INSURGENCY IN NAGALAND

Topography

Covering an area of 16488 sq km, Nagaland is located in India‟s North-Eastern region

(comprising of states of Arunachal Pradesh (earlier known as North East Frontier Agency –

NEFA, Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya)(Map 1). Nagaland is a

mountainous region (average attitude varying from 900 to 1500 meters) with thick – tropical

forest, inhospitable humid climate and challenging conditions. These pose challenge of all sorts

for the counter insurgency operations and for troops operating in hostile environment. The

region is tougher than Afghanistan! Nagaland has borders with Myanmar on the East, Manipur

state in the south; Assam on the West and Arunachal Pradesh on North. (Map 2). The jungles of

Malaya Mountains of Greece and the slushy paddy fields of Vietnam can all be found together in

Nagaland.(1). With just two entry points from rest of India by road and few Second World War

jeepable tracks (which remained disused after the war) the communication and transportation

system in the state was almost non-existent (Map 2). It made movement of counter insurgency

forces difficult, time consuming and tiring. Dense forests restricted visibility severely. All these

characteristics of the topography and climate were exploited by Naga insurgents to develop their

fighting potential and capabilities. In fact these topographical peculiarities where used by Naga

insurgents as force multipliers!!

Population

Approximate population of Nagaland as per 1961 census was 3,69,000. Today it is

approximately 12,27,000. There are various versions as to why the local population is called

“Naga” (meaning people living on hill top, the followers „Nag‟ (cobra snake) and so on). The

Nagas are very strongly build, healthy, hardworking and honest people. They probably formed

part of original population stream, which spread outwards from North Western China (Indo-

Mongolian group). During World War II, especially Burma campaign the people of Nagaland

came in contact and under the influence of British and to some extent Japanese Forces (See Map

1). During Burma Campaign, Japanese forces advanced up to Kohima (now capital of state of

Nagaland). Battle of Kohima between Japanese army and British Indian Army made an lasting

impact on Naga Society and their fighting potential. Christianity and the church made impact

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and influence on Naga society, which resulted in majority of population adopting Christian

religion. Religion has made both positive and negative impact on the people, insurgency and

counter insurgency.

One of the peculiarity in Nagaland has been the one of relatively small groups of people,

separated in time, each coming in with and developing a somewhat different dialect, and each

group living increasingly in isolation from the other. The various Naga dialects all derive from

the Tibeto-Burman family of Languages. The reason for this linguistic isolation is not far the

seek. The Naga tribes lived in physical seclusion and, what is more, they were always at war

with one another. The impenetrable forests (jungles) and the formidable nature of mountain

ranges enforced their isolation. This “isolating tendency” played a very important role when at

the time of independence, Naga District (now the state of Nagaland) was to form part of India.

This isolating tendency was fully exploited to start the insurgency in Nagaland. (Today we see

similar situation in remote areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan also). Though the people of

Nagaland are called „Naga‟ but there are mainly Sixteen tribes in Nagaland namely Konyak, Ao,

Sema, Chalcesarg, Angami, Lotha, Sangtam, Yimchunger, Chang, Khamyungan, Pham, Zelang,

Rengma, Kuku, Kachari, Mikir and few other (Map 3). There are various peculiar features of

Naga life, which render these unique people attractive. Every tribe has its own particular design

in weaves and a person in Nagaland is usually identifiable in respect of his/her tribe by the cloth

he/she wears. One of the extraordinary features of Nagaland is the diversity in the language of

the various tribes. The self imposed isolation in which the Nagas for centuries have lived on

their hilltop – an isolation in which monosyllabic languages like theirs grow apart from one

another, has resulted in the people of even neighbouring villages being unable to understand one

another. The medium of conversation between the various tribes is Assamese, which in

characteristic manner got christened “Nagamese”. Different languages spoken by different tribes

made an impact on insurgency movement. With the passage of time the people of Nagaland and

more so insurgent leaders themselves accepted the word “Naga” with grate pride and it was on

their insistence the state came to be called Nagaland. Insurgent groups initially came together

based on tribal affinity but with gradual interaction came to be known as “Naga Army”. Counter

insurgency forces had to learn different languages to be able to interact with the villagers and

also speak Nagamese. One of the key ingredients of success in counter insurgency / counter

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terrorist operation is to be proficient in local language. People will interact freely only when

they can speak to you in confidence. No one will ever share any worthwhile information (also

called actionable intelligence) in the presence of a third person (called interpreter) for obvious

reason. Most of the forces deployed / employed in counter insurgency operations all over world

fail to acquire this basic ingredient while operating in counter insurgency / counterterrorist

environment / operations. They also fail to study and understand peculiarities of people,

historical, cultural background in the area of interest.

The Insurgency

Brief Historical Background

Tribal groups that entered Nagaland went on struggling and migrating before reaching

their present locations. The concept of “Jhoom” (“Shifting Cultivation” every year) confirms the

migration concept. The powerful Siamese – Chinese speaking Ahom Kings of Tibetan –

Burman origin, who came to Assam in early 13th

Century tried to control Nagas and other

tribesmen by the application of stick and carrot policy (Map 2). While permitting the use of

adjoining lands, offering paddy and agriculture commodities, the Ahoms were perceived to be

ruthless in punishing Nagas for their misadventure, raids and evasion of taxes, by despatching

expeditions. However, due to peculiarity of terrain, in hospitable countryside and environment

Ahoms could not fully control the Nagas. Ahoms succumbed to the British in the early 19th

Century. The conflict between Ahoms and Nagas resulted in the deep-rooted suspicion and

hatred among the Nagas towards people from plain and thus also Indians!

During British rule, the British came in direct contact with Nagas some time in 1839.

British Government attempted to control Naga tribes by sending expeditions into the hills but

could not succeed much. This process was termed as “control from without”. Nagas continued

with their raids into Assam (British Territory!). Later from 1847 onwards the British tried to

establish outposts in the Naga Hills. This attempt was termed as “control from within”.

However this also did not succeed. Sometime in 1851 the British Army withdrew from Naga

Hills and from next 10 years the policy of “non-interference” was adopted. However this also

did not succeed. Nagas continued to raid the villages in Assam. However the British continued

to adopt several means and methods to keep Naga tribes under control.

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In 1935 British Government had enacted Government of India Act 1935. As per this act

the Naga Hills district was declared an “excluded area” within the province of Assam. The

constitutional position of Naga Hills district (present state of Nagaland) until 15 Aug 1947 was

thus that of a regular district within province of Assam and it was as much part of British India

as any other district or any other province of India. It would be pertinent to vote that in 1929

Simon Commission which was appointed by British Government had visited Naga Hills districts.

At that time members of the “Naga Club” (an organisation consisting of local village headman

and youth, formed in 1918) had submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission, demanding

the exclusion of the Nagas from proposed reform and their retention under direct administration,

(of Governor of Assam), to save them from being overwhelmed by people of plains (Assam and

India). This was later carefully and cunningly interpreted by insurgents, that Nagas had clearly

told the British Government that Naga Hills will not be part of India. (3)

The Naga Club, which was basically formed to foster the welfare and social aspirations

of the Nagas under official patronage, was succeeded in 1946 by Naga National Council (NNC)

this council on Jun 1946 submitted a four-point memorandum to the Cabinet Mission as under:-

1. The NNC stands for the solidarity of all the Naga tribes, including those in the un

administered areas.

2. This council strongly protest against grouping of Assam with Bengal province.

3. The Naga Hills should be constitutionally included in an autonomous Assam in a

free India, with local autonomy and due safeguards for the interests of Nagas.

4. The Naga tribes should have a separate electorate (this point was exploited by

some political leaders and insurgents not to participate in first general election held in

Independent India.

It needs to be noted and considered that from August 1947 onwards one of the major task

of Indian statesmanship, Governing and security mechanism has been to impart and develop a

“sense of belonging” among all these groups and tribes, whose progress towards Indian

citizenship had been retarded, consciously or unconsciously, during British rule.

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The British while dealing with the Nagas adopted numerous postures but their main

thrust remained always focused and dominated by colonial considerations. Gradually British

administration made its way into Nagaland. The Nagaland state was known as Naga Hills

District earlier. The Headquarters of District administration was located at Kohima the present

state capital (Map 5). During Burma campaign, the Japanese invaded Nagaland and advanced up

to Kohima via Manipur. British sought the help of people of Nagaland to fight against Japanese

invading forces. Local youth was trained in art of jungle warfare, ambush, raids and so on.

Nagas who were Tough Mountain fighters adapted to guerrilla warfare easily. During Burma

campaign, they had collected arms and ammunition from both, British Army and Japanese forces

when they were retreating from Nagaland towards Myanmar. Their success during the campaign

made there confident to wedge armed struggle.

Origin of Insurgency

Demand of Independence

At the end of Burma campaign and World War II, British administration tried to

reconstruct the generally shattered tribal economy; which was based on forest produce and

agriculture. Naga Hills district council was established in April 1945. Within a short period, the

tribal chiefs decided to change its name to “Naga National Council”. The charter of the council

was to promote welfare, fulfilling social aspirations and develop unity among Naga tribes.

Council was composed of representatives of various Naga tribes. These elected representatives

got the recognition from administrative authorities. However, the inclusion of the word

“National” in the Naga phraseology started making its impact in various ways. (2). Some of the

representatives and members of Naga National Council (NNC) started adopting political posture

and started a movement for unity of all Naga tribes, separate electorate for Nagas and grant of

local autonomy. It is worth noting that similar postures were adopted by political organisations,

which later started insurgency movement in other parts of North East. Such demands do make

an impact and appeal to the local population. These help in seeking support of the local

population and justify insurgency.

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At the time of Independence in 1947, there were different schools of thoughts prevailing

in Nagaland. These found acceptance among some members of NNC: continuation of Naga

areas within India as an integrated autonomous state, integration of certain areas of NEFA,

Manipur and Myanmar, which were habited by Naga tribes to form separate political identity

under British Crown. Some people favoured maintaining special political arrangements and

governing relationship with India until sufficient experience had been attained to govern

Nagaland as an independent state. However, there was a small but influential portion of NNC

which favoured for complete independence at the same time when India became independent.

