infantry - fort benning · ever since. the basis for much of the training was field manual 21-150,...

Infantry

••••• INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S.Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for theinfantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authorsand not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry andinfantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerningeditorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; [email protected]. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. •POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. •USPS Publication No. 370630.

MAY-JUNE 2007 Volume 96, Number 3

PB 7-07-3

MG WALTER WOJDAKOWSKICommandant, The Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENOEditor

MICHELLE J. ROWANDeputy Editor

BETTY J. BYRDEditorial Assistant

Soldiers from C Company, 1stBattalion, 26th InfantryRegiment, take cover during afirefight in Baghdad that endedwith one insurgent dead andthree captured. (Photo bySergeant Michael Pryor)

This medium is approved for officialdissemination of material designed to keepindividuals within the Army knowledgeable ofcurrent and emerging developments withintheir areas of expertise for the purpose ofenhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Distribution: Special

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 00712004

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FRONT COVER:

BACK COVER: Soldiers from A Company,2nd Battalion, 508th ParachuteInfantry Regiment, set up a vehicle patrol base inAfghanistan. (Photo by Staff Sergeant Michael L. Casteel)

FEATURES16 STRYKER UNIT DEPLOYS WITH LAND WARRIOR — GETTING

DISMOUNTED SOLDIERS IN THE FUTURE NETWORKMajor Douglas Copeland

30 MAKING MiTT WORK: INSIGHTS INTO ADVISING THE IRAQI ARMYMajor David Voorhies

DEPARTMENTS1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE2 INFANTRY NEWS5 PROFESSIONAL FORUM

5 RANGER-ATHLETE-WARRIOR: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TOCONDITIONINGMajor Danny McMillian

9 TEACHING THE LONG ARM SIGN LANGUAGE: COMPANY FIRESUPPORT OFFICER CAPABILITIES IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTCaptain Michael Fogarty

13 FROM BLACKHAWK TO BRADLEY: THE 101ST AIRBORNE IN AMECHANIZED ROLECaptain Christopher Hume

41 TRAINING NOTES41 COMBAT-FOCUSED COMBINED ARMS TRAINING

Captain William J. Dougherty and Staff Sergeant Reed Mathis45 L2I ANALYSTS ASSIST WITH INFORMATION REQUESTS

Robert A. CharlesGregory Valrie

46 COMBATIVES: DO WE TRAIN AS WE FIGHT?Captain Josh Collins

49 HOW TO CHOOSE PROPER RUNNING SHOESChris Kusmiesz

51 BOOK REVIEWS53 SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

MAJOR GENERAL WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI

Commandant’s Note

The infantry fight is close, violent, and intensely personal.In today’s contemporary operational environment welocate and destroy the enemy one room, one house, one

street at a time. The global war on terrorism demands the best ofthe entire maneuver force and the arms that support it, becausethe enemy can attack without warning, day or night, and we mustbe ready to destroy him whenever the opportunity presents itself.Mounted forces often fight as infantry when they dismount tosecure their vehicles in built-up areas, when they provide securityfor refueling and rearming, or when they conduct sweeps to cleartheir immediate environment. Likewise, combat service supportSoldiers and their leaders often find themselves fighting as infantryto secure and sustain the vital functions they perform all day, everyday. The insurgent has chosen to take the fight to the urbanbattleground where engagement ranges are short, reaction timesare limited, and split-second decisions literally mean life or death.This environment imposes constraints and limitations on ourforces. This limits the tactics, techniques, and procedures we canemploy. In the close quarters battle (CQB) all options for the useof force must be considered when Soldiers need to achieve controlover a noncombatant. In this Commandant’s Note I want to talkabout combatives instruction, its purpose, and some of theinitiatives we are pursuing in training for this key dimension ofthe close fight.

Although the Army has trained on close fighting since theRevolutionary War, the techniques of pure knife fighting firstreceived serious attention during World War I, where trench raidsand other night operations were common. What we called hand-to-hand combat was commonplace in World War II, in the KoreanWar, and in Vietnam, and it has been a part of Soldiers’ trainingever since. The basis for much of the training was Field Manual21-150, Unarmed Defense for the American Soldier, which stresseddefensive fighting to guard against an enemy’s body and chokeholds, his weapons, and his hand-to-hand combat techniques. Todaythe Modern Army Combatives Program is a proactive program todevelop aggressiveness and self-confidence. Soldiers train to employtheir combatives skills to seize the initiative to dominate, disable, orkill an opponent in the CQB. Personal protection techniques are asecondary purpose for our training, but these skills have their non-lethal applications as well. In crowd control situations, during removalof noncombatants from the area of operations, or when maintainingcontrol over prisoners or detainees such skills enable Soldiers toefficiently seize and maintain control of a situation to accomplishthe mission. A Soldier competent in combatives techniques isbetter equipped to approach a situation with confidence andappropriate aggressiveness, and to thus surprise an adversary

May-June 2007 INFANTRY 1

COMBATIVES AND CONDITIONING

unprepared for the shock of sudden,violent confrontation.

In the past, training forunarmed combat took placewith minimal equipment,aside from a weapon and basicitems of clothing. This is nothow we fight. While our enemymay travel light and be unencumbered by load-bearing andprotective gear, we can find ourselves at a marked disadvantageunless we train to fight effectively under all conditions and withouttaking time to shed unneeded equipment. While units routinelyadjust their Soldiers’ combat load to the mission, they must beready to go into action as soon as the opportunity presents itself,and we can only assure this happens by training as we will fight.No Soldier will be alone for long in the close fight; his teammateswill be there, shoulder to shoulder, and the aggressiveness andmomentum of a fire team or squad engaged in CQB are powerfulcombat multipliers. This is called team momentum and is a keypart of our training.

Combatives training begins with physical conditioning, andperformance-oriented strength training is an effective way toachieve it. Both the United States Marine Corps and the Armyare working this concept, with considerable success. The 75thRanger Regiment has gained over 21 months’ experience withthe planning and fielding of its Ranger-Athlete-Warrior (RAW)program which employs a phased approach to physical training. TheRAW concept includes strength, endurance, and movement skillstraining, as well as movement preparation and recovery. It is amultidimensional approach to conditioning which offers schedulingguidance for both garrison and deployed units, a physical trainingmenu, and guidance on adding battle focus to training.

Today’s Infantry School students receive combatives instructionacross virtually the entire spectrum of our courses, in the 198thInfantry Brigade’s one station unit training and the 192nd InfantryBrigade’s training of infantry and non-infantry MOSs, in ournoncommissioned officer programs, in Officer Candidate Schoolpre-commissioning instruction, and in the basic officer leadershipcourse, infantry basic officer leader course and maneuver captains’career courses. The Ranger Training Brigade has stressedcombatives from its earliest days in the 1950’s. Combativestraining can be an effective part of every leader’s unit trainingplan, and will better prepare our Soldiers for their roles in theglobal war on terrorism. We don’t know how tough the next enemywill be, but we can train to move fast, strike hard, and win in theclose fight. Follow me!

Winning the Close Fight

NOT JUST ANOTHER SPORTING EVENT:Best Ranger Competition is Training for Combat

2 INFANTRY May-June 2007

DDDDDOCTRINEOCTRINEOCTRINEOCTRINEOCTRINE C C C C CORNERORNERORNERORNERORNER

COLONEL GREG HAGER

In July 1981, the Ranger Department was askedto design and conduct a “Ranger Olympics” in order to identify the best two-man Ranger team in

the Army.The guidance was clear from the start - the competition should

place extreme demands on the team’s physical, mental and technicalabilities as Rangers, and the standards of performance should vastlyexceed those required of the average Soldier.

A group of prominent Florida businessmen, belonging to anorganization called the “Chairborne Rangers,” stepped forward andoffered to sponsor awards for the competitors. These patriotic citizenshave long been avid supporters of the U.S. Army and Fort Benningin particular. The Best Ranger Competition was appropriately namedin honor of Lieutenant General David E. Grange Jr., former Rangerinstructor, Ranger Department director, and commanding generalof Fort Benning.

2007 Best Ranger CompetitionThis year’s competition was held April 20-22. Of the 42

teams that began the competition, only 21 finished thecompetition. The following are the results:

1st place — Major Liam Collins and Master Sergeant WaltZajkowski, U.S. Army Special Operations Command

2nd place — Captains Andrew Farina and David Uthlaut,25th Infantry Division

3rd place —Sergeants First Class Adam Nash and BillyPouliot, 75th Ranger Regiment

4th place — Sergeant Luke McDowell and Staff SergeantMichael Broussard, 75th Ranger Regiment

5th place — Sergeants Nathan Anderson and AndrewWallace, 75th Ranger Regiment

(Additional results and information can be found on the RangerTraining Brigade’s Web site at https://www.benning.army.mil/rtb.)

David K. Dismukes

Command Sergeant Major Doug Greenway reportsinformation on a simulated casualty during the second

day of the competition.

Colonel Greg Hager is currently serving as the commander of theRanger Training Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia.

In the 26 years since its inception, thecompetition has grown from a local Rangercommunity competition in which the best teamof Ranger instructors was identified, to a

nationally televised, Armywide event with more than 100sponsors. The only requirement — participants must havesuccessfully completed the Ranger Course.

This year’s field of competitors included more than 40 teamsfrom force generating units and operational units, both activeand Reserve.

Although initially referred to as an “Olympics,” the BestRanger Competition is far from a sporting event. It’s trainingfor combat. The three-day competition revolves around eventsthat are derived from areas common to units training forcombat. They include physical training, marksmanship, smallunit drills, first aid and mobility.

In 60-plus hours, Ranger teams move approximately 60miles by foot with a 70-pound load, fire 10,000 rounds, conducta parachute drop, demonstrate an expertise of orienteering,and demonstrate life-saving skills along with 29 other combat-related individual Soldier skills.


Master Sergeant Walt Zajkowski and Major Liam Collins of the U.S.Army Special Operations Command exit the water after the helocastevent. The pair took first place in the competition.

David K. Dismukes

A competitor takes on therock climbing wall during the

second day of competition.David K. Dismukes

Captain Kamil Sztalkoper

Sstaff Sergeant Michael Broussard of the 75th Ranger Regiment negotiates the DarbyQueen obstacle course during the last day of competition.

INFANTRY NEWS


DEBI DAWSON

Bonus, IncentivesAvailable for

Some CaptainsPEO SOLDIER UNVEILS

NEW COMBAT SHIRT

The Army Program ExecutiveOffice (PEO) Soldier will soonprovide an improved Army

combat shirt to Soldiers deploying toIraq and Afghanistan.

The flame-resistant long-sleevedshirt, which retains the moisture-wicking capability, breathability, anddurability of other components in theACU, also has many of its otherfeatures, including cargo pockets,infrared identification tabs, and hook-and-loop fasteners for the Americanflag.

The new shirt has a foliage greentorso and sleeves in the universalcamouflage pattern, and sports seamlessshoulders and side panels for comfort,along with integrated anti-abrasionelbow pads, and a small Army Stronglogo centered on the chest.

The high performance shirt,designed to be a base layer, can be worndirectly under the Interceptor BodyArmor, according to Major ClayWilliamson, assistant product managerfor clothing and individual equipment.

The ACS is made of an anti-microbial cotton and rayon blend fabrictreated with a new process thatpenetrates to the fiber level. It providesfire-resistance for the life of thegarment. “It is completely safe, non-toxic, and allows us to treat fibers thatwere once not treatable,” Williamsonsaid.

The shirt integrates with otherflame-resistant components, such asthe Army combat pants, to providehead-to-toe protection against burns.The Army combat pants are the sameas the ACU pants, except they aremade of a flame-resistant material,according to the major. Soldiers’hands are protected by flame-resistant

gloves that have been a part of theArmy’s Rapid Fielding Initiative.

This ensemble further complementsthe Army’s system-of-systemsapproach to force protection, whichintegrates layers of protection forSoldiers on the battlefield.

“I want to assure the Americanpublic, the Soldiers, and their Familiesthat they have the best equipment whenand where they need it. If there weresomething better, we would buy it; andwe’re always looking for somethingbetter,” said Brigadier General R.Mark Brown, Program ExecutiveOfficer Soldier.

(Debi Dawson serves with theProgram Executive Office SoldierStrategic Communications Office)

A new Critical Skills RetentionBonus of $20,000 is available tomore than 7,000 regular-Army

captains who agree to remain on active dutybeyond their initial active-duty serviceobligation.

The bonus is part of a “menu of incentives”targeting officers nearing completion of theirinitial active-duty service obligation who arewilling to remain on active duty an additionalthree years. Other incentives include graduateschool, military school, transfer of branch orfunctional area, or post of choice.

The incentives will help the Army retaincompany-grade officers with valuableexperience, said Colonel Paul Aswell, chief,Officer Division, Directorate of MilitaryPersonnel Management, Army G1. The Armyis currently growing to increase capabilitiesand reduce stress over the long term. This hasled to an increased need of nearly 6,000captains and majors since 2004, according toAswell.

The branches considered critical for thepurposes of the CSRB include: Air Defense,Adjutant General, Armor, Chemical, Engineer,Field Artillery, Finance, Infantry, MilitaryIntelligence, Military Police, Ordnance,Quartermaster, Signal Corps and TransportationCorps. Officers originally commissioned in thesebranches are eligible for all incentives on themenu. Officers commissioned into the Armynurse corps or medical science corps are alsoeligible for the CSRB.

Eligible captains must have a date of rankbetween March 1, 2005, and January 1, 2007.Similar incentives will be offered to captainsin other year groups, Aswell said.

The CSRB and other incentives are justpart of the Army’s efforts at eliminating theofficer shortage, Aswell said. The Army hasmoved up the promotion to major from 11years to 10, and is considering moving it tothe 9th year of service. Aswell noted thatearlier promotion points and higher ratesreflect the Army’s recognition of the higherexperience level among today’s companygrade officers, and the value of their service.

Courtesy photo

The new improved Army combat shirt willbe issued to Soldiers deploying to Iraq andAfghanistan.

ARMY NEWS SERVICE

R

MAJOR DANNY MCMILLIAN

AW

ANGER

THLETE

ARRIOR

Editor’s Note: The Ranger-Athlete-WarriorProgram offers a means of improving Soldiers’conditioning well beyond anything we have triedup to now, and it deserves close examination. Forthis reason, the program will appear in three issuesof Infantry. This introductory article focuses onfunctional fitness and the following two will deal with performancenutrition and mental toughness. We recognize that the programis targeted on training U.S. Army Rangers, but non-Ranger unitscan benefit as well from the experience of the 75th RangerRegiment.

The training of combative techniques — like most of theSoldier skills we train — begins with conditioning.Functional, mission-relevant conditioning is the

foundation of a warrior’s readiness, and in this article I want toprovide an overview of one comprehensive and unique initiativethat is now well into its second year of assessment here at FortBenning.

The Ranger-Athlete-Warrior (RAW) program is an initiativewhich the 75th Ranger Regiment has planned and fielded overthe past two years. It includes one of the most comprehensiveapproaches to physical conditioning ever undertaken by an Armyunit, and has relevance to both Ranger and non-Ranger units.Fundamental to this program is its holistic approach to optimizingphysical performance. More than just a fitness program, the RAWmodel also recognizes the importance of nutrition, mentalpreparation, and the prevention and care of injuries. The Ranger-Athlete-Warrior philosophy (Figure 1) is plainly stated andunderlies the program.

A Systematic Approach to Conditioning

RAW draws upon four components to achieve itsintended outcomes: functional fitness, performance

nutrition, sports medicine, and mental toughness(Figure 2). The first of these systematically addressesbroad-spectrum strength, endurance, and movementskills. Strength enables a Soldier to overcome

resistance, improves his performance, and reduces his chance ofinjury. The RAW program uses three discrete modes of trainingto improve strength: Muscle Endurance Moderate-Heavy Resistance Power

The Muscular Endurance workout is performed withoutexternal resistance. A variety of pull-ups, push-ups, lunges, andcore exercises are performed with the emphasis on form ratherthan maximizing repetitions. The workout can be conductedanywhere pull-up bars or ropes are available.

As the name implies, the Moderate-Heavy Resistance workoutgets Rangers in the gym to meet external resistance. Within thisworkout, Rangers will perform a variety of lifts but must balancepushing/pulling movements as well as upper and lower body work.By following this principle, they will avoid the muscle imbalancesthat are so prevalent among Soldiers that concentrate on “beachmuscles.”

We train the power component of strength primarily withmachines that permit rapid, rotational movements from an athleticstance (Hammer Strength’s Ground Base line of machines is anexample). Correct form, and adequate recovery, are essentialbecause power training is more demanding on the neuromuscularand skeletal systems.


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

We cannot emphasize enough theimportance of a systematic andcomprehensive approach to strengthtraining. Too often Soldiers assume that ahigh APFT score indicates adequatestrength. In fact, the APFT does not evenmeasure leg strength or pull strength, twopotentially critical requirements forSoldiers. Ideally, strength trainingenhances a Soldier’s ability to carry hiscombat load indefinitely, transport awounded comrade, upload gear andammunition, prepare fighting positions,and perform the many other Soldier tasksrequiring broad-spectrum strength. Inperformance-oriented strength training, theemphasis is on the movement rather thanthe muscle. Unlike competitivebodybuilding, which emphasizes theappearance of the muscles, the focus instrength training is on the movements tobe performed and the muscles that need tobe developed to strengthen thosemovements.

The second element of functional fitness— endurance — is the ability to sustainphysical activity, and includes both aerobicand anaerobic endurance. Aerobicendurance involves moderately intensetasks that require continuous, sustainedmovement such as road marches, whileanaerobic endurance is needed toaccomplish intense tasks that require quick,

The individual Ranger is ourmost lethal weapon.

You don’t know how toughyour next enemy will be …Assume he’ll be very tough.

You don’t know exactly whatthe physical requirement will be onyour next mission… Assume it willbe extremely demanding.

Ranger missions requirestrength, endurance, andmovement skills. Excelling in onlyone or two leaves you vulnerableto poor performance and/orinjuries.

Training hard is not enough;you have to train smart

As an individual/team/squad/platoon, you are only as strong asyour weakest link. Don’t have aweak link.

Form matters. Master theexercise techniques and demandproper execution from your men.

The body adapts to the stressyou place upon it. This takes time.Be consistent, be patient, andthink of improvement over weeksand months, not days.

Don’t crush yourself everyday. Respect the need forrecovery. Leaders must be attunedto their men and modify thetraining stress appropriately.

Fuel the machine. Don’t trainwell then blow it with a lousy diet.Have a plan for hydration andmeals/snacks and stick to it.

Take care of your injuriesbefore they become chronic.Playing hurt is necessary onoccasion, but do it too long andthere may not be a therapy orsurgery fix.

Figure 1

powerful movements such as scaling a wallor the bursts of speed necessary in fire andmaneuver against an enemy position.Several representative examples of thesetypes of endurance and their demands onthe body are shown in Figure 3. In theRAW program, aerobic endurance istrained primarily through running, footmarches, and swimming. Anaerobicendurance is trained primarily throughinterval running, agility/speed/plyometricdrills, medicine ball drills, and groundbased power training in the gym

The third element of functional fitness— movement skills — links the Soldier’sstrength and endurance to the actual taskor challenge at hand. For example,negotiating obstacles requires not onlystrength and endurance, but movementskills that make execution of each obstaclesafe and efficient. Movement skills can begrouped into three broad categories: agility,balance, coordination (ABCs). Agility is theability to change direction, balance ismaintaining your center of gravity in aneffective position relative to your base ofsupport, and coordination is the ability toeffectively do more than one thing at a time.These skills are best developed inchildhood, but improvements can be madethrough training at any age.

In the strength section, we talked aboutthe type of strength a Ranger needs. For

Figure 2


RAW Philosophy

effective movement skill, strength meanscontrol of forces acting on the body.Muscles work either to move or preventmovement at the joints around which theylive. Most often we focus on the movementthat muscles create because that is what ismost apparent. Less obvious though is the“braking” force that muscles apply to jointmovement. This braking effect creates thestability that allows skillful movement.Without this braking effect, nearly allmovement would be extremely sloppy andpotentially dangerous. An astute observerhas noted that attempting to manage heavyloads without a stable core is like firing acannon from a canoe.

Around the body’s core, this brakingaction of the trunk muscles becomesextremely important for a couple reasons.First, the spine and pelvis are the base ofattachment for many muscles that power thearms and legs. Secondly, the body’s center ofgravity is within the core area. Keeping itthere leads to balanced, skillful movement.This is the job of the core muscles and theydo it primarily by putting on the brakes. Forexample, in agility training we create drillswhere momentum is taking the body in onedirection, but the task requires change ofdirection. This requires a level of brakingstrength, but it also requires awareness ofbody position. This is very evident duringcutting movements.

To turn a corner effectively, not only doyou need braking strength to slow downyour momentum, but you also need an

effective movement strategy. Generally, thismeans lowering the body, planting on theoutside leg, and preventing the ankle andknee from rolling outward. You can bestrong as an ox, but if your ankle and kneeroll to the outside every time you try to cut,you won’t be very effective.

These movement strategies musteventually become subconscious. Think ofthem as your default settings. If your defaultsettings aren’t appropriate, your movementwill be inefficient. Some degree ofconscious awareness of the correctmovement, combined with repetitive,controlled drills will usually help. Suchdrills develop muscle memory, with the goalthat the movement quickly becomesautomatic — your default setting.

Keep in mind the following principleswhen training movement skills:

Take time to learn the correctmovement. When teaching, do the same.This means planning PT sessions to allowsufficient teaching time. You will have tosacrifice a conditioning effect on those daysyou teach new drills, but your men will bebetter in the long run.

You need to be fresh to mastercomplex movements. Don’t smoke yourguys and then expect them to do well withagility/power drills or with obstacles.Within a given PT session, it’s best to placemovement skills training right aftermovement prep.

If the schedule dictates agility/powerdrills after other activities, the men will be

somewhat fatigued. In such cases, the squadleader should take a little extra time beforebeginning agility/power drills and avoidpushing the intensity/duration of thesession too hard.

Understanding Movement Prep andRecovery

Movement preparation and recovery arevital pieces of the RAW PT program. Inthe past, they’ve been known as warm-upand cooldown. In keeping with the termsused by most top trainers, the names havebeen changed to reflect the intent of thedrills.

Movement preparation is a better termthan warm-up. Preparing the body to movewell is precisely the goal. Warming the bodyis part of movement prep, but it is no moreimportant than the other two objectives ofmovement prep: loosening the joints/muscles, and priming the nerve to musclemessages. If warming were the onlyobjective, you could sit in a sauna and callit warm-up. After movement prep, Rangersshould be prepared to run, lift, negotiateobstacles, play a sport, execute a raid...

The movement prep recommended forRangers is very similar to that used by topstrength and conditioning coaches. It issomewhat different than the 5-step warm-up described in the Army’s Physical FitnessTraining FM (circa 1980s). While thatwarm-up was based on sound principles atthe time, in the past decade research hasshown that static stretching during warm-up is not necessary for injury prevention orperformance.

The term recovery is used instead ofcooldown. Similar to the idea of warm-upas only a component of movement prep,cooling down is only a small part ofrecovery. The objectives of recovery are:

1) Safely decrease heart-rate, respiratoryrate, and body temperature;

2) Improve functional flexibility;3) Replace nutrients; and4) Rest enough so that the body is ready

for subsequent PT or missions.Only the first two objectives are met on

the PT field. This means that meetingobjectives three and four are a personalresponsibility. Leaders must educate andmotivate their men to follow the nutritionaland sleep guidelines put forth in the RAWclasses.

Figure 3 — Infantry Task/Physical Component Matrix


It is clear that many individuals blow off cooldown and gostraight to the shower without any obvious ill effects. Leadersshould discourage this practice. Performing the functionalflexibility exercises in the recovery drill will identify areas oftightness that might eventually lead to injury or limit performance.Those exercises were in fact designed to do just that. Obviouslynot everyone will need every stretch. However, those Rangers thatdo find areas of tightness or restriction during recovery stretchesshould be encouraged to repeat the stretches throughout the day.

Performing an organized recovery session offers squad leadersat least two other benefits:

1) The opportunity to provide the men with immediate feedbackon the performance of the PT session, and

2) The opportunity to remind the men to rehydrate and get theproper nutrients at the proper time.

A Phased Approach to TrainingRAW physical training uses a phased approach similar to that

used by athletes. Over the years, researchers and trainers havelearned that athletes maximize their potential by dedicating a givenperiod of time to a particular aspect of physical development, thenchanging the focus at regular intervals. For example, runners mightfirst develop an aerobic base through progressive distance runs,then later add hill training and interval workouts. Lifters mightfirst focus on mass-producing workouts, then later emphasizepower training.

This phased approach has been successful because regularchanges to workouts force the body to continue adapting. If youstay with the same routine, the body becomes accustomed to itand development stops. Another benefit of phased training is theeffect on recovery. Attempting to maintain maximal workouts forseveral months runs the risk of overtraining. By incorporatingrelatively less training intensity and volume during a portion ofthe training cycle, the body is much less likely to breakdown.

The RAW PT program uses four phases over a nine-monthperiod:

Phase I - In the current operational cycle, this phase beginsupon return from deployment and ends after six weeks of PT(block leave, etc. does not count). The emphasis is on recoveryfrom deployment. Rangers should get therapy for any nagginginjuries that linger from deployment. The physical trainingstress is relatively light during this phase. Squad leaders shoulduse this phase to make sure their men achieve mastery of allthe drills. The Functional Movement Screen (FMS), a batteryof assessments that gauge the quality of functional movements(described further in a future article), is best conducted duringthis phase. Initial performance tests may be performed duringthis phase and repeated in phase three.

Phase II - This phase begins immediately after the first phaseand runs for eight weeks. Leaders should gradually demandmore of their men during this phase. More demanding workoutsare added at this time on the assumption that phase one laid agood foundation of core strength, movement skills, andendurance.

Phase III - This phase links the second phase anddeployment. It will generally be about 3-4 weeks in length.

During this time, leaders must ensure their men are ready fordeployment. The RP AT and other performance tests should bedone during this phase. While training should be tough andrealistic, leaders must also take steps to reduce the risk of injuryor overtraining.

Phase IV - In the current operational cycle, this is the deployedphase. While on deployment, the goal is to maintain peak physicalperformance without compromising mission readiness (forexample, an exhaustive workout performed before a physicallydemanding mission). Depending on the location of deploymentand the missions, Rangers might be able to use Phase IV as anopportunity to develop general strength through gym-basedresistance training.

