india's role in nepal's maoist insurgency 2004

India's Role in Nepal's Maoist InsurgencyAuthor(s): Rabindra Mishra ,Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 5 (September/October 2004), pp. 627-646Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2004.44.5.627 .Accessed: 21/06/2014 20:12

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Asian Survey

, Vol. 44, Issue 5, pp. 627646, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X.' 2004 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requestsfor permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of CaliforniaPresss Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.

Rabindra Mishra holds an MSc in International Politics from the Schoolof Oriental and African Studies, London, and works as a Senior Broadcast Journalist with the BBCWorld Service. He is grateful to Dr. David Robson, Dr. Sudipta Kaviraj, Dr. Surya P. Subedi, Dr.Seira Tamang, Dr. Pratyoush Onta, Dr. Saubhagya Shah, and Sudheer Sharma for their highly con-structive inputs. Email:

,

[email protected]/[email protected]

.

.

INDIAS ROLE IN NEPALS MAOIST INSURGENCY

Rabindra Mishra

Abstract

This article examines India-Nepal relations, namely, Indias role in Nepalsongoing Maoist insurgency. It argues that the insurgencys trajectory is heavilyinfluenced by transboundary links and should be viewed in the context ofIndias role in shaping the past 50 years of Nepals political history.

Introduction

The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics andis unaffected by the circumstances of time and place.

Hans Morgenthau,

The Politics Among Nations:The Struggle for Power and Peace

Nepal is in the midst of arguably the most successfulMaoist insurgency the world has witnessed in recent decades. The so-calledPeoples War, started by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) in1996 as a small armed movement in four remote districts (Rolpa, Rukum,Gorkha, and Sindhuli), has now spread to all of the countrys 75 districts, tak-ing the lives of over 9,000 people. The Maoists, who appear to model them-selves on Perus Shining Path guerrillas, have shaken the countrys 14-year-old, multiparty democracy to its very foundation. Following the conspicuousfailure of the police to contain the insurgency, the army was mobilizedfrom late 2001, with little effect. The second ceasere, declared in January2003, collapsed after seven months, and a resolution of the crisis does not ap-pear in sight. Political commentators such as Deepak Thapa have observed


628

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIV, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

that the conict has evolved into the most serious internal crisis facing thenation-state of Nepal since its founding in the mid-eighteenth century.

1

Thiscould not be more true.

Given the magnitude of the crisis, the exploration of its causes and contin-ued success has become a subject of interest to commentators and scholars inNepal and beyond. Popular wisdom holds that the insurgency is a direct resultof the increasing despondency felt by the poor and the socially marginalizedin the country. While there is an element of truth in these prevailing analyses,evidence suggests that the underlying causes of the insurgencys origins, rapidgrowth, and continuing success are far more complex. My study will focus noton the causes of its origins or domestic factors relating to its success but onthe insurgencys transboundary links, which have heavily inuenced its trajec-tory. This crucial aspect has been subject to little scholarly scrutiny to date.

As noted by scholars such as Saubhagya Shah, the epicenter of the insur-gencythe Rapti Zone in mid-western Nepalis not the most backward re-gion in the country. He argues that if social and economic marginalisationalone were responsible for the emergence of the communist revolt, the hill dis-tricts of Karnali, Seti and Mahakali zones would be far more likely candidates,not only because of their grinding poverty and chronic food shortage, but alsobecause of the nature of their terrain and their remoteness from state centres.

2

Thus, it would be wrong to explain the causes of the Maoists continuing suc-cess only in terms of internal political, social, and economic factors. What,then, has sustained the insurgency so effectively for so long? Departing fromthe popular analytical tradition, it will be argued in this study that the answershould be sought in Nepals inter-state relations with its giant neighbor Indiaand Indias role in Nepals domestic politics.

Nepal is a land-locked country, surrounded by India on three sides. The re-maining northern one is separated from the economic might of China by theHimalayas. This geopolitical situation forces Nepal to be totally dependent onIndia for trade, commerce, and access to the sea. Without Indias cooperation,Nepals engagement with the rest of the world and quest for stability and eco-nomic development will not bear much fruit. This allows Delhi to play a ma-nipulative role in Nepali politics to serve Indias interests. For example, Indiaplayed a major role in the removal in 1951 of Nepals 104-year-old Ranadynasty, the continuation for 30 years of a partyless monarchical rule, and therestoration of multiparty democracy in 1990. It is important to understand

1. Deepak Thapa, The Maobadi of Nepal, in

State of Nepal

, eds. Kanak Mani Dixit and Shas-tri Ramachandaran (Lalitpur: Himal Books, 2002), p. 77.

2. Saubhagya Shah, A Himalayan Red Herring? Maoist Revolution in the Shadows of theLegacy Raj, in

Himalayan Peoples War: Maoist War in Nepal

, ed. Michael Hutt (London:Christopher and Hurst, forthcoming).


RABINDRA MISHRA

629

the political crisis Nepal is currently facing within the historical context of In-dias role in Nepali politics, rather than only as a phenomenon nurtured athome by political, social, and economic factors.

In what follows, an overview of relevant Indian-Nepali relations since In-dias independence in 1947 will present evidence cataloging the extent ofIndias role in Nepals Maoist insurgency. Then, an analysis will explain whyIndia has continually interfered in the internal affairs of Nepal. Finally, it willbe argued that Indias role will be crucial in any future resolution of the Mao-ist crisis in Nepal. As countries around the world continue to act in their na-tional interest rather than follow idealistic slogans, Nepal should reect on itsshortcomings in its dealings with India, instead of seeking to blame Delhi forinterfering in Nepali affairs.

Historical Perspective

The decisive battles in [the power] struggle had not been foughtin the hills of Nepal but in the halls of New Delhi.

Leo E. Rose,

Nepal: Strategy for Survival

From 1846 to 1951, Nepal was ruled by a dynasty of hereditary prime ministers,that is, the Rana family, and the monarchy was merely kept as a gurehead in-stitution to be manipulated at the rulers whims. This dynasty maintained cor-dial relations with the British raj to its south and retained supremacy in Nepalwith a policy of international isolation. When the British departed from Indiain 1947, the Ranas were concerned about their future. A growing anti-Ranamovement of exiled Nepali opposition groups, based on Indian territory, andthe establishment of a democratic regime in India put increasing pressure onthe Ranas to open up their polity.

