intended decision mpta v mpwmd (m123512) 03-17-15
TRANSCRIPT
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fiLE
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY
OF
MONT R Y
M R 17 2 15
Monterey Peninsula Taxpayers' Association,
a California corporation, Ronald J Pasquinelli,
Thomas
J
Rowley Jr. and Richards
J
Heuer, III,
Petitioners/Plaintiffs
v
Board
of
Directors
of
the Monterey Peninsula
Water Management District and the Monterey
Peninsula Water Management District
Respondents/Defendants
TERI8A
A
1 1 1 ~ 1
CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
K Ha DEPUTY
• ILSOPl
Case No. M123512
Intended Decision
This matter came on for court trial on February 23, 2015. Margaret
L
Thurn appeared on
behalf
of
Petitioners/Plaintiffs. Michael
G
Colantuono and David
J
Rudderman appeared
on
behalf
of
Respondents/Defendants. The matter was argued and taken under submission. This
intended decision shall suffice as a statement of decision as to all matters contained herein. (Cal.
Rules
of
Court, rule 3.1590(c)(l).)
Petitioners/Plaintiffs Monterey Peninsula Taxpayers' Association, Ronald J Pasquinelli,
Thomas
J
Rowley Jr. and Richards J Heuer, III ( Petitioners ) brought this case against
Respondents the Board
of
Directors
of
the Monterey Peninsula Water Management District and
the Monterey Peninsula Water Management District ( Respondents and/or the District )
to
challenge actions related to the District's passage
of
Ordinance No. 152 (the Ordinance. ) The
Ordinance imposes an annual charge on certain property within the District to support the
District's water supply projects (the Charge. ) Petitioners objected to the Ordinance prior
to
its
passage. However, the public failed to submit sufficient protest ballots to block the Ordinance
under the procedures set forth in Proposition 218. Consequently, Petitioners circulated a petition
RECEIVED M R
17
Z 15
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seeking placement of a referendum to repeal Section Four of the Ordinance (the Petition. )
Respondents refused to place the proposed referendum (the Referendum ) on the ballot,
alleging that the Peti tion and Referendum suffered from fatal deficiencies. Petitioners now seek
a writ of mandate and declaratory relief 1) that Respondents refusal to place the Referendum on
the ballot exceeded their powers; 2) that Ordinance No. 152 violates the Dist rict' s enabling law;
and 3) that Ordinance No. 152 violates the California Constitution.
ackground
The District is a public agency created by special law in 1977 to conserve[ e] and
augment[] the supplies of water by integrated management
of
ground and surface water supplies,
for control and conservation
of
storm and wastewater, and for promotion of the reuse and
reclamation
of
water. (Wat. Code. Appen. § 118-2.) The Legislature observed that water
service in the area is principally supplied by California American Water Company ( CAW ), a
privately owned water supplier which does not have the facilities nor the ability to perform
functions which are normally performed by public agencies Ibid.) Thus, the District was
created to carry out such functions which can only be effectively performed by government,
including, but not l imited to, management and regulation of the use, reuse, reclamation,
conservation
of water
and
bond financing of public works projects. Ibid.)
For nearly 20 years, the District's primary revenue source was obtained via a user fee
imposed by the District and collected by CAW on its customer bills. In 2011, the California
Public Utilities Commission ( CPUC ) suspended CAW s collection
of
the user fee. (Pet. Ex.
Y, at P418, § 3.) To make up the resulting revenue shortfall, the District developed the Charge.
The Charge is imposed on all parcels connected to
CAW s
water distribution system. Subareas
of
the district not connected to the CAW system, such as the Bishop, Hidden Hills, Ambler, and
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On July 26, 2012, the signed Petition was delivered to the District. (Pet. Ex. CB.) On
August 30, 2012, the Monterey County Registrar
of
Voters certified the Petition, verifying all
signatures in their entirety, and finding that the Petition contained 4,136 valid signatures, of
which only 3,824 were necessary to qualify the Referendum for the ballot. (Pet. Ex. CE.)
On September
17
2012, at a meeting
of
the Board, Respondents' General Manager David
Stoldt reported that the Petition had received enough signatures to qualify the Referendum for
the ballot. Mr. Stoldt listed five options he believed Respondents had as to how to address the
Petition and proposed Referendum. Mr. Stoldt also offered five legal arguments, provided
by
outside counsel, against the validity of both the Petition and the Referendum. The Board
concluded that both the Petition and the Referendum were invalid and that, accordingly, it was
not under a duty to place the Referendum on the ballot. (Pet. Ex. CG.)
On June 13, 2013, Petitioners filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate seeking a writ
compelling the District to submit the Referendum to voters. On May 23, 2014, Petitioners
amended the Petition to add a cause
of
action seeking declaratory relief that the Ordinance
exceeds the District 's authority. Petitioners now seek a writ compelling the District to submit the
Referendum to the voters, or, alternatively, declaratory relief that the Ordinance is invalid.
vidence Submitted
Requests
for
Judicial Notice
As to Petitioners' requests for judicial notice, the court declines to take Judicial Notice
of
pages 1-17 22-26 29 37 41-43 59 and 69-78 ofPetitioners' Exhibit A to Petitioners'
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44 (as to the last paragraph only), 50, 59, 61, 64 (as to the first paragraph only), and 65.
4
Petitioners' remaining evidentiary objections are overruled.
Respondents' evidentiary objections are sustained as to numbers: 2, 6,
10, 21, 27, 30, 32,
38 and 41.
5
Respondents' remaining evidentiary objections are overruled.
Legal Standards Governing Traditional Mandamus nd eclaratory Relief
Petitioners seek issuance
of
a traditional writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1085. Code
of
Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a) provides, inter alia, that
[a] writ
of
mandate
may
be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station . To obtain a writ
of
mandate, Petitioners must
show (1) no 'plain, speedy, and adequate ' alternative remedy exists (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086);
(2) a clear, present, ... ministerial duty on the part of the respondent'; and (3) a correlative
'clear, present, and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty.' [Citations.]
