indu rayadurgam patnet paper draft · higher state intervention in the urban planning. ... the...

The Challenges of implementing Urban Decentralisation Reforms in India: Developing a

conceptual framework to understand the functioning of multiple urban agencies

This is work in progress. Please do not quote or cite without the author’s permission

Indu Rayadurgam

4/30/2012

Abstract

In this paper, I develop a conceptual framework to understand the impact of the federal government policies on the changes

in the meaning of decentralisation and the relationships between the urban local agencies. This study on an incentivized

approach to urban reform process in India is based on a qualitative case study approach to understand the changes in the

interactions between agencies and the evolution of objectives of urban governance. This study focuses on content analysis of

documents and records to understand the complexity in the urban policy implementation. We develop the framework using

institutional theory and public administration concepts, in order to understand how the top down policies help in establishing

the objectives and agency interactions.

Keywords: Decentralization; Organizational Field, Institutional Logics, Indian Urban Governance

This paper is based on the introduction of an incentivized approach to urban governance reforms and its impact

on the functioning of the local government agencies. This urban policy reform, titled as the Jawaharlal Nehru

National urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was designed by the Central Government of India (GoI) in 2005,

with specific emphasis on decentralisation reforms and infrastructure development. This is a direct intervention

by the GoI, bypassing the state governments, which are in-charge of Urban Development in the cities.

Additionally, many of the reform objectives have been made prerequisites for further access to finances by the

state and the local governments. At the city level, it is common to have more than one agency functioning to

meet the needs of urban services and development. The agencies created by the State Governments include the

“para statal” agencies, specialised agencies in charge of specific sectors like water etc and the Urban Local

Body (ULB). Constitutionally, the latter has been assigned the pivotal role in the management of an urban area.

The central analytical focus of this paper is to understand the interactions between the local government

agencies within the context of the incentivized policy reform process. Empirically, this study conceptualises as

to how the long term objectives of decentralised policy reform and governance gets reflected and impacts the

interactions between the urban local agencies. Subsequently, the challenges of implementing decentralisation

reforms, as an approach will be understood and explained in the context of interaction between the urban local

governments. This study is focused on understanding the research questions “How has the concept of “Urban

Decentralisation” as an institutional order evolving in context of an Indian urban area? What are the

mechanisms to understand the institutionalization of rules and norms of decentralization within the context of

the Urban Reform Process?

This paper argues that in order to understand the problems of multiple objectives and their impact on the urban

agencies, we need to engage simultaneously with the theoretical approaches of institutional theory and public

administration literatures. Using the concepts of organizational field and institutional logics, this paper provides

a novel theoretical framework about how a group of urban agencies interact, and manage the implementation of

multiple objectives that are mandated by the policy prescriptions. This paper is grounded in a qualitative

empirical study of the urban decentralization reforms in the India. It provides an alternative mechanism to

understand the dynamics of conflict, power and cooperation between the multiple agencies that are engaged in

the management of an urban area.

Indian Urban Governance Context: Reforming the Decentralisation Perspectives

In order to examine the changes in the policies and governance pertaining to urban areas, it is important to

understand the relationship between the various agencies that are in the urban governance domain. Power

conflicts and resource sharing are two important factors that have dominated the urban governance scenario. In

this case, the absence of financial and functional autonomy for the Urban Local Organisations leads to

increasing confusion in the administrative domain. The dominance of the state governments (Shaw, 1996; K C

Sivaramakrishnan, 2009), in the urban domain in India has been a consistent factor in the field of urban policy.

This is not surprising due to the constitutional mandate and powers accorded to the state governments. Rather it

is the role of the Centre and its policies that have thrown interesting possibilities for analysis. In order to

understand the role of the central government, literature has used the texts of the Government of India (GoI)five

year plans to examine the changes in Urban policies. (Shaw, 1996)

Before the 74th CAA

The early stages of urban policies in India leaned towards town planning and land use planning that were in tune

with the “notions of hygiene, order and a sense of aesthetics” (Shaw, 1996, p 226). “The ideal of a good city

even today is one that is unproductive but yet one that provides a pleasing environment for the ruling class- and

that includes us planners, academics, administrators and politicians.”(Planning and Urban Development Report,

1983, p146) These policies led to the control of the Urban Land Market by the government and the creation of

stronger laws towards town and country planning. The conflict here arises from the perception of what is the

objective of urbanisation: either to create beautiful cities or to accumulate capital”. The subsequent years led to

higher state intervention in the urban planning. The creation of supporting institutions like the Housing and

Urban Development Corporation(HUDCO), the state housing boards and the parastatals agencies, in order to

continue with an “optimum” use of urban land, state control of land prices and expanding land ownership. But

these policies failed to increase the financial viability of urban areas and led to an increasing divide between the

bigger and smaller urban areas. The former was due to weak financial instruments and the lack of fiscal

incentives. The absence of fiscal incentives and disincentives (Oommen, 2010) is still considered to be one of

the major factors in the effective implementation of urban policies. During the fourth and the fifth plan period,

the state governments concentrated in the development of bigger urban areas. 1 Another argument that has been

used is that urban decentralisation as rhetoric, with the policies leaning more towards the development of major

urban areas.

The next phase of decentralisation began with the schemes to Decentralise Urban Growth (Shaw, 1996). The

Integrated Development of Small and Meduim Towns(IDSMT) in 1979 was a step towards this, with a funding

of Rs 96 crores, and continued till the 9th five year plan. The next decade became crucial for the role of the state

government in urban areas. Due to fiscal pressures and the focus on rural areas, the seventh plan document

called for a greater devolution of finances and powers to urban entities, and also called for more private

participation. These set of ideas led to the conceptualization of the 74th CAA in the 1990s

The 74th CAA

The 74th CAA was initiated with the objective of recognizing the urban local bodies as “vibrant units of

democratic governance”. Another underlying reason for the devolution of powers and functions was to

1 An integrated development programme in metropolitan cities and areas of national importance was funded to the extent of Rs 250 crores in the fourth and the fifth five year plans and continued through the sixth plan period.

recognize the diversity of urban areas, as opposed to homogenized policy approaches, thus encouraging bottom

up decision making and development and participatory form of urban governance. These power struggles were

an integral part of urban governance and still continues to be. The implementation of the 74th CAA reforms was

a gradual process. It has even been termed as a slow process.(NIUA, 2004) One of the main indications of this

has been the changes that have been made in the state legislations. The enormity of recording the states activities

has also impeded the process of understanding the implementation. This coupled with the fact that even now, the

reform implementation is said to be in progress indicate the slowness of the implementation.

With the introduction of the 74th CAA in early 1990s, the urban local governments were recognized as

legitimate third tier of the federal system. This was an important attempt to “strengthen the municipal

governance” (Mathur, 2007; Bardhan, 2004, NIUA(1998, 2004), K.C.Sivaramakrishnan(2008)) This accorded

“legal status” to the local governments, rendering some powers and responsibilities that were earlier solely with

the control of the respective state governments. This amendment “recognizes the principles of local self-

government”.( MoUD,2005)2, and enables them to with such powers and authority as may be necessary to

enable them to function as institutions of self-governance”.3 This emerged as a dominant idea or a logic that

guided the Central Government initiatives on Urban Governance from 1990s till now.