Mr AZ Phizo who belonged to Angami tribe and was jailed in Rangoon returned to

Nagaland after his release from jail in 1946. He was a hardliner. He spread the idea and concept

of complete independence. In Jun 1947 NNC made a declaration that Naga Hills would cease to

be part of India when British leave India. This demand gave motivation and made beginning of

Insurgency movement in Nagaland.

Hydari Agreement

Sir Akbar Hydary the Governor of Assam was tasked by India‟s‟ Prime Minister Pandit

Jawahar Lal Nehru to discuss the issue with the NNC and come to an acceptable agreement.

After prolonged discussion, nine point agreement (referred as Sir Hydary agreement) was

arrived at with the NNC. As per this agreement, NNC was authorised and responsible for

imposition, collection and expenditure of all taxes including house tax. The areas adjoining

Nagaland with Naga population, were to be reorganised, and Naga right to develop and

administer as per tribal customs and traditions was accepted. It was also agreed that without the

consent of Naga people no law enacted by Government / Legislative bodies was to be applied.

With careful propaganda, some members of NNC and specially Mr Phizo started propagating the

concept of complete independence. In fact, Hydri Agreement was deliberately misinterpreted as

acceptance of demand of Naga people for total independence. The last clause of the agreement

contained a ten years period of special responsibility of the Governor of Assam to ensure the due

observance of the agreement and that at the end of the period the Nagas would be asked whether

they required the above agreement to be extended for a further period, or a new agreement

regarding the future of Naga people to be arrived at. (2). Due to various reasons Hydari

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agreement did not bring any result and was almost discarded. It transpired, not very long

afterwards that NNC interpreted this to mean that they would have the right to demand

independence from India, should they so desire after a period of ten years, whereas the official

version was that the reference was to be revised and more acceptable arrangements arrived at for

the working of autonomy after ten years, and that there was never any question of Nagas having

the right to terminate the agreement and opt out of India. This clause became a bone of

contention. The Naga point of view was that they had the right to secede from Indian Union

under this clause. The administration of these areas including that of NEFA (part of which got

merged into newly formed state of Nagaland later) was through ministry of External Affairs gave

further credence to the secessionists. It is difficult to tell whether there was any genuine

misreading of what was admittedly, an ambiguously worded clause or whether there were

inspired afterthoughts on one or both sides. The sum total was a hardening of Naga opinion,

which was reflected in subsequent events, leading up to a complete dead Lock, and in this

process one person (like all insurgencies or revolutionary movements all over the world) played

a dominant role – he was Mr AZ Phizo. Though the Nagas declared their independence on 14

August 1947, they did not form any parallel government. It was in 1953 that Mr Phizo started

underground activities. In 1955 he brought the warning factions of the Nagas, their armed

groups together and framed a so-called “Constitution”. The armed revolt / insurgency then broke

out.

The Hardening of Attitude and Symbolic Show of Independence

When the sub-committee of the Constituent Assembly of India, then busy writing and

finalising constitution of India visited Kohima to workout the details of the arrangements for

tribal autonomy in the hill districts of Assam (of which the Naga Hills was one) despite all

persuasion the Naga leaders decided to have nothing to do with the scheme and they

subsequently boycotted the elections which were held to form District Councils. In the sense,

this was the turning point. India‟s General Elections in 1952 were also boycotted. The

secessionists used this as a big publicity victory. Mr Phizo in fact staged his own „elections‟ at

about the same time in the shape of a plebiscite or referendum; on two issues; which were

presented to the Nagas – independence or remaining with India. At the same time oaths were

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administered in tribal fashion binding persons to fight for independence. Mr Phizo claimed that

over 99% of the people of Nagaland voted for independence from India.

The next step was deliberate disobedience and defiance. A campaign was launched for

non co-operation with the Government in its development schemes and non-payment of house

tax. (Nagas never paid any tax to any one before). Teachers of schools were forced to resign

and children were made to give up their studies. (Same model was repeated in other states of

North East where insurgency erupted and also in Jammu and Kashmir where terrorism erupted in

1990 and thereafter). The Gaon Burra (village headman) returned their red blankets and the

badges of their authority to Deputy Commissioner and various other actions / gestures to support

the disobedience.

At the same time a claver and sustained publicity campaign was launched by Phizo.

Though the Nagas had no exposure to modern Psychological warfare or propaganda; propaganda

was brilliantly aimed at the deepest feelings of the Naga people and their pride in what they had

and their fears of loosing it all if they remained with India*. They were reminded of their

independence and freedom from control, their unique brand of democracy where unanimity was

necessary to decide an issue, and not a mere majority, their classless and casteless society, their

rights over lands and forests, the absence of beggary and crime in their villages, and the innate

honesty, as exemplified by the fact that they used no looks on their doors and their paddy

granaries were kept outside the villages unprotected or unlocked (which is true even today in

interior parts of Nagaland which is untouched by so called “main stream” civilised people). All

this was the Naga way of life and it was threatened!!

Towards the end of 1953, the separatist movement penetrated the adjoining area of

Tuensang. Which was being administered under NEFA, under ministry of external affairs.

Displaying the strategy which later dominated the tactical movement of the insurgents NNC

started their infiltration from / to the areas adjoining the Burma border.

*(This was the period when as a young NCC cadet I was attending a leadership camp at

Guwahati, the State capital of Assam and was interacting with college Student from North

East).

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Apart from many other causes for eruption of insurgency in Nagaland could be

summarised as:-

(a) Fear of loss of ethnic and cultural identity among Naga people being part of

Assam/India. This was fully exploited by insurgent leaders especially by Mr A Z Phizo.

(b) Inadequate understanding of Naga fears. Lack of knowledge among the political

leaders bureaucrats, policy formulators both in Assam as well as at New Delhi.

(c) Lack of understanding of Naga Psyche and characteristics.

(d) Propaganda conducted by Phizo was not countered effectively.

Induction of Army

On 22 March 1955, Mr Phizo announced the formation of Naga Federal Government

(NFG) and hoisted their flag. Violence now started on a planned scale. Both the state

government of Assam and Government of India were caught off guard and were taken by

surprise. It was also likely, that the governing mechanism and political leadership failed read

and analyse ground realities. Nagas had drawn up a “constitution” under which there was to be a

Parliament and a Cabinet of Ministers (details later). In addition, they went on to appoint from

among themselves Governors of various tribal areas, Magistrate, Deputy Commissioner. They

had established a total parallel government. Naga Home Guard was formed into Naga Army;

adopting the designation, uniforms and badges of rank used by British Army and Indian Army.

By 1956 the Nagas had build up a guerrilla force of about three thousand men and

intensified their campaign of terrorism against Government Officials and even villagers forcing

them to cooperate with the insurgents to provide money, food, shelter and other supplies without

which they could not subsists in their jungle camps / hideouts. As a result the Government of

India was forced to resort to calling Indian Army to deal with the insurgent menace.

The Army was inducted in 1956. The Army was given strict instructions that it was to

function in “aid to civil authorities”, it minimum force (Combat power) was to be used to avoid

any damage to innocent people and army was to provide protection to peace full people /

villagers. These instructions actually gave advantage to insurgents, who could collect their

sustenance from villagers, collect intelligence about movement of counter insurgency forces and

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attack them and again get mixed up among villagers / local people. However due to sustained

Army Operations (details later) in 1957 Phizo was forced to flee to East Pakistan (now

Bangladesh) and then to London (where he remained and influenced insurgency in Nagaland all

his life). The Armed Forces Special Power Act was enacted to give powers to Army to conduct

Military operations. (This has now become almost a prerequisite, when the Army is called upon

to under take such counter insurgency / counter terrorist operations). There are conflicting views

on Armed Forces Special Power Act and its misuse by security forces while combating

insurgency.

The NFG was carefully planned and organised. It provided for private enterprise and free

trade, freedom in religious belief and education of people. Land was to remain with the people

and no tax was to be paid on land. The freedom of the village, tribe, and family to mange its own

affairs and its land, the continuation of the community organization and the social and religious

practices and customs where guaranteed. All these appealed to the Nagas who were getting

conflicting reports and news about the governing administrative philosophy and mechanism in

different parts of India and policies of Government of India. There is an age-old philosophy of

inter phase between people, society and government: “where there is reluctance to understand

ignorance persists, and where ignorance exists suspicion thrives, suspicion results in

misunderstanding, hate and revenge”. (This is what is happening today in many parts of the

world where internal revolt, struggle, insurgency, terrorism has griped the people and society.

Insurgents, revolutionaries, terrorist will always exploit and base their power on the insecurity of

people in a given area of interest They will use fear as political instrument encompassing the

administrators, bureaucrats, politicians and the repressive apparatus inside the circle of fear).

Those who are combating insurgency, terrorism, internal unrest (like naxalites in India) must

understand the local people, environment, beliefs, custom and traditions and only then form their

ideologies operational philosophy, strategies, action plans and techniques of operations/response.

All these must be carefully and efficiently articulated in a manner, which is consistent with the

popular traditions of the area, society or country concerned.