Though India recognized Nepals sovereignty, Delhi was determined tocontinue with British Himalayan frontier policy by keeping Nepal in Indiassphere of inuence. Nepal, which lies on the southern slopes of the Himala-yas, shares 500 miles of open border with India. From the British raj onward,Indian rulers have considered the Himalayas to be a second frontier, protect-ing India from military expeditions and undesirable inuences from thenorth (read: China).

3

To keep Nepal under Indian inuence, especially in thecontext of Chinas declared objective to liberate Tibet just across the Hima-layas, they felt it was becoming more important for India to strike a deal withthe rulers in Nepal than to please those Nepalis who, from Indian soil, wereghting for democracy. At the same time, the Ranas were under pressure to

3. Surya P. Subedi, Indo-Nepal Relations: The Causes of Conflict and Their Resolution, in

Legitimacy and Conict in South Asia

, eds. Subrata K. Mitra and Dietmar Rothermund (Delhi:Manohar, 1997), p. 220.


630


sustain their regime. Against this background, India drafted the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which was signed virtually as pro-posed in Kathmandu on July 31, 1950.

4

Although the Rana regime thatsigned the treaty collapsed within a year, the treaty survives even today. It pro-vides a framework for what is described as a special relationship betweenthe two countries and sets out various provisions relating to security, eco-nomic, and commercial matters, in a manner conducive to Indian interests.

5

Soon after the 1950 treaty was signed, events that would directly affect thesecurity interests of India took place across the Himalayas. Chinas October1950 attack on Tibet greatly worried Delhi, particularly as the Tibetan plateauwas considered a buffer state between the two countries. Now, Chinas fron-tier extended up to Nepal, which had been listed by Sun Yat-sen in 1924 asone of the territories that had been lost by China.

6

Any further Chinese mili-tary ambition southward would directly expose India to an emerging commu-nist power.

Meanwhile, with the help of India, Nepals King Tribhuvan, Crown PrinceMahendra, and his eldest son Birendra sought refuge at the Indian embassy inKathmandu on November 6, 1950, and were own to Delhi four days later.After King Tribhuvan left the palace, the Rana Prime Minister Mohan Sham-sher deposed him, placing the kings four-year-old, second grandson, Gyanendra,on the throne. But this enthronement was never recognized by the interna-tional community. India feared that the instability in Nepal could further jeop-ardize its own security, prompting Prime Minister Nehru to declare in theIndian Parliament on December 6 that India could not risk her own securityby anything going wrong in Nepal which permits either that barrier [Himala-yas] to be crossed, or otherwise weakens our frontier.

7

In this context, a com-promise deal for Nepals political future was envisaged

by India

, which Nehrucalled a middle way. The deal included a constituent assembly to draft anew constitution and an interim government with popular (i.e., Nepali Con-gress Party) representation, but with a Rana prime minister and recognition ofKing Tribhuvan. Surprisingly, the three Nepali parties involved in the dealwere neither consulted properly by India nor given a chance to sit together anddiscuss the matter. All communication took place through Prime Minister

4. Leo E. Rose,


(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971),p. 185.

5. See S. D. Muni,

India and Nepal: A Changing Relationship

(Delhi: Konark Publishers,1992), pp. 18892, for the entire text of the treaty and the letter exchanged with it.

6. Michael Yahuda, The Changing Faces of Chinese Nationalism in

Asian Nationalism

, ed.Michael Leifer (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 27.

7. See A. S. Bhasin, ed.,

Documents on Nepals Relations with India and China, 19491966

(Bombay: Academic Books, 1970), p. 25.


RABINDRA MISHRA

631

Nehru, who never spoke about terms concretely.

8

Nevertheless, the Delhicompromise was agreed upon by all parties, and the king and the NepaliCongress leaders returned to Kathmandu to form the new government on Feb-ruary 7, 1951. This is how, to put it in Kumars words, India midwifed thebirth of democracy in Nepal.

9

Indias inuence in Nepals domestic politics has remained strong to thisday. In the early years of Nepals rst experiment with democracy, Indian ad-vice was solicited by Kathmandu on virtually all political, administrative, se-curity, and foreign policy matters. However, with the death of King Tribhuvanon March 13, 1955, and the succession of his son, Mahendra, Nepals domes-tic and international politics underwent a massive transformation. In an effortto reduce the countrys excessive dependence on India, Mahendra took a num-ber of measures: the Nepali government established diplomatic ties withChina and several other countries; issued an order that the medium of instruc-tion in all schools should be Nepali, effectively barring Indians from teachingjobs; barred all foreignersagain, aimed indirectly at Indiansfrom purchas-ing xed property in Nepal; and requested that India withdraw its militarymission from Kathmandu.

B. P. Koirala, who headed the government after his party, the Nepali Con-gress, emerged victorious in the countrys rst general election in 1959, triedto follow King Mahendras policy of equal friendship with all countries, es-pecially India and China. However, his strong relationship with Nepals south-ern neighbor was apparent on several occasions.

10

When after little over ayear, on December 15, 1960, King Mahendra took over the reins of power bydismissing and arresting the Koirala ministry, one of the charges directedagainst Koirala was that his government had encouraged anti-national ele-ments to a large degree, clearly hinting at India and its supporters.

The dismissal shocked Nehru, who described the kings action as a reversalof the democratic process in Nepal. However, India once again appeared to beclearly guided more by the desire to secure its own national self-interest thanby its public commitment to democracy in Nepal. Within six months of thedismissal of the Koirala government, India had signed four aid agreements

8. Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala,

Bishweshwar Prasad Koiralako Aatmabrittanta

(Audio auto-biography of Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala), recorded and edited by Ganesh Raj Sharma (Lalitpur:Jagadamba Press, 1998), p. 146.

9. Dhruba Kumar, Asymmetric Neighbours, in

Nepals India Policy

(Kathmandu: Center forNepal and Asian Studies, 1992), p. 5.

10. Cf. Rose,


, pp. 21931; Ramakant,

Nepal-China and India(Nepal-China Relations)

(Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1976), pp. 11161; S. K. Jha, PolicyToward India: Quest for Independence, in

Nepal: An Assertive Monarchy

, ed. S. D. Muni (Delhi:Chetana Publications, 1977), pp. 20910; Shiva Bahadur Singh,

Indo-Nepalese Relations: Discordand Harmony

(Varanasi: Ganga Kaveri Publishing House, 1994), pp. 5356.


