in the jewish fund the duke fax
TRANSCRIPT
No.
S199435
INT
HE
SU
PR
EM
EC
OU
RT
OF
TH
ES
TA
TE
OF
CA
LIF
OR
NIA
INT
HE
MA
TT
ER
OF
THE
ES
TA
TE
OF
DU
KE
RO
BE
RT
B.
RA
DIN
andS
EY
MO
UR
RA
DIN
vs.
Petitioners
andR
espondents,
JEW
ISH
NA
TIO
NA
LF
UN
Dand
CIT
YO
FH
OP
E,
Claim
antsand
Appellants.
California
CourtofA
ppeal,Second
District,D
ivision4
2ndC
ivilNo.B227954
Appealfrom
theLos
Angeles
County
SuperiorCourt
Hon.
MitchellBeckloff~
LosAngeles
County
SuperiorC
ourtCaseN
o.BP108971
RE
PL
YO
FB
RIE
FO
NT
HE
ME
RIT
S
OLD
MA
N,
CO
OLE
Y,
SA
LLUS
,G
OLD
,B
IRN
I3ER
G,&
CO
LEM
AN
,LLP
SusanC
ooley,S
BN
9366416133
Ventura
Boulevard,
PenthouseA
Encino,
California
91436-2408(818)
986-8080/Fax
(818)789-0947
BE
NE
DO
N&
SE
RLIN
Gerald
Serlin,
SB
N123421
Douglas
Benedon,S
BN
11019721700
Oxnard
Street,S
uite1290
Woodland
Hills,
California
91367(818)
340-1950IFax
(818)340-1990
RO
DR
IGU
EZ
,H
OR
II,C
HO
I&
CA
FF
ER
AT
A,
LL
PR
eynoldsC
afferata,S
BN
160484777
SouthFigueroa
Street,S
uite2150
LosA
ngeles,C
alifornia90017
(213)892-7700
/Fax(213)
892-7777
GR
EIN
ES
,MA
RT
IN,
ST
EIN
&R
ICH
LA
ND
LLP
Robin
Meadow
,S
BN
51126R
obertA.
Olson,
SB
N109374
JeffreyE.
Raskin,
SB
N223608
5900W
ilshireB
oulevard,12th
FloorLos
Angeles,
California
90036(310)
859-7811/F
ax(310)
276-5261
Attorneys
for
Claim
antsand
Appellants
JEW
ISH
NA
TIO
NA
LF
UN
Dand
CIT
YO
FH
OP
E
TA
BL
EO
FC
ON
TE
NT
SP
age
INT
RO
DU
CT
ION
1
AR
GU
ME
NT
2
RE
FUS
ING
TOR
EC
TIF
YW
ILL
MIS
TA
KE
S—
NO
MA
TT
ER
HO
WO
BV
IOU
SA
ND
NO
MA
TT
ER
HO
WC
LEA
RT
HE
EV
IDE
NC
E—
DE
FE
AT
ST
HE
GO
AL
OF
EF
FE
CT
UA
TIN
GT
ES
TA
TO
RIN
TE
NT
AN
DFO
STE
RS
INJU
STIC
E.
2
A.
When
ThereIs
AC
learMistake
InA
Will,
Reform
ationIs
Necessary
ToH
onorTrue
TestatorIntent.2
B.
When
ThereIs
AM
istakeIn
AW
ill,R
eformation
Avoids
UnjustE
nrichment.
3
II.T
HE
CLE
AR
AN
DC
ON
VIN
CIN
GE
VID
EN
CE
ST
AN
DA
RD
IST
HE
CO
MP
LET
EA
NS
WE
RTO
TH
ER
AD
1NS
’O
VE
RB
LOW
NF
LOO
DG
AT
ES
AR
GU
ME
NT
S.
4
A.
ThisC
ourtHas
Repeatedly
Rejected
Attem
ptsTo
Deny
Legitimate
Claim
sFor
FearO
fFraudA
ndFloodgates.
4
B.H
istoryH
asP
rovenThatA
Heightened
Evidentiary
StandardP
rovidesA
dequateP
rotectionA
gainstAbuse.
6
1.A
sthe
Restatem
entandm
ultiplestate
legislaturesand
courtshave
recognized,a
heightenedevidentiary
standardprotects
againstabuse.6
2.In
asim
ilarprobatecontext,this
Courthas
determined
thataclear
andconvincing
evidencestandard
adequatelyprotects
againstabuse.6
3.There
isnothing
uniqueaboutw
illreformation.
8
1
TA
BL
EO
FC
ON
TE
NT
S(C
ontinued)P
age
4.O
therareaso
fthelaw
thatallowreform
ationare
indistinguishableand
nofloodgates
haveopened.
9
a.The
onlysafeguard
incontract
reformation
isthe
clearand
convincingevidence
standard.10
b.The
onlysafeguard
intrustreform
ationis
theclear
andconvincing
evidencestandard.
12
5.The
clearand
convincingevidence
standardhas
teeth.14
a.The
standarddeters
abusiveclaim
s.14
b.The
standardcan
beapplied
effectively.16
C.
Barring
Reform
ationW
ouldD
oN
othingTo
Avoid
WhateverR
iskO
fFraudA
ndFloodgates
Persists.17
III.R
IGID
FO
RM
AL
RU
LES
MA
YB
EA
DM
INIS
TR
AT
IVE
LYE
AS
IER
TH
AN
EV
IDE
NC
E-B
AS
ED
DE
CIS
ION
MA
KIN
G,
BU
TT
HE
YA
RE
INE
VIT
AB
LY
LES
SF
AIR
AN
DLE
SS
EF
FE
CT
IVE
INH
ON
OR
ING
TR
UE
TE
ST
AT
OR
INT
EN
T.
18
A.
Any
Adm
inistrativeB
urdenO
fTakingE
videnceIn
TheO
ccasionalCaseW
hereA
Beneficiary
SeeksR
eformation
IsFar
Outw
eighedB
yThe
Significant
Opportunity
ToH
onorTrue
TestatorIntent.18
B.
Any
Adm
inistrativeC
onvenienceIn
WillProceedings
IsO
ffsetBy
TheP
otentialForFollow
-On
Malpractice
Litigation.19
C.
Adopting
TheR
estatementW
illNotV
itiateThe
PurposeO
fWillForm
alities.22
11
TA
BL
EO
FC
ON
TE
NT
S(C
ontinued)Page
D.
Allow
ingR
eformation
IsN
otAn
“Attack”
On
IntestacyLaw
s.24
IV.
THIS
CO
UR
TN
EE
DN
OT
AW
AIT
LEG
ISLA
TIV
EA
CT
ION
TOM
OD
ER
NIZ
ETH
EC
OM
MO
NLA
W,A
TA
SK
TR
AD
ITIO
NA
LL
YW
ITH
INTH
EC
OU
RT’S
PU
RV
IEW
.25
A.
TheParties
Agree
ThatNo
StatuteB
arsW
illR
eformation.
25
B.
ThisC
ourtHas
Traditionally
TakenThe
LeadIn
Beneficially
Evolving
TheLaw
.25
C.
Overw
helming
Scholarly
Com
mentary
SupportsThe
Restatem
ent,As
Does
TheE
xperienceO
fStatesThat
Have
Adopted
Reform
ation.27
V.
TH
ER
EC
OR
DC
ON
TA
INS
MO
RE
TH
AN
SU
FF
ICIE
NT
EV
IDE
NC
ETO
ALLO
WR
EF
OR
MA
TIO
N.
29
A.
Reform
ationIs
NotLim
itedTo
Scriveners’
Errors.
29
B.
TheR
ecordC
ontainsM
oreThan
SufficientE
videnceTo
SupportA
FindingO
fClearA
ndC
onvincingE
videnceC
onsistentWith
TheR
estatement’s
View
.31
VI.
TH
EIM
PLIE
DG
IFT
DO
CT
RIN
EA
FFOR
DS
AV
IAB
LE,
IFLIM
ITE
D,
PA
TH
TOR
EA
CH
TH
EF
AIR
AN
DE
QU
ITA
BLE
RE
SU
LTIN
TH
ISC
AS
E.
34
CO
NC
LUS
ION
35
CE
RT
IFIC
AT
EO
FC
OM
PLIA
NC
E36
111
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
Page
CA
SE
S
Addington
v.Texas
(1979)441
U.S.
41816
Appalachian
Ins.Co.
v.McD
onnellDouglas
Corp.
(1989)214
Cal.A
pp.3d1
30
Beach
v.U
S.
Fidelity
&G
uarantyCo.
(1962)205
Cal.A
pp.2d409
11
Biakanja
v.Irving(1958)49C
a1.2d64719,20
Bilafer
v.Bilafer
(2008)161
Cal.A
pp.4th363
13
Bussv.
Superior
Court
(1997)16
Cal.4th
354,
5
Cam
eronv.
Crocker-C
itizensN
at.B
ank(1971)
19C
al.App.3d
9407
Cantlay
v.O
lds&
StollerInter-E
xchange(1932)
119C
al.App.
60512
Carlson
v.Sweeney,
Dabagia,
Donoghue,
Thorne,Janes
&P
agos(m
d.2009)
895N
.E.2d
119127
Chang
v.Lederman
(2009)172
Cal.A
pp.4th67
20,21
Darpino
v.D’A
rpino(N
.J.Super.C
t.App.D
iv.1962)
179A
.2d527
1
Dillon
v.Legg(1968)
68C
al.2d728
4,5
iv
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Continued)
Page
CA
SE
S
Engle
v.S
iegel(N
.J.1977)
377A
.2d892
1,6
Estate
ofB
arnes(1965)
63C
al.2d580
31
Estate
ofK
ime
(1983)144
Cal.A
pp.3d246
2
Estate
ofR
ussell(1968)
69C
al.2d200
18
Fidelity
Union
TrustCo.v.
Robert
(N.J.
1962)178
A.2d
1851
Flannery
v.McN
amara
(Mass.2000)
738N
.E.2d
73928,29
Food
Pro
Intern.,Inc.
v.Farmers
Ins.Exchange
(2008)169
Cal.A
pp.4th976
17
Freeman
&M
ills,Inc.
v.B
eicherO
ilCo.(1995)
11C
al.4th85
26
Getty
v.G
etty(1986)
187C
al.App.3d
115911
Giam
marrusco
v.S
imon
(2009)171
Cal.A
pp.4th1586
10,13,30
Hale
v.G
roce(O
r.1987)
744P
.2d1289
21
Hotle
v.M
iller
(1959)5lCal.2d541
10
V
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Continued)
Page
CA
SE
S
How
ellv.Ham
iltonM
eats&
Provisions,
Inc.(2011)52
Cal.4th
54128
Ikev.D
oolittle(1998)
61C
al.App.4th
5113
Inre
Angelia
P.(1981)
28C
al.3d908
14
Inre
Clark(1993)
5C
al.4th750
14
Inre
Estate
ofG
oyette(2004)
123C
al.App.4th
6724
Inre
Gluckm
an‘s
Will
(N.J.
