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A popular Government,without popular information or the means of acquiring it,

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;

And a people who mean to be their ýwn Governors,must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRYAugust 4, 1822

MOSCOW'S "NEAR ABROAD"

SECURITY POLICY IN POST- SOVIET EUROPE

WILLIAM C. BODIE

McNair Paper SixteenJune 1993

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITYWashington, DC

94 3 7 092

From time to time, the Institute for Nation-NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY al Strategic Studies will publish short"* President: Lieutenant General P. G. Cerian papers to provoke thought and inform"* Vice President: Ambassador H. K. Walker discussion on issues of US national securi-

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Readers are invited to submit nonretum-William C. Bodie is a Senior Fellow, Institute able) manuscripts for consideration for

for National Strategic Studies, National De- publication. Please submit them, with afense University. Previously, he was Chair- 250-word abstract, on 3.5" diskettes inman of the Manhattan Institute Seminar onInternational Affairs. He is the author of The WordPerfect 5.1 and enclose one printout.Intelligent Layperson's Guide to Star Wars(National Strategy Information Center, 1986) Portions of this publication may be quoted

and has published articles and reviews in the or reprinted without further permission,Wall Street Journal, Orbis, World Affairs, with credit to the Institute for Nationaland other periodicals. Strategic Studies, Washington, DC. A

courtesy copy of reviews and tearsheetswould be appreciated.

MOSCOW'S "NEAR ABROAD"Security Policy in Post-Soviet Europe

WILLIAM C. BODIE

SUMMARY

The Soviet collapse bequeathed an uneasy security legacy throughout Eurasia.Especially worrisome to defense planners at the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-zation (NATO) are the actual and potential conflicts in the European republics ofthe former USSR, part of Russia's "near abroad": Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, andthe Baltic republics. This area contains 70 million inhabitants, two thousandnuclear warheads, and a surplus of unresolved strategic, economic, and ethnicdisputes. These new nations are struggling to enter Western economic and securityinstitutions while key Russian figures press for reintegration of the republics underRussia's leadership. Moscow's evolving policy toward the "near abroad" willindicate what kind of Russia-democratic nation, revanchist empire, or anarchicbattleground-the West will face in the 21st century. U

Acoession For

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Moscow's "Near Abroad"Security Policy In Post-Soviet Europe

WILLIAM C. BODIE

During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe,they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of everyman against every man.

-HOBBES, Leviathan 1:13

The end of the cold war, phenomenal threatening, but it is frightening," onestrategic victory though it was for the NATO official summed up.'West, has disoriented NATO capitals. Such an environment is hazardousScenarios that eluded Western planners for daily political forecasts, let aloneeven five years ago have become fact. long-range strategic visions. The WestThe USSR has dissolved, 15 autono- has no experience analyzing countriesmous states have emerged, and inter- "that are attempting nation-building,republican conflict has ignited. The political democratization, and economiconce monolithic military has devolved reform in a context of economic aus-into assorted, self-directed armed forc- terity, imperial disintegration, and thees, and secure unitary control over thir- collapse of state structures."' Yet West-ty-thousand nuclear warheads has di- ern governments must appreciate theminished. Any post-Warsaw Pact con- forces driving defense and diplomacycert of Europe will be buffeted by the in the former USSR in order to fore-ongoing revolutions in the former see-and forestall-general conflagra-Soviet empire. "Russia is no longer tion in post-Soviet Eurasia.

Several unappreciated realities de-An earlier version of this monograph was published mand a review of the stats onas "Anarchy and Cold War in Moscow's 'Near Russia's European periphery.3 TheAbroad'," Strategic Review, vol. 26, no. I (Winter1993), pp. 40-53. Republic of Ukraine, by virtue of its

SI

2 MOSCOW'S "NEAR ABROAD"

geopolitical position, resources, and million (including some- 11 millionnuclear weapons, is already a major Russians) and Europe's second largestactor on the European security scene. standing army. Unlike the CentralQuiescent Belarus, capital of the mori- European Warsaw Pact states, thesebund Commonwealth of Independent republics did not entertain any notionStates (CIS), has nevertheless created of statehood7 and were thrust abruptlyits own army and could be drawn into into independence in 1991. Like Rus-

a regional conflict. A shooting war sia, all six share unfathomable socio-erupted in Moldova in mid- 1992 economic nightmares, not least thatwhich, though currently ignored by the each has banished its Communist partyWest, evinces eerie parallels to the without casting off its Communists.Balkans.' The Baltic republics, centrif- All the historical "risk factors for in-ugal pioneers of the Soviet break-up, tense outbursts of aggressive national-continue to "host" unwelcome Russian ism" are present in these countries:military units and an unsettled Slavic "democratization, state building,population whose cause has energized marketization, mass communications."8

Moscow's conservatives. Russian Josef Stalin designed these states'policy toward the "near abroad" or borders to heighten ethnic identities"nearby foreign parts" (blizhniye and justify repressive Soviet rule. Thezarubezhiya)5 will indicate the kind of area once known as "the Soviet West"Russia-nation, empire, or anarchic maintains strong cultural links withbattleground-the West will know in Western neighbors despite russificationthe 21st century. and sovietization.9 Democratic and

market forces are fragile, but each

The Region republic intends to follow the CentralEuropean republics into Western eco-

The territorial arc from Tallin to Yalta nomic and security structures." In

contains six independent countries with addition, economic, military, and socio-

70 million inhabitants, over 250 strate- logical crises raging in the republicsgic nuclear missiles,6 and a third of the impinge directly on Russia's future and

economic output of the Soviet Union. Western security. Uncertainty sur-

Ukraine alone has a population of 52 rounds the outcome of defense conver-

---

WILLIAM C. BODIE 3

sion and arms sales, the nuclear tug-of- monwealth of Independent Stateswar between Moscow and Kiev, incipi- (CIS), arouses Western attention main-ent "warlordism" in Moldova, and Rus- ly due to Kiev's contradictory state-sian restiveness in the Baltic states. ments about nuclear weapons on its

The two keys to security relations territory. The singlemindedness within this region are the republics' obses- which Western politicians emphasizedsion with Russian power and the Rus- the nuclear issue (besides bruisingsian military's enhanced policy role Ukrainian sensitivities) convinced Kievtoward the republics. Ukraine's leader- that the weapons were of considerableship in particular has justified its au- diplomatic and economic utility. Fu-thoritarian state-building efforts by ture Western policy initiatives will beappealing to fear of Muscovite imperi- more successful if our awareness ofalism. As Russian civil authorities are Ukrainian politics extends beyond ourblamed for the "loss" of territory under interest in the implementation of theMoscow's sway since Peter the Great, Strategic Arms Reduction Treatythe CIS and Russian General Staffs (START) and adherence to the Nuclearhave usurped some Foreign Ministry Nonproliferation Treaty.prerogatives, militarizing policy toward The opportunity to establish a sov-the "near abroad."'" Hence, the current ereign Ukrainian republic surprisedinterplay between Russia and these most Ukrainian politicians, includingstates on such issues as division of Leonid Kravchuk, whose utterances asproperty, rights of russophones in the the parliamentary chairman duringrepublics, and security pacts with other August 1991 were artfully ambigu-states-will be a bellwether for the ous.'2 Unlike tumultuous Moscowstrategic orientation of the world's first during that month's events, Kiev sawformer superpower. neither a coup nor an anti-Communist

revolution. As the dissident leaderUkraine: The Strategy of Vyacheslav Chornovil noted some sixNomenklatura Nationalism months after the coup, "If you look at

a map of Ukraine to see how demo-Ukraine, the largest and most anti-Rus- cratic it is, then three-quarters of thesian, non-Russian republic in the Coin- territory should be painted red or pink

S. .. .. . ... ... .. . ... ... . . . . .. . . . . ... .. . . .. . .. .... ... . . . . . . . .. . . . J ... .


because, even today, it is under control Ukrainian territory. On 27 Decemberof our sovereign Ukrainian Commu- 1991, CIS Commander in Chiefnists.""3 Yevgenny Shaposhnikov announced the

