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PROFESSIONAL PAPER 365 /October 1982

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

OF MINE WARFARE

William L. GreerJames C. Bartholomew, Cdr., USN

ELECT

jMAY t 83

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CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

83 05 i8 028

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The ideas epressed in this paper are those of the author.The paper does not necessarily represent the views of either

I the Center for Naval Analyses or the Department of Defense.

PROFESSIONAL PAPER 365 /October 1982

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTSOF MINE WARFARE

William 1. GreerJames C. Bartholomew, Cdr., USN

4 Accession For

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Navel Studies Group ~'

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

20001North Beauregard Street. Alexandria, Virgievia 22311

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PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MINS WARFARE

INTRODUCT ION

Mine warfare has suffered a history of neglect punctuated by

infrequent renewals of interest. These renewals usually are so short

that they serve only to remind us that mine warfare has not died a

natural death and to delude us into believing that somebody still has a

handle on it. The mental checkmark in the box marked "Annual Mine

aBriefing" is the most predictable, and sometimes most substantive,

result of a flurry-of interest in mines.

Disabled ships are often cited as indicators of a battle won or

lost. Not as obvious but equally decisive in the outcome of battle are

all the ships that never went in harm's way, never became disabled, and

never contributed to the disabling of anything else. The ships that

never got to the fight and the reasons they never got there represent a

factor sometimes overlooked by naval officers: the influence of

minefields on human behavior.

The more minefields control ship movements, the greater the

effectiveness of the minefield. Control results from human perceptions

of potential damage and arises from that aspect of mining which is often

given a soleim nod but rarely emphasized because of its slippery

nature: the psychological impact of a minefield. The specific causes

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a * ,.."- MTi:

of any decision are often obscure, and the decision to avoid a minefield

or to risk it will be influenced by many factors. The decisionmaker's

perception of the minefield is one factor.

-This paper examines historical and psychological data concerning

mine warfare. It then goes beyond those observations to consider how

the psychological warhead in minefields can be exploited

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Let's look briefly at four historical examples of the effect of

mine warfare.

Haiphong, 1943

In October 1943, a single U.S. B-24 dropped three mines in Haiphong

5 harbor. One of them sank a Japanese freighter. The next month, another

B-24 planted three more mines, and another Japanese freighter was

sunk. Then a Japanese convoy of ten ships refused to enter Haiphong

harbor for fear of mines. After loitering outside the harbor for a few

hours, the convoy headed for Hainan Island. On the way, it was detected

and attacked, and six of its ships were sunk. Meanwhile, a small 30-ton

. *- ship was sunk by one of the remaining mines, and the port was closed to

steel-hulled ships for the remainder of the war. When that decision was

* made, a maxim= of three mines remained. The Japanese estimate of the

remaining threat t not known, but there is little doubt that their

fears were exaggerated.

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Palau Atoll, 1944

On the night of 30 March 1944, aircraft from the carriers

Lexington, Bunker Hill, and Hornet dropped mines at the entrances to the

harbor at Palau Atoll. There were 32 Japanese ships inside the harbor,

and they all remained in the harbor rather than run the mined harbor

channel, even though they knew that they had been detected. Subsequent

air raids thus found the ships neatly concentrated targets, and sank 23

of them. As a final touch, U.S. aircraft dropped mines inside the

harbor itself. The Japanese improvised mine-clearing equipment and

believed that they had done a decent job of minesweeping until the first

ship underway in the channel was damaged by a mine detonation. The

Japanese then abandoned Palau as a naval base.

Operation Starvation, 1945

Operation Starvation was an extensive mining campaign aimed at

making the seas around Japan hazardous to Japanese shipping. The

campaign started in March 1945 and included the mining of Sasebo, Kure,

and Shimonoseki Strait. The Japanese altered their shipping routes

markedly to avoid mined waters. Perhaps the most notable change was the

detour of the battleship Yamato from the mined Shimonoseki Strait to

I Bungo Straits where she was sighted, attacked, and sunk before she

reached Gkinawa.

Late in the campaign when most of the navigable water had been

mined, the Japanese sent ships through waters known to be mined and

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t 4

incurred considerable losses. Their only choice at that point was to

risk their ships to mines or to remain immobile and subject their people

to starvation.

When alternative routes were available, the Japanese avoided

minefields. After all routes were fouled with mines, the alternatives

were reduced to running a minefield or not moving, and the minefield

became the lesser of two evils. The U.S. realized that Japanese ships

were challenging the minefields unaided, so mines laid subsequently were

set with lower sensitivities so they would detonate only when a target

was quite near--an almost sure kill. The goal became ship-sinking

rather than deterrence.

North Vietnam, 1972

In May 1972, mines were planted in the harbors of Haiphong, Ron

Gay, and Cam Phon. The first minefield consisted of 36 mines in

Haiphong. These mines were dropped by aircraft under the observation

(and antiaircraft fire) of the enemy. President Nixon announced that

mines were in the water. Ship traffic stopped. Only a few mines had

prompted the decision to stop shipping at. Haiphong. Haiphong remained

closed for 300 days.

• ""PSYCHOLOGICAL THREAT

Minefields can be used most effectively to attain one primary

goal-control of enemy forces afloat. If a minefield forces enemy ships

-4-IT]____________ ______ _ A

t

to delay, divert, or forgo the transit of water suspected of being

mined, it has achieved control. Minefields achieve that goal

principally through the enemy's perception of the threat they pose to

his ships. Mines can sink ships and that capability makes their threat

credible. But the real effect of a minefield derives from a more subtle

influence-an exaggerated fear. Minefields work more on the mind than

on ships. You might say similar things about other weapons, but it is

especially true for minefields. In this section we explore the notion

of the "psychological warhead" in a minefield.

The psychological threat from a minefield arises from the inability

to know with certainty the true threat and, second, from the risk of

dire consequences if the threat is underrated. Another attribute of

minefields that makes them stressful is that they cannot be engaged in

combat as can other enemy forces. Of course, fields can be swept if

time and resources allow, but the satisfaction of fighting back is

missing. Submarines, whose covert threat also operates within the

psychological dimension, can be fought against, even if the engagement

comes too late, as in the prosecution of a flaming datum. By contrast,

the minefield lies quietly, revealing itself only in spasms. The

detonation of one mine gives no assurance that the field is clear of

danger and gives virtually no information about the presence of other

mines. If anything, it confirms the presence of a hidden threat.

