in 1999, nobel laureate, amartya sen wrote a book on...

1 Cory & Duffy-Dual Motive Theory in India-Sen

DUAL MOTIVE THEORY IN INDIA: AN ANALYSIS OF Amartya Sen's Development as Freedom

Gerald A. Cory, Jr.San Jose State University

International Technological University

Mikel DuffyInternational Technological University

Abstract

Dual motive theory, deriving from and anchored in brain physiology, permits a new perspective

on economic and political development. It is a well-known academic challenge that the

contemporary social sciences (political science, sociology and economics) lack a comprehensive

theory of development. In 1999, Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen, taking a new turn, wrote a book

on development as freedom. He cited the expansion of freedom as both the primary aim and

principal means of development. He saw a deep complementarity between individual agency and

social arrangements with the market mechanism, itself, as deriving from the more fundamental

way humans live and interact with each other naturally—interchanging words, goods, and gifts

(1999: xii, 6-7). In the statement of this thesis, Sen builds, then, upon the well-worn Smithian

assumptions about the human tendency to "truck and barter" (Smith 1776). Such assumptions,

although taken as obvious givens by economic writers, must ultimately rest upon factors of

human nature. But human nature itself, a traditionally poorly defined and testily argued concept,

must, in turn, rest ultimately on human physiology. The arguable nature of human nature derived

historically from the lack of scientific understanding of human physiology—specifically the

physiology of the human brain. Late 20th century science has fortunately effectively closed that

knowledge gap and the assumptions of Sen and Smith can be anchored securely in the evolved

architecture of the human brain. The new findings, coming primarily from evolutionary

neuroscience and medical physiology, clarify and correct traditional economic assumptions

thereby anchoring economics in the more fundamental natural sciences in a manner previously

not possible. The authors explore the implications for economic and political development from

this new perspective.

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INTRODUCTION

It is a well known challenge that the contemporary social sciences (political science, sociology

and economics) lack a comprehensive theory of development. In 1999, Nobel Laureate, Amartya

Sen, taking a new turn, wrote a book on development as freedom. He cited the expansion of

freedom as both the primary aim and principal means of development. He saw a deep

complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements with the market mechanism,

itself, as deriving from the more fundamental way humans live and interact with each other

naturally— interchanging words, goods, and gifts (1999: xii, 6—7). In the statement of this

thesis, Sen builds then upon the well-worn Smithian assumptions about the human tendency to

"truck and barter" (Smith 1776: Bk I, Ch 2).

Such assumptions, although taken as obvious givens by economic writers, must

ultimately rest upon factors of human nature. But human nature itself, a traditionally poorly

defined and testily argued concept, must, in turn, rest ultimately on human physiology. The

arguable nature of human nature derived historically from the lack of scientific understanding of

human physiology—specifically the physiology of the human brain. Late 20th century science

has fortunately effectively closed that knowledge gap and the assumptions of Sen and Smith can

be examined. refined, and anchored securely in the evolved architecture of the human brain. The

new findings, coming primarily from medical physiology and evolutionary neuroscience, clarify

and correct traditional economic assumptions thereby anchoring economics in the more

fundamental natural sciences in a manner previously not possible. In the pages that follow we

will present these new findings followed by a preliminary analysis of the essential conditions for

development with commentary on Sen's proposition of development as freedom.

THE SOCIAL EXCHANGE BRAIN

The brain is a physiological organ. That is a fundamental fact of science. The gene-specified

neural circuits or architecture constitute that fundamental physiology. And physiologically, the

human brain is also a social brain. The emergence of the social brain concept, emphasizing both

the self-preservational (self-interested) and affectional (other-interested) components necessary to

social exchange, has been landmarked by the publication of two recent handbooks—Foundations

in Social Neuroscience (Cacioppo, et al. 2002) and Handbook of Affective Sciences (Davidson, et

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al. 2003)(see also, Cory & Gardner 2002). Earlier, but still recent volumes included Descartes’

Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (Damasio 1994), The Integrative Neurobiology of

Affiliation (Carter, et al. 1997) and Affective Neuroscience (Panksepp 1998). Cory’s The

Reciprocal Modular Brain in Economics and Politics (1999) and The Consilient Brain: The

Bioneurological Basis of Economics, Society, and Politics (2004) represent efforts to tie these

new findings graphically, algorithmically, and mathematically to behavioral economics. Recent

years have thus brought great advances in detailing the many complex and interrelated pathways

of brain’s interactive social circuitry.

The social circuitry was forged over millions of years of evolutionary history in small

kinship groups which required a cooperative interactive dynamic for survival. These dynamic

social circuits motivate human social interaction and social exchange at all levels of our lives

today. Like many other physiological processes—for example: blood pressure, body temperature,

glucose level—that mediate between our internal and external environments, these social circuits

are homeostatically regulated (see, Wilson & Cory 2008; Cory 2004; Herbert & Schulkin 2002;

Bloom, et al. 2001, esp. pp 167-206; Kandel, et. al. 2000: 871–997; Nelson, 2000, esp. pp. 447–

494; Lapeyre & Lledo 1994; Becker, et al. 1992; Cannon 1932). In fact, the broader term

allostatic, which means adaptive, perhaps better describes the social circuitry’s rather wide,

variable, and modifiable set points and boundaries (see McEwen 2002; McEwen & Seeman 2003;

Sterling & Eyer 1981).