Ukraine had known only two previ- rejection of a unified CIS force. Thisous periods of independence since the admission meant that "less than twoMongol invasions (in the mid- 17th weeks after the creation of the CIS thecentury and during the 1917-21 peri- integrated military structure maintainedod).'4 Nonetheless, Kravchuk moved over seventy years of Soviet rule hadswiftly and skillfully to establish the begun to unravel in earnest."''7

rudiments of statehood. He national- Having been hailed as the manized Soviet property, decreed the estab- who stood up to Moscow, however, thelishment of independent Ukrainian former ideology chief of the Ukrainiangoverning entities, and made forceful Communist party and his KGB cohortspublic statements that convinced many are paying for this particular path toann-Communist opposition leaders that independence. First, Kravchuk's deter-he was indispensable to the consolida- mination to place "state-building" be-tion of Ukrainian independence." fore democracy has damaged Ukraine's

For Kravchuk, the main factor in international reputation and erodedthe successful realization of indepen- public confidence in the regime."dence was the swift creation of a Second, the aggressive identification ofUkrainian armed force out of the rem- Yeltsin's Russia with the Soviet empirenants of the Red Army based on Ukrai- has exacerbated a bitter psychologicalnian territory. The leader of the 1917 schism with Moscow transcending anyUkrainian republic, according to single political or economic issue. AsKravchuk, "made two cardinal mis- Aleksandr Kluban of the Ukrainiantakes. He entered into a political alli- Ministry of Defense puts it:ance with Russia and he did not createa Ukrainian army."' 6 In the fall 1991 Russia simply can't put up with the ideainterregnum between the coup and the that we're an independent state. They doestablishment of the CIS, Kravchuk it formally. We recognize them as a greathad no doubts that Ukraine would power, but they still don't treat us as an

activa e Sovdobts mitary foranes ond independent, sovereign state.|9"activate" Soviet military forces on

WILLIAM C. BODIE 5

Ukraine's economic performance, forces. As part of its plan to "national-which makes the Russian economy ize" the army, Kiev required all mili-seem stable by comparison, is intensi- tary personnel to swear a loyalty oathfying social conflict in the eastern, to the Ukrainian state, and 9 in 10 ofheavily russophone mining and indus- them complied.22

trial oblasts2'° Despite this apparent quantitativeInternal military challenges include success, the institutional loyalty of the

absorbing a large Soviet officer corps, type Samuel Huntington describes inrevamping command structures, recruit- The Soldier and the State may be lack-ing personnel, and converting ing in Ukraine. First, many officersUkraine's massive military industry to took the loyalty oaths for material rea-peaceful use3. Externally, the numer- sons-Ukraine's economic prospectsous conflicts with Russia include own- looked brighter than Russia's in lateership and control of military assets, 1991. But by summer 1992, growingespecially nuclear weapons and the numbers became dissatisfied with theirBlack Sea Fleet; the status of Russian- material lot.23 Indeed, one public opin-dominated areas such as the Crimean ion poll showed that only 43 percent ofpeninsula; and a tangle of economic the officers who swore loyalty took theissues, notably energy supplies. Kiev's oath seriously.' As a result of suchprogress on all scores is mixed, and the reports, the Ukrainian Ministry ofnuclear issue haunts diplomatic discus- Defense (MOD) organized a "social-sions throughout Europe. psychological division," with its own

Officially, Ukraine inherited an command chain reminiscent of the Redarmy of 1,200,000 active service per- Army political indoctrination system.sonnel, which Kiev plans to halve by Farther down the command chain,the year 2000. The Ukrainian armed desertion, draft evasion, and theft offorces today employ roughly 650,000 military property are rampant.men and women, including some The divided loyalties in the Ukrai-200,000, mostly Russian, officers."' nian military are exemplified by theMore than 100,000 Ukrainian service experience of former Major Generalpersonnel in other republics have been Valeriy Kuznetsov. A Crimean corpsoffered billets in the Ukrainian armed commander, the Russian Kuznetsov,


pledged loyalty to Ukraine and was to assume "administrative control" ofslated for higher office. When a the former Strategic Rocket Force sitesUkrainian MOD official, who was also in Ukraine, placing officers who hada member of the ultra-nationalist Union sworn loyalty to Ukraine in charge ofof Ukrainian Officers, asked whether launch sites. Although Kiev signed theKuznetsov would fight against Russia, Lisbon START protocols calling forhe replied in the negative. Kuznetsov removal of Ukraine's strategic weaponswas fired in May, after appealing to within seven years, the agreement wasthe local (lar,,ely Russian) Crimean criticized in the Ukrainian parliamentparliament."5 While Kuznetsov's case on the eve of the spring 1993 ratifica-was heightened due to the ongoing dis- tion debate.26 While Ukraine may bepute over the status of the Crimea,'6 it using the nuclear "card" to obtain moresignaled Kiev's sensitivity about the Western aid, recent statements byattitudes of Russians in the Ukrainian Ukrainian leaders stressing the need formilitary in an era of Russian-Ukrainian US or NATO "security guarantees"tensions. may indicate a hardening of Kiev's

The most unnerving dispute be- position.tween Russia and Ukraine in 1992 After a "hot" spring and an earlyarose over the status of strategic forces summer in 1992, two Russian-Ukraini-located in Ukrainian territory. Since an summits were held. One summitits sovereignty declaration in 1990, produced an agreement to place theUkraine had made many declarations Black Sea Fleet under joint Russian-about its intentions of becoming a Ukrainian command for three years,"nuclear free state," but its actions when the fleet will be divided. Whileduring 1992 signaled otherwise. On 10 the summits were applauded in theMarch, Ukraine suspended transfers of West (and in the state-controlledtactical nuclear weapons to Russia. At Ukrainian media), parliamentary lead-the same time the CIS command dis- ers in both Kitv and Moscow promptlyputed Ukraine's right to assume control attacked the arrangement on the fleet.of the strategic air bases in Ukraine A Ukrainian cabinet minister said theand their 42 long-range bombers.2 7 accord was merely an effort to calmDuring the summer Ukraine kept trying Western worries.2' Still, by early July

WILLIAM C. BODIE 7

both Russia and Ukraine ratified the Ukraine would be frighteningly clear.Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Beyond these immensely difficultTreaty, meaning that Moscow at least issues, many Russian politicians silent-recognized Ukraine's seizure of con- ly share the view of Russian People'sventional military forces. Deputy Sergei Baburin that, "either

Neither president sees a positive Ukraine unites with Russia, or Ithereoutcome of further Russian-Ukrainian will be] war."'" Given the historicaltension, but hostility between important ties, trade relations (801 percent ofsectors of their political elites still runs Ukraine's commerce is with the Rus-high. The ex-Communist Ukrainian sian Federation), and the existence ofelite sees a Russia disintegrating into 11 million Russians in Ukraine, manychaos and expects a successor regime Russians. even the most liberal andfar less congenial to Yeltsin than to democratic, demonstrate a psychologi-Ukrainian independence. Hence, they cal difficulty in recognizing a perma-might prove unwilling to downsize the nently independent Ukraine.3" At theUkrainian military, or convert the un- same time, a Russian bogeyman hasproductive military industrial complex, become all the more important foror relinquish nuclear weapons. At the Ukrainian leaders whose democraticsame time, as Ukrainian Prime Minis- shortcomings and economic failurester Leonid Kuchma points out, may threaten their grip on power.

And, as veterans of the Soviet Commu-There isn't a single sector of the economy nist power structure, the maintenancethat isn't disastrous-agriculture, industry, of power transcends all other consider-the credit finance system, health,ecology.30 ations for Kravchuk and his circle.

