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Institutional Continuity and the 2004Institutional Continuity and the 2004Institutional Continuity and the 2004Institutional Continuity and the 2004Institutional Continuity and the 2004Philippine ElectionsPhilippine ElectionsPhilippine ElectionsPhilippine ElectionsPhilippine Elections

Julio C. Teehankee*Julio C. Teehankee*Julio C. Teehankee*Julio C. Teehankee*Julio C. Teehankee*

* Julio Teehankee is an associate professor and chair of the Political Science Department at De La Salle University,Manila, the Philippines.

Philippine Electoral ExperiencePhilippine Electoral ExperiencePhilippine Electoral ExperiencePhilippine Electoral ExperiencePhilippine Electoral Experience

The 2004 synchronized national and localelections in the Philippines serve tohighlight institutional continuity in thePhilippines. It was the third presidentialelection, the sixth congressional and localelections, and the third party-listrepresentative election since the restorationof formal democracy in 1986. However,flawed administration of the electoral

process, wanton use of governmentresources for partisan political purposesand allegations of fraud and massivecheating have diminished the politicalexercise as a credible legitimatingmechanism. The 2004 elections, therefore,reflect the continuing challenges ofredemocratization in the Philippines.

The Philippines takes pride in having themost extensive experience in electoralpolitics in the Southeast Asian region.Elections have been conducted at thenational and local level since the Americansintroduced them in the 1900s. However,the uneven social and economicdevelopment in Philippine society hasengendered an élitist and clientelisticdemocracy embedded in anunderdeveloped economy. FerdinandMarcos exploited the illiberal nature ofPhilippine electoral democracy in 1972 todeclare martial law and establishauthoritarian rule for 14 years. Thegroundswell of opposition to the Marcosdictatorship led to a crisis of legitimationthat marked the beginning of theauthoritarian regime. The ouster of Marcosby a people power uprising in 1986 usheredin a wave of democratization not only inthe Philippines but also in the region.

The post-Marcos democratic transition hasseen intermittent periods of political andeconomic stability amid domestic andregional instability. Despite the threat ofmilitary coups, the administration ofPresident Corazon Aquino managed tosurvive and oversee the drafting of a newconstitution and the peaceful transition ofpresidential powers to her successor FidelRamos. President Ramos embarked on anambitious peace and developmentprogramme that provided a period ofrelative economic growth and politicalstability. Nonetheless, the 1997 Asianfinancial crisis decimated much of theeconomic gains of the Ramosadministration.

The election of popular movie actor JosephEstrada to the presidency in 1998 and hissubsequent ouster in a second peoplepower uprising in 2001 that resulted in

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Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo being installedas president clearly demonstrates thefragility of Philippine democracy. Thefailed attempt of disgruntled Estradasupporters, largely drawn from thepoverty-stricken masses, to mount its ownpeople power uprising against PresidentArroyo marked the re-emergence of alegitimation crisis that is reflective of thedeep political and socio-economic divisionsin the country. This crisis was exacerbatedby a mutiny led by junior military officersin late 2003.

Within this context of contemporarypolitical history, the 2004 election can beseen, not only as a referendum on theperformance of the Arroyo administration,but also as a means of addressing the crisisof legitimation in the Philippines. However,the conduct and outcome of the May 2004national and local elections in the Philippinestend to reinforce the fundamentalparadoxes of democratic governance in thecountry. This paper delineates thefundamental problems and paradoxes ofdemocratic governance in the Philippinesas manifested in the 2004 elections.

Institutional FrameworkInstitutional FrameworkInstitutional FrameworkInstitutional FrameworkInstitutional Framework

