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Insurgent–populace relations inNepal: an analysis of attitudinal andbehavioural supportJames Khalil aa Integrity Research and Consultancy, UK

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To cite this article: James Khalil (2012): Insurgent–populace relations in Nepal: an analysis ofattitudinal and behavioural support, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23:2, 221-244

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Insurgent–populace relations in Nepal: an analysis ofattitudinal and behavioural support

James Khalil*

Senior Consultant, Integrity Research and Consultancy, UK

The first objective of this article is to provide conceptual clarity regarding theterm ‘support’ in the context of insurgent campaigns. While it is commonlyclaimed that insurgent and counterinsurgent forces compete for the support ofthe populace, there is often ambiguity as to whether this refers to a voluntarypreference for a group of armed actors (attitudinal support), or a set of actionsthat provide direct benefits to one of these groups (behavioural support orcollaboration). Furthermore, while a number of academics and practitionersfocus upon the former on the assumption that it translates into the latter withsufficient consistency (Lawrence ‘of Arabia’, Mao, etc.), others maintain acontradictory stance (Kilcullen, Kalyvas, etc.). The findings from researchundertaken into the 1996–2006 conflict in Nepal suggest a more complexreality in that certain forms of collaboration (e.g. provisions of information)seemingly necessitate supportive attitudes to a greater extent than others (e.g.supplies of food). The second objective is to evaluate the various approachesused by the Maoist insurgents to generate these distinct forms of support.While their ideology largely failed to resonate with the populace, attitudinalsupport was obtained through various ‘popular appeals’, including landreform, an opposition to an increasingly repressive monarchy, and campaignsto empower certain marginalised sectors of society. In contrast, the develop-ment initiatives of the Maoists, and their nationalist rhetoric in opposition toUS and Indian influence were substantially less effective. Each of theseinitiatives were undertaken to obtain collaboration via attitudinal support, butthe former was also generated directly through the use of coercion againstspecific non-combatants.

Keywords: Nepal; Mao; Maoist; Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist);insurgent; insurgency; support; coercion

The first objective of this article is to provide conceptual clarity regarding the

term support in the context on insurgent campaigns. While it is regularly asserted

that insurgent and counterinsurgent forces compete for the support of the

populace, there is often ambiguity as to whether this refers to a voluntary

preference for a group of armed actors (subsequently referred to as attitudinal

support), or a set of actions that provide direct benefits to one of these groups

(subsequently referred to as behavioural support or collaboration). There is also

ISSN 0959-2318 print/ISSN 1743-9558 online

q 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.642203

http://www.tandfonline.com

*Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

Small Wars & Insurgencies

Vol. 23, No. 2, May 2012, 221–244

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considerable disagreement as to the extent to which the former translates into the

latter, and this leads to a lack of consensus among academics and practitioners as

to whether attitudes or behaviours should be placed at the centre of analysis.

While the focus of this article is upon insurgency, these issues are perhaps most

apparent in the confused attempts to operationalise the hearts and minds

counterinsurgency doctrine.

The second objective is to evaluate the various approaches used by the Maoist

insurgents to gain these two forms of support during the 1996–2006 conflict in

Nepal. It is often reported that leftist ideologies promoted by the insurgent

leadership largely fail to resonate at the ‘support base’.1 Or, as expressed in more

generic terms by Stathis Kalyvas, ‘conflicts and violence “on the ground” often

seem more related to local issues rather than the “master cleavage” that drives the

civil war at the national level.’2 More specifically, insurgent organisations

generate support through coercive methods and a variety of ‘popular campaigns’,

for instance, promoting nationalism, gender equality, ethnic empowerment,

republicanism, and land reform.3 In 1937 Mao Tse-tung famously stated that the

relationship between insurgents and the populace should be comparable to ‘fish in

the sea’,4 yet over 70 years later there have been no widely acknowledged

empirical studies focusing upon the comparative importance of these themes.

The field research for this article took place in 11 Village Development

Committees (VDCs) in the Nepali districts of Dang, Gorkha, and Pyuthan in 2008.

These locations were selected on the grounds that they experienced comparatively

high levels of Maoist influence during the campaign.5 The research involved over

100 interviews with subject matter experts, key informants (including political

leaders, teachers, and other individuals of elevated status), and ‘ordinary

residents’.6 A quantitative component was added through the collection of over

700 questionnaire responses.7While the central emphasis of this article is upon the

conflict in Nepal, a secondary stress is placed upon analogous historical

campaigns, including those occurring in China, Vietnam, Peru, and El Salvador.

Aside from enabling comparative analysis, this makes it possible to benefit from

the insights in more ‘mature’ bodies of literature.8

Following an initial focus upon the interrelationship between attitudinal and

behavioural support, the structure of this article loosely mirrors the historical

evolution of academic explanations for these two variables.9 Thus, in the second

section the emphasis is upon the extent to which contextual factors may

‘predispose’ a populace towards supporting insurgents. The analysis in sections

three and four is centred upon rational choice frameworks that respectively

privilege economic and security-based considerations. More specifically, the

stress in the former is upon land reform, payments to cadre, and the embezzlement

of funds that were supposedly collected for the ‘People’sWar’, and in the latter the

focus is upon the use of coercion by the insurgents, and their ability to protect the

populace from state violence. The final section assesses the relative importance of

various ‘popular appeals’, including the anti-palace stance of the Maoists, their

nationalist rhetoric, and their campaigns to empower the marginalised ethnic

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minorities, subordinate castes, and women. It is argued that from a theoretical

perspective these themes are united by the need for psychological insights to

explain how supportive attitudes translate into collaboration.

Attitudinal and behavioural support

As previously observed, in the context of internal conflict the concept of support

may refer either to a voluntary preference for a specific group of armed actors

over their competitors (attitudinal support), or a set of actions that directly benefit

one of these organisations (behavioural support or collaboration).10 The latter

encompasses the supply of a range of goods (finances, food, medical equipment,

clothing, etc.), and services (withholding information, running errands, providing

shelter, etc.). While the act of enlistment is also a form of collaboration, it is

beneficial to treat this specific activity independently as it is commonly driven by

very specific motives, as discussed shortly.11 The concepts of attitudinal and

behavioural opposition are derived from the above terms, respectively referring

to an aversion to a group of armed actors and to behaviours that have a deleterious

impact upon the organisation in question.

