innovation sources of economies in eastern asia · innovation sources of economies in eastern asia...

Innovation Sources of Economies in Eastern Asia

PRACE NAUKOWE Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we WrocławiuRESEARCH PAPERS of Wrocław University of Economics

256

edited byBogusława SkulskaAnna H. Jankowiak

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ISSN 1899-3192 ISBN 978-83-7695-210-9

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Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 9

Part 1. International trade as a factor of innovation in Asian economies

Jerzy Dudziński, Jarosław Narękiewicz, Iwona Wasiak: PricemovementsintheinternationaltradeandAsiandevelopingcountries’exports........... 13

Guenter Heiduk: Is innovation-based competitiveness in trade crisis-resistant?ThecaseofChina....................................................................... 23

Bartosz Michalski: Technological intensity of the international trade. Thecaseofthesecond-tierAsianTigers.................................................... 36

Paweł Pasierbiak: TechnologicalintensityofJapanesemerchandisetrade.... 47Ewa Mińska-Struzik: Learningbyexportingasasourceof innovation in

Asiancompanies......................................................................................... 59

Part 2. Foreign direct investment as a source of innovation in Asian economies

Magdalena Kinga Stawicka: Economic and Technological DevelopmentZones(ETDZ)asaplaceofFDIlocationinChina.................................... 75

Maciej Żmuda: The determinants of Chinese outward foreign directinvestmenttodevelopingcountries............................................................ 86

Tadeusz Sporek: Foreign direct investment in Nepal. Strategy andpromotion.................................................................................................... 98

Aleksandra Kuźmińska-Haberla: Promotionofforeigndirectinvestment.ExamplesfromtheAsia-Pacificregion...................................................... 109

Part 3. Innovativeness of network in Eastern Asia

Sebastian Bobowski, Marcin Haberla: Networkedclusters in thecontext ofknowledge-seekingstrategyofinternationalbusiness........................... 121

Jerzy Grabowiecki: Zaibatsuconglomeratesasorganisational innovations atthetimeofthemodernisationofJapan’seconomy................................. 132

Małgorzata Wachowska: The importanceof the Japanesekeiretsugroupsforknowledgespillover.............................................................................. 144

Małgorzata Dolińska: Network-centricinnovations.ThecaseofChina....... 153Anna H. Jankowiak: Chineseindustrialclusters........................................... 164

6 Contents

Karolina Łopacińska: Cultural differences in the context of managing aninternationalcorporationwithaSwedishandChinesecapital............. 174

Part 4. Innovativeness of Asian financial markets

Magdalena Broszkiewicz: Innovations incorporategovernance systemas anecessaryimprovementsofcapitalmarketinJapan................................ 187

Jacek Pera: Modern trends in financial innovations on theAsianmarket. Anattemptofassessment........................................................................... 198

Artur Klimek: Sovereignwealthfundsintheglobaleconomy...................... 208Paweł Folfas: Dubai–anemergingandinnovativeoffshorefinancialcentre 217

Streszczenia

Jerzy Dudziński, Jarosław Narękiewicz, Iwona Wasiak: Ruchcenwhand- lumiędzynarodowymaeksportazjatyckichkrajówrozwijającychsię..... 22

Guenter Heiduk: Czykonkurencyjnośćwhandluopartanainnowacjachjestodpornanakryzys?PrzykładChin............................................................ 35

Bartosz Michalski: Technologicznaintensywnośćhandlumiędzynarodowe-go.Przypadektygrysówazjatyckichdrugiejgeneracji.............................. 46

Paweł Pasierbiak: Intensywność technologiczna japońskiegohandlu towa-rowego......................................................................................................... 58

Ewa Mińska-Struzik: Uczenie się przez eksport jako źródło innowacjiwprzedsiębiorstwachazjatyckich.............................................................. 71

Magdalena Kinga Stawicka: Ekonomiczneitechnologicznestrefyrozwojujako miejsce lokowania bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych w Chinach....................................................................................................... 85

Maciej Żmuda: Motywy bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych Chin wkrajachrozwijającychsię........................................................................ 97

Tadeusz Sporek: ZagraniczneinwestycjebezpośredniewNepalu.Strategiaipromocja..................................................................................................... 108

Aleksandra Kuźmińska-Haberla: Promocja bezpośrednich inwestycji za-granicznych.RozwiązaniazkrajówregionuAzjiiPacyfiku.................... 118

Sebastian Bobowski, Marcin Haberla: Usieciowioneklastrywkontekściestrategiiknowledge-seekingbiznesumiędzynarodowego......................... 131