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! - -

There have been experiments performed under controlled laboratory

conditions which bear on the psychological threat of minefields.

Although these experiments were conducted in a laboratory and did not

deal directly with mine warfare, the results seem to be applicable to

minefields.

One example is an experiment in which subjects were shown a slide

picture of an airplane and had to decide whether the aircraft was

"friend" or "foe." The test subjects were acting as sentries and

understood that labelling an aircraft as "foe" would result in an order

to fire on that aircraft. If the call was right, an enemy aircraft was

shot down; if wrong, a friendly aircraft was shot down. The test

subjects were divided into two groups. Half of the subjects were told

that the foe aircraft were enemy scout planes, the rest that the foe

aircraft were enemy bombers. Since it was more important to destroy a

bomber than a scout plane, there was a clear and strong bias, even under

the calm setting of a laboratory experiment, for subjects to exaggerate

the threat perceived in all of the slide projections if the enemy was a

bomber and to underrate the threat if it was a scout plane. The general

conclusion to be drawn from this and other similar experiments is that,

given a choice under uncertainty, the decisionmaker tends to exaggerate

the likelihood of the more serious consequences.

Another general observation from psychological studies has to do

with validation and multiple clues. Feedback on the correctness of a

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" - -

decision made under uncertain circumstances turns out to be a critical

variable. In the absence of feedback, subjects tend to develop "all-or-

none" behavior. ("All-or-none" behavior is a polarization of views with

little flexibility for seeing clues as probabilistic rather than

deterministic.).

The lesson for minefields seems to be the following: With no

opportunity to determine the actual threat a minefield poses (without

sailing a number of ships into it), any danger clues (mine- detonations,

a shipsinking, the observation of mines being delivered, etc.) should

magnify the perception of the threat. The decisionmaker is likely to be

forced into an "all-or-none" mode of thinking; that is, the minefield

threat would be categorized as either unacceptably high or acceptably

low. Historical evidence suggests that the former occurs more often

I than the latter.

In summary, these psychological studies confirm the intuitive

notion that decisions made with incomplete information, with no way to

determine the accuracy of guesses, and with dire consequences for

certain choices lead to a strongly exaggerated perception of the

situation. The application to minefield psychology seems clear, at

least qualitatively. Any minefield, regardless of how small a threat it

actually poses, tends to be viewed as a serious danger not to be taken

lightly.

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'C

p.

This perception is further aggravated if the threat cannot be

combatted directly. Studies done on British reaction to psychological

stress during German bombing raids during World War II show that the

stress was reduced for antiaircraft gun crewmen who fired at the

bombers, even if they never hit anything. The act of fighting back,

even in vain, releases stress. (This finding is just as true as in

noncombat situations-the man kicking his car when it won't start, for

example.) Minefields do not allow this rapid release of tension; they

cause a buildup of tension instead.

Minefields play on all of the psychological levers mentioned

above. The threat of the minefield is largely unknown, and there is n .

direct way to validate a decision made to sweep or to cross the field.

Any events that tend to confirm worst fears (visual observation of the

Iminelaying, loss of first transitor, etc.) intensify the perceived

threat and reinforce "all-or-none" tendencies. Unless delay is out of

the question, no prudent commander is likely to risk his ships until he

* iis convinced that the area under question is free of mines. Moreover,

if some mines are detonated by sweeping, the sense of danger could be

reinforced, at least initially. Sweeping would not reduce psychological

stress. There is not much psychological reward for detonating mines in

a minefield, one by one, however important that action may prove to be

in the overall conflict.

H -8-

I. __ ______

IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Crisis Control

The decision to use mines during crises prior to full-scale war is

a serious and potentially escalatory one. The laying of sea mines is

unquestionably an act of war, and it is felt by some to overstep the

boundaries of the traditional concept of proportionality of response.

For these reasons, mining way not be authorized in most crises.

But acts of war lie on a spectrum determined by their direct

consequences. Clearly an act that has only the potential to sink ships

is less escalatory than one that actually damages or attempts to damage

them. The laying of a minefield is similar to a naval blockade (in

terms of potential for damage) but without the same risk to our own

naval ships. Moreover, a naval blockade may be less likely to provide

the same level of psychological deterrence as a minefielc" for the simple

reason that minefields present a threat of unknown, hence potentially

exaggerated, magnitude.

It is in the use of mines for crisis control that the psychological

leverage of the weapon is at its peak. Consider a third-world country

with whom tensions are mounting inexorably toward war. Mines laid in

the harbors not only bottle up the military and ec-nomic shipping of

that country, but also deny those harbors to the maritime ships of other

countries.

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*J

Treaties with or entreaties to our allies to cut off economic

shipping to this country might not always be heeded. Allies sometimes

look after their own economic interests first. Mining harbors would

reinforce our demands and impose an economic boycott more effective than

any that words alone could. For this purpose, the no-nonsense

significance of a minefield would be more effective than a much more

flexible blockade. Moreover, a naval blockade with warships might force

a face-to-face confrontation with allies, with consequences that would

either weaken our resolve or damage our relationships with these allies.

Their utility aside, the use of mines in crisis situations is

loaded with uncertainty. If other less threatening forms of leverage

are available, and likely to prove effective, mine warfare should

probably not be used. In some crises, any show of force could unravel

potentially productive diplomatic maneuvers. Nonetheless, there are

other cases in which the psychological impact of a minefield might carry

the message of our intentions more clearly than ambiguous diplomatic

"signals." This is particularly true when dealing with renegade

governments that demonstrate little concern for diplomacy or openly

harbor international terrorists.

How large a minefield should be used to carry off this show of

force? If past experience is a guide, very few mines are needed. The

object of crisis control is just that--control. If the psychological

deterrence works, very few mines are needed to create it. Moreover, the

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effect can be enhanced by the mine set 4ngs chosen. If one or two mines

from a minefield dropped into a harbor entrance are set to detonate soon

thereafter, the observation of the explosion will likely confirm the

enemy's worst fears. Similarly, a few mines set to detonate from a weak

* stimulus may discourage any tentative attempts to move ships.

By forcing a closure to harbors or by defining no-man's zones in

narrow straits to keep naval forces separated, time can be bought.

