intentionality, causality and functionalism
TRANSCRIPT
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Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia
IV National Congress of Sociology
Rio de Janeiro, June 1-2, 1989
Round table on SOCIAL THEORY: NEW CHALLENGES
INTENTIONALITY, CAUSALITY AND THE VICISSITUDES
OF FUNCTIONALISM
Fábio Wanderley Reis
I intend to address briefly the problem of intentionality and causality at the
level of social and political phenomena. The focus I have chosen to deal with this
theme would allow me to adopt "the vicissitudes of functionalism" as a kind of
subtitle for this presentation.
A good starting point is the perverse oscillation between two contrasting
models of explanation of social phenomena that was pointed out in a book by Robert
Nozick a few years ago ( Anarchy, State, and Utopia). On the one hand, whenever the
observation of phenomena suggests, at face level, the occurrence of mechanisms of
the "invisible hand" kind (i.e., of causal mechanisms, insofar as they do not involve
or produce the realization of the explicit goals of anybody), proper explanation
appears as consisting of showing that, "actually", we do have the operation of the
interests or objectives of some actor or set of actors -- that is to say, proper
explanation would consist in replacing invisible-hand mechanisms by some
mechanism of the "hidden hand" variety, or by the goals of some (typically sinister or
conspiratorial) individual or group of individuals, who manipulate things and make
them what they are. On the other hand, whenever the apparent level of phenomena
suggests the successful operation of actors in search of their explicit goals, in which
the observed processes fit by this aspect of intentionality a hidden-hand model,
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proper explanation appears, on the contrary, as consisting in showing that "actually"
actors are irrelevant (Napoleon is irrelevant, if Napoleon did not exist someone else
would show up...) and that mechanisms of objective social causation provide the
"real" explanation.
The difficulty thus pointed out emerges in a very clear way in the current
debate on the "rational choice" approach -- or, to take other of its many names, game
theory, "public choice" in the field of political science, or the "analytical marxism"
discussed yesterday in this meeting. This approach has become a growth industry in
recent years, and some of the ramifications of the questions raised in the debate on it
are of great practical interest. After all, the question of whether it is possible to act
intentionally at the level of society and thus to control social processes and
eventually to achieve goals that may be seen as corresponding to shared or collective
goals of some sort is a crucial one -- however problematical the issue of the way in
which such collective goals relate to particular or strictly individual interests, which
is an important ramification of the initial question.
The practical importance of the general problem can be appreciated if it is
related, for instance, to the question of how to build a stable democracy in this
country -- or of how to act so as eventually to consolidate, if possible in not too
distant a future, the democratic arrangement sought by the constitution we have just
seen promulgated. From a different angle, an interesting side to the general problem
emerges in connection with the question of functionalism in the social sciences. So,
functionalism as an approach clearly brings together the two faces of the
methodological debate on intentionality and causality. The functional model of
explanation contains a clear teleological element, just as it contains an element
related to the idea of a "system" in operation which points in the direction of
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"objective causality". We thus have, with functionalism, a sort of "objective
teleology", a fusion between the two contrasting points of view, which seems to me
to provide the explanation for the ever recurring interest the approach tends to arise.
Again and again we see someone declare that functionalism is fundamentally flawed,
or even that it is dead and buried -- but there it comes again. And these recurrent
deaths and rebirths sometimes reveal some highly ironic shades.
Thus, if we ponder the current debate on functionalism in the social sciences in
the perspective of fifteen or twenty years ago, one feature of this debate seems rather
surprising, for it reveals a complete reversal of the positions held by some of the
main contenders. Twenty years ago, functionalism was the hallmark of "academic"
social science, whereas Marxist social science used insistently to attack
functionalism and denounce the functionalist character of the dominant or established
branches of sociology and political science. What we currently have, however, is that
that branch of social science which would deserve to be called "academic"
("established" around the increasingly diffused rational choice approach, with its
many ramifications) is the one to attack functionalism, whereas Marxists, or at least
some sectors that might be seen as more "conventionally" Marxists, resort to
functionalism as a defense against the assault from rational choice quarters and lay
an affirmative claim to it, as is the case with Gerald Cohen in Britain. There are, thus,
some rather intriguing features to the debate. And I think its interest has to do with
the articulation between the dimensions of intentionality and causality.
