inaudible voice commands - princeton universityliweis/publications/ultrasound_attack... · 2019. 5....

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Given any normal voice command, we obtain the attack ultrasound with following steps. We adopt amplitude modulation in step 3 and add the same carrier wave in the final step. Inaudible Voice Commands Liwei Song, Prateek Mittal Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University A typical microphone consists of a transducer, an amplifier, a low-pass filer and an analog to digital converter. The transducer and the amplifier are not perfectly linear modules, resulting in the following non-linear function [2]. = =1 = 1 + 2 2 +⋯ We can leverage the microphone’s inherent non-linearity to obtain normal voice frequencies from the processing of ultrasound frequencies. Motivation Voice assistants are becoming increasingly popular in IoT devices. Previous attacks on voice assistants leverage the gap between speech recognition system and human voice perception [1]. The limitation is that attack sounds are audible and conspicuous to device owners. Can we inaudibly control voice assistants? Typical Diagram of a Microphone Carrier Wave Addition Low-Pass Filtering Upsampling Ultrasound Modulation Attack demonstration of the command “OK Google, take a picture”. Attack ranges for two devices with different input powers. Input Power ( ) 9.2 11.8 14.8 18.7 23.7 Range (Phone, ) 222 255 277 313 354 Range (Echo, ) 145 168 187 213 239 You can scan the QR code in the title to see our attack demo. Attack Scenario for Inaudible Voice Commands [1] N. Carlini et al., “Hidden voice commands”, USENIX Security, 2016. [2] N. Roy et al., “Backdoor: making microphones hear inaudible sounds”, Mobisys, 2017. [3] G. Zhang et al., DolphinAttack: inaudible voice commands”, CCS, 2017 (concurrent work). Attack Algorithm Attack Overview Non-Linearity Insight Attack Experiments References Apple Siri Amazon Alexa Google Assistant Challenge: How to design inaudible attacks? Solution: We transmit ultrasounds (frequencies above 20kHz) to attack victim devices. Challenge: How to control voice assistants? Solution: We exploit the non-linearity of microphone to convert ultrasounds into normal voice commands. Non-linear function Non-Linearity of the Microphone

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Page 1: Inaudible Voice Commands - Princeton Universityliweis/Publications/ultrasound_attack... · 2019. 5. 27. · • Given any normal voice command, we obtain the attack ultrasound with

• Given any normal voice command, we obtain the attack ultrasound with

following steps.

• We adopt amplitude modulation in step 3 and add the same carrier wave

in the final step.

Inaudible Voice CommandsLiwei Song, Prateek Mittal

Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University

• A typical microphone consists of a transducer, an amplifier, a low-pass

filer and an analog to digital converter.

• The transducer and the amplifier are not perfectly linear modules,

resulting in the following non-linear function [2].

𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡 =

𝑖=1

𝐺𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑖 =𝐺1𝑆𝑖𝑛 + 𝐺2𝑆𝑖𝑛

2 +⋯

• We can leverage the microphone’s inherent non-linearity to obtain

normal voice frequencies from the processing of ultrasound frequencies.

Motivation

• Voice assistants are becoming increasingly popular

in IoT devices.

• Previous attacks on voice assistants leverage the

gap between speech recognition system and

human voice perception [1].

• The limitation is that attack sounds are audible and

conspicuous to device owners.

• Can we inaudibly control voice assistants?

Typical Diagram of a Microphone

Carrier Wave Addition

Low-Pass Filtering

Upsampling

Ultrasound Modulation

• Attack demonstration of the command “OK Google, take a picture”.

• Attack ranges for two devices with different input powers.

Input Power (𝑊) 9.2 11.8 14.8 18.7 23.7

Range (Phone, 𝑐𝑚) 222 255 277 313 354

Range (Echo, 𝑐𝑚) 145 168 187 213 239

• You can scan the QR code in the title to see our attack demo.

Attack Scenario for Inaudible Voice Commands

[1] N. Carlini et al., “Hidden voice commands”, USENIX Security, 2016.

[2] N. Roy et al., “Backdoor: making microphones hear inaudible sounds”,

Mobisys, 2017.

[3] G. Zhang et al., “DolphinAttack: inaudible voice commands”, CCS,

2017 (concurrent work).

Attack Algorithm

Attack Overview

Non-Linearity Insight

Attack Experiments

References

Apple Siri

Amazon Alexa

Google Assistant

• Challenge: How to design inaudible attacks?

• Solution: We transmit ultrasounds (frequencies above 20kHz) to attack

victim devices.

• Challenge: How to control voice assistants?

• Solution: We exploit the non-linearity of microphone to convert

ultrasounds into normal voice commands.

Non-linear function

Non-Linearity of the Microphone