Since direct naval confrontations are denied by the minefield, time to

resolve differences might prove crucial to a solution. To these ends,

mines with settings that automatically disarm the minefield (preferably

by detonation) within a very short period of time are useful.

Finally, to enhance the deterrent effect (as opposed to the ship

sinking power) of the minefield under crisis control conditions, mines

should be laid during daylight hours by aircraft. The laying should be

as overt as possible, followed by a public announcement from our

government.

Wartime Transit Control

Great caution must surround the use of mines during crises and

confrontations. As we have noted, the planting of a minefield could

aggravate rather than control such situations. The psychological effect

would be a two-edged sword in crises. The uncertainty in the

consequences of mining a harbor not only would deter enemy forces but

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also might inhibit our planting of mines in the first place. The

conditions for their use must be such that failure to deny transit areas

would almost certainly lead to a broader conflict.

In limited wars, mines are also apparently viewed as weapons of

escalation. In this sense, the use of mines in limited wars has been

subject to some of the same constraints as their use in crisis

control. In the Vietnam War, for example, mines were laid around

Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports only in the last stages of

conflict. Plans for a mining campaign existed early in the war but,

like the massive Linebacker bombing raids conducted against North

Vietnam, were not implemented until 1972.

This conceptual barrier to the use of mines in limited war needs to

be reexamined. In an era in which weapons of high and occasionally

indiscriminate lethality find roles in war, the use of minefields seems

almost humane by comparison. When compared to bombing raids on cities

or harbors, mines come off as weapons of calm and persuasive reason,

exerting their primary inducements through psychological deterrence

rather than by physical destruction. Even if destruction does occur, it

can be selective and result from a conscious decision by the enemy to

challenge the mined areas.

For the reasons already discussed, the enemy is not likely to send

ships through known minefields. If he has sweeping gear, he may attempt

-12-

to clear the area. If he has none or can act on other options, he will

likely abandon the area. In any event, only if the waters that are

mined prove absolutely essential to the strategic interests of the enemy

will he attempt to transit them.

nvlIn this age of increasing overhead surveillance, enemy surface

naval forces can be observed and attacked by means more rapid and

certain than minefields. For this reason, minefields in limited con-

flicts should be used to control the enemy ships, either by diverting

them or constraining them. Either mode of control should be subservient

to larger goals, such as strengthening our bargaining position at the

closure of war.

In a worldwide war, the stops would be out on the use of mines.

But this circumstance would differ from crisis control and limited war

in one crucial aspect: no longer would deterrence necessarily be the

primary objective of minefields. Certainly one objective would be to

damage enemy ships. Slowing down the passage of enemy naval vessels

could have some effect on the war, especially if time were critical.

But nothing would work as well as actual damage to the enemy fleet.

If inefields can be planted to force enemy naval vessels to seek

alternative transit areas in which they risk an attack by our forces,

they serve well. If, however, enemy ships challange the field, the

mines mast sink the ships. Here there are limitations. Mines cannot

-13-

move; once they detonate they are no longer able to engage successive

ships moving by. Thus it can happen that for ainefields with mines

spaced far apart, only a few detonations will result for a determined

transit of ships in trail of one another. These detonations, if they

fail to deter further transit attempts, cause few if any casualties.

Minefield planners should recognize the possibility of catastrophic

failure (all ships penetrating successfully) and make appropriate back-

up plans. Back-up actions could include the laying of adequate numbers

of mines to make the sustained threat virtually insurmountable, and the

use of other naval forces to challenge those ships that do cross the

minefield.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONSIThere is considerable evidence from historical data and from

laboratory testing that minefields exert a substantial psychological

influence -- through what we refer to as a psychological warhead -- on

an enemy's maritime operations. This influence is seated in the

necessity for the enemy to make decisions with incomplete information,

no validation of the accuracy of guesses (until it is too late), and

dire consequences for a wrong choice. Such circumstances are not unique

to mine warfare but are always an integral part of It. Moreover,

minefields aggravate the enemy's circumstances by not allowing a direct

*I combat with the threat. The threat is mechanistic, operating on a logic

all its own in ambush, much like a terrorist's pipebomb.

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I

3:- *.

-7 -7.

The psychological utility of mine warfare also can be applied in

crisis control and wartime tactics. Because the psychological response

to minefields is not absolutely predictable, no unambiguous rules can be

given for their use. Yet, certain observations seem useful.

Mining has in the past been considered an escalatory move, certain-

ly in prewar crises but also in wartime. Our view is that mining fits

into a spectrum on the range of escalatory moves and could send Just the

right message. When it works, only a few mines laid overtly are

required.

During war, enemy forces would be subject to the same psychological

pressures from a known (or suspected) minefield as they would during

pre-war crises, The effect could be the same, but the likelihood of the

enemy challenging the minefield would increase since the consequences

for staying put or delaying transit could outweigh the risk of

transiting mined waters. If the mines fail to deter, they fail

completely unless they can also sink ships. The fields should be

designed to be lethal against more than only a few ships in trail. Mine

warfare planners should also recognize that technical improvements that

increase the lethality of mines and minefields also automatically

enhance their psychological warhead.

* -15-

pp 211 PP 2Niaral. Maurice K., won ApprosleetIng tise Clroular Coveage Mashi, Nwurio N., "Corresondence Rules and PathsFunction.- 14 pp.. Feb 1979, AD AOS4 429 Inltegrals." 30 pp.. Jun 1970 fInvIted paper preented at til

IMs meting an "Ntisesatical Probiems In Fopi- Ws Pail,PP 212 Integrls," Mrsille, France, MRy 22-26. 1976) IP*Ilssed

Mengel. Marc, *On Singular Osarectrlstlc Initial Volvo in liringer Verlag Lecture Not! In PIce.os lob, (f9761,Problem with unique Solution.* 20 pp., Jun 2978, 234-253) AD AOSS 536AD A056 535

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PP 213 Mnel, Marc. "Stocastic Mechanics of Holeculalon MoeleiMangel, Marc, -Fluctuations In System with KNjlplo Steady Reactions," 21 pp., Jun 1976. AD AD56 227States. Application to Lancliester Equations.' 12 pp..Fob 78 (Present"d at Vis First Annual Workishop on the PP 224Inloreston Lineeg Beteen Applied Mmt~I as and Manger. Marc. *Aggegtlon. Biturcation, end Extinction InIndustry. Noval PS School, Feb 23-25, 1976). AD A071 472 Exploited Wooi Popuations*,* 41 pp., Mtar 1971,