1917)101
A.
2951
Inre
LastW
ill&Testam
entofD
aland(D
el.Ch.
2010)2010
29
Inre
LyonsM
aritalTrust(M
inn.App.
2006)717
N.W
.2d457)
28
Johnson&
Johnsonv.S
uperiorC
ourt(2011)
192Ca1.A
pp.4th75717
Lanev.D
avis(1959)
172C
al.App.2d
30211
Leungv.
VerdugoH
illsH
ospital(A
ug.23,
2012,No.
S192768)
—C
al.4th2012
WL
360161626
Lissauerv.
Union
Bank
&TrustCo.
(1941)45
Cal.A
pp.2d468
13
vi
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Continued)
Page
CA
SE
S
LosA
ngelesC
ountyM
etropolitanTransportation
Authority
v.C
ontinentalDevelopm
entCorp.
(1997)16
Cal.4th
69428
Lucasv.H
amm
(1961)56
Cal.2d
58319,20
Marriage
ofW
eaver(1990)
224C
al.App.3d
4788
Merkie
v.M
erkle(1927)
85C
al.App.
8710
Neverkovec
v.Fredericks
(1999)74
Cal.A
pp.4th337
12
Notten
v.M
ensing(1935)
3C
al.2d469
7,14
Ochoa
v.S
uperiorC
ourt(1985)
39C
al.3d159
4,5
Ogle
v.Fuiten
(Iii.1984)
466N
.E.2d
22421
Orcuttv.
Ferranini
(1965)237
Cal.A
pp.2d21610,11
Pivnick
v.Beck
(N.J.S
uper.Ct.A
pp.Div.
1999)741
A.2d
65514
Radovich
v.Lock-Paddon
(1995)35
Cal.A
pp.4th946
20
Schaeferv.
California-W
esternStatesL~fe
Ins.Co.
(1968)262
Cal.A
pp.2d840
10
vii
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Continued)
Page
CA
SE
S
Schauerv.M
andarinG
ems
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ahfornia(2005)
125C
al.App.4th
94912
Sheehanv.S
ullivan(1899)
126C
al.189
14
Tannehillv.Finch
(1986)188
Cal.A
pp.3d224
8
Watson
v.C
ollins(1962)
204C
al.App.2d
2711
ST
AT
UT
ES
ProbateC
ode
Sectio
n6ll0
16,23
Section
1540413
Section
217007
OT
HE
RA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
1W
itkin,S
umm
aryofC
al.Law(10th
ed.2005)C
ontracts,§276
11
4M
allen&
Sm
ith,LegalMalpractice
(2012ed.)§
36:621
Bogert,Trusts
andTrustees
(2001)§991
27
Dear
&Jessen,
‘Followed
Rates’A
ndLeading
StateCases,
1940-2005(2007)
41U
.C.
Davis
L.Rev.
68325
viii
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Continued)
Page
OT
HE
RA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
Langbein,SubstantialC
ompliance
with
theW
illsA
ct(1975)
88H
arv.L.Rev.
48922
Langbein&
Waggoner,R
eformation
ofW
illson
theG
roundo
fMistake:
Change
ofD
irectionin
Am
ericanLaw
?(1982)
130U
.Pa.L.R
ev.521
6,22,23
Restatem
ent3dLaw
Governing
Lawyers,§
5121
Restatem
ent3dP
roperty,W
ills&
OtherD
onativeTransfers
§3.315,16,23
§12.1
2,15,
16,28,30,33
Sherw
in,C
learand
Convincing
Evidence
ofTestam
entaryIntent:
TheS
earchfo
ra
Com
promise
Between
Form
alityand
Adjudicative
Justice(2002)
34C
onn.L.Rev.
45315,
16
ix
INT
RO
DU
CT
ION
TheR
adins’choice
ofauthority
to“sum
[]up”
theirargum
ent
perfectlycaptures
why
theirargum
entisw
rong:A
95-year-oldN
ewJersey
decisionthatrefused
tocorrecta
mistake
ina
will.
(Answ
er,p.33,
quoting
Inre
Gluckinan’s
Will(N
.J.1917)
101A
.295.)
Ninety-five
yearsago.
Before
strictproductliability.B
eforecom
parativefault.
Before
the
abandonmento
fstiffformalism
.B
eforethe
comprehensive
liberalization
ofprobate
law.
Before
ahosto
fothermodernizing
reforms.
And
forty-fiveyears
beforeN
ewJersey
changedcourse.
Since1962,N
ewJersey
hasperm
ittedextrinsic
evidenceto
determine
thetestator’s
“probableintent”
when
aw
illissilentaboutw
hat
shouldoccurw
hena
designatedbeneficiary
predeceasesthe
testator.
(Engle
v.S
iegel(N.J.
1977)377
A.2d
892,893-897
[rejectingprinciple
that
“controllingconsideration
isthe
effectofthe
words
asactually
written
ratherthanw
hatthetestator
actuallyintended”—
them
eaningofchosen
terms
ratherthanw
hat“hew
asm
indedto
say,”citing
Fidelity
Union
Trust
Co.v.R
obert(N.J.
1962)178
A.2d
185,188-189];D
arpinov.D
’Arpino
(N.J.S
uper.Ct.A
pp.Div.
1962)179
A.2d
527,531.)
We
haveseen
noneofthe
Radins’prophesied
openingof
“thefloodgates
oflitigation”—
nocom
plaintsaboutproblem
sw
ithw
ill
reformation
inN
ewJersey
orin
anyo
ftheother
statesthathave
adoptedit.
Rather,the
resulthasbeen
thecreation
ofa
limited
andfocused
means
to
protecttruetestator
intentandavoid
unjustenrichment.
It’stim
efor
California
tojoin
thism
odernapproach.
1
AR
GU
ME
NT
I.
RE
FU
SIN
GT
OR
EC
TIF
YW
ILL
MIS
TA
KE
S—
NO
MA
TT
ER
HO
WO
BV
IOU
SA
ND
NO
MA
TT
ER
HO
WC
LE
AR
TH
E
EV
IDE
NC
E—
DE
FE
AT
ST
HE
GO
AL
OF
EF
FE
CT
UA
TIN
G
TE
ST
AT
OR
INT
EN
TA
ND
FOS
TER
SIN
JUS
TIC
E.
A.
When
There
IsA
Clear
Mistake
InA
Will,
Reform
ationIs
Necessary
To
Honor
True
Testator
Intent.
CurrentC
alifornialaw
guaranteesthatthere
willbe
some
casesin
which
thecourtis
powerless
tohonorthe
testator’strue
intentions,even
when
clearlydem
onstratedby
thew
illandoverw
helming
evidence.
(Opening
Brief,pp.
31-32.)
Thatisthe
unavoidableconsequence
of
azero-tolerance
policyfor
correctingeven
them
ostobviouserrors
of
testamentary
expression.
Thisapproach
cannotbesquared
with
“theparam
ountrulein
the
interpretationo
fwills,”
which
isthat“a
willis
tobe
construedaccording
to
theintention
ofthe
testator,and
nothisim
perfectattemptto
expressit.”
(Estateo
fKim
e(1983)
144C
al.App.3d
246,264;Rest.3d
Property,
Wills
&
Other
Donative
Transfers(R
estatement),§
12.1,corn.b.)
Theansw
erbriefignoresthis
inevitableconsequence
ofits
favored
zero-tolerancerule.
2
B.
When
There
IsA
Mistake
InA
Will,
Reform
ationA
voids
UnjustE
nrichment.
Theopening
briefdemonstrated
thatreformation
preventsthe
unjust
enrichmento
funintendedbeneficiaries—
here,theR
adins—atthe
expense
ofintended
beneficiaries.(O
peningB
rief,pp.
33-34.)
TheR
adinsofferthree
meritless
responses.
First,
theysuggestthatbecause
atestator
can“leave
hisorher
propertyto
whom
everheor
shechooses”
and“[nb
partycan
claima
right
toan
inheritance”(A
nswer,p.23),no
onecan
complain
ifpropertygoes
to
unintendedbeneficiaries.
Theprem
isem
aybe
true,buttheconclusion
does
notfollow.
Ifthetestatororhis
attorneym
adea
draftingm
istake,without
reformation
hisintentto
reward
akindness
ortosupportfuture
goodw
orks
willgo
unfulfilled.Instead,
someone
whom
thetestatordid
notintendto
benefit—perhaps
evenspecifically
intendedto
exclude—w
illgetthe
property.Thatis
classicunjustenrichm
ent.Itdoes
notmatterthatthe
intendedbeneficiary
hadno
inherentrighttothe
property.D
isregarding
testatorintentcreates
unintended—and
therebyunjust—
enrichment.
Second,theyargue
thatreformation
would
unjustlyenrich
the
charities.(Id
atpp.23-24.)This
turnsthe
analysison
itshead.
At
issuehere
isapolicy
question—w
hetherreformation
ofw
ills
shouldbe
allowed
when
thereis,in
fact,clear
andconvincing
evidence
thatthetestatorm
adea
mistake.
Butthe
Radins
assume
justtheopposite:
thatIrvingdid
notmake
am
istakeand
didnotintend
tobenefitthe
charities.Thatassum
ptionrenders
theinquiry
meaningless.
3
Third,theR
adinsargue
thatthecharities
would
beunjustly
enriched
byinheriting
Irving’sproperty
becausethey
“hadno
knowledge
ofIrving
in
thefirst73
yearsofhis
life”
and“provided
virtuallynothing
toIrving
duringhis
life...
.“
(Answ
er,pp.23-24.)They
alsoclaim
(citingplainly
inadmissible
evidence)thatIrving’s
money
originallycam
efrom
their
mother
andfather.
(Id.atp.4.)
Butthe
unjustenrichmentquestion
turns
on—and
onlyon—
whatIrving
intended.Itdoesn’tm
atterwhetherthe
Radins
thinkitw
asunfair
forIrving
toleave
hisestate
tocharities
rather
thanto
relativesw
homhe
expresslydisinherited,w
ithw
homhe
hadno
relationship,and
who
consideredhim
“evil.”
(SeeO
peningB
rief,p.6;
§V
.B.,post.)
Inany
case,theseare,atm
ost,argum
entsfor
thefact-finder.
II.
TH
EC
LE
AR
AN
DC
ON
VIN
CIN
GE
VID
EN
CE
ST
AN
DA
RD
IST
HE
CO
MP
LET
EA
NS
WE
RT
OT
HE
RA
DIN
S’
OV
ER
BLO
WN
FLO
OD
GA
TE
SA
RG
UM
EN
TS
.
A.
This
CourtH
asR
epeatedlyR
ejectedA
ttempts
To
Deny
Legitimate
Claim
sF
orF
earO
fFraud
And
Floodgates.
Prophesieso
frampantfraud
andopened
floodgatesare
nothingnew
tothis
Court.
(Answ
er,pp.1-2,
15-20,25-29,31.)N
eitheris
their
rejection.