As part of the NFG, there was provision for Angs (governors), khedahge (President),

Kilonser (Minister), Advisors, Ambassadors, Deputy Commissioner (administrators) and

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Magistrates (judicial officials etc). This was based on British model of government. NFG was

later named as Government of the Peoples republic of Nagaland (based on Chinese model, due to

influence of Chinese philosophy and may be guidance). The organization is as follows:-

Parliament (Tatar HO-HO)

Chairman

Vice Chairman Based on Chinese model

General Secretary

Ministry of defence (Defence Minister)

Ministry of Home (Home Minister)

Ministry of External Affairs (Foreign Minister)

Ministry of Finance (Finance Minister)

Ministry of Information and Publicity (Information Minister)

Ministry of Forest and Minerals (Deputy Minister)

Ministry of Law and Justice (Deputy Minister)

Ministry of Education (Deputy Minister)

Ministry of Religious Affair (Head Chaplain)

Administrative Regions / Regional Council (Chinese Model)

Chief administrative officer

Project Officer

Assistant Project Officer

Regional Councils

Regional Council Members in Nagaland (Based on Tribes)

Seema

Lotha

Angami

AO

Chekasang

Pochury

Other Tribes

Regional Council Manipur

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Naga Army

Naga Army was initially known as Naga Home Guards (NHG). It had a Commander-in-

Chief, a Major General for each tribe commanding a Division of approximately 500 men,

Brigadier and other officer ranks. A regular uniform with insignia etc. These were based on the

pattern of British Army and even British pattern of decorations. Arms and ammunition was

available in plenty from wartime dumps and at later stage obtained both from China and East

Pakistan. When the American ammunition ran out, the rifles were re-bored to take the British

.303 ammunition by Konyak Nagas who are traditional gun makers. (We see similar pattern in

Afghanistan and some provinces of Pakistan even today). Naga Army was organised almost on

Indian Model. The overall strength Naga Army was not very large. Each Battalion had

approximately 60-80 insurgents. The Naga Army was organised was as follows:-

Army

Headquarters

Eastern

Command

Central

Command

Southern

Command

Western

Command

Area Area

Area

Area

Battalion

Battalion Battalion

Brigade

Brigade Brigade

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To ensure participation of women, Naga women‟s society was formed. This was very

popular during initial stage. It enrolled cooks, nurses, and helpers. Its duty was to organise

receptions, supply of rations to insurgents, act as nurses and couriers etc. Nurses from the

Government department also joined at their free will. There was shortage of doctors, but the

compounders working in Government hospitals provided relief, treatment and medicine.

Chaplains from churches regularly held religious services.

Political Initiative – Strategy by Government

While the counter insurgency operations were conducted by the Army, Political process

was initiated by Government of India and Government of Assam. In early 1957 Baptist Church

condemned the violence initiated by insurgents and appealed to Christian Nagas to work for

peace. As a result several meetings of All tribes Naga People Convention were held in different

parts of Nagaland between 1957 and 1959. These meetings were well attended by delegates

representing almost all Naga tribes. In most of these meetings the main resolution asked for a

satisfactory political settlement (within the Indian Union) as a solution to Naga problem, as

apposed to the demand of total independence by insurgent leaders. It is to be noted that

Tuensong frontier Division of NEFA was administered under Ministry of External Affairs

(which meant directly under Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and not under the Assam

Government). The rest of the Naga Hills district was under Government of Assam. This duel

control did create some administrative problems. As a result of meeting between Naga leaders

under the leadership of Dr Imkongmeren Ao, presented a resolution to the governor of Assam

and then to the Prime Minister Pandit Nehru at New Delhi. As result Government of India

agreed to various suggestions and the main outcome was that on 01 Dec 1957 the Naga Hill

Tuensong Area (NHTA) came into being, as a separate unit to be administered by the Governor

of Assam on behalf of the President of India. At the third meeting in Oct 1959 Naga peoples

convention prepared a memorandum for constitution of the separate state within Indian Union to

be know as Nagaland, again directly under the Ministry of External Affairs with the Governor,

an Administrative Secretariat, a Council of Ministers and a Legislative Assembly. It was hoped

that all this would strengthen the political establishment, meet the aspiration of Naga people and

weaken the support to insurgent for their demand of Independence of Nagaland. The Sixteen

point agreement that was brought about in Jul 1960, provided for transitional period before the

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formation of the state of Nagaland, during which an interim body with elected representatives

from various tribes could assist and advise the Governor in Administration. (4).

Formation of State of Nagaland

State of Nagaland come into being on 01 Dec 1963. Dr S Radhakrishnan, President of

India rightly termed it “as a new chapter of progress, prosperity and goodwill”. Mr Shilu AO,

The Chief Minister of Nagaland declared the “occasion of rejoicing” and “the day to dream our

pledge”. (4.) In February 1961 a peace convention was held in Nagaland, which was attended by

over 5000 delegates from all parts of Nagaland. A request was made to Government of India to

appoint a peace mission, which had to also include Rev. Michel Scott (who was the host of Phizo

living in England) for final settlement. As a result of discussions Suspension of Operations

Agreement was arrived at and become operative on 5 September 1964. The first ever general

elections were held in 1964*. The model of parliamentary form of Government, like the rest of

the country was adopted. The growth of political life in the state had been revolutionary. Head

hunting and universal franchise existed side by side**. The moderates ruled the state for almost

10 years, however baring few they could not make any significant impact on the psyche of Naga

*(I entered Nagaland as young Captain along with my battalion and was deployed at a village

known as Khonoma, which is the birthplace of Mr Phizo. No one can imagine under what

unfavourable and hostile environment we were inducted and started settling down. Just 13

days prior to our arrival at village Khonoma a large number of troops, who used to go to a

particular place to take bath and which was also frequented by women from the village to

collect water, were killed while taking bath. I could see the traces of the blood bath.

Surprisingly the ambush where in the soldiers were killed was the brainchild of some women

from this very village! Just six days after establishing my company post, during the search

operations I hit upon a paper from a house (which I later learned, used to be residence of Mr

Phizo) which contained standing orders / instructions to the revolutionaries / guerrilla fighters

(See Appx A). My first priority was to make my troops understand the relevance and

importance of these while combating insurgency. I strictly followed these and fortunately,

troops under my command never suffered any casualty reverses due to non-observance of

these standing orders).

**(In 1968, I was operating at village Pophor in District of Tuensang, which was part of

NEFA earlier, and just 4 kilometres from border with Burma. I got the news through my local

Naga informer that the Nagas from village Samatore (different tribe) came to village

Chichipurgre early morning and chopped off heads of 16 villagers (another tribe). They had

taken away the heads and had left the bodies in the village. When I reached the village within

six hours from the time of incident, it was unbelievable to see so many headless bodies of

men! I was 25 years of age and was promoted to the rank of Major. I remember that incident

even now and cannot wash off the image from my memory!).

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people. One of the member of Indian Parliament of that era, rose to become Chief Minister of

Nagaland state and later Governor of the state of Goa. He had the vision, desire to end violence

and lead the people of Nagaland on the path of progress and prosperity. Unfortunately, he did

not get the desired support form his political colleagues and people also. If that had happened

Nagaland would have been another success story (like Mizoram which is the most peaceful and

progressive state in the NE having suffered insurgency of almost three decades!) and is one of

the prosperous and developed state. Before the second general elections, some educated people

who had been close to the insurgents‟ cause formed a second political party, the United

Democratic Front (UDF) to evolve a solution to Naga problem and insurgency.

While the government of India instructed SF to suspend all counter insurgency operations

(patrolling, ambush, raids, searches and arrest etc) the NFG did not respect the agreement and

started consolidating its strength in Nagaland. They got in touch with China and East Pakistan to

seek training, arms, ammunition, funds and other help for furtherance of insurgency.

Foreign Interference

SF fully abided the agreement a number of Naga insurgent groups (gangs) went to China

and East Pakistan and retuned after obtaining training, modern arms, ammunition, equipment,

money to increase insurgency operations in Nagaland. Insurgent Groups used to go to China

through Burma. Training Camps in China were located in Yunan Province. Insurgents had to

move through dense forest and difficult terrain. Burmese Army and Government did not have

much control in North Burma, which was also facing insurgency from various insurgent groups

against government of Burma. The situation was fully exploited by China to seek intrusion,

influence and control of North Burma. Infect many parts of Burma were “no mans land”. China

always welcomed the Naga insurgents. This could be in response to Government of India

granting shelter to refugees who came from Tibet to avoid Chinese repression. In early 1968 it

was confirmed that Mowu Angami self styled C-in-C of Naga Army and Isac-Swu with large

number of insurgents had gone across Burma into China. Mowu Angami and his insurgent

group were receiving training in guerrilla warfare and were to return to Nagaland with

sophisticated arms and equipment*. It was later learnt that China had offered wide-ranging

assistance to Naga insurgents. China was prepared to provide advisors to the rebel Naga regime

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and accord it some form of “recognitions” if the Naga insurgents would set up a “Government-

in-Exile” based at suitable place in China. China would “guide” their “foreign relations” and

they would help in various other ways, such as setting up a rebel radio station and permit them to

use their propaganda machinery. (5)*.

Fortunately for Nagaland and India situation did not develop that far. The Christian

elements in Naga Society and growing Christian majority in the insurgent group successfully

resisted “Godless China” and Chinese came to be disillusioned and disappointed with Christian

Nagaland. After the surrender by Mowu Angami and his group to the Indian Army in 1969 there

was a divide among Naga insurgents. (This was the first major success of Psychological Warfare

and Propaganda conducted by Indian Army).

East Pakistan utilized the insurgency in Nagaland and later in Mizoram in 1966

(Mizoram has border with Bangladesh then East Pakistan and Myanmar. Naga insurgents

developed contacts and understanding with Mizo insurgents to fight for common cause. The

route to East Pakistan was through state of Manipur, which has a good percentage of Naga and

other tribal population. This cooperation between Naga and Mizo insurgents resulted in

insurgency spreading in to tribal areas of Manipur. Mizo insurgent leader Mr SS Laldenga (Who

was earlier a sergeant in Indian Army) stayed in East Pakistan for almost twenty year and

directed insurgency operations in Mizoram. Naga insurgents were the best off. They received all

required material support both form China and East Pakistan, secured bases and sanctuary in

Burma and publicity and moral support from Western countries.

Role of pace mission

With the formation of Nagaland as a state aspersions for a autonomous state (though not

independence) were fulfilled. The peace mission comprising of Shri Jay Paraksh Narain, Shri

*I was Major (Company Commander) and used to operate along India and Burma border

intercepting the movement of insurgents across boarder. Many times I had to send my

informers (local Nagas) across the border to get to know the details of Naga insurgents

moving through Burma. We had capture a large material given to Naga insurgents by

China in 1969. I was closely associated with psychological operations and propaganda in

border areas along India – Burma Border.