This economic plight has destabilized Belarus and the Mantra ofthe eastern regions and could prompt Stabilnostdisintegrative pressures or violent so-cial unrest. If violence occurs in the Belarus, with a population of 10.3eastern regions, where Kiev is rede- million (13.2 percent Russian), has hadploying military units, the potential for positively romantic relations with Rus-Russian military intervention in sia compared with Ukraine. Internally,


the post-Communist nomenklatura in independent Belarus than with theirMinsk has elevated stabilnost (stabili- countrymen in far off lrkutsk orty) over democracy. It has decided not Vladivostok.to hold free elections, to limit entrepre- Nevertheless, Minsk has made clearneurial activities, and to prevent an its desires for bilateral relations withindependent judiciary from emerging." Russia in the security sphere, not CIS

The ruling parliament, dominated collective security pacts. Belarus alsoas in Ukraine by veterans of the Sovi- balked at some Russian-sponsored CISet-era communist nomenklatura, has initiatives on financial burden sharing.proven far more amenable to Russian And Belarusian authorities have voicedperspectives and sensitivities, particu- their concerns about political instabilitylarly on nuclear weapons dismantle- in Russia.ment. As Minsk is the titular CIS Belarus's defense minister identi-capital, Belarusian leaders have been fied his major concerns as draft eva-forceful in their public defenses of the sion, corruption in the military, andCommonwealth and its structures. 4 low esteem for the army in Belarus.3 7

Asked about Belarusian foreign policy, Moreover, few officers in theone Minsk official said that soon "vir- Belarusian army wish to leave, andtually every step in this direction will thousands of Belarusians stationed inbe taken in full accordance with the Russia plan on returning home, whichinterests of Russia. 05 will strain Belarus's already sparse

Similarly, Russian attitudes and fiscal and housing resources. By 1994statements toward Belarus have been Minsk is forming its own armed forces,benign. Andrei Kortunov writes that 90,000 to 100,000 strong (a defensethe lack of Belarusian nationalism and law was passed in March 1992).russophobia permit a high degree of Belarusian will be the military's offi-cooperation, even in the military cial language by 1998. According to itssphere. "Russia could probably achieve defense doctrine, Belarus will be amore than just a Finnish model of neutral, nonnuclear state, with a strate-security cooperation with Belarus."36 gy based on defense of its borders.Culturally, Russians in Moscow have Whe'her Minsk, located betweenmore in common with residents of Ukrair , Russia, Lithuania, and Latvia,

WILLIAM C. BODIE 9

could remain neutral in a regional could become a second longer-term securi-

conflict is doubtful. And, like every ty problem for European leaders.""8

nation in the "Soviet West," Belarushas had territorial disputes with Lithua- Sandwiched between Ukraine andnia and Poland ever since Stalin redrew Romania, and granted territory from

borders after World War II. Given both by Stalin, Soviet Moldava was an

Ukraine's problems with Russia, border ethnic melange of Romanians, Gagauz,conflicts with Lithuania, and Russia's Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians.cold war with the Baltic states, Belarus During the last years of the Gorbachevmay soon be forced to reassess its regime, as the "Moldovan Popularhopes about "stability." Front" agitated for closer ties with

Romania, the Russian Communists on

Moldova and Trans-Dneister: the Slavic east bank of the Dniester

The Next Sarajevo? River organized themselves in opposi-tion to both reform and Moldovanindependence. After the coup in 1991,

In mid-1992, as the West anxiously the dominant Romanians establishedfocused on the prospect of widened what some Slavic residents viewed asconflict in the Balkans, the first war in an ethnically based state. Some Rus-the European heartland of the former sians pointed to statements from Bu-Soviet Union erupted six hundred miles charest about eventual incorporation ofnortheast of Sarajevo. Although a Moldova into a "Greater Romania,"tenuous "ceasefire" has been in effect which the political leadership insince summer 1992, the Trans-Dneister Chisinau (formerly Kishinev) did nothas all the attributes of likely future initially contradict. As a result, exist-conflicts in and around Russia-border ing ethnic tensions burst into the politi-disputes, Russian nationalism, Commu- cal, and eventually military, spheres."nist revanchism, and a highly politi- On the surface the contest betweencized, self-controlled ex-Soviet army. the former Soviet republic of MoldavaAs one observer puts it, and the Russian separatists on a sliver

of land east of the Dniester RiverMoldova in 1992 represented a far moreimmediate threat to stability in the region. resembles other blood feuds that have... the Dniester region [after Kaliningrad] erupted across Eurasia. The Moldovan


republic, with a population of 4.3 mil- Ukraine.4' Lebed, who has calledlion nestled between Romania and Moldova a "fascist" state and continuedUkraine, is dominated by 2.8 million to make political speeches ignoring aethnic Romanians whose leaders seek ban on such statements by Russiancloser ties-some say federation-with officers, fancies himself the guarantorRomania. The official language of the of the self-styled Dniester Republic,republic is Romanian, and Moldova itself a kind of redoubt for paleo-Com-has even adopted the Romanian flag. munists in the former USSR. FormerAs much of modem Moldova was KGB officers and ex-Soviet specialannexed by the Red Army in 1940 forces (OMON) officers have beenafter the Hitler-Stalin pact, many identified as serving in the "DniesterMoldovans feel their aspirations are as Republic" security services. However,worthy of Western support as those of even putative Russian liberals such asthe Baltic states. Yeltsin adviser Sergei Stankevich sup-

East of the Dniester, where one port the actions of the 14th Army asquarter of the population is Russian, a protecting legitimate Russian interests.separatist cabal of old-line Russian After several months of sporadic,Communists holds sway with the help but often intense, fighting, the regionof the remnants of the 14th Russian was somewhat becalmed by the sum-Army.' Also in this mix are roughly mer ceasefire. Neighboring Ukraine600,000 Ukrainians-yet another of has shifted it§ position on the DniesterStalin's numerous cartographic be- region by suggesting it gain autonomyquests--and 800,000 ethnic Romanians from Moldova.42 Yeltsin reportedlywho fear the tender mercies of a Rus- said, "Don't worry, there won't be asian force that sports slogans such as war. We will pull back the 14th Army"Death to Romanians" on its armored to Russian territory and will not permitvehicles. Russia to be dragged into war.'43

What distinguishes this conflict is But the army has not been with-the remarkable degree of political drawn. In fact, on 2 December a trans-involvement by the Russian military fer of equipment in progress was re-commander, General Aleksandr Lebed, ported, from Russia's 14th Army to theand the proximity of Russia and "Dniester Forces." The remnants of the

_..._...a

WILLIAM C. BODIE 11

14th Army were to be turned over to The Baltics: Of Citizens and"local authorities" in the "Dniester Soldiersrepublic" or "sold" locally and theunits themselves "disbanded" locally The intensification of the drive forinstead of being withdrawn.4" At any Baltic independence in 1986 struckrate, no effective diplomatic initiatives many Westerners as quixotic. Somehave come from the Russian Foreign even criticized Baltic activists, many ofMinistry, and individuals in the Rus- whom were local Communist partysian parliament and MOD are fueling officials, as injurious to the cause oftensions between Moldova and Russia. Soviet reform. 47 In fact, the indepen-Also, despite the Moldovan authorities' dence movement in the Baltics and thedeclared opposition to unification with violent intervention in Lithuania andRomania, they have indicated their Latvia in January 1991 helped precipi-growing reluctance to sign the CIS tate the ultimate break between YeltsinCharter.45 and Gorbachev that paved the way for

Finally, the Ukrainians have a great the August revolution.interest in the Dniester conflict. Any The Baltic republics today confrontmovement of Russian forces would the same daunting litany of social,have to take place through Ukrainian economic, and political ills as otherterritory or airspace, as Moldava has post-Communist nations: economic andno contiguous border with Russia. ecological catastrophe, the absence ofKiev is also concerned about a flood of legitimate political institutions, and therefugees from the region to a Ukraine challenge of creating responsive statewith scarce support resources. There is structures and civil societies. Thealso the geopolitical problem of an Baltics, however, bear some uniqueaggressive, autocratic Dniester republic burdens. As late recipients (1940) ofon Ukraine's Western frontier.46 Given the gifts of Soviet socialism, manythe many other Russian-Ukrainian Balts have memories of interwar inde-strategic disputes, the Trans-Dniester pendence. These images, romanticizedsituation could prove to be far more through five decades of occupation,than an inconvenient legacy of the form a powerful-and not alwaysMolotov-Ribbentrop pact. democratic--element of Baltic political