AD ADM56PP 214 "Portlons of thsis mrk were starte at tise InstItut of

minland. Roert L. *A Somewhat Different Via* of Tha Applied NgthaeCS and Statistics, UnVSlsty Of Witlftoptimal Navel Posture.'" 31 pp.. Jun 1976 (Presented at tihe Columbia, Vancouver, S.r,, Cana"a1976 Convention of "he Amrican Political Science Associa-tion 4APSAIiJS Panel an "Changing Strategic Requiremnts and PP 225Military Posture'"). Chicago, Ill., September 2, 1976). Mengel. Marc. "OscIllatIons, fluctuations, and thsa lopAD A056 226 Blfurcsflon*," 43 pp.. Jun 1976, 0ADM5 537

'Postions of tils worker icompeted at Vise Institute at

pp 215 Applied Mtisestca and Statistics, Unversity of Witsh

Cales, RussellI C., "tCmmnts on:. iinfcip1es of informeation Coluia. Vancouver, Canada.Retrieval by Manfred Kochen,'" 10 pp.. Kir 71 (Published as aLetter to Ii,. Editor, Journal of Documentation. Vol. 31. PP 226M~e. 4, paes. 296-1302). December 1975). AD A054 426 Ralston, J. N. and J. W. Mann,* '"towpratu and Girrent

Depandence of Degrtion In Pod-fsitting Oap LEDs.*" 34 pp..PP 216 Jun 1976 (Pubtlshed In Journal o* Aoppled Physics, 90, 3630.

Cals, Russell C.. "Lathe's Frequency Distribution of May 1979) AD *056 536Scientlytic Productivity,' 16 pp.. Feb 1978 (Published In thea "%ell Telephone Laboraories. Inc.Journal of thea American Socity Vor Information Science,

Vol. 28, No. 6, pp. 366-370, Novier 1977), At) A054 425 PP 227Mnei, Marc, "Unihora Treeuet of Fluctuations at Critical

PP 211 Pointas." 50 pp.. Nay 1976, AD ADM6 539Colie. Russsell C . "Siblioatric Studies of ScientificProductivity," 17 pp., Mar 78 (Presented at tihe Annual PP 226matIng of Vise Amrican Society tor Inyormation Sciance held Mangal, Marc, '"Aleatlon at Critical Points: Deteseinlstic

In San Francisco, California. October 1976), AD A054 442 and Stodsestlc Theory.* 54 pp., Jun 1971, AD*ADM 540

PP 220 - Classified PP 229Mangel. Marc, '"Diffusion Theory of RAsction Mtee. I:

PP 219 Formulation and Elostoin-Smoiucowssi Aprouwimtion,"MssnZlnga, ft. Layer, -Mrket Analysis with Rational Expac- SO pp., Jan 1978. AD ROS 541tationss Theory and Estiv~tlon." 60 pp., Apr 76, A *034 422

PP 230PP 220 Mengel, Marc, -Diffusion Theory Of 011action Rates, It

Narer. Donaid E., -Diagona isat Ion by Group Matrices,'" lO"naftin-lUhlenbeck Approslmtionow 34 pp., Feb 1976a26 pp.. Ap 76, AD A54 443 AD ADM6542

PP 221 P 231Wainland, Robot 6., '"uproer Navel Olpionaicy In +ise WIs on, ond P., Jr., 9evsl Projction Form:s Wos CamOctober 1973 Arab-Israeli Mr.* 76 pp., Jun 1971 (Publishsed for a flimponsive MAF, Avg 2976, AD*A54 543

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Labor?* A" 1979 lSo*la~ted for psilcatlon ioo Indlisitreland LaOr Relations Review), 00 A1161 W28

AW Profesaion*$ Papers gift, en AD Anew say be obtained free tise National Technical ls~f~oR toervice U.S. Deaertmet ofComre, Wf1ngtieid. Virginia 22151. Otiser papers are sweilale frenie M aiagme infusmet1on Ofie, OWN for NeweAnalyses, 20111 Mrts Omep"e~ Street. Aleaseed-1a, Virginia 22311. As Indow of Saleste Poblletlae Is elsM o"1il019 anrequest. The Index Includes a Listing 4 o teeslonei Powers witis estreet issumed from MO6 fto Jne 1961.

PP 233 pp 249Jacobeon, Lois, *An Alternative Eiplenetlon of tile Cyclical Gims., Kenneth 16. "A scretary Problem with a adPattern of Quit%." 23 pp., Sap 197 Number of holooe, 23 pp.. Nor It"9

PP 234 - livised PP 250Jandc ione And Levy, Rtoert A., "Does federal lispundi- ago$, Marc, wblae9 Fluctowaaem In Mgraeplo *is-tur. Dis&place Stoatend Local E.~andlture. The Cte of tows." 26 PP., Jun 1979Construction wanwts.* 25 pp., Oct 1979, AD 4061 529

PP 235 Trost, Moe t P., -The Eatlortian and latrortatift of0Nzrall Maurice M., The Somicimeacat LEaaelon af theO Seel Selectivity Models.1 37 pp., Joe 1979. 10 01079 941Anhorainc-Ouscit1or PropagetOr,l 41 pp.. Oct 1976 (Publ-ltiseod in Jainelt of Ntheatlcal Phsysics 20 (19791 pp. 644- PP 252655), AD A061 538 Mben, malter ft., -oltlem Radilg with Prior Mi.le~ atI. ovwlanc Paramtes 5 pp.. Jun 19780 (iebllsed Io.ICU

PP 23eron An TranacIons an Aerospace a Elect iec System, Vol. 405O-iS*Nearer, Donald, NA Matrix CrtehnsopMut " al Nos. 3. N.r 1979Bases,- 10 pp., Jan 1979 (Published In thle Illinois Journalof Ibthat Ica, Vol. 22 (1976), pp. 672-Oat pp 213

pp Glasser. lKannti S., 'The d-Choice Selcretary PaoblaePP 230 32 pp., Jun 1979, 10 A075 ZI

