INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY POLICY (ISP)

WORKING PAPER

by Maxim SAMORUKOV

Fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and

Deputy Editor-in-Chief of carnegie.ru

VIENNA 2020

SERBIA, QUO VADIS?

BELGRADE BETWEEN EU

ACCESSION AND ALIGNMENT

WITH RUSSIA

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 2

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................................ 4

III. ECONOMY ..................................................................................................................... 9

IV. SECURITY .................................................................................................................... 16

V. POLITICS AND SOFT POWER ...................................................................................... 21

VI. PROSPECTS ................................................................................................................. 26

With the friendly support of

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I. INTRODUCTION

In October 2019, six countries of the Western Balkans were shocked to learn that French

President Emmanuel Macron had vetoed the start of negotiations with Albania and North

Macedonia on accession to the European Union (EU). 1 Even before that, both Western

Balkan societies and their ruling elites were under no illusion that EU membership was

within reach.

Still, the French veto dealt a major blow to the European aspirations of the whole region. The

general perception was that if North Macedonia — with its anti-corruption revolution and

painful reconciliation with Greece — hadn’t done enough to merit a start to accession talks,

other countries should forget about making tangible progress in European integration in the

coming years, if not decades.

Increasingly, concerns are growing that this disillusionment with the European path may

push the Balkan states into foreign policy adventurism and encourage them to compensate

for setbacks in EU talks with poorly conceived deals with other world powers — like China,

Russia, or Turkey. Serbia, the largest country in the region, is viewed as especially susceptible

to such risks due to its deep and established ties with Russia.

Developments after the French veto seem to corroborate these fears. In the ensuing months,

Serbia has held joint drills with Russia, concluded a free trade agreement with the Moscow-

led Eurasian Economic Union, rapidly completed the construction of its section of the

1 “France under fire for ‘historic error’ of blocking Balkan EU hopefuls,” Reuters, October 18, 2019 / /

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-summit-balkans/france-resists-eu-membership-talks-for-north-

macedonia-and-albania-idUSKBN1WX1CT

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Russia-sponsored Turkish Stream gas pipeline, and toyed with the idea of purchasing a

Russian S-400 missile system.2 The country’s recent moves clearly demonstrate that weaker

European prospects will press Belgrade to put even greater emphasis on its traditional policy

of balancing between different world powers.

However, this can hardly alter Serbia’s strong dependence on the West economically,

security-wise, and even in its domestic politics. The country’s symbolic gestures toward

Moscow notwithstanding, a pro-Western course will continue to guide Serbia’s foreign

policy, as only cooperation with the West can ensure economic betterment and the political

survival of the powers that be in Belgrade.

2 Maxim Samorukov, Did Emmanuel Macron Hand the Balkans to Russia? – Carnegie Moscow Center –

December 12, 2019 / / https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80649

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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For all of Serbia’s supposedly deep connection with Russia, one can hardly find a bilateral

relationship more overtly mythologized than that between these two countries.

Misconceptions and false stereotypes permeate all their aspects, starting with history.

Serbian, Russian, and even Western media invariably speak about “traditional ties,”

“historical affinity,” and “eternal friendship” when describing the two states’ interactions,

rarely giving a second thought to whether these clichés are well founded.

However, the real history of Russia’s relations with Serbia is no less fraught with conflicts

and mistrust than that of Russia’s relations with neighbouring Hungary or Bulgaria. And a

pro-Russian sentiment, ostensibly deep-rooted in Serbian society, is in fact a recent

phenomenon.

During most of the nineteenth century, the fledgling Serbian state was ruled by the

Obrenović dynasty, which was allied with Austria, not Russia.3 Only in the early twentieth

century did pro-Russian politicians come to power in Serbia through a violent coup d’état.

The new alliance was strong enough to drag Imperial Russia into the First World War, but it

proved to be short-lived. As the Russian monarchy collapsed and the Bolsheviks took over

in 1917, Belgrade was inundated with prominent White Russian émigrés and grew hostile

to Soviet Moscow.

3 Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806–1914 – Cambridge University Press, 1991

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The two states only reestablished formal diplomatic ties in the summer of 1940, following

the breakout of the Second World War. In fact, Yugoslavia, ruled by the Serbian dynasty, was

the last country in Central and Eastern Europe to establish ties with the Soviet Union.

A short spell of cooperation after World War II ended abruptly in 1948 with the split

between two ambitious leaders: Joseph Stalin and Josip Broz Tito. Stalin’s death in 1953

raised hopes for reconciliation, but they failed to materialize. Despite adopting socialism,

Yugoslavia maintained distance from the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual

Economic Assistance, opting for the Non-Alignment Movement instead.

The early 1990s saw both countries democratize and their relations grow even more

strained. Serbian strongman Slobodan Milošević allied himself with the domestic rivals of

the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin: hard-line nationalists and unrepentant

communists. The two leaders’ acrimony, along with Russia’s serious domestic problems,

contributed to the Kremlin’s eagerness to cooperate with the West in the early stages of the

breakup of Yugoslavia.

During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia was in no hurry to back its

Serbian brethren. Instead, Moscow declared its support for major Western initiatives: in the

United Nations, it duly voted to sanction the Milošević regime, impose a no-fly zone in

Bosnia, and establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the

Hague.4

The situation changed only in the late 1990s. Russia was vexed by NATO’s eastward

expansion and viewed the West’s actions in post-socialist Europe with growing suspicion.

4 Dimitar Bechev, Rival Power, Russia’s Influence in Southeast Europe – Yale University Press, 2017

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After NATO bypassed the UN Security Council to bomb Serbia in 1999 with the aim of

stopping ethnic cleansing in the Serbian province of Kosovo, the Russian leadership became

convinced that the West’s approach to the breakup of Yugoslavia was a dress rehearsal for

military action against Russia, a multi-ethnic federation with no shortage of restive regions.