12 MOSCOWS "NEAR ABROAD"

culture. Second, the Baits confront the but financial restitution for propertyarmed detritus of their former colo- and equipment seized by the Sovietnists, most of whom feel no responsi- government since 1940 and support forbility for past crimes. Finally, due to the massive ecological cleanup. Infifty years of forced population trans- Moscow's view, withdrawals willfers, industrialization, and relentless occur, but at a pace that fits Russia'srussification, the republics' social and ability to absorb forces into the federa-demographic composition scarcely tion. Moscow's negotiating terms alsoresembles the pre-1940 picture. include the "protection" of Russian

It is important to distinguish among speakers living in the Baltic states.the Baltic republics. They are diverse Some Russian military officers evennations with distinctive problems re- discuss retaining access to certaingarding political development and strategic facilities built by the Sovietrelations with Moscow." Still, the authorities on Baltic territory.50

most pressing security problems for LITHUANIA. Lithuania has had theeach state in the near term are the gicatest success of the three Balticsevere political and economic disloca- states in organizing its own, centralizedtions caused by independence. The armed force and in negotiating Russianconflict between preservation of na- troop withdrawals. Of course, Lithuaniational culture and the creation of vi- has many fewer Russian-speaking resi-brant, contemporary democracies is dents (10 percent of its population)more acute in the Baltic states than in than do the other two states (almost 50Eastern Europe due to the corrosive percent in Latvia and 40 percent inlegacy of Soviet annexation. This Estonia). Lithuania's location on thelegacy colors all attempts to create east-west rail link between the Russiantolerant republican political virtues Federation and the Kaliningrad oblastsuch as respect for majority will and also gave Vilnius some added leverage.minority rights.49 On 8 September 1992, after months

The internal challenges complicate of arduous negotiations, the Russianthe withdrawal process, the primary and Lithuanian defense ministriesWestern concern. For the Baits, the established a framework for the with-issue is not merely troop withdrawals, drawal of all Russian military person-

WILLIAM C. BODIE 13

nel from the territory of the Lithuanian Yeltsin was the strongest supporter ofrepublic by 31 August 1993."' Boris Baltic independence among the Rus-Yeltsin and the Lithuanian leader at sian leadership and that his removalthat time, Vytautus Landsbergis, failed from office would jeopardize the inde-to sign a general, "political" agreement pendence of all the Baltic states andon troop withdrawals, prompting many destabilize the entire continent. In thein Vilnius to view the timetable accord wake of Yeltsin's spring 1993 powerwith some skepticism. Still, the time- struggle with the Russian legislature,table was judged in Vilnius to be a Lithuanian leaders have expressedmajor accomplishment for Lithuanian renewed doubts about Moscow's com-diplomacy, and Russian Deputy For- mitments.eign Minister Vitaly Churkin called it The Lithuanian government electeda "model" for the region.5" Withdraw- in the fall of 1992 is led by membersals proceeded in the absence of the of the Lithuanian Democratic Laborpolitical accord, beginning (most con- party, the former Lithuanian Commu-spicuously) with the airborne unit that nist party.53 Although the respectedhad participated in the January 1991 Lithuanian Defense Minister Audriusassault on Vilnius. Butkevicius retains his post, some

Lithuanian officials are divided on Lithuanians feel that Russia may seekhow to interpret events in Moscow in to stall on its commitments or demandthe wake of the timetable agreement. renegotiation of certain elements.Some believe that Yeltsin is making LATVIA. In contrast with the cau-slow but steady progress in reforming tious optimism in Vilnius, Latvia facesRussia's political scene against the deeper problems with respect to Rus-coalition of reactionary forces opposing sian troop withdrawals, relations withBaltic sovereignty. Others, pointing to the large Russian-speaking population,Russian decrees of October 1992 and and Baltic security cooperation.March 1993 suspending Baltic troop Internally, no full post-indepen-withdrawals, argue that Russian demo- dence parliamentary elections havecrats are being isolated by reactionary been held, and major decisions aboutforces in the military. However, there citizenship and constitutional authorityis strong consensus in Lithuania that have been stalled as a result.'

f-

-A


Latvian officials interviewed em- this many officers is no longer merelyphasize repeatedly how fifty years of a military force-it becomes a politicalSoviet rule hampered the creation of a force," says one observer. "' More-healthy democratic culture. "We are over, as a result of Stalin's forcedbeing asked to do too much," noted transfer of populations in the BalticJanis Jurkans, who was foreign minis- states after 1940, almost half the resi-ter in September 1992. "Democratic dents of Latvia are ethnic Russians,ways of doing things are foreign to our Ukrainians, and Belarusians. Thegenetic makeup," he added. "Russia Russian-speaking population in Rigasucceeded in creating a Soviet man actually exceeds 50 percent. Althoughhere.""5 He concluded that Latvia's the Latvians have not yet passed a lawinternal problems must be confronted on citizenship, Moscow has agressivelybefore Russian relations can be stabi- denounced the drafts circulating inlized. Ironically, Russian official parliament and elsewhere as anti-Rus-Sergei Zotov made the same point: sian. Finally, Russia seeks continued

access to several "strategic facilities" inWithout real steps to change the legislation Latvia, most notably a missile defenseinfringing on political, economic, and radar complex located at Skrunda.e9

social rights of Russians, steps to create anatmosphere of good-neighborly relations ESTONIA. Estonia is the northern-between all nationalities, without a firm most Baltic republic with the smallestdenunciation of territorial claims to the population (1.2 million) and the mostbordering Russian lands, further talks will difficult relations with Russia. As con-be of no success.56 sumed as it is with the withdrawal of

some 30,u00 Russian troops based inNegotiations between Riga and EsoiTlnasohstcpewh

Moscow have been hampered by sever- Estonia, Tallin also has to cope with

al political and social realities. First, competing Estonian military institu-

as Riga is the Headquarters of the tions and an activist Russian minori-Russian Northwest Group of Forces, ty.60 During Lennart Meri's first offi-more Russian troops are stationed in cial visit to NATO Headquarters asLatvia than in the other two repub- Estonia's head of state, he named thelics.5Y Of these troops, however, al- need to counter the "growing pressuremost half are officers. "An army with from Russian extremists" as one of

WILLIAM C. BODIE 15

Estonia's current problems.6" the region and the prospects for aWith or without an agreement, breakdown of discipline within the

Moscow has already begun moving its Russian officer corps."3 The timetableforces out of Estonia. Of the 30,000 accord with Lithuania, though not fullytroops stationed in Estonia at the be- applicable to Latvia and Estonia,ginning of 1992, half had been re- should nevertheless serve them as amoved by the time of Yeltsin's decree rough model.suspending withdrawals. 62 That in- Of the remaining issues oncludes the closure of three Russian Moscow's agenda-access to strategicbases on an island off the Estonian facilities and "human rights" for Rus-coast that had served as a western sian residents--only the first issue willoutpost of the Soviet Air Force. The be settled amicably. Many Baltic lead-Russian Defense Ministry announced in ers express a private willingness toOctober 1992 that conditions for Rus- accommodate Russian demands forsian military forces were so horrendous delaying withdrawals from cetain facil-that a pullout should be undertaken ities. For Moscow, the human rightswithout delay. Meanwhile, the two initiative has proved effective in thesides have been negotiating in desulto- public relations contest. Many Russianry fashion on an agreed timetable for political parties have clamored forwithdrawal, officially suspended by liberalized citizenship rights for Rus-Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in sian residents in the Baltics, as well asMarch 1993. the provision of pension and other

