SYNTHESIS REPORT Improving Shelter Responses to Humanitarian Crises

Acknowledgments

This research was commissioned by Habitat for Humanity and Christian Aid and managed by a steering committee comprising Ian Pearce, Lisa Stead, Mario Flores, Neil Garvie, Adrian Ouvry, Sarah Moss and Michael Mosselmans. Research was undertaken by a multidisciplinary project team that included staff from Habitat for Humanity, Christian Aid, Arup International Development and SaferWorld Communications. Victoria Maynard wrote the report.

The research could not have been completed without the support of our local partners: Habitat for Humanity Indonesia, Habitat for Humanity Philippines, Habitat for Humanity Haiti, The Church’s Auxiliary for Social Action, The Social Awareness Society for Youths, SEEDS India, Servicio Social de Iglesias Dominicanas, Support Group for Refugees and Repatriated Persons, Aprodema, Koral, and Haiti Survie.

Cover photos: Left: Mikel Flamm Right top: Ezra Millstein RIght center: Mikel Flamm Right bottom: Ezra Millstein

Facing page: Ezra Millstein

Contents

Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Synthesis Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Project design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Project implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Project results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Appendices

Appendix A: Case study findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Appendix B: Findings from previous research. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Synthesis Report2

Executive summary

IntroductionChristian Aid and Habitat for Humanity often respond to urgent shelter needs during emergencies. Shelter is a critical component in determining the resilience of communities and their ability to recover from disasters. It is a basic need — a human right — and the absence of appropriate shelter can have widespread implications for health, mental well-being, security and the speed of livelihood recovery. However, shelter assistance is often viewed as difficult and costly, and the experience of our local partners varies, leading to varied results.

This research aimed to provide detailed longitudinal evidence of the success, failures and lessons from previous Christian Aid and Habitat for Humanity emergency interventions in the shelter sector, and to provide recommendations for the improvement of future programs and areas for further research and collaborative work. The ultimate goal of this research project is that affected households receive better quality and more appropriate, timely and cost-effective shelter assistance; better support for their immediate recovery; and long-term resilience against future disasters.

This study was undertaken in three main stages between July 2012 and July 2013:

• In the first stage, completed by Arup International Development (Arup ID), secondary documentation provided by Habitat and Christian Aid was reviewed in order to identify the extent and nature of their engagement in shelter over the past decade. Interviews were then held with key stakeholders to ascertain the attitudes to shelter, policy environment and decision-making processes in each organization. These two activities provided organizational context and enabled the selection of appropriate case studies for further research.

• Fieldwork was then undertaken by SaferWorld Communications in India, Habitat for Humanity in Indonesia and Arup ID in Haiti and the Philippines

to investigate several case studies. In addition to being implemented by different organizations, in different countries, the case studies illustrate shelter programs of different sizes using different methods of assistance. They also allow comparison of the outputs and outcomes over the short, medium and longer term. Each of the case studies was reviewed against a common research framework. This research framework was developed by Habitat, Christian Aid and Arup ID in order to address the research questions identified by Habitat and Christian Aid as important, within the context of guidance on project evaluation from the Department for International Development, or DFID1, and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, or OECD2.

• In the final stage, completed by Habitat and Christian Aid, each of the case studies was summarized (see Appendix A), and common themes emerging from the research were identified and discussed (see sections 3, 4 and 5).

Conclusions

Relevance

The case studies illustrated the challenge of balancing quantity (the number of people to assist), quality (the level of support that can be provided), cost and timescale. They also show that an appropriate balance will depend on local needs and capacities; government policies; the level, flexibility and timescale of funding available; the capacity of our local partners; and their comparative advantage over other organizations. The case studies also highlighted that although the provision of physical assistance (materials, technologies, shelters) can take place rapidly, recovery is a social process, and adapting to a different situation and adopting new technologies or safe construction techniques require longer-term support.

1 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49551/DFID-approach-value-money.pdf

2 http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

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Appropriateness

The research highlighted that the development of an appropriate project (appropriate to the local climate, hazards, culture, locally available skills and construction materials) requires participation of affected families and communities in decision-making and project design (rather than just implementation). However, implementing organizations need both social and technical expertise to work in partnership with communities — balancing the desires of the community with appropriate technical advice on their design choices. The case studies also highlighted the challenges of adopting participatory approaches when programs are large or families are too busy to engage in design choices during the early stages of disaster response.

Integration

The case studies demonstrated the importance of viewing recovery as a holistic process involving physical, social, economic and environmental components. They also show that livelihoods remain a key challenge in the majority of the programs. Integration was a key area of difference between the two organizations – with Habitat typically focusing on shelter assistance at the household level (with other supporting programs), while Christian Aid views shelter (when it does it) as part of a holistic package of support at the community level. Both strategies have advantages and disadvantages, so there is significant complementarity between the two organizations in this aspect.

Economy

The study found that the capacity of local partner organizations was critical to the implementation of high-quality, timely and cost-effective programs. Partners with previous experience reduced costs, maximized support to the local economy and supported long-term capacity building by using local sources of materials (often in bulk at a fixed price), employing local laborers, encouraging households to use salvaged materials to repair or extend their core homes, and using locally available traditional materials.

Efficiency

Partners with less capacity in construction management often experienced challenges in designing an appropriate project, sourcing materials, managing inflation and ensuring quality control, resulting in relatively slow and costly programs or reduced outputs. Partnerships were often made with specialist nongovernmental organizations or the private sector to access specific technical expertise or undertake more holistic programs. Effective partnerships with government were also extremely important in ensuring the provision of roads, drainage, water, electricity and other infrastructure and accessing secure land tenure. Habitat often played a key role in local coordination mechanisms such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Shelter Cluster, but given its significant experience in housing programs, it could have demonstrated greater leadership in advocating to government and other agencies for more appropriate, holistic, developmental approaches to post-disaster shelter.

Effectiveness

Positive outcomes from receiving emergency, transitional or permanent shelter assistance identified by the beneficiaries include a feeling of safety and security; improved sleep, peace, dignity and privacy; a restored sense of stability, meaning that families could restart normal activities such as schooling and livelihoods; reduced health problems; increased status and prestige through having higher-quality housing; and reduced expenditure on repairs and maintenance. In projects with an emphasis on community participation, beneficiaries often reported having greater confidence and feeling of inclusion in society, better relationships with their neighbors, and increased community organization. Christian Aid’s methodology of working with local partners had also increased the partner organizations’ capacity to handle new, different and challenging projects, and developed their skills in fundraising, logistics and project management.