This perception has proven to be extremely persistent and was held by many of Russia’s

ruling elites as late as 2014. Speaking after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Russian

President Vladimir Putin remarked: “Look at what they did to Yugoslavia. They cut it into

small pieces and now manipulate everything that can be manipulated. … That’s basically

what someone apparently wants to do to us.”5

A shared grudge against the “hypocritical West” brought the Russian and Serbian leadership,

as well as many ordinary Russians and Serbs, closer together. The two countries decided to

sweep their many historical disagreements under the rug and revive the century-old myth

of eternal Russian-Serbian friendship.

Their emerging affinity got a further boost in the late 2000s. The Serbian leadership was

shocked by the decision of most Western nations to recognize Kosovo when the breakaway

province unilaterally proclaimed independence in February 2008. In response, Belgrade

successfully sought Russian support to reduce the humiliation for Serbia and prevent full

international recognition of — and UN membership for — Kosovo.

Russia was also interested in growing closer with Serbia. At that moment, Moscow was

undertaking its most serious attempt at economic expansion into the Balkans. The EU was

admitting a number of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, and the

5 Direct Line with Vladimir Putin. April 17, 2014// http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796

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Russian authorities and business community saw an opportunity to strengthen Russia’s

economic position in the former Yugoslavia before Brussels could impose restrictions on

these countries. After gaining a foothold in the Balkans, Russian companies hoped they

would be better positioned to enter EU markets. Moreover, the Balkan countries’ own

economic outlook was quite promising, with GDP growing by about 5% a year.

Still, those hopes were largely dashed by the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. The

political closeness between Russia and Serbia proved difficult to convert into practical

cooperation. With the exception of the energy sector, where substantial Russian

investments indeed materialized, the two countries had little to offer one another in

economic terms. Their ties were as superficial as ever.

Even when former radical nationalists with overtly pro-Russian slogans came to power in

Serbia in 2012, there was no visible pivot to Russia. On the contrary, Belgrade agreed to new

concessions on Kosovo and continued improving its relations with the EU and NATO. 6

Virtually nothing about its dealings with Russia changed.

Often, Russian-Serbian relations appear exceedingly strong and free of major irritants

precisely because they lack substance. When cooperation is limited to joint military parades,

there is nothing to argue about.

Despite lofty talk of brotherhood and unity, the real cooperation between Russia and Serbia

remains limited to just three core elements: the Serbian leadership welcomes and facilitates

Russia’s involvement in the country’s energy market; Moscow provides Belgrade with its

6 Marta Szpala, Hostages to dialogue. The process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations — OSW

commentary — January 6, 2016 / / https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-06-

08/hostages-to-dialogue-process-normalising-serbian-kosovar

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support in the diplomatic arena; and, finally, politicians on both sides are able to boost their

domestic political standing by embracing the popular idea of Slavic and Orthodox Christian

brotherhood. But neither side seeks to move beyond this framework. That would require

significant investments of both economic and political capital that are unlikely to pay off.

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III. ECONOMY

The striking contrast between pompous pronouncements and the real hollowness of Russia-

Serbia ties is most visible in the economy. Russia lags behind the European Union by at least

a factor of ten in almost any area of economic cooperation with Serbia. Serbian foreign trade,

direct investments, financial assistance, money transfers of labour migrants – everywhere

Russia cedes the top ranks to EU countries taken separately. It is completely eclipsed by

Europe if the Union’s share is calculated as a whole.

The only sector of Serbia’s economy where Russia indeed outdoes the EU is energy. Unlike

in many other countries of post-socialist Europe, Russia’s predominance in the Serbian

energy market does not date back to the Soviet era and is based on two relatively recent

deals, both featuring strong streaks of geopolitics.

The first took place in January 2008, when Belgrade agreed to hand over a 51% stake in the

Serbian NIS state oil and gas giant to Russia’s Gazpromneft for 400 million euros in cash and

550 million euros in future investment.7 The NIS deal was struck on the eve of the second

round of the Serbian presidential election, helping the country’s president, Boris Tadić, to

temper accusations of being overly pro-Western and defeat nationalist candidate Tomislav

Nikolić.

The deal also cemented Russia-Serbia cooperation on the Kosovo issue. The breakaway

province unilaterally declared its independence a few weeks later, in February 2008.

7 Shchedrov O., Serbia signs strategic energy deal with Russia. — Reuters UK Edition. — January 25, 2008 / /

http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-serbia-idUKL2515142420080125

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However, due to Moscow’s opposition, it failed to enter the United Nations as a full-fledged

member and is still itemized as a partially recognized state.

There are allegations that Serbia’s leaders sold NIS at a discount,8 but, generally, the deal can

be considered a success from an economic standpoint. Russian expertise in the oil and gas

sector, combined with favorable treatment by Serbian authorities, has helped turn a loss-

making firm into one of the most profitable companies in Serbia within just a few years.9 It

is also one of the largest taxpayers to the Serbian state budget.

The acquisition of NIS (later Gazpromneft’s share increased to 56%) ensured Russia a

dominant position in the Serbian hydrocarbon sector. The company holds a monopoly on

the exploration and production of oil and gas in Serbia. It controls the country’s refining

capacities, including the Pančevo oil refinery, and has a vast network of several hundred

fueling stations in Serbia, with offshoots in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Romania.10

Around 150 more stations owned by Russia’s Lukoil supplement these capacities – back in

2003, the company won a privatization tender, acquiring a 79% stake in Serbian oil retailer

Beopetrol.11

On the same occasion in January 2008, Russia laid the foundation for another major energy

project in Serbia – the construction of a gas pipeline that bypasses Ukraine and delivers

8 Barsukov Y., Serbskaya politika udarila po "Gazprom nefti"[ Serbian politics hit Gazprom Neft] —

Kommersant — August 13, 2014 / / https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2543910 9 100 najvećih — September 2019 / / http://100najvecih.rs/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/100-Najvecih-

