ims for nuclear industry
TRANSCRIPT
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Technical Report Writing
CC-05
Integration of Management
Systems for Safety in theNuclear Industry
By
Muhammad Kamran Shaikh
2333
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the completion requirements
for the Zero-Semester course Technical Report Writing
Karachi Institute of Power Engineering
2016
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Abstract
The need to create integrated management systems (IMS) in order to handle the
proliferation of management system standards is undeniable. There is also evidence in
literature and practice that organizations are slowly starting to tackle the IMS issue,
mainly by putting an integrated quality and environmental management system in
place. Due to the existence of internationally accepted standards covering these two
fields, namely ISO 9000 and 14000 series, such a scope of integration comes as no
surprise. However, we can and should include other systems, for steps of execution,
the ones for occupational health and safety, dependability, accountability or
complaints handling. How this integration be helpful for the existing organizational
structures and how it could be accomplished. When we attempt to address IMS issues,
we talk about integrating the standards or the systems or both. These and other
important questions regarding IMS are addressed here. By means of set of steps of
execution from the nuclear industry, this paper focuses in particular on the integration
of a safety management system within an IMS framework. Since safety is of such a
paramount importance in nuclear plants, it makes sense to integrate safety
requirements within a quality management system, as a possible first step in the
integration efforts. Subsequently, other function-specific requirements may be
included to form an effective IMS.
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Table of Contents
1. Necessity of Integrated Management System (IMS) .............................................3
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................3
1.2 Importance of IMS in Nuclear Sector ...........................................................4
1.3 Companies Providing Services for IMS........................................................4
2. Scope of Integration...............................................................................................6
2.1 Defining Integration for Nuclear Power Plants.............................................6
2.2 Integration of System and Standards.............................................................7
2.3 Recommended IMS Standards for Nuclear Industry ....................................8
3. Im plementation of IMS..........................................................................................9
3.1 Basic Requirements .....................................................................................9
3.1.1 Process Orientation .............................................................................9
3.1.2 Integrated Approach..........................................................................10
3.2 Implementation Steps.................................................................................10
3.3 Documentation of Management System....................................................12
4. Operating Methods and Procedures .....................................................................14
4.1 Stepwise Execution....................................................................................14
4.2 Control and Measurements through Obtained Data...................................15
4.3 Assessment and Feedback..........................................................................17
4.4 Management Review .................................................................................17
5. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................18
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#1
Necessity of Integrated
Management System (IMS)
1.1 Introduction
Due to the proliferation of ISO 9000, ISO 14000 and other function-specific
management system standards (MSS), a need has emerged to somehow integrate them
in order to reduce costs and redundancies. At the same time, it has become imperative
for organizations to continuously improve their overall quality, environmental, safety
and even public accountability performance. By developing and implementing
integrated management systems (IMS), most organizations could theoretically “kill
both of these birds with one stone”, that is, create a lean system compliant to most
regulatory and voluntary standards, and still reduce failures, environmental impacts
and workplace injuries. Practically speaking, however, it is much easier to put
together an IMS policy and procedures manual than to implement and maintain a truly
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integrated system in an organization. Furthermore, the effective implementation of an
IMS pales in comparison with proving a quantifiable cause-and-effect relationship
between the existence of a management system and sustainable improvement of
performance. This is in spite of the fact that MSS requirements include continual
improvement. And the problems do not stop there. Difficulties in finding common
denominators for diverse business functions, disappearance of unique identities of
function-specific systems, fear of job loss as a result of amalgamation, and
misalignment of operational goals are but a few inevitable obstacles on the path to
IMS.
Nevertheless, consider the alternative. Leaving different management systemsseparate and incompatible incurs considerable costs, increases the probability ofmistakes and failures, duplicates efforts, creates unnecessary bureaucracy anddocumentation, and ultimately has a negative impact on most stakeholders, includingthe employees and customers. When these and other disadvantages are weighedagainst the numerous benefits of having a common management system, companies
are slowly choosing to go with the IMS path. The list below illustrates the prevalentadvantages and concerns regarding the integration of management systems.