Drawing upon the quantitative data collected during the research, Figure 1

demonstrates that a minority of the respondents claimed that the populace was

attitudinally supportive of the Maoists, with a statistically greater proportion of

Gorkha residents answering in the affirmative (*** compared to the other districts

in combination and individually).12 Figure 2 indicates a perception in the three

locations that locals were more likely to provide food, shelter, and finances than

they were to supply information or to transport materiel (*** across all possible

comparisons).13 Again, the residents from Gorkha were statistically more likely

25.5%

52.6%

30.2%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Dang Gorkha Pyuthan

Providing attitudinal support

In what way did the people of this VDC support the Maoists duringthe conflict? (tick all appropriate boxes)

Figure 1. Attitudinal support for the Maoists in three research districts.

Small Wars & Insurgencies 223

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to maintain that the latter two services were provided (*** compared to the other

two districts in combination and individually). Rather than focusing upon these

forms of support in isolation, however, a central purpose of this article is to

consider the interaction between these variables. Attempts to comprehend this

relationship begin with the observation that the former commonly occurs in the

absence of the latter, and vice versa.14 It is possible to locate each individual on a

continuous scale according to their degree of attitudinal support (Individuals C

and D) or opposition (Individuals A and B) to a specific insurgent organisation, as

demonstrated schematically in Figure 3. In contrast, individuals may

simultaneously provide both behavioural support and opposition to one

organisation (Individuals A and C).15

The top-right quadrant in Figure 3 is seemingly an intuitive position in which

the behaviours of individuals reflect their attitudes. However, it is necessary to

place a considerable focus upon how attitudinal support is converted into

collaboration given the obstacles provided byMancur Olson’s free-rider problem.

As discussed in greater detail below, this paradox leads ‘rational’ individuals to

avoid participation in collective activities on the grounds that benefits can be

gained irrespective of their actions. Evidence from the field research indicated

that individuals may be located in the bottom-right quadrant (providing attitudinal

support but behavioural opposition to the insurgents), inter alia, if they (a) fear

punishment from the state security forces as a result of non-compliance, (b)

believe that the insurgents are likely to lose, (c) possess insufficient resources,16 or

(d) lack contact with the insurgents. In contrast, individuals may occupy the

84.5%86.0%86.9%89.7%

96.5%91.3%

80.8%

95.3%85.9%

23.6%

74.9%

31.9%

15.5%

68.4%

37.2%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Dang Gorkha

In what ways did the people of this VDC support the Maoists during the conflict?(tick all appropriate boxes)

Pyuthan

Providing money Providing food Providing shelter

Providing information Transporting materiel

Figure 2. Behavioural support for the Maoists in three research districts.

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top-left quadrant (providing attitudinal opposition but behavioural support), for

instance, if they (a) fear punishment from the insurgents in response to non-

compliance, (b) believe that the insurgents are likely to win,17 or (c) feel obliged

to provide resources to ‘guests’ (i.e. the insurgents) on the basis of cultural norms.

Accounts that emphasise the need to gain attitudinal support rest upon an

assumption that sufficient levels of behavioural support (or, at least, a lack of

behavioural opposition) can be generated through developing attitudes that are

supportive, sympathetic, or, at least, non-hostile. For instance, Chalmers Johnson

argues that ‘the mounting of a guerrilla movement as well as the possibility of

guerrilla victory depends upon the loyalties of civilians in the area of operations.’18

And, Walker Connor makes the link to behavioural support more explicit in

claiming that:.

. . . the passivity of the local people is the irreducible requirement. If the people donot love you more, they must at least despise you less than they do your enemy. Thisminimum attitude guarantees (1) that the local people will not violently resist yourpresence; (2) that they will not furnish information on your movements or otherwisecooperate with your enemy; and (3) that food and other essential needs can beacquired locally without excessive coercion.19

Similarly, Eric Hobsbawm maintains that:.

Behavioural opposition tothe insurgents

Attitudinalopposition to the

insurgents

Individual C

Individual A

Individual B

Individual D

Attitudinalsupport for the

insurgents

Behavioural support forthe insurgents

Figure 3. The schematic relationship between two forms of support.


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. . . the guerrilla’s major asset is non-military and without it he is helpless: he musthave the sympathy and support, active and passive, of the local population. AnyRobin Hood who loses it is dead, and so is any guerrilla. Every textbook of guerrillawarfare begins by pointing this out.20

This perspective is also apparent among insurgent practitioners, including T.E.

Lawrence (‘of Arabia’), who argued that insurgent organisations ‘must have a

friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not

betraying rebel movements to the enemy’.21 And, in a similar manner, Mao Tse-

tung maintained that ‘because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses

and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from

their sympathies and cooperation.’22

By contrast, a number of prominent academic studies focus directly upon

the behaviours of individuals on the assumption that, in the words of Timothy

Wickham-Crowley, ‘“warm feelings” are of precious little value to a social

movement.’23 Indeed, Nathan Leites and CharlesWolf Jr specifically state that the

attitudes of individuals ‘affect behaviour but are not identical with it; nor in most

cases are they the primary influence on it’.24 These accounts stress the extent to

which behavioural support can be generated from unsympathetic or hostile

populations, typically through placing an emphasis upon the role of coercion and

authority. For instance, David Kilcullen claims that:

Field experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq . . . have shown that insurgentintimidation easily overcomes any residual gratitude effect, while historical studieshave shown that in civil wars and insurgencies, popular support tends to accrue tolocally powerful actors rather than to those actors the population sees as morecongenial: the more organized, locally present, and better armed a group is, themore likely it is to be able to enforce a system of rules and sanctions.25

And, focusing more directly upon the relevance of territorial control, Stathis

Kalyvas and Matthew Kocher maintain that:

Contrary to a widespread perception that irregular wars are merely contests for‘hearts and minds’, they can be seen primarily as a competition for territorialcontrol, where violence is used to challenge and to create order. To be sure, bothincumbents and insurgent actors must generate popular ‘collaboration’ and deter‘defection’. However, the extent of collaboration they can achieve hinges largely onthe degree of control they are able to exercise.26

Returning to the findings from Nepal, it is possible to take the analysis one step

further through focusing upon the relationship between the two forms of support at

the VDC level. Figure 4 demonstrates that the insurgents were seemingly able to

obtain food largely irrespective of whether or not the populace were attitudinally

supportive, but that this was not the case with information.27 This apparently

supports Elisabeth Jean Wood’s assertion (relating to the Salvadoran case) that

‘sustained flows of high-quality information [were] much more difficult to extract

coercively than tortillas or water’.28 It also provides indicative evidence that the

contradictory stances adopted by Lawrence, Mao, and Hobsbawm on one side of

the debate, and Kilcullen and Kalyvas and Kocher on the other, are equally

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deficient as a result of their failure to distinguish between different forms of

collaboration.

