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iaAPPENDIX C

U. S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

REGION IVi'

NRC Inspection Report: 50-313/85-27 Licenses: DPR-51

50-368/85-28 NPF-6

' Dockets: 50-31350-368

Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)P. O. Box 551Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas

Inspection Conducted: December 1-31, 1985

Inspectors: / //O //6N6W. ~D. Jotp%W. Senior Resident Date ~Reactor 16spector(pars.2,3,4,6,7,8,10,11)

kbSS|&WG /- 4-F5C.~ C. Harbuck, Resident Reactor DateInspector(pars. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)

Approved: 7/7 d m hog- //a.7/7/D..M. Hunhicutt, Acting Chief, Efate /

' Project Section B, Reactor Project'

Branch

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Inspect' ion 3ummary

H Inspection Conducted December 1-31, 1985 (Report 50-313/85-27)'

AreasIbspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safetyverification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previously identifieditems, fo1,lowup on Three Mile Island Action Plan requirements, IE Circularreview, precurement program implementation, and control room ventilation.

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The inspection involved 68 inspector-hours (including 4 backshift hours) onsiteby two NRC inspectors.

Results: . Within the eight areas inspected, one violation was identified(control room ventilation procedure, paragraph 2) and one deviation wasidentified (control room isolation, paragraph 11).

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted December 1-31, 1985 (Recort 50-368/85-28),.

. Areas Inspec_ted; Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety'

verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previously identifiedg= items, followup on licensee event reports, followup on Three Mile Island ActionPlan requirements, IE Circular review, procurement program implementation,'

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containment purge, and control room ventilation.

The inspection involved 87 inspector-hours (including 8 backshift hours) onsite"

by two NRC inspectors.'

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Resul!It Within the ten areas inspected, two violations were identified'

(control room ventilation procedure, paragraph 2, and failure to maintain a.

manual valve locked as required, paragraph 6) and one deviation was identified(control room isolation, paragraph 11).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*J. Levine, ANO General Manager,

R. Ashcraft, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor*B. Baker, Operations ManagerC. Bates, Shift Maintenance SupervisorM. Bolants, Health Physics Superintendent

*P. Campbell, Licensing Engineeri H. Carpenter, I&C Supervisor

T. Cogburn, General Manager, Nuclear ServicesA. Cox, Operations Technical SupportL. Dugger, Acting I&C Maintenance Superintendent

*E. Ewing, Engineering & Technical Support ManagerG. Fiser, Radiochemistry SupervisorM. Frala, Assistant Radiochemistry SupervisorM. Goodson, Civil EngineerL. Gulick, Unit 2~0perations Superintendent

" C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering SupervisorH. Hollis, Security CoordinatorD. Horton, Quality Assurance Manager

*L. Humphrey, Administrative ManagerD. Johnson, Licensing Engineer

*H. Jones, Field Construction Manager*D..Lomax, Licensing SupervisorB. Lovett, Electrical Maintenance EngineerW. McKelvey, Assistant Radiochemistry SupervisorJ. McWilliams, Unit 1 Operations SuperintendentM. Pendergrass, Acting Engineering & Technical Support Manager

*D. Provencher, Quality Engineering SupervisorR. Poole, Assistant Radiochemistry SupervisorP. Rogers, Plant Licensing Engineer ,

L. Sanders, Maintenance Manager,

)' *L. Schempp, Nuclear Quality Control ManagerC. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent

.R. Simmons, Planning and Scheduling SupervisorS. Strasner, Quality Control EngineerC. Taylor, Operations Technical SupportB. Terwilliger, Operations Assessment SupervisorR. Tucker, Electrical Maintenance Superintendente

7 D. Wagner, Health Physics Supervisor*R. Wewers, Work Control Center ManagerG. Wrightam, I&C Supervisor

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S. Yancy,. Mechanical Maintenance SupervisorC. Zimmerman, Operations Technical Support

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*Present at exit interview..

