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INTEGRATING IMPLICIT MOTIVES, EXPLICITMOTIVES, AND PERCEIVED ABILITIES: THE

COMPENSATORY MODEL OF WORKMOTIVATION AND VOLITION

HUGO M. KEHRUniversity of California at Berkeley

The compensatory model of work motivation and volition synthesizes some previouslyunrelated lines of research. The structural components of the model are implicitmotives, explicit motives, and perceived abilities; the functional processes are voli-tional regulation (compensating for inadequate motivation) and problem solving(compensating for inadequate perceived abilities). Propositions that integrate, chal-lenge, and extend existing conceptions are derived. Moreover, the framework of thecompensatory model suggests an agenda for future research.

Why do some individuals reach their goalseasily, whereas others, equally skilled, struggleand fail? Why do individuals sometimes not likethe goals they voluntarily set? Which mecha-nisms allow a person to strive for aversivegoals, and how can these mechanisms be im-proved? These questions are of theoretical andpractical relevance, pertaining to work-relatedissues such as job design, recruitment, compen-sation, leadership, organizational behaviormodification, and organizational development.However, current approaches to work motivationdo not address these questions.

To overcome this limitation, we need new the-ories of work motivation based on the distinc-tion between implicit and explicit motive sys-tems that has stimulated recent research inbasic motivational psychology (Brunstein,Schultheiss, & Grassmann, 1998; Emmons & Mc-Adams, 1991; McClelland, Koestner, & Wein-berger, 1989; Spangler, 1992). In particular, thepossibility that implicit and explicit motive sys-tems might conflict with each other—a centralproposition of the dual system approach to mo-tivation (McClelland et al., 1989; Sheldon &Kasser, 1995)—has not yet been incorporated inwork motivation theories. Furthermore, mecha-

nisms that resolve such conflict have not re-ceived much attention from work motivation in-vestigators. I term these mechanisms volitionalregulation (Kuhl, 1985; Sokolowski, 1993). Thereis abundant research on self-regulatory pro-cesses, but what Kanfer and Ackerman (1989),Binswanger (1991), and Latham and Locke (1991)have conceptualized as self-regulation is tooloosely defined to relate to specific mechanismsthat resolve conflicts between implicit and ex-plicit motives.

In several approaches to work motivation, re-searchers have reserved a prominent role forperceived abilities and related constructs (Kan-fer & Ackerman, 1989; Klein, 1989; Vroom, 1964).However, in approaches to perceived abilities,scholars have generally not analyzed situationswhere this important behavioral ingredient islacking and which, I argue here, require prob-lem solving. Moreover, the relationship of abil-ity to implicit and explicit motives has not beenexamined in work motivation theories.

In sum, contemporary conceptions of work mo-tivation largely ignore implicit motives, the dis-tinction of implicit and explicit motives and thepossibility of resulting intrapersonal conflict,volitional mechanisms to resolve such conflict,and the relation of these processes to perceivedabilities and problem solving. To overcomethese limitations, I have developed the compen-satory model of work motivation and volition.

In this article I describe the structural compo-nents of the model (implicit motives, explicitmotives, and perceived abilities) and explain

The author wrote this paper while a Lynen fellow at theUniversity of California at Berkeley. The author gratefullyacknowledges the support of the Alexander von HumboldtFoundation.

I am grateful to Cathleen Kehr, Ariel Malka, Tom Mongan,Kurt Sokolowski, two anonymous reviewers, and Richard T.Mowday, a special issue editor, for helpful comments.

� Academy of Management Review2004, Vol. 29, No. 3, 479–499.

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the interrelations and interactive effects of thesedeterminants of work motivation. I then discussthe functional processes of the model (volitionand problem solving). Because these functionscompensate for inadequate motivation (volition)and inadequate perceived abilities (problemsolving), I call the model “compensatory.”

The compensatory model is a synergetic ap-proach to work motivation, intended to clarify,challenge, and extend existing conceptions. Idemonstrate the advantages of the compensa-tory model by relating it to expectancy-valuemodels (Vroom, 1964), goal-setting theory (Locke& Latham, 1990), self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977)and self-regulation (Bandura, 1988), dual systemapproaches (McClelland et al., 1989), intrinsicand extrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2000), re-ward models (Lawler, 1971), and the work of Kan-fer and collaborators (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989;Kanfer & Heggestad, 1997). Finally, I suggestfuture research based on the compensatorymodel.

STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL

Implicit Motives

Dual system approaches to motivation have along tradition in psychology (Allport, 1937;Freud, 1967; Lewin, 1926; Wundt, 1907). The gen-eral idea is that a person is a complex systemcomposed of several subsystems (Brunstein etal., 1998; Cantor & Blanton, 1996; Deci & Ryan,2000; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). Particular empha-sis has been on implicit and explicit motive sys-tems, which researchers assume drive, direct,and select behavior (Brunstein et al., 1998; Mc-Clelland et al., 1989).

Implicit motives— or latent motives— havebeen conceptualized as associative networksconnecting situational cues with basic affectivereactions and implicit behavioral tendencies(McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953).Implicit motives are related to unconsciousneeds (Maslow, 1943) and basic and organismicneeds (Deci & Ryan, 2000). In general, implicitmotives are not consciously accessible; they aresubconsciously aroused and lead to affectivepreferences and implicit behavioral impulses(McClelland, 1985; McClelland et al., 1989). Im-plicit motives result in spontaneous, expressive,and often pleasurable behavior (McClelland etal., 1989). They develop early in life and are

relatively independent of social demands inlater life (Koestner, Weinberger, & McClelland,1991; McClelland, 1985).

McClelland (1995) refers to the “big three” im-plicit motives: power, achievement, and affilia-tion. The power motive relates to dominanceand social control (e.g., a CEO presenting thecompany’s new mission statement at an annualgeneral meeting). The achievement motive isaroused when personal standards of excellenceare to be met or exceeded (e.g., a worker tryingto increase output). Finally, the affiliation mo-tive is aroused when social relationships areestablished and intensified (e.g., an employeeextending a break to finish a talk with a newcolleague). Researchers also differentiate hope(i.e., approach) and fear (i.e., avoidance) motives(Atkinson, 1964; Higgins, 1998; Kanfer & Hegges-tad, 1997).

Because implicit motives are not consciouslyaccessible, they are assessed by operant, fantasy-arousing, picture-story tests, such as the ThematicApperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943; cf. McClel-land, 1985). Murray designed the TAT to assessaffectively charged associative networks—notvalues (Vroom, 1964) or conscious self-concepts(Markus & Wurf, 1987). The idea underlying theTAT is that pictorial stimuli differentially arouseimplicit motives, and implicit motive strength isreflected in the motive-thematic story content,without much distortion by cognitive interference,which would have to be expected if people wereexplicitly asked about their motives.

Spangler (1992) summarized the early con-cerns about the TAT, particularly regarding itsreliability (Entwisle, 1972). McClelland (1985) ar-gued that the low reliability of the TAT is causedby the instruction to invent creative stories.Without this instruction, reliability coefficientsare substantially improved. Spangler’s meta-analysis rehabilitated the TAT by showing thatthe TAT predicts behavioral outcomes—particu-larly those related to intrinsic, or task-related,incentives—better than questionnaires.

According to McClelland et al. (1989), system-atic self-observation is an additional method forenhancing self-awareness of one’s implicit mo-tives. Although implicit motives are not con-sciously accessible directly, they give rise toaffective preferences and implicit behavioralimpulses, which may be observed systemati-cally (cf. Schwarz & Bohner, 1996).

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Explicit Motives

Explicit motives are the reasons people self-attribute for their actions (McClelland, 1995; Mc-Clelland et al., 1989). For example, a hard-working person may self-identify as an“achievement-oriented person.” Explicit motivesare identical with values in Atkinson’s (1964)and McClelland’s (1985) terminology, but Mc-Clelland et al. (1989) decided to replace valueswith self-attributed or, synonymously, explicitmotives to avoid confusion with approaches de-fining values as normative beliefs about desir-able modes of conduct (e.g., Rokeach, 1979).

