Dear Premuda's fellows,Dear Premuda's fellows,Dear Premuda's fellows,Dear Premuda's fellows,

In this issue, we will deal with the first four months of the new year 2011, which is expected to be a quite strong year, full of challenges and which will need the efforts and the commitment of everyone, ship and shore, working with and for our Company.

The “Remarks to be shared” deals this time with two very important matters: the fire on board and the abandon ship. Drills on board are impor-tant keys: during their performance the crew learn to use the safety equipments and to coop-erate in the organisation that is to handle the situation if the ship needs to be abandoned or a fire needs to be fought.

During drills, it is also necessary to check that the equipments are in place, are in working or-der and ready for use. It is also important to re-member that abandon ship drills and fire drills are covered by the provisions on occupational health on board ships and must be planned ar-ranged and carried out in a way that is in every respect reasonable from a safety and healthy perspective.

The Academic Lesson continues with the Envi-ronmental Compliance Plan and highlights the most important points which an ECP has to con-sider.

The commercial sections deals with the pre load-ing surveyor procedures in case of steel cargo and what vessel has to expect when a P&I Sur-veyor is appointed for a pre loading survey, what has to be checked and which remarks are to be inserted in the mate’s receipts. .

The vetting section is specially dealing with the high risk remark raised on board of one Com-pany managed tanker during a BP Vetting and the implications the Company had to face in or-

The selected closed casesThe selected closed casesThe selected closed casesThe selected closed cases

In this Issue:

• The assessment of everyday activities

• Commercial issues: the preloading survey for loading steel products.

• Safety issues: Fire on board and abandon ship

• The Academic Lesson: again some words on the Environ-mental Compliance Plan (ECP)

Information Sharing Bulletin

is published by:

Premuda SpA - SQE Dept.

Email: sqe@premuda.net

Collection of selected Collection of selected Collection of selected Collection of selected

Vetting IssuesVetting IssuesVetting IssuesVetting Issues

Commercial issuesCommercial issuesCommercial issuesCommercial issues

Remarks to be sharedRemarks to be sharedRemarks to be sharedRemarks to be shared

Lesson’s bearingLesson’s bearingLesson’s bearingLesson’s bearing

Information Sharing Bulletin

Summary:Summary:Summary:Summary:

§ A near miss during bunkering operations stopped due to high backpressure alarm § A near miss during bunkering operations stopped due to high backpressure alarm § A near miss during bunkering operations stopped due to high backpressure alarm § A near miss during bunkering operations stopped due to high backpressure alarm

§ Contained spill during cargo operations§ Contained spill during cargo operations§ Contained spill during cargo operations§ Contained spill during cargo operations

§ An oil spill from cargo valve hydraulic plant gauge tank § An oil spill from cargo valve hydraulic plant gauge tank § An oil spill from cargo valve hydraulic plant gauge tank § An oil spill from cargo valve hydraulic plant gauge tank

§ A near miss for a tail broken§ A near miss for a tail broken§ A near miss for a tail broken§ A near miss for a tail broken

www.premuda.net Think safe and you’ll be safe

Please, send any comment

to the Editor:

sqe@premuda.net

Lesson LearnedLesson LearnedLesson LearnedLesson Learned

Issue n° 16

April 2011

der to clear the vessel and made it accepted again by the MOC. It’s indeed important to every-one working in the shipping business to have well clear in mind that MOCs approvals are nec-essary to make the vessels workable during these hard times.

G. Mortola

Academic lessonAcademic lessonAcademic lessonAcademic lesson

Selected closed cases

Page 2

Selected closed cases

Page 3

Selected closed cases

Page 4

Selected closed cases

Page 5

The event to which the near miss refers, luckily did not cause any injury or damage to equip-

ments. Anyway, in certain conditions, the break of a tail could, in case of snap back, be an

event with the potential of causing serious incident. Looking at above investigation and

analysis, it emerged that one of the possible causes of the occurrence , could have been a

defective tail. Following to this analysis, corrective actions taken by Company listed above,

cannot be considered sufficient to avoid recurrence, considering the option of a defective

tail. A check of remaining tail, especially those eventually pertaining to same haul, should

have been planned and carried out to avoid the risk of using again defective tails. All above

is a confirmation of the importance of always paying attention to any aspect during investi-

gations, to always improve safety on board.