Some of the important constitutional provisions include delineation of the types of municipalities, devolving

more functional and financial responsibilities to the municipal bodies, rules and regulations on municipal

elections, coordination of the multiple agency functions through the metropolitan planning committee (MPC)

and the District Planning Committees (DPCs), delineating the power of the parastatals vis-à-vis the Urban Local

Bodies (ULBs), and the conflicts between the mayors and the commissioners due to ambiguity in role

definitions. A Twelfth Schedule to the Constitution provides recommended list of local functions. The

amendment also provides a basis for the respective state governments to change their municipal acts, in order to

accommodate the constitutional provisions. What is more interesting in this canvass of governance is the fact

that there is an original long term policy emphasis in the form of the Seventy Fourth Constitutional Amendment

(74th CAA) on decentralization, the effects of which seem to be quite ambivalent (Mathur M P, 2007). This is

also referred to as the “first generation urban reform” by the policy makers.4

Apart from the legitimacy seeking mechanisms for the lower tier governments, this period also witnessed the

emergence of a conflict between the state agencies(henceforth referred to as para statals), which were

dominating the city management scenario in the 1990s. These agencies were created by special legislations by

the state governments. The 74th CAA explicitly called for curbing the powers of these agencies and according

more responsibilities to the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs). This conflict manifested itself in the presence of

multiple agencies for the management of cities, thus leading to problems of fragmentation of powers and

responsibilities between these public organisations. Though the constitutional amendment necessitated the state

2http://urbanindia.nic.in/urbanscene/urbanreforms/urbanreform.htm, accessed on August 1, 2011 3 Implementation of the 74th Constitutional Amendment(2005), State Level Reforms, The JNNURM Toolkit, MoUD 4http://urbanindia.nic.in/urbanscene/urbanreforms/urbanreform.htm, accessed on August 1, 2011

governments to abdicate their hold on the cities, the power and the finances involved in the city management

made this transition to be quite gradual.

JNNURM: 2005-present

On the basis of a much more coercive approach to an autonomous urban governance system, the Central

Government embarked on one of its more ambitious projects towards city development and growth through the

Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) in 2005. What is more important about this

reform agenda is its incentivized approach to the notion of decentralization. This reform process can be

perceived as “a deliberate action by a government to establish new transaction patterns or institutions or to

change established patterns within old institutions” (Smith, 1973), a “catalyst”. 5 .

Considered as an offshoot to continue the 74th constitutional amendment, the JNNURM introduced the idea that

improvement in urban infrastructure can happen only with the strengthening of the local government agencies.

While the emphasis on decentralization has been one of the objectives of all centrally driven policy guidelines

on urban governance, the (JNNURM), went a step ahead and made decentralization (measures) a ‘prerequisite’

for the State and City Governments to access resources from the Central Government. While the earlier schemes

of the Central Government concentrated only on select cities, this reform included 63 cities from all over the

country, based on their population and the criteria of Urban Investment Requirement of the cities. In order to

access the central funds, the cities and their respective state governments were required to prepare City

Development Plans (CDPs) and Detailed Project Reports (DPRs), with specific focus on the development

reform measures. A salient addition to this ongoing decentralisation reform process was the division of the

reform measures into mandatory and optional governance reforms to be incorporated in the governance

mechanism by both the states and the cities.

JNNURM has designed the implementation of an integrated approach of all the forms of decentralization by

attempting to devolve fiscal, political and administrative powers to the state and the local governments. The

comprehensive nature of the reform process makes it a significant context to study the nature of decentralization

in the level of the sub national governments. The policies have come out with a framework of decentralization

that can be considered an ideal type. The following definition summarizes the complexity of a decentralization

process. JNNURM has specified certain reforms that are mandatory to the state governments and the city

governments. Classifying this based on the definitions(Falletti,2005) in the subsequent table helps in

understanding that the state governments have a higher share of the political decentralization initiatives(through

legislations and reforms), while the city governments are entrusted with the Urban Management and

Administrative Issues.(Refer to Table 1 below)

5 Catalyst to the implementation of the 74th constitutional amendments

Table 1: Types of Decentralization and its classification in the Federal Policies

Administrative

Decentralization

Fiscal Decentralization Political

Decentralization

Types of

Decentralization

Transfer the

administration and

delivery of social services

such

as education, health,

social

welfare and housing to

sub

national governments

“Refers to the set of

policies

designed to increase the

revenues or fiscal

Fiscal autonomy of sub

national

Governments like an

increase of

Transfers from the central

Government, creation of

new

Sub national taxes, or the

Delegation of tax

authority that

Was Previously national”.

“Constitutional

amendments and

Electoral reforms

designed to

open

New or activate existing

but

Dormant or ineffective

spaces

for

Representation of sub

national

Politics.”

-

Model Municipal Law Classification of

functions into

• Core municipal

functions including water

supply, drainage and

sewerage, solid waste

management, roads, etc.;

• Functions assigned by

Government; and

• Other functions.

• The “functions assigned

by Government” may

be undertaken subject to

the underwriting of

the costs by the

concerned levels of

government

Municipal fund with

separate accounts for

various

Services.

State Level Municipal

Establishment Audit

Commission to review

the staff status.

Provision to implement

recommendations of the

State Finance

Commission.

State Municipal

Accounting Manual with

improved system of

accounting.

State Government can

appoint a professional

• A unified law for three

levels of ULBs.

Indirect election of

Mayor or Chairperson

with

five years term.

• Constitution of Wards

and Ward Committees

• Provides for the

representation of ULBs in

District

and Metropolitan

Planning Committees.

• Provision for the

implementation of

development

plans by ULBs

In the above table delineating the model municipal law and the JNNURM and aligning these policies to the

various forms of decentralization reveals the expected patterns of divisions between the state and the city

governments. Whereas the mandatory reforms at the state level are more evenly distributed across all the forms

of decentralization, the mandatory reforms at the level of the city governments is more tuned towards

administrative decentralization measures and e-governance and transparency policies. Another interesting aspect

is to question whether the polarisation of political decentralization with the state and that of the administrative

decentralization measures with the city governments has led to a certain counter-decentralization measures.

Falleti(2005) has argued that all the different perspectives have agreed that decentralization has indeed increased

the powers of the local governments. Viewing decentralization as a multi-dimensional process indicates that

certain forms of decentralization reduce the power of the local governments. Though this it is important to

understand which framework increases the power of the local governments, as opposed to others. For this it is

essential to understand the interactions between the various forms of decentralization and their effect on the

local governments. In the Indian context there is a crucial assumption that urban reforms will be more effective

under an efficient decentralization process. As a first step to analyse this, it is essential to understand the

interactions between the various forms of decentralization and their effect on the local governments.

Research Approach

My research focus was mainly to conceptualise a theoretical framework to understand the impact of the long

term centrally driven decentralisation policies on the functioning of the city agencies. The long term purpose of

this research is to understand the nature and perception of decentralisation policies at the level of the city

agencies. Although research on urban local agencies have concentrated on the aspects of conflict and

coordination between the various agencies, clarity is yet to emerge in terms of the various factors that drive the

coordination aspects, especially when the policies that have to be implemented are derived from the higher tiers

of the governments. Results that are established in terms of municipal spending and infrastructural projects are

useful in identifying the nature of agencies involved at the city level. The decentralization index(74th

CAA)(NIUA, 2004) that has been developed by some researchers in this field has focused on the time taken to

“achieve” a particular reform process or rather help in understanding the impact of a particular reform process

on the functioning of these agencies. Based on a qualitative content analysis of archival data, newspaper articles,

judicial cases and minutes of the meetings between agencies, this paper attempts to problematize the various

factors that are involved in the institutionalisation of decentralisation policies in the city level. Institutions also

operate at multiple levels of jurisdictions. In this scenario, the policies are created at the national level; the

repercussions (both positive and negative) can be studied only from the perspective of the city governments.