The current political institutions in thePhilippines were forged in the aftermathof the successful struggle against 14 yearsof authoritarian dictatorship under theMarcos regime. In 1987, the Philippinescompleted its democratic transition with theadoption of a new constitution that wasoverwhelmingly ratified by three-quartersof the Filipino electorate. With there-establishment of a centralizedpresidential democracy anchored on amajoritarian electoral system, the 1987constitution restored institutional continuitywith the previous 1935 constitution thatwas drafted under American colonial rule.Being the embodiment of the ‘supreme lawof the land’, the 1987 constitution servesnot only as the pre-eminent legal andinstitutional framework, but also as aprimary source of legitimation. Legitimacyis viewed here as the citizens’ willingnessto comply with a system of rule, regardlessof how this is achieved (Heywood, 2000).Hence, the maintenance of legitimacy doesnot depend on constitutional edict alone. Itshould also be sustained by the acceptanceof political institutions by individual andcollective actors. Institutions are notindependent from the economic, socio-cultural and international context in whichthey are embedded. Set within the

‘embedding context’ of anunderdeveloped economy, personalisticand patriarchal culture, a weak statecombined with an ethno-linguisticallydiverse nation and neo-colonialism,political institutions and processes such aselections are sure to be fi l led withcontradictions and paradoxes.

Political institutions are essentially formaland often legal components of statemachinery that employ explicit and usuallyenforceable rules and decision-makingprocedures. An institution is ‘an enduringand stable set of arrangements thatregulates individual and/or groupbehaviour on the basis of established rulesand procedures’ (Heywood, 2000: 93).Historical institutionalism asserts thatinstitutions are historically embedded andare shaped by their formation and criticaljunctures in their development. Thehistorical choices made by states createbranching points from which historicaldevelopment moves on to a new path thatoften results in unintended consequences.Once this new path is taken, it is difficultto change track (Burnham et al., 2004). Theinstitutional argument presented by ‘pathdependency’ asserts that ‘when agovernment program or organization

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embarks upon a path there is inertialtendency for those initial policy choices topersist. That path may be altered, but itrequires a good deal of political pressureto produce that change’ (Peters, 1999: 63).The issues and problems encounteredduring the 2004 Philippine election stem

largely from the institutional and electoraldesigns that were initiated by the framersof the 1987 constitution, who were overlymindful of the excesses and abusescommitted by the authoritarian dictatorshipof the Marcos regime.

2004 Philippine Elections2004 Philippine Elections2004 Philippine Elections2004 Philippine Elections2004 Philippine Elections

Over 55,000 candidates competed for17,729 national and local offices in thesynchronized elections on 10 May 2004.Candidates of 33 parties, including the fourmajor parties Lakas Christian MuslimDemocrats (Lakas-CMD), NationalistPeople’s Coalition (NPC), Liberal Party (LP)and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino(LDP), and 66 party list groups contestedthe elections. There were five candidatesfor the presidency, namely incumbentpresident Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, movieactor Fernando Poe Jr., former educationsecretary Raul Roco, Senator PanfiloLacson, and religious leader Brother EddieVillanueva. Two major coalitions dominatedthe national and local elections – theadministration Koalisyon ng Karanasan atKatapatan sa Kinabukasan (Coalition ofExperience and Fidelity for the Future, orK4) and the opposition Koalisyon ngNagkakaisang Pilipino (Coalition of UnitedPilipinos, or KNP).

The administration’s K4 coalitiondominated the 2004 national and localelections against its major competitor – theopposition KNP coalition. The 2004presidential campaign again served tohighlight two fundamental variables inPhilippine presidential elections: popularity

and machinery. The president’s narrowvictory was a result of the massivemobilization of money, party andgovernment machinery, the support ofregional bailiwicks and the delivery of thereligious command votes. Using theadvantage of incumbency, the presidentmanaged to narrow the lead of her popularopponent in the public opinion survey.

Despite the relatively inclusive, moderatelyopen and competitive nature of the 2004national and local elections, the correctnessof the results was undermined by theconduct of the process. Three issues serveto place the conduct of the 2004 electionsin doubt: inefficient electoraladministration, allegations of fraud andcheating, and the outbreak of election-related violence. As the InternationalFoundation for Election Systems (IFES), akey member of the internationalconsortium of election observers, statedin its Final Report, ‘[t]he 2004 Philippineelection was characterized by seriousadministrative shortcomings brought aboutby failed automation plans, fiscal restraints,and poor management by the ElectionCommission. It was also characterized bysignificant violence and allegations of widescale fraud’ (Erben et al., 2004: 36).