Explicit motives are consciously accessibleand can be assessed with questionnaires basedon self-ascriptions, such as the Personality Re-search Form (PRF; Jackson, 1984). Similar to im-plicit motives, explicit motives can be catego-rized according to motive themes (Brunstein etal., 1998; Emmons & McAdams, 1991)—for exam-ple, in achievement, dominance, and affiliation-related categories (Jackson, 1984). In contrast toimplicit motives, explicit motives are stronglyinfluenced by social demands and normativepressures (Koestner et al., 1991; McClelland,1985). Activated explicit motives generate cogni-tive preferences (e.g., in a test situation, a per-son with high self-ascribed achievement mo-tives will develop strong cognitive preferencesfor achieving high test results).

Explicit motives are particularly influential indetermining cognitive choices—for example,task choice (McClelland, 1985; Spangler, 1992).Combined with other factors—notably, per-ceived abilities (Feather, 1982)—explicit motivesare closely related to the development of goals(Brunstein et al., 1998; McClelland, 1985). Otherprominent constructs related to the explicit mo-tive system, besides goals (Brunstein et al., 1998)and values (Atkinson, 1964; McClelland, 1985),are intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999) and self-concepts (Markus & Wurf, 1987).

Perceived Abilities

Several approaches to human motivation,both basic (Ajzen, 1991; Atkinson, 1964; Bandura,1977; McClelland, 1985; White, 1959) and applied(Conger & Kanungo, 1988; Kanfer & Ackerman,1989; Klein, 1990; Thomas & Velthouse, 1990;Vroom, 1964; Wright, Kacmar, McMahan, &Deleeuw, 1995), highlight the importance of abil-

ities. In an early approach, White introduced theconcept of competence: “an organism’s capacityto interact efficiently with its environment”(1959: 297). Recent approaches focus on per-ceived instead of actual abilities (cf. Ajzen, 1991;Bandura, 1977; Vroom, 1964; for exceptions, cf.Klein, 1990; Wright et al., 1995).

Ajzen (1991) outlines the reasons for his deci-sion to concentrate on perceived instead of ac-tual abilities; if the primary interest is in deter-mining output of motivated endeavors, the focusshould be on actual abilities that “must to someextent dictate the likelihood of behavioralachievement” (1991: 183). If, however, the focus ison motivationally relevant antecedents of be-havior and the dynamics in which these factorscombine, perceived abilities are “of greater psy-chological interest” (1991: 183; for similar argu-ments, cf. Bandura, 1977; Tubbs & Ekeberg, 1991).In line with Ajzen (1991), Bandura (1977), andVroom (1964), the compensatory model presentedhere focuses on perceived instead of actual abil-ities. Similar to Tubbs and Ekeberg (1991), I con-ceive of perceived abilities as an individual’sperception of the amount of actual control she orhe can exert over the environment. This defini-tion of perceived abilities excludes metalevelconstructs such as heuristic competence (Doer-ner & Wearing, 1995), but it closely relates toAjzen’s (1991) perceived control, Bandura’s (1977)self-efficacy, and Vroom’s (1964) expectancies.Although a fine-tuned analysis may identify nu-ances in which these constructs differ (Ajzen,1991; Bandura, 1991), discussing such differenceslies beyond the scope of this paper.

Social support, modeling, and attribution af-fect perceived abilities, but the major determi-nant is past performance (Bandura, 1977; Carver& Scheier, 1982; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Suc-cessful performance generally leads to the con-viction that similar behaviors can be success-fully executed (Bandura, 1977), accompanied bythe perception of the relative ease of performingsimilar behaviors (Ajzen, 1991).

In conceptual (Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1977;Tubbs & Ekeberg, 1991) and empirical research(for reviews, cf. Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Kanfer,1990), scholars have identified perceived abili-ties as an important determinant of work moti-vation. Directly (Bandura, 1977) or indirectly, incombination with other factors—notably, values(Atkinson, 1964; Feather, 1982; Vroom, 1964)—

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perceived ability influences goal choice (Mc-Clelland, 1985).

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE STRUCTURALCOMPONENTS OF THE MODEL

In this section I discuss the conceptual andempirical relationships among structural com-ponents of the compensatory model. I first de-scribe the relationship of implicit and explicitmotives and then integrate perceived abilitiesinto the analysis.

Implicit Motives and Explicit Motives

A central proposition of dual motive systemapproaches is that implicit and explicit motivesrelate to different aspects of the person (McClel-land et al., 1989; Spangler, 1992).1 Activation ofimplicit and explicit motives is largely indepen-dent (Brunstein et al., 1998; McClelland et al.,1989; cf. Epstein, 1998; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).Implicit motives are aroused by factors intrinsicto the activity, whereas explicit motives arearoused by factors extrinsic to the activity(Koestner et al., 1991; cf. Deci & Ryan, 2000). Forexample, a manager high in implicit affiliationmotive might enjoy the companionship of afriendly, although unproductive, subordinate(intrinsic), but still defer to the social demandsof his or her supervisor to increase productivityby dismissing the subordinate (extrinsic). UsingBerlew’s (1986) push-pull metaphor, implicit mo-tives “push,” whereas explicit motives “pull” theindividual.

In contrast to explicit motives, implicit mo-tives are built on associations with innately trig-gered affective experiences, called “natural in-centives” (McClelland et al., 1989: 697). Forexample, the natural incentive for the power

motive is to have an impact on human affairs.McClelland et al. (1989) reviewed studies sug-gesting natural incentives differentially arouseimplicit motives, not explicit motives, and trig-ger characteristic hormonal reactions.

Implicit and explicit motives have distinct ef-fects on behavior. On a proximal level (for thedistinction of proximal and distal motivationprocesses, cf. Kanfer & Heggestad, 1997),aroused implicit motives lead to affective pref-erences (“I like this person”) and implicit behav-ioral impulses (“I would like to spend more timewith her”). Here, implicit means these behav-ioral impulses do not necessarily reflect the per-son’s self-ascriptions or explicit values (perhapsthe individual in the above example “knows”that the liked person is a persona non grata). Incontrast, activated explicit motives result in cog-nitive preferences (“I want this prestigious job”)and explicit action tendencies (“I try to influencemy boss to promote me”). Here, explicit meansaction tendencies are consciously reflected andconsistent with the person’s self-ascribed mo-tives.

On a distal level, implicit motives becomeparticularly influential in determining long-term behavioral trends (McClelland, 1985).Spangler’s (1992) meta-analysis, Heckhausen’s(1991) extensive review, and others’ applied re-search (e.g., Chusmir & Azevedo, 1992; Langens,2001; McClelland & Franz, 1992; Sokolowski &Kehr, 1999) lend empirical support for this no-tion. In contrast, explicit motives (or values) in-fluence cognitive choices and goal setting (e.g.,Ajzen, 1991; Atkinson, 1964; Locke & Latham,1990; McClelland, 1985; Spangler, 1992; Tubbs &Ekeberg, 1991; Von Rosenstiel, Kehr, & Maier,2000; Vroom, 1964). For example, people with anexplicit power motive (who highly esteem powerand influence) may aim for influential positionswith power and prestige. In contrast, peoplewith an implicit power motive seek intrinsic ex-periences having impact, but not necessarily in-fluential positions.

