chess (Goffman 1970: 100).

3. It may be that this sense is captured by Rubin and Brown's earlier idea of "final value" (1975: 6).

4. For the purpose of this example, we do not need to consider the historical detail regarding any other factors that may have been involved.

320 Chris Provts Interests vs. Positions

5, Cf. Ann Douglas's memorable comment: "With no perceptible instrument but the human voice, and without stirring from their seats at the table, they move and change position, to attain what they refer to as a meeting of minds" (1962: 8).

6. As noted in the Gospel of St. Mark (3: 24-5): "Ifa kingdom is divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand. And if a house is divided against itself, that house will not be able to stand."

7. The idea that collective positions ought to be abandoned in favor of interests which are implicitly individual interests may even carry the tacit implication that unions ought to cease to exist. This seems to be reflected in the reluctance of U.S. courts to perceive employees" interests in closed shop arrangements, and their interpretation of employees' interests as confined to short- term economic gain (see Atleson 1983, Chap. 4).

8. See Druckman and Zechmeister 1970 and 1973; Zechmeister and Druckman 1973; Druck- man, Rozelle, and Zechmeister 1977.

9. Robert Frank (1988) has also shown in detail how seemingly irrational commitment which appears to ignore one 's own interests may actually serve them better than focusing on them directly.

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