Jerzy Grabowiecki: Konglomeratyzaibatsu jako innowacjeorganizacyjneokresumodernizacjigospodarkiJaponii.................................................... 143

Małgorzata Wachowska: Znaczeniejapońskichgrupkeiretsudlarozprze-strzenianiasięwiedzy................................................................................. 152

Małgorzata Dolińska: InnowacjepowstającewsiecinaprzykładzieChin... 163

Contents 7

Anna H. Jankowiak: Chińskieklastryprzemysłowe..................................... 173Karolina Łopacińska: Różnicekulturowewkontekściezarządzaniafirmą

wielonarodowązkapitałemszwedzkimichińskim................................... 184Magdalena Broszkiewicz: Innowacjewsystemieładukorporacyjnegojako

konieczneudoskonaleniefunkcjonowaniarynkukapitałowegowJaponii 197Jacek Pera: Współczesne tendencjew zakresie innowacji finansowychna

rynkuazjatyckim.Próbaoceny.................................................................. 207Artur Klimek: Rola państwowych funduszy majątkowych w gospodarce

światowej.................................................................................................... 216Paweł Folfas: Dubaj–wschodząceiinnowacyjnecentrumfinansowe.......... 226

PRACE NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU EKONOMICZNEGO WE WROCŁAWIU RESEARCH PAPERS OF WROCŁAW UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS nr 256 ● 2012

InnovationSourcesofEconomiesinEasternAsia ISSN1899-3192

Paweł PasierbiakMariaCurie-SkłodowskaUniversityinLublin

TECHNOlOGICAl INTENSITY OF JAPANESE MerCHANdISe TrAde

Summary:Japanisperceivedasacountrywhich,thankstotechnologicaldevelopment,hasreachedahighpositionintheinternationaldivisionoflabour.Itbecamenoticeableespeciallyafterthecrisesofthe1970sandtheearly1980s,whenitappearedthatJapanwasofferingsuccessfulhigh-technologyproductsoninternationalmarkets,andtheshareoftheseproductsinthetotalexportofthecountryoccupiesanimportantplace.Inthefirstdecadeofthetwenty-firstcentury,thesituationchangedsignificantly.Japan,thoughstillhighinitstechnologicalposition,startedlosingshareinglobalflowsofhightechnologygoods(ICTamongothers),andtheroleofsuchproductsintotalimportandexportflowsofthecountrywasdecliningrapidly.Thenegativetrendcanbeobservedin thecaseof thesectoralapproach(sectorofhigh,medium-high,medium-lowandlowtechnology)aswellastheproductone(productswithhighintensityinR&D).

Keywords:Japan,foreigntrade,technology,internationaltraderelations.

1. Introduction

Theanalysisofthelong-termtrendsininternationaltradeshowsthatmerchandiseexchangemoreandmoreincreasinglyincludedtradeingoodswithahighdegreeoftechnologicaldevelopment.Onehas tokeep inmind thatasa resultof relativelyshort-termchangesonmarkets,theshareofcommoditygroupssuchasmineralsoragriculturalwas temporarily increasing,but thepermanentcapacity toeffectivelyengageandmaintainitspositionintheinternationaldivisionoflabourarosefromthebase,whichwasachievedbytheleveloftechnologicaldevelopmentofthecountry,reflectedinthestructureofitsproductionandexports.Progressinthisareaprovidedabasisforcompetitiveadvantageofthecountryasitinfluencedthegrowthoflabourproductivity,which,inadditiontospecialisationinproduction,isoneofthemostimportant determinants of long-term competitiveness of the national economy.1 Technological leadership is an advantage, because the country is able to offer

1 See:B.Mucha-Leszko,M.Kąkol,AnalizahandlutowaramiUniiEuropejskiejwlatach1995–2008,[in:]B.Mucha-Leszko(Ed.),Pozycja Unii Europejskiej w handlu międzynarodowym,Wydaw-nictwoUMCS,Lublin2009,p.42.

48 PawełPasierbiak

productsoninternationalmarkets,whichareinhighdemandandwhicharegenerallysoldathigherprices,thusaffectingthegrowthofcorporateprofitability.Inthe1980sanexampleofsuchacountrywasJapan.AftertheSecondWorldWartheeconomicstructureofthecountrywasoutdated,anditsexportoffercontainedmainlylabour-intensiveproducts.TechnologicalprogresswhichwasestablishedasabaseofeconomicgrowthenabledJapantobecometheworld’stechnologicalleader.Japanese products started to be perceived as products of high quality with hightechnologycontent,yetofferedatareasonableprice.