Pagina 6

Page 6

Vetting Issues

to suspected incident occurred on 18.04.2011.

Documentation sent, inspection to be performed at first opportunity. Vessel performed a SIRE Inspection with BP, BP, BP, BP, Fujairah 27/02/2011 (8 No)Fujairah 27/02/2011 (8 No)Fujairah 27/02/2011 (8 No)Fujairah 27/02/2011 (8 No), with negative result.

Then vessel performed a SIRE Inspection with Lukoil, Fu-Lukoil, Fu-Lukoil, Fu-Lukoil, Fu-jairah 12/04/2011 (8 NO)jairah 12/04/2011 (8 NO)jairah 12/04/2011 (8 NO)jairah 12/04/2011 (8 NO), with positive result. Next SIRE inspection scheduled with BP in May 2011, then with Shell. Four IslandFour IslandFour IslandFour Island

Vessel performed a SIRE Inspection with Shell, Fujairah Shell, Fujairah Shell, Fujairah Shell, Fujairah 21/01/2011 (5 NO)21/01/2011 (5 NO)21/01/2011 (5 NO)21/01/2011 (5 NO), with positive result.

Vessel was accepted by Chevron referring to last Shell SIRE Report, inspection not necessary until June 2011. Next SIRE inspection to be performed with BHPB-RightShip at first opportunity.

FramuraFramuraFramuraFramura

Vessel performed a SIRE Inspection with Shell, Fujairah Shell, Fujairah Shell, Fujairah Shell, Fujairah 18/04/2011 (7 NO)18/04/2011 (7 NO)18/04/2011 (7 NO)18/04/2011 (7 NO), with positive result. Next SIRE inspec-tion to be performed with BP next May, then with BHPB-RightShip.

Four MoonFour MoonFour MoonFour Moon

No SIRE inspection performed during this period. Four SmileFour SmileFour SmileFour Smile Vessel performed a SIRE Inspection with Shell, Cartagena Shell, Cartagena Shell, Cartagena Shell, Cartagena 19/01/2011 (10 NO)19/01/2011 (10 NO)19/01/2011 (10 NO)19/01/2011 (10 NO), with positive result, then with BP, BP, BP, BP, Tanjung Pelepas 09/04/2011 (6 NO)Tanjung Pelepas 09/04/2011 (6 NO)Tanjung Pelepas 09/04/2011 (6 NO)Tanjung Pelepas 09/04/2011 (6 NO), with positive result. Chevron accepted vessel referring to Shell SIRE report dd. 19 Jan. 2011 deferring inspection until May 2011, as well as ExxonMobil.

Four WindFour WindFour WindFour Wind

No SIRE Inspection performed during this period. Next SIRE inspection to be performed with Shell next May 2011.

BP referred to Shell SIRE Report dd. 19 December 2010, inspection not required until 19 December 2011; Exxon-Mobil referred to last SIRE Report available, as well as Chevron.

Four SkyFour SkyFour SkyFour Sky

No SIRE Inspection performed during this period. Next SIRE inspection to be performed with BP next May 2011, then with Shell. ADNOC accepted vessel referring to Shell SIRE Report dd. 24 March 2010, next inspection due within 24 March 2012; Exxon referred to last SIRE Report available, as well as Chevron Bulk CarriersBulk CarriersBulk CarriersBulk Carriers

Four SpringsFour SpringsFour SpringsFour Springs

No vetting inspection was performed during this period. Last RIGHTSHIP inspection (for Australian market) per-formed at Hadong on 08th November 2010 with 5 stars rating (maximum level of rating achieved) and valid for one year. Next inspection to be scheduled for 11/2011. By M. Leveratto

Dear All,

With this note we are opening and commenting the first quarter of year 2011.