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Impact

Most cases had not been completed long enough to assess long-term impact, but researchers highlighted that in several cases the short-term benefits of robust physical shelter may be eroded by families’ own adaptations and extensions. The majority of construction was undertaken by local masons and laborers, and although families were involved in construction in some projects, this was often as unskilled labor rather than in a supervisory role. Consequently, in very few cases did families and communities poses adequate knowledge and skills to maintain, adapt or extend their houses using safe construction techniques, or supervise local masons or laborers to do so. Livelihoods also remained a challenge for many of the communities, with researchers noting that “the shelter had not addressed their overall situation,” that families lack the opportunities to use the livelihoods training they had received, and that a lack of livelihood opportunities threatens the long-term sustainability of these communities. This reinforces the importance of viewing post-disaster recovery as a holistic process, and underscores the need to maximize the contribution of our shelter programs to the socioeconomic (as well as physical) development of the families we hope to serve.

Recommendations

Recommendations for future programs

When the conclusions from this study are compared with the findings from previous research, several common themes and recommendations emerge:

• A relevant project must match the needs and capacities of the affected communities with the funding available, government and donor policies, and the capacity of the assisting organization to assist. All of these variables are context-specific and will change over time, so strategic decisions might need to be revisited and revised in order to ensure relevance at the time of implementation. Nonphysical methods of assistance such as advocacy for policy change, negotiating tenure security, providing technical support, or market-based approaches may be more cost-effective than engaging in construction.

• Shelter programs should ensure identification and inclusion of socially excluded and vulnerable groups.

• An appropriate project works with affected communities to select assistance methods and design appropriate solutions. Small improvements in traditional designs and technologies can make significant improvements to people’s lives and are easy for people to understand and replicate themselves, whereas imported designs or technologies (while initially desirable) might not be used, replicated or maintained in the longer term.

• Participation of affected communities in the decision-making and design of recovery programs not only generates more appropriate programs, but also helps develop confidence, skills and community organization while aiding in psychosocial recovery. Participation in construction (or supervision of construction) is also particularly important with regard to livelihood diversification and equipping communities with the knowledge and skills to adequately maintain, adapt and extend their houses — or supervise others to do so.

• An integrated project takes a long-term perspective and views recovery as a holistic process supporting not just physical recovery but also social, economic and environmental aspects. Shelter programs should incorporate disaster risk reduction into hazard assessments, settlement planning, infrastructure provision and safe construction techniques. They should also maximize their contribution to the development of sustainable and resilient communities through building skills and community organization, livelihood development and diversification, and environmental protection.

• Relocation should be avoided, but if it has to occur (for example, to relocate communities from particularly hazardous locations), it must be viewed holistically, with sufficient infrastructure and adequate support for community organization and livelihood development.

• The greater the capacity of our local partners, the more economically and efficiently they can implement shelter programs. As the level of experience varies among our

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partners, greater collaboration could support knowledge-sharing and capacity building before the next disaster.

• Partnerships with specialist NGOs, the private sector and academic institutions can be established before a disaster to provide additional technical expertise. Partnerships with other implementing organizations and governments are also essential to provide holistic support to communities.

Areas for further research and collaboration

Suggestions for further research and collaboration identified by the researchers and emerging through the comparative analysis:

1. Review the research framework used in this study to develop a standardized methodology for evaluating shelter programs.

2. Develop a decision-making framework for context analysis and the design of relevant, appropriate and integrated shelter programs.

3. Clarify the intended outcomes and impacts of shelter programs and develop a methodology to measure them and further longitudinal research.

4. Identify best practices in post-disaster shelter programs with regard to:

a. Participation of affected communities in rapid or large-scale programs.

b. Incorporating disaster risk reduction, resilience and climate change adaptation.

c. Identification, targeting and inclusion of vulnerable groups.

d. When relocation is necessary, and the provision of holistic support when it is.

e. Balancing vernacular and modern technologies.

f. Urban disaster response.

5. Develop a greater understanding of what integration means to each organization, and what this might mean in practice if Habitat for Humanity and Christian Aid were to develop a collaborative program.

6. Increase the capacity of our local partners through sharing experience and tools and building relationships and partnerships before a disaster so that they can be relied upon in disaster response.

1 . Introduction

Background

Christian Aid and Habitat for Humanity often respond to urgent shelter needs during emergencies. Shelter is a critical component in determining the resilience of communities and their ability to recover from disasters. It is a basic need — a human right — and the absence of appropriate shelter can have widespread implications for health, mental well-being, security and the speed of livelihood recovery. However, shelter assistance is often viewed as difficult and costly, and the experience of our local partners varies, leading to varied results.

Purpose

This research aimed to provide detailed longitudinal evidence of the successes, failures and lessons from previous Christian Aid and Habitat for Humanity emergency interventions in the shelter sector, and to provide recommendations for the improvement of future programs and areas for further research and collaborative work. The ultimate goal of this research project is that affected households receive better quality and more appropriate, timely and cost-effective shelter assistance; better support for their immediate recovery; and long-term resilience against future disasters.

Study team

The research was undertaken by a multidisciplinary project team including Habitat for Humanity International, Christian Aid, Arup International Development and SaferWorld Communications. Habitat for Humanity Indonesia, Habitat for Humanity Philippines, Habitat for Humanity Haiti, The Church’s Auxiliary for Social Action, The Social Awareness Society for Youths, SEEDS India, Servicio Social de Iglesias Dominicanas, Support Group for Refugees and Repatriated Persons, Aprodema, Koral and Haiti Survie.

Scope

This study included case studies in Haiti, the Philippines, India and Indonesia.

Structure of the report

Section 2 of this document describes the methodology for undertaking the research, and key findings are discussed in sections 3, 4 and 5. The conclusions from this research are presented in Section 6, followed by recommendations for the improvement of future programs and areas for further research and collaborative work in Section 7. A summary of each of the case studies is included in Appendix A, and the key findings from two previous research projects are included in Appendix B.

2 . MethodologyThis study was undertaken in three main stages between July 2012 and July 2013:

1. Mapping Habitat for Humanity and Christian Aid’s experience in disaster response.

2. Fieldwork investigating several case studies.

3. Comparative analysis and synthesis of common findings.

In the first stage, completed by Arup ID, secondary documentation provided by Habitat and Christian Aid was reviewed in order to identify the extent and nature of their engagement in shelter over the past decade. Interviews were then held with key stakeholders to ascertain the attitudes to shelter, the policy environment and the decision-making processes in each organization. These two activities provided organizational context and enabled the selection of appropriate case studies for further research.