632


with Nepal,

11

and after the 1962 Sino-Indian war, during which Nepal wassupposed to have followed a carefully neutral line, New Delhi ordered all anti-royal Nepali exiles in India to cease their activities. These actions virtually en-sured the continuity of the kings absolute rule, and it lasted for the next 30years, primarily as India found it conducive to support the monarchical re-gime. The regime only collapsed in 1990 as a direct result of its decision to ig-nore the wishes of New Delhi in what was, supercially, a trade and transitdispute.

Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul have argued that Nehrus approach to for-eign policy can be divided into two periods: from late 1946 to 1954, idealismwas more prominent than realism, while from 1954 to 1964, as challengesmounted to Indias national security, realism became progressively salient.

12

However, in dealings with Nepal, Nehrus policy always seems to have beengoverned by realismidealism only being used as a veil to cover the sins ofinter-state relations. If he struck deals in the late 1940s with the crisis-riddenRanas to achieve favorable conditions for India, he did exactly the same in theearly 1960s with the royals. This approach continued to be the norm afterNehrus death. King Mahendra wanted to ensure that the Indian governmentwould not help the Nepali opposition politicians based in India, and NewDelhi wanted to make sure that Nepal remained completely within its sphereof inuence. It is argued that this must be the reason why the monarchy signeda secret arms supply agreement in January 1965. The agreement gave Indiarst priority for supplying arms and ammunitions to Nepal, adding that Kath-mandu would be obliged to consult Delhi while purchasing such materiel

from

India or transporting consignments

through

Indian territory.

13

In 1968, Koirala and several other Nepali Congress leaders were releasedfrom jail in Nepal. They immediately ed to India where they once againplanned for an armed revolt against the Nepali state. However, according tothe supreme leader of the Nepali Congress, the late Ganesh Man Singh,Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi not only ignored their request for armsbut, after the 1975 declaration of the state of emergency in India, asked them tocease all their political activities.

14

Once again, Indias role proved instrumentalin the unimpaired continuation of the monarchical Panchayat regime in Nepal.

The real crisis for the regime arose in 1989 when India imposed a so-calledeconomic embargo on Nepal after the two countries failed to reach an agreement

11. Rose,


, p. 234.12. Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul,

India in the World Order: Searching for Major-PowerStatus

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 116.13. See Muni,

Nepal: An Assertive Monarchy

, pp. 19698 (emphasis added), for the full text ofthe agreement.

14. Ganesh Man Singh interview, conducted by the author for the BBC series

Down MemoryLane.

Interview broadcast by the Nepali Service of the BBC on April 28, 1997.


RABINDRA MISHRA

633

on the renewal of trade and transit treaties. India closed down 19 of the 21trade routes and 13 of the 15 transit routes through India used by Nepal, caus-ing chaos in the day-to-day life of Nepalis. Supercially, the embargo was re-lated to trade and transit issues, but the underlying cause was Nepalsapparently hard-line moves to distance itself from Indian inuence. For exam-ple, in 1975, King Birendra proposed that Nepal be declared a Zone of Peace,and this was interpreted by India as Nepals attempt to ignore the basic securityarrangements made by the two countries through the 1950 treaty. In 1987, Nepaltried to introduce a system of work permits for Indian nationals working inNepal, and most importantly, in 1988, Nepal purchased arms that were de-livered directly overland from China. India argued that Nepal should haveconsulted New Delhi under the 1950 treaty before purchasing the arms. How-ever, Nepal insisted that the provision of the treaty did not require any con-sultation unless the import of arms was done in transit through India. Thisresponse did not satisfy India.

In Nepal, all the mainstream political parties decided to launch a massmovement against the monarchys Panchayat system, blaming the economicembargo and the resultant hardship on citizens on awed government policy.India backed the mass movement in Nepal in several ways: 207 members ofthe Indian Parliament appealed to the Indian government to help the restora-tion of democracy in Nepal; an all-party Nepal Fund was established to sup-port the pro-democracy movement; and on January 5, 1990, in an address at aconvention of opposition parties in Kathmandu, Chandra Shekhar, a seniorleader of the ruling Janata Dal who later became prime minister of India, de-clared that while India could not give democracy to Nepal, India would standby the Nepali people on the question of democracy and human rights. How-ever, once again, Indias public commitment to Nepals democracy appears tohave been an idealistic veil intended to cover its true intentions, which werefocused on securing another crucial agreement with Nepal. On March 31, In-dia forwarded a draft treaty proposal to Nepal that

1. forbade Nepal to enter into any military alliance with any other state ororganization without prior consultation and agreement with India;

2. obliged Nepal to consult in advance with India when importing arms, train-ing armed personnel, and raising additional military units;

3. gave India or its nationals rst preference in Nepals development andindustrial projects whenever Nepal sought foreign assistance for suchpurpose; and,

4. ensured Indias preferential involvement in exploiting water resourcesoriginating from shared rivers.

15

15. See Kumar, Asymmetric Neighbours, pp. 14447, for the full text of the draft proposal.


634


According to the Nepali prime minister at the time, Marich Man SinghShrestha, accepting these proposals would have enabled the regime to survivebut the country would have lost its sovereignty completely.

16

His argumentmay be true, given the fact that Nepals agreement to the proposal would haveimmediately restored day-to-day normality in the country, allowing the gov-ernment to focus on suppressing the growing movement for multiparty de-mocracy. But King Birendra decided instead to give in to the demands ofthe pro-democracy activists rather than surrender the countrys sovereigntyto India.

17

Even after the restoration of multiparty democracy in Nepal, NewDelhis attitude to its Himalayan neighbor remained resolutely unchanged,and it still continues to carve the path of Nepali politics as exemplied by thecontemporary case of the Maoist insurgency.