1.2 Importance of IMS in Nuclear Sector
This paper has two main objectives. The first one is to address the key issues in thetheory and practice of integrated management systems. This is accomplished byasking what we believe are the six main questions in establishing an IMS, andsubsequently discussing the options for answering them. These questions discuss arelatively broad spectrum of topics, ranging from the meaning of integration, to thescope of an integrated system and the sequence in which existing management
systems should be integrated. Paramount to this discussion is the thesis presenting theintegration of standards and internal management systems as two largely separateissues. The second objective of the paper is to illustrate the importance of anintegrated safety management system with an steps of execution from the nuclearindustry. There are two main reasons why this industry sector was chosen. First,needless to say, safety is of paramount importance in the nuclear industry, since eventhe smallest of errors may have disastrous effects. Unlike the manufacturing industry,for steps of execution, where productivity and availability are prioritized, in thenuclear industry, these issues are not nearly as crucial as safety. Second, the nuclearsector must conform to a variety of regulations that span, for instance, qualityassurance, environmental, health and safety concerns. Establishing an IMS in thisindustry may provide an effective solution to compliance and continuousimprovement of function-specific systems. Therefore, the establishment of aneffective safety management system, in conjunction with its quality managementcounterpart, is focused on herein. The paper concludes with a brief summary andfurther explanations on why safety in the nuclear industry was chosen for emphasis.
1.3 Companies Providing Services for IMS
Supporting the developments toward IMS is the growing body of standards,
guidelines, as well as both academic and practitioner literature by different companies
around the world. Although an international standard addressing this issue is not
expected in the near future, several national standardization bodies have alreadydeveloped or are currently working on related guidelines. Useful generic references
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include the joint Australian and New Zealand standard (AS/NZS, 1999), as well as the
Norwegian guideline NTS (1996) for quality, environmental and occupational health
and safety management.
Current advances in the field are mostly focused on the development of
methodologies for the implementation and support of IMS in organizations. For stepsof execution, Karapetrovic and Willborn have extended their systems approach to
propose a generic model for the auditing of IMS, and to develop the strategies for
IMS implementation. Wilkinson and Dale (2001) provide another steps of execution
of this focus of research by including the organizational culture and other important
“soft” factors into IMS modeling. Guidelines specific to different business sectors are
also available. For steps of execution, Douglas and Glen addresses IMS
implementation in small nuclear power plants. Poestges et al. (2001) provide insights
regarding the integration in the chemical industry. Renzi and Cappelli (2000), Hauger
(2001), and Bamber et al. (2000) advocate integration of management systems in
manufacturing organizations, while Shen and Walker (2001) and Karapetrovic andWillborn (1998c) do the same for the construction and service industries, respectively.
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#2
Scope of Integration
2.1 Defining Integration for Nuclear Power Plants
Obviously, “integration” means different things to different people, even if we restrictour discussion to function-specific management systems only. For steps of execution,
providing a single manual for quality assurance and safety management procedures issufficient for a governmental office to call it an “integrated safety managementquality assurance program”, although the safety part of the manual is separated fromthe quality assurance part. However, the quality assurance policy of this officecontains elements of quality, environmental and occupational health and safetysystems, and the two parts of the manual are completely aligned, having the samestructure and table of contents. Conversely, Karapetrovic and Willborn (1998b) statethat a real IMS entails a single system, with the complete loss of unique identities offunction-specific subsystems. Although this is an ultimate step in any integrationeffort, most organizations will put their systems together in a gradual fashion, andsome of them may not even require complete integration. Therefore, the extent ofmanagement systems “integration” may vary significantly from one company to the
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other, requiring some workable definition of this term.
“Integration” is generally understood as combining separate parts into a whole.Specifically, integration of management systems can be defined as a process of
putting together different function-specific management systems into a single andmore effective integrated management system (IMS). The degree of such integration
will vary, depending on the prevailing conditions, strategies and standardsrequirements. Three degrees of management systems integration may bedistinguished: harmonization, cooperation and amalgamation. Partial harmonizationand coordination of documentation is the least stringent degree of integration. The
broadening of scope and enhancement of the combined system using integrated auditsand resource deployment takes it one step further. Finally, in a full integration,management systems are amalgamated into a new and comprehensive IMS.
2.2 Integration of System and Standards
It is not a problem to integrate the requirements of standards into a single set of IMS
criteria, or for that matter to create a common manual for separate or integratedmanagement systems (Karapetrovic, 2001). This is particularly evident in the case of
combining supportive systems, such as the ones for handling customer complaints and
developing dependability programs, with the underlying management systems, for
steps of execution an ISO 9000-based QMS. Not only is the content of the
corresponding standards (ISO 10018 for complaints handling and IEC 60300 for
dependability) fully compatible with their ISO 9001 predecessor, but the exact
organization and the four-element structure of the ISO 9001 (ISO, 2000) are also
strictly followed. Table I illustrates the similarities in structure of the quality (ISO
9001) and dependability (IEC 60300) management system standards.