A ministerial duty is an obligation to perform a specific act in a manner prescribed by law
whenever a given state of facts exists, without regard to any personal judgment as to the
propriety ofthe act. [Citation.] People v Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 339-340.) t is
4
Petitioners' objections are granted on the following bases: Objections
5 18:
Secondary
evidence. Objections 28, 34, 36, 44: Speculation, lack
of
foundation. Objections 42, 50:
Improper lay opinion. Objection 4: Lack
of
personal knowledge, lack of foundation, and
hearsay. Objection 10: Improper lay opinion, speculation, and secondary evidence. Objection
35: Improper lay opinion, lack of foundation. Objection 59: Lack of personal knowledge,
improper lay opinion, and hearsay. Objection 61: Lack offoundation. Objection 64: Lack of
foundation, hearsay. Objection 65: Lack of authentication.
5
Respondents' objections are granted on the following bases: Objections 2, 6, 10, 38:
Secondary evidence. Objections 27, 30,
32,41:
Lack of personal knowledge, improper lay
opinion. Objection 21: Lack of authentication.
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well settled that a writ of mandate is available to compel placement of a referendum on the
ballot. (Geiger
v
Board o Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 835.)
Petitioners also seek declaratory relief that the Ordinance is invalid under both the
District's enabling law and the California Constitution. A declaratory judgment action requires
an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective partie.s. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1060.) [The] controversy must be of a character
which
admits of specific and
conclusive relief
by judgment
within the field of udicial determination, as distinguished from an
advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts. (Monahan v Department o
Water Power (1941) 48
Cal.App.2d
746, 751.) And, while ordinances
are
inherently proper
subjects of declaratory relief, yet a declaratory judgment may
not
be rendered in respect to them
in disregard of the customary limitations upon the granting of such relief. ( d.) Here, there is
no dispute that an actual controversy exists regarding an ordinance already in effect.
Accordingly, the standards for obtaining declaratory relief
have
been satisfied.
Discussion
I. The District May Only Refuse to Place a Referendum on the Ballot
if
the Petition
Violates Technical Requirements; it Lacks Authority to do so on Substantive
Grounds
Petitioners argue that the Referendum qualified for the bal lot and otherwise satisfied the
statutory requirements of Elections Code section 914
7
Consequently, Petitioners reason, the
District was under a legal obligation under Elections Code sec tions 9144 and 9145 to either
repeal the Ordinance or submit the Referendum to voters.
The right of referendum is one of the most precious rights of our democratic process.
[Citation.] (Citizens
or
Responsible Behavior
v
Superior Court (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1013,
1022.) Nevertheless,
if the
court is convinced, at any time, that a measure is fatally flawed
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no purpose
is
served by submitting it to the voters.
( d.
at pp. 1022-1023.) Respect for the right
o
referendum does not require the useless expenditure
o
money and creation
o
emotional
community divisions concerning a measure which is for any reason legally invalid.
(Id.
at
p.
1023.)
Respondents argue that the Referendum and Petition are invalid on four grounds:
1
that
the Referendum would exceed the referendum power; 2) that Proposition 218 does not change
this;
3
that the Petition would mislead voters; and 4); that the Referendum would violate the
rights
o
District contractors.
t
is possible that one or more
o
these arguments may suffice
to
invalidate either the Petition or the Referendum. However, i t is clear that the District only had
the authority
to
make a unilateral determination as to the technical, not substantive, validity
o
the Referendum and Petition.
The courts have uniformly condemned local governments when these legislative bodies
have refused to place duly qualified initiatives on the ballot. [Citations.]
Save Stanislaus Area
Farm Economy
v.
Board o Supervisors
(1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 141, 148.) Indeed, [g]iven
compliance with the formal requirements for submitting an initiative, the registrar must place it
on the ballot unless he is directed to do otherwise by a court on a compelling showing that a
proper case has been established for interfering with the initiative
power.
Farley v Healey
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 325, 327.) The same analysis has been applied to referenda:
t is not [a city clerk's] function to determine whether a proposed [referendum]
will be valid i enacted These questions may involve difficult legal issues
that only a court can determine. The right to propose [referendum] measures
cannot properly be impeded by a decision
o
a ministerial officer, even
i
supported by the advice o the city attorney, that the subject is not appropriate for
submission to the voters. Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 564, fn.2
quoting Farley, supra, 67
Cal.2d at p. 327).)
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In response, the District argues that it has a duty to examine referenda before placing
them before voters, citing to, inter alia, deBottari
v
City Council (1985)
171
Cal.App.3d 1204,
1213. The district's selective reading ignores the plain language
of deBottari,
which
distinguished preelection nonjudicial review from preelection judicial review, and concluded that
the relevant governmental entity had a mandatory duty either to repeal the challenged
ordinances or to submit the ordinance to referendum unless 'directed to do otherwise by a court
on a compelling showing that a proper case has been established for interfering with the
[referendum] power. ' ( d. at p. 1204 (quoting Farley, supra, 67 Cal.2d at
p
327).) A local
government is not empowered to refuse to place a duly certified initiative on the ballot.
What should a local government do
if
it believes an initiative measure is unlawful and should not
be presented
to
the voters? A governmental body, or any person or entity with standing, may file
a petition for writ of mandate, seeking a court order removing the initiative measure from the
ballot. [Citation.] But such entity or person may not unilaterally decide to prevent a duly
qualified initiative from being presented to the electorate.
(Save Stanislaus, supra,
13
Cal.App.4th at
p
49l
However, this analysis does not apply to technical deficiencies in a referendum petition,
which
do
not require an elections official to make quasi-judicial evaluations
of
a petition's
validity. (Lin v City o Pleasanton (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 408, 420.) In certifying a
referendum petition, a clerk's duty is limited to the ministerial function of determining whether
the procedural requirements have been met. [Citation.]
(Ibid.)
Thus,
if
Respondents can show
6
Even an improper refusal may be retroactively validated by a judicial declaration that
the measure should not be submitted to the voters. (Citizens for Responsible Behavior
v
Superior Court
(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1021.)
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that the Petition failed to meet procedural requirements, such would be a valid ground for
refusing
to
place the Referendum on the ballot.
t
is to this question that we now turn.
II The Referendum Petition Violated the Elections Code
The ministerial duty to examine a petition for technical deficiencies includes
a
determination
of
whether the petition includes the
'text'
of
the ordinance challenged.
[Citation.]
I
d. Technical deficiencies in referendum petitions do not invalidate those petitions
so
long as they are in 'substantial compliance' with statutory and constitutional requirements.