Winter’s (1982) study of presidential candi-dates illustrates this difference. Candidateshigh in implicit achievement motive droppedout if they had no realistic chances to win,whereas candidates high in implicit power mo-tive continued their election campaigns, even ifwinning seemed impossible. Those with an im-plicit power motive obviously enjoyed mediapresence, walkabouts, and other high-impact

1 Using varying terminology, scholars from different re-search traditions have addressed the basic distinction be-tween implicit versus explicit motive systems. Examplesinclude Epstein’s (1998) distinction between an experientialsystem (the locus of McClelland’s implicit motives) and arational system (the locus of McClelland’s explicit motives);Metcalfe and Mischel’s (1999) differentiation of a hot, emo-tional system and a cold, cognitive system; and Bazerman,Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni’s (1998) distinction betweenwant-selves and should-selves. Further parallels exist withdesired versus actual values (Loewenstein, 1996) and de-layed versus immediate choices (Read & Van Leeuwen,1998).


situations that come about in an election cam-paign.

This discussion shows that implicit and ex-plicit motives are conceptually independent de-terminants of behavior. Regarding the empiricalrelationship of these constructs, Spangler’s(1992) meta-analysis indicates that implicit andexplicit motives are empirically uncorrelated.However, others have reported small but signif-icant correlations between implicit and explicitmotives (Cantor & Blanton, 1996; Emmons & Mc-Adams, 1991; King, 1995; Sokolowski, Schmalt,Langens, & Puca, 2000). These inconsistent find-ings suggest the empirical relationship betweenimplicit and explicit motives may depend on thesample considered: some people may integrateimplicit and explicit motives, whereas othersmay not (McClelland et al., 1989; Mischel, 1999;Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). Some people closelyobserve their affective preferences and implicitbehavioral impulses, enabling them to gain ac-cess to their implicit motives, adjust their goals,and enhance concordance of implicit and ex-plicit motives (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Schultheiss &Brunstein, 1999; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999).

Implicit and explicit motives, although con-ceptually independent, may nonetheless inter-act. For example, McClelland et al. (1989) assertthat explicit motives may “channel” the way inwhich implicit motives are expressed (cf. Mc-Clelland, 1985, 1995; cf. Emmons, 1989). Implicitachievement motives, for instance, reflect affec-tive preferences to do something well. Here,something denotes a class of potential behav-iors. Which behavior is enacted depends on theexplicit motives of the person. For example, aperson high in implicit affiliation motive whowants to remain in solitude (the explicit motive)might write letters to contact people indirectly(C. A. Constantian, cited in McClelland, 1985).

Behavioral tendencies resulting from implicitand explicit motives can be concordant or dis-crepant (Brunstein et al., 1998; McClelland et al.,1989). According to McClelland et al. (1989), thelarger the discrepancy between implicit and ex-plicit motives, the more incompatible the result-ing behavioral tendencies will be. So, one canassume that individuals with low self-aware-ness for affective preferences and implicit be-havioral impulses tend to develop goals incon-gruent with their implicit motives.

Research shows that discrepancies betweenimplicit and explicit motive systems cause in-

trapersonal conflict in terms of conflicting be-havioral tendencies and may result in prefer-ence reversals, performance deficits, impairedwell-being, and health problems (Bazerman etal., 1998; Brunstein et al., 1998; McClelland et al.,1989; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995).Brunstein et al. (1989) provide a counterintuitiveexample. Most people think goal attainmentshould lead to satisfaction and well-being (cf.Locke & Latham, 1990: Chapter 10). However,Brunstein et al. (1998) show that goal attainmentonly leads to well-being if goals are congruentwith a person’s implicit motives; commitment toneed-incongruent goals can decrease well-being. From the discussion above, I derive thefollowing propositions.

Proposition 1: Implicit motives and ex-plicit motives are conceptually inde-pendent and have distinctive effectson working behavior. Aroused implicitmotives are associated with affectivepreferences, implicit behavioral im-pulses, and spontaneous behavior; ac-tivated explicit motives are associatedwith cognitive preferences, explicitaction tendencies, and cognitivechoices.

Proposition 2: Discrepancies betweenimplicit and explicit motives cause in-trapersonal conflict because of con-flicting behavioral tendencies, andthey result in impaired well-beingand failure.

Discrepancies between implicit and explicitmotives, conceptualized at an abstract level ofrepresentation (McClelland et al., 1989), at firstconstitute latent behavioral conflict. Behavioralconflicts become manifest if implicit behavioralimpulses (originating in aroused implicit mo-tives) and explicit action tendencies (stemmingfrom activated explicit motives) are incompati-ble at a given moment.

Incorporating Perceived Abilities

Perceived abilities are conceptually indepen-dent of implicit and explicit motives. We mayperceive ourselves capable of living a healthylife, or of doing all the housework for our family,and still not intend to do so. Conversely, manycognitive and affective preferences exist despite

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insufficient perceived abilities. For example, amanager may adopt the goal to cut the costs ofhis or her work unit despite limited perceivedability to determine how these cuts should beenacted.

McClelland (1985) shows that differentiationof implicit motives, explicit motives, and per-ceived abilities was a principle concern forearly motivation theorists like Hull (1952) andAtkinson (1964). During the “cognitive revolu-tion,” however, the implicit motive to achievesuccess (originally conceptualized as a noncon-scious, affectively toned variable; cf. McClel-land et al., 1953) was reinterpreted in cognitiveterms. It was first collapsed with the probabilityof success (Atkinson & Feather, 1966), and laterabandoned in favor of a purely cognitive ap-proach (Feather, 1982).2

Kehr, Von Rosenstiel, and Bles (1997) foundthat items measuring affective preferences, cog-nitive preferences, and perceived abilities re-peatedly loaded on three separate factors, with-out any sizable cross-loadings. McClelland(1985) summarizes a study showing that per-ceived abilities are unrelated to implicit mo-tives but correlated with explicit motives. Heargues that both variables “are influenced bythe subjects’ cognitive understanding of whatkind of people they are” (1985: 818). Further evi-dence shows correlations between perceivedabilities and explicit goals (Ajzen, 1991; Ban-dura, 1977; Vroom, 1964).

Research on the implicit motive–perceivedabilities relationship is scarce. Given that per-ceived abilities are a by-product of past behav-ior (Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1977) and that behaviorcan be seen as an instantiation of implicit mo-tives (Steers & Spencer, 1971), the implicit mo-tive–behavior–perceived abilities effect chainmay account for some (but generally small) em-pirical relationship between implicit motivesand perceived abilities.

As an isolated factor, perceived abilities haveno motivational significance. Bandura, for ex-ample, recognizes that self-efficacy must com-bine with “appropriate skills and adequate in-centives” (1977: 194) to determine motivation.Consequently, Tubbs and Ekeberg note,“Claims of direct causal relationships betweenperceived control over actions (e.g., self-efficacy)and performance should be viewed with cau-tion” (1991: 196). Similarly, Ajzen (1991) holds thatperceived control is not the only determinant ofbehavior but that “intentions are influenced byadditional factors, and it is because of thesefactors that two individuals with different per-ceptions of behavioral control can have equallystrong intentions” (1991: 184).

For behavioral relevance, perceived abilitiesmust combine with motives. Tidying one’s deskand doing the dishes are common skills, but notnecessarily in accord with one’s implicit andexplicit motives. Conversely, the advice “Youcan do it!” is no real help to a person who isafraid of (or dislikes) bungee jumping. Behav-ioral significance is achieved through liaisonsbetween perceived abilities and explicit mo-tives (“I want to jump”). This leads to the forma-tion of intentions (Gollwitzer, 1993; Tubbs & Eke-berg, 1991) and goals (Feather, 1982; Vroom,1964), which are known to have motivationalsignificance (Hollenbeck & Klein 1987; Latham &Locke, 1991).3

The conception present here refutes Bandura’snotion that “people will avoid transactions . . .they perceive as exceeding their ability” (1977:203). People may engage in transactions, eventhose they perceive as exceeding their ability, ifsufficiently motivated (the motivation may stemfrom aroused implicit motives or activated ex-plicit motives). This is evident when peoplestrive for extremely improbable results (e.g.,physicists aiming to find the link between cos-mology and quantum mechanics).