ThemainobjectiveofthisstudyistoanalysetheimportanceoftechnologicallyadvancedproductsintheJapaneseforeigntrade.IndicationoftrendsinthisregardwilldetermineJapan’scurrentpositionandalsospecifiesthedirectionofchangeintowhichtheJapaneseeconomyisevolving.Thebasicresearchperiodis2000–2010,butdependingon theavailabilityof statisticaldata, thisperiodmaybe longerorshorter.Inordertoachievethepurposeofthearticle,analytical-descriptiveresearchmethodswereused.ThearticlewasbasedmainlyonprimarysourcesofinformationintheformofOECDandtheWorldBank’sstatisticaldatabases.

2. Technological maturity of Japan

JapanisacountrythatintheperiodaftertheSecondWorldWarwaspromotedfromthepositionofadevelopingcountryintooneofthemostdevelopedcountries.Thebasisofthispromotionwasthetechnicalandtechnologicalprogress,whichinthiscountry took place in a relatively short time.2A skillful use of the opportunitieswhichappearedintheinternationalenvironmentbutalsoconsistentimplementationofpoliciestopromotetechnologicaldevelopmentandbehaviourofinnovativefirmsinlittlemorethantwentyyearscausedJapantocatchupwithtechnologicalleaders,suchas theUnitedStatesandsomeEuropeancountries.3Thepreviouslyexistingtechnologicalgapwasoffset, andJapanhaschanged itspositionofa technologyimitatorintoitscreator.

Japanisacountrywhichformanyyearsallocatedarelativelybigpartoftheirfunds for research and development (R&D). Throughout the postwar period theshare of such expenses in relation toGDPwas increasing, but at the turn of thecenturyitexceeded3%.In2008theratewas3.4%,whichgaveJapanthethirdplaceamongtheOECDcountriesallocatingtherelativelybiggestamountsofresourcesfor research and development.4 The following year, the share decreased slightly(3.36%),but itwasconsiderablyhigher than theaverage forallOECDcountries

2 Moreontheproblemsee,e.g.,P.Pasierbiak,Miejsce Unii Europejskiej w zagranicznej ekspansji gospodarczej Japonii,BiuletynEuropejski1998,WydawnictwoUMCS,Lublin2008,pp.46–48.

3 See, e.g., H. Patrick, Japanese High Technology Industrial Policy in Comparative Context, WorkingPaperNo.1,GraduateSchoolofBusiness,ColumbiaBusinessSchool,1986,p.33.

4 OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2010,OECDPublishing,Paris2010,p.196.

TechnologicalintensityofJapanesemerchandisetrade 49

(2.4%),theUSA(2.9%)orforEU-27(2.4%).5Itisworthnotingthattheabsolutevalueofdisbursedfundsrosesteadilyuntil2008(148.7billion).6Thefollowingyear,asaresultoftheglobaleconomicslowdown,spendingonR&DinJapan,asinothercountries,declined.In2009itamountedto137.9billionUSD.7ButonehastokeepinmindthatanabsolutevalueoftheresourcesspentonR&Dinvestmentisnotadeterminantofthetechnologicallevelreachedbythecountry.Therearemanyotherindicatorsthatcanbeusedtodescribethecountry’sposition,forexample,inscienceand innovation,whichaffectwidelyunderstood technology.Figure1summarisesthemostimportantmeasuresofthecurrentpositionofJapaninthisregard.

GERD as % of GDP

BERD as % of GDP

Industry financed GERD as % GDP

Triadic patents per million population

Scientific articles per million population

% of firms with new-to-market product innovations (as a % of

all firms)% of firms undertaking non-

technological innovation (as a % of all firms)

% of firms collaborating (as a % of all firms)

Patents with foreignco-inventors

% of GERDfinanced by abroad

Researchers per thousandtotal employment

Science & Engineering degrees as % of all new degrees

HRST occupations as % of total employment

Japan Average

Attention:GERD–GrossDomesticExpenditureonR&D;BERD–BusinessEnterpriseExpenditureonR&D;HRST–HumanResourcesforScienceandTechnology;GDP–GrossDomesticProduct.

Figure 1.ScienceandInnovationprofileofJapanSource:OECDScience,TechnologyandIndustryOutlook2010,OECDPublishing,Paris2010,p.196.