The current work by Jürgen Habermas is also worth a mention in this context.
If we take, for instance, The Theory of Communicative Action, certainly Habermas's
opus magnum, we will find there the important distinction between "lifeworld" and
"system". "Lifeworld" has to do with the orientations of action, that is, a clearly
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intentional dimension of action (eveng though this aspect of Habermas's thought
certainly involves many important shades if confronted with the usual way to
understand intentionality within the rational choice approach, for in Habermas the
intentional element of the lifeworld includes in a salient way the observance of
norms, instead of what one might describe as the "merely" instrumental search for
goals -- it would be possible to enter a quite complicated discussion with regard to
this point). As to "system", we would be dealing here with the consequences of
action, or with that aspect in which objective causation is at play and which would be
supposedly more liable to a methodological treatment of an empirical-analytic nature
-- and of a functional nature. In effect, Habermas seeks quite explicitly to recover a
functional type of analysis in accordance with the "objective" logic proper to the
"system" dimension of social reality, though he stresses the limits of this analysis and
the irreducibly communicative aspects of action, which are supposed to require a
different approach.
Now, so that I can state, starting from this, a couple of ideas I want to present
to you it is convenient to take as a reference point a text by Adam Przeworski,
"Micro-foundations of Pacts in Latin America". It is an unpublished text, which until
now has had only limited circulation. Przeworski deals in it with the same basic
methodological questions previously indicated, which he relates to the theme of the
setting up of constitutional pacts in the countries of Latin America. Of course, this is
a possible way to phrase the problem we are presently facing in the countries in
which there supposedly occurs, like in Brazil, a transition to democracy: how to
establish social pacts that may turn out to be effective and to represent a real point of
departure for stable democratic forms. From the point of view of our discussion, one
aspect to be emphasized is that a constitutional pact is, in principle, perhaps the most
exemplary case of intentionality in the political life of a society. The deliberations
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connected with the establishment of a new constitution or of a new constitutional
pact clearly represent a case or circumstance in which society as such thinks upon
itself, decides how it is going to organize itself, how some important aspects of the
interaction among its members are going to be regulated, and so on. Thus, we are
supposedly dealing here with a moment of reflection or, in a somewhat redundant
phrase, of self-reflection.
Nevertheless, the main interest that Przeworski's text seems to me to have from
the point of view of our discussion has to do with the fact that, as a consequence of
his adherence to a certain way to conceive of the problem of intentionality that is
characteristic of the most conventional or orthodox version of the rational choice
approach, Przeworski is led even to define the constitutional pact in terms of the
operation of mechanisms which turn out to be but the mechanisms of the market.
Such mechanisms, which he calls “self-enforcing”, correspond to the idea of mutual
adjustment among many disperse agents -- an adjustment that is supposed to take
place spontaneously, without the interference of a coordinating agent such as the
state and without the need for the agentes to establish any explicit bargain. Actually,
the attempt explicitly to achieve "el consenso democrático" is even denounced as
betraying "a non-democratic intellectual legacy" which, to some extent, would be
proper to Latin America -- and to which is opposed the idea that "the quintessence of
democracy is that there is no one to enforce it". So, we have the curious combination
of a radical conception of democracy with the claim to ground the eventual
establishment of democracy in an element of realism, which has to do with the
adjustments among more or less short-sighted interests and their instrumental
promotion that the orthodox rational-choice approach tends to emphasize.
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From the point of view of the problems we are most concerned with, however,
note that there is a still more curious pirouette, where we have a dramatic and even
caricatural illustration of the oscillation between "hidden hand" and "invisible hand":
starting by posing a problem that involves in a central and inevitable way the idea of
intentionality -- of the intentional hand, whether hidden or ostensive --, Przeworski
ends up with such a formulation of the problem that the operation of intentionality
and the deliberate manipulation in which it would necessarily translate itself appear
as only being capable of success if they somehow shift into the operation of
mechanisms of invisible hand and of objective causality. This is accomplished,
furthermore, in the name of an approach (rational choice) whose claim is precisely to
stress the role of the intentional and rational agent against that of merely causal
mechanisms in sociology and in the social sciences in general...