It would be cause for quiet opti- benefits to retired servicemen. Themism if withdrawal of Russian troops economically strapped Baltic states willfrom the Baltic states were the only be hard pressed to provide such finan-significant security problem in the cial support. Still, citizenship rightsregion. The Russian leadership intends looms above all other problems,to withdraw its remaining forces from especially in Latvia and Estonia. Thethe republics, not out of a charitable problem for Moscow is the reliabilityconcern for Baltic independence, but of the officers in the Northwest Grouprather because of the deteriorating of Forces, who may decide to be theconditions on ex-Soviet installations in arbiters of their own fates in the Baltic


republics. Yeltsin was the first Russian politicianto recognize the legitimacy of Baltic

1917 and 1992: Burdens of independence, yet it was he who or-

Empire and Revolutions dered the suspension of Russian troopwithdrawals from the region in October

In one of Russian history's many 1992. And while the Russian leader-ironies, sorting out post-Soviet Europe ship has established a Russian defensein 1992 must begin with 1917. The ministry and a Russian armed force, itBolsheviks sought to graft an interna- still maintains the pretense of a CIStionalist, "scientific" ideology on a unified command and announces theRussian nation-empire riven by a viability of CIS collective securityphilosophical identity crisis." The measures, viewed in the other republicsputschists of 1991 dealt a terminal as an attempt to resurrect the Warsawblow to Lenin's experiment but in so Pact.doing exhumed the dichotomy of Rus- The "near abroad" problems bedev-sia-as-nation versus Russia-as-empire. iling Russian politicians are often over-This centuries-old dilemma had been looked by Western analysts who focushorribly aggravated by seventy-five on Russian politics or the economicyears of Stalinist "nationalities" poli- reform debate. However, as Olegcies that brutally uprooted millions of Rumyantsev notes, concern over Rus-people, changed boundaries repeatedly, sians in the republics "is not a causeand politicized all ethnic relations."5 just of the political right, but of all

Russia today finds itself in a pecu- Russian parliamentarians. It is theliar position. It considers itself the most important cause we now have.",67

successor state to the USSR,6 yet it If it is the most important cause forwas the Russian republic that posed the Russian parliamentarians, it has be-most direct threat to Gorbachev's come a central part of the agenda ofUSSR. The Yeltsin-Gaidar team seeks the conservative forces in Russianto create a democratic republic with a politics and their military allies. Infree market economy, yet it is accused July 1992 Russian Foreign Ministerof weakness by Russian conservatives Andrei Kozyrev condemned the "partyand of imperialism by its neighbors. of war," or those seeking to unify the

WILLIAM C. BODIE 17

Russian populace by being bellicose tary a greater voice in foreign policy.toward the near abroad, in an interview Military leaders, including the CISpublished in the Moscow newspaper General Staff, have become increasing-Izvestiya.i This was just after Russian ly politicized due to the collapse of thePresident Boris Yeltsin reversed him- old control mechanisms. Some, such

self on an earlier idea about a civilian as General Igor Rodionov, chief of the

defense minister, appointing Afghan General Staff academy, and Colonel

veteran General Pavel Grachev as General Mikhail Kolesnikov, deputy

defense minister.' Yeltsin himself chief of the General Staff, have madepointed attacks on civilian politicallater criticized Kozyrev and in October, leaders for their insufficient attention

according to ITAR-TASS, "expressed to Russia's global interests. 72

his dissatisfaction with Russia's fre- The military tends to be even morequently spineless conduct in the inter- sensitive about the 25 million Russiansnational arena, her defensive tactics, outside Russia; the use of force toand her imitation of others."'70 protect their rights was included in a

draft of the Russian defense doctrine inAbout 25 million Russians and Rus- May 1992. The draft "continued tosian speakers... , for the first time in place Moscow conceptually at the200 years, find themselves outside of center of a unified defense system thatRussia and subject to the laws of oth- seemingly included all or most of theer independent nations.... It is keen- old empire."73 The draft also implicitlyly felt in a country which still retains rejected civilian control of the military.

the psychological detritus of a super- In fact, there is no legislative guidance

power. on civil-military relations in Russia-OLEG RUMYANTSEV, Chairman, today or any understanding of constitu-

Constitutional Commission, tional checks and balances. In addi-Russian Federation Parliament 7' tion, some officers feel that disputes

between military leaders on the issueThese developments are cause for of troop withdrawals will damage

concern because they indicate Yeltsin's Moscow's military capabilities andwillingness to grant the Russian mili- undermine officer morale.


On 24 August 1991 right after the its policies toward its former under-failed coup, Boris Yeltsin's spokesman lings can scarcely be expected to be

noted that Russia reserved the right to based on enlightened self-interest.

renegotiate its borders with other post- From a strategic perspective, that lack

Soviet states.74 Since then, Vice Presi- of self-awareness is perhaps the most

dent Aleksandr Rutskoi, an Afghan sobering reality of all.

veteran, has made several provocativevisits to other republics. In the Crimea, Conclusionshe asserted, for example, "The histori-cal consciousness of Russians does not Perhaps the silver lining in this strate-permit anyone mechanically to bring gic cloud is that the internal challengesthe borders of Russia in line with the facing these republics are so dauntingRussian Federation."75 An emerging as to preclude major, deliberate inter-line within Russia was expressed by republican hostilities. A Russian mili-Russia's Ambassador to the United tary in such an advanced state of insti-States Vladimir P. Lukin. The ambas- tutional decomposition has been de-sador described a "new encirclement" scribed that there are no serious discus-of hostile successor states where Rus- sions of strategic doctrine, let alonesia would have to play a more tradi- coordinated planning for offensivetional, activist role, given its geograph- operations.78 In Moldova, a "Dniesterical and historic interests. 76 Republic" Defense Force might not

In viewing Russia's relations with have the same leverage to draw Russiathe near abroad, we should keep in into the fray as did Russian Lieutenantmind Alexander Belkin's description of General Lebed's Russian 14th Army.Russian statehood: In a study of post-Soviet nationalism,

one authority argues:Russia still has no borders defined inaccordance with international law; she has If Ukraine seems unduly assertive in itsno concept of national interest; and she national claims, this stems not from confi-has yet to formulate a definitive long-term dent swagger, but rather from its own self-national development strategy.• doubts about the solidity of newly won

sovereignty. Claims on the Black SeaAs long as Russia fails to know itself, Fleet, foot-dragging oi denuclearization,

WILLIAM C. BODIE 19

resistance to Crimean self-determination, vent these states from joining an anti-and insistence upon a self-defeating degree Russian coalition, be it NATO or aof economic independence have been Black Sea-Baltic Confedertion. There-motivated largely by the symbolic politics fore we are likely to witness a situationof the assertion of national indepen-dence."" in which the republics neither refeder-

ate with Moscow nor are allowed toComffort might be found in the actual join Western security organizations.80

Russian withdrawals from the Baltic Given this framework, and theStates, the Moldovan government's as- residual anti-Western, anti-Americansurances that it would not merge with attitudes in Russian (and Ukrainian)Romania, or the Belarusian commit- political and military circles, there arement to denuclearization, clear limits on Western policy. But the

West must actively support forces for

Anyone who isn't confused doesn't consolidating democracy as well asreally understand the situation. independence; provide aid and exper-

- EDWARD R. MURROW tise in the arts of republican govern-ment and civilian control of the mili-

The pace of change in the region is so tary; and provide the economic assis-

intense that almost any of the above tance targeted on the creation of non-

frictions, from nuclear control to civil military enterprises.

unrest to military insubordination, The West should rid itself of thecould catalyze major conflict between illusion that the CIS will ever serve asRussia and its Western neighbors. the functional equivalent of the USSRRussa ad is Wster neghbrs. in military or strategic terms. TheInter-republican relations in the post- in militar egc terms. TheSoviet West are more likely to resem- ote repbits exce Belarus vieble a new type of cold war, character- CIS as an entity whose usefulness hasized by internal preoccupations and un- passed. At the same time, the Westconsummated strategic ambitions. The should not seek to isolate Russia bysix republics will view Russia as the building security relations with theprinciple threat to their survival or other republics that resemble a new

sovereignty over the next decade. And cordon sanitaire. In the future, the

Russia will use all its resources to pre- West will have to deal with more,

- -- ;• -.-


rather than fewer, regional actors. should be informed that such attitudesSpecific initiatives that flow from may discourage Western aid programs.