The social brain concept can be easily extended and titled the social exchange brain. The

social architecture of the brain drives all levels of social exchange and, as Sen noted above, all

human social activity is in the nature of exchange—from words or conversations (even to smiles

and frowns), to gifts, goods, and services.

THE EVOLUTIONARY BACKGROUND

Leading evolutionary neuroscientist Paul MacLean, long time head of the Laboratory of Brain

Evolution and Behavior of the National Institutes of Health, pioneered the study of the neural

circuitry substrating the brain’s social architecture. Unfortunately for science, in some quarters of

neuroscience, the tri-level concept of MacLean has been gratuitously and unjustifiably referred to

as "outdated." Such statements are clearly based on transient, trivial, nonscientific issues of

"fashion" and general ignorance of his work rather than good science. In his 1990 masterwork,

The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Functions, MacLean gives us a seminal,

comprehensive, and guiding framework for medical physiology, psychiatry, and especially the

emerging disciplines associated with evolutionary neural physiology and evolutionary

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epidemiology (see Patlolla 2008, this session). Recently, numerous works testify eloquently to the

currency and importance of MacLean's work. Among such works are a current volume on

evolutionary epidemiology (Wilson & Cory 2008), an entire issue of the journal Physiology and

Behavior (2003) and a comprehensive and influential volume, The Evolutionary Neuroethology

of Paul MacLean (Cory & Gardner, 2002). The latter volumes report the contributions of

numerous outstanding scholars applying insights gained from the MacLeanian perspective. Other

recent works, too numerous to mention here, support the currency and importance of MacLean's

work (e.g., see also Panksepp, 2002; Stevens & Price, 2000). Tom Insel, current head of the US

National Institutes of Mental Health and a prominent neuroscientist himself, notably commented

in the New York Times obituary of MacLean that MacLean’s research had opened the door for

neuroscience to “ask big questions about consciousness and philosophy, instead of the more

tractable questions about vision and movement.” (NYT, 1/10/08).

MacLean, taking an evolutionary perspective, tells us that the primary function of the

human brain is the preservation of the individual self and the human species. Although this may

be said of the nervous system of any organism which must survive as an individual to reproduce,

MacLean leads us to consider not just automatisms or tightly prewired instinctual mechanisms

but the evolved social architecture or circuitry of the human brain upon which social choices are

made. His concept of brain evolution, appropriately updated, provides the necessary conceptual

platform for this undertaking. For a detailed, documented critique and update of MacLean’s

concepts see Cory 1999, 2002a, 2004).

The warmblooded, nurturing mammalian circuits, overlaying and interconnected with the

earlier self-preserving circuitry of our earlier vertebrate ancestry, became the basis of family life

and our capacity for extended social bonding (e.g. see Carter & Keverne 2002, Numan & Insel

2003). Without knowledge of neuroscience, such scholars as Bowlby (1969), Harlow & Harlow

(1965), and Harlow (1986) earlier identified these behaviors as forming the basis of infant-mother

attachment and affectional relations. These mammalian characteristics were neurally integrated

with the life-support functional and behavioral circuitry of the earlier self-preserving circuitry to

allow for the emergence of our higher brain centers.

The unique features of our human brain were refined over a period of several million

years in a mainly kinship based foraging society where sharing or reciprocity was necessary to

our survival (e.g., see Humphrey 1976, Isaac 1978, Knauft 1994, Erdal & Whiten 1996, Boehm

1999). Such sharing and reciprocity strengthened the adaptive evolution of the now combined

mammalian characteristics of self-preservation and affection. Ego and empathy, self-interest and

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other-interest, are key dual features of our personal and social behavior deriving from these basic

motivational circuits.

The CSN model (Figure 1), developed by Cory, represents the two opposing archetypal

circuits of self-preservation and affection, which become represented as Ego and Empathy in the

higher brain centers of executive circuitry that serves to cognitively mediate their tug and pull in

social exchange activity. The CSN Model is based upon the evidence from a large body of

physiological and medical research on primates and humans beginning in 1930s through 1950s

and continuing to the present day in medical and evolutionary neuroscience. The research

includes evidence from psychosurgery practices of the mid-century (leukotomy, lobotomy, etc.;

e.g. see Fulton, 1952; Freeman & Watts, 1950) in which the connecting cables between those

circuitries and the frontal brain centers were surgically lesioned in lobotomies and similar

procedures, producing frequently a clinical deactivation or "flat effect" in motivation—that is,

reduced or no Ego or Empathy. The additional extensive documentation in brain physiology

underlying the CSN Model is omitted here for the sake of brevity and because its highly technical

nature is of interest primarily to the specialist. Readers interested in such documentation may

wish to consult the lead author’s more detailed works (e.g., Cory 1999, 2000b, 2004; and Cory &

Gardner 2002; Wilson & Cory 2008).