Web.pdf 10 Our business — NIS / / https://www.nis.eu/en/about-us/our-business 11 Sergey Ryabikin, "LUKOYL" vyigral tender na pokupku 80 prots aktsiy odnoy iz krupneyshikh neftyanykh

kompaniy Serbii "Beopetrol" [LUKOIL wins a tender for the purchase of an 80% stake in Beopetrol, one of

Serbia’s largest oil companies] — RIA.ru— August 25, 2008 / / https://ria.ru/20030825/424259.html

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Russian gas to Europe through the Black Sea and the Balkans. The project suffered from

numerous delays and encountered difficulties with ensuring the consent of potential transit

states and conforming to EU energy regulations. Over the decade of negotiations, Russia has

had to partly reroute the pipeline, reduce its total capacity by half (from 63 to 32 billion cubic

meters per year), and change its name from South Stream to Turkish Stream.

In Serbia, the project was also widely criticized on the grounds that it was incompatible with

EU standards and even further bolstered Russia’s dominance over the Serbian gas market.12

However, the Serbian leadership lent unfailing support to all the reincarnations of the

pipeline, regularly reiterating its enthusiasm about diversifying the delivery routes and the

future transit fees the country would receive. Russian Gazprom and Serbian Srbijagas tried

to keep the construction low-profile and rushed to complete it in December 2019, far ahead

of the Bulgarian section, which is still in the works.13

Moscow’s grip on the Serbian energy sector indeed looks impressive. Russia accounts for

almost half of Serbia’s oil imports and is the sole foreign supplier of gas to the country,

accounting for over 80% of its consumption. 14 Still, one should not overestimate the

significance of this interdependence. For Gazprom, Serbia is a small market of little

importance. In 2018, the country imported 2.15 billion cubic meters of Russian gas — just

12 Mila Đurđević, Da li će gas u Turskom toku biti samo ruski? (eng. Will Turkish gas be Russian only?)

— Radio Slobodna Evropa — January 6, 2020 / / https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/gas-turski-tok-srbija-

rusija-bugarska/30363103.html 13 Anadolija, Bajatović: Srbija razmatra da pomogne Bugarskoj oko Turskog toka (eng. Bajatovic: Serbia is

considering helping Bulgaria with the Turkish flow) — N1 — January 22, 2020 / /

http://rs.n1info.com/Biznis/a562768/Bajatovic-Srbija-razmatra-da-pomogne-Bugarskoj-oko-Turskog-

toka.html 14 Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Serbia — 2018 / /

https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2018/PdfE/G20182051.pdf

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1.1% of Gazprom’s sales outside the post-Soviet space. 15 For Serbia, gas plays only a

marginal role in its energy mix, making up less than 14% of the country’s total primary

energy supply. Locally produced coal is still the core fuel.16

Russia failed to replicate its success in Serbia’s energy sector in other parts of the country’s

economy, despite extensive high-level dialogue and encouragement. Two leading Russian

state banks – VTB and Sberbank – entered the Serbian market in 2012–2013, but both

remain far from the top positions in the industry. After a jump in the wake of the NIS deal in

2008, Russia’s share in the annual FDI inflow to Serbia declined sharply. It has stagnated at

around 5–7% in recent years and reached a mere 6.8% in 2018, a level that is hardly

comparable to EU members’ 70–80% share.17

Russia is simply unable to compete with the EU in financial terms. Since 2000, Serbia has

received almost 3.7 billion euros in EU assistance. On average, the country receives around

200 million euros of EU funds per annum, making the Union its biggest donor.18 The three

largest targets for EU support are Serbia’s energy, environmental, and social policy sectors.

With Russia, the situation is very different. An impressive $800 million railway

modernization loan that Moscow promised Serbia back in 2009 is being disbursed very

slowly. Serbia was originally supposed to utilize the loan by the end of 2017, but the

15 Delivery statistics — Gazprom export / / http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/ 16 IEA statistics, Serbia / / https://www.iea.org/countries/serbia 17 Serbia’s Balance of Payments. — National Bank of Serbia //

https://www.nbs.rs/internet/english/80/platni_bilans.html 18 EU assistance to Serbia — The delegation of the EU to the republic of Serbia / / https://europa.rs/eu-

assistance-to-serbia/?lang=en

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countries had to extend the deal through 2021, 19 as only around $220 million were

disbursed by the initial deadline.20 The pace of financing has increased somewhat since

then, though fears remain that another extension will be necessary in 2021.

Other projects were even less successful. Russia’s Inter RAO UES energy holding planned to

construct several power plants in Serbia worth 2 billion euros, but these efforts never got off

the ground. 21 A project to build a nuclear power plant in the country was shelved. 22

Uralvagonzavod’s plans to acquire the Serbian Zelezara Smederevo steel plant also failed to

materialize, and the plant was eventually bought by the Chinese.23

There are plenty of failed projects on the Serbian side as well. Despite lofty pronouncements

and a limited free trade agreement between the two countries, Russia has not become a

major export market for Kragujevac-assembled Fiats or Serbian agricultural products.

Serbia’s decision to abstain from the implementation of EU economic sanctions against

Russia has paid few dividends. The share of exports to Russia in Serbia’s trade actually

19 Tanjug, Mihajlović: Do posete Medvedeva usaglasićemo produženje ruskog kredita [eng. Mihajlovic: Until

Medvedev’s visit we will agree to extend the Russian loan] — Blic — September 19, 2016 / /

https://www.blic.rs/biznis/mihajlovic-do-posete-medvedeva-usaglasicemo-produzenje-ruskog-

kredita/qvf4j3w 20 Mijat Lakićević, Rusko-srpska železna veza [eng. Russian-Serbian iron link] — Novi magazin — September

2, 2018 / / http://mijatlakicevic.com/rusko-srpska-zelezna-veza/ 21 «Inter RAO YEES» namereno postroit’ v Serbii elektrostantsii na 2 mlrd yevro. [Inter RAO UES is planning to

build electric power plants in Serbia totaling 2 billion euros] — Segodnia.ru — April 15, 2008 /

/ http://www.segodnia.ru/news/68875 22 Rusi bi da grade nuklearku u Srbiji [Russians are planning to build a nuclear power plant in Serbia]. — В92.