Utgolff Kathlleen Clesson, 'Unwoloymont Insurance and TheEmploymeet Rstt.- 20 pp., Oct t9?8 (Presented at the Con- PP 254foence an Economl c Indlctors and Performance; The Current Nangol, MaNrc and Cos"ba. David II.. 1ataetIon 41 00114mot Facing Governmnt end Business Leaders, preented by fleet $bral Over an Offset Circle." 14 pp., Jan 1979,Indiana University Graduaft Scholoc of Business). AD A061 527 AD AM9 471

PP 239 PP 255 - Classifiled, AD 6091 441LTrost, R. P. and Warner. J. T.. 'The Effect* of Mi litaryOccupatianal Training on Civilian Earnings. An Incom PP 294Selectivity Approach,' 36 pp., Nov 1979k, AD A077631 Maurar, Donald E., 'Wing Personnel Oistrioutiom Nkiels,'

27 pp.. Feb 1960, AD AM6 216pp 240

Power&. Bruce, 'Goal* of thse Center for Navel Analyse.* PP 25713 pp.. Dec 1978, 00 A063 759 Thaler. A., -Discounting and Fiscal Conemtas Why PlW

catlr4 Is Always OlIit,* 10 pp., Avg 1979. 00 ADIS 224pp 241

Mengol, Marc. -Fluctuations at Chemical Intblltia..' pp 25624 pp., Dac 1978 (Published In Journal of Cheeical Physics, "angel. Masrc S. and Thom". Jame A., Jr., -AnlyticalVol. 89. No. 8, Oct 15. 1970). AD A063 787 Methods In search Thaory.* 66 pp., New 1970. AD0A07132

IPp 242 pp 2"9Slapson, Willim R., 'The Analysis of Opamlcaily inter- Weats David V.. Hsu. lIf-chlngi lo Wal mter ft., anod PiSactive System (Air Cadeat by the N~61e," 160 pp., David A., OA Cleato atconstte Mako Motr~oes,6 1 lp,.Dec 1976. AD 4063 760 60w 1979, AD A977 633

PP 243 pp 260Stepson, William R., AO Probabilistic Formlation of Muirphy Nuaigel, Marc S. and COpe Omvit K.. 00~1etla Nte ADynamics ft Appi led to the Analysis of Oper'ationael %@worcl Savp WVdII In Visual Search.- 14 pp., low 1979. 00A177634Problae.- 1S op.. Dec 1976, 00 4063 761

PP 244 Vila, Carloe L.1; Zvljac, DaId J. and lloft. Johe, e~roadt-Sherman, Allan and No -atz. Stanley A., 414*1ltnaw Costs Conon Theory of Coiolcol Olosoas. Vt. Anmlor Dlotrlbtoof Coeplen Equilpmnt," 20 pp., Dec 1979 (Publiseda By The tIons of Rection Prqicts.* 14 pp., Nov 19179 UketrfnelAmrcon Society of Noel Engineers. Naval Emiglnears from JOweGI coseecal rows. 70012). 19 Jan 197W.Joernal, Vol. 91, Noe. 4, Dec 19791 AI) 4071 473 AD A0631

Simpo. WIlI Im ft., OThatocele arm ethd W at O rtainnal p ls Chre C. mlrdmWrld 0 1 t"r Efltee to etAlrowaft Paoramo rmn iltTo Df DnncPr orpcie"9 p.Ma O, 9713formace Testing$.* 403 pp., Jun 1979, AV A07) 228

PP 263PP VAt ablneA. 010t I.. 'Dalni let Tedetars and coteloer-

Ilreel lng, from. 'ayoffs and Ws@Vioman Ineuane." 35 ships far Nav Uedro Wmslanle n Wtpp, ao On.9p., Ir0 1979 (Preented at thse mar 0onferaa an *.aa AD A*?? GaImain Lette Mokwgt Chooap, Jan 1978), 4040A6829

pp 24Thme, ioe A. Jr.. Ofth Trenept I psertOft of 1 lofte

SemIn Applied Flelds,0 163 pp., N.r 1979. 4009M464

at4

* ... , - - -

PMP 2U4 IP 37Weilead, daert 4. Will. lAS. Navy In "Ile Peeltic: Post, Nafgel. "pe, otmaii Fluetiteeod INsystm wtt% MliplePresent. a" 01 loses ato the future.* 31 pp.. Now It"9 Limit Cycel.-It Ws. War Igng (Pubilished io SIM A. IPPI.(Del ivered at the lmteretoeel aS11M oslan the see, Math.. wal. 38. oft. 1. F"eb ADO Am no0 2sposored by thu Interactions# Institute far StrategicStudies. The Brookings Institution and the Yosturi ,klmabu pp 27S

Tokyo, 1l-20 Oct 1976) AD 306 637 Nisraht, Mmurtoo. *A ?targtig Probiowl Emet vs, gaeetegf-

pp 265 value Approached.' 23pgo.. Apr ION.0AD NOS 096

Wlalad, ftbert IL. -Wr mod Pac In tha Norths Soe pp 279Poiltical Implicationsat of e Ofte"gIg "ilitary Situation In 0alt, Stephen 01,0 NOnuea Inferences and the lUsa of Formal A

Worithera Europe' IS1 pp., fft 1979 (Prepared for Critique of Force Without Wr,' so pp., "a 1960.preentation to te Conference of the Mordlc Balance In At) 406 097

Peripactivel The Changing Military sod Polit.,ce situastion.

Center far Strategic and Intermational Studies. Georgetown pp 26llveltY, Jan 113-IS. 1979) AD 3077 836 Goldberg. Laurance, 'Eslleslon of tha Effects of A Su~pl.