THE CONFLICT SYSTEMS NEUROBEHAVIORAL (CSN) MODEL

Figure 1. The Conflict Systems Neurobehavioral (CSN) model. A simplified cutaway

representation of the brain showing the behavioral programs (or circuits) and the derivation of

Ego/self-interested and Empathy/other-interested motives and behaviors. I should note that earlier

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models, e.g. Freud (id, ego, and superego). Freud, however, was unable to tie his model to brain

circuitry and it remained ungrounded in neural science because brain research had simply not

advanced to that point (see Cory 1999, 2000ab, 2001ab, 2002b, 2003, 2004, 2006ab)

Each circuit of the CSN model is an inseparable part of our makeup, because each is

coded into our genes by the process of evolution. Behavioral conflict potentially exists, then,

simply by virtue of the presence of these two large-scale dynamic circuitries in our lives—up and

running even prior to birth. As an expression of the homeostatic regulatory process, behavioral

tension, which we may subjectively experience as frustration, anxiety, or anger, occurs whenever

one of our two fundamental behavioral programs—self-preservation or affection—is activated

but meets with some resistance or difficulty that blocks its satisfactory expression.

Behavioral tension serves as an dynamic internal emotional compass that we can use to

guide ourselves through the often complicated and treacherous pathways of interpersonal

exchange relations.

Behavioral stress tells us that we are exceeding safe limits for ourselves and others, and

for our larger social, economic and political structures.

THE MAJOR RANGES OF RECIPROCAL SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

The two master, inclusive circuits or programs of self-preservation and affection operate as global

state variables (see Panksepp 2002; cf. Schulkin 2002, who refers to central motive states) to

shape our social exchange behavior.

The major ranges of the CSN model (Figure 2) illustrate the features of this Ego-Empathy

dual dynamic. In the display, social behavior is divided from right to left into three main ranges

called the egoistic range, the dynamic balance range, and the empathetic range. Each range

represents a varying mix of egoistically and empathetically motivated behaviors. The solid line

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stands for ego and pivots on the word “Ego” in the executive program of our brain diagram. The

broken line stands for Empathy and pivots on the word “Empathy” in the diagram.

Figure 2. The Major Ranges/modes of Behavior. To simplify the graph, the three points are

intended to mark the center points of each range, with varying mixes of Ego and Empathy on

either side of each point. The graph thus intends to communicate, not a zero-sum, either/or set of

behavioral options or expressions but a spectrum of the increasing or decreasing (depending on

direction of movement) proportions of Ego and Empathy in behavior. The graph represents only

what may be thought of as central tendencies of interactive behavior, and is far too simple to

represent all the shadings of emotion and motivation (see Cory 1999, 2000ab, 2001ab, 2002b,

2003, 2004, 2006ab).

The Egoistic Range

The egoistic range indicates behavior dominated by self-preservation programming.

Since the two behavioral programs are locked in inseparable unity, empathy is present here, but to

a lesser degree. Behavior in this range is self-centered or self- interested and may tend, for

example, to be dominating, power-seeking, or even attacking, where empathy is less. When

empathy is increased, ego behavior will become less harsh and may be described more

moderately as controlling, competitive, or assertive. As empathy is gradually increased, the

intersection of the two lines of the diagram will be drawn toward the range of dynamic balance.

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Ego behavior will be softened as empathy is added. But the defining characteristic of the

egoistic, self-interested range is self-over-others. Whether we are blatantly power-seeking or

more moderately assertive, in this range we are putting ourselves, our own priorities and feelings,

ahead of others.

The Empathetic Range

The empathetic range represents behavior weighted in favor of empathy. Ego is present,

but is taking a back seat. When ego is present to a minimal degree, empathetic behavior may tend

to extremes of self-sacrifice and submission. When ego is increased, empathetic behaviors

become moderated and may be described as supportive, responsive, or any of a variety of “others

first” behaviors. As the influence of ego is gradually added, empathetic behavior will approach

the range of dynamic balance. In the empathetic range, the key phrase to remember is others-

over-self or others first. Whether we are at the extreme of self-sacrifice or more moderately

responsive, we are putting the priorities and feelings of others ahead of our own.

The Dynamic Balance Range

The range of dynamic balance represents a working balance between ego and empathy.

At this point our behavioral programs are operating in roughly equal measure. I speak of

“working,” “rough,” or “dynamic” balance because the tug-and-pull between the two programs

continues ceaselessly. The dynamic nature of the circuitry means that “perfect” balance may be a

theoretical point, unattainable in practice. Our more balanced behavior tends to be characterized

by equality, justice, sharing, and other behaviors which show respect for ourselves and others. In

fact, respect for self and others is the keynote of the range of dynamic balance. In essence,

dynamic balance represents the range of optimal social rationality and minimal behavioral

tension in social exchange activities.

The interplay of the dual primary circuits allows for the emergence of reciprocity in our

social exchange behavior.

RECIPROCITY: THE UNIVERSAL NORM

The norm of reciprocity expressing our social neural architecture has long been a major theme in

anthropology and sociology (e.g., see Gouldner 1960, van Baal 1975) and more recently in

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economics (e.g., Fehr & Gachter 2000, Bowles & Gintis 1998, esp. ch. 17; Cory 1999, 2004;

Gintis 2000; Eckel & Grossman 1997). Reciprocity is essentially a dual motive process. This

universally observed norm, found in all societies, primitive and modern, has been accounted for,

or shown to be possible, in evolutionary theory by such concepts as kin selection, inclusive

fitness (Hamilton 1964), reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971, 1981) (Alexander 1987), and game

theory (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981, Maynard Smith 1982). These efforts draw upon so-called

gene-centered perspectives, which see such reciprocity as basically selfish. More recently

extensive reciprocity seen as based not upon selfishness, but empathy, has been reportedly

observed in the behavior of rhesus monkeys (de Waal 1996). F. de Waal’s approach is a welcome

departure that tries to escape the selfishness of gene-centered approaches and looks to the implied

motivational mechanisms. All these approaches, however, to include that of de Waal’s, have been

based on the external observation of behavior. They have not attempted to identify or even

speculate upon the neural mechanisms within the organism that must necessarily have been

selected for by the evolutionary process to accomplish the functions of motivating, maintaining,

and rewarding such observed reciprocal behavior.