Generally speaking results are not so bad considering the terrible commercial moment the tanker market is meeting nowadays and considering the obvious neck shrinking that Long time Charterers are trying to get and Vetting Compa-nies are supporting on for any un-preparedness item and consequent observation.

In detail, we are here reporting that M/T Four Bay incurred in an HR observation,HR observation,HR observation,HR observation, causing the immediate failure of BP approval process. This is of course a MAJOR issue MAJOR issue MAJOR issue MAJOR issue on the trading possibility of the vessel causing a chain of jobs and inconveniences that request serious analysis and corrective actions.

The matter is mainly related to bad application of our SQEM System and risk analysis and control/management in front of a contingency cause on IGS system. All details and con-siderations have been already disseminated on Company analysis.

As a final consideration it is a pity to evaluate that the M/T Four Bay BP overall SIRE report, excluding the HR one, was generally quite a good performance that should have leaded to expected positive result..but even one HR is underlining that no any shortcut or compromise should be taken on Safety issues if we want to have the chance to apply the Company policies and tools for managing any situation.

To be noted that some units, mainly the ones coming out from storing activity, Four Sky and Four Wind, didn’t perform enough SIRE as normally requested due to type of employ-ment. They will be for sure subject to at first occasions.

Please note that for Quality Objective n 1 Company is aimed to provide for a fresh SIRE inspection for each vessel (Four Moon excluded – not requested by Charter trading) within four months from the last one carried out.

So application of self preparation in accordance with WIN TEC 31 must be a tool always on going and maximum of attention and commitment must be deployed by all of us in order to overcome the terrible market situation in front of Company.

SIRE Reports performed during January SIRE Reports performed during January SIRE Reports performed during January SIRE Reports performed during January –––– April 2011April 2011April 2011April 2011

Four BayFour BayFour BayFour Bay

Vessel was ac-cepted by Chev-ron referring to last SIRE Re-port available, as well as by Shell.

Then on techni-cal hold with Shell since 20 April 2011 due

Pagina 7

Page 7

Vetting Issues

Vessel was at the first negative Vetting SIRE after perform-ing a series of positive SIRE inspections of which latest two were:

• BHPB Bin Qasim on 16th November 2010 with 4 obser-vations

• SHELL Bin Qasim on 30th November 2010 with 4 observations

Carried out after repairs in Dubai Drydocks. Last BP Car-ried out in March 2010 on 15th March with 14th observa-tions . Reason of present communication is to analyze the grounds of present failure to be later discussed by the de-partments/Ship involved in the observations raised.

…..OMISSIS….…..OMISSIS….…..OMISSIS….…..OMISSIS…. Failure reason to be addressed mainly to HIGH RISK OB-SERVATION 8. 35 and defective proactive attitude of Ship’s Staff in organizing, upon discovered the failure, the man-ual procedure to be adopted and supported by Company procedures and all the risk mitigation actions. Resuming Ship’s Staff should have followed a strict path:

• Stop the discharging if the failure has been detected during the discharging. If discovered along the starting testing, require enough time to address the matter.

• Failure report to Company included of Risk Assessment for performing the discharge with valve in manual con-trol.

• Full familiarization of CCR and ECR dedicated people to control pressure on IGS line as a Team task commit-ment.

The above in case of any question or observation done by attending SIRE Inspector should be available in terms of paper support and in terms of readiness of Seniors, C/M and C/E- S/E in addressing any matter

…..OMISSIS…..…..OMISSIS…..…..OMISSIS…..…..OMISSIS…..

General judgment of this SIRE report is in fact quite good in the Company average, obviously excluding the observa-tion related to IGS system, and this is increasing the strong disappointment of not having addressed correctly the emergency situation due to failure, thing that should have leaded to de-rate the high risk note to a normal one, allow-ing the vessel to be probably accepted.