Having considered the complex interrelationship between these forms of

support, the remainder of this essay is focused upon the factors that drive these

variables.

The structuralist perspective

For many years the field of contentious politics (of which insurgency forms a

radical subset) was dominated by structure-centric accounts. In other words,

prominent studies tended to overlook actors and organisations in favour of a focus

upon the macro-structural conditions in which they operated.29 While a review of

the extensive range of factors considered within the literature is beyond the scope

of this thesis, according toDavidRomano these included (butwere not limited to):.

. . . modes of production; class conflict; state fiscal and economic crises; subsistencecrises and absolute deprivation; relative deprivation; improvements in social andeconomic conditions after prolonged oppression; improvements in socio-economicconditions followed by stagnation or a sharp reversal; rigid institutions unable to keeppace with societal demands and changes; cleavages within a society’s elite and rulingclasses; loss of a government’s effective coercive capacity; the nature and organizationof peasant communities; transnational relations; urbanisation and demographicgrowth; modernization; internal colonialism and a cultural division of labour; andfinally, themere existence of different ethnic groups in a competitive politicalmilieu.30

The most influential account within this tradition arguably continues to be Theda

Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions, published in 1979. Among the most

resolutely structuralist works within the genre, Skocpol maintained that:.

y = 0.1676x + 0.8642R2 = 0.2838

y = 1.4723x - 0.0944R2 = 0.7872

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Providing attitudinal support (% resp) .

In what ways did the people of this VDC provide support to the Maoists during the conflict?(tick all applicable boxes)

Pro

vidi

ng fo

od /

info

rmat

ion

(% r

esp.

) .

Food

Information

Darbhung (Gorkha)

Dharmapani (pyuthan)

Figure 4. The relationship between two forms of support in practice.


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. . . revolutionary organizations and ideologies have helped to cement the solidarityof radical vanguards before and / or during revolutionary crises . . . But in no sensedid such vanguards – let alone vanguards with large, mobilized, and ideologicallyimbued mass followings – ever create the revolutionary crises they exploited . . . Asfar as the causes of historical social revolutions go, Wendell Phillips was quitecorrect when he once declared: ‘Revolutions are not made; they come.’31

While the comparative scarcity of information relating to the principal actors

undoubtedly contributed to this bias, certain proponents of this stance also sought

to justify their structure-centric focus on theoretical grounds. For instance,

Cynthia McClintock argues that:

. . . there is no set of criteria for an ‘effective’ revolutionary organization that can bedetermined by social scientists . . . [This] undermines voluntarist interpretations ofrevolution by emphasizing that what matters is not the organization, but the fitbetween the organization and its context.32

And, furthermore:

To a considerable degree arguments are tautological: revolutionary victory is theindependent variable to be explained by a strong and effective revolutionaryorganization, but the strength and effectiveness of the organisation are measured byits victory . . . In other words, in the terminology of political science, theindependent and dependent variables are the same.33

This stance cannot be sustained, however, as the broader objective of the theory is

not to recognise ‘effective’ organisations, but to identify characteristics that demon-

strate ‘effectiveness’ across a wide range of circumstances.34 The implications of

this latter approach become apparent through comparing the relative ‘success’

(however defined) of the Maoist doctrine to the universal failure of the foco theory

advocated by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara and Régis Debray. The former seemingly

encapsulate tenets that provide an increased probability of attaining ‘success’ across

a variety of contexts. Thus, it is necessary to elevate agent-based variables to a level

previously reserved for structural factors. Indeed, in the aftermath of States and

Social Revolutions an increasing number of voices argued in favour of ‘bringing the

actors back in’, for instance, with Gordon McCormick claiming that:.

. . . organizations matter in the success or failure of revolutionary enterprises. Withfew exceptions, the successful revolutionary takeover has not been the result of an‘eruption’ of the masses, but of the careful and time-consuming efforts of arevolutionary elite to build a countervailing institution to the state. Revolution, inshort, is a deliberative act, involving a gradual process of undermining the authoritystructure of the state and replacing that structure with the revolutionary alternative.As a deliberative act, such an enterprise’s success or failure will hinge in part on theway in which it is conducted and the vitality of the revolution’s organizing agent.35

Shifting the focus to the case of Nepal, Lauren Leve observes that an emphasis is

commonly placed upon the following structural ‘causes’ of support for the

Maoists:

(1) disillusionment with the failure of the Nepali state to deliver the expecteddemocratization of local social relations and political authority after . . . the

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establishment of multi-party democracy in 1990; (2) continuing poverty and awidening gap between rural and urban quality of life despite decades of intensivedevelopment; (3) widespread frustration with corruption at all levels of government;and (4) a backlash against the brutality of the police, and later army, counter-insurgency campaigns.36

While these factors undoubtedly provided favourable objective conditions for the

insurgents, an explanation of how the latter channelled these factors is absent in

many cases. Indeed, narrowing the focus to economic matters, George Graham

correctly observes that ‘many people throughout the world suffer poverty or

inequality, but only some of these have engaged in conflict.’37 And, as expressed

by Saubhagya Shah, ‘a holistic analysis of the Maoist insurgency must therefore

move beyond simplistic economic causality and engage with the other processes

and forces that are at work; the economic context can only be a point of departure,

not the analytical conclusion.’38 While the themes considered in the subsequent

sections incorporate an emphasis upon structural conditions, each is more

immediately focused upon the activities of the insurgents.

Economic motives underpinning support

The shift away from structural variables was led by analysts from the rationalist

school through their emphasis upon the role of self-interested, utilitarian actors.

At the heart of this approach is Mancur Olson’s free-rider problem, which is

summed up succinctly by James DeNardo.