[Citation.]
(Assembly v Deukmejian
(1982) 30 Cal.3d 638, 652.) However, where a petition
fails to furnish the information required by the statute, i.e., the text or language
of
the
challenged law, that petition is not in substantial compliance with statutory or constitutional
requirements.
(Billig v Voges
(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 962, 968.)
Elections Code section 9147, subdivision (b) provides that [e]ach section
of
the
referendum petition shall contain the title and text
of
the ordinance or the portion
of
the
ordinance which is the subject
of
the referendum. The purpose
of
this requirement is to
provide sufficient information
so
that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether
to
sign
the petition and to avoid confusion.
(Mervyn s v Reyes
(1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 93,
99;
Billig, supra,
223 Cal.App.3d at
p
967 [the requirement stems from the need to fully inform[]
[the prospective signor]
of
the substance
of
the challenged measure. ]) Critically, the text
of
the ordinance includes the words
of
the ordinance itself and documents that are physically
attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference.
(Lin, supra,
176 Cal.App.4th at p. 417.)
Thus, in
Chase v Brooks
(1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 657, a city council enacted a zoning
ordinance which reclassified property described in an attached exhibit. The referendum petition
at issue failed to include the exhibit, which described the property affected by the ordinance. The
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court concluded that the failure to include the exhibit as part of the referendum petition was fatal
because the petition was required to contain the entire text of the ordinance or the portion
thereof which is the subject of the referendum. ( d. at pp . 662-663.) Similarly, in
Billig, supra,
223 Cal.App.3d at p. 964, the court upheld the rejection of a referendum petition which omitted a
portion
of
the text of the ordinance and two exhibits which comprise[d] the major portion of the
ordinance. And, in Nelson v. Carlson (1993)
17
Cal.App.4th 732, 739-740, the court found that
a referendum petition challenging a land use plan violated the text requirement because it failed
to include a copy of the general plan that was both attached to the resolution and expressly
incorporated by reference.
Here, Respondents concede that it is possible to referend part of a law, but argue that
Petitioners' attempt to referend only Section Four amounts to a referendum on the entire
Ordinance. Consequently, the fact that the Petition failed to provide the text
of
the entire
Ordinance to voters meant that voters were not adequately informed
as
to the effects
of
the
Referendum. In addition, Respondents argue that, at minimum, the Petition should have
included the text of Section Five and District Law section 326, subdivision (g), both expressly
referred to in Section Four. Petitioners respond that the Petition met all legal requirements by
including the title and text of Section Four, the only challenged portion of the Ordinance.
Petitioners are incorrect. The text
of
an ordinance has consistently been held to include
documents expressly incorporated by reference into a challenged ordinance.
Lin, supra,
176
Cal.App.4th at p 420;
Billig, supra,
223 Cal.App.3d at p 962.) This rule properly limits the
function
of
an elections official to the ministerial function
of
determining whether the
procedural requirements have been met which should consist only
of
'the straightforward
comparison of the submitted petition with the statutory requirements for petitions' that is
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authorized by law. (/d. at p. 421 (quoting
lliance for a Better Downtown Millbrae
v
Wade
(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 123, 133).)
Petitioners challenge only one section of the Ordinance, but that section explicitly
incorporates another section, Section Five, as well as District
Law
section 326, subdivision (g).
Section Four specifically provides that the amount
of
the Charge shal l be calculated as set forth
in Section 5 of this ordinance. Petitioners argue both that Section Five is irrelevant and that
Respondents fail to explain why Section Five would make the Referendum clearer to voters.
These arguments are meritless; Section Five is relevant because it is incorporated by reference
into Section Four. Moreover, Section Five's contents are critical to a
voter's
decision whether to
sign the Petition. The amount of the Charge and the method by which the Charge is calculated
are key pieces of information that a voter would need to determine the effect the Charge would
have upon that voter. The same is true
of
District Law section 326, subdivision (g), cited in
Section Four, both as authority for the District's ability to set penalties for nonpayment of the
Charge, and for the authorized rate of any such penalty. At minimum, then, Petitioners were
required to include the text of Section Five and District
Law
section 326, subdivision (g), both
expressly incorporated into Section Four, to satisfy Elections Code section 9147, subdivision (b).
Further, the court agrees that the Petition mislead voters more generally. There is no
dispute that a portion
of
an ordinance can
be
referended. (Elec.
Code§
9147, subd. (b).)
Nevertheless, where an ordinance clearly pertains to a single subject, failing to provide voters
with the context in which the portion of the ordinance to be referended exists will often deceive
voters. Here, the Ordinance's sole purpose was to impose the Charge. Every other section in the
Ordinance besides Section Four provides key information which either clarifies or affects the
Charge. The Ordinance includes 22 findings of fact, explains the District's purpose in enacting
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the Ordinance, provides a formula for calculating the Charge, establishes an administrative
review and appeal procedure, authorizes a Citizen's Oversight Panel, and declares both an
effective and sunset date. (Resp. Ex. 144.) All ofthis information would be integral to a voter's
decision whether to sign a petition to referend Section Four of the Ordinance.
Finally, we disagree with Respondents that material included with the petition referring
to the Charge as a water tax violated Elections Code section 18600. That law applies when
there are uncontested, objectively verifiable evidence ofuntruth[s].
San Francisco Forty-
Niners
v
Nishioka
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 637, 649.) The question ofwhetherthe Charge is a tax
or a charge is far from simple. t requires significant analysis; an opinion on this issue cannot
fairly be likened to uncontested, objectively verifiable evidence ofuntruth[s]. Ibid.)
III. The Water Supply Charge is uthorized by the Enabling Law
Petitioners argue next that the Ordinance violates the District's enabling law, both
because that law does not authorize the Charge, and because the Ordinance pays for projects for
which voter approval was required but never obtained. Both inquiries require this Court to
interpret the District's enabling law.
The fundamental task in construing a statute is to ascertain the Legislature's intent so
as to effectuate the purpose ofthe statute. Smith
v
Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83.)