The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, includingoperators, technicians, and administrative personnel.

2. Followup on Previously Identified Items (Units 1 and 2).

_(Closed) Unresolved Item 313/8118-02; 368/8116-03: Control roomventilation.

This item was identified in. June of 1981 and identified a lackof knowledge of the design basis for, and a lack of plantprocedures relative to operation of, the outside air dampers onthe control room emergency recirculation and filtration units(VSF-9 and 2VSF-9). The item and the licensee's resolutionattempts were discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-313/8232;50-368/8231 and 50-313/8418; 50-368/8418. The licensee hasrecently revised the control room ventilation procedures(1104.34, Revision 9 and 2104.34, Revision 4) to. includeinstructions on closing the outside air dampers if the emergencyventilation unit fails to start or fails after starting. Inaddition, a check of the reserve air bottle pressure and anoperability check on the outside air dampers have been added tothe monthly surveillance tests.

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However, these procedures provide inconsistent guidance onoperation of the outside air dampers in a chlorine event. TheUnit 2 procedure recommends closing the outside air damper on2VSF-9 during a chlorine event, but the Unit 1 procedure doesnot provide similar' guidance for the outside air damper onVSF-9. Discussions with operations department personnel of bothunits indicated that no clear design basis information wasavailable to'them with respect to-operation of the outside airdampers during a chlorine event. The licensee's failure toestablish adequate procedures.for the operation of the control<

room ventilation system'is an apparent violation of TechnicalSpecification 6.8.1 for both units. (313/8527-01; 368/8528-01).

(0 pen) Open Item 313/8017-03: Reactor building purge alarm setpoint.

The licensee has performed a calibration of RE-7400, the reactorbuilding purge monitor, using Xenon 133. The results of thiscalibration will be used in the calculation of the monitorexpacted count rate and the monitor alarm setpoint prior to thenext Unit 1 reactor building purge. This is expected to resultin a more useful alarm setpoint, since the major isotopedischarged during a reactor building purge is Xenon 133.

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The NRC inspector reviewed Operating Procedure 1104.33, Revision24, dated October 16, 1985. This procedure providesinstructions for conducting a reactor building purge, andAttachment C of this procedure is provided for documenting the

- release. Review of this procedure and discussions withradiochemistry and operations personnel indicated that severalimprovements have been made to enhance control of a reactorbuilding purge. These include:

The recalibration of RE-7400 discussed above..

The determination of a realistic setpoint for the special.

particulate fodine noble gas (SPING) monitor byradiochemistry and the inclusion of this setpoint in thepre-release permit.

Instructions in~ Procedure 1104.33 for lining up sample, .

flow to RE-7400 prior to the release.!

Instructions in Procedure 1104.33 for verifying the.

operability of SPING No. 1 (RX9820)' prior to the release.

Software changes to reduce the likelihood of an error when.

entering reactor building pressure, as was discussed in NRCInspection Report 50-313/85-07.

The following further actions remain to be completed prior toclosing this item:

Development and implementation of a procedure to enable.

operations personnel to adjust the setpoint of the SPING, ,

monitor before and.after a release.- a

Provision of procedural guidance,to operations personnel.

on the use of the SPING monitor during a release,including the required response if the alarm setpoint isreached. ,

Provision of proceddral guidance to operations personnel.

on resetting the RE-7400 setpoint after the release.

Determination of whether the Xenon 133 calibration curve.

for RE-7400 results in.a useful monitor alarm setpoint forthe next reactor building purge.