AnanalysisofthedatapresentedinFigure1showsthatthesituationofJapanisthemostadvantageousinsuchareasas“triadicpatents,industryfinancedGERDas%ofGDP,BERDas%ofGDP”and“GERDasa%ofGDP”aswellas“%offirmsundertakingnon-technologicalinnovation”.Thevalueoftheseindexesis

5 Science and Technology: Key Tables from OECD,OECD2012(accessed:18.05.2012).6 Main Science and Technology Indicators,Volume2011/1,OECDPublishing,Paris2011,p.24.7 Ibidem.

50 PawełPasierbiak

considerablyhigherthantheaveragefortheOECD.Atthesametime,itisworthpointingoutthatinsomeareasJapanhasstillalottodoinordertocatchupwithothereconomies.Forexample,inJapanthereisvirtuallynoexpenditureforR&Dbyforeigncapital.8ThissituationisaconsequenceofalimitedcommitmentofforeigndirectinvestorsontheJapanesemarket.Thelackofforeigninvestmentalsoresultsinpoorperformanceinpatentingactivityinwhichonecooperatingpartyisaforeignpartner.Inthatcase,thecomparisonofJapantotheOECDaveragefallsinfavourofthelatter.

On thebasisof thisgeneraloverviewof the technological situationof Japan,itcanbesaidthatJapanhasatechnologicallyadvancedeconomy,whosestructureallowsfortheproductionofgoodswithhightechnologicalintensity.Theirroleintheforeigntradeofthecountrywillbepresentedinsubsequentpartsofthestudy.

3. Japan’s trade in high technology goods

Japan’sforeigntradeturnoverintheperiodbetween2000and2010showedlargefluctuations invalue.Themain reason for the changewas the state of theworldeconomy and the country’s internal situation. In 2000, Japan’s total export valueamountedto479.2billionUSD,inthenextyearitreducedto402.6billionUSD.9 ThiswasaresultoftheglobaleconomicslowdowncausedbyaburstingspeculativebubbleontheITmarket.Majorworldeconomieshavereducedthepaceofitsgrowth,andsomehaveevenexperiencednegativeGDPgrowth.Insubsequentyears,exportsofJapanesegoodsincreased,butin2009itunderwentasharpcollapse.Incomparisontothepreviousyear,thevalueofexportsfromJapanfellby25.7%(to580.7billionUSD)andimportsby27.6%(552billionUSD).Thesharpdeclineinexternaldemandtookplacebecauseoftheglobalfinancialcrisis,bywhichJapanhasbeenhithardasacountrywhichbaseditsgrowthonexports.Duetothefact that thestructureofJapaneseexportswasdominatedbymedium-highandhightechnologygoods,theconjuncture of the country deteriorated because of the decline in exports of thecountry.10In2010,Japan’sexportswidenedto769.8billion,whichalmostcorrespondstoitsvaluebeforethecrisis(2008).Importsamountedto694.1billion,toaccountforanearly70billionUSDlowerlevelthanin2008.

Asalreadymentioned,theJapaneseforeigntradestructure(especiallyexports)inafairlylargeextentrestsonthegoods/sectorswithahighdegreeoftechnological

8 In2009only0.52%oftheprivatesectorexpensesforR&Dwasfinancedbyforeigncapital.Incomparison,inPolanditwas4.46%andinAustriaasmuchas23.34%.OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2011,Paris2011,p.92.

9 OECDDatabase:International Trade by Commodity Statistics,SITCRev.3,OECDiLibrary(accessed:19.05.2012).

10 Highandmedium-hightechnologygoodsareparticularlysensitivetocyclicalchangesofeco-nomicconjuncture.See:OECD Economic Surveys: Japan 2009,OECD,Paris2009,p.25.


intensity.11However,analysingthechangesinthisrespect,wecanseesomenegativetrends.Taking intoaccount the sectoral approach,onemaynote that in1994 thestructureofJapaneseexportsofmanufactureswasdominatedbyproducts fromagroup of medium-high technology industries (with 51.1% share), followed by ahigh-technologygroup(31.2%),medium-lowtechnologyindustries(12.4%)andthelowtechnologyones(5.4%).12Insubsequentyears,thechangesincludedadecreaseintheshareofhightechnologygroup(to28.9%in2003),medium-lowtechnologyindustries(11.8%),low-technology(5.1%)andgrowthofamedium-hightechnologygroup (to 54.2% in 2003). The share of goods from the industries of high andmedium-hightechnologywasmorethan80%oftotalexportsofprocessedgoods.IfoneanalysesthechangeinthesegroupsinJapan’sexportsagainstthebackgroundofsimilarchangesinotherOECDeconomies,itcanbenotedthatinJapantheaverageannualgrowth rateofexportsofhighandmedium-high technology in theperiodbetween 1996 and 2005was the lowest ofOECD countries.13This resulted in adeclineofJapan’stotalexportsofgoodsfromtheOECDgroupofhighandmedium--hightechnologyby3.3percentagepoints–to11.8%in2005,thehighestfallamongOECDcountriesrecordedintheperiodbetween1996and2005.