…...OMISSIS ….. …...OMISSIS ….. …...OMISSIS ….. …...OMISSIS …..

We want here underlining all commercial consequences penalizing the vessel trading and Company business fol-lowing a negative SIRE, and all the activity, including over-cost and loss, it is necessary to activate to recover the fail-ure especially in a market moment as the one we are leaving nowadays.

The commitment of Anyone, at any position, should be ex-tremely more detailed and proactive allowing to the Team to reach the appointment fixed .

Analysis of negative outcome of BP vetting inspection car-Analysis of negative outcome of BP vetting inspection car-Analysis of negative outcome of BP vetting inspection car-Analysis of negative outcome of BP vetting inspection car-ried out on M/T “Four Bay”ried out on M/T “Four Bay”ried out on M/T “Four Bay”ried out on M/T “Four Bay”–––– IMO n 9015060 on 27 IMO n 9015060 on 27 IMO n 9015060 on 27 IMO n 9015060 on 27 thththth Feb-Feb-Feb-Feb-ruary 2011 at Fujairah AEU.ruary 2011 at Fujairah AEU.ruary 2011 at Fujairah AEU.ruary 2011 at Fujairah AEU.

SIRE # 1000SIRE # 1000SIRE # 1000SIRE # 1000----1733173317331733----2255225522552255----5289 carried out by Capt. Su-5289 carried out by Capt. Su-5289 carried out by Capt. Su-5289 carried out by Capt. Su-

protik Guha from Fanar Marine Services protik Guha from Fanar Marine Services protik Guha from Fanar Marine Services protik Guha from Fanar Marine Services

Result of the BP Vetting inspection carried out on the M/T “Four Bay” on 27th February 2011, with vessel under dis-charging operation, has been assessed negatively. List of Observation raised were related to eight (8) issues. BP message reporting the failure and the non acceptance of the vessel reported as follow:

We note that, in the main, unsatisfactory procedures on the Vessel relating to: Chapter 8 ) Cargo and Ballast Systems - Petroleum have lead BP to form the view that the vessel is not being operated to the standard BPS requires. Following a suffi-cient time period, and once you have satisfactory evidence to demonstrate that there have been improvements in the operational procedures onboard, you are free to reapply for a BP Inspection.

As a short explanation of the above wording to be noted that vessel got 8 observation of which one of them has been marked as “HIGH RISK” one:

8.35. Was the inert gas system in use and operating satis-8.35. Was the inert gas system in use and operating satis-8.35. Was the inert gas system in use and operating satis-8.35. Was the inert gas system in use and operating satis-factorily at the time of inspection?factorily at the time of inspection?factorily at the time of inspection?factorily at the time of inspection?

Inspector Observations: While in CCR it was noted that while Inspector Observations: While in CCR it was noted that while Inspector Observations: While in CCR it was noted that while Inspector Observations: While in CCR it was noted that while the set pressure of the IG system was 1200 mm WG, the the set pressure of the IG system was 1200 mm WG, the the set pressure of the IG system was 1200 mm WG, the the set pressure of the IG system was 1200 mm WG, the common deck line pressure was 500 mm WG and the auto-common deck line pressure was 500 mm WG and the auto-common deck line pressure was 500 mm WG and the auto-common deck line pressure was 500 mm WG and the auto-matic valve to the atmosphere was open in addition to the matic valve to the atmosphere was open in addition to the matic valve to the atmosphere was open in addition to the matic valve to the atmosphere was open in addition to the deck supply valve. The valve to atmosphere was immedi-deck supply valve. The valve to atmosphere was immedi-deck supply valve. The valve to atmosphere was immedi-deck supply valve. The valve to atmosphere was immedi-ately shut when ER was advised of the situation. ately shut when ER was advised of the situation. ately shut when ER was advised of the situation. ately shut when ER was advised of the situation. At the end of the ER inspection the system was reAt the end of the ER inspection the system was reAt the end of the ER inspection the system was reAt the end of the ER inspection the system was re----checked checked checked checked and the situation had once again reoccurred with falling and the situation had once again reoccurred with falling and the situation had once again reoccurred with falling and the situation had once again reoccurred with falling pressure and both valves open. pressure and both valves open. pressure and both valves open. pressure and both valves open.