Other units will benefit from a phased approach to physicaltraining, but might need to adjust the length of each phase basedon their operational cycle, or to repeat the entire cycle betweendeployments. For example, a unit with 12-24 months to preparefor their next deployment could repeat Phase 1-3 once or eventwice while in garrison. Another option is to add two to four weeksto Phase I and/or four to six weeks to Phase II.

The training of U.S. Army Rangers and those vast numbers ofSoldiers who make up the majority of the Army — and who aresharing the burden of the global war on terrorism — cannot beleft to chance. We owe it to them to ensure that they are completelyprepared to take the fight to the enemy, deliver the decisive blow,and return home safely. Physical conditioning is the first step inthat preparation, and the RAW program offers the opportunityand the methodology that we cannot afford to ignore.

Courtesy photoThe RAW Program includes one of the most comprehensive approachesto physical conditioning ever undertaken by the Army, and has great deal ofrelevance because of its holistic nature and its contribution to the developmentof skills and toughness directly related to the demands of combat.


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Major Danny McMillian is the senior physical therapist for the 75th RangerRegiment and is OIC of the Ranger-Athlete-Warrior program. McMillian, whowas recently selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel, received a directcommission. He has served as the chief of physical therapy at the U.S. medicalfacility in Mannheim, Germany, and as chief of Rehabilitative Services for the31st Combat Support Hospital in Baghdad, Iraq. He was also a sports medicineresident at the United States Military Academy, at West Point, New York.

Congratulations, Commander

The day a company commandertakes the guidon there will bemuch to think about. How to

employ the company fire support officer(FSO) will probably not make the top ofthe list. Not long ago the answer wouldhave been simple:

“The primary duty of the company FSOis being the FSCOORD (fire supportcoordinator) at company level. He is a full-time fire support advisor to the maneuvercompany commander, planner, andcoordinator. The company FSO advises thecommander on the capabilities,limitations, and employment of all firesupport assets available to support hisoperation.”

— FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniquesand Procedures for Observed Fire

However, given the near certainty of animpending combat deployment and the

TEACHING THE LONG ARM SIGN LANGUAGE

CAPTAIN MICHAEL FOGARTY

Company Fire Support Officer Capabilities in Low Intensity Conflict

nature of the counterinsurgency (COIN)fight that awaits, there is no easy answeravailable. Fortunately, a commander neednot reinvent the wheel. There may be ablueprint that suits his needs.

This is a study of a few different waysFSOs functioned in low intensity conflict(LIC). These were actual unit solutions fromTask Force 1-30 Infantry during OperationIraqi Freedom III while stationed in DiyalaProvince. No approach profiled iscompletely effective or completelyineffective. They are a product of theenvironment in which they were created.That being said, there are lessons to belearned. A careful reading may yield usefulinsight to the astute future commander.

A Note on FiresRegardless of whatever additional

missions the FSO takes on, he is, first andforemost, a fire supporter. His primary

mission is always to provide timely andaccurate fires to support the maneuver plan.He is the commander’s “long arm,” a meansof influencing the fight beyond direct fire.Even with the best of intentions it ispossible to set the FSO up for failure. Tryingto do many things well can result in doingeverything poorly. The commander simplyneeds to maintain perspective. A busy FSOis like a juggler with many balls in the air,and fire support is the glass ball. Even ifhe drops everything else, it had better notbe that one.

What Else Can My FSO Do for Me?Limitless potential exists for variation

in the employment of the FSO. Many moreconcentrations exist than are representedhere. The duties described below demandedspecial consideration for two reasons. First,they are assigned to many FSOs deployedto OIF and OEF. This is a reflection of the

Sergeant First Class Reginald Holmes

Captain Michael Fogarty, a company fire supportofficer, and his fire support NCO complete a mission.


importance of these missions and the lack of resources at thecompany level to execute them. Secondly, most of these duties,particularly Information Operations (IO), civil-military operations(CMO), and intelligence operations (S2), dovetail very well withthe effects-based operations (EBO) model that has become theorganizing concept for fire support at all levels.

The EBO concept is often referenced but poorly understood.This working definition offers a concise description. (Please notethat emerging doctrine is replacing the term stability and supportoperations [SASO] with stability and reconstruction operations[SARO]).

Effects-Based Operations: Offensive, defensive, stability, andsupport operations planned and executed to achieve thecommander’s desired effect on a threat element, civil leader (tribal,ethnic, or governmental), or population group. EBO achieves thecommander’s desired effect through the synchronized, sequential,or simultaneous application of leadership, maneuver, firepower,and information.

— Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 04-14,Effects-Based Operations: Brigade to Company Level

The EBO concept applies to all Army operations, but it is especiallyapplicable to fire support. A maneuver commander should not needto describe what assets are needed to put effects on a target. Thecommander gives the intent and the FSO translates that intent intoeffects. This applies to lethal and non-lethal methods. As fire supportcoordinators continue to evolve into effects coordinators (ECOORDs),it will be incumbent upon FSOs to apply non-lethal effects to givetheir commander that additional dimension.

Information Operations Officer: COIN operations achieveobjectives rooted in the populace rather than territory. Placing akey leader in charge of IO keeps big picture goals in focus and afinger on the pulse of the society.

Civil-Military Operations Officer: Civil governance,

reconstruction, elections, and other CMO efforts are instrumentalin building sustainable societies and are decisive in SARO.

Company S2: The COIN battlefield is intelligence driven, andintegrating collection, analysis, and targeting at the company levelis crucial to success. Many military strategists are arguing formore emphasis here.

Headquarters Platoon Leader: As a force provider or supportprovider, a headquarters platoon has a variety of capabilities thatrequire effective management, though no platoon leader is providedby the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE).

Maneuver Platoon Leader: Many companies find themselvesrequiring another maneuver element. Under some circumstances,the company FSO can provide leadership and accountability for amaneuver platoon.

Clearly, a brand new FSO straight from the Field ArtilleryOfficer Basic Course at Fort Sill does not arrive as a subject matterexpert on all of the duties described here. There are courses totrain these concepts. Timing and availability constrain thecommander as in any training situation. Where the institutionallearning comes up short some apprenticeship and individuallearning may have to fill in the gaps. It is critical with all of thesemissions that commanders evaluate the potential and training levelof the FSO to execute any of these missions.

How Might This Work?The following are several vignettes that demonstrate some

possibilities for the FSO position in-country. This section alsoshows some dynamics of the company commander-company FSOrelationship. To reflect these purposes, commanders and FSOswho worked together have been grouped together as “teams.”

Task Force 1-30 IN had several different commander-FSO teamsthroughout OIF III. Each profile in this section consists of one ofthose teams. Without exception, each commander-FSO dynamic

produced a different approach. The following segmentreviews some salient characteristics of each case study.

Team 1: FiresTeam 1 was a company of mechanized infantry.

Because of its lethal effects focus, it was a controlfor the rest of this study. It originated from the sametask force as the rest of the teams. However, it didnot share the same battlespace or mission. At thebeginning of the deployment, the company wasdetached from the battalion and placed under brigadecontrol to act as a quick reaction force (QRF). Thecompany then moved from Diyala to ar Ramadi inthe Al Anbar Province to augment one of thebrigade’s task forces.

While used as a brigade QRF, the team respondedto several incidents where coalition troops were incontact with insurgent forces. By nature, the QRFrole is reactive. Therefore, the FSO’s focus was onbringing lethal assets to bear in situations that werealready ongoing. In one incident, the FSO was ableto bring artillery fires on an insurgent position andcut off enemy egress routes that infantry couldn’treach in time. In other cases, he was able to control

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

2nd Lieutenant David Sinclair

The author, Captain Michael Fogarty, briefs the mayors and city councils ofMuqdadiyah and Wadjihiyah on civil-military cooperation.


close combat attack (CCA)aviation to provide additionalfirepower to ground forces. Whilefighting from Ramadi, he was ableto develop fire plans to supportcompany operations and likelycontingencies.

Throughout its deployment thisteam’s focus was lethal effects. As aQRF force, it owned no battlespace,projects, or sphere of influence (SOI)contacts. While in Anbar, defeatinginsurgent maneuver attacksconsumed the bulk of its efforts. Theresult was that the FSO wasprincipally concerned with firesfrom beginning to end. Thatemphasis, and the nature of thesecurity environment, precluded aheavy CMO, IO, or intelligenceeffort.

Team 1’s situation highlights importantlessons. A more intense maneuver fightgenerally decreases opportunities to pursuenon-lethal effects. Fire support becomes thetop priority. Another closely related pointis that the enemy has a vote. Theoperational environment in thecommander’s battlespace may provideconstraints that limit options in employingthe FSO.

Team 2: IO HeavyTeam 2 was a commander-FSO pairing

from a task-organized mechanized infantrycompany team. Its AO was typical of manyin Diyala during OIF III. Insurgents attackedfrequently but with less commitment than theenemy faced by Team 1. Reconstructionefforts were in full swing, as were efforts towin the trust and cooperation of the populace.

Team 2’s FSO spent a great deal of timeidentifying the key stakeholders in hiscompany AO. At every meeting heattended, he ensured that he knew whoeveryone was and what interest eachrepresented. Armed with this knowledge,he created unique products with a sharpfocus on the concerns represented. He alsospent a great deal of time interacting withaverage Iraqis who were not in positionsof influence. Consistent interaction withthese people gave him a measure of howwell the local leadership represented thethoughts of the average citizen. CMO,interpreter management, and headquartersplatoon administration rounded out the

remainder of the FSO’s duties.At this stage in the deployment, the

battalion fire support element (FSE)supported most fires. Maneuver leadershipwas firmly in place. The commander andFSO had trained together for some timeprior to the deployment. They shared aconfidence in the power of non-lethaleffects to shape the fight. Furthermore, thecommander assessed that the FSO had anaptitude for IO.

Team 2 demonstrated that a committedcommander and FSO can make non-lethaleffects a priority. The commander’s focusfreed the FSO from areas that entangledothers. The endstate was a strong IO focusat the company level.

Team 3: ManeuverThe AO that Team 3 worked in was

similar to that of Team 2. The approach,however, was very different. Although itwas a mechanized infantry company likethe others, a platoon was detached, leavingit somewhat short on combat power.

This commander elected to realignelements of his two remaining platoons tocreate a third, smaller platoon. He chosethe FSO to lead this element. This platoondiffered from the other two. It wasmotorized while the other two weremechanized. It also carried a primary roleas the QRF platoon while the company wasin cycle as the task force’s QRF. His elementresponded to improvised explosive devices(IEDs), direct fire contact, emergencieswith Iraqi Security Forces, and any other

situation for which the task forcecommander required additionalcombat power. In this role, theFSO functioned similarly to theinfantry platoon leaders, but waslargely separated from hiscompany fire support team (FIST).In this company, the FIST wasprimarily in charge of thecompany’s operations center.

Eventually, the taskorganization changed and thedetached platoon returned. TheFSO then redirected focus on fires,IO, and administration butretained some duties as amaneuver patrol leader. Duringthis stage, the FSO would patrolregularly with infantry elements.When one dismounted patrol

made contact without its vehicles nearby,he was able to call in fires on an insurgentelement from the FOB’s direct support155mm howitzers.

This option was born out of the needs ofthe maneuver force. The commanderbelieved that the company retained strongfire support capabilities with the FSOforward. By necessity, this option precludeda more in-depth, non-lethal approach. Theopportunity cost was justified by addedmaneuver flexibility.

Team 4: Jack-of-All-Trades, Masterof None

This company was also composed ofmechanized infantry in an AO similar toTeams 2 and 3. As in all cases, the operationalbackdrop included a national constitutionreferendum and a national election.

To address the importance of theconstitutional referendum and the nationalelection, the company commanderdesignated the FSO as the point man forelection issues. This led to action in severalareas: the FSO read and disseminatedelection materials, attended local andprovincial government meetings tosynchronize efforts, and conducted patrolsto establish security measures at pollingsites in the company AO. In other arenas,he developed fire plans for companymissions, briefed the commander onintelligence findings of the S-2 and tacticalhuman intelligence (HUMINT) team(THT), and conducted IO meetings withkey communicators on the company SOI

Private First Class Brandon Bramblett operates the Fire SupportSensor System (FS3).

Sergeant First Class Reginald Holmes


PROFESSIONAL FORUM


Captain Michael Fogarty is currently a student in the Special ForcesDetachment Officer Qualification Course. This article was written while he was astudent in the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course. In previous assignments heserved as a company fire support officer and battalion targeting officer with the1st Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division.

list. He also patrolled with the commander wherever he traveled.As a former S-5 (CMO), the commander was keen to bring

non-lethal effects to the company level. The FSO had also servedon staff, working closely with enablers such as the THT, the CivilAffairs (CA) team, and the tactical psychological operations(PSYOP) Team (TPT). Both parties were eager to incorporatesituational awareness that was frequently ignored or unavailableat the company level. This included intelligence, societalatmospherics, and reconstruction efforts. Civil governance becamea pillar due to the ongoing election efforts. The commander alsosought a headquarters platoon that could conduct its own patrols.

The result of the wide net cast by this team was breadth ratherthan depth. The commander was satisfied that he maintainedawareness of many aspects of his AO. The apparent tradeoff forthis strategy is the difficulty of attaining excellence in any area.

Team 5: IntelligenceTeam 5 represents another outlier for structural reasons. The

armor company represented by Team 5 was an attachment to TF1-30 IN from Task Force 2-34 Armor, which had in turn been taskorganized to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division.FSOs in TF 2-34 AR had specific guidance to focus on intelligence-related matters. Though it had part of the same AO as Teams 2-4,this team had a different approach.

To achieve his intelligence focus, the FSO tied in frequentlywith the battalion S-2 and the THT. Whenever possible, he attendedmeetings in the company’s AO to try to mate the intelligencepicture painted by the intelligence summaries with ground truth.He interviewed local government officials and community leadersunder different pretexts to draw out information he saw in theintelligence reporting. He also used all available opportunities tovisit reconstruction projects in the company’s AO to restoreessential services and better understand the link betweenreconstruction and the insurgency.

Constant updates brought detail to the picture of insurgents, allies,and fence-sitters living in the towns and villages assigned to thecompany. The commander also directed the FSO to act as a primaryliaison with all host nation personnel, to include interpreters, IraqiArmy (IA), Iraqi Police (IP), and civil government officials.

The efforts to develop the intelligence and CMO picture

provided insight, but the team wasn’t always on the same page.The commander was frequently tied up in the lethal aspects of thefight. Consequently, although the information was available, lethaland non-lethal operations were somewhat out of synch.

What Kind of FSO Do I Need?Every company finds itself with a different situation. Therefore,

no two commanders will use their FSO in exactly the same way.The following ideas are considerations and recommendations thatmay help you, a new company commander, employ that FSO tothe maximum potential.

What is my mission? The importance of a thorough missionanalysis should not be new to anyone. What may seem new is theidea that this could shape a key leader’s job description. This wouldapply more directly to a deployed unit. In garrison, METL (missionessential task list) training tends to crowd out new missions. Adeployed commander has more freedom to innovate. Consider thebattalion commander’s intent and how you plan to execute it. Thatmay drive your requirements for the FSO. Are lethal fires thedecisive operation in your AO, or is it IO?

What kind of hand was I dealt? Mission is a key componentof METT-TC, but so is troops available. The commander will needto assess what kind of FSO he was given. Ability to pull his ownweight should be a given, but does he have any important strengthsor weaknesses? Is this an IO savant or a born leader of Soldiers? Howcan I use those abilities to best accomplish my mission?

Be proactive. Although the operational environment willinfluence how your company fights, you will also haveopportunities to exercise influence. Knowing your environmentdoes not mean being passive. If you want to make CMO a priority,providing the FSO with that guidance may help realize that vision.

Integrate lethal and non-lethal operations. This is EBO in anutshell. It should also be one of your FSO’s primary duties. Thecommander is responsible for the intent, but you should be able tocount on the FSO to help you synchronize efforts and coordinateassets. COIN operations require company grade officers to grasp thecivil dimension of operations in detail. If it suits your mission, makethe FSO responsible for keeping you abreast of developments andconcerns.

Stay engaged. You may have a capable FSO, a solid missionanalysis, and detailed guidance. That alone will not accomplishyour mission. Just as no plan survives first contact, the FSO willnot operate at maximum effectiveness without your feedback andinvolvement. Likewise, if the FSO is providing you information,use it. It is useless to perform IO, CMO, and intelligence analysisif you don’t incorporate them into your plans.

Although it may not occur to you the day you take the guidon,don’t forget about the role of the FSO. Company commanders inhigh intensity conflicts learn to love what their FSO can do forthem. With the proper guidance and feedback, you can learn tolove what your FSO can do for you in any operational environment.

First Lieutenant Kein Brunner works with Iraqi soldiers while servingas the task force quick reaction force platoon leader.

Captain Rob Peterson

The versatility of the modernAmerican infantryman is evidentin almost every report coming

out of Iraq and Afghanistan. Examplesabound of young fighting men that adaptand persevere to overcome incredibledifficulties, whether through intelligentproblem solving or sheer determination.These acts are worth remembering so thatthe lessons learned can be passed to futurewar fighters. As the platoon leader for 1stPlatoon, C Company, 1st Squadron, 32ndCavalry Regiment (Reconnaissance,Surveillance, and Target Acquisition[RSTA]), 101st Airborne Division, I wasfortunate enough to witness one particularexample that occurred over a period ofseveral months.

On Christmas Day 2005, three monthsinto their tour, the Soldiers of 1st Platoon,Charlie Company were adjusting to theirnew forward operating base (FOB) inMuqdadiyah, Iraq, a few dozen kilometersfrom the provincial capital of Baqubah.The men from Fort Campbell were used tochange after undergoing transformationfrom an infantry battalion to a RSTA

FROM BLACKHAWK TO BRADLEY

CAPTAIN CHRISTOPHER HUME

The 101st Airborne in a Mechanized Role

squadron in less than six months. Theyhad already adapted well to the use ofarmored trucks in daily operations and werekeen on the ever-shifting shape of theenemy. Flexibility and versatility were intheir best interest since everyone knew thatthe evolving battlefield did not look kindlyupon those who resisted change in the nameof tradition. Despite the change thatdefined their short history, no one couldhave predicted the next challenge theywould face. It did not come in the form ofa new deadly enemy tactic, technique orprocedure (TTP) or a serious loss ofleadership but with the introduction of anew tool: the M2A2 Bradley fightingvehicle (BFV). These air assaultinfantrymen, accustomed to helicopterinsertions and the occasional truck ride,soon learned to operate, maintain, and fightin a fully tracked armored vehicle typicallyfound in mechanized infantry formations.It was a painful transition that many greetedwith resistance and doubt, but it did not takelong for everyone to realize the advantagesof the protection and firepower that the BFVbrought to the table. The strengths could

not be ignored, and all became disciples ofthis unfamiliar beast.

The platoon’s story began a year and ahalf earlier on the Tennessee-Kentuckyborder. Charlie Company had a tumultuousbirth and history, considering its shortexistence. As a result of Armytransformation, the former 3rd Battalion,327th Infantry Regiment, was reduced toone infantry reconnaissance company,consisting of two platoons and a mortar andsniper section. The remaining twocompanies became cavalry troops,composed entirely of cavalry scouts(military occupational specialty [MOS]19D of the Armor branch). For variousreasons, the infantrymen did not work wellwith the 19Ds, and this became a hugetraining hurdle. The officers were moreunderstanding, but friction defined the firstseveral months. There was also a shortageof vehicles and equipment since themodified table of organization and


Soldiers with the 1st Squadron,32nd Cavalry Regiment conduct a

cordon and search operation inDiyala, Iraq, in July 2006.

Tech. Sergeant Ken Bergmann, USAF

equipment (MTOE) had changed. Theplatoons were constantly sharing the fewtrucks the unit owned. On a positive note,because of the mass downsizing of MOS11B, the best Soldiers from 3rd Battalionwere kept in Charlie Company, so a largemajority of the men were physically fit andextremely competent in their technical andtactical expertise. Unfortunately, theimportance of that infantry andreconnaissance expertise was up for debatesince the purpose and employment of theCharlie platoons were in question. Theyinitially trained as a line battalion scoutplatoon, focusing on dismountedreconnaissance and surveillance, hide sites, and long rangemovement by foot. This was fitting since many came from thenow disbanded 3rd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment scouts.However, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel ArthurKandarian, who was acutely aware of his unit’s reduced manpower,considered them as rifle platoons minus machine guns. The debatewas only accelerated when battalion live-fire exercises began, andall platoons in the battalion were expected to execute convoyoperations. The infantrymen accepted the challenge and performedsuperbly, yet they still did not know their role. Finally, one monthprior to deployment, the two platoons became three by detachingone team from each and placing the fire support officer (FSO) inthe platoon leader position. All platoons in the squadron, as thebattalion was now called following re-flagging, would be mannedand equipped the same.

The infantrymen’s expected resistance to more change wasovershadowed by their satisfaction in finally having clear guidance.Of course, the nature of deployments made this comfort short-livedas change would once again define the experience of 1st Platoon,Charlie Company and all the members of 1-32nd Cavalry Squadron.

The first few months of the deployment found 1st Platoon at asmall forward operating base near the Iranian border, temporarilyattached to the squadron’s A Troop. The men were happy to be awayfrom the main body and found comfort in the leadership of A Troop’scommander, Captain Sean Brown, a tanker and a solid officer, whotook care of his infantrymen. The enlisted men also learned to respectand work with the 19Ds as their knowledge of vehicles exceeded theaverage rifleman’s. Operations at the first FOB were routine andwithout great incident. The fall elections of 2005 were the greatestpriority, and everything went smoothly as a result of solid coordinationwith the local Iraqi Security Forces. Things were going so smoothly,in fact, that the troop handed operations over to the Iraqis, with militarytransition team (MiTT) supervision, and headed to their new homean hour’s drive down the road in Muqdadiyah. What would be waitingfor its Soldiers surprised everyone, most of all the men of 1st Platoon.They would relieve a mechanized infantry battalion, the 1st Battalion,30th Infantry Regiment, Battle Boars, of the 3rd Brigade, 3rdInfantry Division, and keep a few of their toys — M2A2 Bradleyfighting vehicles.

After the jump from foot to trucks, the next leap to trackedvehicles did not come to anyone as a complete surprise. The rumor

had surfaced prior to deployment, and a few of the 19Ds who hadBradley experience had conducted driver’s training at FortCampbell. Despite this now obvious indicator, none of the menin 1st Platoon ever thought it would be they who rode in such avehicle. Most of them couldn’t tell the difference between theBradley and an M1 Abrams tank, referring to anything with tracksas a “tank.” However, the commander could not afford to excludeany of the small force currently posted in Muqdadiyah anddemanded that each platoon of A Troop attend the train-up. So,in between left seat and right seat rides for the area of operationsorientation, the 101st men went to Bradley school, courtesy of theBattle Boars. During four days of training, the Soldiers learnedeverything from loading and unloading the weapons systems tochanging track. The designated drivers drove, the designatedgunners fired, and the platoon leadership soaked up as much asthey could. The 3rd ID Soldiers were excellent teachers andanswered a fair share of what must have been ridiculous questions.The training culminated in a condensed gunnery and “road test”out in sector. Some in the platoon received extra training on theirroad test thanks to a well-concealed 155mm artillery shell thatexploded off the right side of the platoon leader’s vehicle. It wasa scenario that would repeat itself two dozen more times in theplatoon’s eight-month relationship with the Bradley, yet this firstincident was most remembered as the one that sold the infantrymenon the advantages of armor. The Bradley performed as advertised.

Once the Bandits of 1-32 took over their new battlespace, theylost no time in getting the Bradleys into the fight. Route clearancebecame an obsession of the commanders, and as a result, the menof A Troop (1-C included) spent many long hours out on the roads.The vehicles also proved an excellent conveyance for sniper teamsand other dismounted assets that needed insertion in sector. Asthe men’s experience grew and they became comfortable with thevehicles, the missions became more complex and coordinated.Many times, the Bradleys were used to support patrol bases insector, dismounted surveillance platforms, raids, and cordon andsearches. The vehicles proved to be excellent for insertion ofsmall dismounted patrols. The survivability and the carryingcapacity allowed a complete element to ride together and get on theground quickly without compromise. These techniques, of course,did not come right away, and the lessons learned by the men of 1stPlatoon could fill volumes. Fortunately, the platoon sergeant, Sergeant

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Courtesy photo

Despite being new to the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Soldiers of 1st Platoon, Charlie Companyquickly learned how to navigate in restricted terrain.


First Class Ricky Elza, made sure the lessonswere implemented, and his relentless pursuitof Bradley knowledge only further inspiredthe men to learn as much as they could.

Maintenance was a vertical learning curve.As stated before, every man in 1st Platoonhad a light infantry background. Most hadnever even seen a Bradley. The few A Troop19Ds with mechanized experience helpedtremendously, and a mechanic was attachedto the troop. However, this did not preventthe inquisitive infantrymen from breaking,and then learning how to fix, just abouteverything that bolted onto the vehicle. Themost comedic incident involved the lug nutsfor the road wheels. The Soldiers soondiscovered that when the wheels cameloose, they would shoot off the side of thevehicle at high velocity. Several wheelslater, they finally learned that the lug nutswere to blame. They were onetime use onlyand could not be reused as on a truck:another problem solved by experience.

Since each piece of equipment in theArmy has its own specific characteristics,it requires its own standard operatingprocedures, load plans, and crew drills. Theplatoon devised contingency plans forvehicle recovery, casualty evacuation,modified fuel loads, and down-weapondrills. Additionally, the gunners learnedhow to implement the Integrated SightUnit, which was a very useful optic, andincorporate its thermal capabilities into

route clearance. The drivers learned howto maneuver in restricted terrain, but notbefore several painful yet useful lessonswere taught, which included: ground thatlooks dry isn’t necessarily so, bridges thatsupport trucks don’t always supportBradleys, and house walls are closer thanthey appear. Despite all the mistakes andchallenges, the men of 1st Platoon, morethan any, became masters of their newtrade. Through a tireless commitment tolearning mechanized operations, theybrought a valuable weapon to the fight. Inmission after mission, the skills of the lightinfantry were combined with the skills ofthe Bradley crewmen to accomplish tasksotherwise beyond the normal capabilitiesof either a purely mechanized force or apurely light force.