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3. Licensee Event Report (LER)-Followup (Unit 2)

Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, andreview of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine

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that reportabi ity requirements were fulfilled, immediate correctiveaction was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has

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been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.~

84-010-01 'Nonconservative constants used in core protectioncalculators and core operating limit supervisory system

84-012-00 Primary overcurrent protection device for containmentpenetration inoperable

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85-006-01 Fire door found open

'' - 85-008-00 Blockout in fire barrier wall not sealed properly

85-009-00 Inadvertent engineered safeguards (ES) actuationduring design change modification

85-010-00 Remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation range notin accordance with Technical Specifications

85-020-00 Reactor trip while in Mode 5 '

85-021-00 Fire barrier penetration not completely sealed

LER 84-010 reported an error in the CECOR code which was identified byCombustion Engineering (CE). The licensee verified that CE had identifiedthe cause of the error, had verified that no other similar errors exist,and had taken appropriate action to prevent recurrence.

LER 85-009 reported an inadvertent ES actuation with the unit shut downand the core unloaded. The actuation was determined to be caused by'

inadequate design modification installation instructions. Theseinstructions were revised and the design change was completed withoutfurther incidents.

LER 85-020 reported a reactor trip while performing a monthly surveillance' test of the reactor protective system in cold shutdown. The licensee's

review of the incident found that the technician had failed to properlyfollow the test procedure. A counseling' session was conducted, addressingprocedure compliance and attention to detail.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Followup on Three Mile Island Action Plan Requirements (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector is reviewing, on a continuing basis, the licensee'sactions in response to the requirements of NUREG-0737 and Generic Letter82-33. The inspector's review of certain of the licensee's actions inthis regard is summarized below. The numbering system and short titles

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correspond to those used in NUREG-0737 and Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737~.

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'(Generic Letter 82-33).

-I.C.1 Upgrade Emergency Operating Procedures. .

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The licensee has performed the necessary analyses, developedtechnical guidelines, prepared procedures writer's guides andpublished human factored, function oriented, emergency operatingprocedures. These procedures are designated Emergency OperatingProcedures (E0P) 1202.01 and 2202.01 for Unit 1 and Unit 2,respectively. Extensive simulator validation of the procedures andoperator training on the procedures was conducted prior to procedureimplementation. The NRC inspector's review of these proceduresindicated that the procedures should improve the operator's abilityto mitigate the consequences of an accident. Discussions withlicensed operators revealed good operator familiarity with andconfidence in the procedures.

I.D.2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS).

The licensee has developed and installed a SPDS for each unit. Thesesystems provide a concise display of critical plant variables to thecontrol room operators to aid them in determining the safety statusof the plant. Use of the SPDS has been incorporated into the E0Psdiscussed above, but the E0Ps do not depend upon the SPDS beingoperable. The SPDS has proved to be useful during plant transientsand has been highly reliable. In addition to the control roomdisplays, the SPDS for both units in the primary technical supportcenter and in the secondary technical support center have beendeclared fully operational.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. IE Circular Review (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector reviewed the documented actions taken by the licensee toaddress the concern of IE Circular 81-13, " Torque Switch Electrical BypassCircuit for Safeguard Service Valve Motors," dated September 25, 1981.This IE Circular was reissued in August 1984 because the original hadomitted the first two of the four recommended actions. These four actionswere:

Verify that all valves important to safety, which are required by.

the design to have torque switch bypass circuits installed, do infact have these circuits installed.

Verify that all applicable electrical drawings correctly reflect.

these electrical bypass circuits.y

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If inspection reveals that required bypass circuits are not.

installed, installation should be done as soon as practicable.

Establish controls to assure that torque switch bypass circuits are.

not inadvertently removed and that they are restored if they areremoved for maintenance or test.

The licensee determined that the scope of the investigation at ANO waslimited to safety-related motor operated vahes in Unit 2. Most valves

.were found to have been wired correctly.with the 100% torque bypass asindicated by the design drawings. Only four valves were found which hadbeen incorrectly designed to not have the 100% torque bypass (servicewater to the containment unit coolers isolation valves). Several othervalves were found to have improper wiring. The NRC inspector verifiedthat these problems had been corrected.