According to the CSN model of our neural architecture, reciprocity through conflict is

achieved in the range of dynamic balance where behavioral tension operating freely tends to pull

us. Taking the dynamic balance range to be approaching or approximating the equilibrium of ego

and empathy as driven by behavioral tension, we can derive a formula that expresses this

dynamic.

THE EQUATION OF SOCIALITY OR SOCIAL EXCHANGE

The homeostatic reciprocal interplay of our archetypal circuits approaching equilibrium can be

stated mathematically in the form of the equation of sociality or social exchange. The explication

of the equation is presented using abbreviations of the actual terms rather than the usual letter

symbols of economics. This is done to facilitate the maintenance of continuity across disciplines

and to aid the non-mathematical reader to more easily follow the transitions in presentation. The

equation is expressed as approaching equilibrium or dynamic balance.

BT = Ego or Emp = 1 (dynamic balance, approx. equilibrium or unity) Emp Ego

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In the above formula BT stands for behavioral tension and is a function of the ratio of ego

to empathy or vice versa. Because of the physiological homeostatic nature of the dynamic either

ego or empathy can serve as the numerator or denominator to accurately reflect the magnitude of

behavioral tension. The degree of convergence or divergence is what is of interest.

This equation gives basic mathematical expression to the social exchange architecture of

our evolved brain structure. As the conflicting circuits of our social architecture approach

equilibrium or dynamic balance (represented by the symbolic approximation to unity or dynamic

balance, ± 1), behavioral tension/stress are minimized. On the other hand, as the ratios diverge

increasingly toward the extremes of Ego or Empathy, behavioral tension increases. That is, if we

have an empathy magnitude of 8 and an ego magnitude of 4, or vice-versa, we have a behavioral

tension magnitude of 2. At a minimum the neural dynamic serves generally to keep our social

behavior, homeostatically, within survival limits which accounts for its Darwinian selection. On

the other hand, at the level of optimal functioning the interactive circuits, driven by behavioral

tension, tend to move us toward dynamic balance of ego and empathy or self and other interest;

that is, balanced reciprocity, or equality. The formula, therefore, is very simple, but deceptively

so, because it can be quite variable and can ramify in many ways (for more extensive proofs of

the equation see Cory 2006ab).

THE EVOLUTION OF THE MARKET

To understand the behavior of the modern day free enterprise market as it is shaped by our

inherited brain structure and behavior, it is helpful to go back to early times—to reconstruct as

best we can the days before the market appeared. For a discussion and documentation in detail

see Cory (2004, 1999).

The Family or Group Bond

In those times, when people consumed what they produced, the excess that they shared

with, gave to, or provided for the needs or demands of the family or community was in the nature

of natural affection or empathy. The reward for the empathetic, supplying act was emotional—

there was not a specific, but a diffuse value assigned to it. It also had social effects—the givers,

providers gaining status in the group. The emotional and the social effects were both directly

governed by the reciprocal algorithms of behavior.

Let us look more closely. The provider, say the warrior brought meat from the hunt or the

wife brought berries and fruits from the field, tanned skins, and so on, to give to the family or

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group. The act of providing, giving, created behavioral tension in the giver, who acting

empathetically denied ego to some degree and required a response of acknowledgment, gratitude,

respect, affection, or some other reaffirmation of ego. This providing or giving also created

behavioral tension in the receivers. It was a service to their ego, their needs or demands—to their

own preservation—which created tension requiring an offsetting empathetic response, a thank-

you, an expression of appreciation or respect. In any family or close group, even now, this

dynamic flows constantly, even in the smallest activities. In the small group the rewards, the

reciprocations of such social exchange, are largely not quantified, but are diffuse. They become

obligations—bonds—that hold the group together for protection or mutual survival. Nevertheless,

they must achieve some approximation of balance or the unresolved tension will build within the

group and become disruptive. Expressions for thank you and you’re welcome, found in all known

human languages, reflect this reciprocity in social exchange activity.

The Gift

From these early, primitive behavioral exchanges, emerged the gift: an empathetic act of

providing or serving that followed the same algorithmic behavioral rules that governed provision

for survival. It created tension in the giver—an expectation of reciprocity—and tension in the

receiver, who was bound to reciprocate. The rewards associated with the gift were diffuse,

unspecified, unquantified—except by some subjective measure of feeling, emotion, or behavioral

tension. A gift to a warrior or chief might vaguely obligate his protection. A gift to a prospective

mate might vaguely obligate his or her attentions. The gift economy of so-called primitive

peoples—an important theme in anthropology—operated in this way (e.g. see, Mauss 1990

[1925]; Bohannon 1963; Cheal 1988; Godelier, 1999; Gérard-Varet, et al., 2000; Davis 2000;

Fennell 2002).