Proposition 3: Perceived abilities areconceptually independent of implicitand explicit motives.

2 Maslow’s (1943) work is an additional example of howimplicit motives fell prey to the cognitive revolution. Masloworiginally proposed “a more central place for unconsciousthan for conscious motivations” (1943: 370). However, in sub-sequent research on need satisfaction (Porter, 1961) and theneed hierarchy theory (Wahba & Bridwell, 1976), researchersused questionnaires to operationalize the need construct.Hence, this research relates to explicit rather than implicitmotive systems.

3 In this perspective, it is important to distinguish be-tween explicit motives and explicit goals, even if both con-structs have an important characteristic in common, in thatthey both relate to cognitive (instead of affective) prefer-ences. Explicit motives may combine with perceived abili-ties to instigate explicit goals and, thus, should be consid-ered a determinant, not a synonym, of explicit goals.


Proposition 4: Perceived abilitiesalone are not sufficient to determinebehavior but may combine with ex-plicit motives to determine task choiceand goal setting. Conversely, insuffi-cient perceived abilities do not pre-clude motivated behavior.

RESOLVING INCONGRUENCE AMONGSTRUCTURAL COMPONENTS: VOLITION AND

PROBLEM SOLVING

Volition

Cognitive investigators propose that higher-order cognitive preferences (e.g., goals or inten-tions) may temporarily override lower-order, au-tomatic behavioral impulses (Ach, 1910; Bargh,1984; Posner & Snyder, 1975). In this section Idescribe how volitional mechanisms, support-ing cognitive preferences, may be employed toaccomplish such impulse suppression.

In recent approaches to volitional regulation,scholars have considered intrapersonal con-flicts from conflicting behavioral tendenciesand the strategies people use to overcome these(Ainslie & Haslam, 1992; Bazerman et al., 1998;Kanfer & Heggestad, 1997; Kehr, 2000; Kuhl, 1985;Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998; Kuhl & Goschke, 1994;Loewenstein, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999;Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996; Muraven &Baumeister, 2000; Sokolowski, 1993). Work-related intrapersonal conflicts include resistingtemptations (stock brokers dealing with the as-sets of others), overcoming fear (salespeople“cold calling” new customers), and persisting ina strenuous task (project managers attemptingto meet rigid project deadlines). Such conflictsare resolved by volitional strategies, includingattention control—for example, ignoring theamount of money one is managing (cf. Egeth &Yantis, 1997; Norman & Shallice, 1986); emotioncontrol—for example, adjusting one’s emotionalstates to the demands of a sales process (cf.Erber & Erber, 2000; Forgas, Johnson, & Ciarro-chi, 1998; Morris & Reilly, 1987); and motivationcontrol—for example, anticipating gratificationsexpected after finishing a project (cf. Mischel,1996; Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001).

Volition can be defined as an array of self-regulatory strategies to support explicit actiontendencies against competing behavioral im-pulses. This concept of volition is related to will-

power (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel, 1996,1999), self-control (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992; Mu-raven & Baumeister, 2000), and self-regulation(Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998). However, volition isnarrower than Latham and Locke’s (1991) andBandura’s (1991) concept of self-regulation orBinswanger’s (1991) use of the term. These con-structs include every goal-related effort—notjust those efforts where intrapersonal conflictsmust be resolved or unwanted impulses over-come.

Volitional regulation is needed to support cog-nitive preferences insufficiently motivated by ordiscrepant from actual implicit behavioral ten-dencies (Brunstein et al., 1998; Emmons, 1999;Epstein, 1998; Kuhl & Goschke, 1994; Ryan, Shel-don, Kasser, & Deci, 1996). Discrepancies be-tween implicit and explicit motives lead to con-flicting behavioral tendencies, requiringvolitional regulation (Brunstein, Schultheiss, &Maier, 1999; Emmons, 1999; Epstein, 1998; Ryan etal., 1996). Conversely, volitional regulation is notneeded for cognitive preferences congruent withaffective preferences (Karoly, 1993; Sokolowski,1993)—that is, if aroused implicit and activatedexplicit motives are thematically congruent.Sokolowski (1993) highlights this distinction,contrasting “motivational regulation states” (be-havior energized by implicit motives) and “voli-tional regulation states” (behavior insufficientlyenergized by implicit motives and requiring vo-litional support). Hence, I offer the followingproposition.

Proposition 5: Volitional regulation isrequired to compensate for insuffi-cient motivation due to discrepanciesbetween implicit and explicit motives.When implicit and explicit motivesare congruent, no volitional regula-tion is required.

A closer look reveals that volitional regulationhas a twofold function: to enhance explicit ac-tion tendencies—for example, networking, de-spite being low in implicit power and affiliationmotive—and to suppress unwanted implicit be-havioral impulses—for example, avoidingthoughts of a tempting sailing trip when oneintends to work during the weekend (Forgas etal., 1998; Mischel, 1996; Norman & Shallice, 1986).Atkinson and Birch (1970), for example, contrast“inhibitory” forces suppressing behavioral im-pulses and “instigating” forces enforcing acti-

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vated goal representations. Kanfer and Hegges-tad (1997) contrast suppression of implicitanxiety reactions and support of explicitachievement-related goals as two main func-tions of motivational skills (volition).

Proposition 6: Volitional regulationhas a twofold function. Volition isneeded to support explicit action ten-dencies (activated explicit motives)discrepant with affective preferences(aroused implicit motives) and to sup-press implicit behavioral impulses(aroused implicit motives) discrepantwith cognitive preferences (activatedexplicit motives).

Like other psychological processes, volitionalregulation may have deficiencies (Baumeister &Heatherton, 1996). There are at least five interre-lated problems. First, volition can be ineffective,as shown with respect to emotion control (Morris& Reilly, 1987) and attention control (Wegner,1994). Ineffective volition accounts for difficul-ties in suppressing tempting impulses and insupporting intentions such as quitting smokingand keeping to a diet (Polivy, 1998). Second, vo-lition may block cognitive capacities, whichthen are unavailable for other task-related ac-tivities (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Third, voli-tional regulation can be associated with rigidself-control (“overcontrol”; Asendorpf & VanAken, 1999; cf. Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998). In awork-related context, Kehr, Bles, and Von Rosen-stiel (1999) found that rigid self-control impededmanagers’ goal attainment and affective re-sponses. Fourth, volition may have negativeside-effects, such as strain, emotional distress,maladaptive behavior, and behavioral excessesafter relapse (Cantor & Blanton, 1996; Polivy,1998). People who constantly overemphasizecognitive preferences, ignore affective prefer-ences, and use dysfunctional volitional strate-gies (e.g., negative fantasies, extreme internalpressure) may suffer from impaired well-beingand alienation (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Kuhl & Fuhr-mann, 1998; Polivy, 1998). Fifth, and perhapsmost important, volition consumes limited re-sources. After volitional acts (e.g., eating rad-ishes rather than tempting chocolates), subse-quent acts of volition (e.g., suppressingemotional reactions) are more likely to fail(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998;Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). These findings led

Muraven and Baumeister (2000) to propose a re-source-based concept of self-control strength,where volitional acts may consume and ulti-mately “deplete” resources.

A recent study examined volitional depletionamong managers and found that implicit/explicit motive discrepancies predicted de-creased volitional strength and well-being andthat the discrepancy/well-being relationshipwas fully mediated by reduced volitionalstrength (Kehr, 2004). Here, volitional strength,defined as the person’s proficiency in using vo-litional strategies, is essentially identical toself-control strength (Muraven & Baumeister,2000), volitional competence (Kuhl & Fuhrmann,1998), and motivational skills (Kanfer & Hegges-tad, 1997).