this analysis include:

a The United States should offer to N The North Atlantic Cooperationd itCouncil should offer to convene a

dismantle in situ the ICBMs and nucle-ar devices on bomber bases in the political summiton thefutureMoldovaformer Soviet republics----andpurchase and the Trans-Dniester region, with

formerSoviet maerubia. Th puraiase active US participation, to determinethe the future borders, political arrange-have often said that they do not wantI nulearweaons n teir errtorybut ments, and armed forces of the repub-nuclear weapons on their territory but lic. A UN peacekeeping force couldlack the facilities to denuclearize them- lp A UN summit resuldselves and mistrust Russian intentions. helportof troess andSuch an initiative by Washington, transport of troops and equipment fromparticularly if coupled with similaroffers to the other republics, would testI •U The Nordic countries--Finland andtheir sincerity on this issue. While Sweden in particular-could offer toRussian officials such as GeneralKolesnikov would rail about Western monitor Russian troop withdrawals

"interference," the Russians would from the Baltic States. These and

certainly prefer such intervention to a other Nordic countries, the European

nuclear Ukraine. Community, and the United Statesshould contribute to a fund to build

SThe United States should offer a housing for Russian officers returning

dramatic new package of conventional to Russia from all foreign bases."

risk-reduction mechanisms and confi- a The United States should expand itsdence-building measures with the re-publics. The package should include contacts with defense officials in theupgrading warning capabilities and pro- republics. This initiative would in-

viding equipment for safe transport and clude expanding US defense attach6disposal of nuclear materials. If the presence, organizing republic exchangeRussian or Ukrainian military reject programs, and composing study planssuch offers as "interference," they and supplying curricular materials for

lI

WILLIAM C. BODIE 21

training republican defense specialists, the US role in it (a task beyond theSuch an effort would provide for great- scope of this monograph). These obser-er interplay with military officers in vations are offered to help concentratethe region and would greatly expand minds toward that task. The alterna-the pool of qualified civilians involved tives could inspire true nostalgia forin defense decisions in these countries, the late, unlamented cold war. OEM

E Industrial refitting must be a partof any regional "Marshall Plan." Allthe republics, particularly Ukraine,need massive help in industrial conver-sion. While Western economists andarms controllers argue that the mili-tary-industrial base in Ukraine must bereduced, little has been offered to copewith the social dislocation of suchindustrial decline, unemployment, andthe harmful erosion of scientific andtechnological skills.

* Above all, the United States shouldsupport democrats in all the republicsrather than favoring one country overanother.

The-se modest steps must be part ofan overall effort to encourage thepeaceful transformation of the formerSoviet Union. They are also a smallpart of a more ambitious US require-ment to reassess European security and


NOTES

1. Christopher Donnelly, remarks, "Russian Fission-Nuclear Consequences of PoliticalDisintegration," US Department of Energy Workshop, Washington, 9 December 1992.

2. George Breslauer, panel discussant, "Transition to Democracy in the Eurasian Commonwealth,"24th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies,Phoenix, Arizona, 20 November 1992.

3. The countries under discussion here are Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, andEstonia.

4. Moldova's delegate to the UN General Assembly, Vitalie Snegur, describing the "devastating"situation in the Dniester region, bemoaned that "A screen of silence has been drawn over thistragedy." RFEIRKL Daily Report, no. 234, 7 December 1992, p. 3.

5. The term refers to the republics on the periphery of the Russian Federation.

6. In December 1992, 176 ICBMs (130 SS-19s, 46 SS-24s) were located on two sites in Ukraine;80 SS-25s were located at two sites in Belarus. International Institute for Strategic Studies, TheMilitary Balance, 1992-93 (London: IISS, 1992), pp. 71, 86.

7. Ukraine and Belarus did have nominal membership in the United Nations, although for most ofthat time their major roles were as adjuncts to the Soviet intelligence effort in New York. Internal-ly, however, they were characterized not as nations, but as "nationalities." Paul Goble, "EthnicPolitics in the USSR," Problems of Communism, vol. 38, no. 4 (July-August 1989), pp. 1-5.

8. Jack Snyder, "Containing Post-Soviet Nationalism: International Substitutes for Impotent States,"(Washington: National Council for Soviet and East European Research, 1992), p. 7.

9. See, for example, Roman Solchanyk, "Poland and the Soviet West," in S. Enders Wimbush, ed.,Soviet Nationalfti.s in Strategic Perspective (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp.158-80.

WILLIAM C. BODIE 23

10. The Baltic states, pointing to their interwar status as a kind of mini-European Community, havepatterned their security institutions after the Nordic nations. Ukraine has established cooperativedefense agreements with Hungary and plans similar agreements with Poland and the Czechrepublic. In an article in an authbritative Ukrainian defense journal, three Ukrainian officialsdescribe NATO as "a strategic counterweight to Russia in Europe," a mission to which Kiev wouldlike to contribute. See Aleksandr Goncharenko, Oleg Bodrug, and Eduard Lisitsyn, "Possible Waysof Safeguarding Ukraine's National Security," Narrodnaya Armiya, pt. 1 (29 July 1992), p. 2;FBIS-USR-92-118 (16 September 1992), p. 53.

11. In a stimulating essay on civil-military relations in the former Soviet Union, ChristopherDonnelly notes that, "whilst the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, the Soviet armed forces havenot." "Evolutionary Problems in the Former Soviet Armed Forces," Survival, vol. 34, no. 3(Autumn 1992), pp. 28-42.

12. Western scholars were similarly surprised. Ukraine, along with the other Western republics,were "considered by many experts to be the strategic reserve of the Soviet nationality policy.... Viewed as the most politically integrated and culturally assimilated of all non-Russian republics,Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Moldavia were viewed as the last piaces to give birth to large-scaleethnic unrest." Charles F. Furtado and Andrea Chandler, eds., Perestroika in the Soviet Republics(Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 215.

13. Vyacheslav Chornovil, quoted in Laurie Hays, "As He Builds a National Ukraine, ChiefBecomes Thorn in Yeltsin's Side," Wall Street Journal, 17 March 1992, p. 1.

14. The authoritative English-language volume on Ukraine is Orest Subtelny, Ukraine-A History(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). See especially pt. 3, "The Cossack Era," and chapter19, "The Ukrainian Revolution."

15. On Ukraine's path to independence, see Adrian Karatnycky, "The Ukrainian Factor," ForeignAffairs, vol. 8, no. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 90-107; Taras Kuzio, Ukraine--The Unfinished Revo-lution (London: Institute for European Defense & Strategic Studies, 1992); and Roman Solchanyk"Russia and Ukraine: The Politics of Independence," 8 May 1992, pp. 13-16.

16. Chrystia Freeland, "Kiev Leader: From Apparatchik to Nationalist," Washington Post, 6 May1992, p. A16.

17. Stephen Foye, Military/Security Notes, RFEiRL Research Institute, 24 November 1992.

I


18. Ukraine is still operating under the old communist constitution, and members of the discreditedparty still predominate in the parliament, ministries, and regional government bodies. See"Ukraine-Independent, but not yet free," Economist, 13 June 1992, pp. 54-55.

19. Stephen Erlanger, "Ukraine Finds 'Active Independence' Despite Military and Other Obsta-cles," New York Times, 6 September 1992. See also Kuzio, Ukraine-The Unfinished Revolution,pp. 9-10.

20. "There has been no Gaidar here, and there won't be," notes an adviser to Ukrainian PresidentKravchuk, alluding to the radical "shock therapy" reforms occurring in Russia under Prime MinisterYegor Gaidar. "They [Ukraine's economic planners] view stability as so much more importantthan economic reform." That Ukraine's leaders cannot see the connection between the two isperhaps the most characteristic failure of the Ukrainian regime. See Margaret Shapiro, "Ukraine'sLeaders Retreat From Reform," Washington Post, 24 October 1992, p. A17.