Because single individuals typically have a negligible impact on the outcome oflarge-scale collective activities, and because public goods cannot be withheld fromthose who do not join in their creation, it is argued that participation in strikes,elections, and revolutions is ‘irrational’ whenever personal sacrifice is required.Instead, the ‘rational’ person will take a free ride, first allowing others to absorb thecost and then sharing freely in the benefits.39

In other words, rather than explaining acts of behavioural support, Olson’s

contribution leads to the conclusion that ‘rational’ individuals tend to avoid

involvement in collective movements. As a result the rationalist literature is

primarily focused upon identifying suitable solutions to the free-rider paradox.40

The most prominent of these solutions, originally proposed by Olson himself,

emphasises the role of material enticements that are contingent upon the actions

of individuals. A prime example of these selective incentives comes in the

form of land provisions. As Jeffrey Race observes with regard to the Vietnamese

case:

The policies relating to economic redistribution offered an incentive which wascontingent from the point of view of the individual’s behaviour in that eachbeneficiary of land redistribution retained his land only as long as he did notoppose the revolutionary movement, and indeed only as long as he assisted inrequired ways. Should he serve as a government spy or fail to pay his taxes, orshould his son desert from the movement’s military, then his land would beforfeited.41


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However, it should not be assumed that this is a standard approach for all leftist

insurgents. As specified by Elisabeth Jean Wood:

From about 1984 to the end of the [Salvadoran] war, it was possible for campesinosin contested areas to remain in the vicinity and farm abandoned land whether or notthey participated in the insurgency . . . the material benefits of the insurgency –access to abandoned land and a degree of autonomy from the daily authority oflandlords and the security forces – were available to everyone (nonparticipants andparticipants) who remained in these contested areas whenever they were available toparticipants, and thus did not have the requisite selective structure required toovercome the obstacles to collective action. In short, ‘free-riding’ on the insurgencywas possible . . . 42

In the case of Nepal it is widely acknowledged (even by the Maoist leaders) that

the emphasis upon land reform was minimal in most hilly districts, including the

field research locations of Gorkha and Pyuthan, due to the relative scarcity of

‘large landlords’.43 However, even in the low-lying terai districts, such as Dang,

this campaign was limited to rhetoric in many locations. Nevertheless, there was

an overwhelming consensus among Dang residents that this theme generated

considerable attitudinal support for the Maoists. The interview evidence with

regard to the use of selective incentives was contradictory, possibly revealing

regional variations in the policies of the Maoists. While it appears that access to

land was used to promote enlistment in certain instances, it was consistently

observed that contingent benefits were not applied to encourage the broader forms

of behavioural support (providing funds, withholding intelligence, etc.).44 As

discussed in detail below, this does not indicate that the Maoists failed to generate

collaboration through their land reform campaign, but that any linkage between

these variables was not based upon economic motives. The odds were further

stacked against collaboration using a narrow economic calculus as the costs of

contributing finances and food to the ‘People’s War’ were relatively high given

the scarcity of resources in Nepal.

The land issue aside, two further material selective incentives may also

partially explain the specific act of enlistment. Firstly, the cadres reportedly

earned 300 or 500 Nepali rupees per month, with the former figure being provided

by three Maoist officials interviewed in the Party office in Kalunga (Pyuthan

district), and the latter by party leaders in the VDCs of Narayanpur (Dang district)

and Dharmapani (Pyuthan district).45 A number of respondents also claimed that

the Maoists specifically publicised this allowance as part of their recruitment

drive. Secondly, it was often asserted by representatives of the opposing political

parties and apparently unaffiliated respondents that embezzlement was prevalent

in the insurgent movement, with references often being made to specific

individuals and events.46 Of course, given that low-risk economic opportunities

existed to most recruits through migratory labour in India, for instance, it seems

likely that the impact of these factors was limited. And, at a broader level it is

possible to conclude that the Nepali case does not conform to the stereotype of

‘criminal insurgency’ as portrayed in many contemporary accounts.47

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Security motives underpinning support

Shifting the focus of the analysis to the security sphere, a second frequently cited

solution to the free-rider problem arises as a result of counterinsurgent violence.

The central argument is that the cost of remaining in a specific location, rather

than absconding with the insurgents, increases as a result of state targeting.

Alternatively, it is also often maintained that state violence leads to collaboration

with the insurgents as a form of vengeance.48 With one or both of these

explanations in mind, Arjun Karki and David Seddon claim that:

During Operation Romeo and the later Operation Kilo Sierra . . . the police was[sic ] particularly violent and even barbaric in operations in the mid western hills.They treated everyone as a potential Maoist and many innocent people werearrested, ill-treated, tortured and killed almost randomly. The police actions resultedin a substantial proportion of the local population making common cause with theMaoists and the mid west was effectively confirmed as a Maoist heartland.49

However, these two alternative explanations are incomplete as they fail to consider

the extent to which the insurgents are capable of channelling these motives.50

Filling this gap, JeremyWeinstein claims that ‘the most important collective good

rebel groups provide is security’,51 and that ‘in particular, they offer protection

from government forces.’52 Of course, the extent to which such activities are

within the realms of possibility is dependent upon the relative strengths of the

competing organisations.53 With a specific temporal and geographical focus,

Steven Levine claims that the Chinese Communist Party provided protection as it

was a ‘well-organized and well-equipped military force’.54 In contrast, Elisabeth

Jean Wood observes that in the Salvadoran case:

. . . the FMLN [Farabundo Marti de Liberación Nacional ] offered little protectionfrom government forces in the case-study areas. Even in their strongholds ofnorthern Morazán and Chalatenango, the FMLN could not protect residents fromaerial bombardments . . . Thus, protection per se does not explain the ongoingparticipation of those who continued to support the insurgency.55

Indeed, in the Peruvian case is it commonly observed that an inability to provide

protection against state violence had a negative repercussion upon the level of

attitudinal support for Sendero Luminoso. For instance, Carlos Iván Degregori

states that:

When the Armed Forces entered Ayacucho, Shining Path [Sendero Luminoso ]retreated in order to protect its own cadres. But in doing so Sendero Luminosoclashed with the role of the traditional Andean patrón who protects his clients. Thus,Shining Path’s retreat left many sectors of the population feeling that they had beengreatly deceived.56

Focusing upon Nepal, not a single one of the 29 interviewees questioned on the

subject claimed that the Maoists shielded the population from the violence of the

security forces. At best, it was stated that the insurgents indirectly ‘protected’

the populace through offering information on the whereabouts of the police and

the Royal Nepalese Army, or through providing training in self-defence. It is


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conceivable (or, even, likely) that the Maoists were able to offer direct protection

in their ‘stronghold’ districts of Rolpa and Rukum. But the failure of this potential

explanatory variable in Dang, Gorkha and Pyuthan is particularly revealing given

that these three locations were selected on the grounds that they experienced

relatively high levels of Maoist influence.

Also within the sphere of security, a third prominent solution to Olson’s

paradox arises through the application of selective disincentives by the insurgent

forces in the form of coercion. This refers to personalised violence, or the threat of

such acts, undertaken with the objective of changing the behavioural patterns of

non-combatants. Considering the elements of this definition in turn: firstly, the

term personalised violence broadly refers to the range of actions undertaken with

the intent of causing physical or psychological damage to individuals, associated

second parties (family, friends, colleagues), or material damage to the economic

assets of these individuals. Secondly, this concept specifically incorporates the

threat of violence on the grounds that this is often sufficient to alter behavioural

patterns.57 And, thirdly, while identifying non-combatants during internal

conflicts is problematic, for the current purposes this term simply refers to

individuals outside of the state security forces and theMaoist political andmilitary

wings. Of course, it should be immediately apparent that the purpose of coercive

practices is distinct from the numerous ‘popular approaches’ discussed in this

article (land reform, republicanism, gender equality, ethnic empowerment, etc.).