Proposition 7. Volitional regulationcan have deficiencies, in that it maybe ineffective, block cognitive capac-ities, be associated with rigid self-control, have negative side-effects,and require volitional resources possi-bly resulting in depleted volitionalstrength. The larger the discrepanciesbetween implicit and explicit motives,the more deficiencies are to be ex-pected.

Problem Solving

Repeated behavioral experiences lead to de-velopment of automatic control processes, re-lieving capacity-limited, conscious cognitiveprocessing of the burden of controlling the be-havior (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shif-frin, 1977). These automatic control processeseventually amalgamate to automatic controlprograms that guide routine behaviors. Such be-havioral programs are called “scripts” (Lord &Kernan, 1987; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Scripttheory suggests that nonroutine situations, en-vironmental obstacles, or personal mistakeslead to script interruptions and require addi-tional problem solving (March & Simon, 1958)and planning (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Shiftsfrom automatic processing to conscious problemsolving enhance one’s capacity to successfullycope with situational demands (Atkinson &Birch, 1970; Carver & Scheier, 1982), but theyabsorb attentional capacity and are experi-enced as effortful (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).


Researchers have proposed several constructsfor unlearned processes used in novel, unex-pected, or difficult situations that require capac-ity-limited attention—for instance, consciouscontrol (Klein, 1989; Posner & Snyder, 1975), con-ceptual and controlled processing (Leventhal &Scherer, 1987; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), prob-lem solving (March & Simon, 1958), and planning(Klein, 1989; Schank & Abelson, 1977). There aresubtle differences among these constructs. Forexample, conscious control and controlled pro-cessing, essentially identical, are generic termsfor conscious cognitive activity, and they em-brace problem solving and planning. Planninginvolves anticipating future developments (Doer-ner & Wearing, 1995) and developing goal hier-archies (Cropanzano, Citera, & Howes, 1995)and, thus, is not restricted to script interruptions.Here, problem solving, being more specific, isthe more adequate term, because problem solv-ing involves a “problem” (i.e., an unscripted sit-uation) that requires conscious attention to at-tain a solution. Hence, the compensatory modelfocuses on problem solving (Doerner & Wearing,1995; March & Simon, 1958; Nair, 2000; Smith,1997), defined as conscious processes used toovercome environmental difficulties (e.g., novelsituations or exceptional task demands) whenno behavioral routines exist.

How does problem solving relate to perceivedabilities? Perceived abilities are conceptualizedat a distal level (because they help determinethe allocation of attention [Kanfer & Ackerman,1989]), and problem solving happens at a proxi-mal level (because it requires reallocation ofattention [Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989]), so thisquestion is not trivial. The answer lies in the factthat both variables are determined by essen-tially the same processes. Past performance, inparticular, is a chief determinant of perceivedabilities (Bandura, 1977; Carver & Scheier, 1982)and the scripted behavioral repertoire of a per-son (Lord & Kernan, 1987; Schank & Abelson,1977). Hence, perceived abilities largely reflectan individual’s scripted response patterns. Con-sequently, low perceived abilities are associ-ated with inadequate, less developed, or nonex-isting behavioral routines. If behavioralroutines are unavailable, problem solving (Doer-ner & Wearing, 1995; Klein, 1989; March & Simon,1958) is required. Thus, inadequate perceivedabilities are positively associated with problem-solving requirements.

The fact that a person’s scripted repertoirereflects actual and not perceived abilities is notin conflict with this proposition. Script theoristshold that script interruptions depend on whetherthe person perceives obstacles in the environ-ment or a novel situation (Lord & Kernan, 1987;Schank & Abelson, 1977). A person with low per-ceived ability will have lower perceptionalthresholds, leading to more frequent script inter-ruptions, than a person with high perceivedability (for similar arguments, see Kanfer & Ack-erman, 1989).

Proposition 8. Perceived abilities arenegatively associated with the re-quirement of problem solving.

Contrasting Volition and Problem Solving

The compensatory model draws a sharp linebetween problem solving and volition.4 As ex-plained above, problem solving compensatesfor insufficient abilities and overcomes environ-mental (extrapersonal) difficulties, whereas vo-lition compensates for insufficient motivationalsupport and resolves intrapersonal conflictsfrom competing behavioral impulses originat-ing in implicit/explicit motive discrepancies(Sokolowski, 1993; cf. Muraven & Baumeister,2000). For example, consider a typical environ-mental difficulty when a driver finds the road isblocked by a fallen tree. The person is highlymotivated to overcome this obstacle. Problemsolving (thinking about alternate routes) is nec-essary. Volitional strategies (visualizing possi-ble positive outcomes) are useless. Conversely,intrapersonal conflicts from tempting impulses(to disregard organizational regulations) or in-sufficient motivation (to work overtime) de-mands volitional regulation (to support cogni-tive preferences and suppress temptations).Here, problem solving has little or no benefit.

There is support for this notion in cognitivepsychology. Behavioral cues, serving as stimuli

4 I draw this sharp line for conceptual clarity of the model.In reality, there may be overlap in the functions of volitionand problem solving. For example, quitting smoking (anintrapersonal conflict) may be facilitated by hiding one’scigarettes (a problem-solving strategy). Kuhl (1985) callsproblem solving directed at altering the external determi-nants of behavior to resolve intrapersonal conflicts “environ-mental control,” but suggests classifying this hybrid as avolitional strategy.

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for affective, cognitive, and conative reactions,may be differentiated into external cues—fromperceptions of the environment—and internalcues—from internal sensations of the person’smind and body (James, 1981; LeDoux, 1995; Lev-enthal & Scherer, 1987). LeDoux (1995) calls these“exteroceptive” and “interoceptive” inputs.Since cues are generally subject to affective andcognitive evaluation (not necessarily con-sciously reflected [LeDoux, 1995; Leventhal &Scherer, 1987]), both internal and external cuesmay be categorized as being either supportiveor obstructive. From this perspective, intraper-sonal barriers reflect internal obstructive cues,and extrapersonal difficulties reflect externalobstructive cues.

Like perceptions (the input), behaviors (theoutput) may also be categorized as internallydirected or externally directed (Norman & Shal-lice, 1986). In the compensatory model I call in-ternally directed behaviors aimed at overcom-ing intrapersonal barriers “volition,” andexternally directed behaviors aimed at over-coming extrapersonal barriers “problem solv-ing” (Kehr, 2000; Sokolowski, 1993). As early as1890, James proposed a similar distinction, writ-ing, “Volition is primarily a relation, not be-tween our Self and extra-mental matter (asmany philosophers still maintain), but betweenour Self and our own states of mind” (1981: 1172).More recent approaches differentiating inter-nally aimed volition and externally aimed prob-lem solving include Lazarus, Kanner, and Folk-man (1980) and Taylor and Schneider (1989).Research on volition depletion supports this dis-tinction, showing that suppressing temptationsor unwanted emotions and compensating for in-adequate motivation impairs subsequent voli-tional regulation (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).In contrast, behavior requiring problem solvingbut not volition (e.g., solving math problems)does not impair subsequent volitional regula-tion (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998: Experi-ment 3; cf. DeShon, Brown, & Greenis, 1996).

Proposition 9: Volitional regulationand problem solving fulfill distinctfunctions. The requirement for volitionis independent of perceived abilities,and the requirement for problem solv-ing is independent of the relationshipbetween implicit and explicit motives.

As detailed above, problem solving and voli-tional regulation both require attentional capac-ity (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Schneider & Shif-frin, 1977). Attentional capacity is restricted, soactions requiring both volitional regulation andproblem solving are likely to be abandoned (ow-ing to inefficient volition), or fail (owing to inef-ficient problem solving). A person preoccupiedwith volitional regulation may fail to notice sig-nals indicating unexpected environmental de-velopments, resulting in delayed script interrup-tions and inefficient problem solving (cf.Doerner & Wearing, 1995). Conversely, extremeextrapersonal difficulties associated with ex-cessive problem solving demands may lead toreassessment of cognitive preferences (Carver &Scheier, 1982; Klinger, 1975).