Theconclusionsdrewfrom thesectoralapproach tochanges in technologicalintensityofJapaneseexportsarealsoconfirmedbytheproductapproach.Whatismore, the tendency to fall in the share in the exports of processed productswascharacteristicofnotonlytheJapaneseeconomy,butalsooftheUnitedStates,theEuropeanUnionandevenworld-wideexport.AgraphicalillustrationofthisproblemispresentedinFigure2.

ThedatainFigure2clearlyindicatetheglobaltrendofadeclineintheshareof high technology products in the exports of processed goods of major worldeconomies. In2000–2010 themostaffectedcountrieswere theUnitedStatesandJapan.However,bothcountrieshaveahighersharethanaveragefortheworldandfortheEuropeanUnion.Thechangesinthevalueoftheexportsofhightechnologygoodsin2000–2010arepresentedinTable1.

11 Twomainapproachesareusedto identify technologyintensity: thesectoralandtheproductapproach.ThesectoralapproachconsidersthetechnologicalintensityofsectorsexpressedasR&Dex-penditure/valueaddedandclassifiesthesectorsashigh,mediumorlowtechnologyaccordingtotheob-tainedscore.High-technologyproductgroupsaredefinedaccordingtotheR&DintensityofproductsfollowingtheconceptsdevelopedbytheOECD–R&Dexpenditure/totalsales.Thesecanbeclassifiedinthefollowingninegroups:aerospace,computers-officemachines,electronics-telecommunications,pharmacy,scientificinstruments,electricalmachinery,chemistry,nonelectricalmachineryandarma-ment.Formoredetailssee:Science, Technology and Innovation in Europe. 2012 Edition,PublicationsOfficeoftheEuropeanUnion,Luxembourg2012,pp.136–137.

12 OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2005, OECDPublishing, Paris 2005, pp.207–208.

13 Forthefirstgroupitwas2%andfortwogroupstogether3.7%.See:OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2007,OECDPublishing,Paris2007,p.215.

52 PawełPasierbiak

0,0

10,0

20,0

30,0

40,0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Shar

e, in

%

World European Union United States Japan

Attention:High-technologyexportsareproductswithhighR&Dintensity,suchasinaerospace,com-puters,pharmaceuticals,scientificinstruments,andelectricalmachinery.

Figure 2. HightechnologyexportsasapercentofmanufacturedexportsofJapan,theEU,theUSAandtheWorld

Source: author’s own work based onWorld Bank’s Database, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS/countries(accessed:20.05.2012).

Table 1. Valueofhightechnologyexportsbetween2000and2010,inbillionUSD

Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

World 116.4 1053.4 1069.9 1192.9 1432.2 1588.8 1825.3 1766.8 1840.8 1572.1 –

EU 390.3 386.2 385.3 421.4 499.9 552.0 624.6 554.3 581.9 511.1 574.3

USA 197.5 176.2 162.1 160.3 176.3 190.7 219.0 218.1 220.9 132.4 145.5

Japan 128.9 99.5 95.9 107.1 126.2 125.4 129.2 117.9 119.9 95.2 122.0

Source: author’s own work based onWorld Bank’s Database, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS/countries(accessed:20.05.2012).

23.2

−22.8

–3.6

11.717.9

–0.6

3.0

–8.8

1.7

–20.6

28.3

−30,0%

−20,0%

−10,0%

0,0%

10,0%

20,0%

30,0%

40,0%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Figure 3. ChangesinhightechnologyexportsinJapan,y-o-yin%

Source:author’sownpreparationbasedonWorldBank’sDatabase,http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS/countries(accessed:20.05.2012).


Accordingtothedata,allthelistedeconomiesshowedalargevariationinrelationtothevalueofexportsofhightechnologyproducts.ShortlyafterthecollapseoftheITmarketintheUnitedStatesattheturnofthecentury,thevalueofexportsdeclinedinalltheanalysedcountries.Insubsequentyearstherewasatrendofgrowing,butthecollapseofglobaltrade,whichtookplacein2009,wasreflectedalsointhefieldofhightechnologytrade.TheillustrationofthechangesthathaveoccurredinthisareafortheJapaneseexportisinFigure3.