Company reply to OCIMF: Company reply to OCIMF: Company reply to OCIMF: Company reply to OCIMF: During testing before the com-mencing of the discharge operation it was noted that the IGS automatic valve to the atmosphere did not work prop-erly in automation mode. Failure report has been issued reporting the matter in detail, see enclosure. Based on risk assessment and dedicated training for preparation, dis-charge have been carried out with control of said valve in manual mode, then on completion overhauled by Ship’s Staff. Final verification and confirmation requested to Ham-worthy with dedicated service (see enclosure). As a quick conclusion although our reply to OCIMF is trying to address the high risk observation in terms of root cause analysis and corrective action according to our Company procedures to be activated at the moment on which the fail-ure is showing up, and the caution and safety proactive ac-tion must be developed to prevent any possible problem, the Ship’s Staff pro-activeness was completely missing in addi-tion to a repetitive missing of mutual coordination and promptness in between CCR and ECR causing a double negative check of handling of the matter.

Pagina 8

Page 8

Commercial Issues

“The carriage of steel cargo: “The carriage of steel cargo: “The carriage of steel cargo: “The carriage of steel cargo:

some guidelines” some guidelines” some guidelines” some guidelines”

Dear all,

Here below, readers can find some more information on the steel cargo surveys

Survey procedureSurvey procedureSurvey procedureSurvey procedure

When examining steel cargo, surveyors will be checking;

• Where the steel was manufactured, how the steel was transported from the steel mill to the port, where the steel was stored in the port prior to arriving at the berth and how the steel is protected from damage and the ele-ments;

• For physical damage, rusting, wetting and possible con-tamination with salt and/or chemical. As everyone can well understand , steel stored close to the sea or deliv-ered by barge, can be contaminated with wind carried salt. Sometime, steel cannot be inspected by Surveyor due to the way it is packed. In which case, the Surveyor will pay attention to the condition of packaging and whether this is damaged, missing or wet.

• The hatch covers are free from defects and that drainage channels are clear.

The Surveyor will want to:

• Examine steel while it is in storage in the port, noting storage conditions;

• Examine each parcel of steel on the quay possibly before loading.

• Note any exceptions with the steel, carefully describing the damage and identifying the damaged steel by refer-ence to plate numbers and /or identification tags. Later it will be necessary to endorse bills of lading and mate’s receipts with details of the damage. It is also possible the Surveyor will recommend not to load the damaged cargo.

It may also happen the Surveyor will seek for the assistance of the duty deck officer, as an example when cargo is being loaded in more than one hold at the same time.

The duty deck officer should always provide assistance.

When requiring details of the cargo’s condition, surveyors should always make detailed notes of any damage seen regardless of whether it is damaged packaging or very mi-nor blemishes on the cargo.

Everything needs to be accurately recorded by the surveyor.

If the steel is in less than in perfect condition, the true con-dition of the steel should be recorded by the surveyor and itemized in the report.

The description has to be precise because it may be neces-sary to prove to the receivers exactly which cargo was found to be damaged and in which condition. The damaged cargo will need to be clearly identified by the steel mill’s identification marks or the shipper’s docket. In this way, the receiver will be able to well identify which is the cargo found damaged by the surveyor before loading.

Always remember that Surveyors who came on board at the discharge port may represent the receivers of the cargo. In this case, they credentials have to be checked and ap-proved before allowing them access to cargo.

Allow only surveyors whose credentials have been approved to take photographs of cargo.

Finally, there will be also occasions when an independent tally of coils will be required; in which case, you will have to ask the Surveyor who is conducting the preloading survey whether he can assist .