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Fieldwork was then undertaken by SaferWorld Communications in India Habitat for Humanity in Indonesia, and Arup ID in Haiti and the Philippines to investigate several case studies:

• Christian Aid’s response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in India in 2004.

• Christian Aid’s response to the flooding in Rajasthan, India, in 2006.

• Habitat’s response to the earthquake in West Sumatra, Indonesia, in 2009.

• Habitat and Christian Aid’s responses to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010.

• Habitat’s response to Severe Tropical Storm Washi in the Philippines in 2011.

In addition to being implemented by different organizations in different countries, the case studies illustrate shelter programs of different sizes using different methods of assistance. They also allow comparison of the outputs and outcomes over the short, medium and longer term.

Key characteristics of each of the case studies

Note: Figures were correct at the time of the fieldwork (October–November 2012).

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Each of the case studies was reviewed against a common research framework as described in the table below. This research framework was developed by Habitat, Christian Aid and Arup ID in order to address the research questions identified by Habitat and Christian Aid as important, within the context of guidance on project evaluation from the Department for International Development, or DFID3, and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, or OECD4.

In the final stage (completed by Habitat and Christian Aid) each of the case studies was summarized (see Appendix A), and common themes emerging from the research were identified and discussed (see sections 3, 4 and 5).

Improving  Shelter  Responses  to  Humanitarian  Crises,  22.10.2013        7    

Each  of  the  case  studies  was  reviewed  against  a  common  research  framework  as  described  in  the  table  below.  This  research  framework  was  developed  by  Habitat,  Christian  Aid  and  Arup  ID  in  order  to  address  the  research  questions  identified  by  Habitat  and  Christian  Aid  as  important,  within  the  context  of  guidance  on  project  evaluation  from  the  Department  for  International  Development,  or  DFID3,  and  the  Development  Assistance  Committee  of  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-­‐Operation  and  Development,  or  OECD4.    

Project  stage   Research  question  

Design  

Relevance  • Was  the  project  in  line  with  local  needs  and  priorities  (as  well  as  donor  and  government  

policy)  at  the  time  of  implementation?  

Appropriateness  • Was  the  project  tailored  to  local  needs,  increasing  ownership,  accountability  and  cost-­‐

effectiveness  accordingly?  

Integration  • Did  the  project  take  a  holistic,  integrated  approach  to  solving  the  interconnected  

problems  faced  by  communities?  

Implementation  • Inputs  • Activities  • Outputs  

Economy  • Are  we  or  our  local  partners  buying  inputs  of  the  appropriate  quality  at  the  right  price?  

Efficiency  • How  well  do  we  or  our  local  partners  convert  inputs  into  outputs?  

Results  • Outcomes  • Impact  

Effectiveness  • How  well  are  the  outputs  from  an  intervention  achieving  the  desired  outcomes?  

Impact  • What  were  the  wider  effects  of  the  project  —  social,  economic,  technical  and  

environmental  —  on  individuals,  gender  and  age  groups,  communities,  and  institutions?  

In  the  final  stage  (completed  by  Habitat  and  Christian  Aid)  each  of  the  case  studies  was  summarized  (see  Appendix  A),  and  common  themes  emerging  from  the  research  were  identified  and  discussed  (see  sections  3,  4  and  5).  

                                                                                                                         3  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49551/DFID-­‐approach-­‐value-­‐money.pdf  4  http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm  

3 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49551/DFID-approach-value-money.pdf

4 http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

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“Quadruplex” houses provided by Habitat for Humanity in the Philippines.

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3 . Project design

Relevance

Was the project in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor and government policy) at the time of implementation?

Relevance to the scale of needIf the programs are compared in terms of numbers of outputs, few programs made a significant contribution in terms of the number of families assisted compared with the number of houses destroyed or damaged. The three exceptions were the programs of:

• CASA in India, providing support to 50,000 beneficiaries, or approximately 10,000 households.

• Habitat for Humanity in Haiti, assisting more than 26,000 households.

• Habitat in the Philippines, supporting more than 7,000 households.

Importantly, the first two of these programs supported a large number of families with shelter relief items. In addition to relief items, the case studies showed a range of different shelter assistance methods, typically supporting between 300 and 3,000 households. These included the provision of transitional shelters, cash and technical assistance for repairs, permanent reconstruction, and the provision of infrastructure through a community-driven “neighborhood approach.” Only Habitat Philippines and the Church’s Auxiliary for Social Action, or CASA, had undertaken permanent housing programs of more than 1,000 houses.

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Relevance to communities or governments

A different trend emerges if you consider the programs qualitatively, as many of the smaller programs specifically focused on assisting the most vulnerable families in the most heavily damaged areas. For example, a program in India by the Social Awareness Society for Youths, or SASY, provided long-term support to 57 marginalized Dalit and Adivasi families, while the Sustainable Environment or Ecological Development Society, or SEEDS India, provided transitional shelter for 300 socially excluded households.

Similarly, after the earthquake in West Sumatra, Habitat chose to work in the most heavily damaged district and prioritized assistance for families whose houses were destroyed or located in high-risk areas, displaced families, female-headed households, the elderly, and families with disabled members.

By contrast, after the earthquake in Haiti, Christian Aid chose to focus its assistance on rural areas — arguably not the most heavily damaged location. However, this approach was relevant to the government’s strategy of decentralizing Port-au-Prince

and to the wishes of Christian Aid’s local partners, who wanted to continue supporting the communities where they already worked.

Relevance to donors

Donor funding — and donor requirements — played a significant role in the case studies in this research. In Haiti, flexible funding obtained from the Disasters Emergency Committee and private donations meant that Christian Aid’s local partners in Haiti were able to design multisectoral programs to meet the needs of communities, while Habitat for Humanity’s program struggled to match more restrictive donor requirements with local needs. Adopting a multidonor funding strategy (of 43 separate donors) was viewed as a significant achievement of Habitat’s response in Indonesia, but meeting the varying donor requirements for disbursement of funds, project completion, frequency and timing of reporting led to challenges. In the Philippines, Habitat was under pressure from the government to deliver physical outputs as fast as possible, so the core home design was determined by

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the master plans and budgets of government and donors, often before beneficiaries had been identified.