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BP Chaliba Chief Minister of Assam and Rev Michael Scott ( as the representative of Phizo who

was staying in England ) as stated above was functioning. But with the passage of time of time it

became evident that Michael Scott in fact was not functioning in consonance with the main

purpose of the peace mission, that was to bring peace in Nagaland. He was more interested in

protecting the interests of insurgents, in consolidating and spreading insurgent activities in other

parts of NE. The Peace Mission was dissolved in 1967 and Michael Scott was asked to leave

India. He later took up the Naga issue with the Western Press and media, and the United Nations

Organisation. It is not surprising that even today the present insurgent leadership prefers the

negotiations, and discussion to be conducted in Western Countries. In fact Michael Scott was

not in favour of Naga insurgents close contacts with China. The Chinese interests in Myanmar

and increasing spread of Mao‟s philosophy among Naga insurgents was a cause of concern to

Western Countries who were keen to protect long term strategic interests in East Asia. The on

going insurgency in the Indo-China (especially in Vietnam, Laos Cambodia) and possible

linkages between insurgent groups operating in Thailand, Myanmar and Nagaland must be

causing concern in Western world. (Map 1)

There was a rift in the insurgent organization in 1968. This resulted in split. One faction

which was anti communist (under the influence of Michael Scott) styled itself Revolutionary

Government of Nagaland (RGN) and was claiming to work for peaceful solution of the Naga

problem, while the others remained as NFG working for total independence.

Split of Insurgent Organisations

After the third general elections, United Democratic front (UDF) came to power in

Nagaland state. The UDF leadership had been earlier closer to the insurgent cause vis-à-vis the

moderates. There was a effort to bring insurgents to shun the violence and join main stream.

This resulted in Shillong accord, which was signed on 11 November 1975. As per this accord,

the Naga insurgents (also referred as underground, and hostiles) accepted the Constitution of

India, agreed to come over ground and deposit their weapons. They were given reasonable time

to formulate other issues for final settlement. While some insurgents laid down their arms and

were subsequently rehabilitated (including their enrolment in Para Military Force (PMF)

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organisation known as Border Security Force (BSF); the insurgent groups who went to China

denounced the accord, repudiated Phizo‟s leadership and declared their intention to continue the

struggle. A new insurgent organization styled as National socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN

IM) under the leadership of Isak Chishi Swu from Seema tribe and Th Muivah (from Tangkhul

tribe). (While returning from China after receiving training, along with other insurgent leaders

under the overall leadership of Mowu – Angami a self styled commander in Chief of Naga

Army; in January 1969 both scraped through an ambush laid by Army in close proximity to

Myanmar borders. Isak Swu had sustained injury but survived. Mowu-Argami along with large

number of insurgents who had also returned from China were surrounded and trapped in a

insurgent camp and were forced to surrender along with arms and ammunition). Local

population of Seema tribes played a major role in this operation. Over a period, NSCN (IM)

built up its strength with the help of Nagas residing in Nagaland, Manipur and across the border

in Burma and started their insurgent activities which are going on even today in Manipur (There

is a agreed Cease Fire in Nagaland as of now).

A Splinter group under Singhya Khemeungan continued to call itself NFG but has almost

lost its relevance now. NSC N (K) under the leadership of Kaphlang who is a Burmese Naga

operates in Northern Burma and Nagaland as well as in Tirap and Changlong districts of

Arunachal Pradesh due to tribal affinity and influence. Both NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K) have

been providing training, arms, ammunition etc to the other insurgent groups operating in other

states of North East.

Insurgent Group

Since the formation of NNC in 1946 and the NFG in March 1955 under Phizo, the

insurgent organizations have undergone number of factional changes. The brief sequence of split

/ change is as under:-

(a) 1980 – NNC Split into :-

(i) NNC / NFG

(ii) NSCN.

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(b) 1988 – NSCN split into:-

(i) NSCN (I&M) – Issac Swu and Muirah faction, also called NSCN (South).

(ii) NSCN (K) – Khaplong faction also called NSCN (North).

(c) 1990 - NNC / NFG split in to two factions:-

(i) NNC / NF (Adino faction)

(ii) NNC (Khudao faction)

NSCN (IM)

(a) Organisation.(At present)

General Headquarters

Brigade operating in Nagaland and Manipur

Brigade operating in Manipur and Myanmar.

(b) Area of Influence

Major townships of Nagaland (to collect money in the form of taxes and through

other illegal means)

Kohima (state capital) Dimapur (entry point to Nagaland by rail, road and air and

a business, economic hub) areas adjoining India in Myanmar.

(c) Major Weaknesses of the group Despite the groups emergence is the most

powerful outfit not only in Nagaland but also in entire NE the group has certain latent

weakness could be exploited in the long run. These are :-

(i) The group is overwhelmingly dominated by Tangkhul tribe.

(ii) After Isac Swu (who is on the wrong side of the age graph) there is no

prominent and influential Seema insurgent leader in the group. This is causing

insecurity amongst the Seema insurgents.

(iii) Due to the massive expansion undertaken by the group in 1994, it now

appears to be overstretched which has resulted in deterioration of discipline and

motivational level of its cadres.

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NSCN (K)

(a) This group operates in Northern portion of Nagaland, and Northern Myanmar and

exercises influence and control in these areas.

(b) Major Weakness

(i) Poor leadership

(ii) Discipline (which is essential for insurgent group to succeed) is lacking.

(iii) The cadre function with relative autonomy and therefore indulge in

excesses.

(iv) Lack of funds and sophisticated weapons.

NFG. This group is almost dormant and less effective. There is a lack of political and

military will due to poor leadership.

Nexus Between Insurgent Organisations. The nexus between ISI of Pakistan and

NSCN (IM) has become apparent in Nagaland, due to illegal migrants form Bangladesh who

have entered in Nagaland and adjoining areas of Assam. There is a nexus between NSCN (IM)

and other insurgent groups operating in various states of NE. There are reports of contacts

between NSCN(IM) and terrorists, from Jammu and Kashmir. This is likely to be for arms and

drug smuggling and creating an insecure environment in Assam. NSCN(IM) purchase arms

from Thailand and Bangladesh. Arms smuggles in Thailand also supply arms to LTTE in Sri

Lanka.

Strategy and Tactics of Insurgents

Initially the strategy was to consolidate their strength, hold and influence in Nagaland and

Manipur. Later they developed nexus with Mizo insurgents also. However, over the period of

time the insurgent leadership has develop personal interests based on tribal affinity. The tactics

adapted by insurgents included:

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(a) Sniping from hidden positions.

(b) Throwing of grenades and bombs from vehicles.

(c) Planting of mines, booby traps, bombs and remote controlled explosive devices.

(d) Terrorising segments of populations, specifically working class, labourers,

government servants and business community who migrated to Nagaland from other

parts of India.

(e) Sabotage, kidnapping to extract money.

Insurgent Demands for Negotiations.

NSCN(IM) which is a major insurgent group in Nagaland has created conditions and

made demands for talk / negotiations based on following:

(a) Consolidate strength to force Government of India to negotiate.

(b) NSCN declined to accept negotiations under the Indian constitution.

(c) Unconditional ceasefire for talks.

(d) During talks third country peacekeeping force to monitor. (Rejected by

Government of India).

(e) Free access to foreigners.

(f) NFG to surrender unconditionally prior to negotiations.

Dealing with Naga insurgency (unconventional war) was the first challenge to the

Government of India and also Indian Army. Indian Army was experienced in

conventional warfare. National focus and also of the Army was towards threats from

Pakistan and later on from China. Threats from within were never thought off.

Government of India was totally caught off guard.

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Counter Insurgency

Problems Faced During Initial Stages in Operations Against Insurgents

The reactions and response of the Government were either untimely or inadequate and

slow, for they produced the opposite results i.e. helped to boost the image of the insurgents and

alienated the masses. Following were the major inadequacies:-

(a) There was a total lack of influence over the Nagas. The intelligence apparatus

was unable to meet the requirements of counter insurgency.

(b) Intelligence about the insurgent setup, their activities and supporters was

inadequate.

(c) Indian Intelligence agencies and the SF did not have much experience of

combating insurgency. The political leadership as well as governing mechanism was not

familiar with peculiarities of insurgency / unconventional war. This resulted in

unrealistic evaluation of situation and inappropriate response in every aspect.

(d) Due to miscalculation of repercussion the concept of “consequences

management” was non existing.

(e) Unsuitable communication, transportation system resulted in poor logistics.

(f) Inarticulate disposition towards the Nagas. Many of the civil officials were

young, inexperienced and unfamiliar with the short term and long-term implications of

the situation. Lack of know-how came in the way of developing a well integrated

approach. While the responsibility of running the internal affairs of Nagaland was that of

local administration and later of the state government with capital at Kohima. The law

and order was still under the Governor located at Shillong who had to depend on advice

and directions from New Delhi.

(g) Use of media for propaganda and counter propaganda, the concept of

psychological operations in support of counter insurgency operations was not thought off

at least up to late sixties. Almost every Naga youth even in remote areas was aware of

NNC and Phizo but were unaware of National leadership. There was total lack of

expertise for the projections of national perspective, propaganda and even interrogation

mechanism.

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(h) SF inducted to combat insurgency in Nagaland were inadequate and ill trained,

oriented and equipped to combat insurgency. They were carrying bulky armaments and

cumbersome equipment and clothing.

(j) Poor logistic build-up and paucity of air maintenance system for troops operating

in difficult and remote areas.

(k) Since there was euphoria of gaining independence and Indian Army was just re-

orientating itself to meet future Chinese threats after 1962 war, there was almost total

lack of strategic, doctrinal and tactical concept on counter insurgency. This was

compounded due to diversity of approach because of varying organisation, equipment

and training of units that belonged to different states and agencies of India.

(l) There was an unrealistic appreciation of the potential, intensity, scope, staying

capacity and capability, extent and likely duration of insurgency.