TheC
ourthasrepeatedly
beenw
arnedthatits
holdingsw
ill
“openthe
floodgates.”(Buss
v.S
uperiorC
ourt(1997)16
Cal.4th
35,57
[insurer’srightto
reimbursem
ent];O
choav.S
uperiorC
ourt(1985)39
Cal.3d
159,171
[negligentinflictiono
femotionaldistress
doesnotrequire
suddenoccurrence];D
illonv.Legg
(1968)68
Cal.2d
728,744
[negligent
4
inflictionofem
otionaldistress].)Each
time,the
Court“rejected
the
argumentthatrecovery
shouldbe
deniedbecause
ofpossible
administrative
difficulty”(D
illon,supra,
68C
al.2datp.
744):“
[We]
shouldbe
sorryto
adoptarule
which
would
barallsuchclaim
son
groundso
fpolicyalone,
andin
ordertopreventthe
possiblesuccess
ofunrighteous
orgroundless
actions.”(O
choa,supra,
39C
al.3datp.
171,quotingD
illon,supra,
68C
al.2datp.
744.)B
eyonddenying
redressin
appropriatecases,such
anapproach
“necessarilyim
pliesa
certaindegree
ofdistrust,w
hich[w
e]do
notshare,inthe
capacityoflegaltribunals
togetatthe
truth..
..“
(Ibid.,
internalquotationm
arksom
itted.)“[T
]hepossible
invocationo
fthis
right—or
anyother—
isnota
sufficientbasisfor
itsabrogation
or
disapproval.”(Buss,
supra,16
Cal.4th
atp.58.)
“Courts
notonlycom
promise
theirbasic
responsibilityto
decidethe
merits
ofeach
caseindividually
butdestroythe
public’sconfidence
inthem
byusing
thebroad
broomo
f‘administrative
convenience’tosw
eepaw
ay
aclass
ofclaim
sa
number
ofw
hichare
admittedly
meritorious.”
(Dillon,
supra,68
Cal.2d
atp.737.)
As
forthe
specteroffraudulentclaim
s,it
“doesnotjustif~’
aw
holesalerejection
ofthe
entireclass
ofclaim
sin
which
thatpotentiality
arises.”(Id.
atp.736.)
5
B.
History
Has
Proven
ThatA
Heightened
Evidentiary
Standard
Provides
Adequate
Protection
AgainstA
buse.
1.A
sthe
Restatem
entandm
ultiplestate
legislatures
andcourts
haverecognized,a
heightened
evidentiarystandard
protectsagainstabuse.
Reform
ationo
fwills
isallow
edin
atleastsixstates.
(Opening
Brief,
pp.28-29.)
And
New
Jerseyperm
itsw
hatiseffectively
reformation
under
its“probable
intent”rule.
(Engle,supra,
377A
.2datpp.
894-897;
Langbein&
Waggoner,R
eformation
ofW
illson
theG
roundo
fMistake.
Change
ofD
irectionin
Am
ericanLaw
?(1982)
130U
.Pa.L.Rev.
521,561-
562.)
Thereis
nohintthatany
paradeo
fhorriblesever
afflictedthese
jurisdictionsin
theyears—
andsom
etimes
decades—since
theyrecognized
willreform
ation.In
fact,ourresearch
hasn’trevealedany
real-world
complaints
atall.V
Legalreforms
oftenengender
feveredspeculation
thatthesky
will
fall.B
utithasn’tbefore,and
itwon’tnow
.
2.In
asim
ilarprobate
context,this
Court
has
determined
thataclear
andconvincing
evidence
standardadequately
protectsagainstabuse.
Forsakinghistoricalexperience
infavor
ofspeculation,the
Radins
positthreereasons
why,they
say,“[wjills
arem
oresusceptible
toadditional
claims”
thanother
contexts:“the
absenceo
faliving
representative,the
easeofasserting
aclaim
,and
theem
otionalattachmentfam
ilym
embers
may
haveto
certainproperty.”
(Answ
er,p.26.)B
utthisC
ourtandour
6
Legislaturehave
alreadyw
restledw
ithand
rejectedidenticalfloodgates
concerns:C
aliforniahas
longrecognized
thattheclear
andconvincing
standardsufficiently
tempers
thetem
ptationto
bringquestionable
suits
seekingto
rewrite
aw
ill.
In1935,this
Courtrecognized
theenforceability
ofan
oralcontract
tom
akea
will,
eventhough
theprom
iseis
enforcedafterthe
testator’s
deathand
effectivelysupplants
thew
rittenw
ill.(N
ottenv.M
ensing(1935)
3C
al.2d469.)
Indoing
so,theC
ourtwas
“wellaw
arethatin
suchcases
the
temptation
isstrong
fromthose
who
areso
inclinedto
fabricateevidence
givingcolor
tothe
claimthatthe
partiesentered
intosuch
anoralagreem
ent
asis
herealleged.”
(Id.atp.477.)
Butthatw
asnota
sufficientreasonto
prohibitthecategory
ofclaim
saltogether.
Rather,the
Courtim
posed
aheightened
evidentiaryburden,the
same
clearand
convincingstandard
thatwould
berequired
forwillreform
ation.(Ibid.;
Cam
eronv.
Crocker
Citizens
Nat.
Bank
(1971)19
Cal.A
pp.3d940,
943-944[increased
burden
addresses“the
manifestdanger
offraud,perjury,
andinjustice”
thatexists
becauseofthe
testator’sabsence].)
TheR
adins’concern
isidenticalto
thatinN
otten:A
partyw
ho
isinclined
tofabricate
evidenceto
supportareform
ationclaim
couldjust
aseasily
fabricateevidence
ofan
oralagreementto
make
aw
ill.B
utasfar
asw
ecan
determine
Notten
didn’topenany
floodgates.To
thecontrary,
theLegislature’s
codificationo
fNotten
in2000
confirmed
thatnothingakin
tothe
Radins’parade
ofhorribles
resulted.(P
rob.C
ode,§21700,
subds.(a)(4)
&(5).)
Ifanything,reformation
shouldengenderless
concernthan
oral
agreements
tom
akea
willbecause
ofthe
broaderscope
ofrelevant
7
evidence,including
writings
andthe
terms
ofthe
willitself.
Here,
for
instance,theC
ourtofA
ppealconsideredthe
languageo
fthew
illinfinding
itd
ifficultto
imagine
thatIrvingactually
intendedto
make
charitablegifts
inloving
mem
oryofdeceased
family
mem
bersonly
undertheextrem
ely
unlikelycircum
stanceofdying
“atthesam
em
oment”
ashis
wife
andto
havehis
estatego
tootherw
isedisinherited
relativesifshe
predeceasedhim
.
(~V
.B.,post.)3.
Thereis
nothingunique
aboutwill
reformation.
Thereis
noreason
tothink
thatwills
presentauniquely
tempting
targetforfalse
reformation
claims.
First,
willdisputes
arehardly
uniquein
generatinghigh
emotions.
Although
family
mem
bersm
aybe
emotionally
attachedto
particular
property(A
nswer,p.26),the
same
istrue
inm
aritaldissolutionsand
Marvin
litigation,where
propertyagreem
entsm
aybe
reformed
andproperty
ownership
disputesresolved
byshow
ingso
fclearand
convincingevidence.
(Marriage
ofW
eaver(1990)
224C
al.App.3d
478,487
[transmutation
of
separateproperty
intocom
munity
propertym
aybe
provenby
clearand
convincingevidence];
Tannehillv.Finch(1986)
188C
al.App.3d
224
[Marvin
claims
assertingoralagreem
entthatownership
differfrom
legal
titlem
aybe
establishedby
clearand
convincingevidence
ofform
er
cohabitants’agreem
ent].)A
ndhigh
emotions
undoubtedlyabound
ina
host
ofclaim
sranging
frompartnership
disputesto
employm
entlitigation.B
ut
amorphous
floodgatefears
don’tcutoffreform
ationorconsideration
of
extrinsicevidence
inthose
contexts.
8
Second,thereis
noreason
tothink
thatemotionalattachm
entto
particularpropertym
akesfrivolous
suitsany
more
likelythan
inbig-m
oney
cases,whether
arisingfrom
contracts,partnerships,ortrusts.
Third,theR
adin’sconcern
aboutthe“absence
ofa
living
representative”totestifSraboutthe
testator’sintentis
illfounded.(A
nswer,
p.26.)For
onething,
attorneysor
otherrepresentativesoften
canfillthis
rolein
willreform
ation.For
another,aliving
representative—a
trustee,for
instance—does
notnecessarilyknow
adeceased
trustor’sintenton
aparticular
issue.N
oris
aliving
representativerequired
oreven
always
availablein
otherareas.
(~II.B
.4.a.-b.,post.)
4.O
therareas
ofthelaw
thatallowreform
ation
areindistinguishable
andno
floodgateshave
opened.
As
courtsand
scholarshave
noted,noprincipled
distinctionexists
between
reformation
ofw
illsand
reformation
ofother
documents.
(Opening
Brief,
pp.13-15,23.)
Nonetheless,
theR
adinsm
aintainthat
reformation
isperm
ittedfor
otherdocum
entsonly
becausethey
offer
“peculiarsafeguards.”
(Answ
er,pp.15-18.)
According
tothe
Radins,
“{c]ourtsonly
allowreform
ationofdocum
entsotherthan
wills
when
they
canbe
assuredsafeguards
willpreserve
theauthor’s
intent,and
thenum
ber
ofindividuals
who
may
seekreform
ationis
limited.”
(Id.atp.
15.)
TheR
adinscite
nothingto
supportthis,undoubtedlybecause
thelaw
isdirectly
againstthem.
9
a.The
onlysafeguard
incontractreform
ationis
theclear
andconvincing
evidencestandard.
TheR
adinsoffertw
oreasons
why
courtsperm
itcontract
reformation.
(Id.atpp.
16-17.)B
otharew
rong.
Party
availability.The
Radins
claimthat“[r]eform
ationof
acontractis
permitted
becausethe
presenceo
fthecontracting
parties
makes
theevidence
more
reliable.”(Id.
atp.16.)
Butparty
presenceis
not
required,and
sometim
esnoteven
possible:
Contracts
may
bereform
edafterthe
deathofone
ofthe
contractingparties.
(E.g.,
Schaefer
v.C
a4fornia-Western
States
LifeIns.
Co.(1968)
262C
al.App.2d
840[insurer
entitledto
reformation
oflife
insurancepolicy
afterinsured’s
death];O
rcuttv.Ferranini(1965)
237C
al.App.2d
216[beneficiary
entitledto
reformation
oflife
insurance
policyafter
insured’sdeath];H
otlev.M
iller
(1959)51
Cal.2d
541,543-544
[reformation
ofdepositagreem
entafterdeath
oftw
oparties].)
•C
aliforniarepealed
the“dead
man
statute,”which
until1965
prohibitedtestim
onyabouta
decedent’sstatem
entsas
tohis
orherintentin
thecreation
ofa
writing.
(Opening
Brief,p.
51.)
