1

Integrationandculture:From‘communicativecompetence’to‘competenceofplurality’(DraftVersion)

RuthWodak,Lancaster/Vienna

IntegrationisareciprocalprocessinwhichtheeffortsofthosewhoarepermittedtoremaininAustriamustwithoutdoubtbegreater.BecausethebasicvaluesofAustriansocietyarenon‐negotiableandmustthereforebefollowed.(S.KurzIntegrationsbericht2016,5)

Initsterminologicalconsiderations,ExpertCounselrejectsanotionofculturethatcanbedefinedonlyvaguelyandisideologicallyloaded.Astaticandessentialistnotionofculturewouldnotdojusticetotherealityofapluralisticandchangingmigrationsociety.Indeed,atthe“endoftheroad”thereawaitsneitheraperfectlyassimilatedsociety,norapatchworkofdiversesocialgroupsthathasbecomeestrangedfromitself,butapluraltogethernessthatmustcontinuallybere‐negotiated.Bothsidesofthemigrationsocietymustthereforedevelop,inadditiontoacompetenceinvolvinginclusionandintegration,somethinglikeacompetenceofplurality,becausefromalongitudinalperspectivesocietyisbecomingmoresimilaranddiverseatthesametime.Correspondingly,integrationwillinanyeventcontinuetobeseenasatwo‐sidedprocesswhosefunctioningrequireseffort.(H.FassmannIntegrationsbericht2016,85)

1. Introduction:definingrelevantnotions1.1.Integration

Thetwoquotesaboveindicatetwosignificantlydifferentpositionsonacontinuumoftotalrejectionofthe‘other’tototalacceptanceofthe‘other’.In‐between,wedetectmanyotherapproaches to culture and integration: ‘integration’ understood as ‘assimilation’,‘integrationaslivinginparallelsocieties’,‘integrationasrespectforthe‘other’andsoforth.Importantly, the second quote, written by the so‐called Austrian expert committee forintegration (Expertenrat) consisting of an interdisciplinary group of scholars in variousfieldsspecializinginmigrationstudies(linguists,demographers,legalscholarsandpoliticalscientists),journalists,architectsandurbanplanners,aswellasvariousNGOs,emphasizesthe danger of essentializing culture as static and homogeneous, as a discrete category,somethingwhichyoupossessordonot,somethingwhichonecanacquireasan‘entity’,orcannot.FollowingHeinzFassman,chairofExpertenrat (seeabove), integrationshouldbeperceived as negotiating and co‐constructing a pluralist society, as negotiating, co‐constructingandadoptingpracticesofrelevantdomains inasociety–practiceswhich,ofcourse, are always open to change. Whereas the Austrian Minister for Integration (andForeignAffairs),SebastianKurz–inspiteofpraisingtheexpertcommitteeanditswork–arguesthatimmigrantsareobviouslyrequiredtoinvestmoreworkinordertocopewiththe norms and values of the host society1. Thus, learning and accepting the constitutivevaluesofthehostsocietyaredefinedasthesinequanonofsuccessfulintegration.

1 See also “50 Punkte Plan zur Integration” (2015) of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Integration (file:///C:/Users/RW/Downloads/50_Punkte_Plan_zur_Integration%20(1).pdf)

2

AsMiller(2016,9)maintains,“Inearliertimes…immigrantswerelefttotheirowndevicessolongastheydidnotbecomeinvolvedinillegalorantisocialbehaviour”.Nowadays,Miller(Ibid, 9ff.) argues that “the contemporary democratic state cannot take such a hands‐offview: itwantsandneeds immigrants tobecomegood,upstandingcitizens.Andachievingthismayinvolveencouragingorevenrequiringthemtoshedsomeoftheculturalbaggagethey bringwith them.” However, it is obvious that such decisions are not easy to take –whichbenefitsshouldimmigrantsenjoy,whatarethecostsandbenefits,andwhichculturalorreligiousbeliefsareperceivedasnotbeingfitforWesternsocietiesoractuallyclashwithcommonandwidelyacceptedroutinesandknowledges?Inthispaper,Ihavetoneglecttheimportantpoliticalandphilosophicaldebateselaborated inMiller’srecentbookStrangersinourMidst(2016).Sufficetostatethatmanydecisionsaboutrightsandobligations(apartfrom the foundationalhuman rights), on thesideof immigrantsand thehost society, arestronglyinfluencedbymanycontextual factors(suchasthenumbersof immigrants,theircountries of origin, levels of xenophobia in the host country, time factors, levels ofeducation,genderpoliticsandsoforth).Inthisvein,AgerandStrang(2008)introduceaconceptualframeworkwhichdefinescoredomains of integration (pp. 169–70)2(Fig. 1, below). In this model, they propose fourdimensions. First, they distinguish between markers andmeans (such as employment,housing, education and health), defined as key aspects of integrating into a society.Furthermore, theyarguethatcitizenshipandrightsare tobeassumedastheconstitutivefoundation for integration. Of course, these are dependent on notions of nationhood,citizenshipand rights,whichvaryacross settings, due tonational traditions,policies andidentitypolitics.(Ibid,176)

2 In this context, see also Carvill et al. (2016), Delanty et al. (2011), Krzyżanowski & Wodak (2009), Messer et al. 2011), Penninx et al. (2008) and Schmiederer (20130, who all discuss different models and forms of political, legal and cultural integration. Moreover, I also rely on the Migration Policy Index 2015 (MIPEX), but I have to restrict myself to cultural – and, even more specifically, linguistic-communicative – integration in this paper, due to reasons of space and expertise.

3

Figure1:IntegrationModel(adaptedfromAger&Strang2008,170).

The third dimension in this model relates to social connection, i.e. investigation of theprocesses thatmediate between foundational principles and public outcomes in the firstdimension (markers and means). In other words, how do feelings of ‘belonging’ evolve,whenaremigrantsacceptedandwhendo they feel accepted in communitiesofpractice?For example,Delantyet al. (2011)were able to illustrate inmuchdetail,while analysingdata from48 focus groupswithmigrants fromdifferent ethnicorigins in eightEuropeanmember states in the EU‐funded project XENOPHOB, that foundational rights (such ashavingacquiredcitizenship), fluencyinthehost languageandsoforth,donotnecessarilyimply access, respect and acceptance; access to housing and the labourmarket remainsdifficult due to prejudices and discriminatory beliefs. Social bonds, social bridges andfacilitators are viewed as essential mediators in transcending various thresholds andgatekeepersinthecomplexprocessofintegration(Ager&Strang2008,179–81).Such facilitatorswerestudied, for instance, ina recentethnographyofaPakistani family,movingtotheUK,overseveralyears.Indeed,theentiretrajectoryofapplyingforlanguagetests, visas, residence permits and work permits, up to settling in a small town inLancashire,was observed and recorded (Capstick 2015). Capstick (2015, 228) concludeshisstudybystating:

Byemployingtheconceptof‘culturalbrokerage’toemphasizethebridgeitprovidesbetweendominantandnon‐dominantknowledge,thedecisiveroleofbrokersinnegotiatingthelinksbetweenindividuals’everydaynon‐dominantliteraciesanddominantinstitutions’bureaucraticliteraciesenablesresearcherstoexploreissuesofpowerwhenexaminingtherelationshipbetweenlocalandglobalcontextsinmigration.Thisisbecauseliteracyeventslikecompletingavisaforminvokebroaderculturalpatternsofliteracypractices,suchasregisteringmarriages,andprovideopportunitiesformigrantstoappropriatebureaucraticliteracypracticesinordertomakesuccessfulvisaapplications.Forexample,theBritishPakistaniimmigrationsolicitorinPrestonunderstandsboththeMirpuritraditionofprovidingworkforspousesoffamilymembersaswellastheBritishgovernment’simmigrationandemploymentlawrelatingtovisarequirementsandvisasponsors’

4

salaries.Theliteracyeventswhichinstantiatethesepractices,suchasthecompletionofvisaformsbyaculturalbrokerwhoisabletodrawonherunderstandingofdominantandnon‐dominantcontexts,areshapedbytheprioritiesofindividualswhohavemuchtoloseifvisaapplicationsfail.Thus,whenbureaucraticliteracieshavesignificantpersonalaswellaspracticalconsequencesforthewholefamily,migrantsareabletodrawonwidercommunitynetworkswhichallowthemtocomplywiththeinstitutionalrequirementswhichshapethefamily’slivesinboththeUKandPakistan.

