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Copyright © ISA Setting the Standard for Automation TM Standards Certification Education & Training Publishing Conferences & Exhibits Industrial Automation and Controls Systems Security Past, Present and Future Eric C. Cosman COBISA 2019

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Page 1: Industrial Automation and Controls Systems Security · • “Security through obscurity” • Inaccurate or non-existing inventory • Unpatched or unsupported (operating) systems

Copyright © ISA

Setting the Standard for AutomationTM

Standards

Certification

Education & Training

Publishing

Conferences & Exhibits

Industrial Automation and

Controls Systems Security

Past, Present and Future

Eric C. Cosman

COBISA 2019

Page 2: Industrial Automation and Controls Systems Security · • “Security through obscurity” • Inaccurate or non-existing inventory • Unpatched or unsupported (operating) systems

Copyright © ISA 2

Your Speaker…

• 35+ years experience in industrial information

technology

• 15+ years in ICS cybersecurity, at the company,

sector, national and international level

• Founding member and co-chair, ISA99 committee

• Past vice president of standards and practices at

ISA

• ISA President-Elect

• Former leader, chemical sector cybersecurity

program

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 3

Topics

• Where have we been?

• Where do we stand?

• Changing the Conversation

• 62443 Basics

• A Cybersecurity Management System

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 4

WHERE HAVE WE BEEN?

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 5

Evolution of Threats

May 2019

High

Low

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000+

password guessing

self-replicating code

password cracking

exploiting known vulnerabilities

disabling audits

back doors

hijacking

sessions

sweepers

sniffers

packet spoofing

GUIautomated probes/scans

denial of service

www attacks

Tools

Attackers

Intruder

Knowledge

Attack

Sophistication

“stealth” / advanced

scanning techniques

burglaries

network mgmt. diagnostics

distributed

attack tools

Cross site scripting

Staged

attack

bots

Source: CERT

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Copyright © ISA 6

Evolution of Targets

May 2019

1980’s Current

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Copyright © ISA 7

WHERE DO WE STAND?

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 8

The Situation

• Evolving Risk

• Increasing Complexity

• Improved Standards

• Proven Practices

May 2019

But The Challenges Continue!

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Copyright © ISA 9

Evolving Risk

• Evolving threats

• Ever-present vulnerabilities

• Always serious potential consequences

May 2019

Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence Risk = f ( )

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Copyright © ISA 10

Lingering Myths

Denial

• Nobody wants to attack us

• It can’t happen to us

Diversion

• It’s all about IT

• Industrial cybersecurity is the same as business system

cybersecurity

Naivete

• Addressing security is a project

• We can eliminate all vulnerabilities

• Cybersecurity incidents will not impact operations

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 11

The Challenges Remain

• Design with No Security

• Patching strategy

• Remote access requirements

• Vulnerability tracking

• Standardization

• Downtime for maintenance

• Unsupported or obsolete software

• Exposure to public networks

• Unable to penetration-test

in production

• No time for remediation

• Shared accounts or no

authentication

• Connecting IT & OT

• Skill set – Proficiency

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 12

And so are the Risks

• “Security through obscurity”

• Inaccurate or non-existing inventory

• Unpatched or unsupported (operating) systems

• Authentication and authorization issues

• Inadequate input validation

• Lack of proper security policies

• Default or weak configuration

• Lack of accountability

• Denial of Service (DoS)

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 13

CHANGING THE CONVERSATION

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 14

Response…

• Challenge and debunk the myths

• Face the challenges

• Acknowledge the risks

• Embrace Imperfections!

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 15

Better: The Enemy of Good

May 2019

“What we have done…”

“What we can…”

+

before

“What we face…”

More Sharing!

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Copyright © ISA 16

From Standards to Practices

Standards

• maturing rapidly….

– ISA/IEC 62443 series almost “feature complete”

• but “not intended for civilians”

– Product and process certification

Practices

• Application and adoption

– Sharing of results

– Sharing of incident

information

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 17

(Typical) Asset Owner Response

• Skepticism (ignorance?) about the imperative and the

return

• Too often driven by compliance;

does not necessarily improve security

• Overwhelmed by complexity

– Analysis paralysis

• A “Program Response” by

Leaders

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 18

(Typical) Supplier Response

• Partnerships and acquisitions

• “embedding” of security into ICS products

– Firewalls, IPS, hardening, etc.

– Secure development life cycles

• Product Certifications

• Security Services

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 19

New Perspectives Needed

• Effective asset management is a prerequisite

– You can’t secure what you can’t identify

• Integrate security management and automation systems

management

– Dynamic system characterization

– Anomaly detection

– Management of change

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 20

62443 BASICS

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 21

Essential Elements…

May 2019

Appropriate IT Security Technology,

Specialized Security Expertise,

Industrial Automation Domain Expertise

Effective Automation Systems Security =

f ()

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Copyright © ISA 22

Foundational Requirements

• FR 1 – Identification & authentication control

• FR 2 – Use control

• FR 3 – System integrity

• FR 4 – Data confidentiality

• FR 5 – Restricted data flow

• FR 6 – Timely response to events

• FR 7 – Resource availability

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 23

Fundamental Concepts

• System Taxonomy

• Life Cycles and Processes

• Principal Roles

• Zones and Conduits

• Security Levels

• Maturity

• Security Program Rating

Source: ISA-62443-1-1, 2nd Edition (Under development)