By G. Mortola CONTINUE ON NEXT ISSUECONTINUE ON NEXT ISSUECONTINUE ON NEXT ISSUECONTINUE ON NEXT ISSUE

Remarks to be shared

Page 9

Dear All,

WELCOME INTO THE SAFETY PAGE!WELCOME INTO THE SAFETY PAGE!WELCOME INTO THE SAFETY PAGE!WELCOME INTO THE SAFETY PAGE! In this issue, we will remind fire fighting/abandon ship procedures on board our vessels.

FIRE FIRE FIRE FIRE

Fire fighting party is structured as follow.

1) two teams with 2 operators each squad (attach team)

2) All remaining crew should be split as (support team)

The importance to have two operators is fundamental, because they can provide support in case is deemed necessary.

Example of scenario:

Manifold on fire.Manifold on fire.Manifold on fire.Manifold on fire.

Squads should approach manifolds as follow,one squad from fwd way and the second one from aft way. Support team should keep at least 3-5 mtrs distance from first two operators due to are not wearing any firefighting ppe. Supporting squad crew should manage fire hose taking place in alternate position in order to have clear visual if operators are mov-ing back. Foam monitors should be used at the same time. CBT training and briefing/debriefing are the most important part of drill in order to highlite all plus and delta and can be also a great occasion to test equipment and have crew familiar with safety equipments.

Abandon shipAbandon shipAbandon shipAbandon ship

Another drill very important is the abandon ship ,in this emergency is fundamental that all crew is aware about proper duty and which material should be collected and take to the boats. Important is to be dress all time warm clothing in order to avoid hypother-mia problem. Training on this matter are recommended through CBT and videos. Officer in charge of lifeboat should supervise continuosly all operations and prevent any unsafe actions,in particular during boarding operations. Lifeboats waterborne every time is possible is very recommended in order to give a chance to all deck officer to improve his skills on boat handling.

FIRE ON BOARD AND ABANDON SHIPFIRE ON BOARD AND ABANDON SHIPFIRE ON BOARD AND ABANDON SHIPFIRE ON BOARD AND ABANDON SHIP

Lesson’s Bearing

Page 10

ASSESSMENT OF EVERYDAY ACTIVITIES: ASSESSMENT OF EVERYDAY ACTIVITIES: ASSESSMENT OF EVERYDAY ACTIVITIES: ASSESSMENT OF EVERYDAY ACTIVITIES: DRUM DANGER OVERLOOKEDDRUM DANGER OVERLOOKEDDRUM DANGER OVERLOOKEDDRUM DANGER OVERLOOKED

PREAMBLE

A ‘trivial’ everyday task led to the death of a seafarer on board a ship in Australian wa-ters. An engine-room oiler made the mistake of attempting to cut off the top of a sealed 200-litre drum with an angle grinder. The drum had initially held engine oil and had not been rinsed or cleaned out after the product was removed, meaning that it probably still contained a small amount of the oil. Later, in the days preceding the oiler’s death, the drum was used to store water and carbon residue from the ship’s exhaust gas boiler. During this time, “hydrocarbon vapours would have been released”, their concentration “eventually entering the explosive range”. When the oiler began using his angle grinder to try to open the drum, he was hit with great force by the top of the drum as it peeled open.

The incident showed how important it is that “a proper risk analysis/job hazard analysis is under-taken by all those involved in the task to be done, no matter how trivial the task may seem”.

The lack of such analyses, or a common under-standing about the task involved, meant that the oiler did not appreciate the dangers involved in using the grinder and the engineer in charge did not consider that a grinder would be used during a relatively easy task of emptying the drum of its contents: he did not consider it was necessary to carry out a risk assessment for the task, consequently, the oiler began his task lacking awareness of the dangers involved.

The incident on Cape Darnley was an example of a problem that went far beyond on single incident.

Unfortunately, the things that led up to this accident happening are not unique.