In late spring of 2006, the remainder ofCharlie Company finally linked up with 1stPlatoon in Muqdadiyah. Thanks to a closerelationship among its young leaders, duein part to the fact that many of the Soldierswere previously in 1st Platoon, the 3rdPlatoon was given some rudimentaryinstruction on Bradley operations andsuccessfully incorporated the vehicles intotheir own patrols. Once again infantrymenproved their ability to master new skills anddemonstrate their undying flexibility.

The integration of mechanized and lightinfantry operations came to a head duringthe last month of the deployment. Tireless

Captain Christopher Hume is an infantryofficer and 2003 graduate of the United StatesMilitary Academy who served for 29 consecutivemonths as an infantry platoon leader in both a rifleplatoon and reconnaissance platoon. He served12 of those months in Diyala Province, Iraq, withthe 1-32nd Cavalry Squadron, 1st Brigade CombatTeam, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He isa 2007 graduate of the Maneuver Captains CareerCourse and is currently attending the SpecialForces Detachment Officer Qualification Course.

intelligence gathering through patrols,interrogations, surveillance and informantsfinally produced a mature target list for anIED cell in a nearby village. The numberof objectives demanded that all of CharlieCompany would participate. The plancalled for a mounted Bradley insertionfollowed by foot infiltration. Coordinationamong all the units was imperative to avoidcompromise. If anyone in the villagesuspected anything besides a normal routeclearance mission, the targets would flee.Once all three platoons were set in theirrespective assault positions, the Bradleyswithdrew to the FOB for quick reactionforce duties. At H hour, all threedismounted elements moved across thelarge canal encircling the village and hitthree objectives simultaneously. The localnationals were caught by surprise, and thetargets were quickly detained after only abrief fight. Once the initial assaultoccurred, the Bradleys returned to providesecurity and prisoner transport. Theintegration was flawless and the mission asuccess. The firepower and speed providedby the Bradleys and the stealth andsituational awareness of the dismountedSoldiers combined to form a lethal andversatile team.

Flexibility is a virtue of all Soldiers,especially infantrymen. Some units learnhow to adapt early, and others drag theirfeet and resist the very mention of change.Initially, the men of 1st Platoon werereluctant to veer from their predestinedpath. Yet as their training and then theirdeployment progressed, versatility came todefine the very nature of their identity.From dismounted infantry battle drills,reconnaissance work, and foot patrols; totruck maneuver and finally mechanizedoperations, their willingness to learn andadapt was ever-present. It was a privilegeto witness.

Courtesy photo

Soldiers with the 1st Platoon, C Company, 1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry Regiment, gather for aunit photograph in front of one of platoon’s Bradley fighting vehicles.



“Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men.”— General George Patton, Jr.

General Patton’s quote rings true today and probably will as long as we have to fight our nation’s wars.Warfighting is tough business and gets tougher as our

enemy adapts. As technology evolves, the U.S. Army Soldier isexpected to do more, absorb more information, and control morethan ever before. I submit that this expectation will not decrease,but only increase as we infuse better technology and faster pacedoperations into our future force structure. The necessity forincreased communications, situational awareness and situationalunderstanding capabilities is intuitive to those who have had tooperate dismounted in the current enemy environment; it iscomplicated and mistakes are unforgiving. As our current forceleverages its technological edge to overmatch its enemies, thecurrent enemy is negating the standoff of our weapons andtechnology by “hugging” our forces in tight urban terrain. This

fact has once again brought the close fight to our small combatunits. They have to know more about their immediate battlespace,both friendly and enemy, and apply that knowledge quickly. Thiskind of tactical decision making has always been at the tip of thespear. However, our sergeants and lieutenants are now makingstrategic impacts when they make decisions during the conduct ofthis dynamic, fluid and always changing “three block war.” Wemust arm these leaders with the capabilities to allow them to fightand win in the current environment and on the battlefields of thefuture.

The capability to communicate by voice and data and the abilityto receive and display maneuver graphics is essential for Armyleaders. Dismounted leaders must be able to do these tasks inorder to receive and issue orders, receive and manipulate digitalinformation, direct fire and maneuver, report information, callfor fire and conduct troop leading procedures. Army leaders havebeen doing these things on battlefields of the past and continue todo so today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. For years,

Stryker Unit Deploys withLand Warrior

Getting Dismounted Soldiers in the Future NetworkMAJOR DOUGLAS COPELAND

Lethality• Vision Enhancements – Day/Night• Improved Detection/Engagement

Accuracy (Joint Direct & Indirect)• Component Integration

Lethality• Vision Enhancements – Day/Night• Improved Detection/Engagement

Accuracy (Joint Direct & Indirect)• Component Integration

Fightability• Increased Accuracy of Direct Fire• Exact Target Locations Transmitted To Direct & Indirect Fire Systems• Rapid Movement, Precise Route Selection & Navigation• On the Move Situation Updates & Orders• Situation Assessment Near Real Time• Soldiers Observe, Shoot, & Communicate From Covered Positions

Battle CommandRapid Decision MakingDigital Orders & GraphicsCommon Operational PictureStryker to Dismount ConnectivityMission Rehearsal/ AAR

Battle CommandRapid Decision MakingDigital Orders & GraphicsCommon Operational PictureStryker to Dismount ConnectivityMission Rehearsal/ AAR

Sustainability• Automated Reporting• Minimized Logistics Requirements• Improved Power Sources• Faster MEDEVAC & Efficient Use Of Assets

Sustainability• Automated Reporting• Minimized Logistics Requirements• Improved Power Sources• Faster MEDEVAC & Efficient Use Of Assets

Interoperability• Increase Shared

Situational Awareness (SA)Red & Blue; Map/GraphicOverlays; Imagery

• Secure, Low Intercept Probability of Intercept Communications

Interoperability• Increase Shared

Situational Awareness (SA)Red & Blue; Map/GraphicOverlays; Imagery

• Secure, Low Intercept Probability of Intercept Communications

Mobility• Smaller, Lighter, Modular, Integrated• Improved Navigational Aids• Soldier Load Management

Mobility• Smaller, Lighter, Modular, Integrated• Improved Navigational Aids• Soldier Load Management

Survivability• Enhanced Survivability thru Reduced

Exposure Fire • Degraded Threat Detection

Ability (Signature Reduction)• Minimize Effects On Combat

Task Performance• Reduced Fratricide with SA

Survivability• Enhanced Survivability thru Reduced

Exposure Fire • Degraded Threat Detection

Ability (Signature Reduction)• Minimize Effects On Combat

Task Performance• Reduced Fratricide with SA

Figure 1 — Land Warrior Capabilities

dismounted leaders have relied onradios to communicate. If they werelucky, they had a map, a picture orother form of imagery, alcohol pen,protractor and pencil, coupled withacetate, to wage both deep and closebattles. Plans were made underponcho liners with a red lensflashlight or on a HMMWV top anddisseminated to subordinates byrunner, radio, or in person. Astechnology evolved, friendlylocations were tracked leveragingglobal positioning systems (GPS).Digital networks proliferatedthroughout mounted formations.Leveraging Force XXI Battle CommandBrigade and Below (FBCB2) and BlueForce Tracker systems, leaders at all levelsdeveloped tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTPs) that built upon theseabilities. Leaders not only saw themselvesand their buddies, but also enemy positionsand other battlefield entities in real time.Static and mobile command posts wereempowered by collaborative planning andbattle-tracking tools. Commandersconcentrated on combat system effectsrather than combat forces, enabling unitsto be both more survivable and more lethal.Our Army evolved into a digitallyconnected, platform-centric force, but ourleaders, once dismounted, have continuedto fight in nearly the same manner as wedid before a digital, GPS-empowerednetwork. Not any more. The Land WarriorSoldier system is the first step to get theleader into the digital battlefield. Currently,Land Warrior systems are deployed to theCentral Command area of responsibility(AOR) with the 4th Battalion, 9th InfantryRegiment, 4th Stryker Brigade CombatTeam, 2nd Infantry Division.

Land Warrior is a fully integrated andmodular close combat fighting system thatconnects the dismounted leader to thedigital battlefield. Land Warrior enhancesthe lethality, battle command and control(C2), mobility, survivability, andsustainability of dismounted combatleaders, enabling them to accomplish theirmission. Land Warrior facilitatescommand, control, and informationsharing. It integrates dismounted Soldiersdown to the team leader level into thedigitized battlefield. The Land Warriorsystem includes a multifunction laserrangefinder, helmet-mounted visual

displays, integrated load-carryingequipment with ballistic protection(Improved Outer Tactical Vest), AdvancedCombat Helmet, Peltor headset withspeaker and microphone, computersubsystem, navigation module, combat netradio system (CNRS), Soldier control unit,weapon user interface and a power source.Land Warrior interfaces with the M4carbine, the M203, and the M249 weaponsystems. Integrated components reduce thenet weight gain to the Soldier toapproximately 9 pounds. Land Warriormodularity permits tailoring for missionrequirements, and has the flexibility forexpanded capabilities. The 4th Battalion,9th Infantry equipped its leaders down tothe team leader level. The unit alsoequipped its medics, joint tactical aircontrollers (JTACs) and slice elements withLand Warrior systems. We have seenadditional equipping of Cavalry Soldiers inresponse to the nontraditional roles inwhich many Soldiers find themselvesoperating in Iraq.

Land Warrior supports the tenets ofcurrent infantry doctrine. It enhances aunit’s ability to perform its Armywarfighting functions. Land Warriorallows the unit to shape the battlefield andset the conditions that permit the equippedforce to close with and destroy the enemy.The Land Warrior Mission NeedsStatement, dated September 8, 1993,identified the need for improvements in fivecapabilities for dismounted Soldiers andleaders. These capabilities are: lethality,command and control, survivability,mobility, and sustainment. The LandWarrior system was developed to overcomethese deficiencies based on therequirements in the Land Warrior

Capability Production Document approvedby the Department of the Army onDecember 19, 2005. Equipping a smallunit with Land Warrior enhances its abilityto perform combat mission tasks byproviding improvements in these areas.Impacts to current techniques andprocedures are primarily in the areas ofmovement, reconnaissance andsurveillance, attack, consolidate andreorganize, defense, military operations inurban terrain, command and control, aswell as supporting individual and collectivetasks. Land Warrior provides the means toenhance combat power across the fullspectrum of tactical actions, missions, andoperations. Infantry unit design enables theforce to achieve dominance across the fullscale of contingencies from stability andreconstruction operations, small scalecontingency to a major theater of war.Tasks associated with these mission areasrequire a system that enables success in theplanning, shaping, and execution of closecombat.

Land Warrior provides units criticallyneeded capabilities to accomplish assignedcombat tasks and overcome existingcapability gaps. Land Warrior, beginningat the small unit level, provides:

A common operational picture ofthe close fight (operational levels);enhanced leader control in the close fightbetween maneuver and support elements,and between dismounted and mountedelements; accurate and timely sharing ofvoice, data, and graphical information,and mutual tracking of individuallocations, enabling tacticalunderstanding at all levels, which in turn,enables full synchronization of maneuverand fires, intra-small unit cooperative

Figure 2 — Views from the Land Warrior common operational picture as seen by the Soldierthrough the helmet-mounted display. Graphical control measures highlighting a scheme ofmaneuver (left) and zoom in view of the objective area (right).



engagements, fire distribution, and fire control.Increased survivability of units through enhanced

situational understanding, individual (body armor) and collectiveforce protection (unit dispersion in the close fight, protected orreduced exposure engagement, individual locations and tracking),and reduced incidences of fratricide.

The ability to generate and maintain reliable combatpower through engineering design of a robust electronics system.Built-in diagnostics and fault isolation reduces the need to evacuatetotal systems but focuses on fault identification at the small unitlevel enhanced by rapid reporting of repair needs; providing themeans to detect and repair problems at the lowest level, increasingthe availability to the end user.

Increased small unit lethality through controlled, efficientmaneuver combined with a greater ability to mass combat power(direct and indirect) at the proper point and time.

Increased movement efficiency through accuratevisualization of the battlespace at all levels, integrated navigation,load reduction, and thermal and image intensification sensors,which enables units to move farther, faster, and fight longer.

Increased leadership and command enhancements at thesmall tactical level, by providing leaders the means to fullyunderstand the situation and to better control the maneuver of hisunit and deliver all forms of effects.

Integrated Soldier systems that use one and/or twobatteries to run all components for 8-16 hours.

Land Warrior employment enables two critical conditions thatinfluence success in close combat. The first is the dismounted

force’s ability to set the conditions of the fight to friendlyadvantage. The second is the ability to strike the enemy withdecisive maneuver while limiting the enemy’s ability to effectivelyengage friendly forces.

Setting the Conditions of the Fight. Friendly forces must beable to develop the situation out of contact prior to making physicalor visual contact with the enemy. To do so, Soldiers must haveaccess to real-time tactical information on terrain, obstacles, andthe composition, disposition, and intentions of relevant enemyand friendly units. The Land Warrior system enables squads,platoons, and companies to synchronize effects through anenhanced ability to acquire and distribute knowledge. Enemydisposition is derived via Soldier reporting (every Soldier is asensor) and leader synchronization. Land Warrior-equippedleaders are provided the means to establish and maintain a commonoperating picture that assists in rapid adjustments to the tacticalplan, more robust combat power synchronization, and an overallhigher unit operational tempo.

Maintaining Situational Awareness (SA). While out ofcontact, Land Warrior-equipped forces continue to have access totimely information. This is enabled through efficiently receivingand disseminating critical information at the appropriate level ofcommand. Land Warrior-equipped units maintain freedom ofaction and rapid tempo by receiving and displaying information

U.S. Army photo

Soldiers from C Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry,take part in urban training during assessments of Land

Warrior equipment at Fort Lewis, Washington.

in such a manner that allows leaders to rapidlymake adjustments to the maneuver plan. Sensorequipment (day, thermal sights, lasers, etc.)integrated onto a Soldier’s primary weaponprovides the ability to generate and distribute SAwithin small units. The Land Warrior system,supported by selected battalion command and staffpersonnel equipped with Land Warrior, enablesmore accurate assessments of enemy dispositionsand is better enabled to support the commander’sintent in the close fight by maneuvering to aposition of advantage out of contact.

Strike the Enemy with Decisive Maneuver.The infantry battalion applies its combat power toproduce overmatching effects at the decisive timeand place to defeat the enemy and accomplish itsmission. Subordinate units are employed as theprimary elements of the battalion’s combat poweragainst specific decisive points, key forces, andcapabilities within the battalion. Within the scopeof battalion operations, companies, platoons, andsquads must maximize their ability to choosedecisive engagement locations from positions of advantage,synchronizing fire and maneuver culminating in tactical assaultfollowed by a rapid transition to exploitation and pursuit. LandWarrior-equipped units still execute the traditional forms ofmaneuver. However, a Land Warrior-equipped small unit will bebetter enabled to rely on forms of maneuver requiring greaterprecision while avoiding engagements such as the frontal attackthat are characterized by minimal maneuver precision andmarginal situational understanding of enemy disposition andintent. As a component of a higher command achieving superiorknowledge, the Land Warrior unit chooses the time and locationof decisive engagement. These attacks are originated by continuingmaneuver from established positions of advantage. Once forcesare decisively engaged, the primary purpose of any infantry-basedforce is to close with and destroy the enemy. Land Warrior enablesunits to leverage information to more rapidly seize and retain theinitiative. Leaders make better informed decisions, increasingagility and threat overmatch.

Offensive Operations. Offensive operations seek to seize,retain, and exploit the initiative to defeat the enemy decisively.Battles may be linear or nonlinear and conducted in contiguousor noncontiguous areas of operations. Infantry forces (companies,platoons, and squads) utilize Land Warrior to reduce reactive battledrills to more deliberate tactical operations. For example, unitswill gain greater situational awareness on enemy positions viceconducting operations to find the enemy. Units develop thesituation largely out of contact instead of reacting to contact. Unitsmaneuver to positions of advantage out of contact while retainingfreedom of maneuver, and conducting decisive combat at the timeand place of friendly force choosing. Units also have the abilityto re-task organize “on the fly,” attach and detach platoons andcross-attach companies, when required to support the commander’sintent.

Develop Situation Out Of Contact. Land Warrior-equippedunits are more capable of developing the situation out of contactthrough access to timely information and thus greater situational

awareness. A common operational picture provides theinformation required in a tactical unit to ensure Soldiers in theforce know where they are, know where their unit members are,and as information is acquired or disseminated from a highercommand, where the enemy is located. The primary requirementsthat will drive enhanced capabilities are a networked small unitinformation infrastructure that generates and routes criticalinformation to Soldiers, combined with a near real-time visualfriendly and enemy common operating picture that provides keyleaders the means to determine required adjustments to the tacticalplan. Land Warrior key leaders located at the battalion commandand staff level review and update the enemy common operatingpicture. Land Warrior leaders will also update a friendly commonpicture scaled to their area of operations. Initially, Soldiers notequipped with Land Warrior will continue to observe their sectorsand provide verbal reports. Subsequent increments will evolvesystem capability towards greater battle command interoperabilityacross the force structure and eventually evolve into the GroundSoldier System.

Maneuver To Positions Of Advantage. Land Warrior-equipped forces are better enabled to maneuver to positions ofadvantage out of contact while retaining freedom of maneuverthrough the enhanced capability of Soldiers having near real-timeaccess to a tailored friendly and enemy common operating picture.An enemy location either becomes known prior to contact or oncecontact is made. Leaders can choose alternative schemes ofmaneuver (e.g. direct and/or indirect fires) that do not rely onsignificant forces to fix an enemy prior to unit movement to destroythe enemy. Given a broader tactical perspective that generatessituational understanding, leaders have the option of retainingfreedom of maneuver and protecting the force to attack moredangerous targets first rather than simply react to contact enrouteto an ultimate objective. Maneuver units are able to moreeffectively identify assailable flanks and positions of advantagethrough knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions and posture.Commanders have greater insight into (and control over) the most


Courtesy photo

The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment spent nine months testing and training withthe Land Warrior system before deploying to Iraq.

A Soldier with C Company,4th Battalion, 9th InfantryRegiment takes part in urbantraining during assessments ofLand Warrior equipment atFort Lewis, Washington,in June 2006.Courtesy photo


effective time to conduct maneuver. Better knowledge furtherpermits commanders to choose the best routes to the objectivearea with respect to stealth, speed, and momentum. Through theconfidence built by knowing the locations of friendly forces, dayor night, and/or limited visibility, small unit agility is enhanced.More complex movements are accomplished to gain positions ofadvantage with distinct force protection improvements of beingable to rapidly synchronize shifts in the maneuver plan withadjustments to supporting fires.

Decisive Operations. Decisive operations are ultimately basedon tactical success in close combat. Land Warrior-equipped unitsmust be effective in closing with and destroying the enemy andseizing and controlling key terrain. The key aspect of close combattactical actions is the ability of units to integrate firepower,maneuver, and assault to win the close combat fight wherever theenemy is found. During contact, Land Warrior-equipped smallunits maneuver to positions of advantage, initiate decisive contactat the chosen time and place while integrating fire and maneuver.Through the integrated capabilities provided to Land Warrior-equipped Soldiers in the close fight, small units are able to employspeed, stealth, and deception to avoid detection, protect movement,retain freedom of action, engage enemy forces while en route,and build momentum. The Land Warrior-equipped unit adaptson the move, adjusting routes and objectives based on changes tothe situation, fighting the enemy, not the plan. The Land Warriortactical assault is characterized by highly precise and synchronizedfires and maneuver. Support-by-fire elements have exact personnellocations and can place effective suppressive fire on distinctlocations. Indirect fire assets are moreprecisely synchronized due to a clear

visualization of all equipped Soldiers in the assault and knowledgeof the enemy disposition and intent. The Land Warrior-equippedunit seeks to engage the enemy one time, denying him theopportunity to retreat and reconstitute. This goal requires bothclose assault and finishing actions that continue contact withretreating forces to destroy them in detail.

Defensive Operations. The purpose of defensive operationsis to defeat enemy attacks with the desired end state to buy time,economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for resumingoffensive operations. Defending forces await the attacker’s blowand defeat the attack by successfully deflecting it. All phases ofdefensive operations are enhanced through tactical awareness,providing a common tactical picture throughout the entire defense.Land Warrior enables focused concentration of fires, fire controland distribution, proper commitment of reserves for execution ofthe counterattack, and execution of alternate and primary battleplans. Capability is enhanced in defensive preparation throughcollaborative planning and coordination of available fires,intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Land Warriorcapabilities provide a combat multiplier in the defense, enablingearly detection of the enemy force and rapid reporting anddissemination of information. The threat is attacked with precisionfrom protected positions, through maneuver and indirect firesupport, in support of the close fight. The result is the disruptionof the attacker’s tempo and synchronization with actions designedto prevent them from massing combat power. Tactical awarenessand understanding enhances the Land Warrior-equipped force’sability to mass effects of overwhelming combat power across a

wide variety of battlefield conditions. A characteristic ofdefensive operations is that commanders accept risk in some

areas to mass effects elsewhere. The common operatingpicture containing both friendly and enemy situational

awareness information enables commanders tomitigate risk given the ability to better discern enemydisposition and intent. Ultimately, Land Warriorenables concentration of forces with enhanced C2

for fire control and distribution, commitment ofreserves, timely occupation of battle positions and

counterattacks.Stability and Support Operations (SASO). In

accordance with U.S. national military strategy and asevidenced by current and recent military operations,

the Army will continue to be involved in SASO.Stability operations promote and protect U.S.

national interests by influencing the threat,political, and information dimensions of the

operational environment. Supportoperations are usually nonlinear and

noncontiguous. Commanders designatethe decisive, shaping, and sustainingoperations necessary for missionsuccess. In stability and supportoperations, the enemy is often disease,hunger, or the consequences ofdisaster. Although the Land Warriorsystem was designed primarily as acombat system to provide infantrymaneuver battalions, companies,

small units, and individual combatants anovermatch capability against enemy forces,it also provides flexibility for employmentacross the full spectrum of military operations.

Soldier as a System:Land Warrior is one of the first steps

that align Soldier capabilities in accordancewith the Soldier as a System (SaaS)concept. The Soldier as a System conceptprovides an integrated system’s approachto modernizing and increasing Soldier andsmall unit capabilities to support currentand future joint operations. In addition,the SaaS concept views the Soldier as thecenterpiece and ensures Soldier-relatedDOTMLPF issues are addressed. LandWarrior is the initial effort in thedevelopment of an integrated, modularSoldier system. It initially focused onStryker brigade combat teams, small unitswithin Stryker infantry battalions, andselected Soldiers in direct support ofinfantry battalions. Land Warrior is theevolutionary base for the Ground SoldierSystems’ (GSS) capabilities. Land Warrior-equipped Soldiers perform missions thatrequire connectivity to their supportingplatforms, but must have survivability andcommunications that are independent ofSoldier platforms. The GSS will improveupon Land Warrior capabilities, and whencombined with the core Soldier system willmeet the needs of all Soldiers who conductground close combat in the future force.The GSS enables Soldiers to efficientlyinteroperate with, and better exploit, allcapabilities by providing continuousconnectivity to sensors and effectivelylinking warfighters to both mounted anddismounted crews and local securityelements. The GSS supports UJTL(Universal Joint Task List) tasks at alllevels, specifically the tasks at the tacticallevel of war. The GSS will enhance missionperformance of the following tactical leveltasks: Tactical 1 — Deploy/ConductManeuver; Tactical 2 — DevelopIntelligence; Tactical 3 and 4 — EmployFirepower; and Tactical 5 — PerformLogistics and Combat Service Support.Capabilities include lighter weight, enhancedpower sources and sensors. GSS will alsoadd FCS interoperability. The user-definedoperational picture (UDOP) will add greaterfidelity to friendly location tracking andadds enemy tracking. Collaborative SAimproves information exchange to enhance

Soldier-to-Soldier interactions, especiallyfor networked lethality, and missionrehearsal. The user interface requiresgreater hands free efficiency. Embeddedtraining (ET) will enable more learning andretention in less time and provides just-in-time refresher training or emergency initialtraining. Networking of Soldiers, weapons,sensors and external assets enablesgeographically dispersed small units tocollaboratively influence larger areas withgreater precision, speed and a broadervariety of lethal and less-than-lethal effects.The UDOP will provide Soldiers theactionable information they need to sustaincollaborative initiative.


Ultimately, Land Warriorenables concentration of

forces with enhanced C2 forfire control and distribution,

commitment of reserves,timely occupation of battle

positions and counterattacks.

While Land Warrior is truly the baselinefor the GSS, the Future Force Warrior(FFW) Advanced TechnologyDemonstration (ATD) has workeddiligently for the last five years on testing,evaluating and integrating best in classtechnologies to further inform the GSS.Focus areas have been in reducing size,weight, power consumption whileincreasing integrated, modular capabilitiesavailable to the Soldier. The FFW ATDwill meet its exit criteria this fall at AirAssault Expeditionary Force (AAEF),Spiral D, at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Integrated Body Subsystem (IBS) — Consists of the Computer/MasterHub Subsystem, Soldier Control Unit Subsystem, Communications Net RadioSubsystem, Navigation Subsystem, Power Subsystem, and Personal Area Network.

Computer/Master Hub Subsystem — Primary device for integrating datafrom the other sensors, components, and subsystems and displaying this informationin the Soldier’s helmet-mounted display (HMD). The computer and software allowsthe Soldier to access and process situational awareness information received in missionoperation orders and messages. It also prepares mission reports to higher echelons,and processes and sends stillframe video or thermal images from sensors andcompresses them for transmission via the radio subsystem.

Soldier Control Unit (SCU) Subsystem — Allows the Soldier to interfacewith the system, through a thumb stick for cursor mouse controls, mouse buttons,radio talk control buttons to control volume and video selection. The SCU is designedfor right or left-handed Soldiers; and has a zeroize button that allows the Soldier todelete sensitive data. The SCU contains a Soldier Access Module (SAM) card readerthat allows Soldier log-on. The SAM card contains the unit reference number (URN)and Soldier’s personal identification number (PIN); it is unique for each Soldier andmade for the Soldier on the Mission Data Support Equipment (MDSE).

Communications Network Radio Subsystem (CNRS) — Provides the voiceand data transmission/communication capabilities of Land Warrior.