The first step in accomplishing this task is to examine the statutory language and give it a plain
and commonsense meaning. People v Verduzco (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1414.) That
reasonable and common sense interpretation must be consistent with the apparent purpose
and intention
of
the Legislature. f possible, [the court] will give significance to the plain
The issue is not, as Petitioners frame it, that Petitioners were required to inform signers of
the impact of the Referendum, but rather, that Petitioners were prohibited from
misleading
signers as to the impact of the Referendum.
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meaning of every word, phrase, and sentence
of
a statute in pursuance of the legislative purpose,
harmonizing the various parts
of
an enactment by considering each particular clause or section in
the context of the statutory framework
as
a whole while considering the context, object, and
history
ofthe
legislation, as well as public policy and contemporaneous construction in [an]
attempt to arrive at a construction that
is
practical rather than technical in nature. [Citations.]
In re Rochelle B
(1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1216.)
f
course, [t]he literal meaning
ofthe
words
of
a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to manifest
purposes that, in the light
of
the statute's legislative history, appear from its provisions
considered
as
a whole.
Silver v Brown
(1966)
63
Cal.2d 841, 845.)
Moreover, both the statute and its statutory scheme must be construed as a whole.
The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence
Lakin v.
Watkins Associated Industries
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 649.) [T]he words of a statute [must
be
construed] in context, harmoniz[ing] the various parts
of
an enactment by considering the
provision at issue in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.
Cummins, Inc. v
Superior Court
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 487.)] Statutory interpretation requires the court
to
harmonize its various parts
if
possible, reconciling them in the manner that best carries out the
overriding purpose of the legislation. [Citation.]
Elsner v Uveges
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 933.)
Additionally, statements
of
the intent
of
the enacting body contained in a preamble, while not
conclusive, are entitled to consideration. [Citations.]
People
v
Canty
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266,
1280.)
Only when the language of a statute generates more than one reasonable interpretation
and neither the plain language
of
a statute nor canons
of
construction resolve the matter, may the
court look to extrinsic aids such
as
legislative history and public policy.
People v. Woodhead
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(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007, citations omitted.) Finally, if neither the plain language nor the
legislative history reveals the meaning
of
the statute, the court must apply reason, practicality,
and common sense to the language at hand with the goal of making the text
of
the statute
workable and reasonable, and with consideration of the consequences flowing from a given
statutory interpretation. ( d., citations omitted).
A.
The Enabling Law Authorizes the Charge
The Legislature created the District to address what it believed to be a need for
integrated management
of
water supply in the Monterey Peninsula, finding that:
The major water supply for this area is derived from the Carmel River basin and
the major uses lie outside that basin. The adopted central coast basin plan divides
the management
of
the several basins, resulting in division, waste, and shortage
of
water resources The water service is principally supplied by [CAW]
which does not have the facilities nor the ability to perform functions which are
normally performed by public agencies, including the ability to raise sufficient
capital for necessary public works, contract with, or provide necessary assurances
to, federal and state agencies for financing of water projects and supplying of
water, and the regulation
of
the distribution
of
water developed within or brought
into such service area. (Wat. Code. Appen. § 118-2.)
Consequently, the Legislature created the District to carry out such functions which only can be
effectively performed by government, including, but not limited to, management and regulation
of the use, reuse, reclamation, conservation
of
water and bond financing
of
public works
projects.
( d.) ore
generally, the District was created to serve the people
of
the Monterey
Peninsula efficiently, to prevent waste or unreasonable use
of
water supplies, to promote the
control and treatment of storm water and wastewater, and to conserve and foster the scenic
values, environmental quality, and native vegetation and fish and wildlife and recreation in the
Monterey Peninsula and the Carmel River basin
( d.)
To accomplish its purposes, the District may exercise the powers which are expressly
granted by [the enabling] law, together with such powers as are reasonably implied from such
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express powers and necessary and proper to carry out the objects and purposes of the district.
I
.
at
§
118-30 1.) The District is empowered to by resolution or ordinance fix and collect
rates and charges for the providing or the availability of any service it is authorized to provide or
make available or for the sale, lease, or other disposition ofwater or other product of its works or
operations.
Id.
at § 118-308.) The District is also authorized to fix, revise, and collect rates
and charges for the services, facilities, or water furnished by it. (/d. at § 118-326, subd. (b).)
More generally, the District shall have the power as limited in [the enabling] law to do any and
every lawful act necessary in order that sufficient water may be available for any present or
future beneficial use or
uses
of
the lands
or
inhabitants within the district
Id.
at
§
118-
325.)
Petitioners argue that these powers do not authorize the District to implement the Charge.
Petitioners argue that 1) the District may only impose a charge for water or service furnished by
it; 2) water and water service are furnished by CAW, not the District; and 3) that the District's
services benefit CAW rather than taxpayers. None of these arguments are persuasive.
8
B
The District Provides Water Service
Petitioners repeatedly argue that the District does not supply water service because it
does not actually deliver water, instead wholesaling water to
CAW
which ultimately furnishes
8
Petitioners also argue that that the enabling law does not authorize fees or charges to
pay for general operating expenses. Petitioners provide no authority for this assertion. In
fact, this claim is directly contradicted by the enabling law, which provides that the District
shall have the power as limited in [the enabling] law to do any and every lawful act
necessary in order that sufficient water may be available for any present
or
future beneficial
use or uses of the lands or inhabitants within the district ( d.
at§
118-325.) In any
event, the Charge does not fund general operating expenses. The Ordinance expressly
provides that [p ]roceeds of the charge imposed by this Ordinance may only be used to fund
District water supply activities. (Pet. Ex
BX
at P0810, italics added.)
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the water to its customers. This narrow definition
of
water service is not supported by relevant
authority, however.
In Griffith
v.
Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 586,
595, the court addressed the validity
of
a groundwater augmentation charge imposed by the
Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency to cover the costs
of
purchasing supplemental water
and
of
providing supplemental water service, a service which included the planning, design,
construction, and operation
of
facilities designed to provide supplemental water. The Griffith
court affirmed this charge, finding that, the entity that produces, stores, supplies, treats, or
distributes water necessarily provides water service. ld.)
The District is such an entity. The mere fact that the water the District provides is
ultimately delivered by CAW does not affect the District's status as either a supplier
of
water or
as
a water service. Indeed, the Legislature's purpose in establishing the District was to address
the limitations of a system in which a privately owned water supplier does not have the
facilities nor the ability to perform functions which are normally performed by public agencies
. . (Wat. Code. Appen.