Table 2-1 Comparison of Quality and Dependability management system.
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The same is true for the coupling of environmental and occupational health and safety
management systems. Both the ISO 14001 and BS 8800 (BSI, 1996)
2.3 Recommended IMS Standards for Nuclear Industry
The system is proposed on the requirements of quality, environmental and
occupational health and safety systems for a nuclear power plant. The first two
systems are supported by international standards (ISO 9000 and 14000), whereas
there are readily available national guidelines (for steps of execution BS 8800)
describing OHSMS. Furthermore, most nuclear setups and organizations are required
to meet environmental and safety regulatory requirements imposed by the government
and diverse interest groups, and it is not uncommon to group these two systems in
order to address the issue. Other MS, for steps of execution the ones for social
accountability, ergonomics, maintainability and dependability are rarely discussed,
either because of the lack of immediate pressure on industry to deal with them, or the
relative obscurity of the corresponding guidelines. However, the necessity of
integrating dependability management into quality management and its benefits are
addressed by Beckmerhagen and Berg (2000). In some cases, widely accepted
standards do not exist, and the conceptualization of a management system represents a
significant problem. However, as Wilkinson and Dale (1999) point out, the scope of a
“true IMS” should be much broader than these three and encompass whatever
additional systems that may emerge in the future. Steps of executions of such systems
may include social and public accountability (external relations), human resource
management (internal relations), as well as financial performance. Conti (1997, cited
in Seghezzi and Schweickardt, 2001) provides an interesting model of different
subsystems that make up an integrative business system and their respective
stakeholders.
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#3
Implementation of IMS
3.1 Basic Requirements
The management system shall comprise all activities with relevance to safe operation.
In this context, safe operation shall always have the highest priority.
3.1.1 Process orientation
i. All activities within the corporation or the power plant that have any relevance
to the operation of the power plant shall be identified.
ii. Those activities that have a direct or indirect influence on safe operation shall
be described in a procedural form.
a. The dangers and risks involved when performing the respective
activities, as well as
b. The safety-related internal and external requirements into account.
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iii. Process goals, process inputs, process flow and process output as well as the
criteria for the process assessment shall be specified. Interfaces between the
processes shall be identified and regulated.
iv. The organizational units and the functions (e.g., of the appointed person, of the
on-site supervisor or of the shift supervisor) involved in the process flow shall
be identified and specified for each individual step of the process. Insofar asactivities with relevance to safe operation are performed by external
companies (in particular, manufacturers, suppliers,
v. Other contractors, experts, other nuclear power plants, operating utilities), the
respective interfaces shall be regulated.
vi. All processes shall be well ordered and presented systematically structured in
the form of a process model.
3.1.2 Integrated Approach
The processes shall be designed taking the requirements resulting from different
corporate perspectives into account, and they shall be conducted using an integrated
approach.The integrated approach shall normally ensure that in the case of
competing requirements and goals, those relevant to nuclear safety and radiological
protection are assigned the correct priority in accordance with their respective
relevance.
The operating utility shall normally determine and integrate the applicable
requirements from statutory and sub statutory regulations (e.g., regarding
environmental protection, occupational health and safety protection) into the
management system.
3.2 Implementation Steps
With regard to a continuous improvement, the plan-do-check act cycle (PDCA cycle)
shall be applied to all relevant operational activities, to partial and entire processes
and to the management system as a whole.
This Section provides guidance to support the inspection of a licensee’s Standard
operating arrangements. It also gives guidance on what evidence the Inspector should
seek to confirm the arrangements are working effectively.
Standard operating-requires licensees to establish and implement management
systems which give due priority to safety. The licensee must therefore ensure that anyof its management system(s) processes (e.g. financial, commercial, project, industrial
safety or environmental) give due priority to safety. Inspectors may monitor this
during their routine inspections by looking at the outputs from the management
system processes to identify any instances where safety was adversely affected by
actions or decisions which did not give due priority to safety (e.g. a purchasing
decision for a safety significant item was based on cost rather than on fulfilling safety
requirements).