“The choice of providing T-shelters in both Cabaret and Léogâne (Haiti) appears to have been influenced by the availability of donor funding as much as specifying local needs and desired outcomes and what support to beneficiaries was necessary to achieve them.” — Arup ID, 2013

Within one month of the 2009 earthquake in West Sumatra, Indonesia, people began building their own temporary shelters using salvaged materials.

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Quality, quantity, cost and timescale5

A relevant project balances the competing and inter-related demands of:

• Quantity: How many people are affected by the disaster? What level of external assistance is available? How many families should the program assist?

• Time: What assistance can be provided over what timescale? A program may be relevant at the time it’s designed, but will it be relevant by the time it’s implemented?

• Cost: What level of funding is available over what timeframe? What conditions are attached?

• Quality: What quality of assistance should be provided? Is it preferable to support a small number of families with permanent houses or a large number of families with repair kits?

An appropriate balance of each of these factors will be different in each situation. It is strongly influenced by the priorities, policies and plans of beneficiaries, governments, donors and other implementing organizations and will vary over time.

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5 Diagram from CRS (2013) “How-To Guide: Managing Post-Disaster (Re-)Construction Projects.” Available from www.crsprogramquality.org/ storage/pubs/emergencies/managing-postdisaster-reconstruction-projects.pdf

Relevance at the time of implementation

In the majority of programs, relief items were provided immediately, or within the first six months, but this was highly dependent on the availability of immediate funding. For example, CASA’s emergency assistance program did not start until three months after the 2004 tsunami, while in Indonesia, Habitat did not provide relief items at all because of a lack of funding. The availability of land and funding for permanent reconstruction meant that Habitat could start repair and reconstruction programs almost immediately in Indonesia and the Philippines. In Indonesia, this was because reconstruction took place in-situ, while in the Philippines this was because the government allocated land for relocation settlements. In contrast, Habitat delayed starting repair programs in Haiti until nine months after the 2010 earthquake, and waited 15 months before starting

reconstruction programs, but it did undertake large-scale relief and transitional shelter programs within the first few months.

In both Indonesia and the Philippines, Habitat played a lead role in the rapid provision of permanent housing, which was replicated by other agencies later in the response. By contrast, Habitat engaged in large-scale emergency and transitional shelter programs in Haiti, supporting almost 26,000 families, but had much more limited influence on permanent reconstruction. This experience highlights the importance of understanding the different stakeholder relationships and governance context in each situation. In the Philippines, government leadership provided a platform and direction for international NGOs to play a role in reconstruction. While in Haiti, although there were many plans and visions, insufficient leadership restricted the possibilities to engage in permanent reconstruction.

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Appropriateness

Was the project tailored to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness accordingly?

The answer to this question was found to have two interlinked components. First, the repair items distributed, transitional shelters provided or houses built needed to be considered as products with regard to their appropriateness to the local climate, hazards, cultural preferences, locally available construction materials and skills. Second, because an appropriate solution will be different for each community and household, the level of participation of affected communities, households and individuals was an important component in ensuring appropriateness of the design. Accordingly, each of the case studies including permanent reconstruction was reviewed in terms of appropriateness of the design and the level of participation.

A significant trend from this analysis was that the two largest permanent housing programs — CASA in India and Habitat for Humanity in the Philippines — showed the lowest levels of both participation and appropriateness of design. In these programs, designs were more likely to be based on donor requirements and the views of external professionals, with communities either “consulted” over minor details or simply “informed.” Consequently, beneficiaries were more likely to express dissatisfaction with their housing (e.g., the house is too small, hot or dark), while the materials used were more difficult to source

locally, and the researchers noted that the beneficiaries lacked the skills or ability to maintain, adapt or extend their houses themselves.

In contrast, the smallest permanent housing program in the research, that of SASY in India with just 57 houses, took a highly participatory approach to project design. However, the community chose to construct houses in concrete for reasons of physical safety from arson, which meant that the overall size of the house had to be reduced to stay within budget, and disaster risk reduction features (such as roof access in case of flooding) were reduced or removed. This illustrates the difficulties in balancing the needs and desires of communities with appropriate consideration of the technical implications of their decisions. SASY was not experienced in housing construction, and thus it could not effectively partner with the community to provide appropriate technical advice on the design choices.

When SEEDS India provided transitional shelter for 300 socially excluded households, it worked with the community to develop an “improved vernacular” design for the shelters.

Appropriate technologies

Both SEEDS India and Habitat Indonesia aimed to improve hygiene and sanitation practices through the provision of toilets and associated training. However, the researchers noted that the SEEDS India facilities gradually went out of use and that fewer than half the Habitat Indonesia facilities visited were clean. Similarly, where the SEEDS India water tanks had suffered damage, they had not been repaired, and the batteries of solar lights had not been replaced.

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Adopting a participatory approach to post-disaster shelter and housing is challenging, given that timescales are limited and beneficiaries are often too busy recovering other aspects of their lives and livelihoods to participate fully in the shelter or housing project. Consequently, an expected trend in the results would be for transitional shelter projects to have lower levels of participation (and therefore appropriateness) given their rapid implementation. Interestingly, these case studies do not show this as a trend, but this might be due to the exceptional program of SEEDS India. This program was designed around community participation and the co-creation of an “improved vernacular” transitional shelter design. These transitional shelters were in fact so appropriate that, despite permanent housing having later been provided by the government, beneficiaries chose to continue to live in them six years after they were completed.

“Beneficiaries (of the CASA program) confided that they didn’t put too much consideration into the design options at the time of relief. Their judgment was clouded by their need for a safe shelter as soon as possible ... they aspired to have a Western, ‘civilised’ house design, whether it was appropriate to their climate or not.” — SaferWorld Communications, 2013

The data gathered during the research regarding the appropriateness of the emergency shelter assistance and repair programs were insufficient to enable comparison of the level of participation in relief versus recovery or reconstruction programs, which are implemented over very different timescales. The level of participation and appropriateness achievable in large-scale versus small-scale programs and those implemented under “humanitarian” or “developmental” timescales is an important area for further research.