The national policies are mostly used to mobilize the resources and help in the functioning of the city

governments, along with certain guidelines for the rules and norms. Transcending two levels of analysis(Yin,

Ray and Hinings), the first task of this research will be to establish the patterns of decentralization as

promulgated by the national level policies, and conceptualize them based on the public administration(forms of

decentralistion) and institutional theoretical framework.

Theoretical Framework

Decentralization, as an extension of the New Public Management reforms called for a collective notion of

public management, with the latter calling for a holistic perspective and developing a sense of collective notion

that “ they are in the same boat”, and following some kind of ethical standards.(Christensen and Langeried,

2007)Institutions, it has been argued, are essential tools to better urban governance and these are the aspects that

interacts more with the societal actors at the state level. Nalalthiga(2009) has stated that any study of the local

governments should incorporate the normative values, along with the empirical aspects.. Institutional

interactions get strengthened with the presence of social norms and values that are common to certain

organizations and are created when the organizations interact with its immediate environment. (NIUA,1998,

p11)

Elsewhere, Faletti(2005) has analysed the interaction patterns between these three forms of decentralization can

decrease or increase the power of the sub-national governments. Falleti(2005) in her research have explained the

effects of decentralisation policies on intergovernmental relations. She used a quantitative longitudinal approach

to measure the impact of the earlier reforms of decentralisation on the later ones. That is, sub-national

executives prefer political autonomy, money, and responsibilities, in that order.” She viewed decentralisation as

a process, and studied the preferences of the sub-national “executives”. Falleti (2005) argued that the executives

prefer political autonomy, followed by money and then responsibilities. A report by the National Institute of

Urban Affairs (NIUA), 2004 regarding decentralisation has used a simple framework of decentralisation index

by measuring the timelines and financial allocation by the state governments in India. The status report of the

74th CAA reforms were based on amount of finances devolved to the local governments or the changes made to

the legislative documents by these governments. These were indicative of the political decentralisation measures

or fiscal decentralisation initiatives. But the impact of these decentralisation measures on the city agencies or

their process of implementation are not getting reflected in such research proceedings.6 Though the policies

have called for enhanced coordination between the local level agencies, all the recommendations towards the

policies are more on the time of a district wise coordination or metropolitan area of coordination, involving

contiguous urban areas/rural urban coordination. The studies on city wise interactions during the JNNURM

period are quite limited. These analyses were not reflective of urban governance as a multiple stakeholder

process (Baud et al , 2008) which requires the collaboration of the weaker and the stronger actors to resolve

problems and issues in a city level governance structure. The nature of changing relationships between the

various actors who are involved in city management is an upcoming area of study.(Baud(2008);

Bardhan(2002);)

Many of the existing policy prescriptions of decentralisation are based on the Principle of Subsidiarity7 which

calls for decision making by the authorities who are in direct contact with the citizens. Tiebout(1956) in his

theory of local public expenditures had argued that “every municipal entity will be under pressure to satisfy the

6 http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Reform_Progress_01-3-12_After_Discussion.pdf 7 This principle is present in several constitutions, the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More recently, it is a key

organising principle behind the European Union (EU) and is articulated in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

needs and desires of its citizens, because it will be subject to the competition of nearby cities. In order to remain

prosperous and to keep or attract residents, it will have to be more efficient in the provision of services and less

greedy when setting taxation levels.” But in the Indian context, the movement of people occurs due to economic

specialization of cities, as opposed to the level of municipal services. The competition between cities is mostly

on the basis of its economic strength as opposed to that of service delivery. The responsibility of providing the

goods and services and their overall maintenance is the responsibility of the local governments, the benefits

reaped by the society is the overall objective. Not the benefits that have been accrued by a smaller group of

people.(West, 1977, Kelman(2007) The governments function on the basis of procedural fairness, no exclusivity

of goods and adherence to certain rules and regulations. But, the provision of public services will render a

certain kind of legitimacy to the organisation. Kelman(2007) has addressed this issue by bringing out the

differences between Goals and Constraints. Goals are the objectives that an organization seeks to achieve,

whereas the constraints are defined as the limits of acceptable behavior that an organization has to follow even

to achieve its goals.8

Organizations that respect only constraints might not be effective. What is more important is to balance the

goals and the constraints by the government agencies. It is the integration of all these factors into a governance

structure that has led to differences in the perspectives of local governments, also referred to as the balance

between efficiency and equity. The public or rational choice theory has argued that the primary role of the local

government is efficient service delivery, as opposed to distributional equity. The government should be

remodelled based on the market concepts of competition and efficiency (Barton, 2001). Although many of these

approaches have provided meaningful theoretical approaches to this study, the theoretical framework that will

be used in this research will be a combined framework of public administration and institutional theory in order

to understand how the rules and norms of “deliberate and consistently”(Bardhan, 2002) targeted decentralisation

policy gets absorbed at the local level. The efficiency in the implementation of urban services and city

management will also be dependent upon the nature of conflicts and coordination mechanisms between the local

agencies. Multiple agencies have to simultaneously deal with the objectives of decentralization reforms and that

of city management. These agencies at the city level deal with multiple policy reforms created by the state and

the central governments.

Institutional Theory

Institutions refer to patterns of interaction sequences between organisations that are legitimised by the social

systems in which the organisations exist. Institutionalisation refers to the process of attainment of such patterns.

Alford & Friedland( 1985) have argued that policies are meant to create a certain type of institutional order in

the contexts in which they are usually applicable. Capitalism, state bureaucracy and democracy are usually the

three institutional orders typical of any modern western society ( Thornton, P, 2008) Each of these orders has

different “practices and beliefs” and these determine how the organizations and individuals engage in their

8 Kelman, S. (2007) Chapter 5: Public Administration and Organization Studies. The Academy of Management Annals, 1(1): 225-267,p 6

interactions with the society. The governance structures gradually evolve based on these beliefs and patterns.

They can also be formed to achieve the objectives and could be moderated by strict mechanisms of control. In

India, the institutionalization of decentralization began with the introduction of the CAA as a legislative

mechanism, information sharing and incentive based funding (MoUD, 2011).One of the important issues to be

determined is the extent and nature of institutionalization governance reforms at the level of the local

government.

Institutional Theory has been in the past used to understand the transitions in the public administration scenarios

(DiMaggio Powell;1983, Selznik,1949, Reay (2005); Miscione, 2007)). It helps understand how the norms and

routines are created and diffused over time and might deteriorate with the emergence of alternate environments.