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 24

System Taxonomy

May 2019

Includes

a set of

Includes one

or more

IACS

Automation

Solution(s)

Includes one

or more

Systems

(Products)

Includes one

or more

Components

(Products)

Policies and

Procedures

Relevant Standards

• 62443-2-1

• 62443-2-2

• 62443-2-4

• 62443-3-2

• 62443-3-3

• 62443-4-1

• 62443-4-2

• 62443-2-1

• 62443-2-2

• 62443-2-3

• 62443-2-4

• 62443-3-2

• 62443-3-3

• 62443-4-1

• 62443-4-1

• 62443-4-2

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Copyright © ISA 25

Solution Phases

May 2019

System

Supplier

Asset Owner

(Service Provider)

System

Integrator

Asset Owner

Operation &

MaintenanceDevelopment

Integration &

CommissioningDecommissioning

Automation

Solution

Security Measures and

Settings

Policies & Procedures

Decommissioning

Policies and

Procedures

Asset

Owner

Specification

Security

Targets

System

Capability

Project Application,

Configuration and User

Management

Automation

Solution

Automation

Solution

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Copyright © ISA 26

Security Life Cycle

Source: ISA-62443-1-1, 2nd Edition (Under development)

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 27

Principal Roles

May 2019

Independent of IACS environment

IACS environment

Industrial automation and control system (IACS)

Control system (as a combination of)

Automation Solution

Essential functions

Control

functions

Complementary

functions

Safety

functions

Supporting

software

applications

Embedded

devices

Network

devices

Host

devices

Maintenance capabilities

(policies and procedures)

Operational capabilities

(policies and procedures)

Asset owner

Maintenance

service provider

Integration

service provider

Product supplier

accountable for

operates

maintains

maintains

commissions and validates

designs and deploys

develops and supports

develops and supports

Roles

Role

Includes configured products

(control systems and devices)

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Copyright © ISA 28

Zones and Conduits

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 29

Security Levels

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 30

Program Maturity

Level Name Description

1 Initial Ad-hoc (non documented) operations and

activities

2 Managed Operation according to written policies

(including objectives)

3 Defined Operations are repeatable and can be

tailored for the situation

4 Improving Effectiveness and performance are

controlled and continuous improvement

programs are in place

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 31

A CYBERSECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 32

The Process

May 2019

Identify measures &

assess effectiveness

Select

countermeasures

Analyze and

assess risks

Determine relevant

security objectives

Implement

countermeasures

Perform

Process audit

Analyze

Threats

Identify

Assets

Start

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Copyright © ISA 33

Risk Based Approach

• Do we understand each component?

• Who has the information?

• What can we do about each term?

Each has a specific response, from a specific

perspective.

Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence Risk = f( )

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 34

Mitigation Options

Secure

Defend

Contain

Manage

Anticipate

Level of Risk Reduction

Support Resources Required

Physical Security,

Security Practices,

Device Hardening,

Patch Mgmt

Perim Firewalls,

Unidir Gateways,

IDS/IPS,

Access Control,

Anti-Malware

Zone

Firewalls, Dev

Firewalls,

App

Whitelisting,

Threat

Intelligence

Full-time

ICS Cyber

Operations

Group

ICS Supplier or

Cyber Service

Provider

Part-time

Plant ICS

Staff

Full-time

Plant ICS

Staff

Co

st o

f M

itig

atio

n S

olu

tio

ns

Breach

Detection,

Incident

Mgmt, SIEM

* - Copyright © ARC Advisory Group

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 35

Sources of Help

• Operations – IT Partnership

– Really!

• Practices and Guidance

• Expectations and Regulations

• Standards

• NIST Cybersecurity Framework

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 36

Informative References

ISA/IEC62443

NIST SP 800-53

ISO/IEC 29100

ISO/IEC 27001

CO

BIT

CCS CSC

NERC CIP

NISTIR 7628

DO

E E

S-C

2M

2

NE

RC

EO

P

NIST SP 800-16

NIS

T S

P 8

00

-50

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 37

The 62443 Standards

• A series of standards, being developed by 2 groups:

– ISA99 Committee → ANSI/ISA-62443

– IEC TC65/WG10 → IEC 62443

• With guidance and consultation from:

– ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 → ISO/IEC 2700x

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 38

The 62443 Series

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 39

Highlights

• New standards approaching completion:

– 62443-3-2 (Risk Assessment)

– 62443-4-1 (Product Development)

– 62443-4-2 (Component Requirements)

• ISA Adoption of 62443-2-4

• Patch management as a standard

– 62443-2-3

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 40

ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 41

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

May 2019

https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework

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Copyright © ISA 42

ISASecure™

• ISA/IEC-62443 standards set the requirements for Industrial

Automation and Control Systems

• ISASecure certifies that suppliers and products meet the ISA/IEC-

62443 standards

• Asset Owners have confidence that the IACS products they

purchase are robust against network attacks and are free from

known security vulnerabilities

May 2019

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Copyright © ISA 43

Questions

May 2019May 2019