Ladder of Participation6

Sherry Arnstein’s “Ladder of Participation” is a commonly used framework for understanding different levels of community participation. “The bottom rungs of the ladder ... describe levels of ‘non-participation’ that have been contrived by some to substitute for genuine participation. Their real objective is not to enable people to participate in planning or conducting programs, but to enable powerholders to ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the participants. Rungs 3 and 4 progress to levels of ‘tokenism’ that allow the have-nots to hear and to have a voice. ... When they are proffered by powerholders as the total extent of participation, citizens may indeed hear and be heard. But under these conditions they lack the power to insure that their views will be heeded by the powerful. When participation is restricted to these levels, there is no follow-through, no ‘muscle,’ hence no assurance of changing the status quo. Rung (5) Placation is simply a higher level tokenism because the ground rules allow have-nots to advise, but retain for the powerholders the continued right to decide. Further up the ladder are levels of citizen power with increasing degrees of decision-making clout. Citizens can enter into a (6) Partnership that enables them to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional power holders. At the topmost rungs ... have-not citizens obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power.”

6 Arnstein, Sherry. (1969) “A Ladder of Citizen Participation.” Available from http://lithgow-schmidt.dk/sherry-arnstein/ ladder-of-citizen-participation.html.

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Integration

All of the case studies included some support to water, sanitation and hygiene; livelihoods; environment; community development; and disaster risk reduction in addition to the shelter assistance. However, integration was a key area of difference between Habitat for Humanity and Christian Aid.

Habitat’s programs focused on providing shelter assistance at the household level. Its shelter/housing programs often included water and sanitation and incorporated measures to reduce disaster risk. Habitat typically included community development activities in its permanent reconstruction programs, but this was less apparent in its emergency and transitional shelter programs. Some projects also included specific livelihood training and environmental programs, where time and funding allowed. In contrast, Christian Aid targeted its assistance at the community level. It typically focused on livelihoods and community-based disaster risk reduction programs, but the programs may include housing, depending on the level of need and the amount of funding available.

These two different approaches led to different results. The shelter assistance provided by Habitat was sometimes of a higher quality, but livelihoods remained a problem. Livelihoods elements were more successful in Christian Aid’s approach, but there was sometimes less focus on the quality of design and construction of the shelter. For example:

• Christian Aid’s programs in Haiti included housing as part of a larger program incorporating livelihoods support, community-based disaster risk reduction and environmental protection. But while noting that Christian Aid’s holistic approach to disaster recovery had many benefits (particularly increased social capital), the researchers expressed concerns regarding the seismic resilience of some of the houses and highlighted that there seems to be a lack of attention to the optimization of the home in the context of the overall program.

• In contrast, Habitat’s program in the Philippines provided a large number of families with good quality, permanent houses in safer locations. This reduced the vulnerability of families to natural hazards and crime, but many households felt that the program had a negative impact on livelihood opportunities and social cohesion.

• Similarly, limited funding meant that specific livelihood development activities were not included in Habitat’s program in West Sumatra, but the researcher noted that this was a missed opportunity, because the loss of livelihoods in the earthquake and lack of livelihood opportunities for relocated families could threaten prospects for long-term, successful settlement or integration in their new homes and communities.

Two of the cases highlighted that disaster recovery requires both physical reconstruction and recovered or adapted social processes. In the SEEDS India program, the researchers noted that a six-month transitional shelter program was not long enough to make long-term changes to people’s behavior concerning open defecation or the use of new technologies. In contrast, beneficiaries of Habitat’s program in the Philippines (evaluated only 10 months after the disaster) noted a lack of social cohesion in the relocation settlements, but this may develop over time as families become accustomed to their new situation.

Synthesis Report18

Building disaster resilience needs to be one of the core objectives of a post-disaster shelter project.

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4 . Project implementation

Economy and efficiency

Are we or our local partners buying inputs of the appropriate quality at the right price?

How well do we or our local partners convert inputs into outputs?

Materials

Inflation is a common challenge in post-disaster reconstruction because of high demand for materials and disrupted supply chains. Experienced local partners, including CASA and Habitat Philippines, managed this problem by purchasing materials locally, in bulk and at fixed rates. Habitat Philippines also allowed contingencies of up to 30 percent in project budgets. Where adequate contingencies were not incorporated into program design, fluctuating costs of materials and transportation led to delays in implementation as budgets were reworked — in the case of Christian Aid in Haiti — or the number of outputs were reduced after lengthy renegotiations with donors — in the case of Habitat Haiti. In addition to local sourcing, innovative techniques to reduce the cost of construction while supporting local economic recovery included Habitat Indonesia’s encouraging families to use salvaged materials for repair or to extend their core homes, and SEEDS India’s using readily available materials such as mud and straw with limited amounts of cement and tools acquired from local sources.

Female beneficiaries of CASAs program were “clear that had each family been given the money, they could not have generated similar or as effective homes.” — SaferWorld Communications, 2013

Labor

Habitat for Humanity’s approach was typically to support the local economy through local sourcing of laborers — in Indonesia and Haiti — and community contracting — in Haiti. Christian Aid’s local partners took different approaches in each situation. In the programs of both SASY and CASA, construction was undertaken by masons and laborers from the surrounding villages who had experience in concrete construction. Beneficiaries were not involved in construction, leaving them without the skills to maintain or extend their houses after the completion of the program. In CASA’s program, the beneficiaries were fishing communities and were adamant about not participating in the building process, stating that they did not have the necessary knowledge and refusing to learn the new skills. In SASY’s program, it is likely that the Dalit and Adivasi communities lacked the confidence to participate. By contrast, a key focus of the project in Barmer was to ensure that beneficiaries could maintain safe building processes once SEEDS had left. Local masons were chosen for construction to ensure that knowledge of the building techniques remained within the community. Beneficiary families were also involved in the on-site construction activities. Under the guidance of trained staff, the foundations and roofs were built and completed by the families themselves.

Involve local laborers, suppliers and the community in the recovery process.

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Technical expertise and partnerships

Christian Aid’s local partners had varying levels of expertise in shelter and took different approaches to accessing technical expertise. In India, SASY had no previous experience of shelter construction, so it hired a local architect and engineer to oversee construction. SEEDS India specializes in sustainable housing and humanitarian response, so it had sufficient in-house technical capacity, while CASA’s experience in disaster response meant that it partnered with a local engineering company to access technical expertise.

All of Christian Aid’s local partners in Haiti were new to shelter and had varying experience and capacity in project management and logistics. The lack of shelter expertise within Christian Aid, and the lack of funding for technical staff within the project budget, also meant that limited technical support was provided. Lack of capacity led to difficulties in designing an appropriate housing solution, and that project’s implementation was slow and relatively costly despite the small number of houses being constructed.