Navigation Subsystem (NSS) — Provides position and navigationinformation. NSS consists of the GPS and antenna and the Dead Reckoning Device(DRD). GPS provides a position solution that is accurate to within 3-5 meters. TheDRD augments GPS and maintains a position solution when the Soldier is operatingin restrictive terrain (e.g., urban or thick tree canopy) and GPS may be degraded orunavailable. The DRD also provides a heading reference indication to assist innavigation. Algorithms process information from the GPS and DRD to provide aposition solution that is more accurate than either sensor alone.

LAND WARRIOR SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Major Douglas Copeland is currentlyattending the Naval Postgraduate School inMonterey, California. He previously served as theAssistant TRADOC Capability Manager - Soldierat Fort Benning, Georgia, and was the GroundSoldier System/Future Force Warrior lead. He hasalso served as the deputy brigade S3 for the 3rdBrigade, 1st Cavalry Division and as a companycommander for B Company, 2nd Battalion, 7thCavalry (Mechanized).


Personal Area Network and Power Subsystem — Adistributed Universal Serial Bus (USB) network that directsinformation between the subsystems and the Computer/MasterHub. Dependent upon duration desired, the system is poweredby 1 – 2 Lithium Ion rechargeable batteries. One of these lastsapproximately eight hours during continuous use.

Software Subsystem — Integrates subsystems whichprovide lethality, survivability, mobility, command, control,communications, and situational awareness.

Helmet Subsystem (HSS) — Integrated on theAdvanced Combat Helmet (ACH), HMD, and image intensifier(I2). The HSS has a Helmet Interface Assembly (HIA) whichinterfaces with the HMD, headset with speakers/microphone, andthe IBS. The HSS is compatible with the manual aiming and firingof the modular weapon, with chemical/biological (CB) andenvironmental protective clothing, and with the M45 CB maskthat are provided as government-furnished equipment (GFE).

* Advanced Combat Helmet — Provided as GFE. Inaddition to the HMD and PVS-14 described below, a Peltorheadset with microphone and speaker is worn with the helmetto receive and transmit voice communications and receive audiofrom the computer and radio

* Helmet-Mounted Display — Is a color display that, whenviewed, replicates a 17 inch color monitor. The HMD is hands-free and can be positioned over either eye. It has an integrated on/off switch so that it can be turned off when not in use. The HMD isnot constantly over the user’s eye. It swings up and out of the wayof the eye when not needed.

* Image Intensifier — The PVS-14 is provided as GFE andconnects to the ACH.

* Headset — The Peltor headset provides high-qualityhearing protection while allowing small-sound recognition andincludes speakers and a microphone. The Peltor headset is acommercial off-the-shelf (COTS) item.

Weapon Subsystem — Consists of the ModularWeapon System (MWS), Close Combat Optic (CCO), ThermalWeapons Sight (TWS), Daylight Video Sight (DVS), andMultifunction Laser (MFL). The TWS, DVS, and MFL areintegrated to the system through a single cable wiring harness.Land Warrior interfaces with the M4, M249 Squad AutomaticWeapon (SAW) and M203 grenade launcher.

* Modular Weapons System — Consists of mounting railsand adapters that can be attached to the presently-fielded M45.56mm weapon, M249 SAW, and M16A4/M203. The MWSrails provide additional mounting surfaces that allowcomponents such as the CCO, DVS, and MFL to be attached.

* Thermal Weapons Sight (AN-PAS 13) — Provides thecapability to detect man-sized targets in daylight, darkness, andthrough obscurants. The TWS image can be viewed directly onthe sight, displayed in the HMD for indirect viewing, or captured(single frame only) for transmission via radio.

* Daylight Video Sight — For daylight use and providesthe Soldier with video images that can be displayed on the HMD.The DVS has the capability to magnify images at 1.5 X, 6 Xand 12 X. Soldiers can also capture and store digital images.

* STORM Multifunction Laser — Incorporates laserrange-finding, digital compass, visible and infrared (IR)pointing, and IR illumination capabilities. The MFL replacesfunctionality of the existing stand-alone PEQ-2 and PAQ-4devices into a combined device that is controlled through LandWarrior software.

* Close Combat Optic – A reflex or telescopic sight. Has ared aiming reference (collimated dot) and is designed for “twoeyes open” method of sighting. The dot follows the horizontaland vertical movement of the eye while remaining fixed on thetarget. No centering or focusing is required.

Protective Clothing and Individual EquipmentSubsystem (PCIES) — Includes existing GFE and new clothingand individual equipment items. Components include: ModularLoad-Carrying Equipment, IOTV, Joint Services LightweightIntegrated Suit Technology (JSLIST), M45 CB Mask, MilitaryEye Protection System (MEPS), and other existing organizationalclothing and individual equipment (CIE).

Land Warrior Support Equipment:Mission Data Support Equipment (MDSE) – Primary

source of digital mission information used by system. TheMDSE is resident on a dedicated laptop computer (toughbook).It allows the user to generate, maintain, and transfer the MissionData Packages (MDPs) that contain critical informationrequired to enable conduct of missions. MDPs include digitalmaps, overlays, operations orders, Unit Task Organization(UTO) data, and images. The MDSE also prepares and editSAM cards. (GFE)

Network Manager — A rugged laptop based softwareprogram used to provide automated network management andcontrol of the communications network. Assigns and maintainsconfiguration parameters of the communications devices. Thenetwork manager is provided as GFE and is resident at thebattalion level S6. Allows the battalion signal shop to configureradios, remote zeroize and monitor network.

Multi-Battery Charger — Recharges system rechargeablebatteries both in the vehicle and out of the vehicle. The chargersare configured for a three-battery charger (vehicle) and a 12-battery charger (unit resupply area).

Keying Device — A hand-held device capable of securelyreceiving, storing, and transferring data between compatiblecryptographic and communications equipment. The keying devicewill be used to load communications security (COMSEC) keysand is provided as GFE to the Land Warrior-equipped unit.

Vehicle Interface Kits (VIK) — Provided for the followingStryker vehicle variants: Infantry Combat Vehicle,Reconnaissance Vehicle, Commander’s Vehicle, EngineerSquad Vehicle, Mortar Carrier, Fire Support Vehicle, MedicalEvacuation Vehicle, and the NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle. TheVIK expands system capability to interoperate with the ArmyBattle Command System by interfacing through FBCB2, AN/VIC-3, and the Land Warrior radio network system, to providethe Army-wide capability to conduct operations with battlefieldinformation distributed in digital voice and data format.


TRADOC Capability Manager(TCM) Soldier conducted aDOTMLPF (doctrine,

organization, training, materiel,leadership, education, personnel, andfacilities) assessment of the Land Warriorsystem with 4-9 Infantry at Fort Lewis,Washington, over the past 18 months. Inconjunction with the TCM-Soldierassessments, the Army Test and EvaluationCommand conducted an independentlimited user test (LUT) in September andOctober of 2006. Land Warrior proved tomitigate 13 of the 19 identified U.S. ArmySmall Unit Capability Gaps. Land Warriorproved to provide increased capabilities tosmall units and their leaders. The mostsignificant impacts were in the areas oflethality, battle command, voicecommunications, and situationalawareness.

Lethality. Day and night visionenhancements are integrated throughthermal imagery, image intensification,and daylight video. Land Warrior providesthe capability to engage targets by viewingthrough the helmet-mounted display whileexposing hands and arms only (reducedexposure firing technique). This integratedcapability is not found on the battlefieldtoday. This technique has proven to reduceSoldier exposure to hostile fire by up to 82percent.

The Land Warrior-integrated Multi-Function Laser (MFL) also allows Soldiersto quickly determine the accurate locationof targets as well as their own location andsend accurate, digital calls for fire or targetdescriptions (e.g. sniper or improvisedexplosive device locations). Land Warriorwas not used as a sole source for clearanceof fires, but was another tool for the firesclearance authority to use to verify thesituation and help alleviate fratricide.

Land Warrior provided increased smallunit lethality through controlled, efficientmaneuver combined with a greater abilityto mass combat power (direct and indirect)

LAND WARRIOR DOTMLPF ANDLUT RESULTS

MAJOR DOUGLAS COPELAND

at the proper point and time. Similar to theeffect FBCB2 has on mounted warfare,Land Warrior provided added situationalawareness to dismounted and mountedpersonnel. Mounted personnel haveenhanced situational understanding ofwhere dismounted Soldiers are located andhow they are arrayed on the battlefield.Dismounted personnel have increasedsituational understanding of where otherdismounted and mounted elements arelocated and how they are supporting theirmaneuver. Digital, real-time reportingcreates a common, easily accessiblemedium for all to monitor enemy andfriendly situational updates. Thiscombination of information enhancessituational awareness and fosters greaterunderstanding for mounted and dismountedleaders, which enables efficient,coordinated maneuver to the decisive point.The MFL provides the user with the abilityto call for fire by using its integratedfunctionality of laze, auto fill, call for fire,or terrain association and verification onthe helmet-mounted display using a hostof maps and imagery. This capability

provides a bridge to controlling precisionfires, another current capability gap for thesmall combat unit. Call-for-fire missionsusing the MFL have proven to provide moreresponsive and accurate fire missions.Clearance of fires procedures are reduceddue to two factors: increased situationalawareness and enhanced communicationsbetween initiator and clearance-levelauthority with the additional capability tointerface with digital call-for-fireprocedures. These additional proceduressupport the “see first, understand first, andact first” philosophy. The combination ofthese capabilities in a unit equipped withLand Warrior results in a more agile andresponsive unit that leverages all enablersavailable to the force.

Battle Command. Command andcontrol is greatly enhanced by the abilityto communicate orders to all elementssimultaneously. Precise unit locations onthe digital map that show the relationshipof friendly and known hostile elements onthe battlefield help reduce the fog of warcreated by voice-only situation reports.Situational awareness allows leaders to

Figure 1 — Land Warrior/Mounted Warrior DOTMLPF Assessment Study DirectorSmall Unit Capability Gap Assessment


track the progress of subordinate elementsas they maneuver, allowing them to makecorrections or changes as necessary.Warning orders, fragmentary orders, andoperations orders are digitally transmittedto higher, subordinate, attached, andsupporting units and greatly reduce thetime and error associated with anotherwise lengthy analog process. LandWarrior provides the user with a greaterdegree of situational awareness than everbefore available. Land Warrior situationalawareness provides every Soldier thecapability to view his position on thedigital map and show his relationship toother friendly and known hostile elementson the battlefield. This enhanced SAcapability also allows the leader to trackthe progress of subordinate elements as they maneuver allowingfor on-the-move corrections as necessary. Situations thatpreviously could take considerable time and effort to overcomeare now streamlined to a common, accurate medium that facilitatesinformed individual and collective synergy. Real-timecommunications and employment of accurate supporting fires giveforces the ability to maintain an unprecedented operational tempo.

Voice Communications. Land Warrior provides voicecommunications between mounted and dismounted leaders andSoldiers. Land Warrior-equipped users are able to monitor up tothree nets simultaneously, a feature that currently only resides inmounted forces. Mounted Soldiers are able to monitor internaland external communications within their vehicle and have theadditional capability to monitor Land Warrior communicationsthrough a gateway. The Land Warrior Vehicle Integration Kitcreates this gateway and allows GPS tracking and normal radiocommunication between mounted and dismounted forces on themove. This eliminates the need for an intercom headset and theassociated communication lapse prior to dismounting. The LandWarrior Soldier radio and noise-reducing headsets facilitatebriefing all Soldiers prior to dismounting. Each Soldier’s abilityto refer to his own helmet-mounted display and map productsfurther enhances comprehension of the leader’s plan. Real-time,secure voice communications bolster efficient vertical andhorizontal digital communications. The coupling of these twomediums allows users to report quickly, exchange criticalinformation between mounted and dismounted forces and discussthe situation while looking at a real-time depiction of theoperational environment (friendly and enemy). A more holisticindividual and collective understanding allows collaboration. Thisresults in faster maneuvering and accurate, coordinated supportingand organic fires with less risk of fratricide. This ability tocollaborate creates momentum within an organization.Coordination can be made on a common waveform for pick-up,drop-off, supporting fires, maneuver, etc., without having to repeatorders or change frequencies. Fifty percent of mounted leadersreported an increased ability to coordinate with mounted squadsbefore they dismount (35 percent report “about the same” and 15percent report a decreased ability).

When mounted, leaders are generally limited to monitoring

radio traffic through a dedicatedheadset because current squad radiosare incapable of receiving ortransmitting through armored vehiclehulls. Monitored radio traffic providesleaders with a general understandingof the larger scale tactical situation, butprovides little information on theirimmediate surroundings upondismounting. When available, FBCB2displays provide additional detail andterrain products, allowing generalanalysis of the terrain near thedismount point. This allows the leaderto identify enemy positions and plan atentative route for his assault.Currently, mounted leaders preparetheir units for dismount by providing a

verbal briefing of the expected situation upon dismounting. Thiscan be difficult in the loud, dark, and cramped confines of a movingarmored vehicle, and Soldier comprehension of detailed briefingsin this environment can be limited. Squad leaders receive a generaldescription of the situation and a direction to move when they areordered to dismount, but this can still be insufficient to overcomethe disorientation that accompanies exiting an armored vehiclein unfamiliar terrain. Immediately prior to dismounting, the leadermust also remove his vehicle intercom headset. This preventscommunication between the leader and the remainder of theplatoon (including the vehicle crew) until the leader is outside ofthe vehicle. This can be particularly dangerous when dismountingin contact, as the leader has no means to receive reports of changesin the enemy situation. During dismount, the squad leader mustrapidly assess his surroundings, identify terrain references fororientation, and find a covered position for his unit. He mustaccomplish all of these tasks before he can begin any offensiveaction. In a Land Warrior-equipped unit, this can all beaccomplished before dismount.

Digital Communications. Land Warrior connects thedismounted leader and Soldier to the digital battlefield. Userssend and receive digital messages (SALUTE reports, situationalreports [SITREPs], unit position reports, known and suspectedenemy positions, calls for fire, medical evacuations [MEDEVAC]),which are fully interoperable with FBCB2 and the entire suite ofthe ABCS. Digital graphics that are created, shared and leveragedare extremely beneficial. A picture is worth a thousand words tousers and can be shared instantly to all members of a unit withouthaving to print and distribute manually. Using mission datasupport equipment, units can distribute black, grey and white listpictures to checkpoints and patrols in a digital package that canbe quickly referenced. In addition, Soldiers and leaders can sendmessages in a free text or preformatted message format. Thesemessages streamline otherwise busy verbal radio communications.While inputting free text messages can be a lengthy process, theyare effective. Radio silence can be maintained and purely digitalmessages can take their place. Creating preformatted digitalmessages prior to a mission has proven to speed up the process ofreporting during movement. Phase lines, rally points, operationalschedules and call-for-fire messages that are preformatted prior

“The Land Warrior systemprovides near real-time knowledge

of where I am and where all myunits are. That gives me a betterability to command and controlthe movement of the unit in the

field, prevent fratricide, anddetermine what force I want to

bring to bear on known orsuspected enemy locations at a

given time.”— Captain Patrick Roddy,

Commander of C Company, 4thBattalion, 9th Infantry Regiment

(Army News Service, January 2007)


to crossing the line of departure can be sent much like an instantmessage on e-mail. This method accelerates operational tempoduring mission execution. Land Warrior-equipped units haveproven that when voice communications fail, digitalcommunications are still possible. Lastly, users can send anautomated call for medic digital message, depicting their exactlocation on the battlefield. Medics equipped with Land Warriorcan maneuver directly to the location of the injured Soldier. Thisstreamlines the process if the Soldier is incapacitated and in ahard-to-find location.

Situational Awareness. Soldiers and leaders can view thecurrent location of all Land Warrior-equipped personnel in thehelmet-mounted display. The display allows the user to view adigital map, imagery, position location information, as well asview sight picture in thermal and daylight modes. The Soldier orleader views his common operating picture on a screen thatreplicates a 17-inch monitor. The helmet-mounted display allowsthe user to view information while maintaining light disciplineduring hours of limited visibility. He can move the display out ofthe way when he doesn’t want to view it and rotate it in front ofhis eye when he needs to check his position or his unit’s friendlyand/or enemy situation. The user checks his situation in a similarmanner to conducting a map check; however, unlike using aprotractor and map, he can get digital updates while on the move.Real-time position location information provides improved,accurate and efficient knowledge of locations of all mounted anddismounted personnel. The shared common picture of geo-referenced maps and images enhances battle tracking, streamlinesreporting and drives efficient application of combat power. Smallunits have greater maneuverability and can cover greater distancesdue to shared, accurate position location information. Accuratesituational awareness allows all users to efficiently control fireand maneuver with increased dispersion. Shared, accurate firecontrol, position location information and real-time enemysituation updates facilitate efficient battlespace management. Usersbetter understand and execute plans and orders because ofcollaborative understanding of the total picture. Leaders can massand prioritize fires with less risk of fratricide while retaining theflexibility of better informed maneuver. Land Warrior’s automaticexecution of these reports enables more consistent reporting. Basedon questionnaire data collected from the Land Warriorexperimental unit, 60 percent of leaders reported a “better” or“much better” ability to monitor the activity of their own unit,and 63 percent reported “better” or “much better” ability to monitorthe activity of adjacent units when using Land Warrior. LandWarrior is continuously updated and its use as a common referencemitigates the effects of adverse conditions or geographic dispersionon the unit’s situational awareness. Sixty-six percent of leadersand 48 percent of non-leaders surveyed reported a “better” or“much better” understanding of other unit members’ position. Inaddition, 38 percent of leaders and 26 percent of non-leadersreported that Land Warrior provided a “better” or “much better”ability to avoid situations of fratricide. The greater perceivedbenefit reported by leaders is likely due to their greater awarenessof this issue and their application of greater significance to it.

Digital Mapping and Topographic Capability. Land Warrior-equipped Soldiers and leaders fight using recent, relevant imagery,rather than outdated maps, rough sketches, piles of acetate and/or

memorization. Users can choose the map, map scale and imageryto use in current operations and have the ability to store theseproducts for reference in the future. Land Warrior-equipped leaderscan manipulate digital maps during the conduct of an operationto facilitate FRAGOs and/or follow-on OPORDs while on themove. Common graphic formats such as Falcon View, geo-referenced satellite images, Microsoft Office products, picturesand FBCB2 overlays can be loaded through the Land Warriormission data support equipment. Land Warrior-equipped mountedpersonnel are also able to view all of these products.

Survivability. Land Warrior aids overall unit survivability.When leveraged by a unit, Land Warrior functionalities increasespeed and accuracy of collective maneuver and allow greatertactical dispersion during a variety of dismounted and mountedmissions. Land Warrior-equipped squads demonstrate enhancedmovement and more accurate navigation as compared to RapidFielding Initiative-equipped units. Opposition forces and subjectmatter experts’ observations concluded that the Land Warrior-equipped unit was less detectable than a standard modified tableof organization and equipment (MTOE) unit. These sameobservers concluded that the observed unit could do extremelydifficult, dispersed missions during hours of limited visibility andin difficult terrain with unprecedented success, while otherobserved non-equipped units took hours longer to conduct the samemissions. The combination of these effects increases unitsurvivability because the unit can get the job done faster withtotal unit understanding and reduced tactical confusion. Thisconstitutes a decrease in massed unit exposure to enemy directand indirect fires during deliberate offensive operations. LandWarrior-equipped personnel survivability is enhanced by increasedsituational awareness, call-for medic function, reduced exposurefire and observation capabilities.

Land Warrior allows for better situational awareness throughthe common operating picture displayed in the helmet-mounteddisplay. The COP shows mounted and dismounted friendlylocations, known and suspected enemy forces and known andsuspected friendly and enemy obstacles and hazards. In addition,

4-2 Mission Rehearsal Exercise 12 Feb 07The battalion commander and command sergeant major

were in a meeting in the commander’s tent inside the forwardoperating base, discussing operations with their JointReadiness Training Center observer/controllers (OCs). Duringtheir discussions the battalion commander continued to trackongoing operations via his helmet-mounted display, and atone point a red chemlight icon appeared on his display. Henoticed this and told his command sergeant major to checkhis Land Warrior ensemble for verification. Both had the sameicon, and within seconds this icon changed to denote an enemyimprovised explosive device. The situation unfolding on theground was relayed to all Land Warrior-equipped leaders andSoldiers and noticed by the OCs. The battalion commanderwas informed by the OCs that the enemy IED was meant forhim when he was to go to an upcoming meeting with localtown leaders. The battalion commander was able to changehis meeting location, secure the device, and accomplish themission without incident.


Soldiers with the 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division from Fort Lewis, Washington, search the palm groves in the Taji area for insurgents May 15.

A Soldier withCompany B, 4th

Battalion, 9thInfantry Regiment,pulls security as an

Iraqi man speakswith an interpreteron the outskirts of

Baqubah.

Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno, as Staff Sergeants Ndifreke Aanam-Ndu Warrior systems May 24.


Photos by Staff Sergeant Antonieta Rico

A Soldier with the 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division checks the position of his Soldiers through his LandWarrior helmet-mounted display during a raid near Baghdad.

commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, listensand James Young talk to him about their Land

the ability to manipulate situation reports and geo-referenced graphics, pictures and overlaysallows for real time situational understanding on current visual products. Land Warrior-equippedpersonnel can avoid potential hazards, such as known or suspected IEDs. Known or suspectedenemy locations can be taken into consideration during planning and execution. Updates tothe situation are reported digitally and are not relayed by grid and plotted on the map using aprotractor. Land Warrior-equipped personnel conducting operations over large areas do nothave to carry around large sets of maps. Land Warrior-equipped leaders do not have to copyseveral sets of graphics that may or may not lose accuracy in translation that in the past hascontributed to confusion and in some cases fratricide. Multiple maps, overlays and paperdocuments can fall into the hands of the enemy and may be used against friendly forces. Thiscreates a substantial operational security issue for our forces. Instead, Land Warrior data isstored digitally in the Soldier’s computer subsystem. Operational security is enhanced becauseLand Warrior-equipped personnel can purge their data if they feel imminent compromise. Inaddition, Land Warrior systems can be remotely purged by others. All equipped users haveinstant access to all materials that are relevant (because of messaging filters), accurate (realtime) and tailorable (leaders can distill higher level graphics and make their part of the planwithout loss of accuracy of the overarching order). The synergistic effect of having thesematerials has the potential to decrease fratricide and increase survivability and overall forceeffectiveness.

Land Warrior-equipped Soldiers also have the ability to remotely call for medical assistanceusing a digital message. This message can either be sent by pressing the call-for-medic buttonon the Soldier Control Unit or by text message. If a Soldier is wounded, he can press his call-for-medic button and send an instantaneous report to his leadership and medical personnel. Ifhis buddy is incapacitated, he can send a preformatted call for medic. This streamlines thecasualty evacuation process which takes up precious time and radio messages over the commandnet. A Soldier that is wounded and unable to move can be located more quickly on the battlefieldby the aid and litter teams, medics or the platoon sergeant since the wounded’s position isinstantly available to all on the common operating picture. These support personnel are better


informed as to the situation around thecasualty thereby setting the conditions forsafe extraction.

Land Warrior-equipped Soldiers incovered and concealed positions utilizingthe Daylight Video Sight (with imagedisplayed in the helmet-mounted display)for observation have a considerablereduction (40-80 percent) in individualvulnerability or exposure to direct firesurvivability. The Daylight Video Sight canmagnify 1.5x, 6x, and 12x. This capabilityhas shown utility when scanning forsnipers, obstacles, improvised explosivedevices and other battlefield hazards byboth infantrymen and sniper teams. LandWarrior-equipped personnel can conductdetailed reconnaissance of the surroundingterrain using the reduced exposureobservation capability, only exposing theirhands and a portion of their arms. Soldiersusing their naked eyes or binoculars in thecurrent fight must expose their heads, uppertorso, hands and arms to the enemy. Whilereduced exposure observation improvesSoldier survivability during stationaryreconnaissance, he is still subject todetection due to the additional timerequired to scan a comparable area. This

is due to the limited Daylight Video Sightfield of view. This could increase scanningtimes and the enemy’s chances of visuallydetecting the Soldier. Land Warrior alsooffers improved survivability whileconducting reconnaissance beforebeginning individual movement underdirect fire, but, again this advantage maybe partially negated by a possible increasein likelihood of detection by the enemy.

Mobility. Mobility, as relayed by a 4-9IN company first sergeant, is the balancebetween added capability to the Soldier/Unit and added weight to the Soldier/Unit.The Land Warrior Capabilities ProductionDocument threshold for Soldier fightingload is 77 pounds. Recent additions toSoldier-worn body armor have increasedthe Soldier fighting load to 80.8 pounds.The total Manchu configuration ensemblefighting load is 96.6 pounds, 19.6 poundsover the threshold. The currentlyconfigured Land Warrior system hasreduced weight from 34 pounds (FY 1998)to 15.8 pounds (FY 2007). A future weightreduction of 3 pounds is planned for FY2008. This would equate to a totalreduction in weight of 150 percent. At thesame time, Individual Body Armor (IBA)

has gone from 12.5 to 33.2 pounds— a 145-percent increase. TheLand Warrior system offsets currentSoldier equipment. The 15.8pounds of added Land Warriorequipment offsets the need to carrya GPS, binoculars, separate aiminglight (PAQ 2 or PEQ 4) and almosthalf of 22 separate batteries. Thefunctionalities of Land Warriorreplace the need to carry these items.This integration of functionalitiesrenders a net gain of 9.3 pounds ofequipment for the Soldier. Soldiersand leaders all agree the 15.8pounds of Land Warrior equipmentincreases weight and degradesmobility. They also agree that 31pounds of body armor increasesweight and is restrictive when itcomes to mobility.

The Soldiers load issue is anArmy issue and not just a LandWarrior issue. Modularity changesto the Land Warrior ensemble haveshown improvements in weightreduction, distribution and anoverall increase to Soldieracceptance. Initial findings

indicated Soldiers associated IndividualBody Armor and Land Warrior weight asone. The unit was fielded both at the sametime therefore no differentiation was madebetween the two. As Soldiers became moreaccustomed to the Land Warrior ensembleand more reliant upon its addedcapabilities, the added weight becametolerable. During the land navigationexperiment, Land Warrior-equipped unitsmaneuvered more rapidly and accuratelythan units without Land Warrior. It shouldbe noted that every other Soldier system hasincreased Soldiers’ load in a modularfashion with little regard to integration.Land Warrior has provided an integratedSoldier system that has decreased in weightand volume over time. See weightcomparatives chart (Figure 3).