•A
trustmay
bereform
ed“even
afterthesettlor
isdead”
(Giam
márrusco
v.S
imon
(2009)171
Cal.A
pp.4th1586,
1603-1604)and
adeed
may
bereform
edafterthe
grantor’sdeath
(Merkle
v.Merkie
(1927)
85C
al.App.
87).
Infact,the
Radins
can’tseemto
make
uptheirm
inds.They
argue
thatreformation
isallow
edfor
contractsbecause
partyavailability
“makes
10
theevidence
more
reliable,”butthen
saythat“[t]he
issueis
notreliability.”
(Answ
er,pp.16,
17fn.
6,emphasis
added.)1
“Na
tura
llimits.”
TheR
adinssay
that“[t]henum
berofcontract
reformation
claims
isalso
naturallylim
itedby
thenum
berofparties
to
thecontract.
...“
(Id.atp.
17.)A
gainthey
offernocitation.
And
again
theyare
wrong.
Anyone
“aggrieved”by
am
istakecan
seekreform
ation
(1W
itkin,S
umm
aryofC
al.Law
(10thed.2005)
Contracts,§
276):
•A
pla
intiffinjured
ina
caraccidentcan
seekto
reform
aninsurance
agreementto
name
thedefendantas
anadditionalinsured
onhis
parents’policy,even
thoughthe
pla
intiffis
acom
pletestrangerto
thatcontract.(B
eachv.
US
.F
idelity&
Guaranty
Co.(1962)
205
Cal.A
pp.2d409,
410,413.)
•A
mortgagor’s
granteem
ayexercise
them
ortgagor’sright
toreform
theunderlying
note.(W
atsonv.
Collins
(1962)204
Cal.A
pp.2d
27,32.)•
Athird
partybeneficiary
may
seekreform
ationeven
afterthe
deatho
facontracting
party.(Lane
v.Davis
(1959)172
Cal.A
pp.2d302,
308-309;O
rcutt,supra,
237C
al.App.2d
atp.223;G
ettyv.
Getry
(1986)
187C
al.App.3d
1159,1180.)
Contractualterm
sdo
notlimitthe
numbero
f
personsw
hocan
claimto
bethird
partybeneficiaries
entitledto
1The
Radins’
footnotealso
saysthatin
othersituations,a
decedent’s
statements
“areallow
edto
addressa
questionthathas
arisenas
tothe
decedent’sintent,
nottocreate
anissue
asto
intentwhere
nonepreviously
exists.”(Ibid.)
Theirm
eaningis
unclear.Ifthey
aresaying
thatadecedent’s
statements
arenotadm
issibleunless
anduntilother
evidencehas
raisedsom
eissue
ofintent,they
arem
istaken,as
theabove
authoritiesshow
.
11
reformation—
onecan
showthatstatus
throughextrinsic
evidencethatthe
promisorunderstood
theintentto
benefitthethird
party.(S
chauerv.
Mandarin
Gem
sofCal~T
ornia(2005)
125C
al.App.4th
949,957-95
8;
Neverkovec
v.Fredericks(1999)
74C
al.App.4th
337,348-349;
Cantlay
v.
Olds
&S
tollerInter-Exchange
(1932)119
Cal.A
pp.605
[reforming
contracttonam
eindividualas
additionalinsuredathis
request].)The
numbero
fpeoplew
hom
ightseekto
reforma
lifeinsurance
policyto
be
addedas
beneficiariesis
surelyno
smallerthan
thenum
berwho
might
claimto
bew
illbeneficiaries.
b.The
onlysafeguard
intru
streform
ationis
theclear
andconvincing
evidencestandard.
TheR
adins’supposed
limited-parties
principlew
ouldbartrust
reformation,
sincetheoretically
anyonecould
claimto
bean
intendedtrust
beneficiary.B
utreformation
isnonetheless
available.(O
peningBrief~,
p.14.)Ignoring
thisproblem
,theR
adinsconjure
anotherflaw
edrationale.
Theyclaim
thattrustreformation
isperm
ittedbecause
trustadministration
“frequentlybegins
before”the
trustor’sdeath
and“the
trustor’sand
trustee’sacts
duringthis
time
provideobjective
indiciao
fintent.”(A
nswer,
p.16.)
According
tothe
Radins,reform
ationis
designedso
thatthetrustor
has“the
opportunityto
amend
thetrustand
correctmisapprehensions
before
hedies.”
(Ibid.)Y
etagain,theR
adinscite
noauthority.
That’sbecause
thereis
none.
First,
California
onlyrecently
recognizeda
trustor’sstanding
to
unilaterallyseek
reformation;the
more
familiar
contextisbeneficiaries
12
seekingreform
ation.(B
ilaferv.B
ilafer(2008)
161C
al.App.4th
363,369-
371[prior
California
cases“involved
petitionsto
reforma
trustfiledby
abeneficiary
oratrustorw
how
asalso
abeneficiary”;
holdingas
am
atter
offirstim
pressionthatnon-beneficiary
trustorhasstanding];Ike
v.
Doolittle
(1998)61
Cal.A
pp.4th51
[beneficiaryseeking
reformation];
Lissauerv.
Union
Bank
&TrustCo.
(1941)45
Cal.A
pp.2d468
[same].)2
Sothe
doctrine’spurpose
cannotbeonly—
oreven
primarily—
togive
trustorsthe
opportunityto
correcttheirow
nm
istakes.
Second,itis
wellestablished
thatatrustm
aybe
reformed
afterthe
trustor’sdeath.
(Giam
marrusco,
supra,171
Cal.A
pp.4thatpp.
1603-1604.)
Thereis
noauthority
suggestingthatreform
ationis
limited
tom
istakesthat
come
tolightduring
thetrustor’s
lifetime.
Tothe
contrary,cases
ordinarily
involvem
istakesthatw
erenotand
couldnothave
beenrecognized
bythe
trustor,em
ergingonly
afterthe
trustor’sdeath.
Forinstance,
inLissauer,
supra,45
Cal.A
pp.2d468,
alltrustadministration
duringthe
trustor’s
lifetime
was
forthetrustor’s
own
benefit.The
issuerequiring
reformation
came
tolightafterthe
trustordied,w
henknow
ledgeableparties
recognized
thatthetrustorhad
mistakenly
expressedherintentregarding
whatw
asto
occurafter
herdeath.
(Id.atpp.468,47
1-472.)R
ecentexamples
are
nodifferent.
(SeeG
iamm
arrusco,supra,
171C
al.App.4th
atpp.1595-
1599,1603-1607;Ike,
supra,61
Cal.A
pp.4thatpp.
62-63,66,70-71,
79-83.)
2The
Probate
Code
contemplates
thatthetrustor
cancom
pelmodification
ortermination
ofthe
trust,butonlyw
iththe
consentofallbeneficiaries.
(Prob.
Code,§
15404,subd.
(a).)
13
***
*
Theclear
andconvincing
evidencestandard
“isnotnew
.”(In
re
Angelia
P.(1981)
28C
al.3d908,919.)
ThisC
ourtdescribedthe
testmore
than110
yearsago
andithas
retainedits
vitalityever
since.(Ibid.,
citing
Sheehanv.
Sullivan
(1899)126
Cal.
189,193.)
Thebench
andbarare
familiarw
ithit.
TheR
adinshave
notshown
anyreason
tothink
that
imposing
thisfam
iliarhigher-proofstandard“w
ould‘lead
tountold
confusionin
theprobate
ofw
ills.”
(Answ
er,pp.26-27.)
5.The
clearand
convincingevidence
standard
hasteeth.
a.The
standarddeters
abusiveclaim
s.
Courts
andscholars
haverepeatedly
recognizedthatthe
clearand
convincingevidence
standardeffectively
detersw
eakor
fabricatedclaim
s.
(E.g.,N
otten,supra,
3C
al.2datp.477
[heightenedstandard
sufficientto
protectagainstthosew
ithstrong
“temptation”
to“fabricate
evidence”of
oralwill];
Inre
Clark
(1993)5
Cal.4th
750,801
(cone.opn.
ofLucas,J.)
[heightenedstandard
“more
easilyelim
inate(s)the
frivolouspetitions
while
stillretainingan
avenueofreliefforthose
who
havelegitim
ateclaim
s”];
Pivnick
v.Beck
(N.J.S
uper.Ct.A
pp.Div.
1999)741
A.2d
655,661
[heightenedstandard
“discourage(s)fraudulentclaim
s”o
flegalmalpractice
basedon
failureto
draftwillthatconform
sw
ithtestator’s
intentand“also
detersthe
more
comm
onproblem
ofsuits
basedon
thesincerely
heldbelief
thattheclaim
antdeservedm
orethan
thew
illprovided”].)A
sthe
Restatem
entputsit,
aclear
andconvincing
evidencestandard
14
“alertspotentialplaintiffs
tothe
strengthofevidence
requiredin
orderto
prevail...
.“
(Restatem
ent,§12.1,
corn.e.)
TheR
adinsclaim
thatthereis
no“substantialevidence
thattheclear
andconvincing
evidencestandard
willdeter
fraud,”citing
Sherw
in,C
lear
andC
onvincingE
videnceo
fTestamentary
Intent:The
Search
for
a
Com
promise
Betw
eenF
ormality
andA
djudicativeJustice
(2002)34
Conn.L.R
ev.453,473-474(S
earchfo
rC
omprom
ise).(A
nswer,p.28.)
But
thearticle
saysno
suchthing.
Infact,
itonly
usesthe
word
“fraud”w
hen
describingthe
groundsjustif~ring
reformation
andin
thephrase
“Statute
of
Frauds.”(S
earchfo
rC
omprom
ise,supra,
atp.475.)3
Nor
doesSearch
for
Com
promise
disputethata
heightenedstandard
willinfluence
partiesto
“declineto
pursueclaim
sin
thefirstplace.”
(Answ
er,p.27.)Q
uitethe
opposite:“Itm
aybe
fairtoassum
ethata
high
standardofproofw
ouldtend
toreduce
thetotalnum
berofclaim
sasserted
onthe
basiso
finformalexpressions
ofintent,
asclaim
antsassessed
the
strengthoftheir
claims.”
(Search
for
Com
promise,supra,
34C
onn.L.Rev.
atp.471,em
phasisadded.)
Thearticle
doesassertthata
heightened
standardm
aynothave
a“substantialeffect”
onthe
settlemento
fclaims
actuallybrought,
seemingly
becausem
ostclaimants
havealready
estimated
~Search
for
Com
promise
doesn’taddressreform
ationatall.
Itexam
ines
Restatem
entsection3.3’s
proposed“dispensation”rules
allowing
acourtto
determine—
basedon
clearand
convincingevidence—
whethera
document
was
intendedto
bea
will
despiteits
noncompliance
with
will
formalities.
(Id.atpp.45
8-463)Thatinvolves
entirelydifferentfunctions
ofw
illform
alities.(C
ompare
id.atpp.466-468
with
§III.C
.,post.)The
articlem
entionsreform
ationonly
asanotherdoctrine
tow
hichthe
clearand
convincingstandard
applies.