—11. 30.2009 // http://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2009&mm=11&dd=30&nav_id=395464 23 A. Dzhumaylo, E. Popov, Т. Dzhodzhua. «Uralvagonzavod» pokatilsya v Serbiyu [Uralvagonzavod rolled to

Serbia] — Kommersant. — October 11, 2012. // http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2041737

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declined from 7.2% of total exports in 2013 to 5.0% in 2019.24 In contrast, the EU share in

Serbian exports increased from 62.7% to 66.7% over the same period.

Serbia’s imports from Russia consist mainly of hydrocarbons and fluctuate in sync with oil

prices. After oil prices collapsed in 2014, the Russian share of Serbia’s imports fell below 8%

in 2016, but recovered back to 16.6% in 2019 when the hydrocarbon market picked up

steam. Still, Russian imports are no rival to the EU share, which remains around 60%.

In October 2019, France vetoed the start of EU negotiations with Albania and North

Macedonia. That pushed Serbia to undertake another attempt at reviving its economic

cooperation with Russia. The country signed a free trade agreement with the Moscow-led

Eurasian Economic Union.25 The move made a splash in the world media, but is unlikely to

bring any major changes on the ground. The deal largely replicates a limited free trade

agreement Serbia has had with Russia since 2000. Serbia’s trade with the four other member

states of the Eurasian Union – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan – amounts to

a few million dollars in total. Even soaring growth in this trade won’t make much difference.

Russia and Serbia consciously refrain from taking any major steps to boost their economic

cooperation. Both countries fear that drastic measures would jeopardize their genuine

economic priorities, which lie elsewhere. Moscow has little enthusiasm for opening its

domestic market to manufactured or agricultural goods from Serbia, as the country might

turn into a back channel for European companies and undermine Russia’s own producers.

24 External Trade. Republican Statistical Institute (Serbia) / /

https://www.stat.gov.rs/en-us/oblasti/spoljna-trgovina/ 25 Serbia Signs Trade Agreement With Russia-Led Eurasian Economic Union, Radio Free Europe/ Radio

Liberty, October 25, 2019 / / https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-to-ink-trade-agreement-with-russia-led-

eurasian-economic-union/30235917.html

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In the meanwhile, Serbia is striving for better access to European markets. Deals with Russia

are little more than leverage in this pursuit. The Serbian leadership openly states that it will

be ready to scrap its trade arrangements with Moscow as soon as it gets a tangible offer from

the EU.26

26 "Kad Srbija postane član EU raskinuće ugovor s Evroazijskom unijom" [eng. "When Serbia joins EU it will

terminate treaty with Eurasian Union"] — b69 — August 31, 2018 //

https://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2019&mm=08&dd=31&nav_id=1584871

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IV. SECURITY

Serbia’s affinity for Russia in the security sphere is often seen as unprecedented for a country

aspiring to become a member of the European Union. Even token gestures of military

cooperation between the two countries always make it into the world news, breeding fears

in the West that the Kremlin may take advantage of pro-Russian sentiment in Serbian

society and turn Serbia into a bridgehead in the heart of NATO’s southern flank in Europe.

However, a closer look at Serbia’s international security ties reveals that Russia lags behind

the West in this field no less spectacularly than in the economy.

The most visible form of Russia-Serbia security cooperation is joint military exercises. They

are held regularly, several times a year, and usually with the clear intention to cause a stir in

local and international media. This stir overshadows the fact that Serbia conducts joint drills

with NATO countries several times more frequently than with Russia. In 2019, the ratio was

13 to 4, respectively.27

In other years, it was even less favorable for Moscow. For example, according to Serbian

Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, in 2017 Serbia conducted as many as 13 major military

activities with NATO and only two with Russia.28 Military cooperation with Russia simply

27 Serbia held more exercises with NATO than with Russia in 2019 — European Western Balkans — November

18, 2019

https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/11/18/serbia-held-more-exercises-with-nato-than-with-

russia-in-2019/ 28 Belgrade Security Forum panel discussion — NATO.int — October 12, 2017

https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/opinions_147839.htm

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gets far more coverage in Serbia, since Russia is popular with the Serbian electorate, while

NATO is decidedly not.

Similarly, arms purchases from Russia are widely advertised by the Serbian leadership,

regardless of their practical benefit, while security deals with the West remain largely

unknown to the public. For a few years, Serbian media reveled in the story that Russia was

donating several second-hand MiG-29 jets and a few dozen used tanks and combat vehicles

to Serbia.29 But in August 2019, the country’s Ministry of Defense revealed that in 2014–

2018 the largest military donor to the Serbian armed forces was the U.S., while Russian

“donations” came with the proviso that Serbia still had to invest a few hundred million euros

to have Russian specialists revamp the old equipment.30

Despite constantly emphasizing its neutrality and friendship with Russia, Serbia in fact

works closely with NATO in numerous ways, even in the absence of any formal game plan

for joining the Alliance. Since 2006, the Serbian armed forces have conducted over 150 joint

military exercises, training activities, and exchange programs with NATO members.31 In

2015, Belgrade and NATO agreed on an Individual Partnership Action Plan. In February

2016, Serbia ratified a NATO Support and Procurement Organization (NSPO) agreement,

which granted the Alliance certain tax exemptions and diplomatic immunity.32 In October