From Gift to Transaction

From the gift evolved the transaction—namely the gift with the reciprocal specified or

quantified (e.g., see, Mauss, 1990[1925], Polanyi 1957, Sahlins 1972, Gregory 1982, Appadurai

1986, Seymour-Smith 1986, 44, Barfield, 1997, 73; Hunt 2002; Osteen 2002). The transaction is

the beginning of the contract, perhaps of the market itself. The transaction operates, however, by

the same behavioral dynamic as the gift—except that it attempts to head off the residual,

unresolved behavioral tension that creates a condition of obligation or bonding. After all, in the

market, we may be dealing with strangers not to be seen again. Nevertheless, it retains its

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essential mammalian characteristics as an act of empathy, of nurturing, which requires a

balancing reciprocal act in payment to ego.

When we encounter its equivalent in the impersonalized market economy of today, how

often do we feel the subjective experience of the transaction? We take our sick child to the

physician, who empathetically and carefully applies the knowledge it took 10 years and a fortune

to gain. We pay the bill—that is, we make a return gift with money that represents a portion of

our accumulated education and labor. The scenario is repeated in transactions with the plumber,

the carpenter, the computer maker. The behavioral algorithms still apply, but the feeling, the

subjective experience has to a large degree been lost.

Behavioral Tension Yet Drives the Transaction

But wait! Let the transaction go wrong, the expected reciprocals not be forthcoming and

the behavioral tension becomes immediately and personally felt. The reality of the transaction—

the market—reveals itself with clarity and intensity. No one likes to be cheated or short-changed.

And most will be motivated to take some action to correct the imbalance in expected reciprocity

or harbor the behavioral tension indefinitely to be acted upon in the future. The dockets of our

small claims courts are filled with cases reflecting the tension of such unbalanced reciprocity.

The evolution of the transactional market (demand and supply) as shaped by neural

architecture can be summarized in Figure 3.

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Figure 3. Evolution of Market Exchange Based on Dynamics of Neural Architecture.

METAECONOMICS AND THE DUALITY OF MOTIVES

From the transactional perspective, the CSN model also provides under-pinning for what is called

metaeconomics and the question of multiple motives or utilities (Hayes & Lynne 2004; Lynne

1999, 2000; Lutz 1993; Etzioni 1986). The CSN model shows that the tug and pull between Ego

and Empathy goes on constantly within us and between us as we interact socially. To the extent

that our economic transactions or choices are social, and they inevitably are, they will involve the

tug-and-pull of ego and empathy to some degree. The very nature of social or market exchange is

dual or transactional necessitating give and take. The idea that we make independent choices

separate from interpersonal or social concerns is largely illusional. The transactional atom when

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opened up is shown to be composed of ego and empathy, mutual benefit, in a state of negotiated

tension (Cory 1999, 77–78). There is therefore some degree of behavioral tension from the tug

and pull of Ego and Empathy, a dual motive on both sides in every social or market choice or

transaction. The degree of tug and pull or behavioral tension will depend upon the triviality or

significance of the transaction—something neoclassical theory does not discriminate. Adam

Smith recognized clearly this essential mutual benefit nature of the market in the line quoted

below which immediately precedes the customarily quoted passage which traditionally has been

wrongly taken to justify a sole self-interest motive.

Give me what I want, and you shall have what you want, is the meaning of every such offer (1776: Bk I, Ch 2).

In modern times we recognize the above quote on mutual benefit as win-win. The dual

mutual benefit or balanced reciprocity position of win-win is reflected in the graph of the CSN

model as dynamic balance and in the equation of social exchange as ± 1.

THE INVISIBLE HAND IN THE STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR OF THE MARKETPLACE

To understand the function of the invisible hand in the socio-economic market, it helps to

maintain a clear distinction between structure and behavior.

Structure

The invisible hand as the tug and pull of Ego and Empathy is expressed in the market

structure as demand and supply. The reciprocal dynamic tends to work despite the unidimensional

overemphasis on self-interest in classical economics by the fallacy of self-reference. This is

because the very structure itself of the market is the institutionalized product of the Ego/Empathy

dynamic of our evolved neural architecture. That is, as Adam Smith saw, when we enter into

market exchange, we fundamentally agree to a give and take exchange which necessitates mutual

benefit, reciprocity, respect for self and others, or Ego and Empathy. Our self-survival Ego

demands are rooted ultimately in our ancestral protoreptilian or vertebrate neural complexes and

represented in our higher frontal brain circuits as self-interest or ego. Contrastingly, the act of

providing or supplying, is fundamentally an act of mammalian nurturing—likewise represented in

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our higher frontal brain circuitry as other-interest or Empathy. The market exchange system

originated from and is sustained by this dynamic. The market could never have evolved or been

maintained on the basis of Ego or self-interest alone. Without Empathy we would not know how

or what to do to respond to the needs of others. Dinosaurs and crocodiles, as well as our ancestral

vertebrates, never produced markets.

Behavior

Behavior, in individual choices and transactions within the above institutionalized

structure, may vary considerably in the mix of Ego and Empathy motives on both the demand and

supply sides. Nevertheless, even in the most Ego-skewed (or self-interested) market behavior, the

overall unobstructed tendency of the market will be toward a balance of Ego and Empathy.