According to the data gathered in Figure 3, in 2000–2010 there weremajorchangesinthedynamicsofexportsofhightechnologyproducts.First,therewasalargevariationintheoccurrence,whichconsistsofafive-folddecreaseinthevalueofexportsandsix-foldgrowth,andsecond,thedynamicsofchangewashighatthebeginningandendof theperiod.Analysing thesechangesandkeeping inmindadecliningshareofexportsofhightechnologyproductsintotalJapaneseexports,oneneedstonotethatthenegativedevelopmentalsotookplaceinalmosteverygroupofhightechnologyproducts.ThetrendsinthisareaareillustratedbythedatainTable2.

Table 2. TradebalanceandexportmarketshareofJapaninhigh-technologyexports,inmillionUSDand%

IndustryTradebalance[millionUSD] Exportmarket share[%]2003 2006 2009 2003 2006 2009

Aerospaceindustry –4501.0 –5115.0 –4482.4 1.5 1.5 1.6Electronicindustry 40058.4 38900.1 23416.6 11.1 8.2 6.8Officemachinery andcomputerindustry –47.1 –2249.9 –1595.9 6.4 4.6 3.9Pharmaceuticalindustry –3239.7 –5244.4 –10863.0 1.9 1.4 1.1Instrumentsindustry 11224.6 11548.5 10238.5 11.3 9.4 7.1

Source:author’sownworkbasedonMainScienceandTechnologyIndicators,Volume2011/1,OECD,Paris2011,pp.95–99.

Based on the information contained in Table 2, one can say that Japan’scompetitivenessasacountryexportinghightechnologygoodsisgettingsmaller.Itisevidencedbytheparticipationratesofthecountryinworldexportsoftheseproducts.Outofthefivegroupsofproductsspecifiedinthetable,only“aerospaceindustry”increaseditsshare,butitwasamodestincreasefrom1.5%(2003)to1.6%(2009).Atthesametime,itshouldbenotedthatthebalanceoftradeinthisgroupofgoodswasnegative.Theshareofallothercommoditygroupsalsoshoweddecreases,withthe largest in the“electronic industry”(from11.1%to6.8%)andthe“instrumentindustry”(from11.3to7.1%).TheanalysisofthedatafromTable2clearlyindicatesworseandworseachievementsofJapaneseexports,which is reflectedeither inadecliningtradesurplus(electronicindustry,instrumentsindustry,officemachineryandcomputerindustry),orinagrowingtradedeficit(pharmaceuticalindustry).This

54 PawełPasierbiak

trendcanbeconsideredasapermanentfeatureoftheJapanesetradeingoodsofhightechnologyintermsoftheproductapproach.

Tosomeextent, this trendisconfirmedbydevelopmentsofJapanese tradeinICTgoods.Figure4showsdataillustratingtheimport,exportandtradebalanceofJapanwiththeworldinthefieldofICTproductssince1999.Afterafallinexportsand imports in 2001, the next year saw a faster growth in exports than imports,whichmeantthatby2004Japan’stradebalanceroseto38.4billionUSDsurplus.However,since2005,importsincreasedsteadily,whileexportsshowedfluctuations,withtheoverwhelmingtendencyforitsdecrease.Thecriticalyearwastheyearofthecollapseoftheworldtrade(2009),whenbothexportsandimportsofJapanfellsharply, causing a reductionof a country’s surplus to its lowest level since1999 (7.4billion).Themainreasonsforthesenegativechangeswere:

reduction of the surplus in the groupof computers and peripheral equipment –(from48.8billionin1999to7.4billionin2009);exchangesurpluses in thefieldofcommunicationsequipment (10.3billion in –1999)intodeficit(–1.5billionin2003and–10.6billionin2009);declineinthesurplusinthegroupofelectroniccomponentsfrom13.2billionto –1.8billionUSD.

93.0

108.

8

82.0

82.9 91

.4

104.

3

100.

8

103.

1

94.0

92.5

70.2

44.2

61.5

53.1

50.0 55

.6

66.0 69

.5

71.7

71.3 73.8

62.7

48.8

47.3

28.8 32

.9 35.8 38.4

31.3

31.4

22.7

18.7

7.4

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Exports Imports Balance

Figure 4. JapanesetradeinICTproducts1999–2009,inbillionUSD

Source:author’sownworkbasedonOECDITCSDatabase,Dataset:HarmonisedSystem1996:ICTGoods(accessed:20.05.2012).

Ifonealsotakesadditionallyintoaccountthechangeinthecommoditystructureofexports (vide Figure5), i.e., thegrowing importanceofelectroniccomponentsgroup and a decline in the importance of communications equipment group, thechangesdoappearseriousandpermanent.