The former is intended to gain collaboration directly through provoking fear, as

opposed to indirectly via attitudinal support.

Seeking to add resolution to the analysis of this theme Stathis Kalyvas

distinguishes between violence that is selective and indiscriminate. The former

refers to that perpetrated by insurgents (and counterinsurgents) in response to

specific actions of the targets, whereas the latter is based upon ‘guilt by

association’. Or, as expressed by Kalyvas:

Violence is selective or discriminant when individuals are targeted based uponpersonalised information about their actions; it is indiscriminate when individualsare targeted solely on the basis of their membership in a group perceived to beconnected with the opposition and irrespective of their individual actions (groupsmay be based on ties of kinship, location, class, ethnicity, etc.)58

While this binary distinction has become the cornerstone of much of the

contemporary analysis, further detail can also be added through focusing upon

the political, economic, and social characteristics of the victims. In the Nepali

case, it was often reported that the local landlords, civil servants, and political

opponents of the Maoists were disproportionately targeted. And, while the

‘official’ justifications for violence were undoubtedly contrived in many

instances, it seems that these activities were highly selective. For example,

numerous interviewees maintained that specific landlords were targeted on the

grounds that they refused to fund the ‘People’s War’ or as they were deemed to be

particularly ‘exploitative’ or ‘feudal’ in their relations with tenant farmers. The

violence against selected moneylenders was also reportedly based upon their lack

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of ‘contributions’, and the extent to which their rates of interest were ‘excessive’.

Similarly, it was claimed that the coercive acts against political opponents were

based upon their refusal to become politically inactive, their provisions of

intelligence to the security forces, and their acts of corruption.59

Approximately half of the interviewees claimed that Maoist coercion led to

collaboration among the ‘ordinary residents’ that comprised the bulk of the

population. These findings largely agree with the questionnaire data, as indicated

in Figure 5. Spatial variations were apparent in the latter, with the residents of

Gorkha being statistically less likely to claim that support was provided through

fear than individuals from the districts of Dang (*), and Pyuthan (**). This

seemingly corresponds to the elevated levels of attitudinal support in Gorkha (see

Figure 1).60 Focusing again upon the entire sample of interviewees, the opinions

were almost evenly divided when they were specifically asked to whether

collaboration was primarily voluntary or coerced. Thus, while coercion was of

greater relevance than either material contingent incentives or the provisions of

protection against state violence, much of the collaboration for the Maoists

remains as yet unexplained.

‘Popular appeals’ and the expansion of the rationalist framework

It was previously observed that in many locations the Maoists’ land reform

campaign amounted to little more than rhetoric, but that there was an overwhelming

consensus among the Dang residents that this generated considerable attitudinal

support. The remainder of this article focuses upon additional ‘popular appeal’ that

also successfully gained attitudinal support, including campaigns to empower

56.5%

46.8%

For what reasons did the people of this VDC provide support to the Maoists duringthe conflict? (tick all appropriate boxes)

54.7%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Dang Gorkha Pyuthan

Because of their threats

Figure 5. Support gained through coercion.


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marginalised ethnic minorities, subordinate castes and women, and an opposition

to the repressive palace rule.61 As discussed shortly, in the absence of selective

incentives it is necessary to move beyond ‘thin’ variants of the rational choice

framework to explain how supportive attitudes may convert into collaboration.

Firstly, the Maoists sought to empower the ethnic communities of Nepal

(known locally as janjatis) through establishing ethnically based united front

organisations,62 ensuring that these minorities were represented within the layers

of parallel governance,63 and subdividing the state territory into nine Autonomous

People’s Governments, of which six corresponded to the ‘homelands’ of the local

minorities.64 Of course, these policies were partly motivated by expedience, as is

indicated by the relative lack of mobility for janjatis within the insurgent

structure. Nevertheless, the field research revealed that considerable attitudinal

support was generated through this campaign. Indeed, there was a widespread

belief among the interviewees that janjatis were more likely to provide attitudinal

support to the insurgents than individuals from the dominant Hindu community.65

Even greater levels of attitudinal support were arguably generated through

appeals to the Dalit communities. While Marxist class identities are defined

according to the relationship between sectors of society and the means of

production (capital and labour), caste affiliations relate to the employment

opportunities available to specific sub-populations, with the Dalit castes in the

Indian subcontinent traditionally being responsible for a range of menial tasks.

This campaign is discussed in surprisingly little detail in the literature, but the

research revealed that non-Dalit Maoists breached the social conventions of

‘untouchability’ through eating with Dalits, entering Dalit homes, and through

‘encouraging’ other non-Dalits to enter these homes. Conversely, the Dalit

Maoists entered the homes of non-Dalit residents, and ‘encouraged’ others from

the Dalit community to undertake this act. It was also reported during the

interviews that the insurgents broke with social norms through allowing inter-

caste marriages within their ranks. While a number of respondents observed that

the campaign amounted to few concrete actions in their locality, it was also

frequently specified that support was generated through rhetoric alone.

In common with many Maoist-influenced insurgent organisations, a third

popular appeal in Nepal was the empowerment of females.66 The wide range of

gender-based activities included campaigns in support of female employment and

inheritance rights,67 and against domestic violence (with the latter commonly

being intertwined with a campaign against the consumption of alcohol).68 While

certain accounts appear to romanticise reality, during the conflict there was also a

partial breakdown in the ‘traditional’ roles as the burdens of work in the fields and

homes were decreasingly divided by gender.69 This change was encouraged by the

Maoists, but it also occurred out of a necessity imposed by the disproportionate

outmigration of males during the conflict. The field research indicated an

overwhelming consensus that the insurgents generated considerable attitudinal

support through these appeals, even in the locations where concrete reforms were

limited.

