innovation, transformation, and war · innovation, transformation, and war us coin operations in...

Innovation, Transformation, and War

US COIN Operations in Anbar and Ninewa, Iraq, 2005-2007

By James A. Russell

Figure 3-1

CAMP

GANNON

CAMP AL QAIM

TOA (Sept 10) DISPOSITION

KHE SAHN

LIMA

3/6(-)

INDIA

sqd(+)

DISPOSITION POST STEEL CURTAIN

(Nov 12)

COP SOUTH

CAMP GANNON

CHAPULTEPEC

CAMP AL QAIM

CHOSIN

AAV

LIMA

AAV

KILO

WHISKEY

LIMA

GUAM

TF 36

LAR

TINIAN

KHE SAHN

AAV

TARAWA

INDIA

LIMA

BEIRUT

HUE CITYLAR

SAIPAN

BELLEAU WOOD

TRIPOLI

WHISKEY

IWO JIMA

KILO

LAR

GUADALCANAL

INDIA

COP NORTH

CO 4-14

The disposition of US forces in the Al Qaim region in September 2005 (left) and the spreading out of those forces (right) following the deployment of the 3-6 Marines in the fall of 2005.

Figure 3-2

UNK

Major Tribes Of Al Qaim Region

T1 VillageT1 Village

JughayfaJughayfa

: Abu Mahal

: Al Tahi

: Al Jeshamy

: Al Salmani

: Al Hardani

: Karbuli

: Mixed

Tribal breakdown in Western Anbar in late 2005.

Figure 3-3

STRATEGIC to TACTICAL LOOSTRATEGIC to TACTICAL LOO

Security

Transition

Governance

Economic

Development

Communicating

SECURITY

GOVERNANCE

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

•CF PRESENCE

•IA CAPABILITY

•IP CAPABILITY

•AIF SUPPRESSION

•ATMOSPHERICS

•JUDICIAL SYSTEM

•POLICE STATIONS

•LOCAL LEADER ENGAGEMENT

•CIVIC INFRASTRUCTURE

•POINT OF ENTRY

•PHOSPHATE PLANT

•CEMENT FACTORY

•CAG/PRDC INITIATIVES

STRATEGIC EFFECTS:

Terrorists defeated and Insurgents neutralized.

Representative government that promotes national unity.

Strengthened rule of law.

Meet basic needs.

Economic reforms spur development.

International support for Iraq increased.

Enhanced understanding of Coalition efforts.

Wedge driven.

Capable ISF assume security lead.

NESTED

Logical lines of operations, or LOOs, developed by 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment in the spring of 2006.

Figure 3-4

3. Economic Development

Sad

ah

Husa

yba

Kar

abila

h

Jura

y’Ji

bU

bay

di

Ram

ana

2. Governance

1. Security

LINES OF OPERATIONBY REGION

Zel

la

C. IP Capability

A. CF Presence

1. Security

Sad

ah

Hu

sayb

ah

Kara

bilah

Ju

ray’Jib

Ubaydi

LINES OF SECURITY

B. IA Capability

D. AIF Suppression

E. Atmospherics

Ram

ana

Zella

C. Local Ldr Engagement

A. Judicial System

2. Governance

Sad

ah

Husa

ybah

Kar

abila

h

Jura

y’Ji

bU

bay

di

LINES OF GOVERNANCE

B. Police Stations

D. Civic Infrastructure

Ram

ana

Zel

la

A. POE (closed)

3. Economic Development

Sad

ah

Hu

sayb

ah

Kara

bilah

Ju

ray’Jib

Ubaydi

B. Super Phosphate Plant

LINES OF ECONOMIC DEV

E. CAG/PRDC Initiatives

C. Cement Factory

Ram

ana

Zella

D. Agriculture

1-7 analyses of the towns in its area of operations according to its LOOs.