Indias Role in the Insurgency

India might have expected more from the Nepali democrats onthe basis that Nepals democratic and communist movementswere made possible only thanks to Indias support. However,

its expectations may not have been met in the new politicalscenario that emerged after 1990, hence it may have

decided to use the Maoists as a bargaining tool.Puskar Gautam, a former Maoist commander who deserted

the guerrilla war in 1999 and became a leadingcommentator on the Maoists strategy,

Himal Khabarpatrika

On February 4, 1996, the Maoists submitted the now-famous 40-point de-mands to the Nepali government, and the top three demands directly related toIndia. The rst demand proposed the removal of all unequal stipulations andagreements from the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Thesecond urged the Nepali government to admit that the anti-nationalist India-Nepal Tanakpur (hydro-electric) Agreement was wrong, and together withthe Mahakali (river) Treaty, which incorporated the former, should be nulli-ed. The third demand stipulated that the entire Nepal-India border should besystematically controlled, and vehicles with Indian number plates should notbe allowed free entry. All of these were categorized as demands related toNepals nationalism. However, today, they have rarely been an issue for theMaoists, and anti-India rhetoric is practically non-existent in their ofcial doc-uments. They still talk in general about Indian hegemony and the danger ofSikkimization (that is, Nepal becoming like Sikkim, which was merged intoIndia in 1975). But these terms have been largely emptied of meaning by their

16. Marich Man Singh interview, conducted by the author for the BBC series

Down MemoryLane.

Interview broadcast by the Nepali Service of the BBC on July 23, 1997.17. Ibid.


RABINDRA MISHRA

635

constant use in nationalist rhetoric, primarily by the Nepali left and right.Hence, the essence of Nepals attitude toward India should be sought in deeds,not words.

The Period of Suspicion

The public, press, and politicians rst began to suspect a link between theMaoists and India after the Maoists lukewarm reaction to the India-NepalKalapani border dispute that grabbed national attention in 1998. The status ofKalapani, an arid mountainous region on the Nepal-India-China (Tibet) tri-junction in Nepals northwest, where India is alleged to have been stationingits troops since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, was rst reported in 1996. But itonly became a national issue in 1998 after several follow-up reports on thesubject. The dispute still continues. During the height of the controversy, in1998, nationalistic sentiment in Nepal was used as political capital by severalpolitical partiesbut not by the Maoists. Until then regarded as one of the mostvocal critics of India, the Maoists were conspicuously absent from the wholesaga. This fueled suspicion that the Maoist leadership had taken shelter inIndia and hence was not in a position to engage in any anti-India activities.

In September that year, there were reports that Nepali and Indian Maoistshad held a two-week-long secret meeting in the Indian city of Kolkata. Byearly 1999, concrete evidence surfaced regarding links between the Maoistsand like-minded groups in India. On the third anniversary of the PeoplesWar in Nepal, Indians and thousands of expatriate Nepalis staged a solidar-ity rally in the Indian capital, Delhi. Following the Delhi rally, suspicion inNepal grew. Meanwhile, toward the end of 2000, anti-India sentiment swept theHimalayan Kingdom after some newspapers wrongly reported that the Indianlm star Hritik Roshan had made insulting comments about Nepal and the Nepalipeople. Students rioted across the countrybut the presence of the Maoist-afliated All Nepal National Free Students Union (Revolutionary) was notevident.

In early 2001, reports about the Nepali Maoists connections with the like-minded Indian Maoist organizations, the Peoples War Group (PWG) and theMaoist Communist Center (MCC), were gaining prominence in the Indianmedia. Quoting intelligence reports, the

Times of India

claimed that the PWGwas planning to create a Compact Revolutionary Zone from Hyderabad toKathmandu, taking Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand into its area of in-uence with the help of other outts.

18

Within two-and-a-half months of theabove report, a Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations

18. Cf. Kalyan Chaudhuri, A Spurt in Maoist Attacks,

Frontline

, April 28May 11, 2001;Dipak Mishra, Nepalese Extremists Being Trained in Bihar,

Times of India

, April 16, 2001.


636


of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) was launched on July 1 to unify and coordinatethe revolutionary process in the region.

By now, there was no doubt left that the Nepali Maoists were receivingmoral and materiel support from their counterparts across the border. How-ever, Nepals suspicion that the top Maoists leaders had been living in India

with New Delhis

knowledge

still remained to be substantiated by hard evi-dence. Such evidence is very unlikely to surface in the foreseeable futuregiven the sensitivity of the matter.

Interestingly, Indias attitude to Bhutans anti-establishment groups has re-mained diametrically opposite to its attitude toward Nepals anti-establish-ment groups. While Nepals anti-establishment politics has succeeded onlywith covert or overt Indian support, any sign of political activities on Indiansoil that might be harmful to Bhutan, whose foreign and defense policies areguided by Delhi under the 1949 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between thetwo countries, have been immediately quashed. In 1997, India arrested Rong-thong Kuenley Dorji, the founder of the Druk [Bhutanese] National Congress(DNC) and chairman of the United Front for Democracy in Bhutan (UFD),and initiated extradition proceedings for his return to Bhutans capital,Thimpu. Currently, he is ghting extradition in Delhi and needs permission totravel outside the capital.

The Beginning of Revelation

In August 2001, there was a dramatic report that the entire front rank of theNepali communist leadership, including the main parliamentary oppositionleader, Madhav Kumar Nepal, had met the Maoist chairman, Prachanda(Pushpa Kamal Dahal), at Champasari, a village near Siliguri, in the Indianstate of West Bengal. It was commented at the time that such a jamboree oftop-ranking aboveground and underground Nepali communists in the so-called strategically important Chicken Neck could not have taken place with-out the knowledge of Indian security agencies. The argument appears valid,given that Siliguri and the adjoining areas are regarded as a popular transitcorridor for ISI [Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence] operatives, and forextremist groups from the northeast of India, making the security agencies ex-tra vigilant about activities in the region.

19

A couple of extracts from two ofthe leading Nepali commentators below indicate Nepali thinking after the re-ported Siliguri meeting:

Since our southern pals claim to know everything that happens inside the smallest

madarassa

(Muslim religious schools) in the

tarai

[plains of Nepal], it is highlyunlikely that they have not been aware of the honoured guests in their strategic

19. See

Times of India

, November 27, 2001.


RABINDRA MISHRA

637

Chicken Neck. The fact that the Maoists have safe havens in Indian territory hasaffected their image back home. So was their rabid anti-Indianism just to hide theshame of being at the mercy of their benefactors?. . . So, what are the many Nepaliswho believed Maoism was born out of their misery going to do now?