“Sometimes people on ships don’t think a risk analysis/job hazard analysis is necessary for something, which, on the surface, appears to be a straightforward task, where dangers are not immediately ap-parent.”

On many vessels there is a lack of attention to safety issues when more mundane tasks are involved. There is too often a culture of “getting the job done” and forgetting to put “safely” at the end of that sentence.

► The exploded drum

Pagina 11

Page 11

The Academic Lesson

“MARPOL: a brief excursus”“MARPOL: a brief excursus”“MARPOL: a brief excursus”“MARPOL: a brief excursus”

Environmental Compliance PlanEnvironmental Compliance PlanEnvironmental Compliance PlanEnvironmental Compliance Plan

This page is aimed to continue the ex-

cursus on the MARPOL and the ECP.

During the previous issue, we spoke

about best practice, panning and implementation.

Let’s continue now with training and other important argu-

ments.

TrainingTrainingTrainingTraining

The importance of training, awareness and competence is

greatly emphasised in the EMS. A training program should

be instituted involving crew and shoreside employees as-

sociated with the operation and management of the ships .

On this regard, our Company provided two intensive full

days to the available ship and shore staff during December

2010.

DocumentationDocumentationDocumentationDocumentation

The EMS shall contain procedures to ensure that there is

appropriate documentation concerning waste manage-

ment systems that are adequate for subsequent evalua-

tion and improvement. The state of compliance of the or-

ganisation should also be recorded, and this information

should be freely available to third party auditors and port

state representatives.

Organisation and cultureOrganisation and cultureOrganisation and cultureOrganisation and culture

Shore Side Management.Shore Side Management.Shore Side Management.Shore Side Management.

The Environmental Compliance Plan (ECP) Environmental Compliance Plan (ECP) Environmental Compliance Plan (ECP) Environmental Compliance Plan (ECP) requires the

appointment of a Corporate Compliance Manager, who is

responsible for the implementation of the ECP, including

the development and implementation of the EMS.

The Corporate Compliance Manager is responsible for the

implementation of the ECP (including the development and

implementation of the EMS), for soliciting, reviewing and

investigating non compliance by employees. Reports shal

be available and the Board of Directors kept fully advised.

The Corporate Compliance Manager is the point of contact

with the outside auditors.

Onboard responsibilitiesOnboard responsibilitiesOnboard responsibilitiesOnboard responsibilities

The ECP defines the responsibilities of the Chief engineer

and Master as well as the ship’s superintendents, port cap-

tains and port engineers. The Chief Engineer is obviously a

key player in ensuring effective MARPOL compliance.

The role of the Master is also important. In the past, the

Master has often distanced himself from anything to do with

the operation of the engine room, but under the ECP, he has

a positive obligation to show compliance with applicable

maritime pollution protection requirements.

Technical Requirements Technical Requirements Technical Requirements Technical Requirements

The ECP will also commonly contain a number of engineer-

ing or technical requirements, enhancement or modifica-

tions.

These cane be even very specific and designed to ensure

that the pollution prevention equipments are working to op-

timum capacity, are tamper proof and generate the mini-

mum amount of oily waste.

The use of tags and seals and brightly coloured marker

paint can also deter unauthorised bypassing and other ille-

gal practices.

Finally, another important point of the ECP is the auditing

process with which we will deal in the Sharing Information

august issue.

Selected by P. Linari

Visit our web at:

Www.premuda.net

Premuda, founded in 1907, is one of the most expe-

rienced shipping Company with the mission of tran-

sporting oil and dry-bulk cargoes.

The Company operates also in the FPSO market.

Premuda holds the most qualified certifications in

Safety, Environmental protection, Quality and Secu-

rity standards.

Premuda S.p.A

Via Fieschi 3/21

I—16121, Genova

Tel.: +39 010 5444.421

Fax: +39 010 5444.313

E-mail: sqe@premuda.net

There are no shortcuts to

safety, and everyone has to

contribute