Legitimation and the Democratic ConsensusLegitimation and the Democratic ConsensusLegitimation and the Democratic ConsensusLegitimation and the Democratic ConsensusLegitimation and the Democratic ConsensusTwo successful and one failed peopleuprisings have underscored the fragility ofpolitical institutions, which threaten the

democratic consensus in the Philippines.The temptation to undertake an extra-constitutional mode of political change

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remains an option for the political élite, civiland political organizations, the military andthe masses. Since the restoration of thedemocratic order in 1986, the polity hasbeen subjected to a series of punctuatedchallenges to its legitimacy. These challenges– insurgency, secessionism, terrorism andmilitary adventurism – emanate from andare sustained by deeply rooted socio-economic, political and cultural conflictsthat simply cannot be resolved within theexisting institutional framework.

The stability of the democratic process liesin its capacity to ensure that varied interestsof citizens are considered and, in cases ofdiscrepancy, a reasonable resolution ofdifferences is achieved. Such is theadvantage of the democratic frameworkin which almost every agenda is consolidatedthrough the process of participation, and atolerated level of competition exists amongstakeholders within an institutionalapparatus. The rules and constraintsprovided by institutions shape humaninteraction and provide behaviouralincentives, thus reducing uncertaintythrough the establishment of stable andpredictable structures for interaction amongindividual and collective actors.Paradoxically, in a fully institutionalizeddemocracy, ‘the competitive nature ofpolitical process is ideally [characterized] bya recurring uncertainty of outcomes, thusencouraging a “rule bounded” commitmentamongst political actors to the democraticprocess itself ’ (Reilly, 2004).

Unlike economic institutions (e.g. themarket) that function optimally in anenvironment where there is certainty ofoutcomes, political institutions (e.g.elections) thrive on a recurring uncertaintyof outcomes. For example, electionoutcomes are essentially unpredictable andimpermanent, individual candidates andparties may ‘win’ or ‘lose’, but their victory

or defeat is temporary until the nextelection cycle. The structural uncertaintyof a democratic electoral process is anessential prerequisite for the developmentand institutionalization of behaviouralnorms of cooperation. The challenge forpolitical scientists and policy makers is howpolitical uncertainty can be managed indeeply divided and conflict-ridden societies.The proper choice of electoral system isone institutional remedy to redirect thetrajectory of political competition towardsthe centre and induce a moderating andcooperative influence on the generalpolitical dynamics. As Reilly (2004: 6)argues ‘certain electoral systems, undercertain circumstances, will provide rationalpolitical actors with incentives towardscooperation, moderation andaccommodation between themselves andtheir rivals, while others will leadlogically to hostile, uncooperative andnon-accommodative behavior if individualsact rationally’.

Among the paradoxes of Philippinedemocracy is that despite the widespreadcommitment and enthusiasm of thecitizenry to vote and participate in theelectoral process through civil society,political parties and election administration,there is also a ‘deeply-rooted mistrust thatcharacterizes the relationships between andamong virtually all participants in theprocess’ (Consortium for Elections andPolitical Process Strengthening [CEPPS],2004: 4). Seemingly, there is lack of faithin the system or the honest intent of theparticipants, which is manifested in intricateelection safeguards and intense pollwatching. The basic integrity and legitimacyof every elective position is held in doubt,and election administrators, parties,candidates and their followers are presumedguilty of actual or planned misconduct. Thiscontributes to a rising public cynicism thatthreatens the democratic consensus.

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BibliographyBibliographyBibliographyBibliographyBibliography

Burnham, P., Gilland, K., Grant, W., and Layton-Henry, Z. 2004. Research Methods in Politics.New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening 2004. Report on the May2004 Philippine Election: Consolidated Executive Summary. Manila: National DemocraticInstitute, International Republican Institute, Ifes.

Erben, P., Thakur, B.H., Jennes, C., and Smith, I. (2004). CEPPS Philippine Election ObservationProgram: Strengthening the Electoral Process IFES Final Report. Manila: Ifes.

Heywood, A. 2000. Key Concepts in Politics. London: Macmillan Press.

Peters, B.G. 1999. Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism. London:Pinter.

Reilly, B. (2001). Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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