29.0 22.710.1

7.1 3.4

8.6

17.518.3

16.3

42.1

43.0

55.8

4.312.5 9.2

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2000 2005 2009

Exports of ICT productsMiscallaneous

Electronic componentsConsumer electronic equipmentCommunication equipment

Computers and peripheral equipment

44.3 39.628.2

7.94.4

16.5

10.913.3 15.3

33.4

32.5 31.9

3.510.1 8.1

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2000 2005 2009

Imports of ICT products

Figure 5. ProductbreakdownofJapaneseICTproductsexportsandimports,in%

Source:author’sownpreparationbasedonOECDITCSDatabase,Dataset:HarmonisedSystem1996:ICTGoods(accessed:20.05.2012).

The changes visible in Figure 5 are not surprising if one takes into accountgeographical breakdownof Japanese turnovers of ICTproducts. Figure 6 clearlyindicatesthedirectionofchangeinthisrespect.TheshareofdevelopedcountriesinJapaneseexportsfallsbut,atthesametime,theshareofAsiandevelopingcountries(China,ASEANandAsianNIEs)showsatendencytogrowth.

16.4

13.6

16.4

11.2

14.6

11.3

6.8

5.6

18.6

22.3

35.1

45.4

14.9

16.4

17.7

16.5

33.0

35.1

24.7

21.9

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%

2007

2010

2007

2010

Expo

rtsIm

ports

USA EU China ASEAN Asia NIEs

Attention:Inthecaseofimportsasumofsharesexceeds100%becausebothASEANandAsiaNIEsgroupsincludeJapanesetradeflowswithSingapore.

Figure 6. GeographicalbreakdownofJapaneseICTproductsexportsandimports2007–2010,in%

Source:author’sownworkbasedon:2009JETROWhitePaperonInternationalTradeandForeignDirectInvestment,GlobalStrategyforJapaneseCompanies:EnvironmentasaNewGrowthEngine,JETRO,Tokyo2009,pp.241–242;2010JETROGlobalTradeandInvestmentReport,AGlobalStrategyforJapaneseCompaniestoOpenNewFrontiersinOverseasMarkets,JETRO,Tokyo2010,pp.135–136;2011JETROGlobalTradeandInvestmentReport, InternationalBusinessasaCatalystforJapan’sReconstruction,JETRO,Tokyo2011,pp.118–119.

56 PawełPasierbiak

Thechanges inexports,however, areonlyminorcomparedwith thechangesobservedinthefieldofimports.WithinjustfouryearsthecombinedshareoftheUSandtheEUdecreasedby6.4percentagepoints,whiletheshareofChinaaloneincreasedby10.3points. It is alsoworthnotingadiminishing importanceof theJapanesesupplymarkets,suchasASEANandthenewlyindustrialisedeconomiesofAsia.Dynamicsofchanges in theICTtrade ishigh,soonecanexpectfurthermodification of the geographical structure of Japanese exports and imports. TheAsianregion(mostlydevelopingcountries)hasbecomethefactoryoftheworld,soICTproductsareincreasinglyproducedintheselocations.ThiswillmeanafuturedeclineintheimportanceofJapanasamanufacturerofsuchgoods;therefore,thiswillalsoreducetheimportanceofthecountryinworldexports,whileincreaseinimports.

4. Conclusions

JapanisacountrythataftertheSecondWorldWarreachedahighleveloftechnologicaldevelopment.Offeringoninternationalmarketstechnicallyadvancedproductshasbecome the source of the country’s economic success. In the first decade of thetwenty-first century the technological position of the country still remains high;however, somemeasures describing the situation differs from those of themostindustrialisedcountries(OECD).Whatseemsofparticularimportanceistodirectlarge amounts on research and development, which positions Japan among thehighestintheworld.Ontheotherhand,therelativelyhighaversiontoforeigncapitalresults in low ratesof technologicaldevelopment in theareaof cooperationwithforeignsubjects.

TheanalysisofJapan’sforeigntradedevelopmentintermsofitstechnologicalintensity in 2000–2010 allows formulating some conclusions. First, the share ofexportsofhightechnologyproductsintotalexportsofJapanhasbeendecreasing.Second,accordingtothesectoralapproach,itcanbearguedthatthereisafall inJapan’sshareinexportsofgoodsproducedbythesectorsofhightechnologyandgrowthinsectorsofmedium-hightechnologies.Third,theanalysisintermsoftheproductsapproachconfirmsthenegativetrendsintheexportsofJapan–inallthesubgroupsunderconsiderationtradesurpluseswerereducedanddeficitsdeepened.Fourth,theanalysisoftradeinICTproductsconfirmstheaforementionedtrendofworseningthesituationofJapan.Thesurplusisstillmaintainedbutsince2004ithasstartedtoshrink.Thisisduetomovementoftheproductioncentrestolocationsthatoffermorefavourableconditions(includinglowercostsamongothers).