ItbecomesapparentthatwithoutculturalandliteracybrokersthisfamilywouldneverhavebeenabletoentertheUKlegallyandsuccessfully.ThisiswhyAgerandStrang(2008,182)rightly identifya fourthdimension in theirmodel, thedimensionof languageandculturalknowledgeaswellasperceptionsofsafetyandstability.The latteraspectsareparticularlyrelevantifrefugees,forinstance,haveencounteredtraumaticeventsduringtheirflight.Italsobecomesapparent,however,thatthefourdimensionsinthemodeldiscussedaboveareconnectedandrelatedwitheachotherinveryintricate,complexandcontext‐dependentways,whichhavetobeinvestigatedbothquantitatively(bysurveys,documentandpolicyanalysis, and interviews) and qualitatively (by focus groups, ethnography, onlineethnography,discourseandsemioticanalysisofimagesandothergenres,andsoforth)inorder tobeable toassesspositive andnegative formsof integration.Accordingly,MIPEX(2015)statesinits‘InternationalKeyFindings’that“thelinksbetweenintegrationpoliciesand outcomes are not always clear. Some countries actively improve their policies torespondtoproblemsonthegroundwhileothersignorethem…ResearchersusingMIPEXaroundtheworldfindthatthecountrieswithinclusiveintegrationpoliciesalsotendtobemoredeveloped,competitiveandhappierplacesforimmigrantsandeveryonetolivein”(p.9). In this way, a drop in the MIPEX score usually indicates a rise in anti‐immigrantattitudesandoffar‐rightparties.

1.2. NegotiatingcultureWhenfollowingthedominantpoliticalandmediadebatesthroughoutEuropeandtheEU(andbeyond),oneisstruckbyaquiteconsistenthierarchyofvalueswhichispresentedasthe hegemonic value system of the West. Apart from the central role of the nationallanguagewhich shouldbeacquired (Wodak2011, 2012,2015a, 90ff; seebelow), specificareasarehighlightedandperceivedassalientfor‘us’,fordemocraticandsecularEuropeanstateswhichhavesigneduptotheHumanRightsCharterandotherinternationaltreaties(such as the Geneva Convention) and have – it is presupposed – implemented genderequality, anti‐discrimination laws, high standards of justice and education, and so forth.Subsequently, a huge Manichean contrast emerges between (an educated, liberal andprogressive)Westand(aretarded,undemocraticanduneducated)East,twosolidifiedandhomogenousblocs,withnothing in‐between. Accordingly,weobserve a culturalizationofdiscourse(Yilmaz2016,17),i.e.arightsuchasfreedomofspeechbeingtransformedintoacultural value, although rights have certainly not developed via cultural evolution butrather as a result of political struggles, revolutions and abrupt breakswith thepast (e.g.

5

Chanock2000).Indeed,asSoysal(2009,5)argues,culturehasbecomethedominantframeforpolitical issuesandpolicies suchas citizenship, security, the economyand so forth. Itseems that culture can be defined as a floating/ empty signifier onto which politicians,media and lay persons are able to projectwhatever problems or categories they choose(Yilmaz2016,18ff.).It is important, therefore, to discuss culture in more differentiated terms. Miller (2016,141ff)drawsalinebetweenpublicandprivateculture.Hearguesthatwecandistinguish,ontheonehand,thecultureofthewidersociety(i.e.itslanguage,symbolsandinstitutions).On the other hand, there are different religions, forms of art and literature, a variety ofcuisinesandrespectivemothertongues.Butwhere,howandwhenshouldthisthinlinebedrawn? Immigrantswill probablywish to retainmany symbols of their own culture andintegratethemwiththehostculture;thehostsociety,however,expectsidentificationwithitsnationalidentityand(banal)symbols(Billig1995;Rheindorf&Wodak2016).Aproblemarisesmost vehemently – as canbeobserved acrossEurope andbeyond– in the caseofreligion, i.e.whenspecificreligiousbeliefsandpracticescollidewithelementsof thehostsociety’s culture. Miller (Ibid, 149) concludes that “full cultural integration requires thatmembers of the indigenousmajority understandwhy the private cultures of immigrantsneedtobeaccommodatedandofferungrudgingsupportforthemeasuresneeded,andthattheimmigrantsthemselvesunderstandandembracethepubliccultureofthesocietytheyhavejoined”.Inviewofthehighlycontroversialdebatesabouttheburqaandtheheadscarfas metonymic tropes for Muslim and indeed Islamist religion and related oppression ofwomen,Miller’sproposalsmightbeconsideredutopian(Wodak2015b,151ff.).Reviewinganti‐Muslimrhetoricinthe1990sandthefirstdecadeofthe21stcenturyrevealsthat specific iconic images of the ‘female’ have become the ultimate ‘Other’. Countlesspoliticaldebateshavesurroundedandcontinuetosurroundtheso‐called‘headscarf’(hijab:ascarfthatcoversthehairandsometimestheshoulders)andthe‘burqa’(whichcoversthehair,face(excepttheeyes)andentirebody)assymbolsofuncivilised,barbaricIslamandofoppressed women who should be liberated by the rules of Western culture. In thisenterprise,interestingly,right‐wingpopulistmovementshavealignedwithsomeleft‐wingintellectualsandparties,aswellasmanyfeminists,allassumingandpresupposingthatallveiledMuslimwomenareforcedtowearheadscarvesortheburqaandthattheWestfacesatwofoldchallengeandresponsibility:toprotectwomenfromoppressionbyIslam;andtoempowerandliberateoppressedMuslimwomen.Inthiscontext,Hammerl(2016)pointstomany hypocritical, contradictory and fallacious arguments: thus, the burqa is accepted ifworn by rich Saudi tourists, but it is not accepted ifworn by poor Afghan refugees; theliberation of Muslim women is called for by right‐wing populist politicians who,simultaneously, campaign against Free Choice or equal pay forwomen andmen, and soforth.

6

Furthermore, I argue that the debate about culture and Islam is primarily fought in anattempt to discipline the female body (Wodak 2015b). This anti‐Muslim discourse isinstrumentalisedtocoverupothersocio‐politicaland–mostimportantly–socio‐economicagendas:Indeed,appealstoliberatewomenfrom‘textual‐sexualoppression’(Amin2015)unite more voters around a right‐wing populist agenda than do anti‐modernisation andanti‐globalisation agendas. Such a dichotomisation renders it very difficult, if notimpossible,forprogressiveMuslimwomentocriticizefundamentalistpatriarchalpositions.Marsdal(2013)convincinglydeconstructsthetraditionalleft‐rightcleavagewithrespecttoachangeinvotingbehaviourrelatedtosocialclassindetail.Heemphasisesthatvotesfor(moral) values have replaced votes for parties and amply illustrates (e.g. withdevelopmentsinNorway)that:

…[c]lass issues are shoved into the background and value issues come to the fore. Tensions overeconomic distribution and fairness are demobilized. This takes place, however, at the top level ofpartypolitics,andnotinsociety.Insociety,economicandsocialinequalitiesandtensionshavebeenrisingoverthelastdecades,notonlyinDenmark,butalsoalloverEurope.Thepoliticaldemobilizingofclassconflictsdoesnottakeplacebecausemostvotershavecometoemphasizevalueissuesmorethanclassissues,whichtheydonothave,butratherbecause,undertheneo‐liberaléliteconsensusonclass issues, confrontation on moral and cultural issues (‘values’) has become the only availablemeansofparty‐politicalandideologicaldemarcation[…].Economicpolicydebatesaredullandgrey.Then,someonesayssomethingabouttheMuslimveilandmediahellbreaksloose.(Ibid,51–52)