Figure 3-5

Project METROProject METRO

Phoenix PD

Investigative

Database

LAPD

Law

Enforcement

TTPs &

X-IED

Lockheed Martin

Tactical Surveillance

Equipment

1stBN, 7thMAR

Law Enforcement-

COIN Operations

Investigative Database: CopLink

Summary of the major elements of “Project Metro” used by 1-7 in adapting law enforcement techniques to its mission in the Al Qaim region.

Figure 3-6

Insurgent attack trends against 1-7 Marines in al Qaim region December 2005-July 2006.

Figure 3-7

Well-trained and Disciplined US Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and MarinesC

om

bat O

peratio

ns

(LOO

: Security)

Civil-M

ilitary Op

eration

s(LO

O: G

overnance & E

conomic D

evelopment)

Iraqi S

ecurity F

orces

(LOO

: Security &

Transition)

Info

rmatio

n O

peratio

ns

(LOO

: Com

munication)

Stable & Secure Environment in AO SABER

Functioning Local Governments

& Economies

Sovereign Iraq

Force Protection at COPs Rawah, Anah (and BP Reyanah) , and North

COIN METHODOLOGY:

Counterinsurgency methodology developed by 4-14 during its deployment in Anbar in the fall of 2005.

Figure 3-8

The 4-14 intelligence-operations target fusion cycle used in Anbar in 2005-2006.

Figure 3-9

Details of 4-14 cache find in Anbar, February 2006.

Figure 3-10

NON-LETHAL EFFECTS

EOFSEP – OCT: 4

NOV – MAR: 1

VOTINGNational Referendum: 1389

National Elections

Rawah: 4264Ramana: 4850

TIPSInternet Cafes, TCPs,

[email protected]

[email protected]

FALSE

CAMERASReduced attacks vic Govt Bldg

SEP – DEC: 6

JAN – MAR: 0

IP SCREENINGRawah: 54 Candidates

31 Qualified

FLASH CMOCSRawah, Hassah,Anah, ReyanahMOST WANTED

POSTERS

Internet Cafes

TCPs

Posters

TEAM GOODWILL

2000 Blankets,

School Supplies,

Heaters, Meals,

Water

RAWAH GOVERNANCEFunctioning City Council,

Recognized Mayor

Iraqi Police Chief

Provincial Council Rep

ANAH GOVERNANCEFunctioning City Council,

Recognized Mayor

Provincial Council Rep

DISTRIBUTED

2,000 RADIOS

864 AM

Summary of 4-14 non-lethal activities during its COIN operations in Anbar.

Figure 4-1

States contributing units to the 2/28 Brigade Combat Team during its deployment to Anbar in 2005 and 2006.

Figure 4-2

Major 2/28 bases in and around Ramadi in 2005-2006.

Figure 4-3

Ready First!AS OF 3 MAR 07

UNCLASSIFIED

3

16th EN 2-3 FA

1-37AR 2-37AR 1-36IN 501st SPT

1ST BRIGADE HQ

RFCT SUBORDINATE UNITS

1-9 IN

FT Carson, CO

1/6 Marines

Camp Lejeune, NC

1-77AR

The major combat elements of the 1/1 Brigade Combat Team (left) and their scheme of deployment in and around Ramadi in 2006-2007.