Steeming on te Failure Nate of Its 15IfIpmnt: An Applica-pp 266 tion of Ecoometric Analysis.' 29 pp., Apr* IM. AD AN$ oft

Utgoff, Kathy Clasesn. and grenling. Frank, -Tae and1sf latlon,' 29 pp.. Nov 1979, AD AO? 194 PP 2S1

Nicrahi, Mouriow N.. 'Cmat ow 'Discretlzatlon Problem ofPP 217 Functional Integrals Is Pluom %NaMI.* 2 pp.. Moy 190,

Trost. Rebort P., end Vogel, flobert C., -The flopoeso of Publiseud In 'Physlowi Movies O', Vol. 22 (1960).Stats governenat Macel ts to Economic F luctuatilows and the AD AM9 994Ailoest~enofta Douter-Cyclicel Movanuel Sweing Gratsl,-12 pp.. Oe. 19"9 (Keptratfed from vife Navtes of Eoonomicseand PP 283Statistics, Vol. LXI, No. 3. August 1979) Oi~aws, Bradford. -Expected Demand for the U.S. Havy to

Serve a An Instruent of U.S. foreign Policy, ThinklegPP 266 About Political mnd Military Environmental Factors.' 30 pp.,

Thomsoon, James S., -Seaport Ospandence and Inter-State Apr 19110. AD AG63 099Cooperation: The Case of Sub-Saharan Arica.- 141 pg..ian IWO0. 40 fOGI 193 pp 284

J. Kellson,' W. kumn. and U. Sualts.0 -na Laguerre Trims-

PP .anah.'Taee 260sn infeoee orm.- 119 pp.. Nay 1960. AID 3063 100ofMdte

on SlvcStudies In October, 1979). A0 A062 219 "The Graduete Schooi Of ibnege-snt UnIversity of Rochlester

pp 270 pp 263PAwk. Richard, "Soviet Pol icy In% the Mon of Africa: The Aends. Richard II.. 'Superpower Sourity Interetie Is tDeision to itervene.' 92 pp., Jan IM6 (TO be pubilinhed In Indian, Oea Are,- 26 pp., Jun 1910, AD A067 113'th Soviet Union In the Third Wrld: lucces or Failure.-ed."Or Report Ki. Donaidson. Wostviow Press, Naulder. Co.. PP 266ISummer 1960), AD Awl1 195 Misrahi, 1burIce NM, 'On me IS Approimation t the

Propagator for Arbitrary Hwalitonians,' 29 pp_, Aug 190PP 271 (Published Ino Journal of Meth. Phys., 22(11 Jon 1l61l.

MtonaI i * Jams. 'Soviet and Aserican Strategic Doctrlmes: AD A09 307One Nor Tim,- 43 pp., Jan 19110, AD A041% 192

pp 287PP 272 Oape, Davis. 't.Ift Cycle Solutloa of bton'lfae

voes. Kenneth 3., 'The Atores Is Dipiom-1 end Strttigy, Equations,' 33 pp.. ion, 1960, AD 3067 1141940-1945. 44 pp., Nan 1960. AD A063 094pp2

PP 273 Golalin, Waiter, %DOant Let Your Slides Flip Voa A Palea

ftkada, Michael K., -Labor Supply of Wivesef wit boens Gold@ to Visual. That %csity Aid,' 21 pp.. (rewledEmployee Either full Tism or Pert Ties.' 39 pp.. imr 10SO, Aug 19112), AD A092 732

pp 214

-* naw, oiter A., -A Result IN the Theory of Spiral Searc., solution a"d a problem.- 7 ".. Aug 1960, AD Awl 212

9 pp. Wr 99pp 279 Wtasa, @OrV K.. 'EVNluetlos Of OMW~te UfVt t 1ar M

Golderg. Loorenee. ullcrlters Advertising sad Navy GEl lit- Operational Enviromnt.-1 p.. Aut 10. so3A9l 213Waste,' 34 pp., war 19100, AD 3092 221

pp 291pp Ms Modese . S.0 and Tost. 1. P., 'Sam Estaalulees of Ite

Gb~rg. Lomose. aflayleg en Overheat and shlp's Goals- Morlose Proe Model.' ? pp. Oct 19M, AD3001 9946* amt, 40 pp. No SM6. AD AM M9 Qiulversity Of Fiorlds

PP 292 PP 305

Thomas, Jam"s A.. Jr.. 'The Transport Properties of Binary Nunn. Laura H., -An introduction to "he Literature of Starch

Gap Mixtures In Applied Magnetic Fieids.c 10 pp., Spt 19110 Thory,' 32 pp., Jun 1961, AD AICO 420(Published In. Journal af Chemical Physics 72010).

15 Nay 1960 PP 306Anger, Thomas E.. "wihat Good Are Warfare Moels?- 7 pp.,

PP 293 May 1981, AD AIDO 421Tht, Jam. A., Jr., "Evaluation f Kinetic Theory

Coll" io Integrals. Using "he GenaliZed Phase Shift pp 307

Approach." 12 pp..* Spt 1960 (Printed In Journal of Chemical Thomason, James, "DOpendence, Risk, and Vulnerabl ity,"

Physics 72(b1), 15 Nay 1960 43 pp., Jun 1961, AD A102 696

PP 294 pp 306

Roberts, Stephen S.. *French Novel Policy outside af Miarahi, N.M., "Crwreepondence Rules end Pathi Integrals,'

Europe.' 30 Pp., Sept 1960 (Presented at the Conference of Jul 19i1. Published In "Muovo Cieento B-, Voi. 61 (19811.the Section on Military Studies, Internationai Studies AD A 102 699Association Kiewti Iland. S.C.). AD A09i 306

pp 309PP 29" Meinland, Robsrt G., -An (The?) Explenation of the Soviet

Roberts. Stephen S., -An Indicator of Informal Empire: Invasion of Afghanistan," 44 pp.. May 1961, AID AbCO 422Patterns of U.S. Navy Cruising on Oversees Stations, 680-1697," 40 pp.,* Sept 1960 (Presented at Fourth Naval Hfistory PP 310Sympoilluo, US Navel Acedeat, 26 October 1919. AD A091 316 Stanford, Janette N. end Tel To Wus* "A Predictie Method

for Determining Possible Threa-dionsilongeI Foidings ofPP 296 lmmunogiobulin Backibones Around Antibody Combining Sites."

Olsaukes. Bradford end Petersen. Charles C_, wifritlim 19 pp.. Jun 1961 (Published In J. theor. Biol. (1961) 66.Factors Affecting Iberien Security," (tactoras Menitions qua 421-439, AD AIO 423

Afecten Is Segurided IberIcal 14 pp., Oct 1960, AD A092 733 "N4orthwestern University, Evanston, IL

00 297 - Classified pp .311'Bowes, Marianne, Brechlings Frank P. R_, end Utgotf.