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The final appeal that resonated with the populacewas theMaoists’ opposition to

monarchical rule. Despite a constant theoretical opposition, there were considerable

fluctuations in the extent towhich this stance was emphasised by theMaoists during

the conflict.70However, in the aftermath of the 2001 ‘royalmassacre’ the republican

demand became a central pillar of the campaign. According to the official version,

Crown Prince Dipendra was responsible for the deaths of King Birendra (his father)

and several other members of his family. By contrast, theMaoists attributed respon-

sibility tovarious ‘reactionary’ and ‘imperialist’ elements inalliancewithBirendra’s

successor, Gyanendra.71 A series of democratic reversals under Gyanendra were

also associated with the intensification of the Maoists’ anti-palace rhetoric. During

the research it was reported by various interviewees that substantial degrees of

attitudinal support were provided as a result of this theme as Gyanendra was

considered to be dictatorial, repressive, corrupt, and indifferent towards thematerial

well-being of the populace. Most notably, however, this support also arose because

large sectors of the populace agreed that Gyanendra was responsible for the death of

his predecessor.

Prior to focusing upon the theoretical link between these campaigns and

behavioural support, it is necessary to observe that not all of the ‘popular appeals’

adopted by the insurgents were equally successful. For instance, unlike the

equivalent campaigns in China against the Japanese occupation and Vietnam

sequentially against French, Japanese, andUS forces,72 theMaoist rhetoric against

Indian ‘expansionism’ and US ‘imperialism’ largely failed to resonate with the

populace.73 Undoubtedly this failure reflects the comparative absence of external

threats to sovereignty in the Nepali case. Similarly, with their resources largely

channelled towards matters of a more directly military nature, the Maoists also

failed to gain significant degrees of attitudinal support through development

initiatives in the three research locations. The literature suggests that there was a

greater focus upon the construction of educational facilities, irrigations systems,

roads, etc., in the ‘heartlands’ of Rolpa and Rukum, and it seems likely that the

impact upon attitudinal support was elevated in these locations.74

As indicated above, in overcoming the free-rider problem the use of coercion

was of greater relevance than material contingent incentives, but much of the

collaboration for the Maoists remains unexplained by these factors. Thus, it is

necessary to draw upon broader variants of the rational choice framework to

understand why attitudinal support converts into collaboration. It is notable that

while rationalists tend to ‘gravitate towards materialist theories of preference and

cognition’,75 Mancur Olson himself claimed that:

Social sanctions and social rewards are ‘selective incentives’; that is, they areamong the kinds of incentives that may be used to mobilize a latent group. It is in thenature of social incentives that they can distinguish among individuals; therecalcitrant individual can be ostracised, and the cooperative individual can beinvited into the centre of the charmed circle.76

While it is commonly maintained that Olson implicitly denied this solution to the

free-rider problem to insurgent organisations (except during their initial phases)


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on the grounds that such factors only apply to small movements where face-to-

face contact is maintained, this objection is of limited merit as insurgents tend to

be embedded in local communities and are exposed to pressures exerted through

familial, clan, tribal, and friendship linkages.77 A number of micro-level studies

that focus upon the Nepal case touch upon these social ties, but this theme has yet

to be systematically analysed.78 Of more immediate relevance, however, is the

range of psychological variables that may provide motivation to individuals.79

According to Stathis Kalyvas these include:

. . . curiosity and the prospect of excitement and adventure, the lure of danger, theacquisition of a new and more rewarding individual identity or moral worldview,the pleasure of acting as one’s own agent . . . or simply the response to emotionssuch as anger, moral outrage caused by public humiliation, and the desire to takerevenge.80

Of course, this adds complexity to the analysis through introducing variables

(revenge, friendship, guilt, camaraderie, etc.) from outside of the traditional

realms of neoclassical economics that are comparatively difficult to define and

measure.81 Yet, in the absence of such factors the empirical evidence from Nepal

and numerous other case studies makes little sense.82 Thus, a comprehensive

understanding of insurgent–populace relations requires a degree of interdisci-

plinary collaboration that is currently absent from the dispersed field of conflict

studies.

Conclusion

In this article it was maintained that a comprehensive understanding of

insurgent–populace relations (and, for that matter, counterinsurgent–populace

relations) necessitates greater conceptual clarity in the distinction between

attitudinal and behavioural support. A number of theorists and practitioners focus

upon the former on the assumption that this asset translates into the latter with

sufficient consistency. In contrast, other authorities stress the disjuncture between

these two variables, commonly maintaining that behavioural support tends to be

underpinned by the demonstration of authority, often supplemented by the use of

coercive practices. However, indicative evidence from Nepal suggests that both

of these contrasting stances are overly simplistic as a result of the failure to

distinguish between different forms of collaboration. More specifically, it appears

that the Maoists obtained food largely irrespective of whether or not the populace

were attitudinally supportive, but that this was not the case with information.

Based upon this conceptual distinction this article sought to evaluate the

relative importance of the approaches used by the Maoists to generate support

during the 1996–2006 conflict. It was argued that considerable attitudinal support

was generated through the land reform initiative, although this failed to translate

directly into collaboration (perhaps other than in the form of enlistment) due to the

absence of selective incentives. While considerable focus in the wider literature is

placed upon the ability of insurgents to protect the populace from state violence,

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this provision was lacking in the selected field locations. By contrast, considerable

explanatory power was provided by the use of selective disincentives in the form

of insurgent violence, or the threat of violence, against non-combatants. The

Maoists also gained considerable attitudinal support through a number of ‘popular

appeals’, including campaigns to empower the marginalised ethnic minorities,

subordinated castes, and women, and their opposition to an increasingly

repressive monarchy. While additional research is certainly required, it is argued

that this converted into collaboration for the insurgents through psychological

stimuli based upon social sanctions and rewards.

Notes

1. See, for instance, del Pino, ‘Family, Culture, and Revolution’, 158–9; Grenier,Emergence of Insurgency in El Salvador, 83; Kataoka, Resistance and Revolution inChina, 300–1; Kessler,Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, 48–50;Marantoand Tuchman, ‘Knowing the Rational Peasant’, 260; Pike, Viet Cong, 381–2; Taylor,Shining Path, 162; and Scott, ‘Revolution in the Revolution’, 97–134. Similarcomments from the case of Nepal were provided by Graham, ‘People’s War’, 241;and Shneiderman, ‘The Formation of Political Consciousness in Rural Nepal’, 304.During the field research conducted for this article the local Nepali residents oftenreported that the ideological appeals of the Maoists were only understood by aminority, and that acts of collaboration were largely contingent upon rhetoric andactions of a less esoteric nature. It also emerged that the narrower concept of classwaspoorly understood, with locals tending to associate to a greater extent with their‘traditional’ ethnic and caste identities.

2. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 364.3. While each of these themes is discussed to varying degrees in the case study

literature, few accounts assess their comparative importance. Focusing upon theChinese case, the following provide two prominent exceptions: Johnson, PeasantNationalism and Communist Power; and Selden, Yenan Way. There are no widelyacknowledged studies that offer empirical evidence from the field.

4. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 92.5. See, for instance, Sharma, ‘The Maoist Movement’, 42.6. A focus upon the issues faced while undertaking research in post-conflict

environments is beyond the scope of this article, but see, for instance, Fujii,‘Interpreting Truth and Lies’; Pettigrew et al., ‘Relationships, Complicity andRepresentation’; and Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 31–50.

7. On the advice of Kathmandu-based researchers the quantitative data was collectedthrough distributing questionnaires to students aged 16 and upwards in schools forcompletion by their parents. This approach is common in rural Nepal as it enablesresearchers to overcome issues associated with a dispersed populace located inregions with a limited transport infrastructure. Using this method, the resultantsample was representative of the populace in terms of caste and ethnicity, but therespondents were disproportionately middle-aged males as the students tended toobtain responses from the ‘head of household’. As this bias was consistent betweenlocations it does not undermine the comparative analysis between the districts.

8. Sendero Luminoso of Peru provided direct inspiration for the Nepali Moaists isarguably the most comprehensively studied insurgent organisation in history.

9. As interpreted, in particular, by McAdam et al., ‘Towards an Integrated Perspectiveon Social Movements and Revolution’.


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10. The distinction between attitudinal and behavioural support is also made in Kalyvas,Logic of Violence in Civil War, 87–110. The extent to which ambiguities in theEnglish-language usage of the term support undermine the comprehension ofinsurgent–populace relations is also observed in Marks, ‘Making Revolution’, 43.

11. Focusing upon a range of case studies, the issue of insurgent recruitment is morenarrowly considered, for instance, in Eck, ‘Recruiting Rebels’; Florez-Morris,‘Joining Guerrilla Groups in Colombia’; Henricksen and Vinci ‘Combat Motivationin Non-State Armed Groups’; and Ribetti, ‘The Unveiled Motivations of Violence inIntra-State Conflicts’.

12. Regarding the statistical information provided in the text: * ¼ at a confidence levelof 90%; ** ¼ at a confidence level of 95%; and *** ¼ at a confidence level of99%. Throughout this article the error bars presented for the questionnaire datarepresent the margin of error at a confidence level of 95%.

13. The information provided in the literature with regard to behavioural support isgenerally anecdotal and focused primarily upon financial matters. Regarding theNepali case, for instance, see Gersony, Sowing the Wind, 68; Ogura, ‘MaoistPeople’s Government’, 185, 192; and Pettigrew, ‘Living between the Maoists and theArmy in Rural Nepal’, 267. For greater detail on behavioural support in practiceoutside of the context of Nepal, see Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution inLatin America, 54–5; and Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 121–8.

14. While largely absent from the field of conflict studies, the relationship betweenattitudes and behaviours has long been a central theme of study in psychology. See,for instance, McGuire, ‘The Vicissitudes of Attitudes and Similar RepresentationalConstructs in Twentieth Century Psychology’; and Terry et al., ‘Prejudices Attitudes,Group Norms, and Discriminatory Behaviour’.

15. Aside from being observed by interviewees during the field research, regarding othercase studies this is also discussed in Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 93; andWood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 17.

16. Numerous respondents claimed that the Maoists often did not demand‘contributions’ from the most impoverished families.

17. Regarding other case studies this is also observed in Hartford, ‘Repression andCommunist Success’, 122; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power,115; Leites and Wolf Jr, Rebellion and Authority, 11; and Maranto and Tuchman,‘Knowing the Rational Peasant’, 257–8.

18. Johnson, ‘Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict’, 649.19. Connor, National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, 71.20. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries, 164.21. Lawrence cited in Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare, 2.22. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 44.23. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 53. Also see

Petersen, Resistances and Rebellion, 9. An alternative justification for adopting abehaviour-centric approach relates to the practical issue of measuring the attitudes ofindividuals during internal conflict, as discussed in Kalyvas, Logic of Violence inCivil War, 92–5.

24. Leites and Wolf Jr, Rebellion and Authority, 45.25. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 67–8.26. Kalyvas and Kocher, ‘The Dynamics of Violence in Vietnam’, 339.27. For instance in the VDC of Dharmapani, where there was little attitudinal support, the

Maoists reportedly gained limited information but considerable food. By contrast, inthe VDC of Darbhung the levels of attitudinal support were elevated and theinsurgents reportedly gained considerable supplies of both assets. While notdemonstrated here, the findings for the provisions of money and shelter largely

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mirrored that for food supply, and the findings for materiel transportation reflected

those for provision of information. These findings are indicative as they do not

specifically demonstrate that the actual supply of food and information varied. Rather,

they indicate a perception among local respondents that these provisions varied.28. Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 156.29. This is also observed in DeNardo, Power in Numbers, 8–15; Goldstone, ‘Theories of

Revolution’, 425–53; Grenier, The Emergence of Insurgency in El Salvador, 2;

McCormick, Sharply Dressed Men; Marks, Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam, 1–15;

and Selbin, Modern Latin American Revolutions.30. Romano, Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 10–11.31. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 17. Wendell Phillips was a US abolitionist.32. McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 16.33. Ibid., 46.34. A similar argument is made in DeNardo, Power in Numbers, 27–32.35. McCormick, Sharply Dressed Men, 1.36. Leve, ‘Women’s Empowerment and Rural Revolution’, 346–7.37. Graham, ‘People’s War’, 233.38. Shah, ‘A Himalayan Red Herring’, 193.39. DeNardo, Power in Numbers, 52.40. A thorough consideration of the many solutions to the free-rider problem is beyond

the scope of this thesis. Comprehensive accounts are available in Lichbach, The

Rebel’s Dilemma; and Moore, ‘Rational Rebels’.41. Race, War Comes to Long An, 174.42. Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 12.43. See, for instance, Gersony, Sowing the Wind, 65; Onesto,Dispatches from the People’s

War, 90; Ramirez, ‘Maoism in Nepal’, 237–8; Seddon and Hussein, Consequences of

Conflict, 31; and Kamal Dahal, ‘Inside the Revolution in Nepal’, 101.44. While the land reform initiative was the most obvious candidate, neither was it

possible to identify selective material incentives to promote these broader forms of

behavioural support in other Maoist campaigns. For instance, the benefits of their

development initiatives (including the construction of roads, school buildings,

irrigation systems, etc.) were not distributed in a manner that benefited collaboration.45. This theme is also briefly discussed in Gersony, Sowing the Wind, 69.46. This evidence is not sufficient to suggest that the Maoists conform to the ‘criminal

insurgency’ portrayed in numerous contemporary accounts, and Maoist respondents

often reported that they sought to limit such practices through internal monitoring

systems and severe sanctions against the culprits.47. This issue is also discussed in Graham, ‘People’s War’, 235.48. See, for instance, Ibid., 243.49. Karki and Seddon, ‘The People’s War in Historical Perspective’, 23.50. The first of these two explanations also overlooks the option of fleeing to secure

locations.51. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 37. Also see, for instance, Goodwin, No Other Way Out,

48; and Mason and Krane, ‘The Political Economy of Death Squads’, 181.52. While not applicable in the case of Nepal, in certain instances insurgents also provide

protection against the violent excesses of competing non-state organisations, often

including those with linkages to the security forces. The ongoing conflicts in

Colombia and Sudan (Darfur) provide two recent examples.53. As observed by Kasfir, ‘Guerrillas and Civilian Participation’, 273.54. Levine, ‘Rural Revolution in Manchuria’, 173.55. Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 13.