Figure 4-4


UNCLASSIFIED

6

SHABAN

ALBU THIYAB

ALBU RISHA

ALBU SHILB, JULIB

ALBU

ALI JASSIM

ALBU

THIYAB

ALBU FARAJ

ALBU MARAI

ALBU AETHA

MIXED

MIXED

JANABI

SODA

GHANAM

MAHAL

HAIABSA

ALBU HAZIMALBU FAHAD

TAHA

BALI

KALIFAH

RUBAIT

MAWRISHBAYL

ALBU

AJUR

TAHA

ALBU

AJUR

HAZIM

HUSAYN

THALAL

TRIBAL COOPERATION JUN 06

ALBU OBAIDALBU

FAHAD

FADHAWAI

ALBU ASSAF

LAKE

HABANIYAHALBU

FAHAD

CHILIB

AWI

ALWAN ALBU ALWAN

ALBU JABBAR


UNCLASSIFIED

8

ALBU ASSAF

SHABAN

ALBU THIYAB

ALBU RISHA

ALBU SHILB,

JULIB

ALBU FARAJ

ALBU AETHA

ALWAN

MIXED

MIXED

JANABI

ALBU JABBAR

SODA

ALBU OBAIDALBU

FAHAD

GHANAM

MAHAL

HAIABSA

ALBU HAZIMALBU FAHAD

TAHA

BALI

ALBU ALWAN

KALIFAH

RUBAIT

MAWRISHBAYL

ALBU

AJUR

TAHA

ALBU

AJUR

HAZIM

HUSAYN

THALAL

TRIBAL COOPERATION JAN 07

FADHAWAI

Al Anbar Awakening50 Sheikhs – Tribal Council

First OBJ = Defeat AQIZ

2nd = Work in Rule of Law

Provide 90+ % IP Recruits

Tribes turn on AQIZLocal nationals start

killing known terrorists

on our target lists

Sheikh Albu Ali Jasim

Murdered by AQIZ

21 AUG 06

Albu Soda FightSheikh Jasim Mohammed

Stops all IDF on Corregidor

AQIZ attacked on 25NOV06

LAKE

HABANIYAHALBU MARAI

ALBU

ALI JASSIM

ALBU

THIYAB

ALBU

FAHAD

CHILIB

AWI

The growth of tribal support during 1/1’s deployment in and around Ramadi from June 2006-2007. Green areas represent tribal support; yellow partial support, and red non-supportive

Figure 4-5

The progression of 1-37’s operations in south central Ramadi is shown in these graphics from left to right as the battalion expanded its control over insurgent neighborhoods in the summer and fall of 2006.

Figure 4-6

5/12/2008 12:35

PM

Seize : COP Construction

NAI 5

OBJ OMAHA

II

G

G

..G

G

G

GI

DTG:SECRET//REL USA AND MCFIOVERLORD CONPLAN JUNO

1-37C

I

1-37B

I

C

1-37B

I

Decisive Point: when barriers

and fighting positions at the

COP are complete enough to

defeat a complex AIF attack.

Key Tasks:• Seize the buildings that will

comprise the COP

• Secure the area around the COP

and the route to it IOT prevent AIF

from disrupting construction.

Maintain that security until the OP

is capable of defeating a complex

AIF attack without reinforcement.

• Rapidly move construction and

barrier materials to the COP using

multiple secure routes.

• Quickly emplace barriers and

install life support required to

sustain a PLT (+)

Endstate: TF has established a

defensible COP with a secure

route connecting it to existing

TF ASRs.

5/12/2008 12:36

PM

Seize : COP Planning HPTs

• Reconnaissance & site selection

• Engineer estimate

• Transportation requirement estimate

• Prioritization of engineer effort

• Transportation & security plan

• Construction/transportation timeline

• Supervision of loading and download

• Construction

• Layered security & surveillance

The 1-37 combat outpost construction standard operating procedure used in the fall of 2006 in Ramadi.

Figure 4-7

The 1-37 “Census Loop” that related census activivties to ongoing operations.

Figure 4-8

Ready to Fight Since 1917 1

Combined TF 1/6 Current Disposition

IPIP

IPIP

IPIP

IPIP

IPIP

IPIPIP

IPIP

Iraqi Police Station (Enduring)

District Police Substation

District or Provincial IP Detachment

District Police Neighborhood Watch OP

Area of Police Control / Influence

IPIPIP

IPIPIP

IPIPIP

…2-1/7

…2-1/7

…2-1/7

…2-1/7

…2-1/7

…2-1/7

I

I I

2 1/7

I

B 6

I

C 6

II

1 6

B

MOHAWK

6

I

MOHAWK

6

I

6

I

A

C

B

B

IPIPIP

I

A 6

I

I

TF 1-9 INTF 1-77 AR

TF 2/5 MAR

TF 3-69 AR

...