PP 296 Kathleen P, Clessen, "An Evaluation of UI Funds," 13 pp..Nizrehl, MaurIce N., "A Markov Approach to Large Missile May 1961 (Published In National Comission on UnemploymentAttacks. 31 pp.. Jan I "I. AC A096,i39 Compensation's Unemployment Compensation: Studies end

PP 299Research. Volume 2, July 19601, AD AIOO 424

Jondrom, jas N. and Lavy. Robert A.. "Wega Leadership in PP 312

Construction, 19 pp.. Jan 1961, AD A094 797 Jondrow. Jes; Boxes, Mariann* and Levy, Robert. "TheOptimum Speed Limit," 23 pp., Nay I9"I. AD A 100 425

'P 00Ijonarow, Jams end Schmidt. Peter,' nCn the Estimation of pp 313Technical Intfficiency In the Stochastic Frontier Produ1ction Roberts, Stephen S.. 'The U.S. Navy In the t960,,'- 36 pp.,-unction Moel,' i1 pp., Jan 1961, AD A096 160 Jul 1961, AD A 102 696Naicnigan state University

pp 314PP 30:. Jehn. Christophar; Horowitz, Stanley A, and Lockman.

jonerow, Jeams %,; Lev, Robert A, end Hughes, Claire, Robert F.. -(Eming the Draft Debae.- 20 pp.. Jui 1901.

'Technical Change and Employment In Steal, Auto$, Aluminum, AD A106 192

and Iror Ore. 17 pp.. Mar 1961. AD AM9 394pp 315

P302 Suck, Ralph f., Capt., -Lo Catastrophe by eny otheirJondram. Jams 4. end Levy, Robert A,, 'The Effect of naem...." 4 pp., Jwli 1961. AC A102 697leport, on Emplaooent LUnder Rationai Expectation," 19 pp..

Apr 196 1, AC A099 392 PP 316Roberts Stephen S., "Western European and NATO Navies,

PP 303 1960,'S 20 .. hAug 1961. AD A104 223Tiowason. James. "The Rarest Coidilty In the Coming

R esourca More." 3 pp.. Aug 1961 iPubllshed in the aefhingtafn PP 31?

Star. April 13, 1"11i, AC A104 221 Roberts. Stephen S.. "SusesWer hovel Crisis management In

the Mediterranean.' 33 pp., Aug 1. AC AlOG 222

Outy Michel K.; Greenwood. Micheel J.6 and Neloseell, John PP 316N,,sa -A CrosectWIane Redl o# Annuai lnterregienai Vega, faien N., -Yugnoaivle en tha Soviet Poicya o at resmigration and Eployent Gramth: Intertemeoral Evidence of In tha Mediterranean Since 1611." 167 pp., Aug 1901Structural Change. 1950-197S.- 31 pp., Apr 196). AD A099 393

'iversity of Coiorado'"ArlIona State University

Ip 319 Pp 334Smith, Michael W.. 'Antlair wrtare Defense of Ships at enny. Lawrence V., Lee, Lung-Fal, Naddela, G. S., and TreatSa, 46 pp., Sep 1961 (This talk wee delivered Ot the INavel Rt. P-* "Returns to College Education. An Investigation ofweefrtm System end Technology Conterence at thel American Salt-Selectlon Bias Based on the Project Talent Dalse" ISInstitute ot Aeronautics and Astronautics In Washington on pp., Jon 1902. (Published In International Economic Review.Oecooloer 12, IM8; In Boston on January 20. 1981; and in Los Vol1. 20, No. 3. October 1979), AD A 112 480Anfgelesl on June 12. 1941.1. AD A106 191

PP 320 Lee. Lung-Pal, 6.5, Maddala, end ft. P. Trost. "AsymototlcTrost. ft. P.; Lurie, Phili p and Berger, Edward, "A Note on Coverlonce Mtric"e of Two..Stagip Probit end Two-Stae" Tobit

Estimating Continuous Tie Decision Models," 15 PP,# Methods tor Simultaneous Equations Models with Selectivity,"

Sep 19B), AD A106 193 13 pp., Jan 1982. (Published in EconostrIca, Vol. 48, No. 2

£-pp 321 March, 1960), AD A112 483

Dufty, Michael K. end Ledson, Jerry Rt.9 "The Simultaneous PP 336Determination of Income and Employment In United States-- O'Neill. Thoorns, -Mobility Fuels tar the Navy,- 13 go..Mexico Border Region Economeas.* 34 pp., Seo f981 Jen 1962. (Accepted tar publication Is Navel institute*Associate Protessor ot Economics, Arizona State University, Proceedings), AD A112 511

Tomb*. AZ.. AD AI06 540

PP 337pp 322 Warner, John T, and Goldberg, Matthew S_, "The Influence ot

Warner, John T_, wIssums in Navy Mnpower Research and Non-Pecuniary Factors on Labor Supply., 23 pp., Doc 1961.Policy: An Economist's Perspective#* 66 PP.. DeC 1991 To A l11 094AD AltO 221

p 3

PP 323 Wilson, Desmond P., *The Persian Gult and the NationalSomail, Frederick N., 'Generation at Correlaited Log-Ilrel Interest." 11 pp., Feb 1982, AD A112 505Sequences for the Sim lation at Clutter Echoes." 33 pp.. Dec1141. PP 340

Lurie, Philip, Trost, ft. P., and Berger, Edward, -A MethodPP 324 tar Analyzing Multiple Spell Duration Date," 34 pp., Feb

Horowitz, Stanley A., NQuantltylng Seapawer Readiness," 1982, AD A112 504

6 pp., Dec 1981 (Puli shed In Detense Management Journal#Vol. 18, No. 2). AD A 110 220 pp 341

Trost, Robert P. end Vogel, Robert C_. "Prediction althPP 32 Pooled Cross-Section end TIme-Serles Data. Two ^Case-fRoberts. Stephen S., ftestern European and NATO Movies. Studies." 6 pp., Feb 4962. AD A112 503

I9"I." 27pp., Jul 1962 .0 AD 8 0

pp 342pp 321 Los, Lung-tel, Moddala, G. S., and Trost. R. P., "Testing

Hammn. Calls, Capt., USM and Graham, David R.,, Dr., tar Structural Change by D-taethods In Switching Siultaneous"Estimation and Analysis at Wavy Shipbuilding Program Equations Models," 5 pp., Feb 1982, A0 A112 462Disruption Costs." 12 pp., mat 1980. AD A112 514