“If 24 square meters was an adequate solution, it is unclear why (larger houses were needed) ... and whether that was worth the additional direct cost as well as the opportunity cost of not building more houses.” — Arup ID, 2013

As an organization specializing in housing, Habitat typically had significant internal capacity to implement shelter programs. It also established partnerships for additional support in specialist areas such as settlement planning and health education (in Haiti)

or school construction (in Indonesia). In the Philippines, Habitat built on existing relationships to rapidly build internal capacity and partner with other organizations. Positive relationships with partners enabled Habitat to deliver an exceptionally efficient program, access additional funding and create opportunities to expand its work.

Beyond partnering for project implementation, Habitat also often made significant contributions to the local Inter-Agency Standing Committee or Shelter Cluster. Habitat’s role in the cluster varied, though. In Indonesia, Habitat’s repair and reconstruction program was later adopted by other agencies, but in the Philippines the researchers noted that Habitat did not use its developmental housing expertise to encourage government and other actors to take a more holistic approach.

The research highlighted the importance of partnerships in supporting the holistic recovery of communities. In Indonesia, Habitat worked proactively with various local government departments to secure construction of an access road for the relocation settlement, electricity connections and water for housing construction. By contrast, in the Philippines, the schedule of Habitat’s core home building program was not aligned with infrastructure. Houses were completed before the roads, drainage and utility connections, because the utility companies had been affected by the disaster and were not given assistance to rebuild their capacity. This meant the homeowners were delayed from moving into the core houses; they were able to move in only once connections had been made to water and electricity.

The key is community participation.

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Participation of beneficiary families in all stages of the shelter process brings multiple benefits, ranging from a greater sense of ownership to finer technical adaptation of locally appropriate solutions.

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5 . Project results

Effectiveness

How well are the outputs from an intervention achieving the desired outcomes?

Housing as a product

Positive outcomes from receiving emergency, transitional or permanent shelter assistance identified by the beneficiaries included:

• A feeling of safety and security (CASA, Habitat Indonesia, Christian Aid Haiti, Habitat Haiti, Habitat Philippines).

• Improved sleep (Christian Aid Haiti).

• Increased peace, dignity and privacy (Christian Aid Haiti, Habitat Haiti).

• A restored sense of stability, meaning that families could restart normal activities such as schooling and livelihoods (Habitat Indonesia).

• Reduced health problems (Habitat Indonesia).

• Increased status and prestige through having higher-quality housing (CASA, Christian Aid Haiti).

• Reduced expenditure on repairs and maintenance (CASA).

• Reduced conflict with neighboring communities through the provision of an access road (SASY).

In Habitat’s work in Indonesia, some beneficiaries noted that the small size of the house meant that some children were limited in using the house as a space to study at home. In Haiti, the researchers noted that a lack of beneficiary participation in Habitat’s “upgradeable” shelter program led to incorrect assumptions about households’ abilities to upgrade their shelters. Families who had not been able to make improvements to their shelters because of a lack of capital complained about their living conditions, despite recognizing that they had initially been improved. The shelter had not addressed their overall situation, and their “temporary” home appeared likely to become permanent.

Housing as a process

In projects with an emphasis on community participation, beneficiaries often reported having greater confidence and feeling of inclusion in society (as in the SASY and Habitat Haiti projects) and better relationships with their neighbors and increased community organization (in the SASY and Habitat Indonesia projects).

Other positive outcomes associated with programs implemented alongside the shelter programs included:

• Increased incomes as a result of livelihoods training and the establishment of local businesses (SASY).

• Improved quality of life and security in the area as a result of training (Habitat Haiti).

• Greater capacity to access official support mechanisms to address their own problems as a result of training in legal rights and procedures (SASY).

• Increased ability to deal with and respond to future disasters as a result of the disaster-awareness program (CASA).

Christian Aid’s methodology of working with local partners had also increased the partner organizations’ capacity to handle new, different and challenging projects, and developed their skills in fundraising, logistics and project management.

Output, outcomes and impact

Habitat for Humanity’s definitions of outputs, outcomes and impact have been used in this analysis:

• Outputs are the products of our work that have direct benefit for the people we are serving. Common examples are directly provided housing and housing improvements through our construction work. Outputs also include directly provided services, such as training in financial literacy or technical assistance in developing building plans or hiring contractors.

• Outcomes are the effects of these outputs on the lives of the people we serve. For example, a short-term outcome for the construction output would be improved quality of housing conditions, such as secure tenure or access to water and sanitation facilities. A longer-term outcome would be improved health conditions for the family or improved educational performance in school.

• Impact refers to the long-term accumulated effects of our interventions on the lives of the people we serve. Impacts can be measured in two ways: those to which our work contributes, and impacts that are directly attributable to our work.

Synthesis Report 23

Relocation

According to Principle 7 of “Safer Homes, Stronger Communities,”7 “relocation disrupts lives and should be kept to a minimum,” but three of the case studies included relocation settlements.

• The program of SEEDS in India included one relocation settlement for 65 households because of government intervention and land ownership problems. After the shelter program, the location had become used as a government mining location, and at the time of the research, six years after the completion of the program, more than half of the houses were no longer occupied, as people had either left to find other places to live and work or used their new houses as stores.

• By contrast, Habitat Indonesia undertook a relocation program for 55 families who needed to be moved from

a hazardous area. At the time of the research, these families reported that relocation to a less hazardous area and the provision of permanent, safe homes had provided psychological comfort and that they had improved access to public infrastructure and services such as markers, transportation, schools and health facilities. Community members felt their new location was likely to result in long-term savings in transportation costs for home partners as well as a potential increase in children’s school attendance rates.

• Habitat’s large-scale construction program in the Philippines was predominately a relocation program. At the time of the assessment — just 10 months after the disaster — families felt that relocation and the provision of permanent housing had reduced their physical vulnerability, but they also noted that it had a negative impact on livelihood opportunities and community cohesion.

7 Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (2010). “Safer Homes, Stronger Communities: A Handbook for Reconstructing Housing and Communities after Natural Disasters.” Available from www.gfdrr.org/node/1074.

Are shelters homes?

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Impact

What were the wider effects of the project — social, economic, technical and environmental — on individuals, gender and age groups, communities, and institutions?

Safe construction

Most of the case studies in this research had not been completed long enough to assess long-term impact, but the research highlighted that in several cases the short-term benefits of robust physical shelter may be eroded by families’ own adaptations and extensions. In India, the researchers noted that the decision to build houses in concrete using paid skilled laborers from outside the community means:

• Families have rapidly resorted to building extensions to their homes using their old, unsafe building practices. This is also attributable to the small size of the houses (SASY).