29 Čpajak B., Vučić: Od Rusije šest „migova 29” i 30 tenkova [Vučić: Russia handed over six Mig-29’s and thirty

tanks]. — Politika —12.11. 2016 // http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/370523/Vucic-Od-Rusije-sest-

migova-29-i-30-tenkova 30 Maja Zivanovic, Serbia’s Biggest Military Donor is US… Er, Russia — balkaninsight — August 13, 2019 / /

https://balkaninsight.com/2019/08/13/serbias-biggest-military-donor-is-us-er-russia/ 31 Stronger Partnerships Towards More Security and Prosperity — Belgrade center for security policy —

February 22, 2018 / /

http://www.bezbednost.org/BCSP-News/6725/Stronger-Partnerships-Towards-More-Security-and.shtml 32 Agreement Between The Government Of The Republic Of Serbia And The Nato Support And Procurement

Organisation (Nspo) On Logistic Support Cooperation — 2015 / /

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2018, NATO drills for the first time were held on Serbian territory.33 In November 2019, the

country approved the second cycle of the Individual Partnership Action Plan for the years

2019–2021.34

When time comes to take another step in cooperation with NATO, the Serbian leadership

always reacts constructively, provided the talks don’t involve formal membership and are

kept low-profile in order not to irk the wider Serbian public. In the eyes of Belgrade’s national

security establishment, close cooperation with NATO is essential because only the Alliance

can guarantee security for the Serbian minority in Kosovo. 35 Russia can provide merely

political support on the issue; Moscow withdrew the last of its peacekeepers from the

Balkans almost two decades ago in 2003.

Russia has offered only token resistance to the deepening cooperation between Serbia and

NATO. In 2013, it granted Serbia observer status in the Parliamentary Assembly of the

Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization – a formal step with zero practical

implications. 36 In 2016, Russia urged the Serbian authorities to conduct a nation-wide

http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/lat/pdf/predlozi_zakona/154-16%20LAT.pdf 33 NATO Secretary General thanks Serbia for hosting civil emergency exercise — NATO website — October 7,

2018 / / https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_159020.htm? 34 Second cycle of the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO adopted — telegraf — November 8, 2019

/ / https://www.telegraf.rs/english/3120017-second-cycle-of-the-individual-partnership-action-plan-with-

nato-adopted 35 NATO’s role in Kosovo. — NATO website. — March 9, 2017 //

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm 36 Afganistan i Serbiya stali nablyudatelyami pri PA ODKB [Afghanistan and Serbia become observers to the

CSTO PA] — RIA news— April 11, 2013 //

https://ria.ru/20130411/932140328.html

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referendum on NATO membership, but soon brushed the idea aside when it received a

frosty welcome in Belgrade.

In 2012, Russia established a joint humanitarian center in the Serbian city of Niš. The center

generates significant concern in the West. Western officials have stressed that it could

become a base for Russian intelligence services operating in the Balkans.37 To make the case

that such fears are overstated, the center has invited Western journalists and diplomats to

visit its premises. It also remains unclear how Belgrade would have been able to reject

Russian demands to grant the center diplomatic status for eight years running if the facility

were actually vital for Russian intelligence-gathering purposes.38

Serbia’s recent joint drills with Russia in October 2019 once again confirmed the country’s

strong dependence on the West in its security arrangements. Exasperated by France’s veto

of the start of EU talks with Albania and North Macedonia, Belgrade agreed to Russia

bringing its S-400 missile system to Serbia. Serbian media buzzed that the country might

consider purchasing one such system from Russia, as Turkey had done a few months earlier.

However, a harsh response from the U.S., which threatened to impose sanctions on Serbia if

it went ahead with the deal, made the Serbian leadership refute the rumors in stark terms.

President Vučić even stated that Serbia would stop purchasing arms abroad altogether.39

37 Milena Djurdjic, “US Sees Russia’s ‘Humanitarian Center’ in Serbia as Spy Outpost — VOA news— June 15,

2017 / / https://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-sees-russia-humanitarian-center-serbia-spy-

outpost/3902402.html 38 No need to give Russian Center diplomatic status. — B92. — July 17, 2017 //

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=07&dd=17&nav_id=101829 39 Vučić: Dodatne reforme vojske, staje se sa nabavkom novog oružja [eng. Vucic: Additional military reforms

are stalling with the acquisition of new weapons] — Politika — December 3, 2019 / /

http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/443238/Vucic-Dodatne-reforme-vojske-staje-se-sa-nabavkom-novog-

oruzja

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Serbia is already an integral part of numerous European security initiatives on fighting

organized crime, drug traffic, and illegal migration. The country closely cooperates with the

EU Frontex agency on border management and contributes to EU military missions.40 It is

negotiations with the EU and cooperation with NATO that largely determine reforms and

development of the Serbian armed forces.

As for Russia, its military cooperation with Serbia is haphazard and has little impact on

Serbian security institutions. Its arms sales to Serbia are overhyped and intended to produce

a short-term political effect instead of lasting dependency. In the meanwhile, Serbia’s key

security priorities are untenable without substantial assistance from the West.

40 Border management: EU signs agreement with Serbia on European Border and Coast Guard cooperation —

European Council website—November 19, 2019 / / https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-

releases/2019/11/19/border-management-eu-signs-agreement-with-serbia-on-european-border-and-

coast-guard-cooperation/

21

V. POLITICS AND SOFT POWER

The dearth of substance in bilateral relations doesn’t embarrass Serbian and Russian leaders

– they continue to meet regularly, issuing public statements about joint projects. The optics

of these projects remain valuable to both governments even if they are never fully

implemented. The theatrical quality of these high-level interactions is hard to miss, but such

performances are well received by the Russian and especially Serbian domestic audiences.

For Russia, engagement with Serbia helps to showcase its geopolitical influence in the

Balkans and demonstrate that the Kremlin still has close allies in Europe. Serbian politicians

are even more eager to meet up, as any public interaction with Russian counterparts

automatically boosts their ratings.