(m) As else where in various countries, existence of some over-zealous commanders

who could not control the temptation of one up-men ship. Such a tendency results in

giving ambitious and at time unachievable objectives, goal, and that too within a specific

time frame. Similar mistakes have been committed elsewhere also. Commanders and

decision makers at all levels no matter how so ever well equipped the armed forces may

be; must clearly understand that no where in the world any one can give a specific time

frame, date lines (like in conventional war) while combating insurgency, terrorism and

even in UN Peace Keeping operations. Also, in armed interventions or the operations like

Afghanistan and Iraq. Unlike in conventional war there are respectable limits within

which the SF have to operate while combating insurgency or terrorism. When

unreasonable time frame is given to achieve military objectives; there is a tendency on

the part of junior commanders and junior leadership to use excessive force and they tend

to cross respectable limits, which makes it difficult to achieve / attain political

objectives*. Even by mistake if you kill just one innocent person, be sure you will have

to face ten more after some time. This is what is happing in Afghanistan, Pakistan and

*During my command of Brigade, Division, Corps in combating terrorism in

Punjab and Kashmir and combating insurgency in NE I had given very strict

instructions and ensured the compliance of my directive that “it does not matter

even if ten terrorists get away or escape from a particular village, camp, or hideout

but make sure that not a single innocent person is harmed”.

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Iraq. Most of the Commanders all over the world tend to use conventional arms, force,

power and tactics in unconventional conflict like insurgency.

Analysis of India’s Counter Insurgency Campaign

As stated earlier neither the political leadership, governing mechanism, including

judiciary, nor the Indian Army had any experience of combating insurgency. During World War

II, Indian Army (as British Indian Army) fought successful battles in different parts of the world,

to protect and further interests of British Empire. The army leadership was totally oriented,

towards conventional war. After independence in 1947, the first experience of combat was in

J&K, to push back the Pakistani invaders and attack. Thereafter in 1962, India had to face the

Chinese attack. Until 1963, the term “Insurgency” was not heard. May be the British had

termed revolt as insurgency.

Indian Army when deployed in Nagaland when the insurgency erupted was still led by

the officers who had served ruing II World War. When the insurgency erupted, it was but

natural to depend heavily on the experience of British Army, which had combated insurgency in

Malaya. The insurgents in Malaya, Indio China (Vietnam) and the Philippines were all inspired

by the Politico-Military thoughts of Mao. However, the Naga insurgency was based on the

ideology of tribal affinity, Naga unity and religion, and exploitation of unawareness, lack of

knowledge and vision among some Naga leaders. Many of the pastors in the church started

preaching and advocating violence by misinterpreting and misquoting “Holy Bible”. That is

what is happening today wherein Holy Quran is being misinterpreted and misquoted to justify

terrorism. Mrs Bhutto the former Prime Minister of Pakistan openly stated at a public meeting in

Pakistan occupied Kashmir in 1990 that every school, every mosque in Kashmir will give a call

to “independence” from India*.

Many of the Political leaders, decision makers in Assam and at Delhi had participated in

freedom struggle of India and achieved it through non-violence, there was reluctance to

understand and accept ground realities. They took considerable time to understand the

seriousness of the events and situation and to understand long-term implications. Authorities

*I have the recording of her speech. Pakistan carefully and cleverly used religion to

spread terrorism in the same way as some of the Church leaders misused religion for

spread of insurgency in Nagaland.

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initially failed to realise the value of means other then purely military to curb insurgency during

initial stage. Lack of awareness about the world affairs, the political realities and ignorance

blinded the Nagas (most of them did not go out of Naga Hill district and even outside their

villages) with their ambitions. It is stated in Mahabharat (the record of war between Kauravas

and Pandavas of mythological era that “those who are blinded by ambitions see even less than

those who are blinded since birth”!! This blindness due to ambitions is prevalent even today.

The modern day terrorists and their sponsors and sustainers have an ambition to control the

world, where as on the other hand the so-called powerful nations who harbour the ambitions of

controlling the world by use of “armed power and regime changes”. It is this ambition of

controlling the world which is encouraging formulation and propagation of phrases like “axis of

evil” and “either you are with us or against us”!! The great ideas, concepts which are part of the

sixth schedule of the Indian Constitution were unknown to majority of Nagas and even beyond

comprehension of the majority of leaders. It was not easy to impress upon them that there could

be a superior constitutional authority to guide them in political and economic field. Hence the

reluctance to accept and respect Indian constitution. Due to limited military exposure and success

of British in pushing back Japanese out of Nagaland and Burma convinced Naga leadership

convened that Britishers could not control Nagas for the fear of Naga might. In 1990 Mrs Bhutto

stated very clearly and forcefully that “if the Americans were defeated in Vietnam, Russians

were forced to move out of Afghanistan, India was no super Power and India is not so super that

she cannot be defeated in Kashmir”. It did sound convincing at that time to simple and innocent

people of Kashmir.

There was lack of understanding and close linkages between political goals and military

goals and objectives in combating insurgency at least during initial phase. For example,

militarily it was essential to exploit tribal rivalries, hate and suspicion about each other and

organize them to protect themselves from other tribal groups, but politically this was not

attempted. This was not to advocate the British policy of “divide and rule” but to organize Nagas

based on their tribal affinity to progress, prosper and protect themselves as per their traditions

and local customs. The term Naga gave them a different feeling and status. Naga Regiment as

part of Indian Army was formed to give status to people of Nagaland.

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India‟s response to the insurgency in Nagaland could be summarized in three phases:-

(a) Induction of SF to counter armed rebellion/insurgency. Bringing situation under

manageable limits.

(b) Initiation of political activities and process to meet reasonable aspirations and

demands of Nagas people. Including giving status and powers of state to people of

Nagaland, like other states of India.

(c) Consolidation of success through a combination of military, political, economic,

academic and other initiatives. This also includes dialogue/negotiations with the

insurgent groups, giving them opportunity to come out of jungles and experience

advantages of stability (staying in pre-designated camps along with their arms), witness

closely the lifestyle of young generation who keep themselves away from violence and

gun culture. During my service, while combating insurgency and terrorism I have always

been advocating that:-

“Do not believe in alliance of money and machinegun.

Because your children may not get money what they

deserve, but if they hold and handle gun it will not only kill

others but will kill them also”.

Due to lack of experience in combating insurgency, use of military force was the option

available to SF during initial phase, however with passage of time and experience philosophy,

doctrine, mechanism and tactics have been evolved. “Use of minimum force” “while combating

insurgency, terrorism” is one such example. Indian Army is probably the only Army in the world

today (I will stand corrected if I am proved wrong) which strictly follows the self imposed

restriction of use of minimum force while dealing with insurgency and terrorism. Use of heavy

armaments like artillery guns, tanks, armed cars, mortars, use of air power (air strike, bombing

etc) is strictly prohibited and ruthlessly avoided. I wonder if there is any other example today any

where in the world. Use of minimum force, not resorting to heavy punishment through area

weapons, air power etc does pose severe restrictions on achieving quick tangible results, but it

becomes counter productive in the long run. Only killing and destruction is not the answer. If one

innocent person is killed, today, be rest assured ten more will be born in near future. (This is

what is happening in Iraq, Afghanistan and some other parts of the world). There are respectable

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limits to use of military force and killing of insurgent and terrorist. Insurgency cannot be

successfully solved through military means alone (like bombing, air strike, use of heavy

weapons and so on). Those combating insurgency particularly the army who are geared, trained

and motivated to fight conventional war must learn and adapt their thinking to the problem of

insurgency, or be defeated. (We have seen this happening in Vietnam, Afghanistan (defeat of

Soviet Union), we are now witnessing in Iraq, again in Afghanistan and several other parts of

world). Any one who has a wrong ambition of wining a subversive war insurgency, terrorism by

military means alone (as is happening in some parts of worlds) should be prepared to face

military defeat.

It is to the credit of Indian Army and other security forces that due to constant and

relentless operational pressure the insurgents were never permitted to establish or declare any

territory as “liberated zone”.

Surrender and rehabilitation is another example. Mr Laldenga who started insurgency in

Mizoram, remained in Pakistan for almost two decades, became Chief Minister after signing

Mizoram accord. Yet another example. Some of the other leaders have realized futility of

violence and destruction and rightly shunned violence. Under their leadership Mizoram is one of

the most peaceful and progressive state of NE. There are similar cases in Nagaland too. Those

Naga insurgents who gave up arms and violence are among prosperous and successful people

today.

Establishment of counter insurgency and jungle warfare school (CIJWS) at village

Vairangte at Mizoram state of NE is yet another military initiative supported by the

government*. It is among the pioneer military training institutions of India importing training in

counter insurgency, counter terrorism, jungle warfare, unconventional warfare, and so on**. It

imparts pre induction and orientation training, to the units, which are to be inducted in to NE to

combat insurgency. Apart from Indian Army, Para military forces, State Armed Police, State

*I had the honour of being among first few to start this training establishment in 1967 as

“Eastern Command Counter Insurgency Training Team”, with the aim and objective of

imparting training in counter insurgency operations.

**I have had the honour to serve as training faculty in the rank of Major (1973-76) and later

as chief instructor (Dean) in 1987-89.

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Police are also trained here. A good number of foreign army personal are trained at CIJWS.

Command Control Structure and Force level

Headquarters Eastern Command of Indian Army located at Calcutta (now called

Kolkotta) was responsible and even continues today, for counter insurgency operation in NE.

Headquarters of 101 communication Zone area located at Shillong was controlling operations in

Nagaland initially. Later Headquarters Nagaland area under the command of a Major General

was established at Kohima. Subsequently it became Eight Mountain Division combating

insurgency. Many illustrious generals have commanded this Division. This is probably one of

most experienced Division Headquarters of Army anywhere in the world, in combating

insurgency and terrorism. I had the honour to serve as general officer commanding of this

division in the rank of Major General combating terrorism in Kashmir (1995-97). It was a unique

experience for a young army officer who started the military career under this Division

combating insurgency in Nagaland 1964, to command the same Division as Major General

combating terrorism in Kashmir!! It is heartening to see that the people of Nagaland consider

this Army Division as their own and have respect and emotional attachment. Since formation of

the state, Nagaland and this Division grew up together.

