innovation in the asset management industry: risk ... alpha • institutional rigidities:...
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Innovation in the Asset Management Industry: Risk Measurement and Risk Management
Robert C. Merton
Harvard Business School
European Colloquia Series: Towards a New Architecture
London
January 28, 2010
• Components of
Best Performing
Risky Assets
Only Portfolio:
•Diversification
Risk Modulation
•Risk Modulation
through Hedging or
Leveraging
•Market Timing
Active Management
Passive
Well-Diversified
Efficient
Portfolio
“Efficient Exposures”
Superior Performing
Micro Aggregate
Excess-Return
Portfolio
“Alpha Engines”
Active
Asset-Class
Allocation
Macro Sector
Market Timing
Super
Efficient
Portfolio of
Risky Assets
Riskless
Asset
Portfolio
Optimal
Portfolio of
Assets
Alter Shape of
Payoffs on
Underlying
Optimal Portfolio
Structured
Efficient Form
of Payouts to
Client
(Optimal
Combination of
Risky Assets)
Domain of Investment Management: Stages
of Production Process
(Derivative
Securities with
Non-Linear
Payoffs)
Households
Entrepreneurs
Endowment
Corporation
Client
• Risk Modulation
through Insurance
or non-linear
leverage
• Pre-programmed
dynamic trading
• “Building Block”
State-Contingent
Securities to create
specialized payout
patterns
• Tax efficient
• Regulatory efficient
• Liquidity allocation
Copyright © 2010 by Robert C. Merton 2
Generating Superior Investment Performance:
What is Alpha?
Traditional Alpha-Seeking
• Depends on being faster, smarter, better models or better information-inputs
• Is it sustainable? Is it scalable?
• The Cost of Active Investing
• Non-economic costs and benefits
Alpha which becomes Specialized Beta
• Performance improvement over benchmark which can be replicated by passive
strategies
• Hedging needs of classes of Investors: Interest rate, volatility changes, liquidity, human
capital
• Momentum, liquidity-event risk, small cap vs. large cap stocks, value vs. growth stocks
Financial-Services Alpha
• Institutional rigidities: regulations, charter, accounting, tax
• Depends on being lightly regulated, strong credit-standing, long-horizon, flexible liquidity
needs, large pool of assets, reputational capital and sponsorship value
• Is it sustainable? Is it scalable?
• Is it a comparative advantage of the provider of the service?
Copyright © 2010 by Robert C. Merton
3
Calculating “True” Fees for Alpha:
Performance and Alpha/Beta Mix Pre-fee Return on Portfolio: f M fR R R R w
w fraction in “pure” alpha and Mw = fraction in “pure” beta
= fraction in benchmark
=
Volatility “scale” active portfolio, so that it has same total volatility as benchmark
#1 Annual Fee (2%, 20%) = 2.0% + .2 Call ( 2 , dividend = 2%, r, E = 1)
#2 Annual Fee (1.25%, 20%) = 1.25% + .2 Call ( 2 , dividend = 1.25%, r, E = 1)
M = 15% r = 5% Fee Paid #1 = 3.47%
21w Fee Paid #2
0.000 1.000 2.81%
0.300 0.954 2.95%
0.500 0.866 3.24%
0.658 0.810 3.46%
0.700 0.714 3.93%
0.800 0.600 4.68%
0.900 0.436 6.45%
1.000 0.000
Copyright © 2010 by Robert C. Merton
4
Effects of Infrequent Trading and Stale Prices
on Performance Measurement S&P 500 Weekly
Returns January 1995-December 1999
Average
Annual
Arithematic
Return
Annual
Standard
Deviation
Correlation
with
S&P 500
Beta Alpha
S&P 500 (0
week no trade) 24.3% 14.9% 1.000 1.000 0.0%
S&P 500 (1
week no trade) 24.0% 14.1% 0.486 0.460 9.9%
S&P 500 (2
week no trade) 24.3% 14.8% 0.329 0.324 12.7%
S&P 500 (3
week no trade) 24.2% 15.3% 0.253 0.259 13.8%
(0 week no trade) means the security trades (or is marked) once every week
(1 week no trade) means the security trades (or is marked) once every two weeks
(2 week no trade) means the security trades (or is marked) once every three weeks
(3 week no trade) means the security trades (or is marked) once every four weeks
Copyright © 2010 by Robert C. Merton
5
1.25
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
Esti
mate
d B
eta
(β
)
0 1 2 3
15%
10%
5%
0%
Esti
mate
d A
lph
a (
α)
0 1 2 3
Security: Standard & Poor’s 500
Number of Nontraded Weeks
per Traded Week
Number of Nontraded Weeks
per Traded Week
Weekly Returns January 1995 - December 1999
Copyright © 2010 by Robert C. Merton 6
Private Equity & Other Non-Traded Assets: Performance & Risk
Returns If Beta = 0, Alpha If Beta = 1.42, Alpha
All Private Equity 14% +8% - 6%
S&P 500 16%
Risk-Free Rate 6%
Core Problem: Mark-to-Market versus Non-Trading Accounting values are
subject to time lags and smoothing that completely destroys correlation among
measured asset returns. Indeed, asset returns have nil serial correlation in
practice so that covariance between Return at time t and Return at time t+1
day=0 for the same asset. Non-trading thus artificially creates a smaller beta.