It inquires into how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how

they fall into decline and disuse. (Scott, 2004)9Though institutions are meant to create stability in social life, it is

also important to comprehend how the process of institutionalisation or deinstitutionalisation leads to power

conflicts and changes. In a situation where there are conflicts between agencies are evident and, resources are

shared, the structural nature of interactions between these agencies have been captured with the help of an

organisational field. (Reay, 2005; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) Organisational fields comprise a group of

organizations which are engaged in similar activities that will shape the meaning and the objective of the field

(Dimaggio and Powell, 1983) Fields are influenced by the logics under which the organizations of the field

function. Friedland and Alford(1991; Thornton(1999)) defined logics as organizing principles or objectives that

guide the field participants. Actors in a field can be influenced by more than either a single logic or multiple

logics at a given point of time. There are common understandings that are explicit in nature and will be difficult

to capture, as opposed to the explicit regulative elements that are used to monitor the functioning of the field

participants. Though this difference is important in understanding the nature of the field, the challenging aspect

is to capture the nuances of implicit arrangements between the participants and its subsequent impact on the

introduction of new policies and logics, specifically among the public sector agencies. Philip Selznick(1949) in

this study of the Tenesse Valley Authority(TVA) viewed organisational structure as an adaptive machine which

gets shaped based on the behaviour of the participants, as well as the influences and the structural constraints

posed by the external environment. Institutionalization, according to Selznick is the adaptive process that

happens to an organisation over a period of time. He studied this process within the context of the TVA in which

rich farmers were brought in to the organization’s leadership structure. DiMaggio and Powell(1983) used the

example of the civil service reforms in the United States to understand the institutionalisation of reforms over a

period of time. Even though the early adoption of reforms were related to the internal governmental needs and

city characteristics, later the adoption was based on institutional definitions of legitimate

The objectives of many policy changes are to impact the socially constructed ideas and introduce possibilities of

change in the interactions between the members of the field. Drawing from the discussions on organisational

field in the literature based on examples drawn from the industry, many organisations respond to these changes

and carry out innovations and changes in order to adapt to the changes. The concept of city level agencies as an

organisational field will be used in this research. This will help in studying the complex nature of interactions

between the agencies through the factors of structuration involving power conflicts, information flow, the

presence of a common objective between the agencies. Simultaneously, the reform process brings out the targets

of development in infrastructure and urban renewal. The former serves as a prerequisite for the latter. Therefore,

within the domain of multiple agencies, there exists another level of constraint. It is imperative to design a

mechanism to understand the process by which these challenges get absorbed and implemented in the systems.

Methodological Approach

Rationale

Transcending two levels of analysis(Yin, Ray and Hinings), the first task of this research will be to establish the

patterns of decentralization as promulgated by the national level policies, and conceptualize them based on the

public administration(forms of decentralistion) and institutional theoretical framework.. Reay and

Hinings(2005) also referred to this as stakeholder analysis. Due to the research context and the policy

formulation, the availability of data will help us in doing in-depth analysis between the agencies, thus ensuring

that the two significant criteria of Informational Adequacy10 and Efficiency

11 are adhered with. Stakeholder

Analysis within an organisational field will highlight the role of the key actors involved and the implementation

and changes in the decentralization process at the city level. We propose to follow the methodology followed by

Reay and Hinings(2005) by identifying the key actors and going through their correspondence, to identify their

perceptions towards decentralization within the specified time period. This will lead to the development of a

conceptual framework that can be used to study specific city administrations.

Sources of Data ,Data Collection and Analysis

Data collection is proposed at two levels:central government policies, state legislations and government orders

and city level agencies. It is proposed to identify the various interactions related to decentralization and its

efforts during the period of JNNURM process. Development of Coding Categories from the hypothesized model

will provide us with a sense of identifying the data and the behavior in the field( Marshall and Rossman(p51)

The publicly available policy documents on Urban Governance spanning over the past 2 decades, newspaper

articles obtained using the lexis nexis database, judicial vases specific to Urban Governance in India and all the

other available reports and minutes of the meetings of the government agencies were collected.

This research has been undertaken within the structure of a stakeholder analysis(Reay,2005) to determine the

relationships between different key actors. The overall research approach was to qualitatively analyse

10 This is based on the thorough, precise and accurate nature of the research plan and its possibilities

11 Efficiency is claimed to be determined by the following question: “ Does the plan allow adequate data to be collected at the least cost in terms of time, access and cost to participants”?

documents related to the policies ( Reay(2005), Greenwood et al, (2006) and Miscione(2007)) at the central

level , analyse the policy responses of each key actor and combine them to get an insight into the

decentralisation at the local level. The documents were manually coded (Miles and Huberman 1994,) into

various categories based on the theoretical lenses and were analysed to understand multiple perspectives of the

scenarios. The newspaper articles were sorted chronologically to understand the changes and also to triangulate

aspects of analysis. The documents were initially perused completely, followed by selection of certain important

sections of the documents and coding the sentences into categories. These codes were then linked to the policies

and the theoretical perspectives to conceptualise the dynamics over a period of time. The data analysis led to an

understanding of the overall structure of the organisational field and the framework that will be used to study the

dynamics between the city level agencies.

Analysis and Discussion

The first level of analysis using the archival data and documents was used to investigate structuration of the

organisational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). A longitudinal analysis of the centrally driven policies on

urban governance and decentralisation indicate that the period from 1992 to 2005 as a whole was that of

legitimacy seeking measures for the ULBs, beginning with the introduction of the 74th CAA. Prior to this period,

the state governments and their agencies were more responsible for the urban governance in the states. The

Central Government retained the role of disbursing funds to the respective states based on the recommendations

of the Central Finance Commissions. Prior to 74th CAA, the central government, with an objective to create a

National Urban Policy, set up the first National Commission on Urbanisation in 1988. In this period, with the

absence of elected city governments and a legitimate third tier of government indicates that the powers and

responsibilities of urban governance and management vested with the state governments. I analysed the

responses and interactions of the stakeholders for every central government intervention over a period of time.

This reveals that the legitimacy and recognition of the city governments, as accorded by the constitution was

more symbolic in nature. In order to understand as to how the changes have evolved over time, the latest reports

of the states vis-à-vis their adherence to the constitutional reforms were studied. It is worthy to note that, apart

from the occasional reports on state legislations and some publications, the periodic documentary evidence on

implementation of the 74th CAA was very limited. 80% of the states amended their municipal legislations in

order to be consistent with that of the constitution.(NIUA, 2004) Using these available documents, I analysed

the timeline of the implementation of election reforms in ULBs, a crucial aspect of political decentralisation in

the states. From the period of 1995-2002, twelve states in India conducted elections for the Urban Local Bodies

(ULBs)(NIUA, 2004, p111-112). Irrespective of an actual transfer of authority, the proposed system of urban

governance structure got modified in this period to include the newly elected Urban Local Bodies (ULBs). The

policy reforms indicate an “ideal” type of decentralisation scenario. A temporal analysis of the structural

changes in the states over a period of time reveals minor alterations in the field structure at the level of city

governance. During this stage, the inter-organisational interactions were restricted to the Centre- State domain,

with correspondences regarding the changes in the municipal amendments and other related aspects. With the

presence of elected Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) in many states, the city governments gradually began to

disagree with the states on the various issues relating to their powers and responsibilities. It is in this context that

the judicial cases become quite useful. These archival texts provide rich source of information on the

perspectives of the judiciary and that of the states and ULBs vis-à-vis their power struggles. Fig 2 reveals the

increasing cases in the judiciary on various issues of Urban Governance. Out of these 60% of the issues were

related to elections in the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) and their contention with the states, followed by issues of

user charges and municipal taxes. The ULBs saw themselves being excluded from many areas of city

governance and sought legal remedies to make the states comply to different provisions. In addition to these

conflicts, the inter-agency conflicts and power struggles between various city agencies were also revealed.