Proposition 10: Actions requiring bothproblem solving and volitional regu-lation are likely to be abandoned orlead to failure.

CONGRUENCE OF IMPLICIT MOTIVES,EXPLICIT MOTIVES, AND ABILITIES

Since simultaneous examinations of implicitmotives, explicit motives, and perceived abili-ties are scarce, I first address consequences ofcongruent implicit and explicit motive systemsand then widen the perspective to include per-ceived abilities.

Ample research suggests that congruence ofimplicit and explicit motive systems is associ-ated with low intrapersonal conflict, intrinsicmotivation, and successful performance—thepreconditions for happiness, well-being, andhealth (Brunstein et al., 1998; Deci & Ryan, 2000;Mischel, 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryan et al.,1996; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Sokolowski (1993)suggests that congruent implicit and explicitmotives are associated with motivational regu-lation states requiring no volitional regulation.Thus, motivational regulation states shouldsave volitional resources. In support of this no-tion, I found that managers’ implicit/explicit mo-tive congruence was negatively associated withsubsequent impairments in terms of depletedvolitional strength (Kehr, 2004).

The compensatory model indicates that a pre-requisite for intrinsic motivation is that the be-havior at hand is thematically congruent withactual affective preferences stemming from


aroused implicit motives (cf. McClelland, 1985;McClelland et al., 1953). As in “autotelic” con-ceptions (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Deci &Ryan, 2000), I propose that intrinsic motivationdoes not depend on support from cognitive pref-erences. Many climbers, for example, do notclimb a mountain just to reach the summit but,rather, try to reach the summit for the intrinsicjoy of climbing. Nevertheless, it seems likelythat intrinsic motivation from aroused implicitmotives (Puca & Schmalt, 1999; Sokolowski &Kehr, 1999) is accompanied by more profoundexperiences of meaning (Hackman & Oldham,1980) and purposefulness (Thomas & Velthouse,1990) only if aroused implicit and activated ex-plicit motives are thematically congruent.

Arousal of implicit motives does not alwayslead to intrinsic motivation, because an addi-tional requirement is the absence of competingcognitive preferences. A crossword puzzle maypotentially arouse implicit achievement motivesand lead to intrinsic motivation, but knowingone is late for work would suppress such moti-vation. I described such situations earlier asvolitional suppression of unwanted implicit im-pulses. This conception allows for partial con-gruence of implicit and explicit motives, sug-gesting that activated explicit motives onlycounteract intrinsic motivation or relate to ex-trinsic motivation if they compete with affectivepreferences. This discussion leads to the follow-ing proposition.

Proposition 11: Behavioral congruencewith affective preferences (arousedimplicit motives) is a necessary, butnot sufficient, condition for intrinsicmotivation. Behavioral congruencewith affective and cognitive prefer-ences (activated explicit motives) is asufficient condition for intrinsic moti-vation.

High perceived abilities are associated with awell-organized, scripted behavioral repertoireand low requirements of problem solving.Hence, if perceived abilities combine with con-gruent implicit and explicit motives, neither ex-trapersonal nor intrapersonal difficulties are ex-pected, and no support of problem solving orvolitional regulation is needed (Karoly, 1995;Sokolowski, 1993). Such situations are character-ized by task enjoyment and low experiencedeffort (even if the objective difficulty of the task

at hand might be high), and they will generallybe associated with behavioral success.

At first, this phenomenology seems to resem-ble Deci and Ryan’s (2000) intrinsic motivationand Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) flow, the latterbeing a specific case of intrinsic motivationcharacterized by undivided attention to the task;impaired sense of time; and absence of intra-personal conflict, self-referential, or other dis-tracting thoughts (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Heck-hausen, 1991). However, the compensatorymodel differs from alternative approaches to in-trinsic motivation (for reviews, cf. Kanfer, 1990),particularly those in which abilities are per-ceived as critical—for example, Csikszentmiha-lyi’s (1975) flow concept.

As stated, the sufficient condition of intrinsicmotivation does not include perceived abilities:low perceived abilities per se do not precludeintrinsic motivation. However, low perceivedabilities preclude flow experience, because lowperceived abilities are associated with frequentscript interruptions that counteract the experi-ence of flow. Hence, congruent implicit and ex-plicit motives (the sufficient condition for intrin-sic motivation) must combine with perceivedabilities to allow flow experience.

In contrast to Csikszentmihalyi (1975, 1988),the compensatory model leads to the assertionthat perceived abilities surpassing task de-mands do not necessarily lead to boredom, orotherwise counteract flow. Consider, for exam-ple, flow experiences in reading, which arelargely independent of reading proficiency anddo not decrease for the experienced reader. Low,compared to high, task demands only counteractflow if they prevent arousal of flow-concordantimplicit motives or activate conflicting explicitmotives (e.g., the reader may not like or want toread a simple book).

Proposition 12: Congruence of implicitmotives, explicit motives, and per-ceived abilities is associated withflow experiences.

SUMMARY OF THE COMPENSATORY MODEL

Figure 1 is a schematic overview of the com-pensatory model. The three structural compo-nents of the model—implicit motives, explicitmotives, and perceived abilities—are repre-sented by the three circles of Figure 1, symbol-

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izing their conceptual distinctiveness. The cir-cles partially overlap, indicating the empiricalrelationship of the structural components. Fig-ure 1 can be used for distal analysis of latentconflict (where the circles represent the overallstructure of implicit motives, explicit motives,and perceived abilities), and for proximal anal-ysis of manifest conflict and regulation require-ments (where the circles represent implicit be-havioral impulses, explicit action tendencies,and scripted behavioral patterns at a particulartime).

Aroused implicit motives are associated withaffective preferences leading to implicit behav-ioral impulses, and activated explicit motivesare associated with cognitive preferences lead-ing to explicit action tendencies. Discrepanciesbetween implicit and explicit motives (at a dis-tal level) may instigate competing affective andcognitive preferences (at a proximal level), caus-ing intrapersonal conflict. Volitional regulationis needed to resolve these conflicts in favor ofcognitive preferences and to compensate for in-sufficient motivational support. Figure 1 also il-lustrates the twofold function of volition—namely, to support need-discrepant explicitaction tendencies (represented in Figure 1 as thesection of the explicit motive circle not coveredby the implicit motive circle) and to suppress

unwanted implicit impulses (the section of theimplicit motive circle not covered by the explicitmotive circle). Problem solving, in contrast, com-pensates for low perceived abilities and insuffi-cient scripted behavioral routines.

Congruence between implicit and explicit mo-tives (represented by the overlap of the implicitand the explicit motive circles in Figure 1) insti-gates compatible implicit behavioral impulsesand explicit action tendencies, associated withintrinsic motivation and requiring no volitionalsupport. The center of Figure 1 represents con-gruence of implicit motives, explicit motives,and perceived abilities, associated with flow ex-perience as a special case of intrinsic motiva-tion.

The “unique” (nonoverlapping) sections ofFigure 1 represent situations where two of thethree structural components of motivation arelacking. Explicit action tendencies in the uniquesection of the explicit motive circle are not sup-ported by affective preferences or perceivedabilities. Hence, both problem solving and voli-tional regulation are required. This decreasesthe chances of successful accomplishment be-cause of the limitations of attentional capacity.Implicit behavioral impulses in the unique sec-tion of the implicit motive circle could be asso-ciated with intrinsic motivation, but are volition-

FIGURE 1Schematic Overview of the Compensatory Model of Work Motivation and Volition


ally suppressed because they are inconsistentwith cognitive preferences. Chances of fulfillingimplicit motives that fall into this section arefurther decreased, because they also requireproblem solving. Perceived abilities in theunique section of the perceived abilities circle ofFigure 1 are not congruent with implicit or ex-plicit motives and, hence, will not instigate be-havior.