20

After the Siliguri meet between Prachanda and other Nepali communist leaders andits coincidence with the Indian minister Jaswant Singhs visit to Nepal, some Nepalianalysts are already beginning to say a new kind of Delhi Agreement is in the mak-ing. In other words, it is not outrageous to surmise that the Indian ruling establish-ment is already making sure that whatever the outcome of the current talks betweenthe Government and the Maoists, both parties will follow the formers soundadvice in letter and spirit.

21

Following the Siliguri revelations, no one in Nepal, except perhaps Maoistsupporters, was ready to believe that Delhi was unaware of the Maoist lead-ers whereabouts on Indian territory. It was also evident to Nepal that theMaoist problem would not be resolved without Indian cooperation. The possi-ble difculties faced by Nepal in seeking Indian cooperation were temporarilyeased by the declaration of war on terrorism after September 11, 2001.

Against this background late that month, the Indian foreign minister, Jas-want Singh, labeled the Maoists as terrorists and stated that India supportedthe Nepali government in its ght against them. For Nepal, this was certainly awelcome and surprising move by India. At the time of Mr. Singhs declaration,Nepal itself had not labeled the Maoists as terrorists, and the Nepali govern-ment and the Maoists were engaged in political negotiations. It is unclear whyIndia wanted to outdo even Nepal in attaching the terrorist label to the Mao-ists. This labeling by India did not easily correspond with the fact that duringthe peace talks, the leader of the Maoist negotiating team in Kathmandu,Krishna Bahadur Mahara, traveled to and from India. On the morning of No-vember 13, he arrived from Delhi to participate in the third round of talks heldlater that day.

22

The Maoists proceeded to walk away from the third round oftalks, and ten days later, to the shock of the nation, attacked the army for therst time, killing 40 security personnel, including 14 soldiers, in the mid-western district of Dang.

The government announced a state of emergency on November 26, mobi-lized the army, and for the rst time ofcially declared the Maoists to be ter-rorists. The following day, India extended its support to the declaration of thestate of emergency, deeming it a necessary step by a democratic governmentto preserve order. The Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Nirupama Rao, prom-

20. C. K. Lal, The Chicken Neck,

Nepali Times

, August 2430, 2001.21. Pratyoush Onta, Neighbourly Interests in Nepali Troubles,

Kathmandu Post

, September7, 2001.

22. See, for example,

Kantipur

daily and

Kathmandu Post

, November 14, 2001.


638


ised that India would not allow its territory to be used by those inimical to Ne-palese interests. However, the top Maoist leaders appeared to be able tofunction without restriction in Delhi: they issued frequent statements andtalked to the world mediafrom Delhi.

23

During the state of emergency inNepal, they also published their weekly,

Janaawaj

, from the Indian capital.Despite this, the Indian authorities continued to insist that they had no knowl-edge of the Maoist leaders presence in the capital, and that action would betaken if any evidence of their presence were found.

Delhis public stand against the Maoists was matched by military assistanceand an offer of two helicopters to Nepal. However, the feeling in Nepal wasthat it would have been a more signicant gesture had India also driven theMaoists back into Nepal, where they could not evade the military and the do-nated helicopters so easily. In fact, when there was no external backing of anykind to another armed campaign against the Nepali state by the CommunistParty of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) in the early 1970s, the Nepali governmenthad easily quashed it: only seven class enemies were killed before the lead-ers were jailed and the movement ended.

24

The resumption of violence with the Maoists attack on the army promptedgreat international concern, especially as it happened only two months afterSeptember 11. Seizing the opportunity, the Nepali government began a diplo-matic crusade against the Maoists. Declaring that the top Maoists are inIndia,

25

Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba went to Delhi in March 2002.After returning to Kathmandu, he said India had pledged to provide full sup-port to Nepal in curbing the Maoists activities. However, there was nothingmore to the promise than the usual diplomatic niceties. Many Nepalis found adifferent news report about Deubas visit far more interesting. During his visit,three senior Maoist leaders, Mohan Vaidhya, C. P. Gajurel, and Top BahadurRayamahi, were said to have visited Kolkata to meet the Nepali prime minis-ter. An article in the reputable

Himal South Asian

magazine suggested that thethree Maoist leaders were escorted by members of the Indian intelligence ser-vice.

26

When I asked the prime minister during his London visit two monthslater to conrm these reports, he acknowledged that the Maoists had unsuc-cessfully tried to meet him in Kolkata but expressed ignorance about who they

23. Interview conducted by the author with politburo member Dinanath Sharma, aired on De-cember 18 and 19, 2001, on the BBC Nepali Service and The World Today program, respectively.A report based on the interview can be accessed at

,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1718056.stm

.

. On May 10, 2002, Mr. Sharma again spoke

from Delhi

with the BBC Hindi Service.24. See

Origins of the Nepalese Maoist Insurgency

,

,

http://www.mypage.bluewin.ch/raonline/pages/story/np_mao14.html

.

, accessed July 16, 2003.25. See interview with Prime Minister Deuba in

Outlook

, April 1, 2002.26. Deepak Gyawali, Reflecting on Contemporary Nepali Angst, HIMAL South Asian, April

2002.


RABINDRA MISHRA 639

were escorted by. Regardless of who was escorting them, the Maoist leadersattempt to meet the prime minister on an ofcial visit could not have gone un-noticed by the Indian security agencies.

When I met Mr. Deuba, who was on his way to Kathmandu after his meet-ing with President Bush in the U.S., he looked delighted with the internationalsupport Nepal was receiving for its ght against the Maoists. In a rst-evervisit by a U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell traveled to Nepal in January2002. A series of high-level visits from American and British ofcials fol-lowed. A former Indian ambassador to Nepal, K. V. Rajan, says that India doesnot feel comfortable about the U.S.-U.K. involvement in Nepal. He arguesthat there is not much Delhi can do about it, however, and also predicts a sub-stantial dilution of Indias inuence in Nepal in the coming years.27 Publicly,the Indian government has not expressed any displeasure at the growing U.S.-U.K. inuence.