Individual and collective actors, whether seemingly motivated primarily by self-interest or not,

will be compelled by the very evolved and institutionalized market structure itself—to survive in

the market—to perform the structural equivalent of Empathy. That is, they will be required to

provide (supply) a proper service or product to fill the needs (demand) of others. This is

especially true of the idealized purely competitive market envisioned by standard economic

theory.

To the degree, however, that Empathy is a consciously included and recognized

behavioral motivational component within the market structure, the product or service provided

may be enhanced in quality and the emergence of trust in market relationships will be facilitated.

Conversely, the overemphasis on self-interest in the neoclassical paradigm tends to vitiate the

development of quality and the emergence of trust in the market. Aside from the scientifically

inaccurate concept of the market in neoclassical economics, this vitiation of quality and trust,

adding to transaction costs, is one of its greatest drawbacks, in practice.

From the perspective of brain physiology, then, reciprocity through conflict is achieved in

the range of dynamic balance where behavioral tension operating freely tends to pull us. In

dynamic balance, ego and empathy provide for the emergence of cooperation and fairness, trust

and morality, in interpersonal, social, and economic exchange activities. Taking the dynamic

balance range to be approaching or approximating the equilibrium of ego and empathy as driven

by behavioral tension, again we call upon the previously derived formula:

BT = Ego or Emp = Demand or Supply = EP = 1 (approx. equilibrium or unity) Emp Ego Supply Demand dynamic balance

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The above equation (with either Ego or Empathy as the numerator or denominator to

accurately reflect the magnitudes of behavioral tension in the transaction) gives basic

mathematical expression to interaction of Ego (demand) and Empathy (supply). As the two

motives intersect freely in the marketplace, we tend to have equitable exchange. Or, in the case of

specific products and services, we tend toward equilibrium price (EP), or fair price. Since the

evolved algorithmic dynamic works imperfectly, I use the word tend.

The formula or equation proceeding from evolved neural network architecture thus

provides the unifying linkage between brain physiology (or neuroscience) and economics or

social exchange theory. The behavioral tension driving toward the proximate dynamic balance

between demand and supply in the marketplace accounts for the motive force for the venerable

Invisible Hand—that illusive dynamic previously accounted for variously by the hand of Deity,

Newtonian mechanics, or other inappropriate physical processes (see Cory 2004, 1999: 92–95,

Ingrao & Israel 1990).

The marketplace is thus clearly a product of the dynamic of our evolved neurological

architecture. The same dynamic formula can be shown to underlie not only market and social

exchange but also power relationships, social stratification, relations of inequality, and even cost-

benefit analysis (Cory 2004). Kept free (by appropriate institutions) of the skewing effects of

excessive wealth accumulation and the pressure of powerful special interests, both a democratic

free enterprise economic system and a democratic political system will, in accord with the neural

architecture, tend toward a dynamic equilibrium which minimizes economic and political

inequalities.

On the other hand, the behavioral tension or inequality within a market system or a

political system may be indexed by the same dynamic formula to the extent that it departs from

dynamic equilibrium and the ratio begins to diverge increasingly.

FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT

In this section we will apply the neural dynamic represented by the CSN model and the social

equation to a preliminary search for the fundamentals of development. In the process we will

comment upon Sen's proposition of development as freedom.

Fundamentally, if development is freedom, freedom, then, would allow the free

expression of the dynamic social exchange neural architecture. And, of course, allowed to operate

freely in any society, perhaps, as Sen proposes, the outcome would be development. Sen's

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argument seems to be based fundamentally on such an unclarified assumption about human

nature. An assumption that is equivalent to the intuited neural dynamic—although he has no

concept of such a dynamic.

The question, then, arises: To the extent that we increase freedom does development

occur inevitably and spontaneously?

If development is natural, if it occurred anywhere, it should occur in the environment of

the primitive family where the neural circuits evolved. Recent research has indicated that the

primitive social environment was essentially an egalitarian one. The neural circuits functioning

freely, however, also impose limits on our own and others' freedom. Limits are imposed by their

conflictual nature and the resolution of that conflict in dynamic balance. Resolution blends the

priorities of self and others. This blending constitutes essentially a compromise with individual

freedom. Or perhaps we should say, that left to function freely the exchange architecture will tend

to a dynamic equilibrium that is reciprocal and in that sense mutual—egalitarian, like the

primitive family. True freedom then would be mutual reciprocity, each individual’s freedom

limited by empathetic respect for others.

But on its own would such freedom lead to development, political and/or economic? In

the primitive essentially egalitarian family that existed for 100,000 or more years prior to modern

society—it did not! It lead to essential harmony—as we perhaps all hunted and gathered and then

sat around the campfire telling stories, singing songs and dancing. Essential egalitarian harmony,

but not dynamic development.

Predictions of the CSN Model

What, then, does the CSN Model of our social exchange architecture predict for

development? Cory (1999, 2004) argued that the human brain evolved as a scarcity-coping organ

in a primarily kinship based foraging society where sharing or reciprocity was essential to

survival. The survival strategy of the human species, in the face of scarcity, was sharing.

Scarcity-coping by sharing does not automatically lead to development.