15
thattheym
etwhatever
theapplicable
burden.(Id.
atpp.47
1-472.)B
utthat
conclusion,even
iftrue,is
irrelevanttothe
issueofpotentialabuse.
Inany
event,California
hasrejected
Professor
Sherw
in’sskepticism
aboutRestatem
entsection3.3’s
useofthe
heightenedevidentiary
standard
toliberalize
willform
alities,which
isthe
article’sfocus.
(Fn.3,ante.)
Probate
Code
section6110,
subdivision(c)(2)
permits
probateo
f
improperly
executedw
illsas
longas
clearand
convincingevidence
establishesthatthe
testatorintended
thedocum
enttobe
hisw
ill—adopting
Restatem
entsection3.3.
(Sen.C
orn,on
Jud.,Analysis
ofSen.B
illNo.
AB
2248(2007-2008
Reg.
Sess.)as
arnendedM
ar.24,2008.)
b.The
standardcan
beapplied
effectively.
Theheightened
standard“instruct[s]
thefactfinder
concerningthe
degreeo
fconfidenceour
societythinks
heshould
havein
thecorrectness
of
factualconclusionsfor
aparticulartype
ofadjudication.”
(Addington
v.
Texas(1979)
441U
.S.418,
423;see
Restatem
ent,§12.1,corn.
e.)Because
judgesrather
thanjuries
decideprobate
issues(O
peningBrief~,pp.
53-54),
onecan
beconfidentthatthe
standardw
illbeunderstood
andaccorded
greatseriousness.There
isno
basisforthe
Radin’s
distrustofcourts—
their
fearthatjudgesw
illrewrite
wills
basedon
insufficientevidence.(A
nswer,
p.20.)
Indeed,therisk
isjustthe
opposite:The
heightenedevidentiary
standardm
eansthatjudicial
errorsm
oreoften
resultinenforcing
aw
ill’s
literalterms
evenw
henthatw
asnotthe
testator’sintent.
(Restatem
ent,
§12.1,
corn.e.;c.f.,Search
for
Com
promise,
supra,34
Conn.L.R
ev.at
pp.462-463.)
16
Contrary
tothe
Radins’
suggestion(A
nswer,pp.26-27),the
heightenedstandard
doesallow
summ
aryadjudication.
Thatisbecause
the
summ
aryjudgm
entinquirym
ustbeundertaken
throughthe
lensofthe
ultimate
burdenofproof.
(E.g.,Johnson
&Johnson
v.S
uperiorC
ourt
(2011)192C
al.App.4th
757,762;Food
Pro
Intern.,Inc.
v.Farmers
Ins.
Exchange
(2008)169
Cal.A
pp.4th976,
994.)Cases
pursuedw
ithoutclear
andconvincing
evidencecan
bethrow
nout,
andclaim
antscan
face
malicious
prosecutionclaim
s.
C.
Barring
Reform
ationW
ouldD
oN
othingT
oA
void
Whatever
Risk
OfF
raudA
ndFloodgates
Persists.
Afinalansw
ertothe
Radin’s
fraudconcern
isthe
realitythatbarring
willreform
ationw
illnotdissuadethose
willing
topursue
claims
basedon
fabricatedevidence.
Partiesso
inclinedalready
havem
ultipleother
options.
Theycan
fabricateevidence
ofan
oralagreementto
make
aw
ill,orto
supportchallengesbased
onlack
ofcapacity,
undueinfluence,
fraud,or
duress.A
ndsince
truthis
nohindrance,they
caneasily
crafttheirclaim
s
andfabricated
evidenceso
asto
avoidsum
mary
judgment.
Insteadof
deterringthese
abusiveclaim
s,barringreform
ationw
ouldforeclose
legitimate
claims.
17
III.
RIG
IDF
OR
MA
LR
ULE
SM
AY
BE
AD
MIN
IST
RA
TIV
ELY
EA
SIE
RT
HA
NE
VID
EN
CE
-BA
SE
DD
EC
ISIO
NM
AK
ING
,
BU
TT
HE
YA
RE
INE
VIT
AB
LY
LES
SF
AIR
AN
DLE
SS
EF
FE
CT
iVE
INH
ON
OR
ING
TR
UE
TE
ST
AT
OR
1~NTEN
T.
Them
oderntrend
hasbeen
tosteadily
move
away
fromstiff
formalism
towards
“flexiblerationalism
”aim
edatascertaining
testator
intent.(Estate
ofR
ussell(1968)69
Cal.2d
200,209-210.)
Acknow
ledging
arem
edyfor
clearmistakes
ofexpression
isthe
necessarynextstep.
TheC
ourtshouldrejectthe
Radins’
argumentthatthe
searchfor
truthshould
takea
backseatto
administrative
convenience.
A.
Any
Adm
inistrativeB
urdenO
fTaking
Evidence
InThe
OccasionalC
aseW
hereA
Beneficiary
SeeksR
eformation
IsF
arO
utweighed
By
TheS
ignificantO
pportunityT
o
Honor
True
Testator
Intent.
TheR
adinsargue
that“[ejvenifm
oresuits
donotoccur,the
administrative
burdenw
illriseas
courtsw
illberequired
totake
testimony
inm
orecases
ratherthanresolving
themas
am
attero
flaw.”
(Answ
er,
pp.26-27.)
Theyurge
theC
ourtnottoallow
judicialresourcesto
be
“squander[ed]”by
consideringevidence.
(Id.atp.27.)
Turninga
blindeye
tocleartestator
intentiscertainly
expedient.
Butitcom
esattoo
higha
price.It
embodies
aview
thatthisC
ourthas
consistentlyrejected
becauseitdisregards
courts’“basic
responsibility”
and“destroys
thepublic
confidence”in
thejudicialsystem
.(~
II.A.,
ante.)
18
And
itindisputably
guaranteesthatin
some
casescleartestator
intentwill
bedenied
andclearly
unintendedbeneficiaries
willbe
unjustlyenriched.
Besides,adopting
reformation
doesnotforeclose
courts’abilityto
decidethe
issueas
am
atteroflaw
—the
heightenedstandard
mustbe
consideredon
summ
aryjudgm
ent.(P.
17,ante.)A
ndthe
absenceofju
ry
trialsm
inimizes
anyadm
inistrativeburden.
B.
Any
Adm
inistrativeC
onvenienceIn
WillP
roceedings
IsO
ffsetBy
TheP
otentialFor
Follow
-On
Malpractice
Litigation.
Allow
ingreform
ationalso
limits
theneed
forinefficienttort
alternativesagainstattorney-scriveners.
(Opening
Brief~,pp.36-37.)
The
Radins
claimthere
canbe
nosuch
benefitbecause,theysay,there
areno
tortalternatives—C
aliforniaattorneys
owe
noduty
ofcare
tonon-client
“potentialbeneficiaries.”(A
nswer,pp.
24-25.)B
utthatisonly
partof
thestory.
ThisC
ourthasadopted
am
ulti-factortestfor
determining
dutyin
suchm
alpracticeclaim
s.(Lucas
v.Ham
m(1961)
56C
al.2d583,
588-589
(Lucas);Biakanja
v.Irving(1958)
49C
al.2d647,
650.)The
case-specific
factorseasily
supportaduty
ofcare
form
istakesthatreform
ationw
ouldfix:
The“e
nd
andaim
’ofthe
transaction”w
asclearly
tobenefitthe
intended
beneficiariesand
thus(1)
“thetransaction
was
intendedto
affect”them
;
(2)harm
was
foreseeablein
thattheattorney
“musthave
beenaw
are”that
failingto
properlydocum
entthetestator’s
clearintentw
ouldharm
the
intendedbeneficiaries;
(3)theharm
became
certainupon
thetestator’s
death;and
(4)the
attorney’snegligence
was
closelyconnected
with
the
19
injury.(B
iakanja,supra,49
Cal.2d
atp.650.)
Moreover,
courtsm
ust
consider“m
oralblame.”
(Id.atpp.
650-651.)Thus,
attorneyliability
is
appropriateif
“theinnocentbeneficiary”w
ouldotherw
ise“bearthe
loss.”
(Lucas,supra,
56C
al.2datp.
589.)So,ifreform
ationis
notavailable,
thesefactors
would
supportmalpractice
liability.
Indenying
theexistence
ofm
alpracticeliability,the
Radins
relyon
Chang
v.Lederman
(2009)172
Cal.A
pp.4th67,w
hichdrew
anovelline
between
“intended”and
“potential”beneficiaries
basedon
thefinalLucas
factor,thepolicy
factoro
f“burdenon
theprofession.”
(Lucas,supra,
56C
al.2datp.
589.)U
nderC
hang,it
doesnotm
atterthatthetestator’s
intentwas
absolutelyclear
andthatthe
attorneyunderstood
it:The
attorney
owes
noduty
tothe
testator’sintended
beneficiaryunless
theattorney
wrote
thatbeneficiary’snam
ein
thew
ill,and
eventhen
onlyas
toproperty
“expresslysetforth
inthe
testamentary
document.”
(172C
al.App.4th
at
pp.82-85.)~
TheR
adinscite
Chang
asthough
iteliminated
foralltim
ethe
potentialform
alpracticeclaim
sagainstattorneys
forfailing
toproperly
documenta
testator’sclear
intent,butthat’s
nottrue.This
Courthas
not
~The
Radins
alsocite
Radovich
v.Lock-Paddon
(Answ
er,p.25),butthat
easedoesn’taddress
anyrelevantissue.
There,the“narrow
question[w
as]w
hetherattorneys”
owe
aduty
tobeneficiaries
named
ina
draftwillto
ensurethatthe
testator“execute[s]
aw
illconsistentwith
”thatdraft.
(Radovich
v.Lock-Paddon
(1995)35
Cal.A
pp.4th946,954-955.)
Radovich
recognizedthatthe
Biakanja
factorsfavored
aduty,butheld
that“[c]ountervailing
policyconsiderations”
counseledotherw
ise:R
equiringattorneys
topush
theirclients
toexecute
wills
consistentwith
thefirst
draftwould
comprom
isethe
attorney’sduty
ofloyalty
tothe
client,who
mightchange
hisorherm
indand
chooseotherbeneficiaries.
(Id.at
pp.959-960,
963-966.)
20
addressedC
hang’snarrow
viewo
fduty.A
ndsisterstates
arespliton
the
issue,with
atleasttwo
Supreme
Courts
permitting
malpractice
claims
by
individualsnotnam
edin
thew
illbecauseo
ftheattorney’s
failureto
properlydocum
entthetestator’s
intent.(4
Mallen
&S
mith,Legal
Malpractice
(2012ed.)§
36:6&
fns.3-4,pp.
1197-1198;Hale
v.G
roce
(Or.
1987)744
P.2d1289,
1290,1292;
Ogle
v.Fuiten(Iii.
1984)466
N.E
.2d224
[relyingon
California
casesand
discountingfloodgate
concerns].)Likew
ise,theR
estatementT
hirdon
theLaw
Governing
Lawyers
imposes
aduty
tocarry
outthetestator-client’s
clearintent.