As stated, the Land Warrior systemreplaces approximately 8 pounds of currentequipment, generating a net gain of 9.3pounds. This represents a 14-percentincrease in equipment weight compared tothe average RFI-equipped Soldier’sfighting load. This is an increase whenone considers that it equates to degradationin Soldier agility of 10-15 percent and a20-percent increase in energy required formovement. Sixty-two percent of Soldierssurveyed reported that Land Warrior madetheir ability to move tactically under direct

Figure 2 — At top, the view without LandWarrior (1/50,000), and bottom is the view

with Land Warrior

(4-9 IN, Mission RehearsalExercise Feb 07)

Discussion between BrigadierGeneral Daniel P. Bolger (JRTCcommander) and some of his seniorobserver controllers: OCs relayedobservations related to the battalion’shigh value target (HVT) mission duringthe 4-9 IN MRE conducted at FortLewis, Washington. The unit executeda dismounted infiltration without beingdetected by the Joint ReadinessTraining Center opposing forces. Thebattalion was able to infiltrate soquickly and efficiently that the opposingforces in the area of operations wereunable to react in time to preventcapture of the HVT. This mission israrely accomplished successfully. Thesenior observer controllers observedthat the same type of unit would nothave been able to execute the missionas successfully without the capabilitiesprovided by Land Warrior.


Major Douglas Copeland is currently attending the Naval PostgraduateSchool in Monterey, California. He previously served as the Assistant TRADOCCapability Manager - Soldier at Fort Benning, Georgia, and was the GroundSoldier System/Future Force Warrior lead. He has also served as the deputybrigade S3 for the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division and as a companycommander for B Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry (Mechanized).

fire “worse” or “much worse.” Land Warrior will affect theindividual Soldier’s ability to move under direct fire under somecircumstances. The increase in the weight of Land Warrior-equipped Soldiers’ basic fighting load will have the mostsignificant consequences. While Soldier conditioning willcompensate for this weight increase during limited-durationmissions, current operations have shown that Soldiers’ mobilitywill suffer greatly when their fighting load is excessive. Soldiersengaging in extended operations are likely to find the increasedweight of Land Warrior to be an encumbrance.

During the equipping and conduct of the DOTMLPFassessment, dismounted Soldiers were fighting within taskorganized infantry companies, selected battalion command andstaff personnel, and selected Soldiers in direct support of maneuverelements employed Land Warrior systems. Upon completion ofthe DOTMLPF assessment (September 06) and followingsubsequent program decisions, 4-9 Infantry asked to take thesystem with them to combat. The unit is currently conductingoffensive, defensive, and stability and support missions across thefull spectrum of military operations in theater now. Some of 4-9Infantry’s key likes and dislikes of the system:

Likes• Friendly, enemy and environment SA when dismounted;• Multi Functional Laser (MFL);• Graphics on the move; and• Stryker integration to the dismounted Soldier.Dislikes• Daylight Video Sight (DVS) as a weapon sight;• Cables; and• Space requirement on IBA (Units now have IOTV).Fundamental principles of doctrine form the basis upon which

Army forces guide their actions in support of national objectives.Throughout past analysis events and the Land Warrior DOTMLPFassessments there has been no indication that the capabilitiesprovided by these systems will have any impact on these principles.The observations and analysis conducted during the Land WarriorDOTMLPF assessment indicate that there will be little or noimpact on the basic way the Army conducts its missions. Thesesystems’ capabilities have the greatest doctrinal impact in the areasof techniques and procedures. Doctrinal impacts to terms andsymbols are minimal. Two symbols were added to depict areas ofinterest and Soldier locations. These symbols are recognized byFBCB2 and are subject to further development by units as theyincorporate them into their own standard operating procedures.All other Land Warrior symbols are doctrinally accurate and allLand Warrior messages are in compliance with Joint VariableFormat Message standards and architecture.

Land Warrior Soldier systems have evolved over time and are

continuing to evolve based on the current fight andcurrent technology. These systems are notrevolutionary, but evolutionary in their approachto answering evolving Soldier capability gaps basedupon an asymmetrical and fluid threat. How theArmy intends to conduct operations in the future,and the capabilities required to execute thoseoperations, may determine the need for furtherdoctrinal review, design, and/or development. Draftrecommendations for techniques and procedures have

been developed, but require validation through their use in anoperational environment. To accomplish this, TRADOC CapabilitiesManager-Soldier is conducting further assessment during combatoperations in Iraq with 4-9 IN. This portion of the assessment willdetermine Land Warrior’s impact to small units in combat, with aparticular focus on fightability, lethality, survivability, battle commandand situational awareness from squad to company-level operations.All unit leaders (from team leaders through battalion commander)are equipped with Land Warrior. TCM-Soldier teamed with theComputer Science & Information Assurance Department of theSamuel Ginn College of Engineering at Auburn University to createa dynamic, “change-on-the-fly” database for this operation. Thisdatabase is a compilation effort from input received from TCM-Soldier, the U.S. Army Infantry Center Directorate of CombatDevelopments, TRAC WSMR, TRAC-Monterey, Army ResearchInstitute (ARI), Program Manager Soldier Warrior and ProductManager Land Warrior. This information will provide valuableDOTMLPF insights regarding dismounted Soldier requirements,will inform future Army procurement decisions, as well as informthe Ground Soldier System and FCS.

WeightComparatives

Land Warrior 26.12 lbs 16.62 lbs 15.83 lbs *12.83 lbs

IBA 9 lbs 25.70 lbs 31.00 lbs TBD

Figure 3 — Weight Comparatives Chart* Subject to General Dynamic Fusion efforts: CSC, NAV Box, HIA and SCU in one LRU.

2002 2004 2006 2008

Staff Sergeant Antonieta Rico

A Soldier with the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd InfantryDivision, sends a message using the helmet-mounted display.


My military transition team(MiTT) experience began inNovember 2005. I was a

junior major in the Combined Arms andTactics Directorate (CATD) at FortBenning, Georgia, and was selected toserve as a battalion MiTT chief to fulfill arequest-for-forces (RFF) 510. Thefollowing article will be a brief descriptionand synopsis of what I learned in my 12months as a military advisor in Iraq. Iintend to describe the environment ofwhere I operated and hope to developsuggestions to educate infantry leaders atall levels regarding military transitionteams. This article focuses on myexperiences while operating in westernBaghdad from February 2006 to February2007.

Though there are too many to articulatehere, I will focus around specific lessonslearned regarding the employment,integration, and conduct of thecounterinsurgency fought by the 4thBattalion, 1st Brigade, 6th Iraqi Division,during that time. I worked with fourseparate coalition brigade combat teams,seven different coalition battalions, severaldifferent units of the Iraqi Police and IraqiSpecial Police, and a Special ForcesOperational Detachment-A (ODA) teamor two. I have seen combat from theperspective of someone seemingly caughtin the middle: I was assigned to the IraqAssistance Group and was the linkbetween the coalition forces and the Iraqibattalion I advised. I was heldaccountable by both coalition partnerunits and my Iraqi counterpart to produceresults. Initially, I was on the receivingend of what first appeared to be a Sunniinsurgency. Over time it would evolveinto a “low-boil” civil war along theSunni and Shia divide. In a December28, 2006, New York Times article writtenby Marc Santora, I said that my MiTTwas “caught in the middle trying toprotect both sides, while getting attackedby both sides, trying not to take a side.”

I hope military professionals readingthis will come to understand not only thecomplex nature of the advisory mission,but also empathize with the particularsituation of advising a foreign armyembroiled in a fight that transcendsmilitary, religious, and cultural lines. TheIraqi battalion I advised was fightingenemy insurgents and foreign terroriststhat supported the ousted Sunni religiousIslamic sect. All the while, it was gettinginfiltrated by a large militia force of therival Shia sect that formed to foment theShia assumption of Iraqi political power.Those in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)who would not cooperate with these Shiamilitias were threatened, targeted, andeventually killed. The pitfall of gettinglost in this chaos was very real. Focusingon what my team and I were sent there toaccomplish, and working to make positivechange for the things we could in factchange, is what ultimately made ussuccessful. In this manner, we kept ourfocus, challenged our Iraqi counterparts to

do better, and ultimately kept our sanity.BackgroundAs a MiTT advisor, my principal duties

entailed leading an 11-man transition teamto advise and train an Iraqi infantrybattalion commander and maintain tacticaloverwatch of a 750-man Iraqi Armybattalion in combat. I am not a SpecialForces officer. I don’t speak Arabic. Mycultural understanding of the Middle Eastwas restricted to cultural briefings by theArmy and what I read in professionaljournals and books. At the time, I had notyet even deployed to fight the global waron terrorism, having spent the previous twoand a half years as a small group instructorfor the Infantry Captains Career Course.Since I was a supposed “expert” on tacticsand small unit leadership, I suspect on thesurface I looked like a perfect choice forthis new initiative that would evolve tobecome America’s strategic exit strategyfrom Iraq. However, in my heart, I believedthat I was woefully unqualified to assumethis important mission.

MAKING MITT WORKMAJOR DAVID VOORHIES

INSIGHTS INTO ADVISING THE IRAQI ARMY

Courtesy photos

The author, Major David Voorhies (left) and Lieutenant Colonel Sabah Gati Kadim Al-Fadilyreceive guidance from Lieutenant Colonel Van Smiley, commander of the 1st Battalion, 23rdInfantry Regiment, during a combined cordon and search mission.

I would later discover that I, in fact, possessed all thenecessary knowledge to perform my duties. What I lackedin knowledge of the Arabic language, I made up for bybeing a quick study of the Iraqi people. I found that Igained as much insight into the Iraqi/Arab culture bywatching the movie The Godfather as I did reading The27 Articles by T.E. Lawrence. My impression of workingwith my Iraqi battalion commander, Lieutenant ColonelSabah Gati Kadim Al-Fadily, was somewhat akin to beingin a militarized version of the TV drama The Sopranos.Tribal loyalties; religious alliances; and the aspects ofprestige, influence, power, money, and revenge playedheavily on the motives of those I advised. The aspect ofcorruption was never so much a notion of “if,” but rather,“to what degree.” I also discovered my natural lack ofpatience only became exacerbated by this environment.However, I found that my sense of humor, my ability tojoke about myself and joke with the Iraqi soldiers, enabledme to get my points across to the Iraqi leadership with an emphasisof “pressured humor.” I used levity to get their attention andmake them laugh, but I always had an underlying principle andmotive for making the joke. The unique ability to be indirectwhile communicating ideas and stories enabled them to get thepoint rather quickly when I used this technique.

I also became pretty adept at deception. My team and I livedon the same small forward operating base (FOB) with three otherbattalion transition teams, their Iraqi battalions, a brigade nationalpolice team (NPTT) and its Iraqi headquarters, and the 1-6 IraqiArmy Brigade HQ and its MiTT. Infiltration into the Iraqi Armyby the Shia militias, most notably the Cleric Moktada Al Sadr’sJaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Iranian Islamic Supreme Councilin Iraq (SCIRI)-influenced Badr Corps, was very common in ourarea of operations. Though never explicitly stated, the Iranianinfluence in both of these militias seemed readily apparent if onelooked hard enough. Parts of the Iraqi Army, and seemingly muchof the National Police and regular Iraqi Police, were openlysympathetic to and supported these Shia militias. Murders,kidnappings, and coercion by these militias, most notably JAM,were commonplace, and my team and I had to walk a tight rope oftrust, security, and fear with the 4/1-6 IA Battalion. I learned totell my local national interpreters only what they needed to know.I learned to believe only half of what the Iraqi leadership wouldtell me. I alternated my visits with the Iraqis every day and variedmy patrol schedule. Planning for missions got pretty creative andtelling the 4th Battalion about a sensitive mission, particularly ina Shia area requiring their participation, forced me to inform themtwo to three hours before “hit” time. My team and I had to exercisethe art of misinformation with operations security (OPSEC)regarding the Iraqi Army: we had to tell enough of the truth to bebelieved and to motivate action on the Iraqis’ part but could notdivulge specifics about times, unit actions, or upcoming operations.“Inshallah,” the Arabic phrase for “God-willing,” so often usedby the Iraqis when responding to my requests and to my team’sdesires, similarly became our responses to many Iraqi Armyrequests for information concerning equipment and upcomingmissions.

I never thought being a good con-artist was a useful qualityuntil I became an advisor. I developed an ability to communicate

ideas and concepts I desired my Iraqi counterparts to adopt byconvincing them it would be personally, professionally, andpolitically in their best interests to do. I did my best to make mycounterpart look good in all endeavors. My team’s best effortsand ideas became the Iraqi’s best efforts and “their” ideas. Myteam and I introduced the art of information operations. We taughtour Iraqi battalion how to use an S9 and create flyers, advertisingthe 4/1-6 IA’s recent actions and military successes and providingphone numbers to the locals to call to report enemy and criminalactivity. Instead of viewing the attendance to neighborhood anddistrict action councils (NACs and DACs) as obligatory events,my team and I taught the Iraqi leadership a different way of viewingthese events. Concerned Iraqi people chose to attend theseneighborhood meetings to help solve problems, but sadly, manylacked any confidence in their own security forces to secure them.The action councils, over time, became vehicles for positive changeregarding the perception of Iraqi Security Forces by their owncitizens. We made them look good to their army and to theircommunities. They needed to be perceived as heroes to theirpeople, heroes their country so desperately needed and which arestill in demand today.

I was further blessed to have perhaps the most talented MiTTthat was assembled as part of the RFF 510 tasking. Comparedwith many other MiTTs, this was an exception to the rule, ratherthan the rule itself. Thrown together from across the Army, manytransition teams contained men who lacked the training, aptitude,and discipline to serve in these autonomous roles. However, myteam was a composite of specialists in their fields. I had fourofficers and three NCOs of my required 11-man team, all differingMOS-types and tailored for their job-specific advisory roles. Thesespecific roles were in the intelligence, maneuver, logistics,transportation, maintenance and communications fields (see Figure1). Men like Sergeant First Class Terry Shaw, Captain JeremyGettig, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Paul Algarin, Captain Ken Frank,Sergeant First Class Jeremy Lerette, and Sergeant First ClassJoseph Grimes really made my job easy and enabled the team toexcel in almost every area of endeavor. I pushed them hard, heldthem to high standards, abused them sufficiently, and did not praisethem enough. They did their best to work in roles to which theyweren’t accustomed. Aside from working as advisors to a foreign

MiTT Transition Team 0614

Team Chief

INTEL TrainerStaff Maneuver Trainer

Fires & Effects Trainer

Fires & Effects NCO

LOG NCO & TM NCOIC

LOG Trainer

HSC Trainer

Communications Chief

INTEL NCOMedic

** Note - Iraq Assistance Group is reassessing this task organization

Figure 1



army, none of them had ever done mountedor dismounted patrols before, and certainly,none of them had ever worked for ademanding and impatient infantry officersuch as me. Both my team and I developedprofound respect for each other and learneda great deal about each other in the process.I believe they, more than any of my efforts,were directly responsible for theoutstanding success enjoyed by MiTT 0614.

I was, however, missing a medic, a firesand effects officer, and a fires and effectsNCO. I was informed that my dedicatedU.S. coalition unit would provide theseindividuals once I got into theater. Inreality, I received four, sometimes fiveaugmentees from every partnered battalionI worked with in my year’s time. Most werelower enlisted and lacked the necessaryexperience and training to adequatelyadvise their Iraqi counterparts. That beingsaid, I played the cards I was dealt and usedthese augmentees in not only a forceprotection role for the MiTT, but also in anadvisory role to their Iraqi counterparts.This was challenging at first, but mostSoldiers jumped at the chance to executethese new and interesting roles. Manyfound it rewarding, and most didn’t wantto return to their parent unit, where theirroles in daily patrols really wore themdown. I was personally surprised at howmany of these Soldiers and junior NCOsexcelled at these advisory roles. I did mybest to make these guys a part of my teamand rewarded them for great workaccordingly. If challenged and expected to

do so, it’s amazing what the AmericanSoldier can and will accomplish outside oftheir skill set. I found that the old adage,“people rise to a level you expect them to”is very true. I did not receive any additionalinfantrymen for force protection andremained the only infantry officer on myteam.

From Here to ThereIn January 2006, I departed for north

Fort Hood, Texas, for the 45-day transitionteam pre-deployment training. (Thistraining is now 90 days long and is heldat Fort Riley, Kansas). The training Ireceived as a MiTT advisor wasrudimentary. We were treated likemobilized National Guardsmen, and verylittle of the training dealt with trainingIraqis specifically. Most of it wasmandatory pre-deployment training andforce protection tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTPs). As I understand it,Fort Riley now has a more comprehensiveprogram that treats the transition teammission in much the same way that theold Vietnam-era Special Forces advisorshad been treated. This training nowincludes robust language training andinstruction steeped in the newly-codifiedcounterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. Aftertraining stops at Camp Buehring, Kuwait,

and Camp Taji, Iraq, my team and I startedour journey with urban combat in thetumultuous West Baghdad area ofoperations.

The neighborhoods of Baghdad arehighly secularized. Shia neighborhoodswere, at first glance, calm and relativelypeaceful. Hallmarked by cheap real estateencrusted with large amounts of garbageand livestock, the Shia neighborhoodscontained large masses of outwardlyfriendly poor people. This surprised me,because they were living on top of eachother and lacked even the basics inhuman services. It was amazing towitness the stunning poverty. It wassometimes ironic: one guy lived in acorrugated steel and sod house but alsoowned a satell i te dish! Theseneighborhoods contained weapons cachesin sensitive sites such as mosques,political offices, and schools. Theytypically harbored robust numbers of theShia militias. Sunnis were forced to fleetheir homes under the penalty of death,and Shia militiamen and sympathizerstook refuge in these properties. The IraqiPolice and Special Police were able to movewith impunity in these areas. They oftenprotected Jaysh al Mahdi’s lines ofcommunication and served as

U.S. and Iraqi Army Soldiers conduct acordon and search mission in a west

Baghdad neighborhood.

reconnaissance for JAM deathsquads. The Iraqi Armyusually enjoyed a neutralreception here. Typicalviolence in this area includedexplosively formed projectile(EFP), improvised explosivedevices (IEDs), smallambushes, and kidnappings.Vehicle-borne IEDs were oftena threat to mass groups ofShias, as well as coalitionforces in these areas.

The Sunni neighborhoodsincluded larger, moreextravagant, gated houses;nicer streets; betterautomobiles; and a subduedpopulation that was verydistrustful of coalition andIraqi forces. Many Sunnisbecame displaced persons overtime from the encroaching Shia militias. The Sunnis, the oldregime’s favored class, now lived life as the “ousted” and hatedminority. They passionately distrusted the government of Iraq.Their neighborhoods usually held large arms caches for Sunniextremists. Oftentimes, these muhallas (or neighborhoods) weresupport zones for Sunni terrorists as well as Sunni insurgents fromoutside Baghdad. Insurgent groups like the 1920 RevolutionaryBrigade, Jaysh al-Iraqia, Ansar al-Sunna, and Jama al-Tawid (AlQaeda) exerted strong influence in many Sunni neighborhoods.The Iraqi Police, being nearly 90-percent Shia in composition,kept clear of the heavily populated Sunni areas. I never saw toomuch police presence in Sunni muhallas, and the Sunni insurgentsoften attacked the Iraqi Army with more vigor than they did thecoalition forces. Snipers were a particularly serious concern inthese Sunni areas. Sophistication in training and equipment madethem particularly lethal. A foreign Sunni terrorist group, Juba or“Ghost,” spouted rhetoric that it had infiltrated two battalions oftrained snipers to operate in Baghdad. This group advertised theshootings of U.S. and Iraqi Soldiers on their Web site and werelargely responsible for the introduction of armor-defeatingammunition infiltrated into Baghdad.

Both the Sunni and Shia people routinely blocked their roadswith whatever materials were available. Over time, mixed-populated areas created what became battlegrounds for sectarianviolence. My team viewed western Baghdad as a series of smallcities within a city. As time wore on, these sectarian divides becamelike fault lines in an earthquake, where sectarian violence wouldflare up for weeks at a time. Multitudes of displaced personseither moved into an area of like religious ethnicity or fled thecountry altogether. Ethnic cleansing, murder, and kidnappingbecame the norm along these fault lines. At one point, upwardsof about 30 bodies were discovered “dumped” in the streets dailyin west Baghdad. I found myself not necessarily focusing on howmany bodies would be discovered and reported on a daily basis;rather, I would wonder about the number of bodies and criminalactivities that went undiscovered and unreported.

The 4th Battalion, 1-6Iraqi Army

The 4th Battalion, 1-6 IA,was 75-percent Shia, and mostof its Soldiers lived in theBaghdad area. LTC Sabah wasa Shia and lived in apredominantly Shianeighborhood in the 1-6 IA areaof operations (AO). Because ofhis successes with us in hisbattlespace fighting both Shiamilitia and Sunni insurgents, hehimself eventually becametargeted by Jaysh al-Mahdi.During the time my team and Iworked with him, his brotherand his executive officer weremurdered by JAM, and he andhis family were routinelythreatened by the group inattempts to influence him to do

its bidding. Over the year I served with him, LTC Sabah wouldhave five of his officers assassinated and several wounded inmurder attempts. One of my interpreters was kidnapped, held forransom, and eventually murdered. Largely seen as the drivingforce behind Sabah, I would eventually be targeted with deathfrom Jaysh al-Mahdi. A price was placed on my head, and I becamea lucrative target to anyone looking to gain profit from JAM. Oneattempt on my life resulted in the death of my gunner in an IEDstrike that turned out to be an EFP. The actual ambush occurredon a joint night patrol with a platoon from the 4/1-6 IA andmembers of the Iraqi Police. Later, U.S. intelligence reportsconfirmed that we had been betrayed by the Iraqi Police: anorganization that is heavily infiltrated by the secretive Shia militias.Even with little forewarning, the insurgents were able to set upthis complex ambush in the JAM-sympathetic neighborhood ofHurryia within 30 minutes of my patrol brief to both IA and IPleadership. The battlespace got to be so dangerous that my boss,the brigade MiTT chief, would also be killed by an IED strike thatmany attributed to JAM.

LTC Sabah and the 4th Battalion were known throughoutBaghdad. LTC Sabah was seen as a hero in many Shianeighborhoods and a villain in some Sunni neighborhoods. Hewas one of the few dependable Iraqi battalion commanders in the6th IA Division. He would aggressively seek contact with theenemy and routinely checked on his jundi (soldiers). He, at least,exhibited these qualities when we were watching him, and he wasbacked with U.S. support. Once I gained rapport with LTC Sabah,I enjoyed support from his battalion, and my advisors were able toinstitute positive changes in their respective areas.

Know Their History, Build Rapport … But Be YourselfGaining and maintaining rapport is the most important aspect

of being a successful advisor. It might be true that you are amilitary prodigy. You may also be competent with the Arablanguage and an expert with the Arab culture. You might be allthese things; however, you will not be successful advising the Iraqis

Lieutenant Colonel Sabah Gati Kadim Al-Fadily, Major David Voorhies,and Major Ryad gather to discuss a mission.



without first gaining both personal andprofessional rapport with your Iraqicounterparts. This important aspect alsoapplies to coalition commanders partneredwith Iraqi forces. I gained rapport byaccomplishing three things: I understoodthe motivations of the people I advised, Idemonstrated a desire to help them in wordand deed, and I did my best to act likemyself in all situations.

If you want to take any militaryorganization somewhere, you first have toknow where it has been. The 4/1-6 IABattalion was going on its third year ofdevelopment, and my MiTT team was thefourth one it had worked with during thatsame time period. Its officer corps wasroughly a 30-percent mix of former regimeofficers. Their jundi were largely locallyhired from the Taji and Baghdad areas.Most were under-equipped, underpaid, andpoorly-led and lived in almostunimaginable fear. I have never seen suchtraumatized people before. Seemingly, fearand mistrust of everything and everyonewas part of being an Iraqi. After 15 daysof consecutive work, the jundi wouldreceive five days off to go home, pay theirfamilies, and see to their family and tribalobligations. When going home, all jundiinfiltrated home at night, and in civilianclothing, for fear of being followed,targeted, and killed by both Sunni and Shia

extremists. The Sunni terrorists wanted thejundi dead because they believed the Shia-dominated government was specificallytargeting Sunni population centers. Bykilling ISF forces, the Sunni couldeliminate their perceived enemies anddiscredit the Shia-dominated governmentof Iraq. The Shia extremists would wantcertain jundi killed because many hadrefused to join or cooperate with the Shiamilitia, Jaysh al-Mahdi. Many Iraqiofficers and NCOs quit because of threatsthey and their families received from JAM.It was not uncommon for a jundi to movehis family three or four times in a period ofsix months!

The ingrained psychological distrust ofeach other, which many attribute to SaddamHussein’s 30-year reign of fear, profoundlyimpacted the psyche of all the Iraqi people.The paternalistic nature of their culture,coupled with the strong top-downhierarchical structure of their military andpolice, often led to extrememicromanagement. LTC Sabah, forexample, directed EVERYTHING hiscommanders and staff did or failed to do.Commanders had zero initiative. I had topersonally engage the IA battalioncommander if I thought a machine gunrequired repositioning!

To gain LTC Sabah’s loyalty, I had todemonstrate I was there to serve his best

interests. This meant spending long hoursinto the night “socializing” with him andhis staff in his office. We talked aboutfamily, hobbies, and interests and watcheda lot of Arab TV. I drank chai tea, smokedcigarettes, and tried hard to adjust mywestern internal clock to a more amicableIraqi clock: they normally socialize from2100 hrs at night to about 0300 hrs in themorning. Paying homage to the traditionof Arab hospitality is huge. I came tounderstand that to eat a meal with themwas akin to demonstrating loyalty, respect,and brotherhood — all at the same time.As such, official business and plans tookplace after a meal – not before. As manycoalition leaders are fond of saying, “it ain’tofficial until you pull goat.” I listenedmostly and observed my surroundings. Ipaid attention to the various cliques insidethe battalion and inside the officer corps.My other advisors did the same with theircounterparts, and we developed a fairlyhealthy understanding of the humandynamics within the organization itself. Ideveloped a mental list of needs and wantsregarding the 4th Battalion, and I later wasable to leverage these needs and wants withmoney to get LTC Sabah to agree with mylist of changes to make the organizationbetter. The $2,500 per month TransitionForce Fund (TFF) fund, available totransition team advisors, allowed us to buythe Iraqis needed office equipment,furniture, automation equipment, andrepair parts. It also became my financialleverage to influence LTC Sabah. PreviousMiTT teams failed to use this availableresource. We used our TFF funds to maketheir lives easier and to show that we caredabout them. It also provided furtherevidence of our desire to make our Iraqisbetter at soldiering.