Despite the international support against the Maoists, the political situationin Nepal remained extremely grim: killings from both the army and the Mao-ists were growing, and the Maoists had made clear that they would disrupt theplanned general elections scheduled for November 13, 2002. When PrimeMinister Deuba recommended to King Gyanendra that the scheduled electionsbe postponed for a year, the king, in a surprising move, sacked him insteadand took over executive power on October 4. In response, the Maoists intensi-ed their anti-monarchy stance, hoping that the kings move would spark awave of protest against him. It did not. The mainstream political partiesstrongly condemned his move but insisted that their protest was not directedagainst the institution of the monarchy. The king has repeatedly emphasizedthat his move is temporary, and as soon as peace is restored, elections for Par-liament will be held.

The international community remained uncritical of Gyanendras move butcalled for the preservation of constitutional monarchy and multiparty democ-racy. The Indian stand was exactly the same. The Indian Foreign Ministrynoted that there are two pillars for stability in Nepalmultiparty democracyand constitutional monarchy, and both should remain strong. While Delhisstatement may appear logical and well intentioned, the question remains:would not these two pillars of stability have become much stronger hadDelhi been more sincere in its dealings with Nepal?

After the announcement of the ceasere in January 2003, the king traveledto India, his second visit within nine months; in contrast, Indian Prime Minis-ter Atal Bihari Vajpayee had not made a bilateral visit to Nepal in the previous

27. K. V. Rajan, Recent US/UK Activities in Nepal, Observer Research Foundation, ,http://www.observerindia.com., accessed July 4, 2003.


640 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIV, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

ve years. Ofcially, the kings visit in March 2003 was described as a pil-grimage to a number of Hindu shrines in southern India, but most Nepaliswere convinced that he was not just seeking divine blessings, but also that ofIndias political leadership.28 If that was his real strategy, then it was cer-tainly good diplomacy, especially since most observers in Nepal maintainedthat any resolution of the Maoist crisis would only come after ensuring Indiasconsent. But not only the establishment was engaged in the make Indiahappy mission; it was also the Maoists, who probably wouldnt have come totalks had there been no pressure from Delhia fact later acknowledged by Dr.Baburam Bhattarai himself. By then, the Maoists anti-India rhetoric had vir-tually vanished, and India was accepted as a neighbor with whom Nepalneeded to maintain cordial relations.

It is difcult to predict who will emerge victorious in this please Indiacompetition. The resignation in late May 2003 of the India-unfriendly but de-voutly royalist Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand after only eightmonths in powerand the appointment of the India-friendly royalist, SuryaBahadur Thapa, in June 2003was interpreted as a move to please Delhi. Butthat does not seem to have satised India.

After Thapas appointment as prime minister, peace talks remained stalledfor some time, and the Maoist leaders, who had remained aboveground for thenegotiations, went underground again, and were reportedly back in Delhi. Tothe astonishment of many Nepali observers, they issued an ultimatum to theNepali government, which included a new condition echoing the Indian con-cern voiced by Indian Ambassador K. V. Rajan, about the growing U.S.-U.K.inuence in Nepal. The Maoists demanded that the government annul theMemorandum of Understanding on terrorism signed with the U.S. govern-ment and expel all U.S. security advisors currently in Nepal29 prior to anyresumption of peace talks. This might be consistent with the Maoists hatredof the U.S. However, it was intriguing that they did not mention a word aboutIndias help to the Nepali Army but argued that the U.S. presence in Nepalwas part of its wider policy to encircle China by keeping an eye on India.This new development can be seen as Indias covert attempt to neutralizeWestern inuence in Nepal.

Peace talks ultimately resumed on August 17, only to be broken within aweek. Just before the breakdown, reports came in that Indian authorities hadarrested a high-prole Maoist politburo member, C. P. Gajurel, at Chennai In-ternational Airport, when he had attempted to board a ight to Frankfurt, onhis way to London, with a forged British passport. The Maoist leader,Prachanda, immediately appealed to the Indian government, using genuinely

28. Rajendra Dahal, Everything on Hold for Two Weeks, Nepali Times, March 2127, 2003.29. See Kathmandu Post, Kantipur daily, Himalayan Times, July 29, 2003.


RABINDRA MISHRA 641

polite language, to release Mr. Gajurel. However, the Indian embassy in Kath-mandu said that it did not recognize Prachandas appeal, and added that Mr.Gajurel may have visited Chennai to meet the leader of the PWG. This certainlygave the impression that India was putting pressure on the Maoists by arrest-ing its senior leader as the peace talks faltered. However, subsequent eventssuggest otherwise.

Despite Mr. Gajurels arrest, the Maoists decision to end the ceasereclearly implied that its leadership still felt fully assured of being able to coor-dinate their activities from Indian soil. The famous meeting between the leadersof the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist [UML]) and theMaoists in the northern Indian city of Lucknow, in November 2003, was a glaringexample. Nepals largest-selling daily, Kantipur, reported in advance that thethree-member UML team, headed by the partys general secretary and formerdeputy prime minister, Madhav Kumar Nepal, had gone to Lucknow for ameeting with the Maoist leadership. The Indian government expressed igno-rance about the meeting, which reportedly took place in a well-maintainedsuburban house. Analysts in Nepal were bafed as to how, despite advancereporting of the planned meeting, the Indian security agencies could be un-aware of it.

After the Lucknow meeting, accusations against India of harboring theMaoist leadership intensied in Nepal. The Indian foreign minister, YaswantSinha, appeared in an exclusive interview with Nepal Television in late De-cember to defend Indias role. Just over a month after Mr. Sinhas interview,India arrested two senior Maoist leaders in Lucknow, Matrika Prasad Yadavand Suresh Alemagar, and handed them over to Nepal. This was condemnedby the Maoists immediately. However, a week later, on February 15, the NepalHuman Rights Protection Committee-India, regarded as the successor to theAll India Nepali Unity Society that was banned by the Indian government in2002, held a public meeting in Delhi to celebrate the ninth anniversary of thePeoples War in Nepal.

According to a Maoist news portal, the meeting was held right under [the]Nepali Embassys nose, where thousands of Nepalis raised slogans againstthe monarchy. Reportedly, the meeting was addressed by several Indians, in-cluding Jahwaharlal Nehru Universitys well-known scholar on Nepal, Profes-sor S. D. Muni, and by several Nepalis, including the general secretary of theMaoist-afliated peasants organization, Chitrabahadur Shrestha, and thepresident of the Maoists student wing, Lekhnath Neupane.30 Back in Nepal,people asked why Mr. Yadav and Mr. Alemagar were arrested and handedover to Nepal, but Mr. Shrestha and Mr. Neupane were allowed to address apublic meeting in the center of the capital.