.The licensee instituted administrative controls to prevent the inadvertentremoval of the torque bypass function by adding suitable precautions to~

the following licensee procedures:

1403.03, "Limitorque Motor 0perated Valves Inspection and Setup,"- (step 5.9)

' 2403.55, "Limitorque Motor Operated Valve SMB-000 Inspection and~

Setup," (step 7.8.9)

Based upon the above, the NRC inspector concluded that the licenseeappears to have adequately performed the recommended actions of this IECircular. Therefore, IE Circular 81-13 is considered closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicablelogs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. Theinspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems,reviewed tagout records, verified proper return to service of affectedcomponents, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated forequipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors made spot checks toverify that.the physical security plan was being implemented inaccordance with the station security plan. The inspectors verifiedimplementation of radiation protection controls 'during observation ofplant activities.

The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plantequipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and

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excessive vibration. The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping andcleanliness conditions during the tour.

The NRC inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 2high pressure safety injection (HPSI) system. The walkdown was performedusing Procedure 2104.39 and Drawing M-2232. The following problems werenoted:

Insulation on electrical power cable to the motor operator for.

2CV-5126-1, HPSI pump 2P89A mini-flow recirculation control valve wasgapped.

One link on the locking chain for 2SI-11B, HPSI pumps discharge.

cross-connect valve, was severed rendering the lock ineffective.This is an apparent violation (368/8528-02). Upon being notified of

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this condition, the licensee promptly installed a new chain on the'

valve handwheel and conducted a position verification and chaininspection on all locked manual valves outside containment in bothunits. No similar discrepancies were identified. The licenseeconducted an investigation to determine how and when the chain on

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-this valve was severed, but the investigation yielded no solidconclusions.

A tensioned wire connecting the bonnet of a vent valve and the HPSI.

hot leg injection header by penetrations 2P34 and 2P13 was found.

Several valves were either not labeled or had an incorrect label:.

2SI-5014C2SI-5115A2SI-5054C and D

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The support for the motor operator on 2CV-5075 was not properly.

installed.

There was boric acid crystal buildup on 2SI-5054D and on 2CV-5128-1..

The pipe through centainment penetration 2P35 was supported by a.

wooden block and shims in the penetration cutout.

Parts of the handwheel mechanism for 2SI-1070A had fallen out and.

were resting on the bonnet around the stem.,

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. These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facilityoperations were in conformance with the requirements established underTechnical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

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7. Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification requiredsurveillance testing on the security diesel generator (Procedure 1305.10),and a Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (Procedure 2104.36, Supplement 1),and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequateprocedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions foroperation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components wereaccomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifications andprocedure requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other thanthe individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified duringthe testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate managementpersonnel.

The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

Unit 2 plant protection system channel 'A' monthly test,.

Section 7.23, reactor trip breaker trip tests (Procedure 2304.38)

Unit 1 steam driven emergency feedwater pump test (Procedure.

1106.06, Supplement II)

Unit 1 hydrogen purge standby system test (Procedure 1104.33,.

Supplement II)

Unit 2 plant protection system channel 'C' monthly test.

(Procedure 2304.39)

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and componentslisted below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted inaccordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codesor standards; and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limitingconditions for operation were met while components or systems were removedfrom service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;activith r, were accomplished using approved praedures and were inspectedas applicEble; functional testing and/or ca!ibrations were performed prior.

to returning components or systems to service; quality control recordswere maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controlswere implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and toensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance

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which may affect system performance. The requests were reviewe'd to'

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determine status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority is assigned- to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The NRC inspector observed that an average of 10 to 15% (5 to 7) of the; instruments or recorders on the Unit-2 radiation monitoring panel (2C25)

were inoperable at a given time during the month. Some of theseinstruments bore deficiency tags which' referred to Job Orders as JobRequests. Others had informal tags indicating " detector on order." TheNRC inspector expressed concern that the process and area radiationmonitoring systems were not being maintained in a high condition ofreadiness. This is an open item pending licensee action to improve the.operability status of these instruments. (0 pen Item 368/8528-03)

The following maintenance activities were observed:

Unit 2 corrective maintenance to CV-1404, shutdown cooling suction.

isolation valve motor operator (JR 0141)

Replacement of transition piece on VSF-9 (JO 704160).