To gain LTC Sabah’s trust andconfidence, I went on combat missionsnearly daily with his platoons. My MiTTand I traveled in three-vehicle, 11-manpatrols. We did a lot of unilateral missionswhere we inspected traffic control points(TCPs) and company combat outposts(COPs), attended NAC meetings, andconducted human atmospherics. We alsowould take Iraqi platoons out on dailyreconnaissance foot patrols, handing outflyers and executing snap tactical vehicleinspections. We went on combined nightpatrols to conduct targeted raids or ambushknown insurgent areas. I tried to show thatMembers of the 1-6th Iraqi Army Brigade gather during a combined cordon and search mission.

at the battalion level, LTC Sabah’s presence was needed with hisplatoons. Just as it works within our doctrine, effective battalionsare defined by trained and lethal platoons. The infantrymen mustget out on foot and engage the population, as well as the enemy.Before my team and I arrived, the 4th Battalion merely mannedTCPs and not much else. The IA jundi grew to love us: at times,we checked on them more than their own leadership did.

For the first few months, we did not even have a partneredU.S. battalion. The MiTT became the few Americans to be seenoperating in the 4/1-6 IA AO. Moreover, we got pretty creativeworking with U.S. special operations forces (SOF). I pressuredboth the local ODA team and LTC Sabah to work together andexecute a lot of joint raids with the SF-trained 4/1-6 IA Strike/Recon Platoon. The ODA team needed Iraqi Army participationfor legitimacy to execute any mission, and I needed my Iraqistrained with close target reconnaissance and raids. During themonths of May and June 2006, we executed well over 20combined/joint raids all over our AO with the ODA and theirIraqi disciples. After three months of steady patrols andtargeted missions, I had soundly burned out my MiTT. All ofthem, not being infantry, thought I was nuts. However, what Ihad, in fact, done was establish rapport with LTC Sabah andhis leaders. LTC Sabah and his commanders saw a U.S. MiTTteam willing to share their hardships, get out on the “Arabstreet,” and support their soldiers. We demonstrated ourwillingness to risk our lives with them, to help them and theirpeople. In doing so, we earned their loyalty and their trust. MyMiTT and I were paid a rare compliment when LTC Sabahinformed his subordinates that my advisors and I “speak with hisvoice” three months into our tour with him.

To gain an understanding of the Arab culture and establishrapport, it was crucial to gain insight into what FM 3-24 calls“cultural intelligence.” Being politically correct and culturallysensitive is great if you’re merely visiting an Arab country for ashort period of time on a diplomatic visit, but if you want to trainthem and advise them in combat — you have got to get them to dothings they ordinarily would not do. To understand them to thepoint of being able to influence them to motivate action, you mustknow how they think, know what motivates them, and know howthey react to both danger and incentives. T.E. Lawrence, the famedBritish officer who assisted the Arab Revolution with the OttomanTurks back in WWI, wrote a compelling book about his experiencesknown as the Seven Pillars of Wisdom. He also codified a list ofrecommendations regarding the advisory role of Arabs specifically,known as the 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence. I highly recommendboth of these works. Read as much as you can regarding the Arabculture. The Crisis of Islam and the Arab Mind were alsotremendously useful. I also recommend you ascertain some insightinto how criminal organizations operate. This is why myfascination with studying the American La Cosa Nostra, asalarming as it sounds, assisted me in understanding themotivations of many Iraqi commanders. Watching Mafia moviesassisted me in my ability to understand underlying motivations ofthe Iraqi leadership. Their Army, insurgent networks, and militiasseemingly mimic each other along the lines of a La Cosa Nostraconcept.

As much as I had read about “Lawrence of Arabia,” studiedArab history and culture and even watched my fill of The

Godfather, I found that the most compelling way to train the Iraqiswas to be myself. At first I tried the subdued approach: stay quiet,put the Iraqi commander in the lead, never talk badly to the Arabs,never insult them intentionally, and try not to do it unintentionally.I found that by adhering to all these things, I personally was gettinglittle accomplished. At first, LTC Sabah, walked all over mebecause he perceived that I was weak and uninterested. My teamalso became frustrated: without Sabah’s approval, my MiTT couldaccomplish nothing with its counterparts.

About the same time I began exercising combined patrolswith the Iraqis, I began to lose the subdued approach and takethe direct, “in-your-face” approach. I basically became theadorable infantry leader I know I can be. I got visibly angrywhen I was ignored. I talked as much with my hands as I didwith my mouth. I scolded excuses when I heard them anddemanded results. I told the Iraqi leaders what they needed tohear instead of what they wanted to hear. I used a lot of dryhumor through my interpreters. I challenged their professionalconvictions and their courage when they balked at doing thingsmy team and I wanted them to accomplish. I often cursed freelyin English and Arabic to get my points across to them. Myown team members were a little surprised by my theatrics, andthey likened me to a puppet master when working with the Iraqis.Most of my team felt I had evolved into a pretty good manipulator.I also used the TFF funds to reward good Iraqi behavior whenthey listened to our advice.

Pretty soon, the Iraqis learned to achieve results: they detainedmore insurgents; engendered more cooperation with thecommunity; and established effective systems regardingaccountability, maintenance, and logistics. The 4/1-6 IA Battalionwent from one of the worst battalions in western Baghdad to oneof the best. My technique may not have made me popular with itsSoldiers, but it gained respect from them. They knew that everyaction I did was for them. They knew I shared their hardships onpatrol. It was in their best interests to listen to me, no matter howcrazy, disagreeable, and cantankerous I may have appeared. Imade their commander look good to both his chain of commandand to the coalition leadership. I understand that this techniquedoesn’t work for everyone, but it worked for me. The personalitythat had made me a successful company commander also mademe a successful advisor. Pretending I was something I wasn’tonly got me and those around me frustrated. Temper what youmay know regarding military operations and a foreign culturewith aspects of your own personality. Your results will surpriseyou.

Lead by ExampleThe basic concept of leadership through example resonates as

strongly with Iraqi jundi as it does with U.S. Soldiers. MiTTsand coalition leadership that dictate action from secure FOBs andonly make the obligatory battlefield circulation patrols of theirareas of operation will see few results in a COIN environment.To have a shot at success in combat, you must take tactical risks.To effectively lead, you must demonstrate that you are willing toshare that risk with those in your charge.

Compelling Iraqi leadership to execute patrols with me was acontinuous challenge. Many Iraqi company commanders, as wellas the battalion commander, enjoyed the tributes of command



without ever having to earn their right tocommand. Sitting behind their extravagantdesks and chatting on their cell phonesappeared to be “the right way to lead” tothese officers. Unfortunately, this wasanother bad habit of the old Saddam-regimearmy. Moreover, some coalitioncommanders, while doing patrols with theirown Soldiers regularly, worked less withthe Iraqi soldiers. Though this is recentlychanging for the better, at the time, manyU.S. battalions viewed the fight asAmerica’s war to win in Iraq, rather thanIraq’s internal war the Iraqis must win forthemselves. As an enlightened philosopheronce said, “if you change the way you lookat things, the things you look at change.”U.S. commanders who correctly identifiedthey were fighting an insurgency that wasquickly escalating to a subtle civil war wereable to shift their tactics to COIN and focuscorrectly on training the ISF to fight andsecure their own people. On the other hand,the U.S. commanders who chose to viewthe war as theirs to win in American termswith American resources only, certainly sawa lot of action, but they didn’t solve anysignificant problems associated with theinsurgency, and they certainly didn’t enablethe Iraqi units that replaced them to succeedwhen they departed the battlespace.

As a MiTT leader, I provided theproverbial “microscope” into the lives andactions of the Iraqi unit operating withcoalition forces. I found that my role inthe fight was ignored by some coalitioncommanders and, likewise, embraced byothers. As a MiTT leader, I really only

succeeded when I was able to coach bothIraqi and coalition leaders into developingan integration of purpose; going back tothe basics, regarding intelligencepreparation of the battlefield and footpatrols, including battlefield enablerswithin shared battlespace; and building aplan to achieve clarity of thought regardingcounterinsurgency. One of the bigchallenges when conducting COINoperations was to integrate coalition andIraqi units to achieve unity of effort.

Abolish the “Jim Crow” Laws ofCOIN

Coalition units must demonstrateleadership to the ISF by their example whenconducting combat operations. Referringto the American Reconstruction Era seriesof laws that kept facilities, areas, andresources “separate, but equal” regardingrace in the United States, the “Jim CrowLaws” for a counterinsurgency refers to theseparate nature of employment by bothcoalition and Iraqi units, particularly inBaghdad. This concept worked poorly inits 75 years of practice in the United States,and it worked even worse in Baghdad.Though many coalition units and Iraqiunits shared the battlespace of many areas,they seldom worked together for any longperiod of time, if at all. Coalition units,desiring to execute raids, specialhumanitarian support missions, NACmeetings, and the like requiring combinedpartnership to achieve perceived legitimacy,would periodically require me to providethe requisite Iraqi force for the mission set.

Otherwise, daily patrolling was generallyexecuted in a “separate-but-equal” fashionwith both coalition and Iraqi units doingtheir own separate patrols in the same nastyneighborhoods of Baghdad.

I believe this occurred for two reasons:first, U.S. forces lacked adequate troopstrength to truly “partner” with Iraqi forcesconsistently to achieve combined purpose;and second, U.S. forces frequently changedareas of operation to fight the elusiveenemy. Destroying the enemy became thenumber one priority for coalition forces, asopposed to securing and stabilizing apopulation center in troubledneighborhoods. This “whack-a-mole” tacticmerely frustrated coalition forces and leftIraqi Army units without consistentcoalition support, training, and resources.

Coalition units and Iraqi units seeminglylacked unity of command, and therefore hadno unity of effort. My MiTT and I acted asthe coalition representatives with the Iraqisand by default became the liaison officers(LNOs) between coalition and Iraqi forces.Being an LNO for seven different U.S.battalions in my year’s time as a MiTT chiefdetracted from my primary job as an advisorand trainer. Coalition and Iraqi Armyforces would leave their separate largeFOBs and orbit their battlespace separately.With the exception of large, top-downplanned cordon and searches, this was thenorm for a long time. However, not allcoalition battalions fought COIN in thismanner. Lieutenant Colonel Van Smiley’s1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regimentfought COIN as a combined effort with theIraqis and engaged the population to assistin security efforts. Its operations taught mea lot about what a coalition unit could dowith the Iraqi Army, given how a unitchanges the way it thinks and operates.Furthermore, with the latest surge planoccurring at the end of February 2007, thenumber of U.S. units and their employmenthas greatly changed to be more conduciveto fighting a counterinsurgency byintegrating elements of coalition force,Iraqi Army, and police. As I was leavingwest Baghdad, the new security planenvisioned a unity of command betweenIraqi Army, police and coalition forces indedicated partner relationships: a step inthe right direction indeed.

Once on the ground, MiTTs are nowgetting assigned to coalition units to assistin helping the coalition and Iraqi

A platoon of jundi from the 4th Battalion, 1-6th Iraqi Army graduate from a combat skillsschool. The program was a collaboration between U.S. MiTT and ODA team personnel.

commanders integrate a common purpose into their operations.In my final three months in Baghdad, I was lucky enough to be apart of a coalition brigade combat team that understood this.Coalition and Iraqi forces began living together in combat outpoststo plan and execute missions together, saturate the Iraqineighborhoods that provide safe harbor for insurgents, and learnfrom each other while doing daily patrols. Through cooperationwith Iraqi Army and police, coalition forces were able to identifythe most dangerous neighborhoods and “wall” them in withconcrete barriers and wire. Iraqi and coalition forces wouldtogether control access to these neighborhoods by guarding themand working closely with the neighborhood council leadership.Controlling the borders, a COIN principle, can be applied to thesectarian nature of the Baghdad muhallas. After all, Iraqis definethemselves through the communities in which they live, ratherthan the city from which they come. The combination of combinedcombat outposts and walling-in neighborhoods started to becomevery effective at securing the Iraqi people; gaining their trust;and, in doing so, denying terrain to the enemy.

At the end of my tour, I found myself assisting in patrol planningand integrating the Iraqi Army and police into coalition efforts.My team and I were able to teach LTC Sabah’s battalion staff howto execute a very rudimentary problem-solving method, akin tothe military decision-making process (MDMP), to effectivelyprosecute daily and weekly missions. Iraqi operations officersbegan to battle-track, and Iraqi intelligence officers started to gleananalysis from recent enemy significant activities. MiTTs can assistwith the abolishment of what I term the “Jim Crow Laws” of COINby bringing commanders from all forces together with a sharedvision and purpose.

Do IPB & Go On FootThe IED threat, the biggest killer of coalition and Iraqi forces

in Iraq, can be defeated. The latest crew systems and additionalarmor kits do great things to disrupt a majority of remote initiationdevices and prevent penetration of much shrapnel; however,technology and armor cannot always defeat well-hidden commandwire systems and well-aimed EFPs. The best way to defeat thisthreat is good old-fashioned IPB (intelligence preparation of thebattlefield) and developing a plan that pits your advantage againstan enemy’s disadvantage. Identify who the enemy is, where hewants to kill you, and bypass his kill zones or interdict his abilityto emplace them. Go on foot. The enemy IED cells that targetcoalition and Iraqi Army units are small teams that number fewerthan five individuals, given an average kill zone. These bad guysare predictable for when and where they strike with IEDs. Theyare, however, no match for a squad of well- trained and heavilyarmed infantrymen maneuvering on them from a direction theyleast expect. A bunch of insurgents in sweat pants and tennisshoes with AK-47s are no match for our infantrymen, and theyare no match for many Iraqi Army units as well.

However, believe it or not, many coalition, and nowunfortunately Iraqi Army forces, desire to execute what some call“movements-to-explosions” in west Baghdad. Instead of gettingout on a foot patrol and maneuvering along unlikely mobilitycorridors and lateral routes to execute patrols, they instead travelin their armored vehicles, with limited visibility, down knownand highly visible avenues of approach. The enemy knows our

allies’ patterns. They know we are painfully predictable when itcomes to using our beloved armored vehicles. They are alsosuccessful at blowing those vehicles up and causing coalition andIraqi deaths and injuries because of them.

The 4th Battalion received 15 M1114s in July 2006. Ever sincethat time, they have been tied to their vehicles and seldom venturedout of foot patrols to execute reconnaissance and combat patrols.They perceive the sniper threat and small arms threat to be toogreat to risk such an adventure. In some cases, the training ofsimple squad battle drills was lacking, and it shook their confidenceto operate on foot independent of coalition forces (hence the frictionI received when I first attempted to get them to execute night footpatrols with my team). The 4th Battalion, unfortunately, learnedthis by watching some U.S. forces, who merely orbited their AO,waiting to either be engaged by the insurgents with small armsfire or hoping to not encounter an IED as they drive around for 8to 12 hours at a time.

In my experience in west Baghdad, many U.S. units discoveredthat their submariner reliance on M1114s was, in reality, causinggreater risk from an IED attack than actually dismounting andmaneuvering into an area from an alternate direction. In thismanner, they maximize surprise, visibility, and ability to see andengage the enemy first. The fear introduced to enemy and civiliansalike when they see coalition and Iraqi squads and platoons inwedge and column formations, moving in a disciplined manner,is also a great advantage we give up when we go on a “mountedonly” patrol. Units, like the 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne InfantryRegiment, that inherited dangerous areas saturated by JAM,executed foot patrols only and disrupted much of the enemymilitia’s lines of communication and ability to emplace IED killzones. Now that many coalition units execute foot patrols in manyof the most dangerous areas of their battlespace, the challengemany MiTT leaders and I had to contend with was breaking theIraqi security forces of their reliance on vehicles for their soleprotection.

Foot patrols earn themselves greater trust by the people livingin the contested mulhallas. Going on foot slows down the patrol.Locals, who at one time, saw only security forces drive by themnow see Iraqi and coalition forces walking by them, talking tothem, and asking questions about threats to them and their families.Information flyers with critical contact information can be easily

Soldiers with the 4th Battalion, 1-6th Iraqi Army Division prepare todepart an area after a mission.



distributed. Critical neighborhood watchprograms that place Iraqi units, like the 4thIA Battalion, in the lead can be reinforcedby constant saturation of pedestrianpatrolling. By demonstrating concern fortheir welfare, many civilian fence-sittersmay choose to trust coalition and Iraqiforces and may, in turn, share intelligenceabout enemy forces in the area. Concernedcivilians start to volunteer to becomeinformants and sources for enemymovements, and can open their shops andallow their kids to play in the streets withconfidence that there is always an Iraqi orcoalition force nearby that can respondquickly. Civilians who act as auxillaries forthe enemy forces become frightened to act,and are therefore neutralized. In essence, thefoot patrols deny terrain to the enemy, bothurban and civilian, something which meremounted patrols alone cannot do.

As a MiTT leader, I fought constantlywith LTC Sabah to order more dismountedpatrols for his battalion. Additionally, theIraqi S2 disdained the IPB process andchose to focus on source operations only.With dedicated coalition units that patrolon foot with their 4th Battalion partnersand intelligence officers willing to assistmy trainers to demonstrate IPB techniques,I enjoyed an easier sales pitch for theseideas. Identifying the terrain and enemycapabilities and predicting enemy coursesof action greatly assisted units to avoid andcounter IEDs. Area denial and informationcollection increase when units routinelyengage the population in a personal andsincere manner: going on foot is the wayto win civilian support for their army.

Battlefield Enablers: InviteEveryone to the Party

As a MiTT advisor, you will find manyinteresting units and organizationsoperating within your battlespace. Not onlywill you see Iraqi Army, police, specialpolice and coalition forces in your area, butyou will start to see various “alphabet soup”intelligence agencies, news media, civilianreconstruction teams, and maybe even someU.S. State Department folks working in thesame area. As a MiTT advisor, you musttake the lead to help get these organizationswork together, or at the very least, be awareof each other.

The U.S. ODA teams all have differingmissions and may not want to share or workwith MiTTs whatsoever. Ironic as it may

seem, the training of indigenouspopulations, a onetime Special Forces corecompetency, didn’t appear to be a focus forthem. That being said, most of theirstrategic intelligence they glean requiresthe cooperation of trusted Iraqi securityforces to help collect, corroborate andprovide action on intelligence. Byapproaching the ODA team in a mannerthat was mutually beneficial to us and myIraqi battalion, the SOF Soldiers agreed tohelp train portions of our Iraqi battalion inreconnaissance, marksmanship, andcombative physical training. These wereinstructor skill sets my MiTT team lackedand excited the Iraqi jundi to finally get anopportunity for some good, hard trainingto build up their confidence. In exchangefor source and intelligence sharing, as wellas going on targeted raids andreconnaissance missions, the 4th Battalion,1-6 IA, got the opportunity to re-zero theirweapons and re-blue their infantry skillsby doing some hard training with our SFbrothers on the same FOB. Iraqi moraleincreased, bonds were forged, and the ODAteam got to build better intelligencenetworks and work relationships with ourIA battalion.

As a MiTT advisor, you will see plentyof coalition organizations in the area thatcan assist you with intelligence. Eventhough you may have a partnered unit withits own digital command post of the future(CPOF) and intelligence of its area, you stillmust fight for intelligence about your AO,the ISF with which you’re working, andthe surrounding civilian personalities whodwell in your battlespace. There is so muchinformation available and so many differentorganizations there collecting it that notmany intelligence fusion cells exist to“piece the intelligence picture together.”Regarding the various “special units” thatoperate in Baghdad, not many are going tocontact you and offer assistance. Some ofthese organizations included cross-teams ofFBI and other U.S. law-enforcementpersonnel, as well as the many intelligenceagencies that go by different names in Iraq.It’s amazing how many of these specialcoalition intelligence/ law enforcement taskforces can share information with you onceyou merely ask them for assistance. Italways helps to bring a certain aspect ofintelligence that would interest them in theprocess. As a MiTT advisor, you are in aninteresting role to not only train, but also

to collect intelligence concerning your Iraqisecurity forces. My team and I witnessedextensive enemy insurgent infiltration,weapons smuggling, and other criminalactivities associated with our Iraqi sector.Such firsthand information is valuable tomany of these organizations and can beused by your MiTT to assist in buildingpackets and case files for these specialorganizations. In exchange for thisinformation, they can and will shareinformation regarding targets, intelligence,and human factor information, such assectarian infiltration routes and ethniccleansing areas of focus. This informationhelps you understand where the enemy is,define enemy kill zones, and determine howthe enemy is trying to target you and yourteam. It also assisted me in focusingoperations for the 4th Battalion to besuccessful. Take the lead as a MiTT leaderand invite all these organizations to playin your AO. I learned this late in my tourand wish I could have taken advantage ofthis sooner. There is too much informationat stake to not take advantage of this idea.

Introduce Positive ReinforcementUsing medals and certificates of valor

and achievement of our own creation, myteam and I introduced positive motivationto the 4th Battalion jundi. So much of thediscipline used by the Iraqi commanderswas centered upon negative reinforcement.Taking a week’s pay, dressing down soldiersin public, firing them outright, andthreatening jundi were all commonplace.In a culture that reveres strength anddisdains weakness, I first had todemonstrate to the Iraqi leadership that Iwas strong and used an uncompromising,no-nonsense approach to win rapport withLTC Sabah and his commanders. Once thiswas accomplished, I turned my attentionto showing the Iraqi command a differentway to get jundi to perform their jobs well.I started complimenting good behavior andrewarding those Iraqi jundi who executedthe standard. I honored them andreprimanded them when they deserved it.I had a creative MiTT S2 captain whoinvented medals for valor and extreme valoron his computer. We sent these designs toa U.S. manufacturer and had them madeespecially for our Iraqis. The cost cameout of our own pockets, but it was morethan worth it. The jundi were instantlyoverwhelmed with pride and longed for

more praise by working harder. The Iraqi jundi pined forrecognition and were motivated by these never-before-seen awards.I was not partnered with a coalition battalion at the time, and wedid not have a means in which to request U.S. Army AchievementMedals and Army Commendation Medals for the deserving Iraqis.Many MiTTs now are assigned to U.S. formations and can nowrecommend official medals for their deserving Iraqi counterparts.

These medals were an opportunity for me and the MiTT teamto recognize publicly the heroism and sacrifice demonstrated bythese often neglected Soldiers. These medals, once presented bya U.S. officer personally to them, became a legitimate foreignaward that could be worn on their uniforms. Presented to themin mass formations, we showed LTC Sabah how to rewardaccordingly and provided him an opportunity to address andcompliment his soldiers en masse. Eventually, LTC Sabah’s S1began creating the battalion’s own certificates of achievement,and LTC Sabah began holding formations on his own to honorhis jundi. Using a combination of positive reinforcement andnegative reinforcement, LTC Sabah saw his battalion’s moraleincrease exponentially. Using good solid leadership, we showedthe Iraqi leadership one way to provide purpose, direction, andmotivation to their jundi.

Define a Training & Operations Model to Fit ThemThe Iraqi Army needs a training concept. Currently, training

is done halfheartedly or not at all. The Iraqi Army, falling underthe Ministry of Defense, is required to work 15 days straight andthen allows Iraqi jundi five days off to go home, pay their families,and execute tribal obligations. This work/release cycle isnonnegotiable to all Iraqi leadership. As such, the Iraq Armyengages in a Fight-Fight-Fight-Leave training strategy. In practice,25 percent of the 4th Battalion was gone on leave. All four riflecompanies and its HSC company were reduced to 75-percentmanning to fight. This left no room for training and maintenance.Training occurred “on-the-job.” Except for basic training andcombat, Iraqi jundi never get a dedicated opportunity to fire theirweapons for marksmanship practice. Maintenance was nearlynever done to standard or even treated seriously. Over time,uniforms, equipment and jundi become tired, ineffective, andeventually worn out. Though some coalition units are makinguse of joint patrols to train individual, collective, and leader tasksthey, in fact, have codified. Most of the Iraqi Army lacks a meansby which to achieve balance in combat, training, maintenance,and rest. My answer to this would be to develop and implement atraining and operational cycle akin to our own in the U.S. Army,but do it on their terms.

Based on the four-rifle company MTOE, it is possible to developa training and operational cycle that still meets the constraint of25 percent jundi on leave. This cycle would be based on a 20-daycycle, with company rotations occurring every five days and meetsthe Ministry of Defense requirement for fives days off for every15 days of consecutive work. Additionally, it is possible to alsohave one IA company dedicated to training, maintenance, andlimited missions as well. Calling it a Fight-Train-Leave-Fightrotation, the Iraqi Army could implement a system much like ourGreen-Amber-Red training/operational cycle. The fight or “green”companies would be manned 100 percent and would executecontinuous fighting for five days straight. Another company, the

train or “amber” company, would execute command maintenanceon all their assigned equipment and execute individual tasktraining such as first aid, marksmanship and communication skillsfor five days. The remaining leave or “red” company would be100 percent on leave for five days. The IA HSC company wouldstill rotate jundi home and would have 25 percent of the supportpersonnel and staff gone at any given time. One of the “green”companies would get stuck with 15 consecutive days fighting at100-percent strength, but after that the cycle would right itself.The specialty platoons within the HSC company would also rotatethrough training and maintenance along with the IA riflecompanies. The lack of jundi out in the fight would be augmentedby greater participation by Iraqi police into the patrol schedule.The tactical footprint also becomes increased with the advent ofdedicated U.S. units partnered with the Iraqi companies on the“green” fight status.

Based on an agreed upon mission essential task list (METL), atask list for all individual, collective, and leader training wouldneed to be developed and approved for use by the Ministry ofDefense (MOD). Currently, neither MOD, nor the Iraq AssistanceGroup, officially recognizes any such Army Training andEvaluation Program (ARTEP) manuals for Iraqi Army specifictraining. The METL is depicted differently depending on whomyou ask. The Iraq Assistance Group and coalition BCTs havediffering opinions concerning what ought to be the Iraqi ArmyMETL. Much of the training we provided our Iraqi battalioncame from directly from U.S. doctrine, or from guidance from themuch generalized Transition Readiness Assessment, a monthlyreview of Iraqi units, much akin to our unit status report (USR)reporting. Many coalition brigades are forced to improvise thetraining by the seat of their pants. Some were successful. Somewere not.