Several brigades of Army were inducted into state combat insurgency. The Assam Rifles

(Para military force operating under ministry of Home Affairs of government of India) organized

on the lines of Army battalions were organized by British to control NE. The controlling HQ of

this force was located at Shillong the then capital of Assam it continues even today were also

deployed to combat insurgency. The majority of troops serving in Assam Rifles are from NE and

hence they have the advantage of local knowledge of all aspects of life. This force has made a

valuable contribution in combating insurgency all over NE and especially in Nagaland.

Several battalions of state armed police of different states of India were also inducted to

combat insurgency. Their employment and operations were coordinated by army formation

headquarters located in different parts of Nagaland. They faced various problems due to

organizations, cultural, language differences, but made very useful contribution.

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Immediate aim was to restore normalcy wherein civil administration which was rendered

totally ineffective due to insurgency could perform normal functions of governance and

administration. This was achieved soon. There was coordination and cooperation among

various governing agencies. Army rightly accepted the role of being in “aid to civil authorities”

and never, ever even thought to be an authority. This continues even today. Whenever and

wherever army is deployed to “restore normalcy” the first and foremost objective is always to

restore the authority of governing mechanism, local administration and other agencies.

Counter Insurgency operation require a soldier to use minimum force and maximum

mind and win the hearts of the local populace, and militants, whereas, conventional wars require

the use of enormous firepower with little regard to the hearts and minds of enemy. Armed

Forces also have to consider international organisations, religious leaders, and human rights

activists who are constantly watching the situations and criticizing the use of force. Constant

involvement of Army in such operations makes it difficult to sustain a high degree of motivation

and morale. At the same time they have to face many problems, challenges while in operations.

It is one the biggest challenge to the leadership at all level to convince the ranks and file that they

are fighting for a “just cause”.

Golden Rules for Conduct of forces in Counter Insurgency Operations.

Counter insurgency philosophy in Nagaland (and now in entire North East) has been

based on the following.

(a) Respect village leader (Gaon Burra), elders and teachers.

(b) Never take liberty with women.

(c) Pay for what you take.

(d) Never remove any items from house at the pretext of keeping souvenir

(e) Respect religion and customs of local people.

(f) Do not make promises which you cannot fulfil (specially applicable to

commanders at all levels).

(g) Do not damage crops.

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(h) Be polite but firm.

(j) Do not ill-treat captured or surrendered insurgents, in presence of other people.

(k) Respect and observe human rights.

(l) Do not use third degree methods to extract information.

Apart from carrying out militancy operations, Army has been carrying out various good

will projects like:

(a) Opening schools in remote areas, provide teachers organise training in

information technology, and various other fields to prepare youth to get meaningful

employment and means of sustenance. A large number of students were taken to other

parts of India to expose them to peaceful life and also explain them the advantages of

peaceful life and prosperity.

(b) Army Development Group (ADG) an adhoc organisation of Army was launched

in 1995 named as “Operation Good Smartian”. It envisages people friendly development

programmes in Nagaland and Manipur. It aims to “win hearts and minds” of public and

negate adverse impact of intensified counter insurgency operations by improving basic

infrastructure in rural areas. It is funded by Ministry of Home Affairs.

(c) At all levels army and SF have been carrying out civic action from its own

resources to win over hearts and minds of people. All developmental, social community

work as part of: ”Civic action“ programme which was part of army‟s overall plan was

executed keeping in mind the following:-

(i) Meet popular aspirations of majority of people (especially women and

youth)

(ii) Meet greatest need first with greatest effort.

(iii) Programmes have been progressive keeping in tune with time and existing

environment.

(iv) Respect the culture and religion of people, in the area.

(v) Create good and favourable image of governing mechanism (without any

political leanings).

(vi) Exhibit governments resolve and determination for the up-liftment of

people.

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(vii) Enlist the people‟s participation in planning and execution of civic action

programmes

(viii) Keep overall political and military aim in mind.

Psychological Campaign

Insurgency, terrorism, fundamentalism, extremism are all product of destructive and

disruptive thinking and therefore to counter these we must seriously and sincerely attempt to win

over minds of people. Wean them away from path of violence and destruction. As part of

Army‟s overall counter insurgency philosophy, systematic psychological operations have been

conducted. Basic aim has been to convince people and specially youth about the futility of

violence, and separation from India. Desirability of being part of India and attainment of peace,

progress and prosperity. It has paid good dividends. People have now realised that almost four

decades of statehood for Nagaland indeed has been a along and winding road for Nagaland.

Total annual budge in 1963 was Rs 3.88 Crores. The State Legislative Assembly voted a budget

of over 2000 Crores in last financial year. Today almost all villages are connected by jeep able

road. Schools, playground, health care and electricity is provided to all. The literacy rate is

87%, which is among highest in India.

What was once a movement of the people, by the people, for the people has now been

reduced to meaningless terrorism. Insurgent groups embarking on spree of extortion and self-

promotion. Insurgency is now been kept alive by criminal gangs, drug and arms smugglers.

Insurgents are like fish in the water. Water being the local population. Once the insurgents were

deprived of local support they could not survive and hence had to shift to other areas away from

their traditional strong holds.

It has also been explained that an independent country requires today:

(a) Resources to run government, general administration, judiciary, police, civil

services etc.

(b) Establishing and finding resources for a standing army, air force and other

defence related expenditure.

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(c) Providing education health care, power, water supply and so on. Where will the

funds come from?

(d) Establishing diplomatic missions with countries in the world. Membership of

United Nations. Who will support membership for the UN?

(e) Finding avenues for employment of educated youth within the nation.

(f) Establishing own air, rail, transport services, postal, telegraph services, customs,

excise, import, export facilities, banking services, currency and coinage etc. The list is

endless and could go on and on. Assuming one gets independence where the resources,

funds human resource will come from?

Youth is also being made aware that “we all have a new century ahead of us. We have no

choice but to look forward, evolving new ideas on how to survive and exist in 21st Century.

There is no point harping on the past, future should be the theme. Future of Nagaland lies being

with people of India and enjoy the fruits of prosperity”.

All above themes, messages have made and are making positive impact. Boys and Girls

from Nagaland studying in various academic institutions of India, do not wish to return back for

lack of avenues and opportunities. They are being encouraged to return back to Nagaland and

start small scale business, cooperative societies, and so on, and develop Nagaland. I am the

President of one such NGO “Arunoday” (rising of Sun) located at Pune. There are almost 7000

students from NE studying in Maharashtra State. They are being guided, motivated, encouraged

to return to their states on completion of education and help in development of NE including

Nagaland. We are getting good response.

Role of Media Baring few exceptions, media has always played a very important and

constructive role in Nagaland. My special tribute to national media to bring facts to the notice of

people and governing mechanism. It did not (very rightly too) hesitate to expose inadequacies,

drawbacks, shortcomings and even high headedness of few in dealing with insurgency. It is to

the credit of both print and electronic media to have established direct contacts with insurgent

33

leadership and put across their point of view. It made the process of understanding and dialogue

simpler.*

One of the most striking aspects of the philosophy, doctrine and strategy of counter

insurgency operations undertaken by Indian Army is that it does not permit the insurgents to

operate in large groups. There has been hardly an incident in the history of insurgency in

Nagaland wherein insurgents in large numbers surrounded any post / camp of SF and caused

damage. We have witnessed many such incidents in Vietnam, Afghanistan (during Soviet

occupation), Sri Lanka, Africa, Iraq, now again in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan. It did not

happen in Nagaland. Insurgents are never given an opportunity to operate in large numbers. As

the head of the operational group of Unified Command Combating insurgency in Assam, on

many occasion I had to deliberately keep some areas dormant so as to encourage the insurgents

to surface, and organise for a big operation. It was then easy to locate and eliminate them. Of

course this was done without endangering the security of local population.

Despite their possession of weapons like mortars, rocket launchers etc the insurgents

could not use them effectively. They were always kept on run. They were not allowed the

freedom to carry big weapons, though they got these weapons from China and Pakistan but could

not use them.

Despite availability of modern equipment and technology, insurgents were not permitted

to become “techno insurgents”. The only technology which could be used by Naga insurgents

was the explosion of improvised explosive devices with remote control mechanism.

Constant area domination operations, did not permit the insurgents to stay in permanent

camps within Nagaland. They were always forced to be on move. This made an impact on the

daily life and moral of the rank and file of insurgents. Local insurgents are made to understand

that while their leaders stay abroad in luxurious environment (which is a fact) the local insurgent

*I had issued my personal directive to the commanders at all levels on interaction with media. I

”hate” and always discouraged the concept of “Media management” or “Management of Media”.

To my way of thinking management of Media amounts to “manipulation”. Media has a role to

play. It has responsibility towards society and Nation. (My directive to commanders is att Appx

B)

34

has to rough it out by staying in deep jungles and mountains without any facility. The insurgent

rank and file have realised this reality.

As part of counter insurgency a clear, and strong message has been conveyed to

insurgents that no one can cessed from India merely at the point of gun and through violence.

People of India will not permit this to happen. It is this realisation among leadership of

insurgents and sincere desire of Indian leadership and governing mechanism which is

encouraging various insurgent groups to shun the path of violence and return to normal life.

There is an urgent need to convey this massage forcefully.

Despite adverse publicity and propaganda by the insurgents their supporters within

Nagaland and abroad, majority of people clearly understand the sincerity of SF to end violence

and protect the interest of people.

During initial stages the multiplicity of forces (Army, Assam Rifles, Central Reserve

Police (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), State Armed Police from various states of India)

did create the problems in coordination of operations, connectivity, communication, logistics and

so on. Gradually standing operating procedures, regular interaction among various agency,

concept of Unified Command to deal with insurgency, establishment of Counter insurgency grid,

clear areas of responsibility and several other means and mechanism helped in resolving the

problems. The system is totally stabilised.

Indian Army‟s Corps Headquarter headed by a three star general officer is located in

Nagaland to formulate counter insurgency strategy and tactics, exercise command and control

over all the forces operating within counter insurgency grid. Overall philosophy, and doctrine to

combat insurgency is formulated by Indian Army‟s Training Command in due consultation with

commanders who are combating insurgency.