RELATIONSHIPS TO EXISTING APPROACHESTO WORK MOTIVATION

In this section I assess the compensatorymodel in relation to existing knowledge of workmotivation and volition, although space limita-tions preclude detailed reviews of existing ap-proaches. The emphasis is on explaining therelation of the model to selected person-centered conceptions of work motivation.

Expectancy-Value Approaches

In expectancy-value approaches (Feather,1982; Vroom, 1964; cf. Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996),scholars seek to predict behavioral choices as afunction of expectancy of behavioral success(perceived abilities) and subjective value of thissuccess (explicit motive). The compensatorymodel extends this approach by considering im-plicit motives and conflict resulting from implic-it/explicit motive discrepancies. Moreover, thecompensatory model provides a proximal anal-ysis of mechanisms that compensate for inade-quate support from structural components. Thisis not included in expectancy-value approachesthat are largely confined to distal-level behav-ioral prognoses.

Goal-Setting Theory

Goal-setting theorists generally do not differ-entiate between explicit goals (their primary ob-ject of interest) and implicit motives. Locke (2000)recently acknowledged this limitation. The com-pensatory model stresses this distinction andthe necessity of distinguishing between explicitgoals and explicit motives, because the lattermay combine with perceived abilities to insti-gate the former. Furthermore, goal-setting theo-rists disregard volitional resolution of intraper-sonal conflict. When Locke and Kristof (1996)speak of “volition,” they refer to Rand’s (1964)

broad concept of volition, according to whichattention must be voluntarily focused to permitgoal setting and goal striving. This may includethe narrower concept of volitional conflict reso-lution here, but Locke and Kristof (1996) do notexplore this issue.

Bandura’s Self-Efficacy and Self-Regulation

Bandura acknowledges that motivation isonly “partly rooted in cognitive activities” (1977:193), but he does not address noncognitive de-terminants of motivation, such as implicit mo-tives. As a consequence, Bandura’s approachoveremphasizes cognitive motivators, particu-larly self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977) and goals(Bandura, 1988). In contrast, the compensatorymodel indicates that perceived abilities mustcombine with implicit and explicit motives togain motivational significance and that low per-ceived abilities are not necessarily an obstacleto motivation.

Bandura’s (Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli,Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001) concept of metacog-nitive self-regulation embraces evaluating taskdemands and searching for alternatives (ele-ments of problem solving in the compensatorymodel), as well as creating self-incentives andsuppressing intrusive thoughts (elements of vo-litional regulation in the compensatory model).A basic principle of the compensatory model isthat problem solving and volitional regulationmust be clearly distinguished, since they fulfilldistinct functions and employ different mecha-nisms. These differences are obscured in theconstruct of metacognitive self-regulation. Bycontrasting implicit and explicit motives (andperceived abilities), the compensatory model al-lows analyses that isolate causal antecedentsleading to problem solving or volitional require-ments.

McClelland’s Dual System Approach toMotivation

McClelland and collaborators (Koestner et al.,1991; McClelland et al., 1989; Weinberger & Mc-Clelland, 1990) examined differences betweenimplicit and explicit motives and proposed thatdiscrepancies lead to intrapersonal conflict.However, McClelland did not cross the Rubiconto incorporate volitional conflict resolution pro-cesses into his analysis. The compensatory

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model builds heavily on McClelland’s work butadds the functional analysis of volitional regu-lation and problem solving. Some dual systemapproaches to motivation include speculationsabout the relationship between motive discrep-ancies and volitional regulation (Brunstein etal., 1999; Emmons, 1999; Epstein, 1998; Ryan etal., 1996), but these links have not been exploredsystematically.

Deci and Ryan’s Intrinsic and ExtrinsicMotivation

The compensatory model extends Deci andRyan’s (2000) approach by including perceivedabilities and problem solving, and it also differsfrom Deci and Ryan’s understanding of intrinsicmotivation and regulation requirements. Thecompensatory model suggests that fulfillment ofany implicit motive is associated with task en-joyment and intrinsic motivation—not just ful-fillment of certain “fundamental” implicit mo-tives or needs (cf. McClelland et al., 1953).Moreover, arousal of implicit motives does notlead to intrinsic motivation per se, but only if noincompatible cognitive preferences exist at thesame time. Flipping the coin over, the presentapproach differs from Deci and Ryan’s in sug-gesting that even externally imposed goals canbe intrinsically motivating, provided they arecongruent with the person’s actually arousedmotives. For example, speeding up an assemblyline, probably experienced as externally regu-lated and alienating by most workers, may bestimulating for those high in implicit achieve-ment motive. This challenges Deci and Ryan’sconclusion that “some goals are not integrate-able” (2000: 248). Finally, and perhaps most im-portant, the compensatory model expands Deciand Ryan’s approach by taking a closer look atfunctional processes that support external reg-ulation (i.e., volition).

Rewards and Corruption of Intrinsic Motivation

Lawler’s (1971; Lawler & Jenkins, 1992) ap-proach to rewards is based on cognitive modelsof motivation (i.e., goal-setting, expectancy-value, and equity approaches). Lawler and Jen-kin’s (1992) notion that organizational rewardsmay attract and retain individuals is consistentwith the compensatory model, since social in-

centives and rewards activate extrinsic motives(e.g., an explicit money-making motive [cf. Sriv-astava, Locke, & Bartol, 2001]) known to be influ-ential in determining choice behavior (e.g., jobchoice). However, working behavior itself, par-ticularly intrinsic work motivation, seems lessinfluenced by rewards, particularly those unre-lated to the task—like increased pay or time offwork (French, 1955). This suggests that rewardsdo not necessarily arouse implicit motives, in linewith McClelland’s (1985) view. Rewards may pro-duce inconsistencies between explicit and im-plicit motives that require volitional regulation.Employees may not have the necessary volitionalresources, or not choose to use them, and absen-teeism and withdrawal cognitions may result.

The compensatory model suggests a differen-tial view of task-intrinsic incentives. An individ-ual’s implicit motives determine the tasks he orshe experiences as intrinsically motivating (cf.Winter, 1982). Nevertheless, the influence of im-plicit motives on behavior may disappear in thepresence of powerful social constraints (McClel-land et al., 1953). Hence, social incentives ingeneral and rewards in particular can reducethe variation of employee behavior. In sum, thecompensatory model advocates including im-plicit motives and volitional regulation in theo-rizing on rewards.

The compensatory model also offers alterna-tive explanations for inconsistencies in researchfindings on the corruption effect of extrinsic re-wards (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). Summariz-ing the contradictory evidence, Kanfer writes,“Extrinsic rewards may enhance, impair, or failto affect task interest, enjoyment, and persis-tence” (1990: 92). The compensatory model leadsto the prediction that extrinsic rewards only cor-rupt intrinsic motivation if they activate newgoal representations (“I want a higher salary formy job . . . ”), and deactivate the originallyaroused implicit motives (“ . . . and I can nolonger enjoy my work without more pay”). If,however, extrinsic rewards do not deactivatemotives, intrinsic motivation may be enhancedinstead of corrupted. As suggested by Figure 1,the reward must thematically fall into the inter-section of the two circles to avoid the corruptioneffect. For example, existing intrinsic work moti-vation will be enhanced—not impaired—if the ex-trinsic reward is to improve working conditions.