......

...

IPIP

IP

IP

IP

IP IPIPC

IPIP

S-3Ready to Fight Since 1917 11

1/6 AUGMENTATION TEAMS“EXPANDED PERMANENT PARTNERSHIP”

B 6

I

C 6

IA 6

I

6

I

MOHAWK

ATAT

AT

AT

AT

AT

AT

AT

HEAVY

QRF

Al Warar

QatanaWest

Ramadi

Governor’s

Security Area

17th St

Provincial

IP

Azzizziyah

Jumayah

Thalat

Sharikah

Jumhori

AT

S-3

The disposition of the different 1-6 elements and its Iraqi partners in joint security stations in central Ramadi in 2006-2007.

Figure 4-9

Removal of rubble around the government center in central Ramadi initiated by 1-6 Marines in 2006-2007.

Figure 4-10

Ready to Fight Since 1917 8

•Iraqi District Police-led

operation of more than (500)

police from (6) police

stations and 1st PSF.

•10-Hour Operation resulted

in:

-Apprehension of (45)

known / suspected

insurgents.

-Discovery of several

weapons caches including:

•Assault Rifles

•Machineguns

•Mortar/Artillery Shells

•IEDs and IED-making

materiel

•Debriefing continues. IP

are reporting an

exaggerated 100 AIF KIA.

•Atmospherics extremely

positive—Iraqi Civilians

reported AIF activity / threats

to IPs throughout operation.

IP

IP

IP

ERU

IP

Operation OKINAWA (Phase 4)

Clearance of North Central Ramadi By ISF

Cache

Government Center

Mosque Entry

Sheikh Sittar

Arab Media

Interview

Ramadi General Hospital

Visit / Screening

IP

Details of Operation Okinawa in the spring of 2007 by the ISF and 1-6 Marines.

Figure 4-11

ASR Michigan

RAMADI JCC

West Central Ramadi District

Council Meeting

Line of Operation: Governance

Who: XO 1/6 and CA Team Leader

What: First meeting of the West Central

Ramadi District Council

When: 25MAR2007

Where: Ramadi JCC

Significance:

On 25 March 2007, XO 1/6 and CAG Team

Leader met with the West-Central Ramadi

District Council. There were 15 members in

attendance for this historical first meeting.

Districts represented; Al Warar, Jamiya,

Qatana and Sharikah. After introductions

and welcome, the group discussed the

purpose of the council as well as goals,

resources, and projects. The council

president, Sa’ad Hamad Sharqi, led the

discussion with Arif Mukhaibir Sayad. The

members of the council were very

enthusiastic about ideas for improvements.

Security, education, and employment as well

as water, electricity and basic services were

identified as important issues. All agreed the

first step is to clear the streets of trash and

rubble. They voted that the first 2 projects to

stem from this council will be rubble and trash

removal. Plans were made to have this

contracted before the next meeting. Bids will

be collected, voted on, and passed to Team 1

for processing. The council shared lunch and

all agreed that this was a great step forward.

We anxiously anticipate the next gathering.

Arif Mukhaibir Sayad, vice-president of the district council discuses his vision for the

district.

The meeting covered specific agenda items formally, then broke for lunch and tea.

Details of the first Ramadi district council meeting in March 2007 convened by 1-6 Marines.

Figure 4-12

Details on the 1-6 information operations program that featured use of loudspeakers in the Ramadi neighborhoods.