ThisobservationprovidesevidenceforYilmaz’sclaimthat“theculturalizationofdiscoursehas changed the understanding of politics as site where problems caused by culturalencountersarehandled” (Yilmaz2016,18).Accordingly,he identifiesa ‘hegemonyof theculturalparadigm’(Ibid,19).Inthefollowing,IfirstprovideabriefoverviewofmultilingualismpoliciesintheEuropeanUnion as the broad context for the subsequent implementation of national language andKoS(KnowledgeofSociety)testsintheformofNAPs(NationalActionPlans).Here,IdrawprimarilyonsurveysconductedbytheCouncilofEurope.Ithensummarisetwoempiricalcase studies which serve to illustrate some complex challenges to ‘cultural integration’:First, are the results of a study of Austrian political and media discourses (2015/16)regarding the term ‘Integrationsunwilligkeit’ (‘unwillingness to integrate’). This term isemployedinordertolegitimizepunitivemeasuresformigrantsandrefugeesalreadylivinginAustriaoncetheyareperceivedtoreject‘ourvalues’.ThisdiscourseemergedasreactiontotheterroristattacksinParisinJanuary2015;somepoliticianslinkedpotentialterrorismand radicalization to Integrationsunwilligkeit allegedly manifested by male Muslimadolescents. Consequently, debates about positive measures for integration werebackgrounded.Secondly,Idiscusstheresultsfromanongoingstudy–INPUT–onlanguageacquisitionbychildrenwithandwithoutaTurkishbackground,incorrelationwithparentallinguistic input. INPUT provides evidence that socio‐economic status overrides ethnicorigin,i.e.childrenwhoreceivemoresupportfromtheirparentsandgrowupinHSES(high

7

socio‐economicstatus)familieslearnGermanfasterthanchildrenfromLSES,regardlessofmigrant background. These results obviously contradict many school curricula designedspecificallyformigrants(childrenandadults),whileneglectingotherrelevantvariables.

2. Languagecompetenceandlanguagetests2.1.EUmultilingualvsnationalmonolingualpolicies

EuropeanmultilingualismhasbeendefinedasanessentialcomponentofthefutureconstructionofaEuropeanidentity,orofEuropeanidentities,andforthepreservationofnational,regional,local,societalandindividualmultilingualism.Theimportanceoflanguagelearning,forexample,hasbeenrepeatedlystressedbyvariousEuropeanauthoritiesindeclarationsofpoliticalintentonmattersoflanguage,educationandpedagogy(e.g.Article2oftheEuropeanCulturalConvention,19December1954;‘Recommendation814onModernLanguagesinEurope’fromtheCouncilofEurope,5October1977;theKSZEfinaldocumentof1August1975).IntheMaastrichtandAmsterdam2000treaties,theEUcommitteditselftoEuropeanmultilingualism,whichwasechoedbytheCouncilofEurope’sResolutionfromtheCommitteeofMinistersandParliamentaryAssembly(PACE)‘Recommendationconcerningmodernlanguages(98)’.3Thelastofthesewarnsexplicitly“ofthedangersthatmightresultfrommarginalisationofthosewholacktheskillsnecessarytocommunicateinaninteractiveEurope”(ibid.)andstatesinteraliainitsAppendixthat:

[S]tepsshouldbetakentoensurethatthereisparityofesteembetweenallthelanguagesandculturesinvolvedsothatchildrenineachcommunitymayhavetheopportunitytodeveloporacyandliteracyinthelanguageoftheirowncommunityaswellastolearntounderstandandappreciatethelanguageandcultureoftheother.(Ibid,Appendix2.2)

Therecommendationsalsostressthatgovernmentsshould“[C]ontinuetopromotebilingualisminimmigrantareasorneighbourhoodsandsupportimmigrantsinlearningthelanguageoftheareainwhichtheyreside”(Ibid,Appendix2.3.)ItisimportanttoemphasisethattheCouncilofEuropeendorsesamorenuancednotionofplurilingualismthandoestheEuropeanUnion(i.e.theCommission).Nevertheless,ina‘WhitePaperonEducationandTraining’,issuedbytheEuropeanCommission,itisstatedthat“[L]anguagesarealsothekeytoknowingotherpeople.ProficiencyinlanguageshelpstobuildupthefeelingofbeingEuropeanwithallitsculturalwealthanddiversityandofunderstandingbetweenthecitizensofEurope”(EuropeanCommission1995,67,myemphasis).Between2005and2007,theEUrecognisedtherelevancetopolicyoflanguageandmultilingualismbyaddingamultilingualismportfoliototheremitoftheUnion’sCommissioneronEducationandCulture.Thekeydocumentofthatperiod–‘Thenewframeworkstrategyformultilingualism’(EuropeanCommission2005)–arguesfortheCommission’s 3 Seewww.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/migrants2_EN.asp?#P110_13141.

8

“commitmenttomultilingualismintheEuropeanUnion”(Ibid.,1)andfor“promotingmultilingualisminEuropeansociety,intheeconomyandintheCommissionitself”(Ibid.).ByarguingthatmultilingualismisnotonlygoodfortheEuropeaneconomybutalsofora‘socialEurope’andthedemocratisationoftheEU,itplacesmultilingualismbetweenmajorEUdiscourses:thediscourseondemocratisation,andthediscourseontheknowledge‐basedeconomy.InthesameperiodtheEUalsoproposed–forthefirsttime–apolicy‐relevantdefinitionofmultilingualism.Itarguesthat“multilingualismreferstobothaperson’sabilitytouseseverallanguagesandtheco‐existenceofdifferentlanguagecommunitiesinonegeographicalarea”(Ibid,3).Thedocumentstatesthat:

TheEuropeanUnionisfoundedon‘unityindiversity’:diversityofcultures,customsandbeliefs–andoflanguages...ItisthisdiversitythatmakestheEuropeanUnionwhatitis:nota‘meltingpot’inwhichdifferencesarerendereddown,butacommonhomeinwhichdiversityiscelebrated,andwhereourmanymothertonguesareasourceofwealthandabridgetogreatersolidarityandmutualunderstanding.(Ibid,2)

In2007,however,indiscoursesrelatedtotheLisbonStrategyoftheearly2000s,wewitnessa(returnto)rhetoricorientedtowardsskillsandcompetences(Krzyżanowski&Wodak2011;Wodak2011a,b).TheEuropeanMultilingualismStrategyhasrecentlyadoptedanewandbroaderunderstandingofthesocial,politicalandeconomicroleoflanguagesandmultilingualism.Sadly,inthewakeofthe2008crisisandbecauseofthetransferoftheMultilingualismPortfoliooftheEuropeanCommissiontoEducation,CultureandYouthin2010,mostofthekeyprovisionsofthepolicieselaboratedabovehavenotyetbeenimplemented.Itis,however,clearthatmultilingualismandsupportforbothindividuals’andcollectives’languageidentitiesformpartandparcelofEuropeanlanguagepolicies.Thesepolicies–aswillbeillustratedbelow–contradictnationallanguagepoliciesinsomeEUmemberstatesinmanyrespects.Nationalpolicies,however,exertmajorinfluenceonlanguagerequirementsformigrantsfromnon‐EUcountries.Infact,manynationalpoliticiansendorsetheso‐calledLeitsprachenmodell(amodelwhichproposesthatthelanguageofthemajorityshouldserveallcommunicativepurposes),thuscontradictingtheEuropeanlanguagepoliciesmentionedabove,whichemphasisemultilingualismandtheequalityoflanguagesanddiversity.AssociolinguistMichaelClynefamouslystated,“[E]uropeanintegrationwasneverintendedtomeanhomogenization.Oneofitsaimshasalwaysbeenunitywithindiversityandthisshouldbeoneofitscontributionstotheworld”(Clyne2003,40).