One such successful brigade that developed a METL for theIraqi units it worked with was the 2nd Brigade (Dagger), 1stInfantry Division. Colonel J.B. Burton mandated that a METLbe developed, cross-walked, and refined to incorporate individual,collective and leader tasks tailored to the Iraqi Army. Oncecompleted, this METL served as a model for all training conductedin a combined effort with coalition, transition teams, and IraqiArmy units within the 2/1 ID AO. Because no formal training/operations cycle was in existence, collective training was to occurduring actual combat and reconnaissance patrols. One exampleCOL Burton used was to train Battle Drill #6: Enter and Clear aRoom. A coalition patrol and an Iraqi patrol would move to anIraq muhalla, pay an Iraqi civilian money for use of his house,and practice techniques for breaching a house, and battle drillsfor a few hours. Not only did the jundi get trained by the Americansin a combat environment, but the presence of both forces in zonegarnered the confidence of the Iraqi locals. The Iraqi jundi learnedthe art of room clearing and tactical site exploitation from theAmericans in a hands-on fashion. This type of training wasextended to tactical checkpoints, ambushes, raids, and close targetreconnaissance. By doing this, the coalition units partnered withthe 4th Battalion, 1-6 IA Division, were provided clear tasks andpurposes, were motivated to not only “baby-sit” their Iraqicounterparts, but to train them in functional combat roles to securetheir own neighborhoods. It was a creative and effective techniqueto train the Iraqis while conducting combat operations.


The role of the MiTT teams in thisprocess is one of scheduling, patroloversight, and Iraqi staff training and battlecommand training. I was fortunate to bethe “microscope” into the 4th Battalion formy partnered coalition unit. My team andI assisted in the refinement of the IA METLand associated battle tasks; prepared theTransition Readiness Assessment everymonth to provide feedback for the Iraqitraining progress; and assisted with thescheduling of missions, patrols, andtraining for the Iraqi command and staff.Eventually, I was able to coach LTC Sabahinto providing his own form ofcommander’s intent to his subordinates andwas able to assist his S3 in planning a TCPand patrol matrix that facilitated his unit’straining with our coalition partners. MyMiTT staff trainers were able to focus ondeveloping IPB and maintenance andlogistics systems and training a very basicmodel of MDMP and orders production.Earlier in my tour as a MiTT chief, I wasunable to focus my team in this way becauseof all the coverage we provided the Iraqiplatoons and companies. Now, with adedicated U.S. partner that had a vestedinterest in training, I was able to train LTCSabah, his commanders and his staff usingthe full knowledge and skill sets of myteam. I reported directly to LieutenantColonel James Nickolas, the 2nd Battalion,12th Cavalry Regiment commander, whosebattalion was partnered with the 1-6 IABrigade. I, in a sense, became a third fieldgrade officer for his battalion’s efforts tosecure its portion of western Baghdad. MyMiTT had a great relationship with 2-12CAB, and we were able to accomplish muchin the way of COIN in my remaining twomonths of my tour.

Currently, no training and operationalcycle exists regarding the whole Iraqi Armyforce. Even though it is a great idea thatcan be applied to the whole force, it requiresthe approval of the Ministry of Defense toimplement it. The top-down hierarchy ofthe Iraqis forces this issue to be addressedin this manner. It takes the efforts of ourMulti-National Corps – Iraq (MNCI) andMulti-National Force – Iraq (MNFI)commanders, in my opinion, to coax theISF to adopt this technique. It can onlybenefit everyone concerned to do so. Notonly would they achieve balance regardingcombat, training, maintenance and rest, buttheir institutional knowledge of war-

fighting would increase over time, therebyreducing coalition presence over time.

In ClosingThe fight in west Baghdad will improve

with time. Combining Iraqi Army units,police units, and coalition units in unifiedaction is the way to go. The MiTTs canexpedite the training and implementation ofthis unified action by raising Iraqi Armyawareness and levels of competency. Beforecoalition units and MiTT teams can begin toleave the fight, Iraqi units must be able tomimic the basics of a COIN doctrine manyMiTTs and coalition units are just nowbeginning to understand and implement. TheMiTT’s focus should be placed on leading byexample, using all the coalition assets in agiven area, and developing a training cycle tomaximize the balance and effectiveness oftheir Iraqi counterparts.

My experience as a MiTT team chief wasan overall positive one. It challenged myresolve, my patience, and my ability to leadnot only Americans in combat, but Iraqisas well. It was an extremely dangerousbusiness. A Soldier of mine was killed, aswere many U.S. coalition Soldiers, andcountless Iraqi soldiers. Scores more werewounded. Stability had its price, andpayment was all too often.

I believe I learned almost as much abouthow not to fight a counterinsurgency in myyear’s time there as I learned how to fightone. Upon my return to the United States, Ipicked up the new FM 3-24,Counterinsurgency, and found it to be almost

Major David Voorhies recently returned fromIraq where he served as a military transition teamchief advising the 4th Battalion, 1st Brigade, 6thIraqi Army Division. He was previously assignedas a small group instructor with the InfantryCaptains Career Course, U.S. Army InfantrySchool, Fort Benning, Georgia. He graduated fromthe U.S. Army Military Academy at West Point in1995. His previous assigments include serving asa company commander and battalion S-1 with the1st Cavalry Division from 2000-2003.

counterintuitive. I had learned by doing: trialand error. I was pleased to see most of myassumptions and ideas turned out to be thecorrect ones in which to fight in a COINenvironment. I also feel optimistic that ourforces in Iraq are now getting COIN savvyand are fighting this war using appropriatetechniques and doing it in a way that makesthe Iraqis better.

MiTT may have “happened” to mewithout my choice, but I am glad it had.As I look forward to being an operationsofficer and executive officer in my ownright, I can look back at my experiences tobuild upon when I return someday to Iraq.I know a lot more about the nature of thewar there. I understand the suffering andthe civil insurrection going on in theirculture. I know some things about how tomake their army better, for their country’ssake. Transition teams can be extremelyuseful if used to the end to make the Iraqisecurity forces the heroes in this fight.After all, it will be only through theirdefinition of achieving victory that our ownmilitary may someday achieve the sameand come home.

Lieutenant Colonel Sabah Gati Kadim Al-Fadily confers with Lieutenant Colonel James Nickolas,commander of 2-12 Combined Arms Battalion, during a combined search.


In the confusion of battle, simplicity often decides successor failure. That statement is especially true when it comes to the connected issues of calls for fire (CFF) and close

combat attack (CCA). Non-fire support personnel are by definitionthe greatest consumers of indirect fire support. Non-aviationpersonnel are equally by definition the greatest customers for aerialclose fires. Those two groups — the non-aviation and the non-fire support personnel — are the same folks. This article suggestsmethods for both CFF and CCA that are equally simple to trainand to remember.

Polar Target Location and Creeping Fires AdjustmentPolar target location is the simplest method for training non-

fire support personnel in procedures. The creeping fires methodis the simplest way to adjust those fires. There are several otherways to accomplish either or both tasks simultaneously; however,they are best left to fire supporters. A trainer’s main goal must be

putting a “T” for trained status for the training audience on anygiven task. Attempting to train on grid, polar and shift from aknown point and the various methods of adjustment wastes trainingtime; a non-fire support trainee ends up “drinking from a firehose.” At the end of the day, the trainee may be familiar on allthree methods, but he will have mastered — and be comfortablein using — none. Training time these days is precious. We mustmake the most of it.

So, what makes polar and creeping fires efficient methods?First of all, when used together these two techniques provide thesafest and most easily trained method of employing indirect fires.Secondly, the polar method of target location provides abackground and methodology for using other fire support assetssuch as attack aviation and AC-130 gunships. You can “nest”training with follow-on training for CCA, adding to your trainingevolution. The third reason is that both methods use technologycommon to almost all Soldiers, especially small unit leaders. Basic

COMBAT-FOCUSED COMBINED ARMS TRAININGCAPTAIN WILLIAM J. DOUGHERTY AND STAFF SERGEANT REED MATHIS


2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne DivisionPublic Affairs Office

Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery fire insupport of the 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, out of

Muhumidiyah, Iraq.

needs are a global positioning system (GPS)and an ability to guesstimate range.Although not necessary, a laser range finderwill improve the quality of the “polar” plotby adding a more accurate range, and theGPS takes the guesswork out ofdetermining location. You can pretty muchassume that a team leader will have a GPS;it is quite likely his Soldiers do as well,given the availability of inexpensive andaccurate civilian GPS systems.

A GPS is what makes the polar methodthe preferred choice for CFF. Polarincreases the speed of the initial targetlocation and the adjustment. It reduces thepotential for fratricide, provides others withthe location of the target in respect to theobserver’s location, and is easy to train.

The polar method also allows theobserver to quickly look at and report hiscurrent location to generally within 30meters, use his compass to determinedirection to the target and either“guesstimate” range or use a laser rangefinder. All this can be done rapidly eitheras a team or individually, day or night.

In comparison, the grid method involvesdetermining a map spot (inherentlyinaccurate) or inputting data into aPrecision Lightweight GPS Receiver(PLGR) (This involves pushing multiplebuttons where each push on a buttonincreases the potential for a mistake, andthe datum input are polar measurementsanyway). “Shift from a known point”requires a known point, the observer’sability to visualize where the known pointactually is, and math.

During limited visibility, these tasksincrease in difficulty but to a lesser degreewith polar. Under the stress of closecombat, these tasks again increase in theirperceived complexity. Acquiring polar datais the least complex of the three methodsand closely resembles the standard infantryreport of direction, distance, and enemydescription given by a team leader to asquad leader.

Polar increases the speed of adjustmentbecause observer target (OT) direction issent in the initial CFF. OT direction isrequired before the first adjusting round.Soldiers are notorious for forgetting thistask. During grid missions, the observeroften does not send the OT direction, andthe fire direction center (FDC) must request

it from the observer or,in the case withmortars, default to thegun target (GT) line.In low-stress classroomtraining, non-firesupport personnelforget to send directionmore than 50 percent ofthe time. Even firesupport Soldiers forgetthis essential task. Thechaos of close combatmakes missing thiscritical task even morelikely. Imagine theadditional seconds orminutes wasted whenan FDC must remindthe observer about theneed for a direction.The observer then has to get out hiscompass, reacquire the target and send theOT direction transmission. These secondscount because the enemy is now alerted toour use of indirect fire by the impact of thefirst round.

The polar method reduces the chancesof fratricide, especially when used withcreeping fires to adjust. It also providesthe most positive control of the initialround’s impact location. If the observercan accurately locate himself (usually witha highly accurate GPS), then he canreasonably be assured that the first roundwill impact at the direction and distancetransmitted from his location. Using thegrid method, the observer can be reasonablyassured the round will impact in the vicinityof the grid transmitted. It is harder to besure of the accuracy of the grid transmittedas it relates to both target and his location.

Using the polar method also makes iteasier to verify in combat that the observeris ensuring the first round impacts at theunit standard distance of first round fromfriendlies or the appropriate risk estimatedistance (RED). Polar also allows FDCpersonnel to make appropriate shell/fuzedecisions based on the observer’s locationto the initial rounds predicted impact and/or the target. If observers fail to request adelay fuze or a converged sheaf, the FDCcan take the appropriate action to mitigaterisk. This is especially important whennon-fire support personnel are calling for

fire support in the confusion of combat.Grid and shift from known point

missions provide the FDC the targetlocation but do not provide the distancebetween the observer and the first round’spredicted impact location. Polar missionsprovide the FDC with the information tohelp the observer conduct a safe mission.The use of creeping fires further adds tothe safety of the polar method. The creepingfires method represents the most likelyadjustment method in combat expected forlight infantry. Indirect fires for light forcesrarely exceed 600 meters and in most caseswill occur within extreme danger closedistances in support of meetingengagements, ambushes, and defense ofcombat outposts. Creeping fires is thedoctrinal method of adjusting fires withindanger close distances; adjustment ofsubsequent rounds can be no more than 100meters.

Polar missions inherently provide highercommand posts and headquartersimmediate situational awareness on whereforces in contact are located. This can beespecially important as decisions are madeto bring other fire support assets to bearagainst the enemy. Again, grid onlyprovides the target location and not theobserver’s location. Of course, friendlyinformation will be passed eventually oreven before a fire mission, but the polarmission guarantees it will be sent. Attackaviation assets monitoring a fire support

TRAINING NOTES


Captain William J. Dougherty

Staff Sergeant Reed Mathis (left) and Specialist Stidham, both of the1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, stand next to a mortar firingposition in Iraq.

net are also provided situational awareness of friendly locationsshould they be brought into the fight and have essentially beengiven the data required for their own attack aviation CCA.

Soldiers instinctively like the polar method because it is easierto grasp. Whenever non-fire support personnel can choose theirmethod of target location they almost invariably attempt the polarmethod because it is the easiest to understand and execute.

One argument against the polar mission is that it takes longerfor an FDC to determine firing data. This is true because of theneed to input the observer’s location into fire control computersor on the firing chart. When looked at from just the perspectiveof the FDC determining firing data, then technically polar missionsdo take longer. When the polar mission is looked at from theperspective of an observer and especially a non-fire supportobserver, then a polar mission is faster and more likely to producea safe first-round impact. With a polar mission, the observer doesnot have to check a map spot or input polar data into a PLGR,FDCs and leaders who are battle tracking have greater situationalawareness, and observers get a better “warm and fuzzy” about theinitial round’s impact location. A polar mission places more ofthe button pushing, figuring and shell/fuze decisions onto the FDC.This is the proper place for those tasks when you consider a non-fire support Soldier (or a young forward observer) calling for firein close combat with failing or no visibility. He may be freezingtrying to push buttons on a PLGR or lying prone while being shotat. The FDC, if properly located, is removed from the chaos ofthe direct firefight to allow for accurate computational proceduresto take place. Those involved in the chaos of the direct fire fightshould be given the tools and training to keep the CFF as simpleand safe as possible.

Proper Format for Call for Fire Using Close CombatAttack and Friendly Marking

All team leaders and above should also know exactly the CFFformat for CCA. This is an easy task, one made more achievable

through the use of the polar method because it automaticallyincludes the vital OT direction. Most personnel who have hadformal CCA training understand the essential information thatgoes into the CFF. What they forget is the proper format.

If your initial response to that is “so what,” then you need toreconsider. It is true that no pilot would refuse a CCA because theformat is incorrect, but do you want the pilot trying to sort outgarbled information while dodging enemy fire? Do you want towait the extra time required for the pilot to make those adjustmentsbefore you get the fires you need? The quickest — and the safest— way to get those fires is to use the proper format correctly. Theformat is therefore important. If ground personnel send the CFFthe same way every time, it increases the efficiency, speed, andsafety of the fire mission. The reality of a CCA is ever-increasingchaos. The enemy will be shooting at the observer and thehelicopters. Friendly forces will be trying to sort friendly andneutral locations even as they mark that of the enemy with aplatoon’s worth of lasers, small arms fire, or other markingmethods. A standard CFF transmitted correctly will increasechances of success. CCA is the most likely fire support asset wewill employ in Iraq; the CFF should be known by all leaders.

Summary RecommendationsNone of what was offered above was new, and CCA TTPs have

been around since the inception of true indirect fire support andaerial fires. Longevity in a military sense is a strong indicator ofboth relevance and importance. We have known since WWII justhow lethal an infantryman could be when he could bring in

An OH-58A Kiowa provides close air support toSoldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 35th InfantryRegiment during a mission in Iraq.Staff Sergeant Samuel Bendet, USAF


accurate and timely fire support whetherby cannon, rocket, mortar, or aerial means.We also learned just how dangerous aninfantryman could be when fire support getsscrewed up. In summary, this article closeswith some simple recommendations tocombat leaders at all levels.

On CFFo When training non-fire support

personnel in CFF, the techniques learnedshould only be the polar method of targetlocation and the creeping fires method ofadjustment. Limiting instruction to thesetwo techniques provides a focus for trainingobjectives, which is especially importantgiven that CFF training probably does notoccur as often as it should.

o Train more on CFF. Achieve a “T”status on polar and creeping fires for squadleader and above throughout a battalion.Once this is achieved, move on to a higherlevel but keep techniques simple that showhow to move under the suppression ofindirect fires. Example: section/battery left/right.

o Develop a battalion combat focuswritten exam that incorporates the riskestimate distance for indirect fires incombat. The required RED knowledgeshould be focused for 155, 105 and 120s,and 60s that are at two-thirds system rangeat a .01 percent probability of injury.Again, this provides focus on likelyassets at probable rangesusing acceptablerisks that will

be used in high intensity combat.o Purchase more (IFATS) systems so that

there is one in each battalion; more IFATScould make the first three recommendationspossible. The cost of the systems issignificant, but the payoff would faroutweigh the investment.

o Recommend to the U.S. Army InfantryCenter at Fort Benning that it change theexpert infantryman badge (EIB) firesupport task to the polar method of targetlocation using the creeping fires method ofadjustment. The conditions should allowthe observer to use a GPS, have a compassand guesstimate range (this used to be an EIBtask). The standard should not be completelybased on target location but on where theobserver places the first round in an extremedanger close situation. This would involveknowledge of REDs and or a unit SOP ondistance from friendlies of the initial roundsimpact. Then the observer creeps therounds back onto the target.

On CCAo Develop a battalion combat focus

written exam that incorporates the 160thSpecial Operations Aviation Regimentstandard CCA CFF and techniques of


TRAINING NOTES

executing a CCA. Knowledge of the CCACFF, to standard, is an achievable goal.

o Continue to focus on CCA in dry,live, and maneuver-type trainingsituations so that all leaders understand thisvaluable fire support asset.

o Recommend the Infantry Center adda “Conduct a CCA CFF” task for EIB.Conditions should incorporate a target,radio, compass and personnel to role playthe pilot.

o Standards should have a +/ – for thedirection to target and + /– for the range totarget and accurate target description. Theformat of the CCA CFF is sent correctly.This recommendation could spur an Army-wide standard for CCA that would reducefriction and retraining time for PCS’dpersonnel or when different units supporteach other in combat.

o Battalions need a standardizedmarking system. The purchase of thedouble A strobe should become a priority,and VS17 panels should be an inspectableitem for leaders and vehicles.

o Glint tape provides the pilotssituational awareness on friendly locations.Glint wears out with exposure to the sun.Propose that this tape be made ready foruse with the new combat uniform.

Staff Sergeant Sean A. Foley

Captain William J. Dougherty is currentlyserving as a senior company observer controllerwith Task Force Two, Joint Readiness TrainingCenter at Fort Polk, Louisiana. He previously servedwith the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st AirborneDivision and had two tours in Iraq with the unit.

Staff Sergeant Reed Mathis has served asan 81mm mortar squad leader, 60mm sectionsergeant and 81mm platoon sergeant with the 1stBattalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd BrigadeCombat Team, 101st Airborne Division. Hecompleted two deployments as part of OperationIraqi Freedom while with the 1st Bn., 502nd Inf.

A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion,377th Field Artillery Regiment,

receives instructions for a firemission in Iraq.


The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) hasstrategically located a network of Lessons LearnedIntegration (L2I) analysts throughout the continental

United States and abroad. The concept is for this network ofmilitary analysts to expedite the flow of information/lessonslearned which is critical during the global war on terrorism. TheL2I initiative is foremost about people networking andcollaborating together rather than individuals searching to findinformation. If you are not already aware, a team of L2I analystsis currently assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia. The three-mancell arrived at Fort Benning in late August 2006 and were locatedwithin the Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate (CATD) inBuilding 4, Room 445. The primary function of the L2I analystsis to support both the United States Army Infantry Center (USAIC)and Fort Benning. Throughout the past several months we havediscovered that there is a tremendous number of Soldiers who arenot familiar with CALL or the L2I program.

KNOWLEDGE IS POWERDuring several CALL briefings and CALL Web site train-

the trainer classes that were given to Soldiers at Fort Benning,the L2I analysts discovered an alarming pattern — manySoldiers were not informed about CALL, an organization thathas been in existence since 1985. This may be due to the factthat the Center for Army Lessons Learned is located at FortLeavenworth, Kansas. In October 2006, a survey was conductedat the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy(USASMA) by fellow L2I analysts (Scott Gould/ColinAnderson). The survey, which covered 113 students (sergeantsthrough sergeants first class who were attending Phase II BattleStaff NCO Course) revealed: 50 percent of these Soldiers had no previous knowledge

or use of CALL; 74 percent of these Soldiers had never used any of CALL’s

services; and 98 percent of these Soldiers had never submitted a request

for information (RFI).A series of Center for Army Lessons Learned briefings were

created to educate Soldiers on CALL, and these briefings havebeen given to Soldiers in the Warrior Leaders Course (WLC),Basic NCO Course (BNCOC), Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC),CATD, as well as officer and NCO Professional Developmentclasses. If your unit would like to receive the Center for ArmyLessons Learned brief or the train-the-trainer briefing on how to

L2I ANALYSTS ASSIST WITHINFORMATION REQUESTS

ROBERT A. CHARLES AND GREGORY VALRIE

utilize the CALL Web site, contact the Infantry Center L2I analystsusing the contact information listed on page 46.

CALL PRODUCTSSince September 11, 2001, the Center for Army Lessons

Learned has produced 451 publications. CALL publishes severalcategories of publications including:

Handbooks — “How-to” manuals on specific subjects (e.g.,Soldiers’ Handbook: The First 100 Days, Base Defense: Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures)

Newsletters — Publications that address a specific subject (e.g.,convoy operations, etc.)

Special Studies/Editions — Publications related to a specificoperation, exercise, or subject. These publications generallyprovide information on topics ranging from a country’s history inrelation to current events, cultural do’s and don’ts, language, andenvironmental cautions, to tactics, techniques and procedures(TTPs) and emerging doctrine.

JOIB (Joint Operations Integration Branch) Bulletins —Publications that showcase articles which encompass all aspectsof war fighting at the operational to strategic level.

CTC Quarterly Bulletins and Trends — Periodic publicationsthat provide current lessons, TTPs, and information from theCombat Training Centers.

News From the Front — News From the Front is a bimonthlyonline publication that contains information and lessons onexercises and real-world events.

CTC Tips For Success — Tips extracted from reports compiledat the Center for Army Lessons Learned from recent rotations atthe National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness TrainingCenter (JRTC), Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC),and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).

Training Techniques — Online publications that providetraining techniques and procedures collected or sent to the Centerfor Army Lessons Learned by units, commands, Combat TrainingCenters, Soldiers and leaders.

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATIONThe L2I analysts disseminate information/lessons learned on a

daily basis. This information primarily consists of observation/insight/lesson (OIL) and TTPs. The analysts “push” this information toInfantry Center units and directorates through e-mail, compact discs,and paper copies. The primary search for information for dailydissemination of information is conducted through a search onthe internal L2I SharePoint Site. This Web site is available for

Center For Army Lessons Learned



TRAINING NOTES

access by L2I analysts only. Allinformation on the site has been screenedby the Center for Army Lessons LearnedHub and validated prior to the release ofinformation.

REQUEST FOR INFORMATIONThe most common way for L2I

analysts to support the Infantry Center isby answering requests for information.An RFI occurs whenever a Soldier has amilitary question that they cannot find theanswer to. The Soldier should contact anL2I analyst who will research the questionand also notify the L2I network of militaryanalysts which expedites the informationgathering process. Generally, the RFI isanswered within 72 hours or less. It isimportant to note that any Soldier caninitiate an RFI. The Center of ArmyLessons Learned Web site (http://call.army.mil) is a great source ofinformation for Soldiers of all ranks.There is a phenomenal amount ofinformation available on a broad rangeof military subject areas.

Fort Benning L2I analysts contactinformation:

Edwin Nelson - (706) [email protected] A. Charles - (706) [email protected] Valrie - (706) [email protected]

Robert A. Charles is a retired Infantry firstsergeant with more than 22 years of service.His assignments included serving with the82nd Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division,3rd Ranger Battalion, 25th Infantry Division,507th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and theInfantry Training Brigade with the 2nd Battalion,58th Infantry Regiment and 1st Battalion, 19thInfantry Regiment. He is now employed as acontractor for Eagle Systems & Services, Inc.,where he serves as a military analyst at theU.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning,Georgia.

Gregory Valrie is a retired Armor firstsergeant with more than 24 years of service.He is a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom 1where he served with 2nd Battalion, 69th ArmorRegiment as a tank platoon sergeant (CCompany), and OIF 3 where he served as afirst sergeant of a tank company (C Company)with 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment. Heis now employed as a contractor for MilitaryProfessional Resources Incorporated (MPRI),where he serves as a military analyst at theU.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning.

CCCCCOMBATIVESOMBATIVESOMBATIVESOMBATIVESOMBATIVES:::::CAPTAIN JOSH COLLINS

Do We Train As We Fight?

An Infantry Soldier enters abuilding and is immediatelyconfronted by an angry,

unarmed man who yells defiant obscenitiesin his native tongue. The Soldier closesthe distance and tells the man to get onthe ground. The two collide. The Soldiertakes him to the ground as he has beentrained to do, but something goes wrong.The man flails and resists and the Soldier’steammates descend upon the entangledpair. As they struggle, the resistantnoncombatant’s hand finds its way to afragmentation grenade on the Soldier’sequipment. The unthinkable happens.

The Current Army CombativesProgram

The purpose of combatives training asidentified in Chapter 1-2 of FM 3-25.150(Combatives) is to prepare Soldiers “to usedifferent levels of force in an environment

where conflict may change from lowintensity to high intensity over a matter ofhours. Many military operations, such aspeacekeeping missions or noncombatantevacuations, may restrict the use of deadlyweapons. Hand-to-hand combatives trainingwill save lives when an unexpectedconfrontation occurs.” The next paragraphstates that, “More importantly, combativestraining helps to instill courage and self-confidence.”

In terms of accomplishing the greaterpurpose, the Army Combatives School doesjust that. During Phase I training, it presentsa comprehensive program of Gracie Jiu-Jitsuthat is easy to learn, effective for rules-basedground fighting and requires minimalresources for training. This accomplishes thegreater purpose of instilling courage andself-confidence, but ironically does notaddress the lesser purpose, which is morecombat-oriented.