• Households are not aware of safe construction techniques for their houses, and the maintenance, repair and extension of these houses will always need to be completed by others (CASA).

In contrast, the program of SEEDS India focused on long-term skills transfer to the communities. Six years after the completion of the program, the researchers found that trained masons still present in the village clearly remembered and demonstrated the principles they had learned. Raising awareness of the importance of safe construction was also a focus of Habitat’s program in Indonesia, but the researcher noted that while families evidently have increased construction skills capacity, some of the finer details and key principles of disaster-resilient construction “were perhaps lost in translation.”

Livelihoods

Despite many positive outcomes from the shelter programs in this research, livelihoods remained a challenge for most communities. This highlights the constraints that the wider socioeconomic context may impose upon livelihood support, particularly where markets may be nonexistent, underdeveloped, saturated or undergoing a temporary spike after a disaster. Specific examples include:

• SEEDS’ program in India had intended to generate livelihood opportunities by leaving the mud-block-making machines with the community on completion of the program, but the researchers found no evidence of their continued usage. This was thought to be because the short time frame and limited scale of the initial project were not sufficient to change local practices and establish demand and supply chains for the new material.

• Limited funding for Habitat’s program in Indonesia meant that specific livelihood development activities were not included in the project design, but the researchers noted that the loss of livelihoods in the earthquake and the lack of livelihood opportunities for relocated families could threaten prospects for long-term, successful settlement and integration in their new homes and communities.

• Beneficiaries appreciated Habitat’s livelihoods training programs in Haiti but noted a lack of opportunities to use the training they had received.

• Beneficiaries of Christian Aid’s program in Haiti felt that it had contributed to the social capital of the community and were hopeful that this would support longer-term livelihood development. Many interviewees still highlighted the lack of income as a key area of concern with the researchers, stating that many communities remain economically and environmentally vulnerable to hazards.

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6 . Conclusions

Project design

Relevance

The case studies illustrated the challenge of balancing quantity (number of people to assist), quality (level of support that can be provided), cost and timescale. They also show that an appropriate balance will depend on local needs and capacities; government policies; the level, flexibility and timescale of available funding; and the capacity of our local partners and their comparative advantage over other organizations. The case studies also highlighted that although the provision of physical assistance —materials, technologies, shelters — can take place rapidly, recovery is a social process, and adapting to a different situation while adopting new technologies or safe construction techniques requires longer-term support.

Appropriateness

The research highlighted that the development of an appropriate project — appropriate to the local climate, hazards and culture, along with locally available skills and construction materials — requires

that affected families and communities participate in decision-making and project design, rather than just implementation. However, implementing organizations need both social and technical expertise to work in partnership with communities, balancing the desires of the community with appropriate technical advice on their design choices. The case studies also highlighted the challenges of adopting participatory approaches in large programs, or when families are too busy to engage in design choices, during the early stages of disaster response.

Integration

The case studies demonstrated the importance of viewing recovery as a holistic process involving physical, social, economic and environmental components, and showed that livelihoods remain a key challenge in the majority of the programs. Integration was a key area of difference between the two organizations – with Habitat typically focusing on shelter assistance at the household level (with other supporting programs), while Christian Aid views shelter as part of a holistic package of support at the community level. Both strategies have advantages and disadvantages, so there is significant complementarity between the organizations in this aspect.

Trees were planted, drainage channels were provided and a school was built in a resettlement site in Indonesia.

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Project implementation

Economy

The study found that the capacity of local partner organizations was critical to the implementation of high-quality, timely and cost-effective programs. Partners with previous experience reduced costs, maximized support to the local economy and supported long-term capacity building by sourcing materials locally (often in bulk at a fixed price), employing local laborers, encouraging households to use salvaged materials to repair or extend their core homes, and using locally available traditional materials.

Efficiency

Partners with less capacity in construction management often experienced challenges in designing an appropriate project, sourcing materials, managing inflation and ensuring quality control, resulting in relatively slow and costly programs or the reduction of outputs. Partnerships were often made with specialist NGOs or the private sector to access specific technical expertise or undertake more holistic programs. Effective partnerships with government were also extremely important in ensuring the provision of roads, drainage, water, electricity and other infrastructure and accessing secure land tenure.

Habitat often played a key role in local coordination mechanisms such as the IASC Shelter Cluster, but given its significant experience in housing programs, it could have demonstrated

greater leadership in advocating to government and other agencies for more appropriate, holistic, developmental approaches to post-disaster shelter.

Project results

Effectiveness

Positive outcomes from receiving emergency, transitional or permanent shelter assistance identified by the beneficiaries include a feeling of safety and security; improved sleep, peace, dignity and privacy; a restored sense of stability, meaning that families could restart normal activities such as schooling and livelihoods; reduced health problems; increased status and prestige through having higher-quality housing; and reduced expenditure on repairs and maintenance. In projects that emphasized community participation, beneficiaries often reported having greater confidence and a feeling of inclusion in society, better relationships with their neighbours, and increased community organization. Christian Aid’s methodology of working with local partners also increased the partner organizations’ capacity to handle new, different and challenging projects, and developed their skills in fundraising, logistics and project management.

Reusing salvaged material for construction can reduce a house’s cost.

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Impact

Most cases had not been completed long enough to assess long-term impact, but researchers highlighted that in several cases the short-term benefits of robust physical shelter may be eroded by families’ own adaptations and extensions. The majority of construction was undertaken by local masons and laborers, and although families were involved in construction in some projects, this was often as unskilled labor rather than in a supervisory role. Consequently, in very few cases did families and communities possess adequate knowledge and skills to maintain, adapt or extend their houses using safe construction techniques or to supervise local masons or laborers to do so.

Livelihoods also remained a challenge for many of the communities, with researchers noting that the shelters had not addressed their overall situation, that families lack the opportunities to use the livelihoods training they had received, and that a lack of livelihood opportunities threatens the long-term sustainability of these communities. This reinforces the importance of viewing disaster recovery as a holistic process, along with the need to maximize the contribution of our shelter programs to the socioeconomic as well as physical development of the families we hope to serve.

Best practices for post-disaster housing programs include real-time material distribution progress and house cost tracking, along with on-site supervision and quality control.

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It is the softer elements that matter more in the larger picture.