2.2. CultureandCommunicationVianaturalisationregulations,the27memberstatesoftheEuropeanUnion(EU)determinewhobelongsordoesnotbelongtotheEuropeanUnion,andthuswhoremains‘outside’andwho is allowed to venture ‘inside’ Europe, i.e. the European Union (e.g. Bauböck &

9

Goodman‐Wallace 2012). Naturalisation conditions vary enormously: In 1998, only sixstates had citizenship and/or language tests; by 2010, the number had grown to 18, by2014 to 23 (see Table 1; note, however, that the situation is constantly changing).Moreover, requirements and the content of tests also vary. Orgad (2010, 69–70) rightlystateswithrespecttoGermancitizenshipteststhatthey:

MirrornotonlywhatGermancultureis,butalsowhattheGermanswantittobe...AlthoughtheLändertestshavebeenreplacedbyafederaltest,theyindicateanideologicalconceptofKulturnation.Byadoptingthesepolicies,Germanyembracesastrictruleofforcedculturalassimilation.

ManyEuropeancountriesarepromotingare/nationalisationwithrespecttolanguageandculture – in spite of beingpart of themultilingual andmulticultural EU (see above). Theconcept of ‘mother tongue’ as a salient prerequisite of belonging has become part andparcel of new citizenship laws, regulations and requirements, advocated or evenchampioned not only by the far right but also by mainstream political parties ingovernment.

10

Table1:CitizenshipandlanguagerequirementsinselectedEUcountries(Aindicatesalanguagetestbeforeentering;Balanguagetestrequiredforaworkpermit;Calanguagetestrequiredforcitizenship)4

Inthefollowing,IsummarizesomeresultsfromasurveyconductedbytheWorkingGroup:LinguisticIntegrationofAdultMigrants(fromtheLanguagePolicyDivisionoftheCouncilofEurope;LIAM)in2013/14,in36Europeancountries(thusincludingmorethanthe27EUmemberstates).Thissurveyillustratesthevariationacrosstheinvestigatedcountries.Thekeydocumentopenswiththefollowingmissionstatement:

Thefindingsreportedhere,consideredinthecontextofRecommendationsandResolutionsoftheCommitteeofMinistersandtheParliamentaryAssemblyoftheCouncilofEurope,underlinetheconstantneedtoreflectcriticallyontheappropriatenessandeffectivenessofaspectsofourlanguageintegrationpolicieswhiletakingfullyintoconsiderationtheimplicationsforhumanrights,theruleoflawandparticipationinthelifeofdemocraticsociety.Thisisalogicalandnecessarystepinthecontinuousprocessofensuringthatanyrequirementsenactedandaccompanyinglanguageprovisionactuallycorrespondtotherealneedsandcapacitiesofmigrantsintheirdiversity,andthattheyreinforcetheirmotivationtodeveloptheirplurilingualprofilewithinacontinuingprocessofintegration.Whileofcourselanguageisanimportantinstrumentinthisprocess,initselfitisnotanindicatorofhowsuccessfulintegrationactuallyis.

Thefollowingindicatorswereincludedinthesurvey(itsresultswerealsocomparedtotwoprevioussurveys;20countriesrespondedtoallthreesurveys)(p.8): 

• Optional/compulsoryintegrationprogramme• Languagetestspriortoentry• Optional/compulsoryofficiallanguageclasses• UseofCEFRproficiencylevelstodefinerequirements• Costtomigrants• Sanctionsfornon‐attendanceorlowattendanceatlanguagecourses• Qualityofcourses• Optional/compulsoryknowledge‐of‐societycourse• Optional/compulsorytestingoflanguageproficiencyandknowledgeofhostsociety• Costtocandidates• Sanctionsiftestnottakenorfailed• Coursecurriculum• Istheeffectivenessofprogrammesmeasured?

Morethanhalfoftheparticipatingcountries(20/36)indicatedthattheyattachalanguagerequirementtootherpurposesbesidesentry,residenceandcitizenship.For12countriesotherpurposesincludeobtainingaworkpermit/gainingaccesstothelabourmarket.Inanothersixcountriesalanguagerequirementmustbefulfilledtoobtainalong‐termresidencepermit,ofteninthecaseoffamilyreunification.Twocountriesattachalanguagerequirementtohighereducationandtrainingprogrammes.Ninecountriesreportedapre‐

4FinalReportonthe3rdCouncilofEuropeSurvey2014,LinguisticIntegrationofadultmigrants:Policyandpractice(www.coe.int/lang‐migrants),byClaireExtramiana,ReinhildePulinxandPietVanAvermaet.

11

entrylanguagerequirement(usuallyA1,onlyonecountryrequiresA25):Austria,Albania,Germany,Finland,France,Liechtenstein,theNetherlands,Poland(onlyinthecaseofcertainregulatedprofessions)andtheUK.Severalstatesoffersignificantlymoreandbetterprovisionthanothersintermsoflanguagelessonsandsecondlanguageacquisition:Migrantsareobligedtotakealanguagecoursein12ofthe23countriesthatattachalanguagerequirementtothegrantingofaresidencepermit.Ofthe22participatingcountriesthatattachalanguagerequirementtoaresidencepermit,14provideofficiallanguagecourses.Attendanceiscompulsoryinfourcountriesandoptionalineight.TheCEFRreferencelevelsrangefromA1.1toB2.Theshortestcourselasts75hours,thelongest3,000.TobringlearnerstolevelA2,onecountryprovidesacourselasting75hours,another180hours,andathird364hours.Languagecoursesforadultmigrantsareprovidedbyadulteducationcentres,schools,institutionsofHEandinstitutionsfundedbyMinistriesofCulture,InternalAffairsorEmployment–orbyNGOsorvolunteers.In26countriesmigrantsarelegallyobligedtodemonstrateaspecifiedlevelofcompetenceina/thelanguageofthehostcountryinordertoobtaincitizenship.Nineteencountriesthatattachalanguagerequirementtocitizenshipalsoattachonetoresidence.In2007,12ofthe20countriesthatparticipatedinallthreesurveysindicatedthattheyhadsuchlegislation,by201317countrieshadlanguagerequirements(A)priortoentry,(B)forresidenceand/or(C)forcitizenship.Moreover,18countriesorganiseaknowledge‐of‐society(KoS)programmeformigrantsseekingaresidencepermit;attendanceisobligatoryineightcountriesandoptionalin11.InninecountriesmigrantsarerequiredtotakeaKoStest.Inalmostallcases,KoStestsforcitizenshipareinwrittenform.Fourcountries(Germany,Liechtenstein,LithuaniaandtheUK)havemultiple‐choicetests,threecountries(Germany,theNetherlandsandtheUK)computer‐basedtests.InGreece,thetestispartofanoralinterviewwitharepresentativeoftheNaturalizationCouncil;inSwitzerlandsomecantonshaveawrittentest(possiblycomputer‐based),whileothersexamineKoSinanoralinterview;inLithuaniathewrittentestcanbereplacedbyanoraltestincasesofspecialneed.Insum,thefollowingstatesrequirelanguageforresidenceandcitizenship:Austriasince2011,Bosnia‐Herzegovina,FranceandtheNetherlandssince2012,DenmarkandtheUKsince2013.Altogethertherewere18changesbetween2009and2013andnonefurtheronesplannedin2013.Furthermore,ifoneconsidersthe42stateswhichparticipatedinat

5 Council of Europe. Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment. (CEFR) Council of Europe/CUP, 2001 (available in 38 languages). www.coe.int/lang-CEFR and www.coe.int/lang-migrants

12

leastoneofthethreesurveys,15stateshaveintroducedalegallanguagerequirementsince2008.Inmostcases,knowledgeofthelanguageisrequiredforresidenceandtheacquisitionofcitizenship.Thisappliesto19countries,mostlyinWesternEurope.Anothernotabletrendisanincreaseintheamountoflegislationconcerninglanguagerequirementsfrom2009to2013comparedwith2007–2009.From2007to2009,11newlawswerepassed,intheperiodfrom2009to201318,withninenewonesplannedafter2013.Lastly,adistinctionexistsbetweentheso‐calledinterventionistcountriesinnorthernEuropeandthoseinthesouth,buttherearealsolessdemandingcountriesalongsidethesetwogroups.InEasternEurope,theissueofmigrationmanagementislessimportant,giventhelowlevelsofimmigration.Theauthorsofthesurveyconclude,that

Theabilityofademocraticstatetointegratemigrantsdependsequallyontheirownwillingness–whichneedstobesupportedasregardslanguagelearning–andontheinterculturalsensitivityofthecommunityofcitizens.Thismustbeenhancedbyeducatingallcitizensinlinguisticandculturaldiversity,whichhasproventobeaninvaluablesourceofenrichmentthroughoutEuropeanhistory.(Ibid,33).