Another important aspect is the presence of multiple legislations that govern the urban domain of a city. For

example, the multiple agencies in a city can comprise of a development authority which will have its own

legislative document. The provisions that govern every agency in the city are governed by multiple legislative

acts. Regarding the city f Bangalore, a judgment stated that “Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) is a local

authority but not a local Self-Government. "BDA" is constituted for the specific purpose of 'the development of

Bangalore according to plan'. - BDA is not a municipality as defined under Part-IXA of the Constitution nor

does Part 1 X-A of the Constitution have any application to the BDA Act. None of the provisions of the BDA

Act is inconsistent with any of the provisions contended in Part IX-A of the Constitution and none of the

provisions of the BDA Act cease”. 12The nature of these judgments and rulings indicate the presence of conflicts

in the domains, which also get reflected in the functioning of the organisational field. There is also a tussle for

power and resources between the state level organisations and city agencies. The various judicial cases reveal

the dissatisfaction of the members within the field at the city level. This stage is indicative of a very conflict

ridden association between members.

Stage 1 a Continuity and persistence of the decentralization measures: 2003-2005

While there was a very gradual adoption of the 74th CAA by the states, the central government continued its

policy of decentralisation with the promulgation of the model municipal law (MML) in October 2003.

Introduced with an intention to provide a legislative framework for the ministry’s urban sector reforms agenda

with a two pronged objective: enhancing the capacity of the ULBs to leverage public funds and create an

environment in which the ULBs play their role effectively and also improve service delivery, it also ensured that

there was some kind of continuity by the centre in its objective of a decentralized governance. The provisions

of this law are similar to that of the 74th constitutional amendment, but this was more on the terms of providing a

review for the state governments to amend their municipal acts in line with the constitutional provisions.

However it has to be noted that the ministry had requested the Indo-US financial institutions reforms and

expansion (FIRE) for drafting the MML, which allotted funds to the Times Research Foundation to prepare a

policy options paper. The MoUD then obtained the feedback on the draft from all state urban development

secretaries, leading to the finalization of the MML. It could be argued that a private player was involved in this

phase in order to obtain more legitimacy to the entire spectrum of urban governance. Even before the effects of

12 The Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority and Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka and Anr.; MANU/KA/0502/2005; : ILR2006KAR318

such a measure could be analysed, the central government again plunged itself into a subsequent policy reform

process. This period still witnessed only an advisory role, with limited influence on the city governments, and a

renewed focus on the state initiatives towards the creation of a democratic urban governance structure. All the

documents indicate that the interactions and information dissemination was higher between the state government

and the MoUD agencies, with very limited scope for the city level agencies to contribute to the policy making.

Stage 3: Incentivized approach to decentralisation- December 2005 to present

During this stage, it is significant to notice the many changes in the field level interactions and redefining the

roles of the various agencies. Firstly, as noted by K C Sivaramakrishnan (2010), the advent of JNNURM has led

to MoUD gaining some legitimacy and a standing among the other Central Government ministries. As a GoI

driven mission, JNNURM has encompassed both the State level and their city counterparts in the overall policy.

Firstly, as an incentivized approach to the implementation of urban governance reforms, JNNURM has

reiterated the role and importance of decentralisation. Due to the continued presence of decentralisation rhetoric

in the urban policy domain over the past twenty years, using the incentivized approach is more of an indication

of garnering more support to reforms at the city level. The pace of the reform process has also been an important

factor in this period. The mission statement read as “The aim is to encourage reforms and fast track planned

development of identified cities. Focus is to be on efficiency in urban infrastructure and service delivery

mechanisms, “community participation, and accountability of ULBs/ Parastatal agencies towards

citizens.”(MoUD, GoI, 2005) This statement indicates the acceptance of multiple agencies and can be viewed as

an attempt to broaden the definition of an Urban Government, and is in contradiction with the provisions of the

74th CAA and also reiterated the role of the Central Government in urban governance. As indicated in the Table

2, proponents of decentralisation and greater powers to the local governments continue to oppose the

modifications under JNNURM. As a comprehensive policy framework and by virtue of the continuity of reform

process, documents have incorporated an inherent feedback mechanism on the previous policies. As indicated in

the table, the policy has argued that it is the lack of finances that has prevented the state governments from

implementing the ratified provisions of the 74th CAA. Even if the policy reform process indicates the change of

urban local government, it has also played a balancing role in realigning the responsibilities of the reforms. By

dividing the responsibilities of the state and the city governments through the mandatory reforms at the state and

the city level, it indicates an equal distribution of power and responsibilities between the two governments. And

with both the lower tiers of the governments being dependent on partial finances from the centre, clarity in the

relationships between agencies looks to be emerging. With both the reform environment and a separate space for

parastatals and other agencies, the earlier vision of using the latter as technical wing of the city government has

been gaining ground. Along with the challenges of multiple agencies, this period of reform process has also

delineated the evolution of multiple objectives(Fig 2) in the domain of urban governance. 13

13 As delineated by the policy statement, “The aim is to encourage reforms and fast track planned development of identified cities. Focus is to be

on efficiency in urban infrastructure and service delivery mechanisms, “community participation, and accountability of ULBs/ Parastatal agencies

towards citizens.” These statements reveal that the city agencies are expected to comply with atleast two agendas, as derived solely from the policy statements and the government responses.

Figure 2: the evolution of multiple objectives for the city Agencies

Source: Derived by the author based on the analysis of policy documents

With respect to the structuration of the environment, there is evidence of information dissemination through

conferences, seminars etc, both at the national and the state level. In addition to this, the frequent exchange of

documents between the various agencies is also an indication of the inter-organisational interactions. The

MoUD has also facilitated the exchanges of best practices by ULBs through the development of Peer

Experience and Reflective Learning (PEARL) initiative. In addition to this, the MoUD’s Centre for Sanctioning

and Monitoring Committee (CSMC), which is the nodal agency to monitor the progress of the states and city

agencies, sanctions the funds for urban infrastructure and governance based on reform progress. The power

tussles and the changing roles of urban local agencies have also been monitored through the analysis of the

Minutes of the Meetings(MoMs) of the CSMC meetings. As an indicative of decentralisation measures, the

CSMC MoM’s list of representatives for every meeting reveals a significant pattern of analysis. “ The CSMC

asked the Indore Development Authority (IDA) representatives who were present at the meeting to revert back

Bureaucratic Logic(Long term) Development Logic(Short term)

Legitimacy By procedure By Results

Central

values

Legality, continuity, constitutional and policy

measures, Functional Clarification between

government tiers, Rationalizing aspects of municipal

administration(Model Municipal Law),

Fast tracked growth, international standards,

performance efficiency, Goals and Results

Evaluation

Criteria

Rules and responsibilities, adherence to constitutional

provisions, Managerial and organizational

infrastructure

Resource usage based on plans, goals and results,

Improvement in Physical Infrastructure

Governance

Model

Increased accountability and participation, State

driven models of implementation, Redefinition of the

roles of the functional agencies and development

authorities, Redefining state-municipal relations in

order to grant greater autonomy to the municipal

bodies

Increased accountability and participation,

Professionalization of policy implementation, More

central control on urban reform processes, shifting

power positions among agencies at the city level,

Legitimizing existing policy measures, Constraint

oriented, Increased Information disclosure

Interaction

between

actors

Community Participation, Aiming for decreased

fragmentation of powers and responsibilities

(Reduction in conflicts), Involvement of local and

context based actors

Community Participation, Knowledge production and

dissemination by professionals and academics

with the city officials and the Principal Secretary (Urban

Development), Government of Madhya Pradesh so that appropriate measures could be initiated to overcome

poor state of implementation. The CSMC also expressed concern that Indore city was not represented either by

the City or SLNA and State level representatives.” In similar instances, the CSMC had insisted on the presence

of city government or state government representatives, in addition to the members of the parastatals. Similarly

in the case of Chennai, the water board is much more powerful than the city corporation. A review of the

attendees of the MoMs will reveal that rarely do City Corporation and nodal agency representatives attend