Figure 4-1314SEP06 – 03MAY07 Attacks

30 Day Weekly Avg (1)

60 Day Weekly Avg (7)

Cumulative Wkly Avg (31)

Ap

r 25 –

May 0

3

05

101520253035404550556065707580859095

100

Sep

14 -

Sep

20

Sep

28 -

Oct

04

Oct

12 -

Oct

18

Oct

26 -

No

v 0

1N

ov 0

9 -

No

v 1

5N

ov 2

3 -

No

v 2

9D

ec 0

7 -

Dec 1

3D

ec 2

1 -

Dec 27

Jan

04 -

Jan

10

Jan

18 -

Jan

24

Feb

02 -

Feb

08

Feb

16 -

Feb

22

Mar

01 -

Mar

08

Mar

15-

Mar

22

Mar

29-

Ap

r 05

Ap

r 11-

Ap

r 18

Complex Atk

VBIED

IDF

FIED

HIED

Gren

IRL

RPG

SAF

Operation

BELLEAU

WOODTOA

Operation

NEW

PROVIDENCE

(Al Warar

Substation

Build)

Operation

HUE CITY}

IP / ERU

Clear

Qatana /

Thaylat /

Shirikah

Districts

}

Operation

OKINAWA

Insurgent attack trends in the 1-6 Marines area of central

Ramadi from September 2006-April 2007.

Figure 4-13


UNCLASSIFIED

20

IRAQI POLICE IN RAMADIUNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

• IP RECRUITING IN JAN06 IN THE GLASS FACTORY WAS ATTACKED BY A SUICIDE BOMBER

• PREVIOUS UNIT CONTINUED IP RECRUITING IN THE GLASS FACTORY IN APRIL AND MAY06 DESPITE PREVIOUS ATTACK, RESULTING IN LIMITED SUCCESS

• JUN06 THE RFCT MOVED RECRUITING TO BLUE DIAMOND

• JUL06 RFCT HEAVY TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT BEGAN

• SEP06 TRIBAL “DONOR FATIGUE” WAITING FOR IP TRAINEES TO RETURN FROM JORDAN

• DEC06-JAN07 RFCT RECRUITED ERU RECRUITS FOR JORDAN (OVER 500)

• JAN07-FEB07 AO TOPEKA IP FORCE FORMALLY ADDS ANOTHER 740 IP (~370/SHIFT)

Rebuilding Ramadi’s police force during during 2006-2007.

Figure 4-14


UNCLASSIFIED

16

AIF ATTACK TRENDS IN AO TOPEKA

IRAQ STUDY GROUP INDICATES SITUATION IN IRAQ IS “GRAVE AND

DETERIORATING”; HOWEVER CONDITIONS IN RAMADI INDICATE OTHERWISE

DIRECT CONTACT (COMPLEX) ATTACK CAPABILITY IS DWINDLING

MOST COMMONLY USED WEAPON FOR AIF REMAINS IED ATTACKS. THESE,

ALTHOUGH DISRUPTIVE, ARE ALSO MOSTLY INEFFECTIVE

DOWN

67%DOWN

40%

DOWN

57%

DOWN

38%


UNCLASSIFIED

21

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN

LN

IP

IA

JOINT (US/IA)

US

RFCT CACHE FINDSREMOVING THE THREAT BEFORE IT CAN BE USED

IP PRESENT FORDUTY STRENGTH

1/1/7 IA & 3/1/7 IA

ASSUME BATTLE SPACE

JARAYSHI HIGHWAY

IP CHECK POINT

E. RAMADI IP STATION

ESTABLISHED

ISF HAVE DOUBLED OUR CACHE FINDS

• IRAQIS KNOW WHAT TO LOOK FOR WHEN SEARCHING FOR CACHES

• LOCALS WILL SHARE INFORMATION WITH IP BECAUSE IP ARE FROM THE LOCAL AREA

• THE INFORMANT WILL NOT BE MARKED AS A CF COLLABORATOR FOR TALKING TO IP.

• UNTRAINED IP INVESTIGATION IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN CF INVESTIGATION BY VIRTUE OF

LANGUAGE/ CUSTOM BARRIER ALONEOPERATION SQUEEZE PLAY

DEC 06

Summary of insurgent activity and cache finds over the course of the 1/1 deployment in Ramadi during 2006 and 2007.