3. CaseStudies

3.1. The Culturalization of Discourse – Debating “Unwillingness to Integrate(Integrationsunwilligkeit)”DetailedlinguisticanalysesillustratehowIntegrationsunwilligkeitcametobrieflydominateAustrianpoliticalandmediadiscourse.Totracethe“lifehistory”ofthisterm,wecombinedqualitative and quantitative linguistic methods to show its frequency, collocates,contextualization and instrumentalization in legitimizing ever‐stricter policies (seeRheindorf2016andWodak2015aforextensiveanalysesanddiscussion).Thediscourseon integration is representedbya corpusof3,200 texts compiled from11nationwide newspapers in Austria (i.e. Der Standard, Die Presse, Heute, Kleine Zeitung,KronenZeitung,Kurier,OberösterreichischeNachrichten,Österreich,SalzburgerNachrichten,TirolerTageszeitung,WienerZeitung) as well as four magazines (Profil,News,Biber,DieZeit). Inearly2015,thediscourseonintegrationconvergeswithtwootherdiscourses, i.e.the discourse on educational reform (which focuses on teachers taking on newresponsibilitieswithrespecttotheintegrationofchildrenwithmigrantbackgrounds)andthediscourseonterrorism (focusing on so‐called Islamic State as an initially external butincreasingly internal threat, embodied by radicalized young adults and schoolchildrensympathizing with or joining the terrorist group). The convergence of these threediscoursesconstitutestheimmediatediscursivecontextofthetermIntegrationsunwilligkeitinAustrianpoliticaldiscourse.

13

“Integration” is primarily discursively constructed as cultural and, more specifically,linguisticassimilation(Permoser&Rosenberger2012).Amongotherthings,thishasmeantthat language policy in Austria regarding languages other than German and theconstitutionally protected linguistic minorities (Croatian, Romanès, Slovakian, Slovenian,Czech,Hungarian,AustrianSignLanguage)isratherrestrictive(deCillia2012;deCillia&Vetter 2013). Acting individually, for example, schools have repeatedly tried to prohibitchildrenwithmigration backgrounds from speaking their L1 during breakswhile in theschoolgrounds(deCillia2012;e.g.VanLeeuwen&Wodak1999).Discipliningthosewhodonotcomplyhasbeenanintegralpartofrelateddiscoursesfordecades,mostnotablyintheformofthe“IntegrationAgreement”aspartofAustrianresidencelaw(since2003,amendedin2005and2011).TheprovisionsoftheIntegrationAgreementapplyonlytoimmigrantsfrom non‐EU states, who must sign it if they want to obtain a right to residence. Thelanguage requirements here specify three stages: A1 before immigration, A2within twoyearsunderpenaltyofdeportation,andB1withinfiveyearsofresidenceinAustria.Thediscourse on Integrationsunwilligkeit comprises 280 texts from the aforementionedsources,publishedbetween20Januaryand5February2015.Itsonsetismarkedbythreeevents: a resolution passed in the regional parliament of Styria – explicitly linking theterrorist attacks in Paris to “a lack of integration” and calling for a legal definition of“Tatbestände”, i.e. punishable offences, under the heading of Integrationsunwilligkeit(Resolution3237/6,20.01.2015)–and twosubsequentnewspaper interviewspromotingtheconcernsofthesaidresolution.Thetwointerviewsweregivenonthesamedaybytwoprominentpoliticiansofthecenter‐leftSPÖ,FranzVovesandHansNiessl,thenGovernorsof the Austria Federal Provinces of Styria and Burgenland, respectively. Both werecampaigninginregionalelections,facedwithdecliningpopularityandincreasingpressurefrom the right‐wing populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) propagating a politics of fear andsecuritization(Wodak2015a,b).Thesupposedlydivergentbehaviouridentifiedbythemasindicative of said “unwillingness” comprised absences from classat school,wearinga“headscarf”, speaking a language other than German in school breaks anddisrespectingfemaleteachers.Themeasuressuggestedtocounteracttheseundesiredbehaviourscanonlybequalifiedaspunishments,rangingfromcommunityserviceandseverefinesof€1,000to(onfailuretopay) imprisonment, lossofwelfare, lossofcitizenshiporevendeportation. It isnotsurprisingthatthetwointerviewstriggeredastrongresponse,moresothantheresolutionitself, because the latter had not included any specific suggestions for punishablebehavioursorpunishments.Toindicatetheterminologicaleffecttheseinterviewshavehadon discourses on migration and integration in general, and in the Austrian media inparticular, Figure 2 shows the average frequency/week for the term

14

Integrationsunwilligkeiton theWorldWideWeb(Austriandomainsonly)and inAustriannewspapers for thepast decade; Figure3 focuseson the samedata for amorenarrowlydefinedperiodcentredonthediscoursestrandanalyzedhere.

Figure2:Averageuse/weekontheWeb(GoogleAnalyticsforAustriandomains)andinnationalnewspapers(2005–2015)

Figure3:Averageuse/weekontheWeb(GoogleAnalyticsforAustriandomains)andinnationalnewspapers(2014–2015)

Both figures indicate that the gradually increasing use of the term on theWebwas notmatchedbycorrespondinguseintheAustrianmedia.Indeed,thetermanditsderivatives

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

01.02.2005

01.07.2005

01.12.2005

01.05.2006

01.10.2006

01.03.2007

01.08.2007

01.01.2008

01.06.2008

01.11.2008

01.04.2009

01.09.2009

01.02.2010

01.07.2010

01.12.2010

01.05.2011

01.10.2011

01.03.2012

01.08.2012

01.01.2013

01.06.2013

01.11.2013

01.04.2014

01.09.2014

01.02.2015

"Integrationsunwilligkeit"ontheweb

"Integrationsunwilligkeit"inAustriannewspapers

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000 Integrationsunwilligkeitontheweb

IntegrationsunwilligkeitinAustriannewspapers

15

remainedamarginalphenomenonupuntiltheinterviewsandsubsequentreporting,whentheirusepeaked.Atleastintheshortrun,theinterviewsestablishedthetermasafixtureinAustrianmediaand,byimplication,publicdiscourse.The discourse strand stands out from the overall discourse on integration througharticulating thealleged lackorunwillingnesstointegratewith(a)schoolchildren,(b)Islamist terrorism and (c) punishments. Those suspected and accused of being“unwilling” aremainly schoolchildren, also referred to asboys and sonsmore frequentlythanasgirlsanddaughters.Indeed,familialrelationsplayanimportantroleasthisgroupisalsorepresentedasfamiliesandparents, fathersmorefrequentlythanmothers.Thethirdmostcommonformofrepresentationislinkedtoatoposofdifference,emphasizingtheiralleged difference asmigrants, immigrants, Turks, foreigners,Muslims orminorities. Thefourthmostcommonwayofrepresentingthisgroupisbyreducingthemtothequalityofbeing “unwilling” in a nominalized form. Less frequent are neutral representations as(fellow)humanbeings,womenandmen.This, then, marks a notable shift in the political discourse on integration, which is nowinformedbythreemainargumentativepatterns:

• Integrationthroughachievement:IfAustriansareanindustriousanddiligentpeople,andforeignersarenot,thentobesuccessful(demonstratingsuchqualities)istobecome(more)Austrian.Notethattheseeminglyliberalevocationofthe“entrepreneurialmigrant”isembeddedinastrictlypaternalisticviewofintegrationinwhichmigrantsmustbepushedifnotforcedfortheirowngood(deCillia&Preisinger2012).