(Id.at
§51,corn.
f[this
dutyw
ill“serveto
fulfillthe
lawyer’s
obligationsto
the
client”;allegedly
intendedbeneficiary
mustprove
client’sintentby
clear
andconvincing
evidence].)M
alpracticeclaim
stherefore
remain
avery
real
possibilitynotw
ithstandingC
hang.
Chang’s
goalofavoiding
malpractice
burdensis
betteraccom
plished
throughreform
ation:There
willbe
noneed
toim
posetortliability
onan
attorneyfor
failingto
implem
enttestatorintent,because
theintended
beneficiaryw
illreceivew
hatthetestator
intended.There
canbe
littlem
oral
blame
when
theintended
beneficiarysuffers
noloss.
(P.20,ante.)A
nd
relyingon
reformation
ratherthantortis
more
likelyto
bringdrafting
errors
tolight,
allowing
attorneysto
carryouttheir
deceasedclients’w
ishes
without
fearo
fliability.(O
peningBrief~,p.
37.)
And
iftheR
adinsare
correctthatclearly-intendedbeneficiaries
haveno
malpractice
remedy,then
reformation
isallthe
more
important.
Itwould
bethe
onlyw
ayto
vindicatetestator
intentandto
redressinjury
to
intendedbeneficiaries.
21
C.A
doptingThe
Restatem
entWillN
otVitiate
TheP
urpose
OfW
illForm
alities.
TheR
adinsargue
thatreformation
“disregardsw
illformalities
and
undermines
thefunctions
theyserve.”
(Answ
er,pp.18-20;
seealso
id.at
pp.37-38
[allowing
extrinsicevidence
“jettisonsthe
formalities”].)
Notso.
Thecenterpiece
ofthe
Radins’
argumentis
anarticle
byP
rofessor
JohnLangbein
thatdiscussesthe
functionsofw
illformalities.
(Id.at
pp.18-20,repeatedly
citingLangbein,S
ubstantialCom
pliancew
iththe
Wills
Act(1975)
88H
arv.L.R
ev.489.)
ButP
rofessorLangbeinw
asalso
theR
estatement’s
Associate
Reporter,and
heco-authored
theleading
articleurging
thevalue
ofreform
ationand
explainingw
hyw
illformalities
shouldnotbe
anobstacle
toreform
ation.
As
heputit
inthatarticle,
“[w]hen
atestator
executesa
willthatis
afflictedby
am
istakenlyrendered
ormistakenly
omitted
term,
onlythe
evidentiaryfunction
ofthe
Wills
Actis
seriouslyin
question.”(Langbein
&
Waggoner,R
eformation
ofW
illson
theG
roundofM
istake:C
hangeo
f
Direction
inA
merican
Law?
(1982)130
U.Pa.L.R
ev.521,
529fn.27.)
“Because
theresto
fthew
illwas
properlyw
ritten,signed,
andw
itnessed,”
willform
alitiesserved
allotherfunctions:
(1)“w
arningthe
testatoro
fthe
seriousnessand
finalityo
ftheinstrum
ent,”(2)
making
itdifficultfor
“crooksto
deceiveor
coercethe
testator,”and
(3)electing
theprobate
channelforresolution.
(Ibid.)A
sto
thesole
remaining
function—the
evidentiaryfunction—
”courtshave
shown
themselves
ableto
deal
effectivelyw
iththe
concernaboutthe
qualityo
ftheproofs
inm
istake
cases.”(Id.
atp.529.)
Thus,the“problem
raisesa
technicalorform
al
ratherthana
purposivequestion.”
(Ibid.)A
sP
rofessorLangbeinargues,
22
honoringw
illformalities
shouldnotrequire
turninga
blindeye
toclearand
convincingevidence
ofm
istakenexpression.
(Id.atpp.
524-529,577-590.)
Indeed,C
aliforniano
longerrequiresslavish
adherenceto
formalities
evento
provethata
documentw
asintended
asa
will—
thecircum
stance
where
allformality
functionsare
inplay.
Probate
Code
section6110,
subdivision(c)(2)
allows
probateofa
noncompliantdocum
entwhen
clear
andconvincing
evidenceestablishes
thatthetestator
intendedit
asa
will.
Contrary
tow
hattheR
adinsargue
(Answ
er,pp.2
1-22),nothingin
the
statutorylanguage
orthecited
legislativehistory
limits
section6110
to
holographicw
ills.U
ndoubtedly,partofthe
Legislature’sim
petusw
asthe
recognitionthatm
orepeople
were
draftingtheir
own
wills
oncom
puters
withoutfollow
ingthe
necessaryform
alitiesto
executethem
.B
utthereis
no
reasonto
excuseform
alitiesonly
inholographic
wills,
andthe
Legislature
didn’tattemptto
doso.
Tothe
contrary,thesource
ofsection
6110is
Restatem
entsection3.3
(p.16,
ante),which
specificallyapplies
to
attorney-draftedw
illsas
wellas
holographicw
ills.(R
estatement,§
3.3,
corn.a,p.217,
com.b,illus.
2-4,pp.219-220.)
And
evenifthe
Radins
were
correct,theirargum
entwould
counsellessadherence
toform
alities
here,since
Irving’sw
illisholographic.
TheR
adius’argum
entboilsdow
nto
fearthatafact-finder
might
wrongly
interprettestatorintent.(A
nswer,pp.
19-20.)Thatis
always
possible.B
utitis
certainthatby
categoricallyprohibiting
reformation,
courtsw
illrefuseto
enforcew
illsthattestators
thoughttheyw
erem
aking.
And
althoughit
ispossible
thatatestatorm
ightlieabouta
will’s
content
becauseo
fsocialpressure(id.
atp.20),thatconcern
addressesthe
quality
ofthe
evidenceand
whetherthe
partyseeking
reformatipn
cancarry
its
23
burden,and
thenonly
ina
particularcircum
stance.It
isn’tareason
to
categoricallyprohibitreform
ationregardless
ofthe
typeor
strengthof
theevidence.5
D.
Allow
ingR
eformation
IsN
otAn
“Atta
ck”O
n
IntestacyLaw
s.
TheR
adinsclaim
thaturgingreform
ationreflects
“distrustofthe
intestacylaw
s”and
amounts
toan
“attack[on]the
wisdom
ofthe
intestacy
laws.”
(Answ
er,pp.22-23.)M
elodramatic,
andw
rong.
Reform
ationreflects
thedesire
toidentif~’and
carryoutclear
testatorintent.
Thereis
noaim
to“avoid
theintestacy
statutesatallcosts”
(ibid.),although
infactthe
lawdoes
seekto
avoidintestacy
(Inre
Estate
ofG
oyette(2004)
123C
al.App.4th
67,74
[noting“the
rulethatprefers
aconstruction
ofa
termofa
willthatavoids
complete
orpartial
intestacy”]).To
thecontrary,the
clearand
convincingstandard
puts
aheavy
burdenon
theparty
seekingreform
ation:The
defaultisto
deny
reformation,
evenw
henthatresults
inintestacy.
No
onedoubts
the“w
isdom”
ofintestacy
laws
intheirproper
context.A
sthe
Radins
state,intestacylaw
sdo
indeedsupportvaluable
socialfunctions,including
encouragingw
ealthaccum
ulationand
ensuring
~H
ere,any
suchargum
entisextrem
elyw
eak.For
onething,the
will
itselfsuggeststhe
gift.For
another,Irvingdid
notmention
thegiftin
some
unplannedsocialencounterw
ithsom
eonew
hom
ightexpectagift.
He
setup
them
eetingw
ithC
ityo
fHope
todiscuss
multiple
annuities,and
thatwas
why
hedescribed
hisw
ill.(See
Opening
Brief~p.
5.)W
hat’sm
ore,Irvingtold
City
ofH
opeabouthis
intentwith
respecttoJew
ishN
ationalFund—an
unrelatedentity
thatwas
notpresentandas
tow
hichthere
couldbe
noconceivable
socialpressure.
24
passageofclean
title.(A
nswer,p.22.)
Butpassing
propertyaccording
to
thetestator’s
intentservesthose
same
purposes.The
wisdom
ofintestacy
laws
isto
providean
ordero
fdispositionw
hentestator
intentdoesnot.
Itis
noattack
onthatw
isdomto
seekoutthe
testator’strue
intent.
IV.
TH
ISC
OU
RT
NE
ED
NO
TA
WA
ITLE
GIS
LA
TIV
EA
CT
ION
TO
MO
DE
RN
IZE
TH
EC
OM
MO
NL
AW
,A
TA
SK
TR
AD
ITIO
NA
LLY
WIT
HIN
TH
EC
OU
RT
’SP
UR
VIE
W.
A.
The
Parties
Agree
ThatN
oS
tatuteB
arsW
ill
Reform
ation.
Theopening
briefdemonstrated
thatjudicialconcernscreated
thebar
tow
illreformation
andthatno
statuteforecloses
judicialreconsideration.
(Opening
Brief,pp.
43-48.)The
Radins
donotdisagree.
Indeed,theironly
statutoryargum
entisthatstatutory
liberalizationsshould
notberead
as
encouragingjudicialadoption
ofreform
ation.(A
nswer,pp.
21-22,39-40.)
B.
This
CourtH
asT
raditionallyT
akenT
heLead
In
Beneficially
Evolving
TheLaw
.
TheR
adinssuggestthatthe
Courtshould
leavethe
issueto
the
Legislature.(Id.
atpp.39-40.)
Butthis
Courthas
nevershied
away
from
addressing“d
ifficult
issueso
fbroadapplication.
...“
(Dear
&Jessen,
‘Followed
Rates’A
ndLeading
StateCases,
1940-2005(2007)
41U
.C.
Davis
L.Rev.
683,707-709.)
Thatisam
ongthe
reasonsw
hy“the
California
Supreme
Courthas
been,and
continuesto
be,them
ost
‘followed’
statehigh
courtinthe
nation.”(Id.
atp.693.)
25
Nor
hasthe
Courtexpected
theLegislature
toacton
theC
ourt’s
behalfindeveloping
comm
onlaw
principles.It
is“w
ellestablished”that
staredecisis
mustbe
“sufficientlyflexible
toperm
itthiscourtto
reconsider,
andultim
atelyto
departfrom,
itsow
nprior
precedentinan
appropriate
case.”(Freem
an&
Mills,
Inc.v.B
eicherO
ilCo.(1995)
11C
al.4th85,93.)
Thepolicies
servedby
staredecisis
‘“shouldnotshield
court-createderror
fromcorrection.”
(Ibid.)“T
hisis
especiallyso
when,
ashere,the
error
[ina
prioropinion]
isrelated
toa
‘matter
ofcontinuing
concern’tothe
comm
unityatlarge.”
(Ibid.)
Likewise,
“reexamination
ofprecedentm
aybecom
enecessary
when
subsequentdevelopments
indicatean
earlierdecision
was
unsound,orhas
become
ripefor
reconsideration”based
onm
odemscholarly
criticism,
decisionso
fotherstates,and
therecognition
thattheprecedenthas
created
“inequitableresults”
and“w
illcontinueto
producesuch
effectsunless
and
until[this
Court]
overrule[s]it.”