But there is another aspect concerning this text by Przeworski which is of great
interest for what I intend to propose. I refer to the fact that, in the characterization
made by him of different situations where we would have the operation of self-
enforcing mechanisms, we learn that such mechanisms can be, so to speak, both of a
"good" and of a "bad" nature. Thus, open conflict is seen as one case of self-
enforcing mechanisms at play, for mutual adjustments would lead conflict to prosper
and last, perhaps to amplify; but a dynamics leading to a democratic "institutional
compromise" can also present this self-enforcing characteristic, and we have just
seen that, for Przeworski, this is necessarily the case of an authentic -- or
authentically democratic -- constitutional pact. A third case or possibility presented
as having the same characteristic is the one exemplified by the tug-of-war situation
of praetorian oscillation between populism and militarism which marks the general
framework of political instability in several Latin-American countries. Although
Przeworski does not state the issue in these terms, what we have here is, of course,
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the idea underlying the distinction between a "virtuous circle" (case of the dynamics
leading to institutional compromise) and a "vicious circle" (cases of praetorian
instability and of the conflict which feeds itself), which are both characterized by the
occurrence of a mechanism of positive feedback in which a certain tendency
reinforces itself.
Having that in mind, let us recall the ferocious criticism of functionalism that
has been repeatedly stated in recent years by Jon Elster, one of the champions of the
rational choice approach. In several texts (for instance, in Ulysses and the Sirens)
Elster has characterized the model of functional explanation as involving the
occurrence of two elements. In the first place, the model would have an essential
feature in pointing to the production of effects which are both unintended and
beneficial. Thus, real functional explanation would resort to the Mertonian idea of
the "latent" function (otherwise, that is, if we had Merton's "manifest" functions, we
would be at the level of intentionality and of rational choice itself, not of
functionalism), which is seen, moreover, as producing beneficial effects. Secondly,
there is the assumption of the operation of a feedback loop through which the
function maintains the institution (or structure, behavior-pattern etc.) that produces it
in a certain collectivity. It is the existence or the working of a mechanism of this
type, in which an institution or item of whatever kind is produced by its beneficial
effects, that introduces the teleological element through which functional explanation
differentiates itself from merely causal explanation -- just as the "latent", as opposed
to "manifest", character of the function differentiates functional explanation from
intentional explanation as such. An important point of the criticism addressed by
Elster to functionalism concerns the fact that this feedback mechanism is very often
merely assumed to exist and work: typically, those who resort to the functional
model of explanation do not feel the need to provide the corresponding evidence.
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One question emerges at this point: how does the conception of functional
explanation described by Elster relate to Przeworski's idea of the situation
characterized by the operation of self-enforcing mechanisms? Let us observe that, in
the cases discussed by Przeworski, both those conditions in which we have the
virtuous circle and those corresponding to the vicious circle involve the occurrence
of a positive feedback mechanism, that is to say, of a mechanism of such a nature
that information concerning the production of a certain effect reverts upon the agent
so as to intensify its propensity to act in the way in which the effect is produced.
Now, it is of the utmost interest in the context of our discussion to contrast the case
of positive feedback to the case of negative feedback, which involves the idea of
something that works in opposition to an initial movement and which neutralizes that
movement. In other words: the idea of the negative feedback is first of all that, once a
disturbance is introduced in the state of equilibrium of a given system, corrective
mechanisms are put to work so as to neutralize the disturbance and keep or restore
the equilibrium of the system.
Clearly, we have here a likely factor of confusion in the fact that we are
speaking about two levels on which a certain idea of "positive" versus "negative" is
at play, to wit, the level of positive and negative feedbacks and the one of "positive"
(beneficial) and "negative" (noxious) effects corresponding to the distinction between
the virtuous circle and the vicious circle -- both beneficial and noxious effects being
cases of positive feedback. Once the confusion is avoided, an important observation
is that the literature on functionalism unequivocally tends to emphasize the idea of
the negative feedback, that is, the operation of mechanisms that are supposed to
concur to the maintenance of a given system. The view of the state as "functional"
for capitalist domination is an example that may be seen as adequate even from the
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point of view of some of the political references contained in our discussion. The
basic idea is that the state works so as to promote the interests of capitalists and help
maintain the capitalist system, countering any disturbance or threat that may involve
the risk of revolutionizing the latter: there would be negative feedback mechanisms
whose operation would have to do, according to certain views, with the very essence
of the state in capitalist societies. However that may be, the most common outlook
with regard to the use of the functionalist model of explanation in the social sciences
is that the "positive" or beneficial character of the function somehow brings about the
feedback which is "appropriate" to the maintenance of the institution that produces it
-- and there is the tendency to presume that the appropriate feedback will be of the
negative variety, in which any disturbances to the equilibrium of the system are
counteracted.