§
118-2.) The Legislature therefore found it necessary to create the
District
to
serve these governmental functions, effecting a clear and explicit division of labor
between CAW and the District. Ibid.)
Moreover, the Legislature plainly intended the District to protect the continued viability
of
the area's water supply. Thus, the District was granted the power as limited in [the enabling]
law to do any and every lawful act necessary in order that sufficient water may be available for
any present or future beneficial use or uses
of
the lands
or
inhabitants within the district
( d. at§ 118-325.) The projects funded by the Charge are specifically intended to ensure the
availability of sufficient water to the District inhabitants. Further, the District's powers include
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fixing and collecting rates and charges for the providing or the availability
of
any service it
is
authorized to provide or make available or for the sale, lease, or other disposition
of
water or
other product
of
its works or operations
( d.
at§
118-306.)
f
by service, the Legislature
did not mean water service, it is difficult to imagine what service the District could possibly
be intended to provide. Indeed, legislative history shows that [a] principal objective
of
the
district would be to wholesale water supplies developed by the district to the existing private
water purveyor. (Resp. Request for Judicial Notice, Ex.
1
at p. LIS
- 5.)
[T]he words
of
a statute [must be construed] in context, harmoniz[ing] the various
parts
of
an enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context
of
the statutory
framework as a whole.
Cummins, Inc., supra,
36 Ca1.4th at
p
487.) Statutory interpretation
must be directed at ensuring that the overriding purpose
of
the legislation is carried out.
Elsner, supra,
34 Ca1.4th at
p
933, internal citation omitted.) Petitioners ' logic,
if
accepted,
would violate these canons by undermining the very purpose
of
the District, rendering it
incapable
of
achieving the very goals for which it was created. Such a construction
of
the
enabling law defies legislative intent, and hence, must be rejected.
C. The District was Not Required to Obtain Voter Approval for Projects That
Benefit the District as a Whole
The enabling law authorizes the District to use the revenue from any authorized rates and
charges to pursue works and projects. The term works is defined expansively
to
include,
without limitation, dams and damsites, reservoirs and reservoir sites, and all conduits and other
facilities useful in the control, collection, conservation, storage, reclamation, treatment, disposal,
diversion, and transmission
of
water, the collection, treatment, reclamation, or disposal
of
sewage, waste, or storm waters, and all land, property, franchises, easements, rights-of-way, and
privileges necessary or useful to operate, maintain, repair, or replace any
ofthe
foregoing. ( d.
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at § 118-14.) The term projects is not defined by the law, but it can reasonably be inferred that
projects include, at minimum, programs to construct, operate, and maintain these works.
The enabling law provides that the District must determine which works or projects
to
carry out and must determine whether a work or project is
1
[f]or the common benefit
of
the
district as a whole; 2 [f]or the benefit ofparticipating zones ; or 3) [f]or the benefit
of
a single
zone.
( d.
at § 118-452.) The term zone is defined as any area designated within the district
created in order to finance, construct, acquire, reconstruct, maintain, operate, extend, repair or
otherwise improve any work or improvement of common benefit to such area
The enabling law prescribes a detailed set
of
procedures by which certain works and
projects may be evaluated and voted upon by the public. As to these works or projects, the
enabling law requires the District to adopt a resolution fixing a time and place for a public
hearing
( d.
t§ 118-453), to reject works or projects that either receive a majority protest from
affected property owners or are defeated in an election
( d. t§§
118-455, 118-74), and provides
mandatory ballot language for use in such an election.
( d.
at § 118-4 73.)
However, the above process only applies to works or projects for single zones, and joint
works or projects for participating zones
( d.
t§ 118-453.) The projects funded by
revenue from the Charge are for the benefit
of
the District as a whole. (Pet. Ex. BJ at P0721,
~ 2 1 .
Accordingly, Respondents argue that no voter approval was required to institute these
projects. Respondents reason that the public hearing, protest, and voting requirements were
intended to protect individual zones from being saddled with potentially expensive projects
without being consulted. By contrast, as to projects that benefit the District as a whole,
Respondents argue, the Legislature trusted the District to proceed without the need for voter
oversight. Petitioners argue that voter intent was
to
require a districtwide vote on any project the
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District sought to implement, and that the way to effectuate this intent is to consider the District
as a whole to
be
a single zone, the largest possible zone within the District. Neither point has
merit.
9
1. The Plain Language of the Enabling Law Provides That Elections
are Only Required to Approve Projects That Benefit a Portion
of
the District Rather Than the District as a Whole
The enabling law requires the District to determine which works or projects to carry out
and to label each such work or project as being: 1 [f]or the common benefit ofthe district as a
whole; 2 [f]or the benefit of participating zones ; or 3 [f]or the benefit of a single zone. Jd.
at§
118-452.) The very next section, however, authorizes the District's board to institute works
or projects for single zones, and joint works or projects for participating zones, for the financing,
construction, maintaining, operating, extending, repairing, or otherwise improving any work or
improvement of common benefit to the zone or participating zones.
( d.
at § 118-453.) Similar
language is employed in other related sections. For example, the law provides that a work or
project shall be terminated whenever, prior to the conclusion of the hearing, a written protest
is filed with the board against the proposed work or project which is signed by a majority in
number of the holders of title to real property within such zone or within any o he
participating zones for which such work or project was initiated, or by the holders of title to a
majority ofthe assessed valuation
ofthe
real property
( d.
at§
118-455, italics added.)
9
The resolution
of
this issue does not control whether the Ordinance violates the enabling
law. Petitioners' challenge is not to the projects funded by the Charge but to the validity
of
the
Ordinance itself. The Ordinance does not stand or fall on whether the projects funded by the
revenue derived from the Charge comply with the District's enabling law. And, while ASR and
GWR are specifically identified by the District as projects funded by the Charge, the District
identifies other projects funded by the Charge, such as a desalinization plant, which Petitioners
do not allege violate the enabling law. Thus, even if ASR and WR were held to violate the
enabling law, the Ordinance itself would be unaffected. Because declaratory relief is requested,
however, and because the validity of the projects is arguably relevant to Petitioners'
constitutional claim, the court will address this issue.