Gompers-Lerner attempt to rectify with time series of returns as surrogate to
actual trading using best estimate of change in price from observable data.
More advanced approach would be a Brownian Bridge estimation model.
Another example: Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS) versus Direct
Investment in Commercial Real Estate Fund.
Gompers and Lerner 1974-1997: Sensitivity to Wrong Systematic Risk Estimate
Copyright © 2010 by Robert C. Merton 7
Risk Measurement for Credit-Risk Assets: Nonlinear Risks
of Being a Lender When There is Risk of Default
8 Copyright © 2010 by Robert C. Merton
RISKY DEBT + GUARANTEE OF DEBT = RISK-FREE DEBT
RISKY DEBT = RISK-FREE DEBT - GUARANTEE OF DEBT
A = D + E
IN DEFAULT, THE HOLDER OF THE GUARANTEE RECEIVES PROMISED VALUE OF
THE DEBT MINUS VALUE OF ASSETS RECOVERED FROM DEFAULTING ENTITY =
MAX [0, B – A]
VALUE OF GUARANTEE = PUT OPTION ON THE ASSETS OF BORROWER
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS ARE GUARANTEES OF DEBT AND THEREFORE ARE PUT
OPTIONS ON THE ASSETS OF THE BORROWER
Corporation
Operating Assets, A Debt (face value B), D
Common Stock, E
Non-linear Credit Risk Buildup
Firm/Mortgage
Debt
Guarantee
Bank
Deposit
Guarantee
GB
'
BA
'
BG
GB
BA
'
CG
CG
'
CA CA
CG
Copyright © 2010 by Robert C. Merton
'
CA CA
'
CD
CD
Firm/Mortgage
Debt
CD
Corporate/Household Sector
Liability
Banking System
Liability
Government
Liability
Corporate/Housing Assets, A C
Bank Assets, AB Corporate /Housing Assets, AC
9
Performance Measurement: Market Timing and
Nonlinear Risk Hedge Funds
For Perfect Market Timing and No Borrowing or Short-Selling
Measuring Return to Market Timing
Call Returnp f m f pR R a b R R c e
Hedge Fund Relative-Value Strategy [risk level change is negatively
correlated with returns]
Call Returnp f m f pR R a b R R c e
Call Returnp f m f pR R a b R R c e
,
,
p f m f
m f f m
R R Max O R R
R R Max O R R
,p f m f m f pR R a b R R c Max O R R e
Hedge Fund Momentum/Stop-Loss Strategy [risk level change is positively
correlated with returns]
Market Timing [A “free” call or a “free” put]
Copyright © 2010 by Robert C. Merton
10
Beyond VAR: Put Option Price for the Portfolio
as a Tail-Risk Indicator
What is the minimum value of our portfolio at the end of time h with probability
1 – p? V (p, h)
What is the amount that the portfolio could lose it or more with probability p at
the end of time h? VaR (p, h) = V (0) – V (p,h)
Put Option Price Reflects Rare-But-Significant Events
• Robust with respect to probability distribution
• Intuitive because the put price is the price of insuring the downside tail
• Reflects a price for insurance versus self-insurance amount of capital
• Jarrow and Van Deventer, GARP Risk Professional, August 2009
Value-at-Risk (VaR): Summary Risk Measure
V(h)
(p, h) V(0) (h)
Copyright © 2010 by Robert C. Merton 11
Integrated Systemic Risk Policy: Refinancing
Ratchet Effect 1996-2006
• Trend #1: rising U.S. home prices
• Trend #2: declining U.S. interest rates
• Trend #3: increasing efficiency of mortgage refinancing
• Each trend taken individually is beneficial or benign
• All three trends superimposed creates unintended
synchronization of homeowner leverage
• Leveraging can be done incrementally, but deleveraging
cannot due to indivisibility of owner-occupied residential
housing
• Result: residential mortgage market is six times more
vulnerable and estimated losses of $1.2 - $1.5 trillion
between June 2006 and December 2008 12
Copyright © 2010 by Robert C. Merton