Repair of steam generator level meter 2LI-1031-2 (JO 705174)..

Installation and testing of trip circuit breakers.

(Procedure 2405.17),

Testing spare reactor trip breaker for Unit 1 (JO 99000014).

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Adjustment of packing on the Unit 1 steam driven emergency.

feedwater pump (JO 70872).

-Changing oil on the inboard pump bearing for the Unit 1 emergency.' feedwater pump (JO 705637)

Repair of control element drive mechanism control system.

J. '(JO 705723)

No violations or deviations were identified.c

9. Procurement Program Implementation.

.The purpose of this area of_the inspection was to ascertain whether the. licensee is implementing its quality assurance program relating to the'

control of procurement activities in conformance with regulatory ~requirements, SAR commitments, and industry guides and standards. The NRC'

inspector reviewed the following chapters of the ANO Quality AssuranceManual for Operations, Revision 7 of May 31, 1985, pertaining to -

:e procurement:,

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4.0 Procurement Document Control7. 0 Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services8.0 Identification and Control of Materials, and Components15.4 Supplier Nonconformances

The NRC inspector also reviewed the following licensee procedures:

1000.10 Control of Procurement, Rev 9, 11/1/851000.11 Purchase Requisition Preparation and Control,

Rev 4, 11/1/851025.007 EQ Listed Equipment's Approved Lubricants,

Rev 1. 4/19/851033.01 Receipt Inspection, Rev 12, 11/1/851032.06 Procurement Technical Assistance, Rev 6, 10/31/85

The NRC inspector concluded from this review that the licensee appears tohave adequate administrative controls and procedures to implement therequirements of the following guides and standards committed to by thelicensee:

Regulatory Guide 1.123, Rev 1, July 1977ANSI N45.2.13-1976, " Quality Assurance Requirements for

Control of Procurement of Items and Services forNuclear Power Plants"

Regulatory Guide 1.38, Rev 2, May 1977ANSI N45.2.2-1971,~" Quality Assurance Requirements for

Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and Handlingof Items for Water-Cooled Nuclear Pcwer Plants"

ANSI N18.7-1976, " Administrative Controls and QualityAssurance for the Operational Phase of NuclearPower Plants," (Sections 5.2.13 through 5.2.15)

The NRC inspector reviewed 27 procurement packages from 1984 and 1985 toverify that the licensee is implementing its procurement program inaccordance with the foregoing procedures. Components were selected fromthe following general system areas:

Reactivity Control and Power Distribution.

Instrumentation.

Reactor Coolant System.

Engineered Safety Features Systems.

Containment System.

Electrical Distribution Systems.

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Examples of components included were pump bearings, fasteners, electroniccomponents, valves and valve parts, electrical cable, emergency dieselgenerator parts, nuclear instrumentation detectors and associatedelectronics, breakers including spare reactor trip breakers, valve motoroperators, power supplies, protective coatings, welding material, andlimit switches.

The NRC inspector found that the procurement documents (purchaserequisitions, purcha n orders, material receipt inspection reports, andmaterial tickets), associated with the procurement packages reviewed, hadbeen prepared in accordance with the approved procedures. The NRCinspector also verified:

That the material purchased was obtained from qualified.

vendors, and

That the licensee specified to each vendor the documentation.

requirements for quality and traceability and took appropriateaction when the documentation was not supplied, or was in error.