CSMC meetings. Thus, it is indicative that the power distribution varies across cities and that there is a constant

tussle between the members of the various agencies in the city administrative structure. Given the distribution of

power and conflicts between the agencies, it is indicative that the period of this reform has led to a higher

presence of information sharing between the agencies, and also in the public domain. This kind of information

sharing can also be an indicator of higher organisational interactions between members in the field. But in this

information overload scenario, there is also a challenge of information asymmetry as reflected by an excerpt by

CSMC "The MoA signed by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation clearly captures the

timeline for reform on Byelaws for reuse of recycled water. While the City stated that the reform was yet to be

implemented, discussion with the State level authorities indicated that this reform had been implemented. It was

desired that accomplishment of the reform may be clearly indicated." These kind of instances capture the

presence of conflicts between various agencies. The battles of power and conflict are also getting more

pronounced and ongoing. So far, the analysis has concentrated at one level through the national policies and

documentary evidence.

Conclusions

The main objective of this study has been to provide an overall picture of the policy processes pertaining to

urban governance reforms and study the changes that have occurred over the two time periods. Considered as an

offshoot to continue the 74th constitutional amendment, the JNNURM introduced the idea that improvement in

urban infrastructure can happen only with the strengthening of the local government agencies. While the

emphasis on decentralization has been one of the objectives of all centrally driven policy guidelines on urban

governance, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) introduced in 2005, went a step

ahead and made decentralization (measures) a ‘prerequisite’ for the State and City Governments to access

resources from the Central Government The focus on the reform measures to some extent have led to the

increase in the role of municipal finances and the role of finances in the management of urban local bodies.

Though this is a very relevant issue, it can be argued that focus should also be on the improvement of systems

without funding. This demarcation and debate in the policy and academic circles has been very limited. This is

also the only scheme in which the ULBs have been appointed as nodal agencies by many state governments.

(NIUA, 2004, KC Sivaramakrishnan(2008) . Sectoral Report, Karnataka(2007)).

The concepts of organisational field and institutional logics were used to understand the relationship between

the members in the urban governance environment. Due to the continued presence of the central government

policy reform on decentralisation, the process of institutionalisation of the rules and norms of decentralisation

was captured with the various aspects of field level interactions. The increasing presence of power/ conflict

relationships, inter-agency interactions and information sharing indicate the presence of a mature but unstable

field. The relationship between the city level organisations might change with the policy prescriptions from

above. But one of the significant indicators from this study has been the expanded scope of urban government.

(Table 2), with the legitimation of the parastatals and other city organisations. This paper has outlined as to how

the city agencies were faced with more than one objective during a specific policy implementation process. But

the implementation will not be able to happen without the help of para statals and other specialised agencies. In

the process of these changes, the different types of decentralisation, as reflected in the mandatory and optional

reforms of the JNNURM, will also play a significant role in the city level analysis of agency interactions.

Table 2: Variables derived from the analysis

Description Indicators City Level Analysis

1 Expanding the scope

of Urban

Government

• Legitimation of the

Parastatals

• Increasing disconnects

between ULBs and

JNNURM projects

Focus on the interactions between the

agencies in the Institutional and the

specialised environment

2 Multiple

Logics(Objectives)

• Infrastructure

Development and Reform

• Multiple Agencies

Measure and analyse the conflicts between

the goals and constraints(prerequisites). And

the involvement of agencies other than the

ULB in the reform progress

3 Types of

Decentralisation

• Decentralisation as a

multi-dimensional

process(Falleti)

With an incentive based approach to political

and administrative decentralisation measures,

how are these implementation mechanisms

getting reflected in the interactions between

the city agencies

4 Incremental changes

to decentralisation

• Representation

• Sharing of information

How is decentralisation as a concept being

perceived in the relationship between

agencies at the city level? Are they in

congruence with the documentary evidence?

Source: A summary of the analysis and the discussion session

The content analysis that has been carried out on the documentary evidence, newspaper articles, judicial cases

and the minutes of the meetings of the CSMC has helped identify certain variables and changes have been

identified towards constructing a conceptual framework. (Fig 3 ) Based on these, certain propositions have been

developed for studying the nature of decentralisation with a group of city agencies as a unit of analysis.

Fig 3: A proposed overview of the variables and their interplay in the urban environment

JNNURM documents state that the municipalities own “political accountability

CAA and JNNURM, and share the “technical, financial and administrative” accountability”, with the other

organizations at the city level. The financial transfers to the local governments till the JNNURM initiative were

based on the Central and the state

have led to a notion of complacency at the level of the city governments.(Falleti, 2005) From the point of view

of the city corporation, if both the political and the administrative de

the city and the state governments, it might have increased the power and autonomy of the city corporation. But

with the finances and fiscal measures being dependent on predominantly political decentralization ini

mostly though the passing of legislations) , and the finances being devolved to mostly infrastructural projects

that are carried out by the specialized agencies, the autonomy of the city corporation has further been reduced

and increasing the power of the state government.

reflect the deepening conflicts among urban local agencies. It has to be noted that the focus of the urban

decentralization initiatives has been the city government or t

chosen by the JNNURM process in many cases has been that of the State level agencies.

P1: An incentivized approach to urban governance reduces the development of mutual

common objectives about decentralization

overview of the variables and their interplay in the urban environment

that the municipalities own “political accountability” for provisions under the 74



based on the Central and the state planning commission formulae leading to automatic transfers which could


of the city corporation, if both the political and the administrative decentralization efforts were shared between


with the finances and fiscal measures being dependent on predominantly political decentralization ini



er of the state government. The allocation of projects and the progress of the JNNURM


decentralization initiatives has been the city government or the municipal corporation. But the nodal agency

chosen by the JNNURM process in many cases has been that of the State level agencies.

An incentivized approach to urban governance reduces the development of mutual

decentralization in the field

overview of the variables and their interplay in the urban environment

provisions under the 74th



planning commission formulae leading to automatic transfers which could


centralization efforts were shared between


with the finances and fiscal measures being dependent on predominantly political decentralization initiatives(



The allocation of projects and the progress of the JNNURM


he municipal corporation. But the nodal agency

An incentivized approach to urban governance reduces the development of mutual awareness about

Decentralization is a process of institutionalization of the values and norms within the urban governance

scenario. In the process of the Renewal mission, decentralization is a prerequisite for access to funds. In this

case, the political decentralization initiatives by the states will become mere formality, like passing a law,

without any deeper understanding of its implementation mechanisms or the consequences. Symbolic

decentralization initiatives will increase the information availability between the organizations, but might not be

leading to any constructive mechanism. For example, the passing of a disclosure law or a community

participation law by a state legistature will necessarily not mean that mechanisms are being implemented. But

the passing of the law by the state legislative assembly will be termed as a “success”” and will lead to

devolution of funds for the state and its agencies. The urgent need for finances and also the pressure from the

central government will ensure that more of the political decentralization initiatives will be expedited, in order

to maintain procedural fairness. In this case, it will be viewed more as a constraint than an objective of urban

governance.