Level II and III training at theCombatives School elevate drastically inintensity. Level III teaches advanced fightingtechniques and styles, such as striking,kicking, knife fighting, stick fighting and

Staff Sergeant Jay Hilliard, left, assists Iraqi Army soldiers during combatives training in Mosul.Specialist Christa Martin

This article first appeared in theSummer 2007 issue of the InfantryBugler.

someone is wearing this gear and immediately shifts into acombatives mode. This type of discrimination (as it relates to anoncombatant) is uniform-based, as opposed to a more realisticbehavior-based assessment.

During these exercises, Soldiers are able to practice combativestechniques in tandem with their CQB tactics. In role playereducation, genuine human reaction is crucial. Consequently, thistype of training not only amplifies our tactical expertise, butalso is cost effective (initial cost of the High Gear suits).Founded upon lessons learned during successful contingencyoperations around the world, ACTS create a fluid environmentwhere the Soldier will shift gears based on threat, situational

more advanced grappling. The school successfully createsconfident, tough Soldiers. However, the realistic operational skillsets — weapons retention while controlling a noncombatant orcaptured combatant, nonlethal techniques in crowd control, andtraffic control point procedures for removing unwilling passengersfrom their vehicles — are not addressed. The Level III programaddresses some close quarters battle (CQB)-related combativestactics, but the premise is still the same — grappling.

As Soldiers, the combative drills we adhere to and themethodologies by which we train prepare us for today’s battlefield.The premise behind our combatives training is the belief that mayfights end up on the ground. The training is hampered, however,by the fact that we train without the equipment we use on thebattlefield. The dangers of sticking to a “go-to-the-ground”mentality are only learned when the Soldier finds himself in apersonal defense situation with more than one assailant, or worseyet on the ground with a noncombatant who is not encumbered by60 pounds of gear. Ultimately, we are not preparing for combat ifwe do not simulate the combat environment during training.

Combatives on the Modern BattlefieldWe train in the art of hand combatives for at least three reasons:

to prepare to defend ourselves in unarmed (hand-to-hand) combatas a form of personal protection, to instill an aggressive spirit andthe Warrior Ethos and to execute CQB in a way that mandatesSoldiers use nonlethal force as a means to control the actions of anoncombatant.

If we agree that the most beneficial aspect of a combativesprogram is its potential value in the CQB arena, then we mustcreate a program that fits the tactics and techniques used for CQB.Training in both stand-up and ground-fighting methods providesa base for opponent takedowns, prisoner control, pressure pointcontrol tactics (PPCT), and weapons retention. The majority oftraining should focus on the stand-up approach whilemaintaining mobility and centering on the use of explosiveaggression. Though most fights and prisoner controlsituations will end with someone on the ground, they allbegin standing up, as does CQB.

A CQB-Focused Combatives ProgramCombining the combatives and CQB training during

simunition exercises (using paint ball rounds) is not anew concept. Incorporating exercises that provide accurateadvanced MOUT techniques (AMT) environmentalsimulation with human (role player) response adds a newdynamic to the training. These exercises, called AbsoluteCombatives Training Scenarios (ACTS), require role playersto interact, each outfitted in combatives protective equipment,called High Gear. ACTS replicates the AMT environmentby incorporating combatants and noncombatants who areaggressive, resistant, passive or immediately compliant. TheSoldier reacts, discriminates, and responds based not only onwhether the target is a threat (weapon present), but on the demeanorand behavior of noncombatants. Putting both bad guys and goodguys into the same protective gear eliminates the “red man suit”artificiality, which exists anytime a Soldier comes to a room where

Specialist Christa Martin

Staff Sergeant Gaylord Reese, bottom,attempts a submission hold onSpecialist Robert Johnson duringcombatives training in Iraq. TheSoldiers are with the 5th Battalion,20th Infantry Regiment.


awareness and target demeanor.Army-taught jiu-jitsu provides the Army an inexpensive and

efficient way to train hand-to-hand techniques; however, does jiu-jitsu alone satisfy the criteria for feasible control options during amilitary operation while wearing 50-60 pounds of Kevlar vest,ammunition and equipment? We must train as we fight.

The Combatives EnvironmentThe combatives environment, as it relates to the Soldier, is

defined as the use of one’s total body, armed or unarmed, to defendagainst, control, manipulate or eliminate the threat of a hostileopponent by physically imposing one’s will onto another. Mergingsound combative principles and techniques with more realistictraining, (i.e. combatives training in full gear), leads to a betterchance for success in a true life situation.

The fundamentals for “the stand-up approach” are thegroundwork for training. The first priority of a victorious fighteris to become proficient in the initial phase of any fight — thestanding phase. More importantly, a combatives situation thatgoes to the ground during CQB is not one in which a Soldiermust fight alone; CQB is a team sport.

When the combatives environment includes armedopposition, as in CQB, it is imperative for Soldiers to stay ontheir feet. Even where the threat is eliminated, there still maybe a need to control a frightened hostage or resistantnoncombatant. Many of the same principles from unarmed handcombat transpose into armed hand combat, i.e. the instinctiveuse of straight, fast and effective blows to move someone outof the path or to put him on the ground. Defensive principleschange slightly according to specific tactics used and withrespect to the particular armor that is worn.

The most powerful aspect of CQB is team momentum.Combatives decisions made during the forward attack towardan opponent will maintain the momentum. The dynamics ofteam momentum entail speed, surprise, and violence of action.If capture is the intent, a combatant must close with the victimand swarm him, using the appropriate takedown or controlmechanisms.

With ever-changing and more difficult missions, Soldiersmust be prepared to face new challenges. Today’s Soldier isthe complete warrior, capable of highly sophisticatedoperations, precision shooting and relentless hand combat.While concentrating on becoming a skilled, stand-up fighter, heshould always prepare for the possibility of a fight going to theground. Keeping a strong defensive posture from a mobile offensiveplatform and reacting instinctively with fast and effectivecombinations will keep him on his feet. There is no other choicefor a Soldier during CQB, and certainly no other choice when heis by himself in a personal protections situation.

Captain Josh Collins has 17 years of active duty service, with the past11 years spent in the special operations community. He was an amateurboxer for 12 years before turning professional. He currently teachescombatives to fellow infantrymen.

AMT/CQB-Focused CombativeProgarm of Nonlethal Force

(With the secondary intention of developing personalprotection skills)

Removing noncombatants from the Soldier’s pathduring CQB

Weapon-muzzle strikes/rakesPalm strikesForearm blast/SPEAR techniques (Threat

Confrontation Management Systems - TCMS by TonyBlauer)

Kicks

Takedown/capture or subdueTeamworkWith primary weapon (pain compliance)SPEAR techniques (TCMS)Asp (pain compliance and disablement)Stun and grabLeg kicks/sweepsTwo-man high/low tackle

Prisoner control/cuffingTeamworkHead controlPPCT (pain compliance)Joint manipulationGround fighting/control in kit and weapons retention

Crowd control (MOUT)Maintaining reactionary gapJoint manipulationThe surreptitious strike/attention getter (ball slap)SPEAR techniques (TCMS)TakedownsGround fighting/control and cuffing

Personal protection measuresStreet-fight psychology (types of attacks/attackers)Confrontation managementSituational awareness (tell-tale signs of imminentdanger)Stand-up approach (boxing/kickboxing)Maintaining effective distanceSPEAR techniques (TCMS)Ground-fightingClose-quarter tactics (biting, eye-gouging, headbutts, etc)Knife fighting (a pocket knife can be carried mostanywhere)Asp/stick fighting (an asp can be carried most places)

TRAINING NOTES


Choosing the proper running shoe can make the differencebetween enjoying running or hating it, running incomfort or in pain, and staying injury-free or incurring

a multitude of injuries. Trying to select a single pair of runningshoes from numerous brands and models can be intimidating.Ensuring that you buy the proper shoe for your foot type andrunning gait can be extremely confusing. The following articlewill help guide you in your search to find the best running shoefor you.

Understand PronationWhenever you talk about running shoes, the term “pronation”

is bound to come up. Pronation is the normal biomechanicalprocess that occurs during running that allows the body to naturallyabsorb shock as each foot strikes the ground. A normal runninggait begins with the foot contacting the ground on the back outsidecorner of the heel. The foot then rolls inward or “pronates” toabsorb shock. The runner’s weight then transfers to the ball of thefoot, the heel lifts up and finally the toes push off. Many runnerspronate too much which is called “overpronation” or not enoughwhich is called “underpronation.” Wearing the appropriate runningshoes can help to improve your running gait and eliminate or atleast minimize lower extremity pain and injuries.

The Wet Foot TestDetermining your running gait is best achieved by having a

qualified expert such as a sports medicine physician, physicaltherapist or an exercise physiologist analyze your running with avideo gait analysis (VGA) program. If you don’t have access to aprofessional gait analysis, the “wet test” is a much simpler methodthat will give you a general idea of your foot shape and your degreeof pronation.

Wet Foot Test Procedures:1. Wet the bottom of your feet and step on any surface that will

leave an imprint of your feet. A brown grocery bag or coloredconstruction paper works well for this test.

2. Compare the imprint left by your feet to the three mostcommon foot imprints found below.

3. The imprint will let you see how high or low your archesare as well as your degree of pronation.

4. This information combined with your shoe wear patternwill allow you to better determine the best shoe for you.

HOW TO CHOOSE PROPER

RUNNING SHOESCHRIS KUSMIESZ


Neutral (Normal) Pronation: A neutral running gaitinvolves a slight amount of pronation. The foot contactsthe outside of the heel, rotates inward toward the mid-foot, then your weight is transferred to the ball of thefoot. The least amount of injuries are associated with thisrunning gait. These runners usually have a medium ornormal arch height.

Overpronation: The foot is overly flexible and rotatesexcessively inward toward the mid-foot. This is the mostcommon type of running gait seen. The amount ofoverpronation can range from slight to severe. Theserunners tend to have flat or low arches.

Underpronation: The foot is very rigid and lacks thenormal amount of pronation. The foot does not rotateinward resulting in the runner’s body weight stayingtoward the outside edge of the foot. Many injuries areassociated with this running gait because of the poorshock-absorbing biomechanics. This running gate is muchless common. These runners tend to have high arches.

Neutral RunnersNormal Arch Height: A normal/medium arch is generally

associated with normal pronation and a neutral running gait.Wear Pattern: Wear on lateral heel and medial forefoot.Shoe Shape: “Semi-curved” — The bottom of semi-curved

shoes have a slight curve toward the midline. These shoes generallyhave a blend of flexibility, cushioning and stability.

Best Shoes: Stability Shoes — These shoes provide a mixtureof cushioning and medial support under the arch. These shoesusually have a semi-curved shape. Runners with a normal archheight and a slight amount of overpronation wear these shoes.

This article first appeared in the Army Physical FitnessResearch Institute’s April 2007 newsletter.

Figure 1 — Normal Arch

TRAINING NOTES


OverpronatorsFlat/low Arch Height: A flat/low arch is usually associated

with overpronation.Wear Pattern: Medial heel and forefootShoe Shape: “Straight” — The bottom of straight shoes have

little or no curvature which helps provide maximum stability.Best Shoes: Motion-Control Shoes — These shoes provide the

maximum amount of stability to control excessive overpronation.These shoes usually have a straight shape. Runners who have amoderate to severe amount of overpronation wear these shoes.

10 Tips for Selecting the Proper-fitting Running Shoes1. Get the proper shoe length: Allow for a thumb’s width (about

a 1/2 inch) between your longest toe and the front of the shoe. Ifyou have ever had black toe nails or blisters on the front of yourtoes, it is most likely caused by running in shoes that are not longenough for your foot.

2. Get the proper width: You should be able to easily wiggleyour toes in the toe box. If your toes are cramped together or youfeel the shoes rubbing on either side, then you need a wider runningshoe. If the upper part of the shoe is bulging over the sides of thesole, then the shoe is too narrow.

3. Get a snug-fitting heel: The back of the shoe (the heel cup)should conform to the shape of your heel and provide a snug fitand prevent your foot from slipping.

4. Running shoes should feel comfortable immediately:Running shoes do not require a “break-in” period. The shoesshould feel comfortable the first time you put them on your feet. Ifthe shoes feel tight or stiff, then you should avoid them and try ona different pair, size, brand or model.

5. Look for flexible shoes: Running shoes should flex easily inthe toe box region. If they do not flex with ease, it can add extrastress and strain to your lower extremities. To test a shoe’sflexibility place the shoe lengthwise between the palms of yourhands and apply even pressure. Get a sense for how much force isneeded for the shoe to bend. If it requires a great amount of force,avoid that pair of shoes.

6. Test fit arch support/orthodics: If you wear arch supports ororthodics in your running shoes, be sure to bring them along whenyou try on new running shoes. If the new shoes are constructedslightly different than your current pair, the arch support ororthodic may not fit correctly in the shoe. It’s best to find this outin the store as opposed to when you get the new pair of shoeshome.

7. Shop for new running shoes in the late afternoon/earlyevening: Feet tend to swell slightly at the end of the day. A pair ofrunning shoes will have a slightly tighter feel at night as opposedto in the morning.

8. Wear appropriate socks: Try on new shoes with the socksthat you normally run in. Dress socks and nylons are much thinnerthan running socks and will give the shoe a different fit and feel.

9. Take a test run: It’s hard to get a true feel for running shoeswithout actually running in them. Most good sporting good storesand specialty running shoes shops will allow and even encourageyou to take a test run before purchasing the shoes.

10. Seek further guidance: If you feel you need more helpselecting an appropriate pair of running shoes, ask a qualifiedprofessional for advice. Podiatrists, sports medicine physicians,physical therapists, athletic trainers and exercise physiologists maybe able to provide you information to make the shoe-buying processa little clearer. In particular, if you are an avid runner or if you arerecovering from an injury, then consider consulting with APFRIregarding your shoe selection.

UnderpronatorsHigh Arch Height: A high arch can be associated with a neutral

gait or underpronation.Wear pattern: Lateral heel and forefootShoe Shape: “Curved” — The bottom of curved shoes have a

greater degree of curvature toward the midline which allows formaximum flexibility and encourages pronation.

Best Shoes: Cushioned Shoes — These shoes provide the leastamount of stability and encourage foot motion. These shoes usuallyhave a curved shape. Individuals who have a neutral running gaitand high arches wear these shoes. The name of this shoe typeshould be call a “neutral” shoe since all running shoes providecushioning.

Chris Kusmiesz is an exercise physiologist with the Army Physical Fitness Research Institute, U.S. Army War College.

Figure 2 — Low Arch

Figure 3 — High Arch

The Secrets of Inchon: The UntoldStory of the Most Daring Covert Missionof the Korean War. By CommanderEugene Franklin Clark, USN. New York:Berkley, 2002, 326 pages, $14.95.Reviewed by Colonel Mike Davino.

Although the Korean War is oftenreferred to as “the forgotten war,” eventhose readers with a casual knowledge ofmilitary history are familiar with theamphibious assault at Inchon. General ofthe Army Douglas MacArthur famouslyremarked the daring operation was “a5,000-to-1 gamble.” To reduce thosedaunting odds, obtaining detailedknowledge of the enemy and terrain in thetarget area was essential to set the UnitedNations up for success. How thatinformation was gained, and the men andwomen who collected it, is the subject ofthis book.

On the surface, then-Lieutenant EugeneClark at 39 years old seemed to be anunlikely choice to lead a reconnaissancemission deep behind enemy lines. Ayeoman who sought a commission in WorldWar II to escape a desk job, Clark wasattached to MacArthur’s Far EastCommand staff in Tokyo at the outbreak ofthe Korean War. Complicating matters,Clark was tasked to assemble his team andcomplete his mission less than three weeksbefore the September 15, 1950, invasiondate. However, this exceptionallyresourceful and intrepid officer hadextensive experience with both combat andamphibious operations in WWII as wellwith covert operations in post-war China.

Transported to the objective area by aBritish warship and supported by a KoreanNavy patrol craft, Clark’s pick-up team ofKorean commandos was sooncompromised. In what sometimes reads likean action novel, Clark vividly describesfighting for the information the Navy andMarines needed to accomplish theirmission. Adventure follows adventure in adramatic series of gun battles, air strikes,hand-to-hand combat, interrogations, raids,and a sea battle between junks. In spite of


the enemy opposition, Clark gathered thecritical elements of information requiredand relayed them to headquarters in Tokyo.

Not surprisingly, Clark’s success inproviding information to his superiors inTokyo is rewarded with even more tasks.Yet Clark and his men press on, usingBenzedrine to help get by on just a couplehours sleep each day. In an almostincredible finish, before they departed forhome, Clark led his band of raiders on anaudacious mission to turn on the light inthe Wolmi-do lighthouse to guide theinvasion fleet on its approach to the Inchonchannel.

The book is not without its flaws — themain one being the lack of maps. Only twoare included and unlike the incrediblycomprehensive text, neither map has anyuseful details to help the reader understandthe distances and locations that makeClark’s mission even more difficult. Also,an index would have been handy to helpreaders keep track of the numerous peopleand places Clark depicts.

Despite these problems, The Secrets ofInchon merits reading. It provides greatinsight into the challenges of operating withindigenous forces. More significantly, it isa classic firsthand account of how aningenious and persistent leader canaccomplish his mission even when facedwith almost inconceivable impediments.

Contract Warriors, How MercenariesChanged History and the War onTerrorism. By Fred Rosen. New York:Alpha Books, 256 pages, $16.95.Reviewed by Major Keith Everett.

The first three chapters make apromising start in introducing the readerto the world of private military companies,with exciting accounts of successes andfailures of modern day mercenaries invarious parts of the world. Then the authormakes a perplexing leap into a patchworkcollection of historical anecdotes ofmercenaries through the ages. Although

interesting, the collection of mercenarystories in the middle three chapters leavesa doubt as to the author’s purpose alludedto in the title. We come back to the modernworld quite suddenly in chapter seven andare seemingly back on track; then theauthor attempts to forge a hodgepodgecollection of information from the internetinto the end of his book.

Rosen explains how organizations likeExecutive Outcome changed the mercenarybusiness. Executive Outcome receivedmineral rights and a percentage of the oiland diamond trade of Angola and SierraLeone. The author zeros in on the exploitsof retired British Colonel Tim Spicer inPapua New Guinea. Spicer developed anew concept of a private military companyby calling his outfit a military contractingcompany. Although Spicer’s efforts inSierra Leone and Papua New Guinea werenotable fixtures, his efforts were reborn inIraq. Rosen quotes figures on the amountof money spent by the Bush administrationon government contractors without a singlenote on where these figures came from. “Itis estimated…” does not cut it. The lackof credible sources is a shame, as themilitary contracting method of gettingvarious dirty jobs done in a combat zone ishere to stay. Primary sources appear to beself-serving Web sites of the private militarycompanies.

The jumping around from modern toancient back to modern anecdotes makesfor a lot of head scratching trying to relateit to how mercenaries changed the world.The ancient history as used, is more of adistraction than supporting Rosen’s thesisof mercenaries changing the world. Forexample, Hannibal, Spartacus and El Cidare explored, but the way they changedhistory is only suggested. The ancienthistory seems to be added as filler andrecent anecdotes would have been moreeffective within the parameters of modernmercenaries affecting the world. Theauthor at times jumps from Italy to India,then Japan outlining mercenary activityaround the globe. Some stories did not need

BOOK REVIEWS


to be told at all, such as that of Dutchmercenary William Hessing or the Ronins.The stories are interesting, but thetransition along the way makes you blinkat the confusing chain of thought.

Chapter six was a somewhat ramblingchapter with anecdotes of mercenariesserving in the Spanish-American War,Egypt fighting Ethiopia, the Irish Battalionfighting in the Mexican War, andmercenaries fighting for Britain at Gallipoliduring WWI. A quick gloss over of themodern age turned into a chapter that isnot effective at all in explaining the use ofmercenaries today. The work could haveused an editor cutting out chapters four,five, and six to bring the work more in linewith the author’s thesis.

The strength of the book rests with thedescription of the activities, problems,accomplishments, and failures ofBlackwater, Control Risks Group, and otherprivate military contractors mentioned.The thesis’ focus of how the use ofmercenaries changed history is not clear.Adding Richard Marcinko’s advertisementfor mercenary training Marcinko-style andcalling it an afterword appeared as anattempt to gain credibility. W. ThomasSmith’s portion of the afterword was tackedon in apparently the same lively spirit. Youneed to look elsewhere for either a historyof mercenaries or an account of howmercenaries changed history.

Commanding the Army of thePotomac. By Stephen R. Taaffe.University Press of Kansas, 2006. 284Pages, $34.95. Reviewed by CommandSergeant Major (Retired) James Clifford.

Continuing the “Modern War Studies”series by the University Press of Kansas,Commanding the Army of the Potomac byStephen R. Taaffe offers a betterunderstanding of one of America’s leastsuccessful but best known armies. As statesseceded after the election of AbrahamLincoln, the United States Army consistedof just 16,000 men stationed in far flungconstabularies on our frontiers. Of thesmall professional officer corps, only twoleaders had any experience leading largeformations in combat. One of those wouldsurrender his forces in Texas and throw in

with the Confederacy. The other was asedentary bureaucrat whose old age andinfirmities prevented active leadership onthe field of battle. About one half of therest would resign to join the rebellionleaving just a few loyal stalwarts to leada rapidly expanding army.

The premise of this book is that thesuccesses and failures of the Army of thePotomac rested heavily on the skills ofthe 36 officers who served as eitherpermanent or long-term temporary corpscommanders during the life of thisorganization. This is a survey of thoseofficers. Taaffe places each in one of fouroverlapping categories: McClellanites,Lincolnites, opportunists, and a small butimportant cadre of those that meritedpromotion. Each of these categories isfully explored to determine their effecton the Army of the Potomac.

The author tells the story in a generallychronological pattern, presenting eachcategory within chapters on four Armycommanders: McClellan, Burnside,Hooker, and Meade. The final and longestchapter covers the period in which UlyssesS. Grant served as general-in-chief of allthe Union armies but was most influentialin the daily operations of the Army of thePotomac. As such the reader learns asmuch about the Army commanders as aboutthe corps commanders serving under them.This is a fine comprehensive story of theArmy of the Potomac, especially for thosenot so well-read on the topic.

Knowledgeable students of the easterntheater may find this book to be toogeneral for their purposes. Thedrawbacks include the superficial analysisof each corps commander; too muchemphasis on the army commanders,President Lincoln and politicians; and adistracting discussion of the Army of theJames and its commander, BenjaminButler, that covers nearly one quarter of thebook. Additionally, the lack of anyrecognition that these corps commanderswere either civilians or low-ranking officersat the outset of the Civil War leaves a gapin the understanding of the leadershipchallenges inherent in a rapidly expandingarmy at war.

Also missing was any context betweenthe 36 officers who served as corpscommanders. The author’s point is that

most of these men ultimately failed in manyrespects while in command. A chart wouldhave enabled the reader to better evaluatethese conclusions. Considering that eachcommander left his position for differentreasons — some positive, some negative— a chart would have enhanced thereader’s understanding. This visual devicecomparing these men would have beenuseful in understanding and evaluating thepremise of the book.

Despite these observations this is a verygood book for the casual Civil War student.It brings forth topics worthy ofconsideration and presents them in a highlyreadable format that will enhance thereader’s understanding of the Army of thePotomac and whets one’s thirst for further,more in-depth study.

Norway 1940: The Forgotten Fiasco -A Firsthand Account of the DisastrousBritish Attempt to Block the GermanInvasion of Norway in April 1940. ByJoseph Kynoch. Shrewsbury, England:Airlife Publishing, 2002, 174 pages,$26.95. Reviewed by Brigadier General(Retired) Curtis Hooper O’Sullivan.

To those who followed the news in 1940,Norway is hardly forgotten. It was the onlyshow on the road at the time and was afirst in many respects, though World War IIhad been going on since the incident at theMarco Polo Bridge on July 7,1937. It hadcome closer to home to Europeans with theinvasion of Albania by Mussolini on April7, 1939, and there was no doubt after Hitlerattacked Poland September 1 of that year.That blitz was followed by what was calledthe “phoney” war on the western front.During that time, Der Fuehrer becamealarmed at the non-neutral acts of theBritish in Norwegian waters and wereconcerned it might be the prelude to theiroccupation of that nation. As early asFebruary 1940, Hitler decided on apreemptive invasion of Norway, which waslaunched April 9, 1940 — precipitating aquick counterinvasion by the Allies.

The Germans made the first airborneoperation in history and the firstamphibious landing since Gallipoli, whichsucceeded despite the alleged superiority ofthe Royal Navy. The latter did a poor job of


SUBSCRIPTION AND UNITDISTRIBUTION INFORMATIONPersonal subscriptions: INFANTRY Magazine is available to

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improvising their own landings, with consequentproblems for the troops ashore. The author wasamong these. He was a private in a territorialbattalion who had been called up only seven monthsbefore. The book is largely his personal odyssey thatis intermingled with accounts by comrades and such.He attempts to give enough background to show howhis experiences fit into a slightly larger picture. Thisis his story and is not intended to be a history of thecampaign. The maps and sketches are useful for hispurpose. The pictures are a cut above most in suchworks in giving a graphic portrayal of conditions.

The verdict is still out whether this was truly a“fiasco.” That’s defined as “a ludicrous orhumiliating failure or breakdown.” There’s noquestion that the operation was a failure or thatthere was confusion in its conduct, but it waswaged gallantly. On the bright side, the Nazisdidn’t achieve all they’d hoped. They had hopedfor a major contribution to their economic neworder. That didn’t materialize, and Norwayactually became a liability. Considerable forceswere tied down there. They may have been awarethat Churchill seriously advocated a returnappearance and obviously were aware of thedeception threats there before Operation Overlord(along with Pas de Calais). Overall, it is a goodchoice for anyone who wants a boots-on-the-ground look at Norway in 1940.

Staff Sergeant Stacy L. Pearsall, USAF

A Soldier leads his squadduring a cordon and searchoperation in Iraq April 2. TheSoldiers were with the 5thBattalion, 20th InfantryRegiment, 3rd Stryker BrigadeCombat Team, 2nd InfantryDivision.

CORRECTIONIn the January-

February 2007 issue ofINFANTRY, we failed toidentify that the article“Dealing with the Iraqi

Populace: An Arab-American Soldier’s

Perspective” written bySergeant Mounir

Elkhamri hadpreviously run inMilitary Review’s

January-February 2007issue. We apologize for

any inconvenience.

infantry - fort benning · ever since. the basis for much of the training was field manual 21-150,...

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