Based upon this review, the NRC inspector concluded that the licenseeappears to be implementing its procurement program in accordance withregulatory requirements and licensee commitments.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Containment Purge (Unit 2)

The NRC inspector reviewed Operating Procedure 2104.33, Revision 14,dated November 21, 1985. This procedure provides instructions forconductir.g a containment building purge, and Supplement 1 of thisprocedure is provided for documenting the release. The NRC inspectoralso reviewed the records of containment purge release No. 2GR-85-179,conducted on December 7, 1985. The following discrepancies were noted:

The multipoint chart recorder (2RR-0645) used to record the response.

of the containment purge monitor (2RE-8233) during the release wasin very poor operating condition, and produced a chart which wasalmost completely illegible.

The alarm setpoint for 2RE-8233 used during the purge was about.

three decades above the actual count rate reached by the monitorduring the release.

No procedural guidance has been provided to operations personnel for.

adjusting the SPING monitor (SPING No. 5, RX 9820) setpoint before orafter a release.

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[- This~ item will remain open pending correction of these discrepancies.; (0 pen Item 368/8528-04)

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' No violations or deviations were identified. '

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11. Control Room Ventilation (Units 1 and 2)' - In' conjunction with the followup of Unresolved Item 313/8118-02;,

368/8116-03, the NRC inspector reviewed the control room air flowdrawings and the' appropriate sections of the Safety Analysis Reports(SAR). Discussions were also conducted with various licensee personnelto determine which ventilation systems supply the control room andadjacent' areas. Two areas of concern are discussed below.

a. Control Room Isolation

The ventilation for the Unit 2 shift supervisor's office is suppliedby the elevator-machine room ventilation system (2VEH-5 and2VSF-28). The ventilation for the Unit 1 shift supervisor's officeis supplied by VUC-14. The Unit 1 kitchen and restroom area issupplied by VSF-41. None of these three systems are isolated upondetection of high radiation or high chlorine, and prior toDecember 17, 1985, the doors between these areas and the main partof the control room were normally open. Signs had been attached tothe doors indicating that they should be closed in the event ofcontrol room isolation, but no procedures included instructions toshut the doors upon control room isolation. The NRC inspectorconcluded that there was no assurance that these three doors couldbe closed within 5 seconds of control room isolation actuation onhigh radiation or chlorine.

Section 9.7.2.1 of the Unit 1 SAR and Section 9.4.1.1.2 of theUnit 2 SAR indicate that the control room is completely isolated fromits normal ventilation systems and from adjacent areas within5 seconds following detection of high radiation or high chlorine

' concentration. This is an apparent deviation from the commitmentsin the SARs. (313/8527-02; 368/8528-05)

On December 17, 1985, the NRC inspector observed that these threedoors were being maintained closed.

b. Unit 2 Air Flow and Control Diagrams

Several discrepancies were noted on the air flow and control'

diagrams for the Unit 2 control room and adjacent areas. (Drawings*

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M2263 Sheet.1 shows no ventilation system supplying the'..

visitors viewing room (Unit 2 shift supervisor's office). Ductdrawings and licensee personnel indicated this area is servedby the elevator-machine room ventilation system.

M2263 Sheet 2 shows a ve'ntilation duct from the normal Unit 2.

control room, ventilation system (2VSF-8A/B) supplying the_

viewing gallery (Unit 2 shift supervisor's office). Licenseepersonnel stated that this duct has been' blanked and no longersupplies this area.

M2263 Sheet 2, Note 9 states, "2VSF-9 is located in Unit 1 and.

is presently powered from' Unit 1 for Unit 1 startup. This unitwill eventually be powered from Unit 2 power source for Unit 2startup." This note is outdated and in error with respect tothe power supply for 2 VSF-9.

The above errors were not bubbled on the drawings to indicate.

- pending design changes.

This item will remain open pending correction of the Unit 2 controlroom air flow and control diagrams. (368/8528-06)

12. Exit Interview

The NRC inspectors met with Mr. J. M. Levine (ANO General Manager) andother members of the AP&L staff at-the end of this inspection. Atthis meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection

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