Quality Management Arrangements-standard operating (2) requires licensees to make
and implement adequate quality management arrangements in respect of all matters
which may affect safety. ONR expects such quality management arrangements toinclude.
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Scope of the Quality Management System-The scope of the arrangements should
cover all matters which may affect safety including activities both on and off the
licensed site. Inspectors should note that each facility on the site may be in a different
phase in its lifecycle (e.g. research and development, siting, design, construction,
commissioning, operation, or decommissioning) and should ensure that the licensee’s
arrangements cover all the applicable lifecycle phases. A licensee should review, and
where appropriate revise, its arrangements before entering a new lifecycle phase.
Inspectors should ensure that the processes identified by the licensee in the
management system documentation are consistent with the current lifecycle phase(s)
and that safety related activities are being controlled by the management system.
Site Steps Condition Compliance Processes-the standard operating arrangements
should include all the processes which ensure compliance with the site steps
conditions including the arrangements which are ‘made’ under specific steps
conditions. Inspectors should ensure that the licensee is able to demonstrate
compliance (e.g. by having a site steps condition compliance document that signpoststhe processes, procedures and instructions that deliver steps compliance).
Derived Powers-Inspectors should ensure that any derived powers which have been
agreed with the licensee are included in the arrangements.
i. A policy which includes a statement on quality (this may be a quality policy or
in integrated management systems it may be contained in other policies such
as the safety policy).
ii. The quality statement should be developed by senior management and be
appropriate to the activities and facilities of the licensee.
The short answer to the above question is usually no in the case of larger
organizations. Full integration is required at the top and bottom organizational levels,
while function-specific elements can be kept separate at intermediate levels. However,
these elements must be harmonized and mutually compatible. Because the priority of
executive management is the performance of a company as a whole, and not
necessarily the operation of individual QMS, EMS or OHSMS, a management
“system of systems” should be completely integrated toward achieving global
policies. Consequently, middle managers are occupied with quality, environmental,
financial and other aspects of performance, which may require some partition of
responsibilities for meeting the MS requirements. Finally, total amalgamation into the
individual work processes is demanded at the operational level. Similarly to executive
management work, an elementary operation must be performed as a whole. Although
they contain different quality, environmental or safety aspects and characteristics,
both the operation and the product are physical entities that require an integrated
system to be realized. Therefore, function-specific MS and related documentation
resources (e.g. instructions and records) should be fully integrated at this level, as
well.
However, in some cases, including small businesses, full integration is required at allorganizational levels. Such complete amalgamation is particularly important in
industry sectors operating with potentially high degrees of risk, for steps of executionnuclear and chemical industries. Since environmental and safety performance are of
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paramount importance in those cases, solid environmental, health and safety systemsmust be fully integrated at all organizational levels. The following sections illustratethe importance and methods of integrating a safety management system (SMS) in thenuclear industry, although such a system can be generically applied to anyorganization regardless of the industry sector.
3.3 Documentation of Management System
Inspectors should examine the management system documentation (e.g. management
system manual) associated with the Standard operating arrangements and ensure it
contains the following:
i. Job description of each individual shall be specified such that the duties,
responsibilities and authorizations are congruent with each other (principle of
organizational congruency). To this end, the responsibility for performing the
task and the corresponding authorizations (i.e., authorizations for making
decisions and for issuing instructions) shall also be assigned wheneverassigning a task.
ii. In case that tasks specified in the personnel organization of the operating
manual (see KTA 1201, chapter 6.2), the respective duties shall be properly
delegated to the hierarchically subordinate position. Duties may only be
delegated if the delegation recipients have the required qualification and
expertise. Responsibilities may not be delegated. Likewise, no duties may be
delegated that are directly associated with exercising responsibilities of the
radiation protection commissioner, plant security commissioner, or nuclear
safety commissioner.
iii. The directors of the organizational units and the management systemcommissioner including their representatives shall be specified by name. The
management system com-
iv. missioner shall be granted access and reporting rights directly to corporate
management.
v. The commissioners shall be provided with sufficient support by the
corporation in order to be able to perform their duties. The individual
commissioners, namely the
a. nuclear safety commissioner,
b. plant security commissioner, and
c. management system commissioner, as well as their representativesshall be positioned apart from the organizational units responsible for
production, maintenance, technology, components and systems.