P2: PoliticalDecentralization as a prerequisite for funds results in the perception of decentralization as a

constraint, leading to increase in symbolic initiatives, and reducing the significance of the constitutional

reforms in the field

One of the important questions that need to be addressed here is the role of funding and its impact on the aspects

of decentralization. It has been argued that with the linking of decentralization and reforms, the role of finances

should not be too significant to make local governments highly dependent on higher level of governments, or

too limited to restrict the activities of the local governments. (Rao and Bird, 2010) It is also likely that the ULBs

will be opting for many activities that are not necessarily dependent on finances, in terms of urban management.

P 3: Decentralization as a prerequisite for finances contributes to the trend of associating the inadequacies to

funding, thus reducing the scope of city other innovative practice, and increasing the focus on fiscal

decentralization.

P3(a): The isolation of fiscal decentralization from political and administrative decentralization results in

diluting the objectives of the decentralization process, and making finances as a predominant objective in the

field.

The 74th CAA and the subsequent processes reflected the need for transparency and greater accountability

between agencies and also insisted on participatory governance, amongst others. As a major step towards that,

JNNURM introduced some initiatives to make more information available about the urban reforms and

decentralization. One of the positive consequences of JNNURM has been the contribution to an increase in

awareness and concerns about urban management. (Sivaramakrishnan, 2010) This is expected to increase the

longevity of the decentralization process beyond the reform period and install a platform for sharing knowledge

and experiences on city governance. (Vaidya, 2010, PEARL,JNNURM)

P4: The isolation of political and administrative decentralization results in increased sharing of information

among agencies, and a reduction to the power conflicts between the specialized agencies and the city

corporation.

Through this data, we are trying to get in a conceptual framework to help understand the nature of city level

interactions. It can be argued that the extent of decentralisation and its meaning can be understood only at the

city level. There will be inherent limitations of theorising based on a single case study, the changes in the

organisational field can be analysed at the level of the cities, where these policy implementation procedures will

be implemented.

Table 2: Excerpts of Coding from the data

Statements from the data Indicative factors

A case study of select ULBs in Tamil Nadu has revealed that one of the main impediments for efficient accountability is the “lack of coordination”

between the chairpersons, political leaders, councillors, and the officials of the ULBs in “day to day” affairs. Political influences were found to

prevent the upward movement of taxes. The case study by the NIUA team recommended that there should be awareness building amongst the officials as well as the elected representatives. ( p 39, Urban Governance Decentralisation in India: An Overview, NIUA(2004)

Need for coordination

“The 74th CAA 1993 mandates that there shall be an independent third tier of local government for urban areas but does not specify the institutional

character of this level of government. Hence, State Governments have some liberty in choosing an appropriate institutional form depending on local conditions.” (Kasturirangan_kuidfc report)

“Municipalities have to be empowered in a manner that holds them responsible for civic governance. That can happen only when they are avested with the powers to raise and retain resources through the taxes they levy. Unfortunately, that is not the case so far because those powers are vested in the State governments. Absence of fiscal authority undermines accountability in administration and spending so that profligacy and lack of

amenities go hand in hand” (Business Line, 6th dec 2005)

Conflicting roles of the state governments

“In any city in India big or small, if the question is asked “who is in charge of the city? the answer is painfully simple – “no one”. (K C Sivaramakrishnan, 2008)“With NURM, the Union Government has unequivocally answered the one tricky question that has kept it out of city issues, despite the fact that urban breakdown was visible to all: why should the Centre get involved, given that urban issues are a state subject, especially with limited resources and large rural demands? The

answer lies in the acknowledgement that the challenges facing urbanisation in our country cannot be solved exclusively by city governments alone, or even just with the leadership of the concerned state governments.” ( Financial Express, Dec 5, 2005)

Domain of urban governance

The practice of bypassing the Municipalities and City Corporations which has steadily grown since independence in many states of the country hathus persisted.”(K.C.Sivaramakrishnan, 2010) There may, for instance, be problems of coordination when a number of specialised agencies

providing different services are involved. In addition, these agencies may have no local political accountability unless their decisions are subject to the approval by the municipal executive.(Rao and Bird,2010)”

It requires a radically different set-up in the governance process such that the prime responsibility and the powers for the execution of its tasks are assigned to a single and competent authority. What better way than placing that responsibility on the lowest level of administration -

municipality? Given the history of urban development failure under a top-down governance model, isn't it time to consider a more decentralised set-up for JNNURM?(Business Line, 6 dec 2005)”

The Karnataka government order dated 14.12.2009 clearly states that the Local Planning functions will be firmly with the Urban Development Authorities and planning authorities. Based on this order, the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 is given preeminence over the74th

constitutional provision. But looking at this from a different perspective, the ULBs, according to this order are given time to read through the plans and give their feedback. This again indicates that decentralization as a study needs to be looked at from a more incremental perspective. Small

minor changes over time “Decentralization and improved central evaluation and assessment of local activities are not substitutes; they are complements.”(rao and bird, 2010)

“Decentralizing a function to local governments thus does not imply that the central and state governments no longer have any responsibility. Rather, it means that the nature of central responsibility has changed to regulating and monitoring the efficiency and equity of services delivered by

local governments (Rao and Bird, 2010) “The Government of India, the State Governments and the city administrations have to, therefore, work together to provide the enabling supp

systems, including infrastructure and services, which will help the cities and towns realize their full potential.” ( Speech by the minister of urban development)

Incremental changes in decentralisation

Figure 2: A timeline of the total number of judicial cases on urban reforms

Source: Manupatra.com

REFERENCES

Journal Articles and Book Sections

Bagchi, S(2004), Decentralised Urban Governance in India-implications for financing of Urban

Infrastructure.Economic and Political Weekly, 39(49): 5253-5260.

Bardhan(2002) Decentralization of Governance and Development,The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol

16,(No.4): pp 185-205,.

Batra, L. 2009. A review of Urbanisation and Urban Policy in post independent India, CSLG WORKING PAPER

SERIES,CSLG/WP/09/05.

Baud, D. W. 2008. Shifts in Urban Governance In B. DeWit (Ed.), New Forms of Urban Governance in India. New

Delhi: Sage Publications.

Burgoyne, J. G. (1994). Stakeholder analysis. In C. Cassell&G. Symon (Eds.), Qualitative methods in organizational

research (pp. 187-207) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Centre, H. D. R. Decentralization in India: Challenges & Opportunities, Discussion Paper Series - 1. New Delhi:

United Nations Development Programme.

Chen, W., Mitchell, R. K., Mitchell, J. R. The invisible other hand: Institutions and entrepreneurship in a field of

multiple logics. . Abstract, USASBE Proceedings: WINNER - ET&P Best Conceptual Paper, Anaheim, Ca., January,

2009.

Chetan Vaidya, V. D. a. N. D. S. Pearl: Networking of Cities Program Under JNNURM,.Context Journal of DRONA,.

Decentralization: A Sampling of Definitions(1999). Working paper prepared in connection with the Joint UNDP-

Government of Germany evaluation of the UNDP role in decentralization and local governance).

http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/decentralization_working_report.PDF,.

DiMaggio, P. J. a. W. W. P. 1983. "The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in

organizational fields."American sociological review, 48(2):: 147-160.

Falleti, T. G. 2005. A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective.

American Political Science Review, Vol. 99(No 3)

Hammerschmid. 2003. Current initiatives and central actors in the Austrian administrative reform process. Paper

presented at the EGPA Annual Conference Oeiras, Portugal.