PP 343pp 324 Goldberg, Matthew S,, "Projecting the Navy Enlisted Farce

*ainland, Robert G., "Northern Watersl: Theirl Strategic Level," 9 pp., Feb 1962. AD Alf2 484Significance.- 27 op., Dec 1980, *0 Al12 509

PP 344PP 329 Fletcher, Jeen, W., 'Navy Quality at Lifte and Reenlistment,"

Man1.e01 Marc, -Applied Mathematicians And Novel Operators," 13 pp., Nov 1961, 00 A113 09

40 pp., Mor 1 902 (Revised), AD A116 590

PP 545op Rober F, AtraieApoceUoAt~~n tgatt, Kathy and Thaler, Dick, "The Economics ot Multi tent

iLockrnn, Rbr F. -AtraieApoce toArton Contracting," 47 pp., Mar 1962, (Presented at the 11112Menage owt.,"5 pp., Jan 1962. AD Al 113510 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Son Antonloo

Texas. Narch 5-7, 1982), AD A114 732PP 331

Roberts. Stephen S., -The Turkish Straits and the Soviet pp 346Navy Ins te madterranfean,' 15 pp., Nat 1962 (Published In Roamtier, Bernard, -Selective Service and the All-VolunteerNavy International) Farce," 23 pp., mar 11012, AD A113 096

PP 332 PP 347Jeen, Cnristopher. "The ADIF and Amphibious "Oftf"," 36 pp., McConnell, Jees, M. "A Possile Countertarce Role tar theMat 1962, AD A 113 392 Typhoon," 24 pp. Nat 1962, AD A116 601

pp 333 pp 348Lee, Lung-al ad Troat, Robert P., "Estimat ion ot Soep Jondrow, Jaes, Trost, Robert, "An Epirical Study afLiied Dependent Variable Models with AlIcatlon to Produjction Inefticiency In the Presence ot Errors-In-The-Plouasng Demand.- 26 Pp., Jan 1962. tPubllshed In Journal at Variables.- 14 pp., Feb 1982, AD A113 391Econometrics 8 119781 357-3621, *0 A 112 336

ow 5-I ______ -;

Fil

pp 549 AP 361

1.N ealp 0. K10 Helsu" CisbIIIlonst lotte- Quanbedi David a.. '-btmwd for Geerating Aircraftmaltple b~utlsof wuspelpo I 6V b Alkane, 4WDo- Trajectories," 31 pp., Sep M92.. AD A122 336

oarbg. 7 pp.. Jul 1961. (PFaieJ 1n.2'swnaI of ChmioelPhysics. 76M.3 15 feb 1962). 06 A113 093 PP 562

1orowitZ. Steele" A., -Is the Military Budget Ot ofpp9 Balance?.- 10 pp., Sep 1962.. AD M322 366

1.00". Marc. 0A lbth"d for Incrasilng tise F iregmaw ofVirginia Class Cruisers.- 30 pp.. Wp 19112. (To be pubIlished pp 363In U.S. Novel Institute Proceedings). AD A116 62 leprous, A. J., er~sonnelI Substitution end Navy Aviation

Readlneas." 55 pp., Oct 19612., AD 4322 420

(butre. S. E.; Staford. J. W.; 66Vle, J. G.. Stevefis PP 364P, U.; WMu. T. T_. *Pssile ThraeOlsonalonal Backbone Quester, Alias; Wakade. Nlohaal, "The 1Mlitary's IbkopeonyFolding Around Aftibooy boabining Site of linogoballn Power," 29 pp.. Oct 1962.. 00 £123 637MKP 367." 16 pp.. Apr 1962. (Publ ished In Journal ofTheoretical Sloo'. PP 365

Pip, 332 lgclApcsoNiewrae-1p..Oct 39612Borfoot. C. Bernard. "Aggragetlos of Oanditlonal Absorbinag

atth U~vrstyatVlnisAp 102),AD 3I6 603 at fIhe Gorrelotion (baffliagat From grouped aet*,* 9p.,Oct 19112. tPubli shed In the Journal of thea Ameritoen

foroce n Mdellbsllo, hld a Bu Mofloo Wst orsny, Weinland. Feber 0., *The Evolution of Soviet AsufraentsApr 942.. ADA 11 W4for Naval Forces--Solvfng the Problem of Ff14 Early 3560*."

41 pp.. oe 0062 £D123 633

Naval planning." 6 pp.. Jun 12.. 00 All$ 702 Questor. Al In*; Lockmen, Pobert, "The Al I-Volunteer Force:A

Poeltivo Perspective," 29 pp., Nov 3982.PP 336JCylke. Steven; Goldberg. Matthew S.; fbgen. Paul. Malts, PP 370

Lee; "Estlmstion of the Pertonal DIscount Flats. Evidence Flostiar. Bernard D., 'fImn Masouro Vidolit: An Overvlee."

jfrom MlIItary MeantIsaowent Decisions.- 19 pp., Apr 39062., 17 pp.. Nov 1962.. 00 A123 65600 £122 419

PP 372pp 337 Nepotism.Wendi"' .. -An Ovarvla, of Acoustic Analysis,-

Goldberg, M~atthmew S., "Discrimination, Nptn. nd 46 op. '. Ja "93Long-NOn "eg Difteratlals," 33 pp.. Sep 19112. (Publishaedin Quarterly Journal of Economics, Way 31"2.). PP 373

Jacobson, Loi, Rsearch to Quantify thle Effect ofPP 336 Poriunant (oange of Stat ion Waves on wivs' wagas and Labor

Mest. Geoirge. 'Evaluating aTWIcal Olstd And (bntrol Supply," 33 pp.. Jan 3963.Systm-s-A Three-TIerad Approach," 32 pp.. Sep 3962.,AD 0322 47f pp 373

Feldwan. Paul, "Privatizing Airports in Washington, DC.."PP AIM 1ltfa, Ja;Nr.. Aa; 'eea 7 pp.. Feb. 1963

Queater.Aln.FeceJa;MruAe; Vor%Status As A ScreeInlgi Device: GOint." 26 pp., Avg 3992.00 A123 636

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