vi. Any guideline concerning representatives shall clearly transfer the duties,
responsibilities and authorizations (i.e., instruction and decision making
authorization) to the respective representative (including the main person on
standby and the on-call persons). This is to ensure that, in case of absence of
the person primarily holding this position, the transferred duties can be
completed. The representative shall fulfill the same qualification requirements
as the person represented.
vii. When defining the organizational units it shall be taken into consideration thatthe respective directors of the organizational units must be able to properly
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fulfill their managerial functions. The directive width and the directive depth
shall be specified to be in accordance with the associated duties.
viii. Insofar as duties, responsibilities and authorizations concerning safe operation
are fulfilled by organizational units of the corporation outside of power plant
organization.
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#4
Operating Methods & Procedures
4.1 Stepwise Execution
In the following, the steps of execution is provided to illustrate the necessity ofsetting up a safety management system in an integrative fashion SMS(Beckmerhagen et al., 2000). The steps of execution particularly emphasizes theimportance of including “minor events” in overall safety management. Suchanomalies, conditions or situations are commonly disregarded, especially when
personnel is busy handling other operational events, which are deemed more“significant”. On an individual basis, these low-level events may indeed appear to
be insignificant. However, when analyzed together with other low-level events orwhen brought into proper context, they can reveal common patterns and provideinformation that may be important for preventing events with substantial adverseeffects on safety or environment.
This steps of execution describes an event that occurred in a four-loop pressurized
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water reactor in Germany. After a repair of coolers in the secondary coolingchains, the plant was restarted and it was running at 60 percent of poweroperation. In this case, a level drop in a tank supplying lubricating oil to theturbine was being investigated for a possible leak. An operator switched one ofthe large bypass valves for the turbine from the automatic to the manual mode.
Seeing the rapid drop in the oil level, the shift manager ordered the shut down ofthe turbine. Because there was no possibility of dumping steam to the condenser,the secondary-side pressure rose until the secondary safety becomes operational.
Figure 4-1 Step wise execution plan loop
4.2 Control and Measurements through Obtained Data
Where measuring or test equipment is used for any inspection, testing, verification
and validation activity which may affect safety, the equipment should be of the proper
range, type, accuracy and precision. A process should ensure the measuring and test
equipment is calibrated and traceable to national standards.
Using a UKAS accredited calibration service is one method of achieving traceability.
Inspectors should check the calibration process is applied to all measuring equipment
which may affect safety (e.g. radiological measuring equipment, operational process
measuring equipment and measuring equipment used for maintenance). Inspectors
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should check that equipment is uniquely identified and within its calibration period.
Out of date equipment should be identified and segregated to prevent inadvertent use.
The licensee should assess the validity of the previous measuring results when the
equipment is found to be out of calibration (this may mean keeping a record of use of
the equipment).
Control of Documents– The document control process should describe how
documents are written; the format and numbering system used; the methods and
responsibilities for review and approval; and the method of distribution. The
arrangements should ensure that current documents are available at the point of use
and superseded documents are withdrawn. Documents may be in electronic format.
Inspectors should sample documents to ensure they are in the correct format and have
been reviewed and approved correctly. Work areas may be visited to see if documents
are at the correct issue and if superseded or obsolete documents have been withdrawn.
Inspectors should also look for any notices, aide memoires or note books which may
constitute unauthorised and unapproved instructions.
Control of ‘Approved’ Arrangementsshould be included in the document control
process. A documented process should control the revision and amendment of any
arrangements that have been ‘approved’by the ‘Executive’. The process should ensure
that no alterations or amendments are made without the approval of the ‘Executive’.
The person(s) responsible for this process should be identified. It is good practice for
‘approved’ documents to be clearly identified so as to prevent unintended amendment.
Inspectors should check if the people writing, approving, revising or controlling
‘approved’ documents are aware of the process. ‘Approved’ documents may be
sampled to ensure there have been no alterations or amendments have been madesince the date of approval.
Control of Products – The licensee may have documented processes which control the
manufacture and inspection of its products. Such processes are within the scope of LC
17 arrangements when they may affect safety. Inspectors should also be aware that
incorrectly manufactured products may give rise to hazards when they are put into use
(e.g. fuel pellets) and if product safety is found to be compromised Inspectors should
take appropriate action.
Control of Records – Technical Assessment Guide T/AST/033 provides Inspectors
with guidance when considering the management and control of records.