21. According to Ministry of Defense figures 264 (53 percent) of the Ukrainian General Staff areRussian; 202 (43 percent), Ukrainian, Russians account for almost 90 percent of generals, 80 per-cent of air force officers, over 50 percent of all officers. The ministry also notes that 300,000senior and warrant officers of Ukrainian origin serve outside Ukraine. Molod Ukrainy, 21 August1992.

22. Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, Political Review, October 1992, pp.82-83.

23. Grigory Omelchenko, chief of the Union of Ukrainian Officers, indicated in August that thearmed forces of Ukraine could not be counted on to protect Ukrainian sovereignty. VladimirRuban, "Rozhdeniye Voyennoi Derzhavy" ["Birth of a Military Power"], Moskcvskii Novosti, no.32 (9 August 1992), pp. 6-7.

24. Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, Political Review, October 1992, p. 83.

25. Kuznetsov remains a deputy in the Crimean Assembly, which has sought greater autonomy forthe region. According to a Russian journalist in Crimea, "In Ukraine in general, the federativetendency is ripening. After the Crimea, the Donbass may separate, and western Ukraine." Suchviews are partial and overstated, but they reflect an undercurrent that cannot be comforting forKiev. See Fred Hiatt, "Crimea Catches Sovereignty Bug," Washington Post, 1 June 1992. p. A12.

WILLIAM C. BODIE 25

26. The Crimean peninsula, "granted" to the Ukrainian SSR by Khrushchev in 1954, was in turmoilthrough most of 1992 due to Russian parliamentary calls, endorsed by Russian Vice PresidentRutskoi, that Crimea receive independence from Ukraine, or that it even be returned to Russia.The issue was also mingled with the tussle over ownership of the Black Sea Fleet and appearedto be defused-if only temporarily-in the two summit meetings between Boris Yeltsin and LeonidKravchuk during the summer of 1992. On the Black Sea Fleet, see Celestine Bohlen, "YeltsinRebukes Ukraine Over Fleet," New York Times, 8 April 1992, p. 3; Douglas L. Clarke, "The Sagaof the Black Sea Fleet," RFE/RL Research Report, 24 January 1992, pp. 45-49; for a detailedhistorical perspective, see Paul Olkhovsky, Russia's Navy From Peter to Stalin: Themes, Trends,and Debates (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analysis, 1992).

27. IISS, Military Balance 1992-93, p. 86. On the dispute over control of strategic air bases, seeSerge Schmemann, "Friction Rises and Ukraine and Russia Clash over Ex-Soviet Armed Forces,"New York Times, 3 March 1992, p. 3.

28. On Kiev's efforts to"activate" nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil, see Irwin Stelzer, "Ukrainianchaos threatens peace in east," Sunday Times (London), 9 August 1992, p. 111-7; Chrystia Freeland,"Ukraine Having Second Thoughts About Giving Up Nuclear Weapons," Washington Post, 6November 1992, p. A20; Fred Kaplan, "Ukraine officials tying missile removal to aid," BostonGlobe, 16 November 1992, p. 1.; and Mark Frankland, "Ukraine's stance on nuclear arsenal stirsfresh worries," Washington Times, 23 November 1992, p. 7.

29. See John Lloyd, Chrystia Freeland, and Anthony Robinson, "History bears down on States ofthe Union," Financial Times, 19 August 1992, p. 3. The authors conclude that "the deal reachedat Yalta is fraught with the possibility of misunderstanding." On Ukrainian reaction to the Yaltaaccord, see "Statement of the Republican Party on Events Concerning the Black Sea Fleet," 4August 1992, in Ukraine in Documents (Kiev: Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research,1992), pp. 77-78.

30. Serge Schmemann, "New Leader in a Lament for Ukraine," New York Times, 9 November1992, p. A9. Kuchma, who for 25 years was a director of the largest military factory in the USSR,also complained about the lack of Western aid. "We were always told, by our own MikhailGorbachev and by the politicians in Europe and America, that when we cease being an enemy theywon't leave us in the lurch. Now we're left in the lurch waiting for a dictatorship that will beworse than the last one."


31. Oleg Bodrug, Aleksandr Goncharenko, and Eduard Lisitsyn, "Possible Ways of SafeguardingUkraine's National Security." Narodnaya Armiya, 29 July 1992. FBIS-USR-92-118 (16 September1992), p. 53.

32. As Mykola Mykhalchenko, adviser to Kravchuk, puts it, "Russia wishes to become thesuccessor of the old Russian empire. It has an economic crisis and its leaders are trying to rallythe country around nationalist-patriotic ideas." See John Lloyd and Chrystia Freeland, "Dividedfeelings about Russia split former USSR into two camps," Financial Times, 5 June 1992, p. 4. OnRussian attitudes toward Ukraine, see the work of the great Russian philologist Dmitrii Likhachev,Reflections on Russia (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991), esp. "The Greatness of Kiev," pp.62-76, and chapter 3, "The Baptism of Rus' and the State of Rus'."

33. Ignor Sinyakevich, "Offensive of the Postcommunist Nomenklatura Calls a Halt," NezavisimayaGazeta. 19 November 1992, p. 3. FBIS-SOV-92-234 (4 December 1992), p. 35.

34. Following a CIS summit meeting in February, Belarusian parliamentary Chairman StanislavShushkevich noted, "Yesterday, as never before, we understood that the Commonwealth of Inde-pendent States is the structure without which we will never survive," a curious statement con-sidering the flaps between Kiev and Moscow. On that score, Shushkevich noted, "It was clearthere was no single approach on military matters." See "Ex-Soviet Summit Called a Success," NewYork Times, 16 February 1992, p. 16.

35. Moscow INTERFAX, 30 November 1992. FBIS-SOV-92-233 (3 December 1992), p. 28.

36. Andrei Kortunov, "Strategic Relations Between the Former Soviet Republics," Backgrounder,Heritage Foundation, no. 892, 17 April 1992, p. 6.

37. Pavel Kozlovsky, "Do Not Be Critical. We Have Worked Out Our Conception," Respublika,21 October 1992, p. 2. FBIS-SOV-92-219 (12 November 1992). p. 74.

38. See Stephen c: yc. Military Security Notes, p. 5.

39. See lnternationai Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Fact-Finding Mission to Moldova,22-26 November 1991.

40. The leaders of the self-appointed Dniester Republic held one of the few official celebrationsof the 75th anniversary of the Bolshevik coup in November 1992. The lead speaker was thecommander of the Russian 14th Army, Lt. Gen. Aleksandr Lebed. On the roots of the Dniester

WILLIAM C. BODIE 27

conflict, see Vladimir Socor, "Creeping Putsch in Moldova," RFEIRL Research Report, 17 January1992, pp. 8-13.

41. See Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine and Moldova: The View from Kiev," RFEIRL Research Report,1 May 1992, pp. 39-45.

42. Kravchuk had previously insisted on the principle of "inviolability of borders," in all suchdisputes within the CIS. His mid-summer shift in policy could prove risky, considering thenumerous parts of Ukraine seeking similar degrees of "self-determination," such as the Crimea.

43. Financial Times, 27 May 1992.

44. RFE/RL Daily Report, no. 232, 3 December 1992, p. 3.

45. RFE/RL Daily Report, no. 235, 8 December 1992, p. 3.

46. According to Snegur. Moldova "will not give up the Dniester to anyone, particularly not tothose who also want to get the Crimea and also create here an outpost against Ukraine." RFE/RLDaily Report, no. 95, 19 May 1992, p. 3.

47. For an interesting cross section of views on Western policy toward Baltic independence as lateas 1989, see "The International Status of the Baltic States: The Baltic Republics Fifty Years Afterthe Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact," in Nationalities Papers, Semi-Annual Publication of the Associationfor the Study of the Nationalities of the USSR and Eastern Europe Fall 1989, pp. 156-203. Seealso Walter C. Clemens, Jr. Baltic Independence and Russian Empire (New York, NY: St. Martin'sPress, 1991), esp. pp. 293-318.