• Integrationthroughlanguagecompetence:IfthenationallanguageofAustriaisGerman,thentoacquirelanguagecompetenceinGermanistobecome(more)Austrian.

• Integrationthroughpunishment:Ifnoncompliancewithdesiredbehavioursisindicativeof(cultural)otherness,anymeanstoenforcecompliancewillhelptheoffendersbecome(more)Austrianandpreventradicalization.

The former two arguments have been employed to legitimize hegemonic politicsimplemented inpolicies for considerable time; the thirdargument,however, is a recentinnovationtiedtothediscursiveconstructionofreligiousandculturaltensionsbetweenahomogenous Self (white, Christian, German‐speaking) and an Other (coloured, Muslim,non‐German‐speaking) living inside Austrian borders, and thus an internal threat tonationalintegrity.Wherepreviouslypolicieshadreferredtotheneedtointegrateaswellastocriteriaforintegrationbywhichtomeasurethesuccessorfailureofintegration,theterminology has now obviously shifted to accommodate a vague blaming strategy(scapegoating).Moreover,thefocusofmediaandpoliticalattentionseemstohaveshiftedfrom ‘integration’ to an ‘unwillingness to integrate’, providing an example of theculturalizationofdiscourseonintegration.

16

3.2. The salience of social (in)equality for (second) language acquisition,regardlessofethnicbackground

Incontrasttomanyexpertopinionsandmigrationresearch,socio‐andpsycholinguisticresearchconfirmsthatthesocio‐economicstatusofsmallchildrenhasmoreimpactontheacquisitionoflanguage(L1andL2)thanethnicorigin.Indeed,thisisnotsurprisingastheseresultsconfirmsomefoundationaltheoriesofsociolinguisticssincethe1970s,e.g.fromBasilBernsteinandhiscollaborators.WhenBernsteinwroteaboutlanguagehewasnotreferringtosystemsofgrammar,syntaxandvocabulary,thestructuresoflanguagesystems,buttothesocialrelationshipsthatmakeupinstitutions,suchasfamilies.Hewasinterestedinthewaysocialrelationshipsalignandorderideas,characterizedasthegrammarofthesocialincontradistinctiontothegrammaroflinguistics.Hearguedthatworking‐classchildrenparticipateindifferentkindsofsocialinteractionwithparentsthandomiddle‐classchildrenand,evenmoreimportantly,thatfractionswithinthemiddleclassesareorientedtomeaningindifferentways.IntheINPUTproject,theresearchersstudy24parent‐childdyadslivinginVienna,Austria,i.e.inapredominantlyGerman‐speakingenvironment(seeKorecky‐Krölletal.2015fordetails).HalfofthechildrenarebilingualandspeakTurkishmainlyathomeandGermanmainlyinkindergarten,halfofthemaremonolingualGerman‐speaking.Theiragerangeisfrom3y2mto3y6m(meanage:3y4m).Thegroupsarebalancedforsocio‐economicstatus(SES)andalmostbalancedforgender:6AustroturkishHSES(highsocioeconomicstatus)vsLSES(lowsocioeconomicstatus),monolingualHSESvsLSES(Koreckyetal.,inpress).Themaincaretakerwasidentifiedasthepersonthatspentthemosttimewiththetargetchildorthepersonwhomthechildwasmostcloselyattachedto(inallcasesbutone,thiswasthemother).WhereasHSESparentsareknowntousemoreconversation‐elicitingspeechacts,LSESparentsoftenshowabehaviour‐directingconversationstyle.ThemostsalientintermediaryresultsamongmanyarethatthecleavagebetweenHSESandLSESinputandoutputisstrongerwithAustrianmonolingualspeakersthanamongAustroturkishchildren,andthatasurprisinglylargepartofHSESAustroturkishchildrendevelopsomeoftheirGermanlanguageskillsearlierandfasterthantypicalLSESnativespeakersofAustrianGerman.Inthefollowing,Ifocusonlyonpragmaticvariablesasoneofmanyexamples,suchastheacquisitionofspeechacts,althoughtheprojecthasbeeninvestigatingawiderangeoflinguisticindicators(datawerecollectedviainterviews,participantobservation,story‐tellingandpicturedescriptions,aswellascompetencetests).Especially,directivespeech

6 The data of this study are part of Project SSH11‐027 “Investigating Parental and Other Caretakers’UtterancestoKindergartenChildren(INPUT)”thatissupportedbytheViennaScienceandTechnologyFund(WWTF).

17

actsprovideaninterestingtestinggroundforexploringdifferentconversationstyles(e.g.Hoffetal.2002):parentalconversationstyleiscloselyrelatedtothesocio‐economicstatusoffamilies.ParentsfromHSESbackgrounds,7whomostlyhavebroaderknowledgeofchilddevelopmentandchildcareissues(Rowe2008),aremoreresponsivetotheirchildren’sverbalizations,initiateandsustainconversationwiththeirchildrenmorefrequentlyandencouragethemmoreoftentotalkbyaskingthemquestions(Hoff2003).HSESparentsalsotendtoformulaterequestsinanindirectway,e.g.intheformsofquestions,suchas“Whydon’tyoupickupthetoysforme?”Ontheotherhand,parentsfromLSESbackgrounds,whooftenexperiencegreatersocialstressandarethusmorefocusedongoal‐directedcaretakingsettingsthanonplaysituations,reportedlyusemorebehaviour‐directingspeechacts(Hoff‐Ginsberg1991),suchasdirectcommandsandprohibitions(e.g.“Putithere!”,“Don’ttouchit!”).Speechactsare,ofcourse,importantcharacteristicsofparentingstyles(SearleandVanderveken1985).Speechactsoccurringinchildspeechandchild‐directedspeechareassertives(e.g.assertionsandstatements),expressives(e.g.complaints,praiseandgreetings),commissives(e.g.promises,offersandthreats)anddirectives(e.g.requestsandquestions).Requestsareveryfrequentinchild‐directedspeechduetothepositionofparents’authority.Directivespeechactsarealsofrequentinchildspeechbecausechildrenareinneedofcaretakers’helpandinformation.Amongdirectivespeechacts,requestsaremorecharacteristicofabehaviour‐directingthanofaconversation‐elicitingparentingstyle.Theyarerelativelyrareinadult‐directedspeechbutverycommoninchild‐directedspeech.Clearly,adultstendtodirectchildren’sratherthanotheradults’behaviours.Muchdailytalkisfocusedonmotivatingthechildtogetsometaskdonethatservestheongoingdailyschedule.Likeotherspeechacts,requestsmaybedirectorindirect(cf.Searle&Vanderveken1985,10ff.):Directrequestsareusuallyperformedviaimperatives(e.g.“Bringmethetoy!”),whereasindirectrequestshavethelocutionaryformofotherspeechacts,e.g.questions,suchas“Couldyoupleasebringmethetoy?”(Ihavetoneglectlanguage‐specificgrammaticalformshereandreferthereadertoKorecky‐Krölletal.,inpress).Sufficetostatethatallgroupsofchildrenpreferassertivespeechacts,whereasallgroupsofparentsusedirectivespeechactsmostfrequently.Expressivespeechactsaremorefrequentinchildspeechthaninchild‐directedspeech,butcommissivespeechactsarerareinbothchildrenandparentsfrombothlanguagebackgrounds.Inmonolingualandbilingualchildren,wefindsimilarSESdifferences:HSESchildrenusemorerequests,whereasLSES 7SESwasassessedviathehighestlevelofeducationofthemainparentalcaretaker(cf.Czinglaretal.2015):Childrenofparentsthathadobtainedatleastahigh‐schooldiplomaaccordingtotheInternationalStandardClassificationofEducation(ISCED‐97,cf.OECD1999)wereclassifiedashighSES,whereaschildrenofparentsthathadlowerlevelsofeducation(e.g.compulsoryschooloranapprenticeship)wereclassifiedaslowSES.