The popularity of Russia and President Vladimir Putin in Serbia indeed verges on a religious

cult. For many years, all opinion polls that ask which country is or should be Serbia’s main

ally have returned the same result: Russia takes the top spot by a wide margin.41 The share

of Serbs who support strong ties with Russia is so high that it reaches over 90% when

respondents are allowed to choose several options.42

In Serbia, Russia’s appeal defies reality. Since the fall of the Milošević regime in 2000, the EU

has provided the country with 3.7 billion euros in financial assistance. Still, according to the

polls, a mere 21% of Serbs consider the EU to be the biggest aid donor to Serbia, while the

41 “What will the empire do… Serbia between East and West” [in Serbian], Demostat, August 2017.

http://demostat.rs/sr/vesti/istrazivanja/kojem-bi-se-carstvu-priklonili--srbija-izmedu-istoka-i-zapada/214 42 Survey of Serbian Public Opinion — Survey Research — November 24 – December 3, 2015 / /

https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/serbia_november_2015_poll_public_release.pdf

22

plurality (36%) falsely believes that it is Russia.43 Contrary to these perceptions, official data

reveals that Russia is not even among the top 10.44

Similar delusions guide Serbs’ attitudes in the security domain: 55% of them believe Russia

to be militarily superior to NATO, while only 19% think the opposite.45 It is hardly surprising

that the president of such a mighty and benevolent power – Vladimir Putin – tops Serbian

polls as the most trusted foreign leader. His trust rating in Serbia (57%) is similar to the

support rating of the country’s own president, Aleksandar Vučić.46

One shouldn’t attribute this popularity to the magnitude of Russian propaganda in Serbia.

In fact, direct Russian presence in the Serbian media landscape is quite limited. Unlike Al

Jazeera Balkans, BBC News na Srpskom, or CNN-affiliated N1, Moscow has not invested in

the creation of a Serbian-language TV channel and has confined itself to establishing

Sputnik Srbija, a moderately popular online and radio news broadcaster. Further expansion

looks unnecessary since the majority of Serbian media is eager to promote the pro-Russian

narrative even without any input from the Kremlin. This way, the media capture a wider

audience in Serbian society, which still harbors a deep resentment toward the West.

43 Survey of Serbian Public Opinion — Survey Research — November 24 – December 3, 2015 / /

https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/serbia_november_2015_poll_public_release.pdf 44 Milan Nešić, Gde je Rusija među donatorima u Srbiji? [eng. Where is Russia among donors in Serbia?] —

Radio Slobodna Evropa — August 29, 2018 / / https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/29459781.html 45 Western Balkans: Between East and West. Public Opinion Research in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia,

Montenegro, and Serbia. November 2018. National Democratic Institute, 2018 / /

https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Download%20Report_1.pdf 46 “Research: Vučić Is the Most Popular Politician; Putin Has a Higher Trust Rating than Other World Leaders”

[in Serbian], Novosti, January 3, 2019 / /

http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:769462-Istrazivanje-Vucic-ubedljivo-

najpopularniji-politicar-Putinu-najvise-poverenja-medju-svetskim-liderima

23

Strong pro-Russian sentiment in Serbia is not of the Kremlin’s making. Rather, it is the result

of the Serbs’ grudge against the West, which dates back to the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Few

Serbs feel nostalgic for the Milošević era, but many believe that the West has treated them

unfairly and that they are excessively blamed for the horrors of the Yugoslav civil war. 47

Moreover, in the eyes of many Serbs, they lost that war to NATO and the West, rather than to

Bosnians or Albanians. For them, this imbues any cooperation with the West with a tinge of

national humiliation. Closer ties with Russia, on the contrary, are perceived as a way to push

back against “arrogant Westerners.”

Mindful of this reality, Serbian politicians of all stripes and colors loudly promote any form

of interaction with Russia regardless of its practical benefits. At times, such

pronouncements may seem exceedingly hollow, but they still work well with Serbian

audiences. For example, during his 2017 presidential campaign, Aleksandar Vučić boasted

of meeting Vladimir Putin in person as many as nine times — more than all the other

presidential candidates combined. 48 He never bothered to specify what those meetings

helped him to achieve in practical terms. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the

statement contributed to his landslide victory in the first round.

Still, when it comes to practical issues, both Serbian society and its ruling elites display a

more rational approach. Opinion polls demonstrate that the majority of Serbs, despite their

fascination with Russia as a geopolitical ally, would prefer to live, work, and send their

47 Piše: P. D., Vučić odmah iza Tita, Đinđić ispred Miloševića [eng. Vucic just behind Tito, Djindjic in front of

Milosevic] — Politika — November 16, 2016 / /

http://www.danas.rs/politika.56.html?news_id=332335&title=Vu%C4%8Di%C4%87+odmah+iza+Tita%

2c+%C4%90in%C4%91i%C4%87+ispred+Milo%C5%A1evi%C4%87a 48 Vučić verovatno pre izbora sa Putinom [Vučić will probably meet Putin before the elections]. — Politika. —

03.19.2017 // http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/376540/Vucic-verovatno-pre-izbora-sa-Putinom

24

children to study in Western countries.49 In the same vein, all major political parties in

Serbia – both in the opposition and in the ruling coalition – proclaim joining the EU to be

their main foreign policy priority. There is a broad consensus that cooperation with Russia

is a secondary element in Serbia’s foreign policy. It augments the country’s position in

dealings with the West, but should not preclude Serbia’s European aspirations.