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Correspondingly, the election must be held in the zone or participating zones on the question
of
proceeding with the work or project Only registered voters
within the zone or participating
zones
shall
be
entitled to vote at such election.
( d.
at§ 118-471, italics added.) Finally, the
ballot for any such election must ask: Shall the proposed work or project for Zones No.
in the Monterey Peninsula Water Management District be approved?
( d. at§
118-473.)
The enabling law's provision regarding votes for emergency projects not only does not
undermine this reading, it supports it. That provision calls for the same procedure described
above for notifying the public and holding an election, except that the election shall be
conducted in
the entire portion o he district
benefited by the emergency improvement.
( d.
at
§ 118-333, italics added.) In other words, an emergency justifies forgoing the establishment
of
zones for a particular project or work to expedite that project or work being completed, but
voting itself remains restricted to the portion
of
the district that would benefit by the
improvement. Even in the case of an emergency, then, an election
is
only required when a
project affects less than the entire District.
In sum, the enabling
law s
text belies Petitioners' contention that elections are required
for projects which benefit the entire District. And, because the enabling law is unambiguous on
this point, it
is
unnecessary to look to legislative history for further guidance.
Woodland, supra,
225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1007-1008.)
11
The District
as
a Whole is not a Subdivision of the District
Petitioners also argue that the enabling law only expressly empowers the District's Board
to institute projects for single zones or participating zones. Accordingly, Petitioners reason,
either the law does not authorize the District to institute projects that benefit the District as a
whole or the entire District may be considered a zone. The court is not persuaded.
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Petitioners' argument is predicated on the conclusion that the District's power to
implement projects is exclusively authorized by section 453
of
the enabling law. This is not the
case. That authority is conferred
by
section 325
of
the enabling law, which authorizes the
District "as limited in [the enabling] law
to
do any and every lawful act necessary in order that
sufficient water may be available for any present or future beneficial use or uses of
( d.
at
§ 118-325, italics added.) The purpose
of
section 453 is not to confer power on the District to
institute projects, but rather, to provide specific limitations on the District's authority, which, by
their terms, apply only to projects the District seeks to implement for the benefit of less than the
entire District. For any such project, the District must adopt the necessary resolution, hold a
public hearing, terminate such a project
if
sufficient written protest ofproperty owners is
presented, and hold an election in the zone(s) affected by the particular work or project.
( d.
at
§§ 118-453, 118-455, 118-473, 118-474.) No such limitations apply to the District's power to
carry out projects for the District
as a whole;
such projects are expressly contemplated by the
enabling law.
( d.
at
§
118-452.)
Second, there is no merit to the suggestion that the entire District is a zone. The
enabling law defines a zone as any area within the district created in order to finance, construct .
. . or otherwise improve any work or improvement
of
common benefit to such area
( d. at
§ 118-18.) This definition plainly distinguishes the entirety ofthe District from a portion of the
District. If the Legislature intended the District as a whole to constitute a zone, it could have
added language such as
or
the entire District after within the district or omitted the within
the district language entirely. The Legislature could also have expressly stated that projects
benefitting the entire District were subject to the public hearing, protest, and elections procedures
set forth in the enabling law. The enabling law does not contain such language and, indeed,
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expressly distinguishes projects [f]or the common benefit of the district as a whole from
projects for the benefit
of
less than the entire District. (Id
t§
118-452.)
Further, Respondents are correct that Petitioners' interpretation would frustrate the
District's legislative mandate for integrated management
of
Monterey Peninsula water supplies.
(Id
t§
118-2.) The enabling law authorizes the city council of any city including territory in a
proposed zone to exercise a veto power over such territory. (Id
t§
118-433.) Thus,
ifthe
District were a zone, any city in the District could opt-out
of
District-wide projects, precluding
the District from fulfilling its legislative mandate.
In short, adopting Petitioners' suggested construction would require this Court to read
language into the statute which would not conform
to
either that statute or to the intent of the
statutory scheme as a whole. The court declines the invitation to so revise the enabling law.
1
IV. The Water Supply harge Does not Violate the alifornia onstitution
Finally, Petitioners argue that the Ordinance violates article XIII D, section 6
subdivisions (b) and (c)
of
the California Constitution, passed in 1996 as Proposition 218.
Proposition 218 was passed to plug certain perceived loopholes in Proposition 13.
[Citations.] Specifically,
by
increasing assessments, fees, and charges, local governments tried
to raise revenues without triggering the voter approval requirements in Proposition 13.
(Silicon
Valley Taxpayers Assn. v. Garner (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 402, 405-406].) Proposition 218
was designed to: constrain local governments' ability to impose assessments; place extensive
1
Because the court concludes that the District
as
a whole
is
not a zone, the court rejects
Petitioners argument that reimbursement of pre-project costs with Ordinance 152 before a
project is approved
by
the voters violates District Law section 118-434. That section
concerns the conditions under which the District's board may advance general funds
of
the
district to accomplish
the purposes
of
zone formed in accordance with Section 431 or 476 .
. . . ( d. at § 118-434, italics added.) Since the projects at issue concern the District as a
whole rather than one
or
more zones, section 434 is inapplicable.
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requirements on local governments charging assessments; shift the burden o demonstrating
assessments' legality to local government; make it easier for taxpayers to win lawsuits; and limit
the methods by which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers without their consent.
Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass
n,
Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority
(2008)
44
Cal.4th 431, 448.) Proposition 218 placed numerous restraints on the ability
o
public agencies
to
impose assessments, fees, and charges. The constitutional amendments resulting from
passage
o
Proposition 218 shall
be
liberally construed to effectuate [Proposition 218'
s]
purposes
o
limiting local government revenue and enhancing taxpayer consent. (Jd. at p 438
(citation omitted).)
t
is the District's burden to demonstrate compliance with Proposition 218.
(Cal. Const., art. XIII D,
§
6, subd. (b)(5).)