Figure 5-1

172nd SBCT laydown in Ninewa, Iraq, 2005-2006.

Figure 5-2

TRANSFORMATIONAL LOE

CIVIL MILITARY/INFO OPERATIONS LOE

SECURITY LOE

FORCE SUSTAINMENT LOE

OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL

1ST QTR 2nd QTR 3rd QTR

CAMPAIGN METHODOLOGY

NE2/ COP

CLEAN-UP

NE2

COP

TF2-1OVERALL

ENDSTATE1.IA BNs ABLE TO CONDUCT INDEPENDENT SECURITY OPS

2. ESSENTIAL SERVICES FUNCTIONING IN 80% OF AO

3. AQIZ/CRIMINALS NEUTRALIZED IN AO LEGION

4. POPULACE VIEW GOVT. AS

LEGITIMATE AND ABLE TO PROVIDE BASIC NEEDS

5. POPULACE SUPPORT OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY IS ERODED

HIGHER HQ TASKINGS

QUARTERLY

ENDSTATES

QUARTERLY

ENDSTATES

QUARTERLY

ENDSTATES

QUARTERLY

ENDSTATES

QUARTERLY

ENDSTATES

THREATS =

◊ QJBR

◊AAS

◊CRIMINALS

◊UNEMPLOYMENT

◊ESSENTIAL

SERVICES

◊PUK

◊KDP

◊FUEL SHORTAGE

◊ETHNIC

VIOLENCE

◊CORRUPTION

DECISIVE

OPERATION

QUARTERLY

ENDSTATES

IMN RADIO

SERVICES

REDEPLOY

LOE

ENDSTATES

LOE

ENDSTATES

LOE

ENDSTATES

CJ2906

CJ2998

CJ2789

CJ2931

CWTG

NESTED IN HIGHER

ENDSTATE

BUILT BY QTR TO LEAD TO

BN/BDE ENDSTATE

2-1 Campaign plan overview used in operations in Mosul during 2005-2006.

Figure 5-3

Early Assessment of insurgent control over Mosul Neighborhoods at outset of 172nd COIN operations. Note: AAS is Ansar Al Sunna; QJBR is Tanzim Qa“idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or Al Qaeda in Iraq—the organization of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi.

Figure 5-4

Findings of pattern analysis during October 2005 by 2-1 in Eastern Mosul

Figure 5-5

2-1 Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance plan and its changing map of battle space in November 2005

Figure 5-6

Humint generated by 2-1 following changed handling of detainee questioning from September through October 2005

Figure 5-7

26 October 2005 directed raids on Al Sharkya IED Cells by 2-1 in Mosul.

Figure 5-8

Roll-up of the “Opel Gang” by 2-1 in the Fall of 2005 in Mosul.

Figure 5-9SITEMP 20 – 27 APR

$

VBIED

C2

BATTLE ZONE

DISRUPTION ZONE

VBIED

C2

s

SUPPORT ZONE

C2 ELEMENT

SAFE HOUSE

DA CELL

FACILITATOR

INTIMIDATION CELL

SNIPER CELL

SVBIED CELL

DETAINED

HUMINT TARGET

BAD MOSQUES

MORTAR CELL

SIGINT TARGET

DEVELOPING

TARGET

TASK: NEUTRALIZE CF & ISF

WITH THE USE OF OUTSIDE

TTPs.

PURPOSE: PREVENT POPULAR

SUPPORT OF THE IZ GOV’T &

CAUSE CIVIL UNREST.

TASK: CONDUCT CATASTROPHIC

ATTACKS VS CF & ISF IN BATTLE

& DISRUPTION ZONES.

PURPOSE: NEUTRALIZE CF & ISF

CONTINUED TO SUCCESS.

TASK: MURDER CF/ISF SUPPORTERS. KIDNAP

CIVILIANS. ASSASSINATE ISF.