Something else, then, is needed—something that not just releases the free expression of,

but that encourages and accelerates, the social exchange dynamic. Cory (1999, 2004) writes that

modern capitalism changes the scarcity-coping neural dynamic into a scarcity-generating

dynamic. The scarcity-generating dynamic, however, requires a stable social system to support

cumulative development—else the effort may be dissipated in chaos.

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According to the logic of our evolved social exchange architecture, then, the fundamental

requirements for development would be two:

1. The acceleration of the scarcity-coping dynamic into a scarcity-generating dynamic

2. The provision of a stable society in which

a. the exchange dynamic can operate freely

b. and the productive outcomes could be cumulative.

The above fundamentals require the presence and operation of what economists define as

institutions—the rules, procedures, or customs that permit and support those fundamentals. They

require such institutions, howevcr, from both the political and market perspectives—not from just

the market perspective alone as often assumed by economists.

The Unified Perspective of Economics and Politics

We must first, then, realize that for a comprehensive theory of development we need to

incorporate more than the market perspective alone. We must consider both the political, market

—essentially the entire social perspective. Our current departmented university system militates

against this, forcing us into narrow channels of specialization. A development theory from the

market perspective alone is inherently incomplete—likewise is one solely from the political

perspective. Only a combined perspective will suffice.

Cory (2004) attempted this unified perspective. Based upon the dynamic of the social

exchange architecture, all society is seen as an overarching social exchange system with two

essential component subsystems: an economic exchange system and a politico-legal exchange

system (Figure 4).

These represent functions that were combined in the family unit of our evolutionary past

(which shaped the very neural architecture itself), when families hunted and gathered

economically and politically had the power of distribution among members. As societies became

larger, these functions became represented in the larger units. They are essential to any society

today, national or global.

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Figure 4. Society consists of a politico-legal system plus an economic exchange system.

The two systems cannot be separated. They determine the nature of the overall social

system—they either preserve and force social exchange equilibria or they allow such equilibria to

form with more or less freedom. Allowed to function freely, the two systems together form a self-

correcting mechanism with both sides based on and motivated by our selfsame social exchange

neural architecture. That is, ideally, where the economic system fails, the political system

corrects. When the political system fails (overcorrects) or becomes unstable, the economic system

reacts sending signs of reduced productivity and efficiency. The critical questions for

development center around how this interaction between the two systems works to both

accelerate the social exchange dynamic and assure its freely operating and cumulative capacity.

This brings us again to the question of institutions —which govern or channel that interaction.

The institutions that operate implicitly or explicitly within each system determine the way

the systems function. Institutions channel the neural organic dynamic. So what, then, are the

institutions that channel the dynamic for development?

Looking to Present-day Economics

On the economic side we might look to present-day economics for some direction. What

concepts does it offer? For the basic outline of such a framework, we can look to traditional

macroeconomics and the concept of long run aggregate supply (LRAS).

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LRAS is said to be determined by the interaction of three factors: resources, level of

technology, and structure of institutions. The new findings added here by dual motive theory are

that these factors direct the flow of the neural exchange dynamic. Said another way, the neural

exchange dynamic is the driving force which works through the traditionally identified factors. A

change in any one or more of the three factors affects development. An increase or favorable

change causes a growth in development; a decrease or unfavorable change causes a decrease or

decline in development. Holding resources and technology constant, the essentials of the

framework we seek will be found in the structure and nature of institutions. Many nations have

resources and are undeveloped. Many have access to technology but remain undeveloped. Given

resources and technology, what, then, are the institutions that promote development? It is

instructive to turn to history.

From Mercantilism to Free Enterprise

The great historical move from mercantilism to free enterprise occurred in 18 th century

Europe, especially in England. To understand what happened at that juncture of history is

important to any understanding of development.

The movement from mercantilism in 18th century England to free enterprise was a

momentous step in the re-channeling of our dynamic exchange architecture. A look at the

concepts and institutions of the mercantilistic period in terms of the political and economic

systems is enlightening.

Political system: Politically, mercantilism was among other things a highly controlled

system based upon the following institutional concepts:

1. A nation’s wealth was built by taking from others, it produced winners and losers in

trade, therefore,

2. It was a matter of national policy to block free trade in favor of a favorable balance of

trade.

3. It was based on a Zero sum concept of wealth that often led to exploitation,

colonialism.

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4. Creation of a nation's wealth, then, was seen as taking it from others

Economic system: These institutional concepts were forced politically upon the economic

system. The fledgling manufacturing economy of England was subordinated to political

objectives of securing wealth by one-sided trade and exploiting the resources and wealth of

colonies.

As a zero-sum based institutional system, mercantilism had no real concept of

development. The assumptions and institutions of mercantilism, in fact, militated against

development. Development is by definition opposed to a zero-sum concept of wealth.

Adam Smith was instrumental in turning the tide against mercantilism. In his landmark

work, The Wealth of Nations, Smith argued directly against this zero-sum concept of wealth

creation that underpinned mercantilism. He thus contradicted the fundamental premise of

mercantilism. He said the wealth of nations was created, not zero sum—and it was based on the

productivity of the people. Therefore free trade and unleashing the productivity of the people was

the path to wealth creation —thus the title, The Wealth of Nations.

This was for the first time truly a development concept!

What, then, were the institutional features of the free enterprise system advocated by

Smith?

Political system: The institutional adoption of what is called Laissez Faire, an

institutional concept which emphasizes a minimum of government control of enterprise

exchange and trading activity.