Article XIII D, subdivision (b) sets specific requirements for the imposition
o
a fee or
charge. Petitioners contend that the Ordinance violates several
o
these provisions. Before
addressing these substantive arguments, however, the court must address the argument that
Petitioners' constitutional arguments are waived for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
A
Petitioners' Claims are Not Barred by the Exhaustion Doctrine
Respondents are correct that Petitioners never raised their Proposition 218 arguments
below. Nevertheless, all
o
the Proposition 218 arguments at issue were both raised by
community members and considered by the District below. (See, e.g., Pet. Ex. 91 at D980-
D990.) There would be little to be gained by requiring the exact members
o
the public who
raised Proposition 218 objections to be the same parties bringing this action. (Cf. State Water
Resources Control Bd. Cases
(2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674, 791-791 (in the CEQA context, the
exhaustion requirement is satisfied
i
the alleged grounds were presented by any person
during the public comment period ) Because public, as opposed to private, concerns are
at
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issue, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied by the relevant issues being both raised and
considered below.
B. The Ordinance Satisfies the California Constitution
The Court now turns to the substance
of
Petitioners' claim that the Ordinance violates
several provisions
of
article XIII
D
subdivisions (b) and (c). The provisions invoked include:
that revenues derived from the Charge shall not exceed the funds required to provide the
property related service (subd. (b)(l)); that the amount of the Charge imposed on a parcel as an
incident
of
property ownership shall not exceed the proportional cost
of
the service attributable
to
the parcel (subd. (b)(3)); that the Charge may only be imposed for a service actually used
by, or immediately available to, the owner ofth property in question (subd. (b)(4)); and that no
charge may
be
imposed for general governmental services where the service is available
to
the public at large in substantially the same manner as it is
to
property owners. (subd. (b)(5).)
Finally, article XIII D, subdivision (c) requires voter approval for any property related fee or
charge with the exception of charges imposed for sewer, water, and refuse collection services .
. . . Petitioners contend that the Ordinance violates all of these provisions. The court will
address each provision in turn.
(a) Subdivision (b)(l)
Petitioners argue that the Ordinance generates revenues which exceed the funds required
to provide the property related service since it authorizes the use of proceeds from the Charge for
water supply services, project capital costs, up to 15% for general unallocated administrative
overhead, and to fund a reserve to meet the cash-flow needs of the District. (Pet. Ex.
BX
at
P0810.) Petitioners argue that the fact that the charge may pay for more than
just
a 'service'
indicates the charge exceeds the cost to provide that service. Additionally, Petitioners claim
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that the reserve funded by the Charge may be used for any cash-flow need o the District because
the Ordinance does not place any restrictions on the expenditure o these excess funds.
Petitioners' arguments lack merit. Subdivision (b)(l) requires only that the revenues
derived from the fee or charge not exceed the funds required to provide the property related
service. The property related service here is water supply service. Contrary to Petitioners'
narrow construction, water supply service is not limited to discrete events. Instead, the term
contemplates consistent, reliable service. Hence, the funds required to provide this service
necessarily include overhead, capital acquisition costs, and the availability o a reserve fund for
unexpected events. The District does not generate water supply from thin air. The costs
o
generating that water supply necessarily include personnel costs and the facilities required to
support that personnel. Correspondingly, capital acquisition and operational costs are direct
costs necessary for both ASR and GWR. (Pet. Ex BX at
P081
0); Howard Jarvis Taxpayers
Assn. v City ofRoseville (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637, 647-648) [The cost
o
providing a service
includes all the required costs o providing service, short-term and long-term, including
operation, maintenance, financial, and capital expenditures. The key is that the revenues derived
from the fee or charge are required to provide the service, and may be used only for the
service. ]) Similarly, maintenance
o
a reserve fund ensures the continued operation o the
District's water supply projects, and hence, o water service.
As to the reserve fund in particular, the plain language
o
the Ordinance refutes
Petitioners' claim that the Ordinance does not place any restrictions on the expenditure o these
funds. The Ordinance expressly provides that [p ]roceeds o the charge imposed by this
Ordinance may only be used to fund District water supply activities. (Pet. Ex BX at P081 0
italics added.) Further, Petitioners' note that the Ordinance authorizes the use o the reserve to
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meet the cash-flow needs of the District but omit the remainder of the quote, which
contextualizes this phrase. The full phrase reads that proceeds of the charge may be used for
reserves to meet the cash-flow needs of the District and to otherwise provide or the cost to
provide services
or
which the charge
is
imposed."
( d.,
italics added.) No fair reading of this
passage supports Petitioners' claim that the proposed reserve may be used for general, as
opposed to water-supply related, purposes.
In sum, water supply activities necessarily include the items described in Section Three
of the Ordinance, including administrative overhead and a reserve fund. Thus, the revenue
derived from the Charge does not exceed the funds required to provide the property related
service, and the Ordinance satisfies subdivision (b) 1 ).
(b) Subdivision (b )(3)
Petitioners next argue that the amount
ofthe
Charge exceeds the proportional cost of the
service attributable to each affected parcel, in violation of subdivision (b )(3). Petitioners note
that, although the Charge does not apply to the Bishop, Hidden Hills, Ambler and Toro sub
units, the Charge will pay for projects which benefit both the entire District and water users
outside the district such as the City of Seaside, which will benefit by the increased water levels in
its aquifer that SR and GWR will generate. This argument is specious. There is nothing in
subdivision (b )(3) which prevents third parties from benefitting from projects paid for by the
revenues derived from the Charge. That subdivision only requires that parcels that are charged
not pay more than the cost to serve them. (Cf. Dahms v Downtown Pomona Property (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 708, 719.)
Moreover, the Charge is calculated based on a hybrid fee structure which accounts both
for the water consumption used by each affected parcel (to account for use) and by the size of the
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meter (to account for costs which exist irrespective ofuse). (Resp. Ex. 58 at D815, Pet. Ex. BX
at P0811-P0812.) Petitioners have failed to show that the District's calculation methodology is
either unreasonable or inconsistent with subdivision (b)(3). And, while this formula does not
result in an exact match between usage and the charge, such exactness is not required,
[a]pportionment is not a determination that lends itself to precise calculation. [Citation.]
Grifjith, supra,
220 Cal.App.4th at p. 601.) Proposition 218 proportionality
'is
measured
collectively, considering all rate payors' [Citation] ; a parcel-by-parcel proportionality
analysis is not required. Ibid.) The Charge therefore satisfies subdivision (b)(3).