Parties and movements that do prioritize ties with Russia over cooperation with the West

are confined to the margins of Serbia’s political life. Some of them, like the ultranationalist

Radical Party, are manipulated and allegedly supported by President Vučić in order to

present his own nationalist views as moderate and compatible with the pro-Western

agenda. Others, like the right-wing party Dveri or the Military Union of Serbia, are more

autonomous and seek to develop direct ties with the Kremlin.50 Occasionally they are hosted

in Moscow at the State Duma (the lower chamber of the Russian parliament) or the Foreign

Ministry, but so far there is no hard evidence that Russia coordinates the activities of these

groups or provides them with anything beyond rhetorical support at low-profile meetings.51

The Russian Orthodox Church also has strong appeal in Serbia. Its high-ranking clerics,

including current Patriarch Kirill, visited Belgrade as NATO bombed the city in 1999.52 The

49 “What will the empire do… Serbia between East and West” [in Serbian], Demostat, August 2017.

http://demostat.rs/sr/vesti/istrazivanja/kojem-bi-se-carstvu-priklonili--srbija-izmedu-istoka-i-zapada/214 50 “From Moscow Without Love,” Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, March 2019, https://www.ceas-

serbia.org/images/publikacije/CEAS_From_Moscow_Without_Love_EN_A4_WEB.pdf 51 Maxim Samorukov, A Spoiler in the Balkans? Russia and the Final Resolution of the Kosovo Conflict —

Carnegie Moscow Center — November 26, 2019 / / https://carnegie.ru/2019/11/26/spoiler-in-balkans-

russia-and-final-resolution-of-kosovo-conflict-pub-80429#_edn21 52 “Patrijarh Kiril: Divimo se hrabrosti Srba na Kosovu” [Patriarch Kirill: We admire the courage of the Serbs in

Kosovo], Serbian Orthodox Church, April 28, 2019 / /

http://www.spc.rs/sr/patrijarh_kiril_divimo_se_hrabrosti_srba_na_kosovu

25

Russian Church also contributed to the construction of the largest Orthodox cathedral in the

country, the Church of Saint Sava, and supports Orthodox communities in Kosovo.53

The growing divide between the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates has brought the

Russian and Serbian Orthodox Churches even closer together, as both face similar problems

with upholding their jurisdiction over the Churches in neighbouring states, which became

independent just a few decades ago. Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew

has already granted independence to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and may consider

similar moves for the Macedonian and Montenegrin Churches. The Moscow and Serbian

patriarchates are staunchly opposed to such developments.54

Thus, Orthodox brotherhood is sure to remain one of the central motifs in future displays of

the Russian-Serbian national affinity. However, it is unlikely to be a game changer for the

dynamics of bilateral relations. The Russian and Serbian Orthodox Churches enjoy a certain

degree of autonomy and should not be viewed as mere departments of their governments,

but both persistently refrain from challenging the state on political issues.

Despite numerous attempts by non-state and quasi-state actors to shape and profit off

Russia-Serbia relations, their future development will continue to be determined, first and

foremost, by the two countries’ leaders and governments.

53 “Serbskaya seminariya v Kosovo poluchila v podarok komplekt Pravoslavnoy entsiklopedii” [Serbian

seminary in Kosovo received a set of the Orthodox Encyclopedia as a gift], Russian Orthodox Church,

November 26, 2015 / / http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4281131.html 54 Position of the Serbian Orthodox Church on the Church Crisis in Ukraine After the Newest Decisions by the

Patriarchate of Constantinople,” Serbian Orthodox Church, November 28, 2018 / /

http://www.spc.rs/eng/position_serbian_orthodox_church_church_crisis_ukraine_after_newest_decisions

_patriarchate_constanti

26

VI. PROSPECTS

Relations between Russia and Serbia are extremely asymmetrical. Paradoxically, that means

that Belgrade shapes their dynamics more than Moscow does.

For Vučić, Serbia’s ties with Russia are an important foreign policy asset, which he manages

carefully and often personally. For the Kremlin, Serbia is a third-rate partner that only

occasionally appears on the agenda, usually in the wider context of NATO expansion or gas

transit to Europe. This relegates the day-to-day management of relations with Serbia to the

lower levels of the Russian bureaucracy. In the centralized and rigidly hierarchical Russian

state machine, that means inertia guides Russian policy vis-à-vis Belgrade by default.

Moscow is well aware that it is no match for the West when it comes to economic or security

issues in Serbia. Thus, it sticks to the status quo to forestall the further waning of its influence

in the country. In the meanwhile, any disruptive move by Russia is likely to bring about the

opposite of its intended effect: it may provoke a backlash in the West, reinvigorate Europe’s

commitment to the Balkans, and bring Serbia closer to the EU and NATO. In this respect, the

French veto and the general “enlargement fatigue” in the EU plays into Russia’s hands. It

prolongs the uncertain status of Serbia for another number of years, obviating the review of

Moscow’s current strategy in the region.

On top of that, in January 2020 Russia entered a tumultuous period of transition. President

Putin is gradually handing over his powers to a younger generation of ruling elites after two

decades at the helm.55 For the next few years, the Kremlin’s resources and attention will be

55 Alexander Baunov, Putin Is Planning a Partial Retirement – Foreign Policy – January 17, 2020 / /

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/17/putin-planning-partial-retirement-russia-whats-next/

27

consumed mainly by domestic issues, significantly reducing its appetite for foreign policy

undertakings. In this context, Moscow will be more than happy with the leadership in

Belgrade if Serbia just stays cooperative on energy issues, doesn’t formally join NATO, and

continues with the ritual displays of “historical affinity with its Slavic brethren in Russia.”

Serbian President Vučić is quite content with these red lines, as they are compatible with his

own foreign policy priorities. As both Russia and the EU become more absorbed in their

internal issues, the Serbian leader will carry on his geopolitical balancing act with even

greater vigor. Vučić has already mastered the skill of presenting himself, depending on the

audience, as either Putin’s best friend in the Balkans or the only guarantee that Serbia will

not turn into a Russian satellite. Growing geopolitical uncertainty in the region will provide

him with ample opportunities to apply this skill in practice.