PURPOSE: PREVENT GROWING

SUPPORT OF A UNIFIED IZ.

DEPICT AN UNSECURED

ENVIRONMENT. CAUSE ISF TO

DESERT.

TASK: RANSOM & EXTORT

WEALTHY CIVILIANS. SMUGGLE

WEAPONS. RECRUIT YOUTH.

TRANSPORT MARTYRS.

PURPOSE: ALLOW DA CELLS TO

CONTINUE OPS AGAINST CF/ISF

THROUGH FINANCING,

RECRUITMENT, & SMUGGLING.

DECISIVE OPERATION

C2, DA, INTIMIDATION CELLS

SHAPING OPERATION 1C2 & DA CELLS

SHAPING OPERATION 2C2, DA, INTIMIDATION CELLS

SUSTAINING OPERATION$, SMUGGLERS, INTIMIDATION

C2

C2

C2

C2

C2

C2

C2

C2

C2

C2

Example of a situational template, or SITEMP, used by 2-1 in the spring of 2006 during its operations in Mosul .

Figure 5-10

2-1 “Wheel of Stuff” to help guide target decision-making during its deployment.

Figure 5-11

L1

L3L2

L7

L4 L5

L6

AO LEGION ZONEsTARGETING FOCUS

TGT—LETHA COMBINED

TGT—LETHAL UNILATERAL

TGT—NON-LETHAL

PROJECTS

OTHER / CTR

CJ1119ABU AZIZ

CJ2020NE2 RUBBLE

CJ2114NE4 RUBBLE

CJ2356TRASH REMOVAL

CJ2114NE2A RUBBLE

CJ2910ABU HAJER

CJ3184GHAZI

CJ2951ABU ALI

CJ2909RCIED CELL

CJ2913ABU NOOR

CJ2912ABU AHMED

CJ1107YAHYA

CJ1108MUSTAFA 2

CJ2949ABU YOUNIS

CJ2930ABU BAKR

CJ1071ABU TAYYIB

QH2001BASAHAR

CJ2941FAREED CELL

CJ2938ABDUL SALAM

CJ2911SHEIK SBAK

QH2002YUSIF

CJ2901CIVIL RECON

CJ2900PUK/PDK COMPOUNDS

CJ2044E. TIGRIS SEC MTG

CJ2897SCHOOL PARTNER

QH2402SWT IED EMPLACE

CJ2901CIVIL RECON

CJ2907IP AWARD

CJ2100JT RADIO SHOW

CJ2121BRIDGE TCP

CJ2902SEWAGE PROJECT

QH2000SCHOOL DAMAGES

CJ2044N. TIGRIS SEC MTG

CJ2047N. TIGRIS REC MTG

CJ2043E. TIGRIS REC MTG



FIRST 3 WEEKS OF JAN 06FIRST 3 WEEKS OF JAN 06AS OF 6 JAN 06AS OF 6 JAN 06

INK SPOTINK SPOT

2-1 integrated targeting set in Mosul, January 2006.

Figure 5-12

Insurgent attack trends in eastern Mosul from November 2004-May 2006.

Figure 5-13

Growth of Company C 1-17’s area of operations in its “economy of force mission” in Mosul during the course of its deployment. Blue Stars Are Iraqi IP Stations; Green Stars Iraq Army Facilities

Figure 5-14

Standard organization of Strkyer company on left vs. the organization on right created by Company C, 1-17 during its deployment in Mosul in 2005-2006.

Figure 5-15

Example of small kill team operations by Company C, 1-17 in Mosul in May 2006.

Figure 5-16

The 4-11 Field Artillery area of operations south of Mosul.

Figure 5-17

The 4-11 integrated assessment of its area of operations. Key: red is negative; green positive; yellow is neutral

Figure 5-18SAMPLE COA DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

COA Analysis

The 4-11 “Targeting Wheel” as it applied to the economic situation in its area of operations.

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