Economic system: A competitive market in which

a. Individuals were egoistically incented to perform acts of production or supply—that

is, rewarded for performing acts of Empathy for others.

b. The social exchange dynamic of our neural architecture was accelerated by

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incentives, releasing and encouraging individual initiative in the form of self- and

other-interest, Ego and Empathy (It is obvious that individual initiative is

not limited to self-interest as often assumed by economists; people can exercise

great personal initiative in Empathy or other interest).

Of course these political and economic institutional features rested upon pre-existing

institutional features of the English political economy. These institutional features can all be

understood as acts of official Empathy, designed to mitigate the unbridled expression of Ego or

self-interest. They are:

1. Respect for private property

2. Enforcement of contracts

3. Provision of limited public goods (i.e., infrastructure, education)

4. Political stability or order

Such institutional features, in effect, freed and channeled the neural dynamic toward

creation of wealth. Most of the effectiveness of the market economic system, then, is the result of

the political institutions providing the right institutional framework.

The Delicate Balancing Act

To maintain a productive economy that produces Adam Smith's anticipated more

equitable share of wealth to all requires a delicate balancing act between the two major exchange

systems. To take advantage of the self-correcting tendency of the interactive politico-legal

exchange system and the market exchange system, driven by our neural architecture, requires a

delicate balancing act to assure economic growth.

1. The politico-legal exchange system must, after providing stability and facilitating

infrastructure, function to correct the failures of the market system.

2. And it must do so without stifling the productivity of the market exchange system.

22


Democracy vs. authoritarianism

Sen argues from the perspective of freedom, essentially democracy. He acknowledges the

so-called "Lee thesis" attributed to Singapore's former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew. The Lee

thesis argument is essentially authoritarian and holds that denial of civil rights and political rights

helps to stimulate economic growth. Such argument has been seen historically in the rise of

Hitler's Germany and was even used widely to justify proletarian dictatorships under official

communism during much of the latter part of the 20th century.

According to dual motive theory, the essential problems with the argument are:

1. Authoritarianism, like central planning, interferes with the self-corrective mechanism

of our dynamic neural architecture as it is expressed freely in a democratic

political system combined with a free enterprise market system.

2. Authoritarian systems may work well for development in the short run, but they are

dependent upon authority and caprice. No one can be sure when they no longer

choose to support the conditions necessary for development.

3. In the long term authoritarian systems interfere with the natural neural dynamic that

pushes toward dynamic balance in both wealth and power.

Dual motive theory predicts that based upon the neural dynamic, individuals as they

achieve dynamically balanced economic freedom, will also tend to seek dynamically balanced

power and/or political freedom and rights and vice-versa. It is noteworthy that Sen (1999: 150)

cites evidence that people will choose political freedom and rights even above economic

development.

Any deviation from dynamic balance in any situation of significance, be it power or

wealth, will be responded to by the self-corrective tendency to homeostatic dynamic balance or

equalization. Based upon the dynamic, the minimum acceptable position on issues of true

significance (survival) would be dynamic equality. This, self-corrective tendency is, in fact, the

23


engine of competition and productivity. As Cory (1999, 2004) points out, the human brain

evolved as scarcity-coping organ in primitive kinship based foraging societies—we survived by

sharing and by enforcing that sharing through groups and alliances.

Development is fundamentally achieved by turning our brain's scarcity-coping

mechanism into a scarcity-generating mechanism and providing the institutional stability and

protections to sustain the transition. Development, then, depends on the managed creation of

inequalities and the tendency of all to homeostatically strive to correct them. The self-correcting,

self-equilibrating of Ego and Empathy, demand and supply, is the engine of development.

Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the capitalist enterprise of advertising. The entire

advertising industry is unabashedly dedicated to the creation of demand—not merely to satisfying

the demand that previously exists. This newly created demand is, of course, to be responded to by

newly created supply. The engine of productivity, the acceleration of our neural dynamic, goes

into full throttle endlessly creating demand and the responsive supply—generating endless

productivity as an end in itself.

This, of course, brings us to the question of sustainability. Given the endless acceleration

of productivity, demand and supply, we must face the growing danger of exhaustion of resources,

global warming, and pollution. But these issues are beyond the scope of this brief paper.

CONCLUSION

This paper began as a consideration of Sen's proposition of development as freedom. Such a

proposition must rest ultimately on assumptions about human nature about which Sen is never

clear. Examined from the vantage point of brain physiology and dual motive theory, it is doubtful

that freedom alone will produce development. In the primitive egalitarian societies of our

evolutionary heritage it did not—for 100, 000 or so years. Development requires institutions that

accelerate the evolved scarcity-coping dynamic of our homeostatically-regulated social neural

architecture, allow it to be expressed freely, and provide as well the stability necessary for the

productive outcomes to be cumulative. These are the fundamental requirements for development

although the details of such institutions may vary situationally. The shift from mercantilism to

free enterprise thinking in 18th century England provides a conspicuous historical example. The

free expression and acceleration of the neural dynamic, however, does not stop with economic

development. It presses also to dynamic equality in power as well. The dynamic works best in

24


and tends ultimately toward a society with a democratic political system interacting and self-

correcting with a free market economic system. Both systems, of course, are driven by the

selfsame homeostatically-regulated social exchange architecture.

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