(Id.atpp.
93,98-102.)Indeed,the
Court
undertooksuch
areexam
inationjustdays
beforethe
filingo
fthisbrief.
(Leungv.
VerdugoH
illsH
ospital(Aug.
23,2012,No.
S192768)
Cal.4th
—[2012
WL
3601616][overturning
comm
onlaw
ruleregarding
effectof
releaseofjo
inttortfeasor].)
Fulfilling
theC
ourt’scom
mon
lawrole
isparticularly
appropriate
here,where
resolutiono
ftheissue
involvescore
judicialfunctions—
balancingpolicies
regardinglegalpresum
ptionsand
theuse
ofextrinsic
evidence.
26
C.
Overw
helming
Scholarly
Com
mentary
Supports
TheR
estatement,A
sD
oesThe
Experience
OfS
tates
ThatH
aveA
doptedR
eformation.
Allrelevantfactors
pointtoadopting
theR
estatement:
Reform
ation
reflectsthe
overwhelm
ingscholarly
consensusand
hasbeen
acceptedby
agrow
ingnum
bero
fsisterstates.
Itrecognizesthatclearly-established
testator intentshouldnotbe
sacrificedon
thealtar
ofstiffform
alism.
And
inpractice,there
isno
indicationthatcourts
orpartieshave
sufferedthe
Radins’
imagined
paradeo
fhorribles.(~
II.B.l-2
,4,ante.)
Scholarship.
“Theunw
illingnesso
fcourtsto
reformw
illson
the
groundo
fmistake
hasbeen
stronglycriticized
bym
odemscholars.”
(Bogert’s
TrustsA
ndTrustees
(2011)§991
fn.11,citing
thew
orko
f
numerous
scholars.)The
Radins
don’tcitea
singlescholar
opposingw
ill
reformation.
(Seepp.
15-16&
fn.3,ante.)
Sisterstates.
According
tothe
Radins’tally,
sevenstates
have
adoptedreform
ation(A
nswer,pp.29-3
0),threestates
haverejected
the
Restatem
ent(id.atp.
30),and
many
statescontinue
tom
echanicallyapply
thetraditionalrule
withoutpausing
toreconsider
it(Id.atp.
32fn.
8).
TheR
adinssay
thisjust
isn’tenough.(Id.
atpp.33~
34.)6
6The
Radin’s
countneitherincludes
norexplicitly
excludesN
ewJersey’s
“probableintent”
rule,which
isa
reformation
look-alike.(Pp.
1,6,ante;O
peningBrief~,p.28
fn.5.)
Theyalso
claimthatone
ofthe
casesinvolved
“atrust,ratherthan
aw
ill.”(A
nswer,p.
30.)W
ordplay:C
arisonv.Sw
eeney,D
abagia,D
onoghue,Thorne,
Janes&
Pagos
(md.2009)
895N
.E.2d
1191involved
“thereform
ationo
ftrustprovisionsin
two
wills”
thatwere
“admitted
toprobate”
afterthedeath
ofthe
“Testators.”(Id.
atpp.1193-1194.)
27
•N
onsense.
ThisC
ourthasneverhesitated
toadopta
minority
rulew
henitis
the
fairand
rightthingto
do.(E
.g.,How
ellv.Ham
iltonM
eats&
Provisions,
Inc.(2011)
52C
al.4th541,
566fn.
10[adopting
minority
ruleon
damage
limits];Los
Angeles
County
Metropolitan
TransportationA
uthorityv.
ContinentalD
evelopmentC
orp.(1997)
16C
al.4th694,7
18-719[joining
“respectablem
inority”in
recognizingevidence
tobe
consideredfor
severancedam
ages].)M
oreover,theR
adins’argum
entignoresthose
cases
thatactuallyresortto
reformation
withoutexpressly
invokingthe
doctrine.
(Restatem
ent,§12.1,reporter’s
notes4,pp.
367-370;O
peningBrief~,
pp.19-22.)
Nor
dothe
Radins
saym
uchto
defendthe
threecourts
thathave
expresslyrejected
theR
estatement’s
view.
That’sbecause
thereisn’tm
uch
tosay.
As
theopening
briefdemonstrated,Flannery
v.McN
amara
(Mass.
2000)738
N.E
.2d739,
containslittle
reasoning.The
majority
assertedthat
reformation
would
violateM
assachusettsstatutes,w
hichobviated
theneed
forfurtherpolicy
analysis.(O
peningB
rief,pp.29-30.)Itthen
statedthatit
disagreedw
iththe
Restatem
ent’sand
othercases’rejection
offloodgates
fears.(Ibid.)
Theothertw
ocases
offereven
less:O
neinterm
ediateappellate
courtrefusedto
followthe
Restatem
entbecauseno
criticalmass
ofother
stateshad
yetdoneso
(Inre
LyonsM
aritalTrust(Minn.A
pp.2006)
717N
.W.2d
457,462)—
anapproach
thisC
ourthasconsistently
rejected.
And
atrial-levelcourtdeclined
tofollow
theR
estatementbecause
(1)the
courtfeltitwas
constrainedby
precedentand(2)
“forthe
reasonsstated”
28
inFlannery.
(Inre
LastW
ill&Testam
entofD
aland(D
el.Ch.
2010)2010
WL
716160,*5
)
Given
thatthesecourts
feltconstrainedby
existinglaw
andthatthey
saidprecious
littleaboutpolicy
considerations,itis
difficulttounderstand
howthe
Radins
canclaim
that“[ijtis
clear”thatthey“considered
thepublic
policy”behind
reformation
indeciding
torejectthe
Restatem
ent.(A
nswer,
pp.3
1-33.)
V.
TH
ER
EC
OR
DC
ON
TA
INS
MO
RE
TH
AN
SU
FF
ICIE
NT
EV
IDE
NC
ET
OA
LL
OW
RE
FO
RM
AT
ION
.
TheR
adinsclaim
thatevenifthe
Courtperm
itsw
illreformation,
it
shouldnotbe
availablein
thiscase.
Notso.
Thiscase
isa
prime
candidate
forreform
ation.
A.
Reform
ationIs
NotLim
itedT
oS
criveners’E
rrors.
According
tothe
Radins,“{t]he
Restatem
entallows
reformation
for
mistakes
arisingfrom
‘scriveners’errors.”
(Answ
er,p.34.)
Thatistrue
enough—various
comm
entsillustrate
reformation
tocure
scriveners’errors
orquote
casesdiscussing
scriveners’errors.
Butthe
Radins
arew
rongto
suggestthattheR
estatementonly
allows
reformation
ofscriveners’
errors—an
attorney’sm
istake,butnota
mistake
ofexpression
in
aholographic
will.
(Ibid.)
Nothing
inthe
Restatem
entevenhints
atsucha
limitation.
And
onceagain,the
Radins
don’tciteanything.
Indeed,theyseem
tocontradict
themselves
justone
paragraphlater:
“[T]he
Restatem
entitselfmakes
no
29
suchdistinction”
between
holographicw
illsand
wills
preparedby
attorneys.
(Id.atp.
35•)7
TheR
estatementis
premised
onreform
ation’savailability
forall
otherdocum
entsand
thelack
ofany
principledreason
toexceptw
ills—any
kindo
fwills.
(Restatem
ent,§12.1,
corn.c.)W
eare
aware
ofno
scrivener
onlylim
itationw
ithrespectto
otherdocum
ents,and
theR
estatement’s
authorsw
ouldhardly
haveintroduced
anovellim
itationforw
ill
reformation
withoutexplanation.
Thenotion
iseven
more
strainedgiven
thatSection
12.1applies
toall“donative
documents,”
which
would
mean
that,according
tothe
Radins,the
Restatem
entreducedreform
ation’sscope
fordonative
documents
otherthanw
ills.
Ifanything,
theneed
forreform
ationfor
holographicw
illsis
even
strongerthanfor
attorney-draftedw
ills.M
istakesofexpression—
eitherby
accidentallyincluding
anunintended
termorby
accidentallyom
itting
anintended
term—
area
functiono
fbeinghum
an.Itm
akesno
senseto
expectlayman
tobe
lesssusceptible
toerrors
thantrained
professionals.
‘~The
Radins
elsewhere
citeG
iamm
arrusco,supra,
171C
al.App.4th
at
p.1604
asholding
thatreformation
ofintervivos
trustsis
limited
to“a
scrivener’serror.”
(Answ
er,p.16.)
Iftheym
eanonly
anattorney’s
draftingerror,
Giam
marrusco
doesn’tsaythat.
Instead,itrefersto
thecourt’s
comm
onlaw
powerto
correcta“drafting
error.”(171
Cal.A
pp.4thatp.
1604.)Likew
ise,courts
haveobserved
thatcontractreformation
isavailable
forerrors
“dueto
anoversightor
dueto
anerror
ofa
scrivener.”(A
ppalachianIns.
Co.v.M
cDonnellD
ouglasC
orp.(1989)
214C
al.App.3d
1,21,em
phasisadded.)
30
B.
TheR
ecordC
ontainsM
oreT
hanS
ufficientEvidence
To
SupportA
Finding
OfC
learA
ndC
onvincingE
vidence
ConsistentW
ithThe
Restatem
ent’sV
iew.
TheC
ourtofA
ppealthoughtIrving’sintentw
asplain:
Itis
clearthat[Irving]
meantto
disposeofhis
estatethrough
hisbequests,
firsttohis
wife
and,shouldshe
predeceasehim
,
thento
thecharities.
Itis
difficulttoim
aginethatafter
leavingspecific
giftsto
thecharities
inthe
names
and
mem
orieso
fbelovedfam
ilym
embers,Irving
intendedthem
totake
effectonlyin
theeventthathe
andhis
wife
died
“atthesam
em
oment.”
(Slip
Opn.,p.
12.)Irving
“intentionallyom
ittedallotherpersons,w
hether
heirsor
otherwise”
(AA
122-123)—individuals
who
hadceased
allcontact
with
himand
who
consideredhim
“evil.”
(AA
18,20-21,31,36,70-7
1,79,
81.)The
courtfurtherfound
that,unlikein
Estate
ofB
arnes(1965)
63
Cal.2d
580,extrinsicevidence
confirmed
theevidentintento
fIrving’sw
ill:
Irvingcontinued
tom
akedonations
tothe
charitiesand
toldC
ityofH
ope
that hehad
previouslym
adea
willthatlefthis
estateto
City
ofH
opeand
Jewish
NationalFund.
(Slip
Opn.,p.
12.)Indeed,the
Courto
fAppeal
thoughtIrving’sintentw
asso
clearthatitsreluctantaffirm
ancecalled
on
thisC
ourt“toconsiderw
hetherthereare
casesw
heredeeds
speaklouder
thanw
ordsw
henevaluating
anindividual’s
testamentary
intent.”(Id.
at
pp.12-13.)