All the forces which are inducted into “counter insurgency grid” first go through a pre-

induction and re orientation training capsule at “Corps Counter Insurgency Training Centre”. SF

are explained the historical background to insurgency, characteristics and sensitivity of people

35

where a unit will have to operate, modus operandi of insurgents and how to combat these, and

various other aspects of counter insurgency operations. Troops are also trained to converse with

people in local language for better understanding. Thanks to influence cinema and TV, good

number of youth understand the Hindi Language. All these measures have helped in achieving

success against insurgents.

Granting status of full state to Nagaland was a very important step taken by the

government of India. This has made a big impact on the people. Successive state governments

also contributed to bring development and stability in Nagaland. Despite inadequacies within the

political establishment and governing mechanism, corruption, etc the political leadership in

Nagaland irrespective of the fact as to which political party they belong to, is convinced and

united in one aspect that their future lies being with India. A good number of educated and

qualified people have joined Indian Administrative Services (IAS), Indian Police Services (IPS)

and Indian Foreign Services (IFS) and are occupying high posts. There is no department of

Government of India where people of Nagaland are not serving. Those who joined Indian

Armed Forces and other SF have risen to high ranks. Aviation industry has good representation

of youth from Nagaland. Academic institutions have flourished in Nagaland and are developing

good human resource to bring economic prosperity to state. A visit to Nagaland will prove my

statement. Baring few who wants to keep insurgency alive for their own prominence and self

preservation, no one favours insurgency now. Every one wants peace, progress, and prosperity.

Almost about 1000 insurgents who had surrendered to the government were enrolled in Para

military forces. One of their leader rose to the rank of commandant of Border Security Force

Battalion. The Government of India decided to establish “Naga Regiment” (Infantry Unit) as

part of Indian Army. It is to be noted that right from British rule, Infantry Regiments of Indian

Army were organised on regional basis (like Jat Regiment, Rajput Regiment, Maratha Regiment,

Punjab Regiment and so on). Establishment of Naga Regiment (where in majority of troops are

from Nagaland and North East) gave a sense of pride and belonging to the Naga youth and

people.

36

Opening up road communication into Myanmar, encouragement to border trade, freedom

of movement to the Naga people residing in close proximity to border with Myanmar has given

boost to local trade. Of course, this freedom of movement with in 20 kilometres of border belt is

misused and abused by insurgents.

Discovery of mineral resources, including oil, in Nagaland has generated new hope. Both

Government of India and Government of Nagaland are encouraging industrialist, business and

corporate houses to start new ventures in Nagaland. The people and especially youth have

understood the close linkage between peace and prosperity.

While respecting the local customs, traditions, the authority of village councils, village

heads and so on the Government of India had to promulgate “ Armed Forces Special Power Act”

(AFSPA) to give certain powers to SF to conduct counter insurgency operations. The act

authorizes SF to arrest and detain insurgent for 24 hours and hand him / her over to local police

authorities. There is also provision to declare an area as “disturbed area”. Once a given area is

declared disturbed, and SF are to be inducted to conduct operations “Armed Forces Special

Power Act” can be promulgated. There are different viewpoints on the desirability and

usefulness of AFSPA in the present environment. Government of India had appointed a expert

committee to examine the present AFSPA and suggest changes.

Government of India had banned the entry of undesirable elements into Nagaland through

a system “inner line entry permit”. Outsiders entering Nagaland had to obtain a entry permit

from local civil authorities. To give boost to tourism industry this restriction is being gradually

relaxed.

When counter insurgency operations were in full scale during initial phases of insurgency

many countries especially Western Countries indulged into adverse publicity. They gave

financial and other support to insurgents cause. Church leader‟s role in sustaining insurgency

under the pretext of religious freedom was questionable. Both China and Pakistan gave full

cooperation, encouragement and support to Naga insurgents. By permitting establishment of

insurgent camps and bases inside their territory, Myanmar also helped the cause of insurgency

37

initially. Now the Myanmar Army has been conducting military operations against Naga

insurgents.

Fortunately, there was not much of a reaction, interference from neighbouring states of

Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. Manipur Government could not exert desired

controlled over the hilly areas under the occupation of Naga population. Because of tribal

affinity, insurgents started exerting pressure and influence in Manipur. Insurgency in Manipur

spread due to various other reasons.

As stated earlier Church had an influence on insurgency in Nagaland. Some of the

religious representative did use their influence to sustain insurgency under the pretext of Naga

Cause. However, the situation is changing for good now.

A large number of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) propped up to protect the

Naga Cause. They obtained funds from public, foreign countries and even from Government of

India. In fact, they started supporting insurgency indirectly. Over the years, formation of NGO

has become a business and a way of making money. Insurgency is being used as cottage

industry. Few NGOs have realized that continuation of insurgency in Nagaland will ensure flow

of money and resources (which unfortunately does not reach people of Nagaland) from various

channels of Government of India. The Government of India has realized this of late and the role

and functioning of some of these NGOs is under Scanner. Same is the case with some of the

persons who have appointed and projected themselves as protectors of Naga cause. Some of

them are from within Nagaland, NE, other part of India and even some foreigners. However,

their influence is also declining gradually. People of Nagaland have understood the hidden

agenda of many such people and the NGOs.

Intelligence

To Combat insurgency successfully effective intelligence network is one of the most

important factor. Higher the efficiency in intelligence gathering batter would be the results in

terms of curbing insurgency and employment of limited resources available to field formations

tasked to combat insurgency. There is a danger in taking refuge behind the excuse that the

38

intelligence about the insurgents is not available and hence lack of success in operations.

Nagaland was no exception. During initial stage Commanders were looking for information /

intelligence about insurgents on similar lines as for conventional war. However with passage of

time and experience intelligence gathering system, evaluation and sharing was refined. The

emphasis was intelligence gathering at company and battalion level. If the information was

available to junior leaders they could quickly launch operation against insurgents.

The main sources of intelligence were local villagers, students, porters, (local villagers

who were employed to carry supplies water and even supply of fire wood). Many times school

teachers were of great help. Even local ladies at times provided information. Troops from

Assam Rifles (who have been operating in Nagaland and other parts NE for a long time on

permanent basis) were very useful. Many of them had married the local girls and thus had the

advantage of local knowledge, Language, Customs, traditions, sensitivities and so on.

Army units were encourage to identify such villagers whose families suffered in the

hands of insurgents. This was primarily to use them to gain intelligence about insurgents, their

sympathisers sustainers and so on. Villagers whose children were forcibly taken away by

insurgents to join insurgency were also identified and were of great value since they wanted their

children to come back and lead normal life. Many times, the students who were studying in

various parts of India and were keen to bring peace, were also very useful. School children of

impressionable age were very useful in providing information like, if any food is to be sent

outside the village, any pigs to be sent out, if firewood, water, Madhu (a local drink) is to be

provide for 10-15 or even more people at any given point of time and place. The insurgents use

to inform the village headmen (Gaon Burah- GB) to organise these and GB in turn would ask the

villagers to provide means of sustenance and comfort, to the insurgents.

It must be noted that in counter insurgency operations, the most important aspect is

actionable intelligence which is available at junior command level. Higher the headquarters,

more are the gray areas always and every time without any exception. Experience shows that

intelligence gathering by junior leaders which is the most crucial and important function of

junior commanders depends on the following:-

39

(a) Continuity of junior leaders / commanders in the given area of operations /

responsibility.

(b) Adaptation ability of junior leaders and troops.

(c) Knowledge of local language, customs, traditions and life style of people.

(d) Degree of environment to accomplish the given assignment / responsibility.

(e) Motivation level of junior commanders.

Staying Capability

One of the lesson from India‟s counter insurgency campaign which may interest various

countries could be that do not commit armed forces unless you are prepared to stay for a long

duration, and you are prepared to remain committed and go all the way till you succeed in

eliminating insurgency through a combination of political, diplomatic and military means.

India‟s experience in Nagaland, Mizoram is a indicator. One of the reason for this long “Staying

capability” could be that Indian Security Forces have been combating insurgency on their soil

(areas which are integral part of India). But when one commits forces on foreign land how does

one ensures that the prolonged stay of the forces (10 years, 20 years, 30 years) will be excepted

by governing mechanism of host country, the local population, and international agencies,

organisations as well as world governing mechanism!

The Way Ahead

As mentioned earlier insurgency in Nagaland is a political problem and needs to be

solved politically. This is being done. The leaders of insurgent groups have been brought to

negotiating table. There have been several rounds of talk between insurgent leaders and

Government of India. Ceasefire is in progress in Nagaland. Insurgents are permitted to stay in

designated camps with their arms. Counter insurgency operations have been suspended for the

time being. However as it happened earlier also, the insurgents are misusing ceasefire and are

busy in consolidating their position. Since the NSCN (IM) has given a call for formation of

„Nagalim‟ (Greater Nagaland) to include certain areas of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal

Pradesh, the neighbouring states have become apprehensive and concerned of the future

possibilities. The hearts and minds of general public especially the youth (who are possible

recruits to insurgency) must be won over. The number of insurgents killed or arms capture will

40

not help to end the insurgency completely if the support of general people is not won over by

Government. Therefore the final solution is a political solution.

Government must continue to hold talk with the insurgents leaders at the same time

convince the rank and file of the futility of conflict and violence. It must be ensured that

insurgents do not get new young recruits. The ceasefire Agreement with NSCN (IM) is holding

on. NSCN (K) group will also agree to end hostility and abide by peace, if they come to

negotiating table.

Feeling of alienation from mainstream India must be removed. This could be achieved by

organizing youth camps, visit of youth to several other states of India and youth from other states

of India, organizing festivals of Nagaland in different parts of India to increase awareness.

The institution and concept of Unified Command must be strengthen and made effective.

The one-upmanship tendency, individualistic attitude and unwanted competition among various

agencies must be avoided.

Education and economic development will hold key. Removal of corruption and proper

utilization of funds allocated by Government of India will be the key to success in eliminating

insurgency completely. There is no shortage of funds, enough resources are being allocated by

the Government, however they do not reach people in villages and interior parts of Nagaland

where insurgents operate and influence the innocent people.