Purchasing – Technical Assessment Guide T/AST/077 provides Inspectors with
guidance for assessing a licensee’s procurement arrangements. Where appropriate
(e.g. for safety related structures, systems and components) the licensee’s
procurement arrangements should require a supplier to be certificated to ISO 9001 by
an accredited certification body or have its management system assessed in some
other way to give confidence that requirements in the purchase specification will be
fulfilled.
Communication – The licensee’s should have a process to communicate safety,
health, environmental, security, quality and economic goals to all relevant personnelon site.
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4.3 Assessment and Feedback
A documented process should require management at all levels to carry out self
assessment to evaluate the performance of work and the status of safety culture. The
process should include recording the results of self assessment and the corrective
actions taken. Inspectors should note that self-assessment is a requirement in GS-R-3
but there is no similar requirement in ISO 9001.
The management system should contain a process for independent assessment as well.
The GS-R-3 requirement for independent assessment is more onerous than the audit
requirement in ISO 9001 and represents greater strength in depth. The independent
review process should be carried out by an organizational function which is
sufficiently independent to ensure there is no conflict of interests and the
arrangements should specify that individuals do not assess their own work. Inspectors
should judge the effectiveness and scope of the independent assessment process, the
adherence to the independent assessment programme and the quality of correctiveactions.
4.4 Management Review
A process should require senior management to carry out, at planned intervals, a
review of the management system to ensure its continuing suitability and
effectiveness. The inputs to the management review should include: outputs from all
forms of assessment, the licensee’s safety performance, non-conformances and
corrective and preventative actions, lessons learned from other organisations, and
opportunities for improvement. The process should describe how the outputs andactions from management review are managed and recorded. The management review
should be documented and records kept as required by LC 6. Inspectors should check
the licensee’s records to ensure that management review is being carried out at
planned intervals (at least annually). The Inspector should ensure that the outputs and
actions from the review are effective in promoting the continual improvement of the
management system and an improvement in safety culture.
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#5
Conclusion
This paper presented some of the key questions in the theory and practice of IMS fornuclear industry. For instance, three different levels of “integration” were identified,including harmonization, cooperation and amalgamation. It must be recognized thatfull integration requires a complete loss of unique identities of constitutingmanagement systems, in other words it results in a fusion of function-specific systemsinto a single IMS. Such integration should not be limited to a few systems, forexample quality and environment, but should involve all existing managementsystems in an organization. These systems can be organized into a “core plusfunction-specific modules” structure of an integrated “system of systems”. However,
other organizational approaches, which take into account the existing managementstructures, are also available. This paper further recognized that integrating standardsand internal systems are two largely disconnected issues, the first one being mucheasier to accomplish than the second one.
The integration of management system standards will continue to be a part of future
research in the area of IMS, not only because minor differences among the standards
still exist, but also because new standards that will stretch the boundaries of what we
currently consider as “management systems” will appear. For example, the
International Organization for Standardization is currently considering a standard on
business ethics and corporate social responsibility. Another major area of research
focus will be the provision of a “generic” methodology to implement IMS inorganizations, in other words, the study and development of a “how-to-build-your-
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own-IMS” guideline. As a part of this effort, models for supporting technologies of
IMS, including self-assessments and internal auditing, will be required. Finally,
expansion of the minimalistic requirements of standards to include business
excellence criteria will provide additional challenges for IMS researchers.
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References
AS/NZS (1999), AS/NZS 4581 Management System Integration – Guidance toBusiness, Government and Community Organizations, Standards Australia andStandards New Zealand. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09544780210414254
Bamber, C.J., Sharp, J.M. and Hides, M.T. (2000), “Developing management systemstowards integrated manufacturing: a case study perspective”, IntegratedManufacturing Systems, Vol. 11 No. 7, pp. 454-61.
Beckmerhagen, I.A., Berg, H.P. and Wohanka, A.E. (2000), “Safety management toimprove the operational safety of nuclear installations performance”, Proceedings ofthe 8th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, Baltimore, MD.
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/action/showLinks?system=10.1108%2F09576060010349758http://www.emeraldinsight.com/action/showLinks?system=10.1108%2F09576060010349758http://www.emeraldinsight.com/action/showLinks?system=10.1108%2F09576060010349758http://www.emeraldinsight.com/action/showLinks?system=10.1108%2F09576060010349758