(c) Subdivision (b)( 4)
Petitioners further argue that the Charge violates article XIII D, section 6, subdivision
(b)(4), which provides that [n]o fee or charge may be imposed for a service unless that service
is actually used by, or immediately available to, the owner
of
the property in question. Fees or
charges based on potential or future use of a service are not permitted Petitioners claim
that the District has not provided any service
t
the parcel subject to the [Charge] and that a
property owner has no ability to terminate the services provided in exchange for the [Charge].
However, Petitioners fail to provide authority for the proposition that either condition is a
prerequisite
of
the Charge. Instead, Petitioners repeatedly argue that the District does not supply
water service because it does not actually deliver water, but instead, wholesales water to
CAW, which ultimately delivers that water to consumers. As discussed,
supra,
the definition
of
water service is not as narrow as Petitioners insist. Indeed, it is even broader in the context
of
Proposition 218.
Government Code section 53750, contained in the Proposition 218 Omnibus
Implementation Act, contains definitions to be applied [f]or purposes
of
Article XIII C and
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Article XIII D The definition of water, i.e. any system of public improvements
intended to provide for the production, storage, supply, treatment,
or
distribution of water from
any source, applies to the District. (Govt. Code § 53750, subd. (m).)
Thus,
the entity that
produces, stores, supplies, treats,
or
distributes water necessarily provides water service.
Griffith, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 595.)
The Distr ict 's projects are intended to provide supplemental water supply. The mere
fact that the water provided is ultimately delivered by CAW does not affect the District's status
as a water supplier. The purpose
of
the District was to address the limitations of CAW, a
privately owned water supplier which does not have the facilities
nor
the ability to perform
functions which are normally performed by public agencies (Wat. Code. Appen. § 118-2.)
The Legislature plainly intended a division oflabor between
CAW
and the District. Ibid.) In
light of the water problems in the Monterey Peninsula area, the development
of
supplemental
water supply is especially urgent.
Ibid.)
In Griffith, the Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency imposed a groundwater
augmentation charge to cover the costs of both purchasing supplemental water and providing
supplemental water service, a service which included the planning, design, construction, and
operation of facilities designed to provide supplemental water. Griffith, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th
at p 595.) The Griffith court affirmed this charge, finding that the costs of purchasing,
capturing, storing, and distribution supplemental water did not violate subdivision (b)(4).
Since one cannot rationally purchase supplemental water without identifying and determining
one's needs, identifying and determining future supplemental water projects is part of
defendant's present-day water service. ( d. at p. 602.)
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~ i m i l a r l y the District's efforts to provide supplemental water supply are aimed at
ensuring a consistent, reliable water service for those within its jurisdiction, a task which CAW
is incapable o accomplishing, and one which the District was expressly created to achieve.
(Wat. Code. Appen. § 118-325.) Accordingly, the Ordinance satisfies subdivision (b)(4).
(d) Subdivision (b )(5)
Subdivision (b)(5) prohibits charges for general governmental services including, but
not limited to police, fire, ambulance or library services, where the service is available to the
public at large in substantially the same manner as it is to property owners. The Ordinance does
not violate this subdivision. The Charge is imposed only on those who receive the water service
funded by its revenues; sub-units not connected to the water system are explicitly excluded from
the Charge. (Pet. Ex. BX P0810.) And, because the Charge is only imposed on [t]he owner o
each parcel o real property connected to the main CAW water distribution system, many
members o the public, such as owners
o
property not connected to that system, property
lessees, and community visitors, are not subject to the Charge. Ibid.) In short, the services
funded by the Charge are not general governmental services akin to police, fire, ambulance or
library services, and accordingly, the Ordinance does not violate subdivision (b)(5).
(e) Subdivision (c)
Finally, subdivision (c) requires voter approval for property related fees or charges unless
those fees or charges are for sewer, water, and refuse collection services. Here, Petitioners
repeat the argument that water service necessarily entails the delivery or production o water.
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As explained, supra both statutory and decisional authority refutes this claim and hence, the
District was not required to obtain voter approval to impose the Charge.
Disposition
Petitioners' requested relief is denied. Respondents' counsel is to prepare an
appropriate order consistent with this ruling, present it
to
opposing counsel for approval as
to
form, and return it to this court for signature.
Dated: March 17, 2015
EFREN N IGLESI
EFREN N. IGLESIA
Judge
o
the Superior Court
11
Because the court concludes that the Ordinance does not violate either the District's
enabling law or the state Constitution, it is unnecessary to address Respondents' laches
argument. Nevertheless, the evidence supporting this argument is strong. A writ was
available to Petitioners as soon as Respondents announced the decision not to place the
Referendum on the ballot. Yet Petitioners failed to act for nine months. Respondents
reasonably and detrimentally relied on Petitioners' failure to timely bring suit, waiting seven
months after rejecting Petitioners ' referendum to obtain the 4 million Rabobank loan, and
committed significant additional funds with expected charge revenue in the months
thereafter. Even i Petitioners had been successful on the merits then, laches would bar their
claims. (See
San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v City o.fMoreno Valley
(1996)
44
Cal.App.4th 593, 605.) Moreover, because the Referendum Petition was improper, the
contracts that Petitioners entered into, such as the Rabobank loan, were valid. Invalidating
the ordinance at this late stage would abrogate these agreements, effectively eviscerating
third parties' contract rights in violation
o
article
I
section 9
o
the California Constitution.
32
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8/9/2019 Intended Decision MPTA v MPWMD (M123512) 03-17-15
33/33
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
(Code
o
Civil Procedure Section 1013a)
I do hereby .certify that I am employed in the County of Monterey. I am over the age of
eighteen years and not a party to the within stated cause. I placed true and correct
copies of the
Intended Decision
for collection and mailing this date following our
ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the Court s practices for collection
and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is
placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited
in
the ordinary course of business with
the United States Postal Services in Salinas, California, in a sealed envelope with
postage fully prepaid. The names and addresses o each person to whom notice was
mailed
is
as follows:
Margaret Thurn
PO Box 99
Pebble Beach, CA. 93953
David Ruderman
11364 Pleasant Valley Rd.
Penn Valley, CA. 95946-9000
David Laredo
Delay Laredo
606 Forest Ave.
Pacific Grove, CA.
9395
Date: March 17 2015
TERESA A RISI, Clerk
o
the Superior Court,
_dr t , < q L/ _ _ _ ,
Deputy Clerk