Since the beginning of the armed rebellion the support from neighbouring countries has

been a big morale and material booster to the insurgents. Outside support in one form or the

other has been one of the reasons for sustenance of insurgency. Despite repeated appeals and

request by India to its neighbours to stop support to the insurgents not much has been achieved.

India must break this support, by improving relations (which is being done now) with

neighbouring countries, take up the issue with international bodies and UNO and if need be as a

last resort take some hard decision to initiate tough measures.

41

Some Food For Thought

If we wish to tackle and end insurgency successfully we will have to deal with

apprehensions, fear and rage among the insurgents and people who promote, support and sustain

it. (Same is true of terrorism also). Thos combating insurgency will have to know the people

and motivational factors among the insurgents as to what motivates them or attract them to arms

and violence. We will have to recognise hatred and deal with causes, and learn to dispel fear and

most important of all just learn about the environment. It is desirable to learnt about the people

and the youth in the area of your immediate interest or possible areas of conflict where counter

insurgency / counter terrorist operations may have to be undertaken. There is a need to

undertake further study and deliberations and armed forces and specially by those nations who

have a history and tend to deploy their armed forces and combat power all over the world on the

pretext of guarding their so called national interest or to project themselves powerful nations and

self appointed decision makers in deciding destiny of people and nations. Some important issues

which need consideration are as follows:-

(a) What are the springs of alienation and disaffection which prompt and motivate

young people to the jungles, mountains, remote parts of deserts and other difficult places

and induce them to take up arms and initiate violence against nation states or society?

(b) What is the history of insurgent /terrorist movement and what has been the

success rate? Insurgency, armed insurrection, terrorism are almost invariably a

manifestation of deeper suspicion, hatred and disaffection resulting from feeling of

alienation, (Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Assam) and an identity crises as well as

frustration (Naxalites in India)?

(c) Insurgent groups and terrorist organisations tend to regard themselves as victims

of exploitation by a dominant ruling power / group (NE India) or foreign power (Iraq,

Afghanistan), and it is a sense of perceived disadvantage, deprivation, denial, injustice

that motivates most of them. These perceptions may be shared by civilian population in

varying degree (as was the case in Nagaland and Mizoram initially when the insurgency

was in infancy) and insurgents depend on the support and cooperation of the civilian

42

population for their very survival. What philosophy, mechanism should be evolve in

possible areas of conflict to deprive local support from initial stage it self, before the

conflict gets momentum?

(d) The objectives of the insurgents / terrorists movements would be to attain its

political goals / objectives through the use of force, to impose unacceptable level of

damage on adversary (Soviet Union in Afghanistan, American Experience in Vietnam

and now in Iraq and Afghanistan) so that the adversary gives in, either because of lack of

ability / capacity to withstand physical damage (in terms of deaths and injury to forces

combating insurgency / terrorism), to sustain the domestic and international pressure on

involvement of forces or on account of collapse of confidence (Soviet experience in

Afghanistan) etc. How to maintain the motivational level of forces conduction counter

insurgency / counter terrorist operation and how to convince the people domestically and

internationally that the forces are combating for a just cause and achievable objectives?

(e) What are the ways, means, mechanism for a modern, democratically lawfully

constituted state to respond to insurgent / terrorist movements. Can conventionally

equipped and trained forces cope with this kind of threat or it is it necessary and

sustainable to raise special forces? Can the forces trained for conventional war

reoriented, regrouped and be ready to undertake counter insurgency operations at a short

notice in an unknown and hostile environment? What should be the mechanism for

reorientation and training?

(f) How to identify possible trouble spots and possible areas of interventions /

operations? How to monitor the emerging situation in possible area of interest /

operations?

(g) Insurgency / terrorism is an aggravated form of protest through violence and use

of armed power, every state need to deal with it at different levels. However a “bullet-

for-bullet” policy alone will not work. Declaring some nations as “rogue state”, throwing

away established regime will not work and will not solve the problem. The state will

43

have to respond to problem politically, diplomatically, economically, psychologically

adequately supported by military to meet the challenge. Sometime, a combination of

counter insurgency operation and political pacification (as has been the case in Nagaland)

can be undertaken concurrently. How to achieve this?

(h) In counter insurgency appropriate mechanism for an effective civil – military

interface must be established. State power must be seen to be used in the task of re-

establishing the primacy of law and lawfully established institutions. Arbitrary and

excessive use of force or state terrorism would only harden the attitude of insurgents

/terrorists and their supporters. Merely head count and quantitative comparison,

statistical analysis, figurative assessment does not work. Armed forces dealing with

counter insurgency / counter terrorism would be required to modify their own command

and control system, weapons, tactics etc to meet the emerging challenges thrown up by

insurgents / terrorists. How to evaluate the desired philosophy, strategy and mechanism

to implement the policies while conducting counting insurgency operations?

(j) Promotion of insurgency / terrorist movement in other countries is always seen as

a low cost / no cost option by some countries in their struggle against their adversaries.

How to make this low cost option, a high cost option / high risk misadventure?

(k) Many nations and societies are confronted by internal threats / challenges to their

unity. (Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, many other countries in central Asia, Africa, Middle

East and Latin America). What should be the major component of philosophy, doctrine

and strategy for overcoming such threats?

Conclusion

Nagaland is a state of scenic beauty, simple tribal folk with great customs and traditions

having unending rest for life.

Insurgency can never be wiped out by the armed forces through military means alone. It

is a political problem to be solved with political solutions and mechanism. Armed forces being in

44

direct contact can only bring the violence to acceptable level where normal civil administration

can function, they can not eliminate insurgency totally. Success in counter insurgency operation

is not counted by the number of insurgent killed or arms and ammunition captured; but by the

number of people brought back to national mainstream. Even one stray incident by armed forces

can turn common people hostile, where as armed forces can contribute a lot towards permanent

solution with courteous behaviour and friendly attitude towards common people. This is already

happening in Nagaland and needs to be further strengthened. Last five decades of insurgency has

taken heavy toll of lives and resources. It has slowed down the pace of progress and development

of the state. It has also cost the nation heavily in various fields and aspects of national

governance. It is high time the people of Nagaland and also NE carry out introspection to make

the peace ever lasting. Government of India is doing its best for the progress and prosperity of

Nagaland. It is now up to the people and especially the young generation to decide how soon

they want to bring peace, progress and prosperity. The day people of Nagaland resolve to bring

and end to insurgency; insurgency will come to an girding halt. If, it could happen in the state of

Mizoram, why can‟t it happen in Nagaland. Like Mizoram, Nagaland can also be a success story

(eventually it will happen one day). It also needs to be understood very clearly that is not easy

to achieve quick victories in this kind of conflict against insurgents, separatists, militants. The

state must show patience (as has been seen in Nagaland) in facing destructive elements and work

deliberately and thoughtfully over extended period so that insurgent and rebel groups are

weakened through sheer attrition. No fix time limits can be given and should be expected, to

which most of the armed forces all over world are used to, as they do in conventional war.

The present Cease Fire Agreement, when translated into a permanent and everlasting

solution for the common populace of Nagaland will be a harbinger of peace and prosperity in the

state and entire North East. Let us hope the days are not very far off when people of Nagaland

will enjoy total peace, progress and prosperity, more opportunities, and move ahead along with

other progressive states of India. This can be done only by young generation of Nagaland. No

one can do this for them. Others can only guide and help to achieve these goals.

The young generation of Nagaland and other parts of NE as well as India must take a

note of the fact that “history has shown repeatedly that ideology seldom wins. In the end it is the

45

hard – headed common sense that yields the best results and enduring success”. This will also

hold good for all the conflict ridden nations and societies all over the world.

46

Map 1

Map 1

47

Map 2

48

Map 2A

49

Map 2B

50

Map 3

51

Map 4 Map 4

52

Map 5

53

Annex ‘A’

STANDING ORDERS

1. Don’t forget nothing.

2. Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet scoured, sixty rounds powder ball,

and be ready to march a minute’s warning.

3. When you are on the march, act the way you would if you were sneaking up on a

deer, see the enemy first.

4. Tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending

on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about

the rangers, but don’t never lie to a ranger or officer.

5. Don’t take a chance you don’t have to.

6. When we are on the march single file, far enough apart so one shot cannot go

through two men.

7. If we strike swamps, or soft round, we spread out abreast, so it is hard to track

us.

8. When we march, we keep moving till dark, so as to give the enemy the least

possible chance at us.

9. When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps.

10. If we take prisoners, we keep them separate till we have had time to examine

them, so they cannot cook up a story between them.

11. Don’t ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you would not

be ambushed.’

12. No matter whether we travel in big parties or little ones, each party has to keep a

scout 20 yards ahead, twenty yards on each flank and twenty yard in the rear, so the

main body cannot be surprised and wiped out.

13. Every night you will be told where to met if surrounded by a superior force.

14. Don’t sleep beyond dawn. Dawn’s when the French and Indians attack.

15. Don’t sit down to eat without posting sentries.

16. Don’t cross a river by a regular ford.

54

17. If somebody’s trailing you, make a circle, come back on to your own tracks and

ambush the folks that aim to ambush you.

18. Don’t stand up when the enemy’s coming against you. Kneel down, lie down,

hide behind a tree.

19. Let the enemy come till he is almost close enough to touch. Then let him have it

and jump out and finish him up with your hatchet.

55

References

1. P.D. Stracey – Nagaland nightmare. Allied publishers private limited, New Delhi

2. V.K. Anand – Conflict in Nagaland, Chanakya Publication, Delhi

3. YD Gundevia ICS (Retd) – War and Peace in Nagaland. Publisher Palit & Palit, New

Delhi – Dehradun - 1975

4. YD Gundevia ICS (Retd) – War and Peace in Nagaland. Publisher Palit & Palit, New

Delhi – Dehradun - 1975

5. YD Gundevia ICS (Retd) – War and Peace in Nagaland. Publisher Palit & Palit, New

Delhi – Dehradun - 1975

6. V.K Anand – Conflict in Nagaland.

7. General KV Krishna Rao, Insurgency in North East, United Services Institute Journal.