30. See KrishnaSenOnline, ,http://www.cpnmaoist.org/index/krishnasen/newsksna.htm.,accessed February 16, 2004.



The Maoists prompt high-command decisions, and their rapid and ef-cient communication using sophisticated email and internet technologieswould be virtually impossible to sustain from within the borders of Nepal,given the very limited network of electronic communication outside the majorcities. Without being able to operate from Indian soil, the Maoists abilitieswould be greatly hampered. Had the top Maoist leadership any doubt aboutthe ability to function from outside Nepal, their course of action would havebeen different. So far, India has arrested and handed over around 60 Maoistleaders and activists to Nepal.31 However, that seems to have made no differ-ence whatsoever to the functioning of the Maoist leadership on Indian soil.

The EnigmaThe quality of friendship is important. The number of treaties you

have with your neighbours is inconsequential. If friendship isthere, even one treaty sufces. If it isnt, then even a thousand

treaties will not make a difference.Former Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral, quoted in

V. Sudarshan, Next Door Boor, Outlook

Indias interference in Nepals domestic politics is inuenced by three relatedfactors: Indias attitude to Nepal, Nepals attitude toward India, and bilat-eral issues. Most analyses of the problems concerning the relationship betweenthe two countries focus on the third factor. However, it will be argued here thatthough bilateral issues are crucial in determining the immediate nature of therelationship, the essence of the problem in Indo-Nepali relations lies in atti-tude rather than issues. Obviously, attitudes are inuenced by issues andvice versa. However, attitude is much broader and reects the overall mind-setthat is instrumental in determining the issues and the approach toward them.

Except for Bhutan and the Maldives, India has strained relationships withall of its South Asian neighbors. An analysis in a leading Indian magazine,conducted with the help of senior journalists from Nepal, Bangladesh, and SriLanka, identied the main reasons for this as follows: India

takes its neighbors for granted; insists it is always right on all issues; does not grant concessions to its smaller neighbors; is not serious about correcting trade imbalances created by its becoming a

regional economic power; and is excessively paranoid about its own security, placing undue emphasis on

security at the cost of all other facets of a relationship.32

31. See Kantipur daily, February 11, 2004.32. See V. Sudarshan, Next Door Boor, Outlook, September 2, 2002, http://www.outlookindia.

com/full.asp?fodname520020902&fname5IndiaNeighbours&sid51, accessed June 29, 2003.


RABINDRA MISHRA 643

Though such attitudes may not be new phenomena in the realm of interna-tional politics, where universal moral principles cannot be applied to the ac-tions of states,33 such realist approaches are coming under increasingchallenge. Notions like neo-Wilsonian idealism, idealpolitik, and neo-idealism are being taken more and more seriously.34 When considered inthese theoretical contexts, it would be quite justiable to question whether it isappropriate, or even advantageous, for India to constantly seek a hegemonicrole in the region, rather than equitable deals with its smaller and weakerneighbors.

But that is not how India would generally like to argue. Rather than take aneutral viewpoint, the common Indian approach is to blame neighbor coun-tries for not taking Indias concerns seriously. Size doesnt matter. India facesa bagful of woes from the folks next door that puts it in a quandary, argued ananalysis last year in a leading Indian weekly, noticeably without discussingpossible grievances that neighbors might have.35 While India suffers from thisbiased victim psychology, it also believes that its foreign policy has to pred-icate itself on realpolitik, rather than on purely moral considerations or an ide-alistic worldview.36 Perhaps it is the combination of the two that makes Indiaparanoid about its own interests. That might also explain why India has be-come increasingly preoccupied with what it views as the growing activities ofthe Pakistani intelligence services, the ISI, in Nepal. India believes that the ISIis taking advantage of the porous border between Nepal and India and is usingNepal as a launching pad for anti-India activities. Circumstantial evidencesuggests that there is a degree of truth in the Indian accusation.

Following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane from Kathmandu in1999, the Nepalese government arrested and deported a Pakistani embassy of-cial, who allegedly served as the lynchpin of the ISI in Nepal. The plane wasown to Kabul before the hijackers demanded the release of certain Kashmirimilitants, and the incident was generally thought to be closely linked with ISIoperations in Nepal. However, the reporting and detailed analysis of ISI activ-ities in Nepal appearing regularly in leading Indian publications contrastsstarkly with their continued silence on Nepals main concernthe allegedlinks between the Maoists and the Indian state.

33. Hans Morgenthau, The Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 12.

34. Cf. Francis Fukuyama, The Beginning of Foreign Policy, New Republic, August 17 and24, 1994, pp. 2432; Stanley Kober, Idealpolitik, Foreign Policy, Summer 1990, pp. 324;Charles W. Kegley, Jr., The Neoidealist Movement in International Studies? Realist Myths andthe New International Realities, International Studies, June 1993, pp. 13146.

35. Raj Chengappa, A Neighbourhood of Trouble, India Today International, February 10, 2003.36. J. N. Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of Indias Foreign Policy (Delhi: Picus Books,

1998), p. 407.



This Indian attitude is further complicated by the Nepali attitude toward In-dia, which has remained consistently unfavorable to Delhi from the 1950s.Whatever the covert intentions, India helped Nepal free itself in 1951 from104 years of autocratic rule. But by 1954, anti-India demonstrations were al-ready taking place in Kathmandu. Anti-India feeling has continued to date,and perhaps with more vigor. Any statement or incident originating fromacross the border that is allegedly directed against Nepal or a Nepalihow-ever insignicant it might becan immediately trigger violent anti-India pro-tests in Nepal. When the Indian lm star Hrithik Roshan was wronglyreported in late 2000 to have made an anti-Nepal slur, neither the Nepali pressnor the government tried to establish the truth. Rather, the government bannedhis movies from cinema halls in Nepal, and several people died in violent anti-India protests. For many Nepalis, the stronger ones hostility toward India, thebetter a Nepali nationalist one is. This oppositional sense of nationalism is re-ected in the Nepali press as well. Just as the mainstream Indian press only re-ports on Indian concerns vis--vis Nepal, the Nepali mainstream press focuseson Nepali concerns vis--vis India.