18

childrenusemorerealquestions.ThisSESdifferenceisgreaterinbilingualthanmonolingualchildren.Amongrequests,bothmonolingualandbilingualHSESchildrenusemoreindirectrequests,whereasbothgroupsofLSESchildrenclearlypreferdirectrequests,butheretheSESdifferenceisgreaterinthemonolingualthanthebilingualgroup.Hence,languageacquisition(bothL1andL2)ishighlydependentontheparents’SESandtheirlinguisticinput(i.e.thefamilylanguageenvironment).LSESchildren(bothAustro‐Turkishaswellmonolingualchildren)usesimilarconversationalstyles,theirprogressisslower.Insum,HSESmonolingualchildrendobetterthanHSESAustro‐Turkishchildren;allHSESchildrendobetterthanallLSESchildren.Austro‐TurkishLSESchildrenperformbetterthanmonolingualLSESchildren(e.g.Korecky‐Krölletal.2015).Thefollowingtworeasonsmightplayarole:Ontheonehand,familiesthathavetakentheinitiativetomigratefromonecountrytoanotherinordertoimprovetheirlivingconditionstendtoshowgreatermobility(includingsocialmobility)andhighereducationalaspirationsthanfamiliesthathavealwaysstayedinthesameplace,regardlessofSES(Block2016).Ontheotherhand,HSESfamiliesinthemajoritypopulationhavewell‐establishednetworksthathelpthemtoacquiregoodjobsandhigh‐qualityeducationfortheirchildren.HSESmigrantfamiliesdonothavetheserelations,theyhavetofocusonbuildingthemupsuccessively,whichmayputthemundergreatersocialdistressthanautochthonousHSESfamilies.Theseresultsconfirmnewtheoreticalsociolinguisticandpsycholinguisticapproaches,whichelaboratebothBernstein’sclass‐centredsociolinguistictheory,suchasBlock’s(2016)studieson“declassing”and“reclassing”resultingfrommigrationandtransnationalism,andPennycook’sinsightsintonewurbandevelopmentsinaglobalisedworld,condensedintheconceptof“metrolinguistics”(2015).Asmigrantsfrequentlylosetheirformerclasspositioninthehostcountryandhavetoresituatethemselvesinanewsocialenvironment,theypreserve“theirmulti‐strandedrelationsthatlinktogethertheirsocietiesandcommunitiesoforiginandsettlement”(Block2016).Socialdivisionsthusseemtobesmallerinmigrantcommunitiesthaninthehostcountry,i.e.inAustria.Thisfactaswellasthegreaterpressureforassimilationthatisexperiencedbyallfamilieswithmigrationbackgroundsmaybereflectedinthelinguisticinputthattheygivetotheirchildren.Itisobviousthattheseresultsshouldbeconsideredwhendevisingnewlanguagepolicies,bothforchildrenandadults.

4. Conclusion

TheCouncilofEurope(2016)emphasizesthatlinguisticintegrationdependsonthehigherorlowervalueaccordedtothelanguagespresentintheirrepertoirebeforemigrantsarrivedinthehostsociety.Thedegreeofsuccessinintegratinglanguagesintotherepertoireisobviouslynotquantifiable.Frequentlylinguisticexpertsarenotbeinginvolvedindesigningthevarioustestitems,whicharealsonotstandardizedacrosslanguagesandcountries.Itshouldbeemphasizedthatthesuccessoflinguisticintegrationhighlydepends

19

onthemotivationandattitudesofadultmigrantsaswellasontheirSES,thetimespentinthehostcountry,theirlevelofeducation,theirreligiousroutines,theirgenderidentities,andtheiraccesstoworkandhousing;accordingly,migrantscould

• Decidenottochangetheirrepertoire,i.e.nottolearnthemainlanguageofthehostsocietysystematically;

• Wishtochangetheirrepertoire,butunabletodosoduetolackoftimeorself‐confidence;

• Aimtofunctionallyrearrangetheirrepertoire,withoutattemptingnormativeadaptation,aspartofasingle‐identitylanguagestrategy,markedbythemigrant’slanguageoforigin;

• Aimtorearrangethelinguisticrepertoireinordertoachieve‘linguisticnaturalisation’,involvingthegradualdroppingofthelanguageoforigin;

• Aimtorearrangethefunctionalrepertoirebutwithtwojointlanguagesofidentity.Itisuptomigrantstodecideforthemselveswhichoftheselanguagestrategiesisbestsuitedtotheirgoalsinlifeandthemanagementoftheiridentity.Inanycase,thefactthatmigrantsmaywishtochooseamongthesevarioustypesofadaptationimpliesthatarrangementsneedtobemadeforlisteningtomigrants’viewsandfordesigningandmanagingtailor‐madecourses.Toacquirepluralcompetence,bothmigrantsandthehostcountryhavetoinvestmuchenergy,workandfunds.Thiscompetencedoesnotonlyconsist–thoughitiscertainlyimportant–ofacquisitionofthemajoritylanguage.Successfulintegrationimpliesknowledgeofrelevantlanguagegames,inalldomainsoflife;indeedformanypeople(bothmigrantsandhostpopulation)aGestalt‐switch.Motivation,learning,curiosity,patienceandrespectarenecessaryprerequisitesinordertoenableunderstandingofeachother’sdifferentwaysoflife,alwaysonthefoundationsofhumanrightsandrespectivesocieties’constitutions.

References

Ager,A.,&Strang,A.(2008)“UnderstandingIntegration:AConceptualFramework”,JRefugee Studies11(2):166‐191.Amin, T. (2015) “The discursive construction of women in the Quran and Tafsir”, PhD Thesis,

LancasterUniversity(forthcoming).Bauböck,R.,&Goodman‐Wallace,S.(2012)‘EUDOCitizenshipPolicyBrief2’,EUI.Billig,M.(1995)BanalNationalismLondon:Sage.Block,D.(2016)‘Migration,language&socialclass’.In:S.Canagarajah(ed.),RoutledgeHandbookon MigrationandLanguage(inpress).Capstick,A.(2015)“ThemultilingualliteracypracticesofMirpurimigrantsinPakistanandtheUK:

Combiningnewliteracystudiesandcriticaldiscourseanalysis”(Unpubl.PhDthesis),LancasterUniversity.

Carvill‐Schellenbacher,J.,Dahlvik,J.,Fassmann,H.,&Reinprecht,C.(eds.)MigrationundIntegration –wissenschaftlichePerspektiveninÖsterreich.Vienna:V&R.Chanock,M.(2000)“’Culture’andHumanRights:Orientalising,OccidentalisingandAuthenticity”. In:M.Mamdani(ed.)BeyondRightsTalkandCultureTalk.CapeTown:DavidPhilip,15‐36.

20

Clyne,M.(2003).Towardsinter‐culturalcommunicationinEuropewithoutlinguistichomogenization.InR.deCillia,H.‐J.Krumm&R.Wodak(eds.),39–48.

CouncilofEurope(2001)CommonEuropeanFrameworkofReferenceforLanguages:Learning,Teaching,Assessment.(CEFR)CouncilofEurope/CUP.www.coe.int/lang‐CEFR,www.coe.int/lang‐migrants

Czinglar,C.,K.Korecky‐Kröll,K.Uzunkaya‐Sharma&W.Dressler(2015).“Wiebeeinflusstder sozioökonomischeStatusdenErwerbderErst–undZweitsprache?“In:DeutscheGrammatik inKontakt.DeutschalsZweitspracheinSchuleundUnterricht.eds.K.–M.Köpcke& A.Ziegler.Berlin:DeGruyter,207–240.DeCillia,R.(2012)“MigrationUndSprache/n.Sprachenpolitik–Sprachförderung–iskursanalyse.” InMigrations‐undIntegrationsforschung–MultidisziplinärePerspektiven.EinReader,eds H.Fassmann&J.Dahlvik,185–212.Göttingen:V&R.DeCillia,R.&Dorostkar,N.(2013)“Integrationund/durch“Sprache”.”InMigrations‐und IntegrationsforschunginÖsterreich,edsJ.Dahlvik,C.Reinprecht&W.Sievers.Vol.2. Göttingen:V&R.DeCillia,R.&Preisinger,A.(2012)‘IntegrationFunktioniertDurchLeistung’.Derunternehmerische MigrantAlsAnrufungsfigurinOnlineDiskursen.”Unpubl.conferencepaper,Paternalismus inder (sprachbezogenen)Erwachsenenbildung.Erkundungeneines migrationsgesellschaftlichenHerrschaftsverhältnisses,Vienna.DeCillia,R&Vetter,E.(eds)(2013)SprachenpolitikinÖsterreich:Bestandsaufnahme2011.