Againstthis
backdrop,theR
adinsm
akeseveralm
eritlessargum
ents.
31
First,
themselves
relyingon
extrinsicevidence,the
Radins
arguethat
Irvingw
ouldhave
intendedto
benefithisnephew
sand
othersurviving
family
mem
bersw
hosupposedly
continuedto
thinkofhim
astheir
uncle.
(Answ
er,pp.3-4,23-24,
38&
fn.10.)
Theargum
entmisstates
the
evidenceand
relieson
testimony
thatwould
beexcluded
attrial.8B
utin
anyevent,these
sortsofdisputes
arefor
thetrier
offact.
Theydo
not
undercuttheexistence
ofevidence
fromw
hichajudge
couldfind,by
clear
andconvincing
evidence,thatIrvingintended
tobenefitthe
charitiesifhis
wife
predeceasedhim
—an
intentthattheC
ourtofA
ppealthought“clear.”
(Slip
Opn.,p.
12.)
Second,theR
adinssay
thatinterpretingIrving’s
intentis“sim
ply
speculation.”(A
nswer,pp.
37-39.)A
gain,thatisa
matter
forthefact-
finder.A
sthe
Courto
fAppealindicated,both
theterm
so
fIrving’sw
ill
andthe
extrinsicevidence
providem
orethan
enoughbasis
forajudge
to
determine
thatIrvingclearly
intendedto
benefitthecharities.
TheR
adins
justdismiss
thatevidence.For
instance,theysay
thatIrvingm
ighthave
intendedto
make
charitablegifts
inloving
mem
oryofdeceased
family
mem
bersonly
inthe
oddevento
fsimultaneous
death(id.
atp.39),
improbable
thoughthatw
ouldbe.
And
theyignore
Irving’sstatem
entsto
City
ofH
ope.
8For
instance,theR
adinsclaim
that“Irving
specificallydisinherited
his
brotherHarry”
whereas
theR
adinsare
“sonsofIrving’s
‘belovedsister’
Rose.”
(Answ
er,p.38
&fn.
10.)B
utIrving’sw
illgaveH
arry$1
andin
aseparate
provisionspecifically
omitted
everyoneelse,including
theR
adins:“I
haveintentionally
omitted
allotherpersons,whetherheirs
orotherw
ise,who
arenotspecifically
mentioned
herein..
..“
(AA
122-123.)
32
Third,theR
adinsclaim
thatwhathappened
herew
asnota
mistake
ofexpression
butratherIrving’sfailure
toplan
forw
hatshouldoccur
ifhis
wife
predeceasedhim
.(A
nswer,pp.24,
34-35,37-39.)
Yetagain,thatis
aquestion
forthe
trieroffact.
As
theC
ourtofA
ppealexplained,thereis
more
thanenough
evidenceto
findIrving’s
“clear”intent,torpedoed
by
mistaken
expression.N
othingsuggests
thathejustfailed
toconsiderthe
possibilitythathis
wife
coulddie
beforehim
orthathedid
notcarew
hat
would
happenin
thosecircum
stances.
Fourth,the
Radins
notethatthe
Restatem
entdoesnotauthorize
reformation
to“m
odifya
documentin
ordertogive
effecttothe
donor’s
post-executionchange
ofm
indorto
compensate
forother
changesin
circumstances.”
(Restatem
ent,§12.1,corn.h.;A
nswer,pp.
34-35.)
That
isn’tatissuehere.
Thecharities
havenever
suggestedthatIrving’s
intent
changedafterhe
executedhis
will.
Nor
havethey
suggestedthathis
wife’s
deathw
asan
unanticipatedevent(i.e.,
achanged
circumstance
when
it
happened).R
ather,they
contendthatIrving
always
intendedthe
charitiesto
behis
beneficiariesifhis
wife
didnotsurvive
him—
anintentunartfully
expressed.The
Radins
arefree
toargue
thatIrvingnever
consideredthe
matter.
Butonce
again,thatisan
argumentforthe
fact-finder.
33
VI.
TH
EIM
PLIE
DG
IFT
DO
CT
RIN
EA
FF
OR
DS
AV
IAB
LE
,IF
LIM
ITE
D,
PA
TH
TO
RE
AC
HT
HE
FA
IRA
ND
EQ
UIT
AB
LE
RE
SU
LTIN
TH
ISC
AS
E.
Inthe
alternative,theopening
briefurgedthatthe
Courtcould
alter
theim
pliedg
iftdoctrine
toallow
extrinsicevidence
tobetter
determine
the
testator’sactualintent.
(Opening
Brief,pp.
38-42.)
TheR
adinsrespond
thatimplied
giftsare
limited
forpolicy
reasons
andthatconsideration
ofextrinsic
evidencew
ould“undercutthe
whole
notiono
fimplied
gifts.”(A
nswer,pp.
36-37.)W
ell,sure.
Thatisw
hythe
charitiessoughtreview
—to
changethe
lawto
reflectam
orem
odem
approachthatbetterbalances
policyconsiderations.
TheR
adinsdo
notaddressthe
unjustenrichmentissues
orthepolicy
goalofeffectuating
testatorintent.
Nor
dothey
addressthe
implied
gift
doctrine’sfundam
entalpremise—
thatwhere
aw
illisincom
plete,courts
shouldtry
todeterm
inetestator
intentbeforeresorting
tointestacy
rules.
Instead,theyraise
onlyone
policyargum
ent:Thatabandoning
thefour
cornersrule
“willjettison[]
theform
alitiesrequired
forwills.”
(Id.at
pp.37-3
8.)W
ehave
alreadydem
onstratedthatslavish
adherenceto
those
formalities
shouldnotstand
inthe
way
ofhonoring
actualtestatorintent.
(~III.C
.,ante.)
Beyond
this,theR
adinsofferno
realresponseto
thecharities’
demonstration
thatthefour
cornersrule
shouldatleastbe
liberalized
(1)as
regardso
fholographicw
ills(w
herem
istakesare
farmore
likely)or
(2)w
herethe
willitselfstrongly
suggeststhatthe
literallanguagecontains
34
am
istakeand
extrinsicevidence
servesa
confirming
role(as
theC
ourtof
Appealthoughtoccurred
here).
Although
thecharities
continueto
believethatreform
ationis
the
simplestapproach,
liberalizingthe
implied
giftdoctrinerem
ains
analternative
thatpermits
justiceto
bedone
inthis
andsim
ilarcases.
CO
NC
LUS
ION
As
theR
estatementand
anum
berofsister
stateshave
recognized,
thereis
noprincipled
reasonto
allowstrictform
alismto
trump
testator
intentestablishedby
clearand
convincingevidence.
History
provesthatthe
Radins’
fearso
fopeningthe
floodgateso
flitigationhave
nobasis
inreality.
Itis
time
forC
aliforniato
modernize
itsview
oftestam
entarydocum
ents.
TheC
ourtofA
ppeal’sand
trialcourt’sjudgm
entsshould
berevers
Dated:A
ugust28,2012
Respectfully
submitted,
OLD
MA
N,
CO
OLE
Y,
SA
LLUS
,G
OLD
,B
IRN
BE
RG
,&
CO
LEM
AN
,LLPSusan
Cooley
RO
DR
IGU
EZ,
HO
RII,
CH
OI&
CA
FF
ER
AT
Reynolds
Cafferata
BE
NE
DO
N&
SE
RLIN
Gerald
Serlin
Douglas
Benedon
GR
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,MA
RT
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STE
IN&
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eadowR
obertA.
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ffrey
E.Raskin
Attorneys
forC
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andA
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FU
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andC
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OF
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FC
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IAN
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Counselo
fRecord
herebycertifies
that,pursuanttoC
aliforniaR
ules
ofC
ourt,rule8.204(c)(1)
theR
EP
LYIN
SU
PP
OR
TO
FB
RIE
FO
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ITS
isproduced
using13-pointR
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typeincluding
footnotes
andcontains
8,220w
ords,which
isless
thanthe
totalwords
permitted
by
therules
ofcourt.
Counselrelies
onthe
word
countofthe
computer
programused
toprepare
thisbrief.
A/I~
Dated:A
ugust28,2012~I~I,j7C-.
7C_—
~/19’Jeffrey
E.Raskin
36
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OO
FO
FS
ER
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ilshireBoulevard,
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Avenue,Suite3500
LosAngeles,C
alifornia90071
Counselfo
rR
espondentsR
obertand
Seym
ourRadin
Clerk
oftheC
ourtC
aliforniaC
ourtofAppealSecond
AppellateD
istrict,Division
Four300
S.SpringStreet,Floor2
North
Tower
LosAngeles,C
alifornia90013-1213
(Court
ofA
ppealCase
No.B227954)
Wilfrid
Roberge
Donahue
GallagherW
oods1999
Harrison
Street,25thFloor
Oakland,C
alifornia94612
Counselfo
rR
espondentsR
obertand
Seym
ourR
adin
Mary-C
hristineS
ungaila,Snell&
Wilm
erLLP600
Anton
Blvd.,
Suite1400
CostaM
esa,California
92626C
ounselfor
Plaintiffs
andR
espondentsR
obertand
Seym
ourR
adin
Clerk
forThe
Honorable
MitchellB
eckloffLos
AngelesSuperiorC
ourt111
North
HillStreet
LosAngeles,C
alifornia90012
(LAS
CC
aseN
o.BP108971)
(X)
By
Envelope:
byplacing
atrue
copythereofenclosed
insealed
envelopesaddressed
asabove
anddelivering
suchenvelopes:
(X)
By
Mail:
As
follows:
Iam
“readilyfam
iliar”w
iththis
firm’s
practiceo
fcollectionand
processingcorrespondence
form
ailing.U
nderthatpractice,
itwould
bedeposited
with
United
StatesP
ostalService
onthatsam
eday
with
postagethereon
fullyprepaid
atLosA
ngeles,C
aliforniain
theordinary
courseo
fbusiness.I
amaw
arethaton
motion
ofparty
served,service
ispresum
edinvalid
ifpostalcancellationdate
orpostagem
eterdate
ism
orethan
1day
afterdate
ofdepositfor
mailing
inaffidavit.
Executed
onA
ugust28,2012,
atLosA
ngeles,C
alifornia.
(X)
(State)
Ideclare
underpenaltyo
fperjuryunderthe
laws
ofthe
StateofC
aliforniathatthe
foregoingis
trueand
correct.Chance
.Lawrie
ST
AT
EO
FC
AL
IFO
RN
IA,
CO
UN
TY
OF
LOS
AN
GE
LE
S
Iam
employed
inthe
County
ofLos
Angeles,
Stateo
fCalifornia.
Iam
overtheage
of
18and
notapanty
tothe
within
action;m
ybusiness
addressis
5900W
ilshireB
oulevard,12th
Floor,LosA
ngeles,C
alifornia90036.O
nA
ugust28,2012,I
servedthe
foregoingdocum
entdescribedas:
RE
PLY
OF
BR
IEF
ON
TH
EM
ER
ITS
onthe
partiesin
thisaction
by