Anti-India attitudes among Nepali leaders are even more worrying. Theytry to secure support by overtly appealing to the publics anti-Indian senti-ment, while covertly trying to keep India happy, reinforcing the common per-ception that Delhis favorable attitude helps the careers of aspiring Nepalipoliticians. This duplicity on the part of the leadership, and irrational national-ism on the part of the public, coupled with the ever-suspicious approach to-ward Delhis motives, make the Nepali attitude toward India ever confused.

Between the twoa self-centered attitude based on principles of realism(on the Indian part), and a suspicious and confused attitude emanating fromthe lack of sincerity and rationalism (on the Nepali part)lie a number of bi-lateral issues. These include Nepals insensitivity toward Indias securityconcerns; on-going reviews of the 1950 treaty, trade, transit, and water dis-putes; Indias construction of dams in the bordering region; and its alleged en-croachment into Nepali territory at several places. However, such issues havecome and gone. Relations have been strained and normalized, but the attitudesthat form the root cause of these problems have remained constant for the pasthalf-century of India-Nepal relations.

The responsibility for changing these attitudes largely lies in the hands ofIndia, because of its size and power. With this realization, I. K. Gujral attemptedto change Indias regional foreign policy between 1996 and 1998, rst as for-eign minister and then as prime minister. The so-called Gujral Doctrine ar-gued that India should not insist on reciprocity with its immediate neighborssuch as Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka but give andaccommodate what it can in good faith and trust. Gujrals time in ofce is oftenreferred to as a period of good neighborliness, and if this doctrine had continued


RABINDRA MISHRA 645

to steer Delhis foreign policy after his departure, there might have been posi-tive changes in Indo-Nepali relations. However, since Gujrals departure, hisdoctrine has largely been conned to foreign policy debates among commen-tators and scholars.

Because Indian interference is closely related to its attitude, Nepal has al-ways found it difcult to identify true Indian intentions. It would have beenmuch easier for Nepal to deal with Delhi if Kathmandu had had a list of issueson which India expected Nepals compliance, in return for a stop to interfer-ence in Nepali affairs. However, Indias attitude has been rather insatiable.This puts Nepal in a difcult position, because it does not want to reduce itselfto the status of Bhutan vis--vis India, but Nepal does not know what India ex-pects other than deference.

This is why no one has been able to explain what India may have expectedto achieve from its alleged link with the Maoists. Politicians of all persua-sions, from the avowedly anti-Indian to moderates, to the allegedly pro-Indian,have been in and out of revolving-door-governments since the Maoist insur-gency began in 1996. Many of themprime ministers, deputy prime minis-ters, home and foreign ministers, who would have had direct access to allcondential documents and knowledge of secret negotiationshave directlyand indirectly spoken about Indias role in the insurgency. But none has artic-ulated a denitive understanding of Indias goals or expectations. That is notsurprising, as India has never commented on the existence or character of itsmotives for maintaining secret links with Nepals anti-establishment groups.Remaining discreet, India has used these links to keep the Nepali state in aconstant state of fear in an effort to extract continued subservience.

ConclusionIndia, from the time of its independence, has played a crucial role in Nepalsdomestic politics. However, Indias role has remained largely covert, except inthe early 1950s. The covertness of the Indian role appears to be characterizedby a Machiavellian pursuit of self-interest, regardless of its effect on Nepalsfuture or impact on Indias own image. This is probably why Delhi seems lit-tle bothered by inconsistency and duplicity in its dealings with Nepal.

The Machiavellian approach, coupled with Indias asymmetrically largesize, inuence, and location vis--vis Nepal, means that any search for a mo-tive behind Indias role has to be sought primarily in Indias foreign policyattitude, rather than in other factors such as Nepals attitude toward India orissues of immediate bilateral concern. Therefore, unless Nepal resolutelyfocuses on developing strategies to bring about a change in Delhis attitude to-ward Kathmandu, India will always exercise its geopolitical supremacy andpower to manipulate developments in Nepal. Such a focused Nepali approachwould necessarily involve a realization that, though judicially both India and



Nepal are equal, empirically the two are vastly unequal in every sense of theword, and a country like Nepal cannot in any way try to show brinkmanshipwith a country like India. To put it in India-friendly and many-time PrimeMinister Thapas words, such brinkmanship would just be foolishness.37

Thus, Nepal should rst try to change its own attitude toward India, beforeexpecting any good-will gestures from her. It will also be imperative for Nepalto develop a well-woven India policy. To date, Kathmandus attitude towardDelhi has remained consistently inconsistent and clearly awed. This can beattributed partly to Nepals Foreign Ministry, which, in the words of Kumar, isregrettably useless, and partly to the politicians, who, in the words of Pan-dey, use nationalism opportunistically in respect of relation with India andto seek its blessings to feel secure.38

Any solution to the Maoist problem must involve winning the hearts andminds of the Indian authorities, perhaps more so than winning the heartsand minds of the Maoists themselves. It would be diplomatically immature forNepal to expect an automatic change in Delhis attitude, unless an idealist likeI. K. Gujral were to come to power once again. However, such political ideal-ists are rare, and Wilsonian idealism is still a feeble cry in internationalpolitics, which continues to be governed by the rules of realism. It might betoo early to judge, but the new government of Prime Minister ManmohanSingh in India has not appeared any different than its predecessor in dealingwith Nepal.

The only way for Nepal, then, is to reect on its own shortcomings and putas much effort as it can into safeguarding its national interest through a moremature and sophisticated use of diplomacy. Because of its geopolitical loca-tion, Nepal cannot expect to completely remove itself from Indias inuence,at least in the foreseeable future. However, with more wisdom in dealing withDelhi, the degree of that inuence can be reduced. Or else Nepal will continueto suffer more from exogenous interferences than endogenous imperatives.

37. Surya Bahadur Thapa interview, conducted by the author for the BBC series Down MemoryLane. Interview broadcast by the Nepali Service of the BBC on June 16, 1997.

38. See Kumar, Asymmetric Neighbours, p. 32; Devendra Raj Panday, Nepals Failed De-velopment: Reections on Missions and the Maladies (Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Center,1999), p. 347.