Kanfer and Collaborators’ Resource Allocationand Motivational Traits/Skills Analysis

Initially, Kanfer and Ackerman (1989) concep-tualized self-regulation as problem solving—notvolition. Recently, however, Kanfer and col-leagues (Kanfer, 1996; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1996;Kanfer & Heggestad, 1997) adopted Kuhl’s (1985)notion of volitional regulation into a motiva-tional traits/skills analysis that has some paral-lels with the compensatory model. However,Kanfer and colleagues restricted their analysisof motivational traits to explicit motives; im-plicit motives and the important distinction be-tween implicit and explicit motives were notincluded. In consequence, their approach isvague about situations that require volitionalsupport and those that do not. For example, Kan-fer and Heggestad suggest that fear motivesrequire volitional support (particularly emotioncontrol). In the compensatory model, activatedfear motives only require volitional support ifthey lead to implicit behavioral impulses (“I amafraid of this job interview”) in conflict with ex-plicit action tendencies (“I want this job”). Novolition, in contrast, is needed if implicit fearassociates with explicit action tendencies thatare avoidance related (“I don’t like this com-pany, and I do not want this job”). Thus, thecompensatory model allows a deeper analysisof causal antecedents and functional propertiesof volitional regulation than Kanfer and Hegges-tad’s approach. Moreover, the inclusion of per-ceived abilities and problem solving in thecompensatory model allows comprehensiveanalyses of work motivation processes.

AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Research should be directed at developingvalid, reliable, and economic instruments to ex-plore the main constructs of the compensatorymodel—notably, implicit motives and volitionalregulation. One of the main obstacles to wide-spread use of the TAT in motivation research isthat it requires qualitative analysis of picture-stories. This raises reliability concerns (Ent-wisle, 1972) and absorbs considerable researchresources. New instruments, such as the Multi-Motive-Grid (Sokolowski et al., 2000) may help toovercome this limitation. There is also a mis-match between recent advancements in re-search on volitional regulation on the one hand

and methodological stagnation on the other. TheVolitional Components Inventory (VCI; Kuhl &Fuhrmann, 1998) is a first attempt to fill this gap(cf. Ryan, 1998). Nevertheless, the factorial struc-ture of the VCI seems somewhat inconsistent(Kehr et al., 1999), and additional research isneeded to improve the VCI and develop alterna-tive instruments for volitional regulation. It isalso worth examining whether affective prefer-ences (“I really like this task”) and cognitivepreferences (“I consider this task important andI really want to do it”) can serve as easily as-sessible proxy variables for implicit and explicitmotives, respectively.

With respect to structural components of thecompensatory model, additional research isnecessary to determine how implicit motives,explicit motives, and perceived abilities relatein praxi and how they interact to determine per-formance. It is to be expected that these predic-tors have different relative weights and differ-ent interactive effects for different classes ofbehavior. Leisure-related behavior, for example,may be more strongly impaired by inadequatesupport from implicit motives than work-relatedbehavior.

Differential research may test the propositionthat some employees achieve higher congru-ence of implicit and explicit motives than others,perhaps because they have enhanced self-awareness of implicit motives owing to im-proved skills in self-observation (McClelland etal., 1989), or because they use metamotivationalstrategies to align affective and cognitive pref-erences (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999). Furtherdifferential effects can be expected in terms ofthe degree to which employees take account ofperceived abilities when setting goals. On theone hand, employees giving much weight to per-ceived abilities may reject socially supportedgoals if ability perceptions are low. On the otherhand, employees with low ability perceptionwho ignore these may adopt unrealistic goals,resulting in failure.

With respect to functional processes of themodel, additional research is needed to deter-mine when problem solving and volitional reg-ulation interact. Even if problem solving andvolition are conceptually distinct, there might betransition periods where extrapersonal difficul-ties surpass a certain threshold and problemsolving becomes ineffective. This may erode mo-

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tivational support and result in intrapersonalconflict requiring volitional regulation.

The most important task is to further explorethe interrelations of motives and volitional pro-cesses. Replications of the finding that implicit/explicit motive discrepancies deplete volitionalresources (cf. Kehr, 2004) are needed. Specifi-cally, the Baumeister et al. (1998) paradigmcould be adopted to determine whether employ-ees with high discrepancies between implicitand explicit motives also have particular diffi-culties with single volitional acts (e.g., to strivefor externally imposed goals or to withstandtemptations).

Additional work is needed to develop moresophisticated conflict taxonomies. The compen-satory model focuses on conflict between im-plicit and explicit motives, which proponents ofdual system approaches view as the principlecase of intrapersonal conflict (McClelland et al.,1989; cf. Brunstein et al., 1998). However, theremay be additional conflicts among activated ex-plicit motives (cf. Emmons, King, & Sheldon,1993), as well as among aroused implicit mo-tives. This differentiation may relate to Lewin’s(1938) distinction of approach/approach, ap-proach/avoidance, and avoidance/avoidanceconflict, resulting in a multidimensional typol-ogy of intrapersonal conflict. Different classes ofintrapersonal conflict may require different vo-litional regulation strategies.5 This suggestsseveral interesting research questions, but con-ceptional work is necessary first. Researcherscould also examine whether different actionphases (i.e., task choice or task fulfillment) anddifferent classes of regulatory requirements (i.e.,suppression or support) may require differentvolitional strategies (cf. Kehr, 2000).

Several propositions derived from the com-pensatory model await empirical support,particularly those that challenge existing ap-proaches. To give an example, the compensa-tory model indicates that expectancy-value ap-proaches (e.g., Feather, 1982; Vroom, 1964) do notpredict behavior well if potential conflicts re-sulting from implicit/explicit motive discrepan-cies are disregarded. Likewise, the advice fromLocke and Latham’s (1990) goal-setting theory toset specific and challenging goals may be con-traindicated if the goal is not supported by im-

plicit motives and the volitional resources of theindividual are low.

The compensatory model differs from Bandu-ra’s (1977) view in predicting that perceived abil-ities must combine with motives to instigate ac-tion. Moreover, low perceived abilities are notnecessarily an obstacle to action, as Ajzen’s(1991) approach might indicate, and high per-ceived abilities are no obstacle for flow experi-ence, in opposition to Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975)suggestion. Another proposition requiring em-pirical substantiation is that extrinsic rewardscorrupt intrinsic motivation only if they lead to areconfiguration of the initial motivation struc-ture. This may offer an explanation for inconsis-tencies in research findings regarding the cor-ruption effect (Deci et al., 1999).

Finally, an intriguing task relates to the de-velopment of intervention methods. Baumeisteret al. (1998) use the metaphor of a muscle forvolitional regulation, indicating that volitionalstrength may be depleted but can also be builtup by exercise. However, volitional strengthdoes not necessarily develop automatically,and systematic exercise and training may besupportive (Kehr & Von Rosenstiel, in press;Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999). Clearly,organizations need motivational interventionprograms, based on sound theoretical and em-pirical work, that are thoroughly assessed.

CONCLUSION

The compensatory model of work motivationand volition coalesces three previously unre-lated approaches to human motivation: dualsystem theories, theories on volition, and theo-ries on perceived abilities. The basic notion ofthe compensatory model is that volitional regu-lation compensates for insufficient motivationdue to implicit/explicit motive discrepancies.Volition is sharply contrasted with problemsolving, which compensates for insufficient per-ceived abilities.

Earlier theories on work motivation do notcompete with the compensatory model; rather,they complement it. However, the compensatorymodel extends these earlier approaches by (1)simultaneously examining implicit and explicitmotives and perceived abilities, (2) accountingfor individual differences, and (3) highlightingintrapersonal conflict and volitional conflict res-olution. Not surprisingly, most propositions de-5 I owe this insight to an anonymous reviewer.


rived from the compensatory model still awaitempirical support. Hence, there is reason to be-lieve that the compensatory model will providefresh impulses for research on work motivationand its applications.

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Hugo M. Kehr is professor of organizational behavior at the Macquarie GraduateSchool of Management, Macquarie University, Sydney, and a Heisenberg fellow of theGerman Research Foundation. He received his habilitation and his Ph.D. in psychol-ogy from the University of Munich. His research interests include work motivation,volition, self-management, and leadership.

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integrating implicit motives, explicit motives, and ... classes/fall 07/org psy/cases... ·...

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