48. On the differences among the three republics, see Graham Smith, ed. The NationalitiesQuestion in the Soviet Union (London and New York, NY: Longman, 1990), chapters 3-5;Romuald H. Misiunas, "The Baltic Republics: Stagnation and Strivings for Sovereignty," inLubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society(Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 204-27; and Economic Survey of the Baltic Republics(Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in collaboration with the governments of Estonia,Latvia, and Lithuania, June 1991).

49. See, for example, the interview with Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman VytautusLandsbergis in Moskovskiy Novosti, no. 32, 9 August 1992, p. 11.


50. For a detailed look at Russian troops in the Baltic republics, see "Problems of MilitaryWithdrawal," in RFE/RL Research Report, 28 August 1992, pp.15-37.

51. According to Lithuanian Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius, there were 20,745 Russianmilitary personnel in Lithuania as of August 1992, of which 10,000 were officers or NCOs,organized in 5 divisions. At full strength, these units would number 35,203.

52. When Boris Yeltsin suspended troop withdrawals on 29 October, it was Churkin who soughtto assuage Baltic fears that the suspension meant a fundamental change in Russian policy. He toldEstonian leaders that the withdrawal decision "has never been questioned." See John Lloyd,"Moscow tries to reassure Baltic states," Financial Times, 5 November 1992, p. 4.

53. In the late 1980s, the leader of the LDP, Algirdas Brazauskas, was among the first communistofficials to come out in favor of Baltic independence.

54. On the debate in Latvia over citizenship, see Alexei Grigorievs, "The Controversy over Citizen-

ship," Uncaptive Minds, vol. 4, no. 4 (Winter 1991-92), pp. 57-60.

55. Interview with the author, Latvian Foreign Ministry, Riga, 19 September 1992.

56. TASS, 28 September 1992. FBIS-SOV-188, 28 September 1992, p. 14

57. In recent negotiations, the Russians used 58,000 as their figure for troops stationed in Latvia.The Stockholm-based SIPRI estimated 48,000, while the Norwegian press estimated the numberat between 28,000 and 29,000. Latvia's deputy defense minister, without revealing the exactnumber, told the author that the figure was closer to the Norwegian estimate.

58. Paul Goble, scholar of Soviet nationalities, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, speechat Club 21, Riga, 18 September 1992.

59. Located 120 kilometers west of Riga, the Skrunda facility includes a "Hen House" radar usedfor early warning and space tracking, and a Krasnoyarsk-type large phased-array radar systems(LPARS) still under construction. See US Department of Defense, Military Forces in Transition(Washington: USGPO, 1991), p. 39.

60. The Estonian city of Narva, scene of Peter the Great's first defeat in the Great Northern War,is a hotbed of Russian nationalism and site of one of the many anti-Baltic speeches made byradical Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. For Zhirinovsky's views on partition of the Baltic

I

WILLIAM C. BODIE 29

states, see RFE/RL Daily Report, no. 234, 7 December 1992, p. 6.

61. ITAR-TASS 25 November 1992. FBIS-SOV-92-229, 27 November 1992, p. 64.

62. Helsingin Sanomat, 29 September 1992, in Military and Security Notes, RFEIRL ResearchInstitute, Issue 41, October 1992.

63. In December 1992 the Russian Officers' Assemblies of the Baltic region sent an open letterto the Congress of Peoples' Deputies demanding the resignation of Russian Defense MinisterGrachev, accusing him of attempting to withdraw forces from the Baltic states without providingsuitable facilities in Russia. See John W. R. Lepingwell and Alfred A. Reisch, MilitarY andSecurity Notes, RFE/RL Research Institute, Issue 49, December 1992.

64. On Bolshevik ideology toward the multinational Russian empire, see Richard Pipes, TheRussian Revolution (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1990); Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union:Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964);Walter Laquer, The Fate of the Revolution (New York, NY: Scribner's, 1967; 1987 rev.); AdamB. Ulam, The Bolsheviks (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1965); and Mikhail Heller and AleksandrM. Nekrich, Utopia in Power (New York, NY: Summit Books, 1986).

65. On the debate between empire savers and nation builders in Russian and Soviet history, seeRoman Szporluk, "The National Question," in Timothy J. Colton and Robert Legvold, After theSoviet Union-From Empire to Nations (New York, NY, and London: W. W. Norton & Co.,1992), pp. 84-112; Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism," Problems of Communism,July-August 1989, pp. 15-35; and Hd1•ne Carr•re d'Encaussel, The Fnd of the Soviet Empire-TheTriumph of the Nations (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1993).

66. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev prefers to use the term "continuer" state, expressingsemantic concern for the other republics, all of which were "successors" to the USSR.

67. John Lloyd, "Painful legacy."

68. FBIS-SOV-92-127, 1 July 1992, p. 11.

69. On the significance of the afghantsi in the post-Soviet military, see Michael Dobbs, "CoupLifted War Heroes to Top of Russian Military," Washington Post, 27 September 1992, p. A37.

70. Moscow INTERFAX, 27 October 1992.


71. John Lloyd, "Painful legacy of an empire," Financial Times, 9 July 1992, p. 12.

72. Kolesnikov stated in ITAR-TASS on 30 July that NATO may be behind the moves in otherrepublics to contest Russian power. The RFE/RL Research Institute adds, "Kolesnikov warned thatgrowing instability could lead to direct intervention by Western powers in the former USSR underthe pretext of establishing international control over nuclear weapons located there." See RFEIRLDaily Report, no. 145, 31 July 1992, p. 2.

73. Stephen Foye, "CIS Armed Forces Yearender, 1992," Military/Security Notes, RFE/RL

Research Institute, 24 November 1992, p. 6.

74. See Kuzio, Ukraine--The Unfinished Revolution, p. 9.

75. Aleksandr Rutskoi, "Vzaschituu Rossii," Pravda, 30 January 1992.

76. Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," Foreign Policy, no. 88 (Fall 1992), pp. 57-75.The article received great attention in Ukraine and the Baltic States.

77. Alexander A. Belkin, "Needed: A Russian Defense Policy," Global Affairs, vol. 7, no. 3(Autumn 1992), p. 89.

78. Stephen M. Meyer, "Russian Fission-Nuclear Consequences of Political Disintegration,"remarks at US Department of Energy Workshop, 9 December 1992, Washington.

79. Columbia University Professor Jack Snyder, Containing Post-Soviet Nationalism," 1992, pp.33-34.

80. Although Lithuanian President Landsbergis and some Ukrainians have floated the idea of aconfederation including Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltics, no real progress has been madebeyond various bilateral cooperation agreements. The Baltic defense ministers have had a hardtime realizing their plans for Baltic security cooperation. See Andrei Kortunov, "StrategicRelations Between the Former Soviet Republics, p. 6.

81. See George F. Kennan, "For Russian Troops, A House to Go Home to," Washington Post, 8November 1992, p. C7. Kennan's idea is quite sound, although he suggests that the United Statesshould provide sole financing for housing and infrastructure for up to 20,000 officers and theirfamilies.

McNair Papers

ie McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, home of the Institute forNational Strategic Studies and the National Defense University. An Army post since1794, the fort was given its present name in 1948 in honor of Lieutcrnant General LesleyJames McNair. General McNair, known as "Educator of the Arni\ and trainer of somethree million troops, was about to take command of Allied ground jorces in Europe underEisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy, 25 July 1944.

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 1989.2, John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May 1989.3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional Monarch?, October 1989.4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 1989.5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, November 1989.6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third World, February 1990.7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign Policy." and Francis Conte,"Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990.8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of Insurgencies: Insights from ElSalvador, May 1990.9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June1990.10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and Nationless States, September1990.11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1990.12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand, May 1991.13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: Coping with RevolutionaryTechnological Change in Land Warfare, March 1992.14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and -Military Operations in theMediterranean, June 1993.15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria's Quest for Security After the Cold War, February 1993.16. William C. Bodie, Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy in Post-Soviet Europe, June1993.17. William H. Lewis (ed.), Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, June1993.

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