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INFORMATION SECURITY

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Page 1: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

INFORMATION SECURITY

Page 2: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� Information security

challenges

� Cryptography

� Addressing information

security challenges

� Digital certificates

Outline

Page 3: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

INFORMATION

SECURITY

CHALLENGES

Page 4: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

An observer should not be

able to access information

Secrecy/Privacy

�E.g. someone intercepting

network packets

�Particularly easy with

wireless communications

Page 5: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

Data has not been tampered

with

Integrity

� E.g. packets modified

as they travel through

network

Page 6: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

The author is the intended

one

Authentication

� A user or system sending

data pretending to be

another one

� Sometimes it includes

integrity

Page 7: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

The author cannot deny it

�After having performed

an operation a user states

someone else did it

on his/her behalf

�E.g. on-line contract

signing

Non Repudiation

Page 8: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

CRYPTOGRAPHY

Page 9: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� Provides solutions to all

the above

� Literally: hidden writing

� Deals with techniques

and protocols

Page 10: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� Information represented

by a code

�Coded version does not

reveal the information

�(Secret) techniques

and parameters needed

to reveal it

Encryption

Page 11: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

#$ˆ!@%&#ˆ

7jsdfk &*685

23*(&&*ˆ*#$J

\*#(@HKJH?

KFHDSAF><

Computer

Networks

are an

integral part

of daily life.

Usually known

Usually secret

The longer the key, the stronger

Page 12: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

Decryption

Same as encryption key

Symmetric key cryptography

#$ˆ!@%&#ˆ

7jsdfk &*685

23*(&&*ˆ*#$J

\*#(@HKJH?

KFHDSAF><

Computer

Networks

are an

integral part

of daily life.

Page 13: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� Key must be shared

securely

� E.g. off-line

Shared/Secret Key

Page 14: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� Requires pre-existing

relation

� If key is compromised on

one party, no one can use

it any longer

Page 15: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

Asymmetric KeyCryptography

Computer

Networks

are an

integral part

of daily life.

#$ˆ!@%&#ˆ

7jsdfk &*685

23*(&&*ˆ*#$J

\*#(@HKJH?

KFHDSAF><

Computer

Networks

are an

integral part

of daily life.RSA (2048 bit key)

Page 16: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� One of the two keys can

be publicly distributed

� Used for encryption

� Public key

� Only owner of paired

private key can decrypt

Public Key Cryptography

Page 17: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� Private key never needs

to be shared

� Easier to keep safe

� Keys are complementary

� Repository for public keys

� Associated to users

Page 18: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

ADDRESSING INFORMATION SECURITY

CHALLENGES

Page 19: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

Secrecy/Privacy

A B#$ˆ!@%&#ˆ7jsdfk &*68523*(&&*ˆ*#$J\*#(@HKJH?KFHDSAF><

B’s public key

B’s private key

Key repo

Computer

Networks

are an

integral part

of daily life.

Page 20: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� Asymmetric (d)encryption

requires more computation

power

Symmetric and Asymmetric

Cryptography

Page 21: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� Used for secure sharing

of secret key

� Shared secret to encrypt

data

� Periodically changed

Page 22: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

Authentication

A’s private key

A’s public key

Key repo

A B#$ˆ!@%&#ˆ7jsdfk &*68523*(&&*ˆ*#$J\*#(@HKJH?KFHDSAF><

Computer

Networks

are an

integral part

of daily life.

Page 23: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

Digital Signature (Integrity+Authentication)

A’s private key

Messagedigest

AComputer

Networks

are an

integral part

of daily life.

Computer

Networks

are an

integral part

of daily life.

Signeddocument

Page 24: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

A’s public key

B

Computer

Networks

are an

integral part

of daily life.

Key Key repo

Page 25: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

Cryptographic Digest (Hash)

Electronicsignature

A

Computer

Networks

are an

integral part

of daily life.

A’s private key

MD5 (128 bit digest)

SHA (160 bit digest)

Page 26: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� An authentication problem

� Signature can solve it

What if the signer’s

public key is not the

signer’s

Page 27: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

A.k.a. public-key certificates

DIGITAL CERTIFICATES

Page 28: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

A key with a tag, both

signed

What is it?

A

But who is going

to sign it?

Page 29: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� CA needs to verify owner’s

identity before signing

�E.g. show up in person

with a piece of ID

� Can be used to enforce

non repudiation

Certification Authority

Page 30: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it
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Page 32: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� Impractical to have

� One CA

� Multiple independent CAs

PKI: Public Key Infrastructure

Certification Authority

Hierarchy

Page 33: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

Certificate Verification

MB

PdT

PdT

ePKI

ePKI

ePKI

Root CA

Obtained with own cert

Page 34: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� CA verifies owner’s legal

identity

�Possibly through

Registration Authority

� CA generates key pair

� CA assembles and signs cert

Certificate Issuance

Page 35: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� Cert. published in

repository

� Contains public key

� Owner is given private key

� Owner is given root CA cert

Page 36: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

� Unfortunately not

� Several Root CAs

Does the whole World

trust one Root CA?

How do we get their certs?

Page 37: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it
Page 38: INFORMATIONSECURITY - polito.itnetgroup.polito.it/courses/Didattica/CNTS-TSR_slide/...The author cannot deny it After having performed an operation a user states someone else did it

Embedded in operating

systems/browsers

We all trust software

vendors!?!

(maybe just because we don’t

know it)