Theconclusionsfromtheanalysishaveaclearlynegativeconnotation.Butoneshouldbearinmindthatnowadays,becauseoftheglobalisationoftheenterprises’valuechain,productionprocessesofvaryingcomplexitycanbelocatedindifferentcountries. Therefore, even a high share in exports of high technology does notnecessarilyreflectthecomplex,sophisticatedindustrialactivityofcountries.Itcan


beconcludedthatthedecreaseinhightechnologyproductsintheexportsofJapandoesnotmeanadropintheleveloftechnologicaldevelopmentofthecountry.

references

2009JETROWhitePaperonInternationalTradeandForeignDirectInvestment,Global Strategy for Japanese Companies: Environment as a New Growth Engine,JETRO,Tokyo2009.

2010JETROGlobalTradeandInvestmentReport,A Global Strategy for Japanese Companies to Open New Frontiers in Overseas Markets,JETRO,Tokyo2010.

2011JETROGlobalTradeandInvestmentReport,International Business as a Catalyst for Japan’s Reconstruction,JETRO,Tokyo2011.

Main Science and Technology Indicators,Volume2011/1,OECDPublishing,Paris2011.Mucha-LeszkoB.,KąkolM.,AnalizahandlutowaramiUniiEuropejskiejwlatach1995–2008,[in:]

B.Mucha-Leszko(Ed.),Pozycja Unii Europejskiej w handlu międzynarodowym,WydawnictwoUMCS,Lublin2009.

OECDDatabase,International Trade by Commodity Statistics,STCRev.3,OECDiLibrary(accessed:15.05.2012).

OECD Economic Surveys: Japan 2009,OECD,Paris2009.OECDITCSDatabase,Dataset:HarmonisedSystem1996:ICTGoods(accessed:20.05.2012).OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2005,OECDPublishing,Paris2005.OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2007,OECDPublishing,Paris2007.OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2010,OECDPublishing,Paris2010.OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2011,OECDPublishing,Paris2011.Pasierbiak P.,Miejsce Unii Europejskiej w zagranicznej ekspansji gospodarczej Japonii, Biuletyn

Europejski1998,WydawnictwoUMCS,Lublin2008.PatrickH.,Japanese High Technology Industrial Policy in Comparative Context,WorkingPaperNo.1,

GraduateSchoolofBusiness,ColumbiaBusinessSchool,1986.Science and Technology: Key Tables from OECD,OECD2012(accessed:18.05.2012).Science, Technology and Innovation in Europe. 2012 Edition, PublicationsOffice of the European

Union,Luxembourg2012,pp.136–137.World Bank’s Database, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS/ countries (ac-

cessed:20.05.2012).

58 PawełPasierbiak

INTENSYWNOść TECHNOlOGICZNA JAPOńSKIEGO HANDlU TOWAROWEGO

Streszczenie:Japoniajestpostrzeganajakokraj,którydziękirozwojowitechnologicznemuosiągnąłwysokąpozycjęwmiędzynarodowympodzialepracy.Szczególniewyraźniezauwa-żalnestało się topookresiekryzysów lat70. ipoczątku80.XXw.,kiedyokazałosię, iżJaponianarynkachmiędzynarodowychoferujezsukcesamiproduktywysokichtechnologii,audział tychproduktówweksporciekrajuzajmujeważnemiejsce.WpierwszejdekadzieXXIw.sytuacjazmieniłasięznacząco.Japonia,mimowciążwysokiejpozycjitechnologicz-nej,traciudziaływświatowychprzepływachdóbrwysokichtechnologii(m.in.ICT),arolatego rodzaju produktóww całkowitych strumieniach eksportu i importu kraju szybko sięzmniejsza.Negatywnetendencjedająsięzauważyćwprzypadkuujęciasektorowego(sektorwysokich,średniowysokich,średnioniskichiniskichtechnologii),jakrównieżproduktowe-go(produktywwysokiejintensywnościwydatkównaB+R).

Słowa kluczowe: Japonia, handel zagraniczny, technologia, międzynarodowe relacje handlowe.

innovation sources of economies in eastern asia · innovation sources of economies in eastern asia...

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