Frankfurt/Main:PeterLang.DeCillia,R.,H.‐J.Krumm&R.Wodak(eds) (2003).Thecostsofmultilingualism:Globalisationand

linguisticdiversity.Vienna:AustrianAcademyofSciences.Delanty,G.,Wodak,R.&Jones,P.(eds)(2011)Migration,identity,andbelonging.Liverpool:LUP.EuropeanCommission(1995)WhitePaperonEducationandTrainingCOM(1995)590,Brussels

3/11/1995EuropeanCommission(2005).Anewframeworkstrategyformultilingualism.COM(2005)596,

Brussels22/11/2005.EuropeanCommission(2007).FrameworkfortheEuropeansurveyonlanguagecompetences.COM

(2007)184,Brussels13/04/2007.EuropeanCommission(2008).Multilingualism:AnassetforEuropeandasharedcommitment.COM

(2008)566,Brussels18/09/2008.Extramiana,C.,Pulinx,R.&VanAvermaet,P.(2014)LinguisticIntegrationofadultmigrants(LIAM):

Policyandpractice,FinalReportonthe3rdCouncilofEuropeSurvey2014,Hammerl,E.(2016)“Burkindl”,Profil36/2016,p.32.Hoff‐Ginsberg,E.(1991)Mother‐childconversationindiffferentsocialclassesandcommunicative

settings.FirstLanguage12:233–44.Hoff,E.(2003)“TheSpecificityofEnvironmentalInfluence:SocioeconomicStatusAffectsEarly

VocabularyDevelopmentViaMaternalSpeech”,ChildDevelopment74:1368–78.Hoff,E.,Laursen,B.&Tardif,T.(2002)“SocioeconomicStatusandParenting”.In:M.H.Bornstein

(ed.),HandbookofParenting.BiologyandEcologyofParenting.Mahwah,NJ:Erlbaum.Integrationsbericht(2016)„IntegrationvonAsylberechtigtenundsubsidiärSchutzberechtigten

inÖsterreich–Wostehenwirheute?Zwischenbilanz”(ed.ExpertenratVienna)(https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Integration/Integrationsbericht_2016/Integrationsbericht_2016_WEB.pdf.)

Korecky‐Kröll,K.,Uzunkaya‐Sharma,K.&Dressler,W.U.(2016)“RequestsinTurkishand Germanchild‐directedandchildspeech:Evidencefromdifferentsocio‐economic backgrounds”(inpress).Kilani‐Schoch,M.,SánchezMiret,F.&Dressler,W.U.(2011)“Towardsnaturalnessscalesof

pragmaticcomplexity”.PapersandStudiesinContemporaryLinguistics47:237–263.

21

Korecky‐Kröll,K.,Uzunkaya‐Sharma,K.,Czinglar,Ch.,Sommer‐Lolei,S.,Yanagida,T.&Dressler,W.U.(2015)“Thelowertheslower:ParentalSESandinputaffectspeedofdevelopmentofvocabularyandmorphology”.Poster,ChildLanguageSymposium2015.21July2015.

Krzyżanowski,M,.&Wodak,R.(2009)PoliticsofExclusion:DebatingMigrationinAustria.New Brunswick:TransactionPress.Krzyżanowski,M,.&Wodak,R.(2011)‘PoliticalStrategiesandLanguagePolicies:The'RiseandFall'

oftheEULisbonStrategyanditsImplicationsfortheUnion'sMultilingualismPolicy’,LanguagePolicy10(2):115‐136.

Marsdal,M.(2013)‘LoudValues,MuffledInterests:ThirdWaySocialDemocracyandRight‐wingPopulism’,in:Wodak,R.,KhosraviNik,M.,&Mral,B.(eds.)RightwingPopulisminEurope:PoliticsandDiscourse.London:Bloomsbury,39‐54.

Messer,M.,Schroeder,R.,&Wodak,R.(eds.)(2011)Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Berlin: Springer.MigrationPolicyIndex2015(MIPEX)“InternationalKeyFindings”(www.mipex.eu/key‐findings).Miller,D.(2016)StrangersinOurmidst.ThePoliticalPhilosophyofImmigration.Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniv.Press.Orgad,L.(2010)‘Illiberalliberalism:culturalrestrictionsonmigrationandaccesstocitizenshipin

Europe’,AmericanJournalofComparativeLaw58:53–105.Penninx,R.,Spencer,D.,&VanHear,N.(2008)MigrationandIntegrationinEurope:TheStateof ResearchESRCCentreonMigration,PolicyandSociety(COMPAS).OxfordUniversity.Pennycook,A.,&Otsuji,E.(2015)Metrolingualism.Languageinthecity.NewYork:Routledge.Permoser,J.M.&Rosenberger,S.(2012)“IntegrationPolicyinAustria.”International Perspectives:IntegrationandInclusion,edsJ.Frideres&J.Biles,39–58.Montreal:McGillUP.OECD(1999):ClassifyingEducationalProgrammes.ManualforISCED‐97ImplementationinOECD

Countries.OECD.Resolution3237/6,Entschließungsantrag3237/6eingebrachtam20.01.2015.Online:

http://www.landtag.steiermark.at/cms/dokumente/ltpdf.11411653/na/11411653.pdf.Rheindorf,M.(2016)DiscipliningtheUnwilling:Normalizationof(Demandsfor)PunitiveMeasures againstImmigrantsinAustrianPopulistDiscourse(inpress).Rheindorf,M.,&Wodak,R.(2016).Borders,FencesandLimits–ProtectingAustriafromRefugees. Metadiscursivenegotiationofmeaninginthecurrentrefugeecrisis.Int.JImmigration& RefugeeStudies(inpress)Rowe,M.(2008)“Child‐directedspeech:relationtosocioeconomicstatus,knowledgeofchild

developmentandchildvocabularyskill”,JChildLanguage35:108–205.Searle,J.R.&Vanderveken,D.(1985)Foundationsofillocutionarylogic.CUP.Schmiederer,E.(2013)WirinWien–BerichteausMargaretenundderDonaustadt.Wien:

Import/Export.Soysal,L.(2009)“Introduction:TriumphofCulture,TroublesofAnthropology“,Focaal55:3‐11.VanLeeuwen,T.,&Wodak,R.(1999).LegitimizingImmigrationControl:Adiscourse‐historical analysis.DiscourseStudies1(1):83–118.Wodak,R.(2011a)TheDiscourseofPoliticsinAction.PoliticsasUsualBasingstoke:Palgrave.Wodak,R.(2011b)‘‘Us’and‘them’:inclusion/exclusion–discriminationviadiscourse’,in:Delanty,

G.,etal.(eds.)Migration,IdentityandBelonging.Liverpool: LUP, 54–77. Wodak,R.(2012)‘Language,powerandidentity’,LanguageTeaching44(3):215‐233Wodak,R.(2015a)“‘NormalisierungNachRechts’:PolitischerDiskursImSpannungsfeldvon

Neoliberalismus,PopulismusundKritischerÖffentlichkeit.”doi:10.13092/lo.73.2191.Wodak,R.(2015b)PoliticsofFear:WhatRight‐WingPopulistDiscoursesMean.LosAngeles:Sage.Yilmaz,F.(2016)HowtheWorkersbecameMuslims.Immigration,Culture,andHegemonic TransformationinEurope..AnnArbor,MI:Univ.MichiganPress.