Hinings, T. R. a. C. R. B. 2005. The Recomposition of An Organisational Field: Health Care in Alberta". Organization

Studies, 26(3):: 351–384.

Hinings, T. R. a. C. R. 2009. Managing the Rivalry of Competing Institutional Logics,Organization Studies, 2009 30:

629

K.C.Sivaramakrishnan. 2010. THE JNNURM STORY New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research.

Kala Seetharaman Sridhar, A. V. R. 2010. State of Urban Services in India’s Cities- Spending and Financing:. Delhi:

Oxford University Press.

Kelman, S. (2007) Chapter 5: Public Administration and Organization Studies. The Academy of Management Annals,

1(1): 225-267,p 6

Kundu, A. Infrastructure Financing and Emerging Patterns of Urbanisation: A Perspective ,prepared for the planning

commission , Government of India, planningcommission.gov.in/reports/genrep/.../9_bg2020.pdf

Lalit batra(2009), A review of Urbanisation and Urban Policy in post-independent India.CSLG Working PaperSeries,

CSLG/WP/09/05.

Lawrence, T. B. S., Roy (2006) Institutions and Institutional Work In Handbook of Organizational Studies Second

Edition pages

M. Govinda Rao and Richard M. Bird(2010). 2010. Urban Governance and Finance in India, Working Paper ,No. 2010-

68, ed.: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,.

Maiti, K. C. S. a. A. (Ed.). Metropolitan Governance in India: An overview of selected cities. Delhi: Centre for Policy

Research.

Marshall, C. a. R., Gretchen. 1989. Designing Qualitative Research. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Mayring, P. 2000. Qualitative Content Analysis, Vol. Volume 1, No. 2 – June 2000.

Meyer, J. W. a. B. R. 1977. "Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony"American journal

of sociology: 340-363.

Nallathiga, R. 2005. Institutional innovations of Urban Governance: Some examples of Indian cities.Urban India, Vol

XXV, No. 2 (2005): 1-28.

Nallathiga, R. 2008. Metropolitan Urban Governance Approaches and Models: Some Implications for Indian Cities.

Paper presented at the Third international conference on Public policy and management on “Urban Governance and

Public-Private Partnerships”, Bangalore.

P.K.Mohanty, B. M. M., Rajan Goyal, P.D.Jeromi(2007) Municipal Finance in India: An Assessment. Department of

Economic Analysis and Policy Reserve Bank of India, Development research group, study no 26

Panel, A. 2001. Decentralization and Municipalities, A Consultation paper: National Commission to Review the

Working of the Constitution.

Peterson, C. a. 1999. Decentralization: A Sampling of References, Working paper prepared in connection with the Joint

UNDP-Government of Germany evaluation of the UNDP role in decentralization and local governance) ed.

PK Bardhan, D. M. 2006. Decentralization and local governance in developing countries: MIT Press.

Powell, W. W., P. J. DiMaggio, et al. (1991). 1991. The new institutionalism in organizational analysis,. Chicago, IL.:

University of Chicago Press.

Program, I.-U. F. I. R. a. E. 2011. Developing Sustainable and Inclusive Urban Infrastructure Services:A Guidebook for

Project Implementers and Policy Makers in India. Silver Spring,, MD, USA: Ministry of Urban Development,

Government of India.

Programme, J. R. T. Governance and Reforms: Centre for Good Governance, Adminstrative Staff College of India.

Renate Meyer, G. H. 2004. Public Management in Austria: Changing sector logics and executive identities. Paper

presented at the EGPA Annual Conference Study Group on Personnel Policies, Ljubljana.

Scott, W. R. 2004. Institutional Theory. In G. Ritzer (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Social Theory Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Smith, T. 1873. The Policy Implementation ProcessPolicy Sciences,, 4(2): 197-209.

Thornton, P. 2008. Institutional Logics. In G. e. al (Ed.), The Sage Handbook of Organisational Institutionalism :SAGE

Publications Ltd.

Tolbert, P.S. and Zucker, L.G. (1996) The Institutionalization of Institutional Theory, in Clegg, S.R., Hardy, C., and

Nord, W.R. (eds) Handbook of Organization Studies. Sage.

W . Richard Scott (1987) The adolescence of institutional theory, Administrative Science Quarterly.Vol. 32, No. 4

(Dec., 1987), pp. 493-511

Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, e. 2007.Transcending New Public Management: The Transformation of Public

Sector Reforms. Aldershot, UK :: Ashgate, 2007.

V, A. R. 2009. Public Policy Making in India.New Delhi: Pearson Longman.

V, G. 1995. Urban Policies in India: Paradoxes and Predicaments.Habitat International,, Vol. 19(No. 3): 293-316.

V(1995), Gnaneshwar. 1995. Urban Policies in India: Paradoxes and Predicaments. Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 293-316,.

Vaidya, C. July 2009. Urban Issues, Reforms and the way forward in India, Vol.

Working Paper No.4/2009-DEA: Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.

Yin, R. K. 2009. Case study research: design and methods: 219 pages: Sage Publications.

Chamaraj., K. 2006. Urban renewal: Mission Accomplishable, Vol. 2011, http://www.indiatogether.org/2006/jul/gov-

jnnurm.htm

Reports

The Urban Context and Governance: Developing Sustainable and Inclusive Urban Infrastructure Services: A guidebook

for project implementers and policy makers in India, Indo-US Financial Institutions Reform and Expansion Program—

Debt & Infrastructure, Ministry of Urban Development Government of India, 2011

Urban Governance Decentralization in India: An Overview(2005),. New Delhi, India: National Institute of Urban

Affairs.

The JNNURM Toolkit, M. 2005. Implementation of the 74th Constitutional Amendment, State Level Reforms:

Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India.

A compendium of Municipal Legislations in conformity with constitution(Sevety-Fourth Amendment Act, 1992). New

Delhi: National Institute of Urban Affairs, 1998

Toolkit, J. 2005. Implementation of the 74th Constitutional Amendment and Integration of City Planning and Delivery

Functions: State Level Reform: Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India.

Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, Government of India http://jnnurm.nic.in/

Mahadevia, Darshini 2006, NURM and the Poor in Globalizing Mega Cities, EPW. August 5

Mathur, Om Prakash 2007, Moving forward with the JNNURM reforms, Business Standard, June 15

Mukhopadhyay, Partho 2006, Whither Urban Renewal?, EPW, March 11.

Planning Commission 2010, Mid Term Appraisal for Eleventh Five Year Plan 2007 – 2012, Government of India, New

Delhi

Ramamoorthy, Sarita 2009, Citizens Review, JNNURM, Focus on the Global South – India, Hazards Center, New Delhi

Sivaramakrishnan, KC 2010, The JNNURM Story, Unpublished version from February 25.

Manupatra

Jyotiben R. Pathak and Ors.Vs. Rafigsa Chammansa Fakir and Ors.; MANU/GJ/0156/1999; AIR2000Guj129

Arvind Textiles Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors MANU/RH/0042/1994; AIR1994Raj195, www.manupatra.com

Abdul Azeez,Vs.Kerala State Election Commission; MANU/KE/0320/2006; 2006(4)KarLJ7,

Junjamma and Ors.Vs.The Bangalore Development Authority, rep. by its Commissioner and Ors, www.manupatra.com,

indu rayadurgam patnet paper draft · higher state intervention in the urban planning. ... the...

Documents