If we take a closer look at the problem, however, we can see that the logic
involved in functional explanation is quite compatible with the idea of the positive
feedback mechanism, whether we think of this logic in terms of the classical
discussion by Carl Hempel or in terms of Elster's characterization presented above.
In the case of Hempel's discussion of the logic of functional analysis, the issue is if
(or to what extent) functional explanation can be seen as genuine explanation; in
Elster's case, the issue is rather what it is that makes functional explanation
functional, or brings to the latter its specificity as a supposedly special type of
explanation. At any rate, it is undeniable that the model of functional explanation
also fits very well the idea of the positive feedback mechanism: if it is legitimate to
admit that the beneficial effect of an institution concurs in a decisive way to maintain
the latter, or even to produce it, then it is also patently legitimate to admit that the
same effect will concur to maintain or produce a certain set of interrelated elements
which articulate themselves with one another in a way that is favorable to the
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existence of that institution, in accordance with the pattern of the virtuous circle. If
we admit that the assumed functionality of the state regarding the capitalist system
can be taken as an explanation for its existence and operation under capitalism, it is
obviously also possible to claim to be able to explain in functional terms whatever
else may favor the existence of the state and of the features it exhibits under
capitalism -- and whatever else may help reinforce those features in an automatic
way. Actually, there is even a clear element of tautology or redundancy in this
statement.
But if one gets to this point, it is imperative to take another step and ask: what
about the vicious circle? If we are forced to admit that the logic of functional analysis
is compatible not only with the negative feedback, but also with the positive
feedback of the "virtuous" type, or with the "virtuous circle", why should it not also
be compatible with the "vicious circle"? The logic involved in the dynamics of
processes characterized by both types of positive feedback is evidently the same in
crucial respects. A decisive remark in this context is that, of course, the evaluation of
the character of a certain item, behavior pattern or institution as being either
beneficial or noxious no doubt depends on the point of view that one is willing to
adopt. Take, for instance, the tug-of-war characteristic of perverse oscillation
between militarism and unstable populism which is shown by the Brazilian and
Latin-American protracted praetorian condition and which is described by Adam
Przeworski himself as an example of a self-enforcing situation. It seems quite clear
that, if this characteristic can be seen as disfunctional from the point of view of a
democratic goal supposedly shared by certain actors (or supposedly promoted by
certain "parts" of the system in its complexity), it can certainly also be seen as
functional from the point of view of other actors, other interests, other goals.
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What consequences should one extract from that? One important consequence
seems to me to corroborate in certain respects the methodological position that has
been sustained by Elster -- although it also brings about an important correction to
him, to be stated below. Thus, I think one has to agree that, in the case of the social
sciences, the problem of explanation turns around the tension (and the occasional
articulation) between the intentional and the causal levels -- with emphasis on the
insight that, in a sociologically relevant sense, the causal is itself the consequence, to
a large extent, of a complex process of strategic (and hence intentional) interaction
among multiple actors, either individuals or collectivities of various scales in the
very process of constituting themselves as actors and affirming their interests and
goals. We would thus have a general conception in which the "Durkheimian",
objective and opaque feature of society would be linked in a theoretically and
methodologically more proficuous way to the level of intentional actions. In terms of
some categories that have been employed by Elster, Boudon and others, it would be
possible to speak of the level of a "supra-intentional" causality in which we would
have regularities or "sociological laws" in correspondence with the composition or
aggregation of actions undertaken at the "micro" level (in the limit, the strictly
individual level); in opposition to it we would have the level of a "sub-intentional"
causality that would be, in a way, pre-sociological or a-sociological. Those specific
aspects previously discussed in connection with the functional model of explanation
can be related to this: the fact that the "beneficial" or "noxious" character of a certain
institution or pattern of behavior turns out to be irrelevant from the point of view of
the general logic at play would have to do with this aggregation or composition effect
taking place among multiple and disperse intentional actions; perceptions of positive
or negative (beneficial or noxious) consequences of behavior on the part of
uncoordinated actors would lead to actions fitting such perceptions, and these
actions, at the aggregate level, would produce both vicious circles ("unfavorable"
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processes) and virtuous circles ("favorable" processes), as well as situations of
equilibrium liable to being treated in terms of the notion of negative feedbacks.