The recent foreign policy moves by Vučić offer a good idea of what is coming. For over three

years, Serbia defied Russian pressure, dragging its feet on signing a free trade agreement

with the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union. The deal was almost identical to the one

the country had with Russia for two decades, but Belgrade didn’t want to complicate its talks

with the EU. However, Serbia changed its mind and swiftly signed the pending agreement

just days after the French veto in October 2019.56 The grandiose ceremony in Moscow was

intended to be a clear signal to Brussels that Belgrade has other foreign policy options in case

Europe takes too tough a stance in the talks.

Soon, this message was balanced by another one, which portrayed Vučić as a leading

defender of Serbia against the Kremlin’s spies and pro-Russian radicals. In November 2019,

56 Serbia Signs Trade Agreement With Russia-Led Eurasian Economic Union – Radio Free Europe – October 25,

2019 / / https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-to-ink-trade-agreement-with-russia-led-eurasian-economic-

union/30235917.html

28

unidentified sources leaked footage online that showed a Serbian official accepting a bribe

from a Russian. 57 The Russian was later identified as Georgy Kleban, a man previously

assigned to the Russian Embassy in Belgrade and, reportedly, a GRU colonel.

The scandal received wide coverage in the Serbian pro-government media, and Vučić

himself eagerly commented on the issue. His ostensible astonishment at Russia’s

intelligence activities was hardly convincing, as it was most likely the Serbian authorities

who leaked the footage. The identity of the Serbian official was never revealed and nobody

has been arrested, while the Russian official had left Serbia in a regular rotation long before

the scandal erupted.58 The whole affair seems to have been greenlighted by the Serbian

president to demonstrate to the West that his genuinely pro-Western course faces

significant pressure from Russia and pro-Russian sympathizers at home.

Vučić enjoys a virtual free hand to manipulate Serbia’s ties with Russia, because such

manipulations mostly remain under the Kremlin’s radar. Despite its clearly anti-Russian

undertones, the recent spy scandal had zero impact on Vučić’s visit to Moscow just a couple

of weeks later in December 2019. His meeting with Putin proceeded in an atmosphere as

amiable as ever.

Besieged by numerous controversies in relations with other Balkan states, Russia is

reluctant to play hardball with Vučić, who is always ready to placate the Kremlin with public

displays of loyalty and admiration. Besides, Moscow is mindful of the fact that numerous

57 Mila Đurđević, Una Čilić, “Ruski obaveštajac na sastanku sa ‘srpskim agentom’ u Beogradu” [Russian Agent

Meeting with “Serbian Agent” in Belgrade] – Radio Slobodna Evropa – November 18, 2020 / /

https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ruski-obavestajac-sastanak-srpski-agent/30278590.html 58 Maja Zivanovic, Serbian Prosecution Ducks Probing Russian Spy Affair – BalkanInsight – December 9, 2019

/ / https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/09/serbian-prosecution-ducks-probing-russian-spy-affair/

29

pro-Russian establishments in Serbia are, to a large extent, controlled by Vučić. Thus, it is

not clear that the Kremlin would have the upper hand in a showdown with Belgrade. The

fact that even notorious Sputnik Srbija, funded by Russia, fears Vučić’s reprimands more

than those of the Kremlin is more than indicative.

Russia can do little about the pro-Western tilt in Vučić’s foreign policy course. For the

Serbian president, the West’s benevolence is essential — and not only as a source of

economic benefits and security for Serb minorities in neighboring countries. It also

guarantees his own political survival.

The increasingly authoritarian Vučić regime faces accumulating problems with legitimacy

at home. Last year, Serbia saw the largest anti-government protests since the fall of Milošević

in 2000. For half a year, every weekend, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of

Belgrade and other major cities to protest Vučić’s governing methods. This year, many

opposition parties plan to boycott parliamentary elections in May, as they believe the vote

will be neither free nor fair.59

Vučić can hardly survive a standoff on two fronts if rising discontent at home compounds

with the West’s disfavor in the international arena. For this reason, the Serbian president

strives to preserve his image as a constructive and broadly pro-European leader in the West.

No matter how vague Serbia’s European prospects have become, Vučić is still open to talks

and compromises with Kosovo. In January 2020, Serbia and Kosovo agreed to restore direct

flights between Belgrade and Pristina, and full-fledged dialogue between the two states is

59 Serbia’s opposition declares start of boycott campaign, joins people in protest – N1 Info – February 1, 2020 /

/ http://rs.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a565804/Serbia-opposition-declares-election-boycott-join-

protest.html

30

likely to resume soon.60 On the domestic front, the Serbian government is lowering the

election threshold for political parties from 5 to 3 percent of the votes in order to

demonstrate to the EU that it welcomes pluralism in parliament and that the opposition

boycott of the polls is misplaced.61

In the coming years, Serbia is unlikely to be offered incentives strong enough to persuade

the country to abandon its current foreign policy course. It will continue to leverage its ties

with Russia to improve its standing in relations with the West. One day, the Serbian

leadership may portray Russia as a viable alternative to the West; the next day it might

present Moscow as a threat to regional stability. The Kremlin’s failure to come up with a

coherent strategy in the Balkans affords enough ground for both options. But the Western

capitals will invariably remain the target audience for all these gestures. All facets of life in

Serbia are already too deeply embedded into Europe to allow for an alternative, regardless of

whether the country will ever join the EU.

60 Serbia, Kosovo Sign Deal To Restore Direct Air Link – Radio Free Europe – January 20, 2020 / /

https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-kosovo-sign-deal-to-restore-direct-air-link/30387590.html 61 Veljko Popović, Šta sve nosi moguća promena pravila pred trku i izborni cenzus od tri odsto – Voice of

America – January 12, 2020 / / https://www.glasamerike.net/a/%c5%a1ta-sve-nosi-mogu%c4%87a-

promena-pravila-pred-trku-i-izborni-cenzus-od-3-odsto/5242120.html