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56. Degregori, ‘Harvesting Storms’, 141. Also see Isbell, ‘Shining Path and PeasantResponses in Rural Ayacucho’, 90.

57. As observed, for instance, in Lecomte-Tilouine ‘Terror in a Maoist Model Village’.58. Kalyvas, ‘“New” and “Old” Civil Wars’, 101. Also see Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in

Civil War, 141–5; and Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 18.59. While such acts generated behavioural support directly from the elite subsets of the

populace, there was little evidence to suggest that this violence gained attitudinalsupport from ‘ordinary residents’ as a form of vengeance. As is often the case thegreatest level of micro-level detail regarding this theme comes from the Peruviancase. See, for instance, Berg, ‘Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas’,114–15; Degregori, ‘Harvesting Storms’, 136–41; Starn, ‘Missing the Revolution’,76; Taylor, Shining Path, 129, 164; and Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 249.

60. Various causal mechanisms may underlie this inferred relationship. Most notably, alack of attitudinal support may be a consequence of the coercive practices of theinsurgents. Or, conversely, the insurgents may utilise elevated levels of violenceagainst the populace in certain locations as a result of a local lack of attitudinalsupport.

61. It is worth briefly observing that a number of interviewees maintained that each ofthese themes provoked attitudinal opposition from certain individuals from the‘traditional’ sectors of society, including the ‘dominant’ castes, elders, etc.

62. Karki and Seddon, ‘The People’s War in Historical Perspective’, 28; Shah, ‘AHimalayan Red Herring’, 219; and Sharma, ‘The Maoist Movement’, 41–2.

63. Sharma, ‘The Maoist Movement’, 45; and Shneiderman and Turin, ‘The Path to JanSarkar in Dolakha District’, 80.

64. Karki and Seddon, ‘The People’s War in Historical Perspective’, 28–9; and Ogura,‘Maoist People’s Government’, 177, 216–17.

65. While beyond the scope of this article, it is necessary to observe that not all of theethnic communities provided support to the insurgents in equal measure, as indicatedin Gersony, Sowing the Wind; and Shneiderman and Turin, ‘The Path to Jan Sarkarin Dolakha District’, 87.

66. With regard to other leftist insurgent movements this issue is discussed, for instance,in Cordero, ‘Women in War’, 352; Lobao, ‘Women in Revolutionary Movements’;Reif, ‘Women in Latin American Guerrilla Movements’; and Wickham-Crowley,Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 21–3, 215–19.

67. Onesto, Dispatches from the People’s War, 174; Parvati, ‘Women’s Participation inthe People’sWar’, 169; and Pettigrew and Shneiderman, ‘Women and theMaobaadi’.

68. Gautam et al., ‘Where there are no Men’, 229; Gersony, Sowing the Wind, 58–60;Manchanda, ‘Maoist Insurgency in Nepal’, 249; Onesto, Dispatches from thePeople’s War, 175–7; Pettigrew and Shneiderman, ‘Women and the Maobaadi’;Sharma and Prasain, ‘Gender Dimensions of the People’s War’, 156–7.

69. Compare, for instance, Manchanda, ‘Maoist Insurgency in Nepal’, 253; Onesto,Dispatches from the People’s War, 168; and Pettigrew and Shneiderman, ‘Womenand the Maobaadi’. Li Onesto is or was a correspondent for the RevolutionaryWorker and provides an account that is highly sympathetic towards the Maoists.

70. Shah, ‘A Himalayan Red Herring’, 208.71. See, for instance, Bhattarai, Monarchy versus Democracy, 57; Shah, ‘A Himalayan

Red Herring’, 208; and Thapa, ‘Erosion of the Nepali World’, 237.72. This issue is discussed, for instance, in Connor, National Question in Marxist-

Leninist Theory and Strategy, 84–6; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 112; Johnson, PeasantNationalism and Communist Power, 4; Maranto and Tuchman, ‘Knowing theRational Peasant’, 253; Popkin, Rational Peasant, 218; Selden, Yenan Way, 116;Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam, 22; and Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, 245–50.

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73. The former theme is considered in detail in Mishra, ‘India’s Role in Nepal’s MaoistInsurgency’.

74. See, for instance, Gersony, Sowing the Wind, 64; Onesto, Dispatches from thePeople’s War, 131; Seddon and Hussein, Consequences of Conflict, 32; and Thapa,Kingdom under Siege, 109.

75. As observed, for instance, by Levi, ‘A Model, a Method, and a Map’, 24–5;Lichbach, ‘Social Theory and Comparative Politics’, 249–50; Moore, ‘RationalRebels’, 427; and Romano, Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 68.

76. Olson, Logic of Collective Action, 61.77. Outside of the case of Nepal, a list of the studies that focus upon this issue is available

in Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 95. Also see, for instance, Kerkvliet, HukRebellion, 33; Selden, Yenan Way, 53; Taylor, Shining Path, 180; and Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 257.

78. See, for instance, Lecomte-Tilouine, ‘Terror in a Maoist Model Village’; Pettigrew,‘Guns, Kinship and Fear’; Pettigrew, ‘Living between the Maoists and the Army’; deSales, ‘The Kham Magar Country’; de Sales, ‘From Ancestral Conflicts to LocalEmpowerment’; Shneiderman and Turin, ‘The Path to Jan Sarkar in DolakhaDistrict’; and Shneiderman, ‘The Formation of Political Consciousness in RuralNepal’.

79. A very limited psychological treatment of the Nepali case is provided in Graham,‘People’s War’, 243.

80. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 95–6.81. As observed by Levi, ‘A Model, a Method, and a Map’, 24–5.82. This is also the approach adopted byWood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War.

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