For the sake of brevity, I state in terms of a list of items and somewhat
elliptically certain ideas that unfold in connection with the above perspective.
1. The logic involved is always the logic of collective action, of the
aggregation or composition of multiple and disperse intentionalities. This
aggregation results in the production of "supra-intentionality", which can
occasionally take the specific form of "contradictions" or "counter-finalities" (Sartre,
Elster), just as it can take the form of the "virtuous circle" or of the "mere"
functionality of the "corrective" negative feedback.
2. Therefore, resorting to intentionality is inevitable and indispensable: to
grasp the logic at play in any given situation always involves dealing with
intentionality. In a ramification I deem very important, that leads us to Jean Piaget
and to the idea of the operational character of logic...
3. The problem with functionalism does not lie in the recourse to intentionality
(or in the assumption of the search for beneficial effects), but rather, as several
writers have emphasized, in the misterious form that the use of the corresponding
procedures tends to acquire, with the "intentions without a subject" and especially the
assumption of a global collective intentionality at the level of society whose precise
operation one feels dispensed to show. The challenge is how to face in a lucid and
appropriately sophisticated way the empirical implications of the problem of the
emergence or constitution of the (collective) subjects or actors to whom
intentionality is to be ascribed.
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4. The rational choice approach that has recently been thriving has an
important merit in this regard, to wit, the emphasis laid on what there is of
problematical in the formation of collective subjects. Yet, in its more orthodox
version it reveals a double defficiency: (a) a lack of sensitivity toward the
"sociological" and "institutionalized" dimension of society, which is linked to the
claim to deduce society starting from the mere assumption of a "state of nature"
peopled by nothing else than calculating individuals, or from the sheer realm of
strategy; and (b) the tendency, which Przeworski's pirouette pointed out above
clearly illustrates, to deemphasize the possibility a reflexive intentionality (and hence
of a superior form of rationality) in favor of a short-sighted and immediatist search
for interests or objectives which is somehow thought to fit better the idea of a self-
regulating market in operation. Actually, this tendency turns out to be incongruous as
regards the very emphasis on rationality that is supposed to be the basic trait of the
rational choice approach.
5. As to functionalism and the seemingly irresistible attraction exerted by some
of its central assumptions (which is currently illustrated again by the functionalist
claim on the part of respectable Marxist scholars), I propose it is necessary to
recognize the legitimacy of the attempt to grasp the logic that presides in a
comprehensive way over the dynamic of a given collectivity, that is to say, of
speaking in terms of a social system. In other words, the denunciation of the
mistifying postures that often occur in connection with the question of collective
subjects, or with methodological collectivism, should not result in the sheer
prohibition to resort to guiding assumptions linked to the idea of a tendency to "self-
regulation" on the social level. The use of the idea of social system and related
assumptions can certainly be made in an adequate way if a perspective distinguished
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by sensitivity toward the intentional character of actions at the "micro" level and
toward strategic interaction is combined with attention to the sociological level as a
level that is always "given" (or with an "ontology" that is sociological from the
beginning): we would be dealing here with the study of the ways in which the
complex interaction among "subjects" of various scales in the very process of
constituting themselves as such and of facing one another turns out to permit certain
"intentionalities" (projects, goals, interests...) to prevail in making up or moulding (in
a more or less precarious or successful, more or less coercive or normatively
convergent way) a comprehensive collective subject -- as well as the "systemic" logic
that will regulate it. An important illustration is provided by a theme that has
received a sophisticated and persuasive treatment in the hands of such authors as
Claus Offe and Adam Przeworski himself: the conception of the structural
dependence of society and the state on capital in the capitalist system, in which are
plausibly connected the level of strategic interaction among certain interest nuclei, on
the one hand, and, on the other, the level of the functionality displayed by various
institutions, policies and patterns of behavior from the point of view of the
preservation or transformation of the system.
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