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7 . Recommendations

Recommendations for future programs

When the conclusions from this study are compared with the findings from previous research (see Appendix B), several common themes and recommendations emerge:

• A relevant project must match the needs and capacities of the affected communities with the available funding, government and donor policies, and the capacity of the assisting organization. All of these variables are context-specific and will change over time, so strategic decisions might need to be revisited and revised in order to ensure relevance at the time of implementation. Nonphysical methods of assistance, such as advocacy for policy change, negotiating tenure security, providing technical support, or adopting market-based approaches, might be more cost-effective than engaging in construction.

• Shelter programs should ensure that socially excluded and vulnerable groups are identified and included.

• An appropriate project works with affected communities to select assistance methods and design appropriate solutions. Small improvements in traditional designs and technologies can make significant improvements to people’s lives and are easy for people to understand and replicate themselves, whereas imported designs or technologies (while initially desirable) might not continue to be used, replicated or maintained in the longer term.

• The participation of affected communities in making decisions and designing recovery programs not only generates more appropriate programs, but also helps develop confidence, skills and community organization while aiding in psychosocial recovery. Participation in construction (or

supervision of construction) is also particularly important with regard to livelihood diversification and equipping communities with the knowledge and skills to adequately maintain, adapt and extend their houses or supervise others to do so.

• An integrated project takes a long-term perspective and views recovery as a holistic process supporting not just physical recovery but also social, economic and environmental aspects. Shelter programs should incorporate disaster risk reduction into hazard assessments, settlement planning, infrastructure provision and safe construction techniques. They should also maximize their contribution to the development of sustainable and resilient communities through building skills and community organization, livelihood development and diversification, and environmental protection.

• Relocation should be avoided, but if it has to occur (for example, to relocate communities from particularly hazardous locations), it must be viewed holistically, with sufficient infrastructure provided and adequate support for community organization and livelihood development.

• The greater the capacity of our local partners, the more economically and efficiently they can implement shelter programs. As the level of experience varies among our partners, greater collaboration could support knowledge sharing and capacity building before the next disaster response.

• Partnerships with specialist NGOs, the private sector and academic institutions can be established before a disaster to provide additional technical expertise. Partnerships with other implementing organizations and governments are also essential to providing holistic support to communities.

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Areas for further research and collaboration

Suggestions for further research and collaboration identified by the researchers and emerging through the comparative analysis include:

1. Reviewing the research framework used in this study to develop a standardized methodology for evaluating shelter programs.

2. Developing a decision-making framework for context analysis and the design of relevant, appropriate and integrated shelter programs.

3. Clarification of the intended outcomes and impacts of shelter programs, along with the development of a methodology to measure them, and further longitudinal research.

4. Identification of best practices in post-disaster shelter programs with regard to:

a. Participation of affected communities in rapid or large-scale programs.

b. Incorporating disaster risk reduction, resilience and climate change adaptation.

c. Identifying and including vulnerable groups.

d. Determining when relocation is necessary, and providing holistic support when it is.

e. Balancing vernacular and modern technologies.

f. Providing urban disaster response.

5. Developing a greater understanding of what integration means to each organization, and what this might mean in practice if Habitat and Christian Aid were to develop a collaborative program.

6. Increasing the capacity of our local partners by sharing experience and tools, and building relationships and partnerships before a disaster.

The shelter story goes far deeper than the structures. It is about people — their lives, livelihoods, social status and much more.

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Appendices

Appendix A This section summarizes findings from each of the case studies included in this research.

1. Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) in India — Christian Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

2. Flooding (2006) in Rajasthan, India — Christian Aid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

3. Earthquake (2009) in West Sumatra, Indonesia — Habitat for Humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

4. Earthquake (2010) in Haiti — Christian Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

5. Earthquake (2010) in Haiti — Habitat for Humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44

6. Severe Tropical Storm Washi in the Philippines — Habitat for Humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

Appendix B This section summarizes the findings from two previous assessments of shelter programs undertaken by Habitat for Humanity and Christian Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

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Appendices | Synthesis Report 33

Appendix A: Case study findings

1 . Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) in India — Christian Aid

Context

On Dec. 26, 2004, an Indian Ocean tsunami caused extensive damage along the coast of southern India. More than 16,000 people lost their lives8, 650,000 were displaced9, and more than 3.2 million people were directly or indirectly affected. Virtually all homes were destroyed in a belt stretching up to half a kilometer inland, leading to estimates that more than 100,000 homes were needed10.

Project design

Relevance

The research reviewed two shelter programs funded by Christian Aid after the Indian Ocean tsunami in India: a program by the Church’s Auxiliary for Social Action, or CASA, which provided relief, recovery and reconstruction assistance to 50,000 people; and a program by the Social Awareness Society for Youths, or SASY, which focused on two villages of marginalized Dalit and Adivasi communities. CASA’s program included the distribution of shelter items, construction of 800 temporary houses, repair of 400 damaged houses and 50 schools, and the reconstruction of 2,900 core houses and 25 multipurpose disaster shelters from April 2005 to March 2007. SASY’s program focused predominantly on social development, but it also built 57 houses in two villages. Although it was a small project, the final houses were not completed until April 2011, more than six years after the tsunami. This was in part because there was no recognition of the impact of the tsunami on inland Dalit communities until 2008, and complexities in acquisition of land for permanent housing further delayed housing provision.

Appropriateness

The small scale of SASY’s program (only 57 houses) meant that community members could play a lead role in developing an appropriate shelter design, responding to their priorities within the limited funding available. However, the community chose to construct houses in concrete for reasons of physical safety from arson, which meant that the overall size of the house had to be reduced to only 18.6 square meters to stay within budget. The house also did not incorporate disaster risk reduction features such as roof access in case of flooding.

In CASA’s large-scale housing program, seven possible shelter designs were developed. The most effective and popular design of 37 square meters was determined through workshops with beneficiaries and included a living room, bedroom, kitchen, toilet and washroom. It also included a small veranda at the front and back, and additional space was left for extensions or as a place for beneficiaries to grow crops on their land. The program balanced the need for safety from future tsunamis with the requirements of fishing communities to live close to the sea by relocating communities a minimum distance – just 500 meters above the high tide line.

Village committees were formed in both villages, but it is not clear how much involvement they had in the design and construction of the houses. CASA chose to allocate houses to beneficiaries once construction had been completed. This was supported by the beneficiaries at the time, but in hindsight they felt that being responsible for managing the construction of their own houses would have generated a greater sense of ownership among the community. A case in point is the prayer room, which was discussed with beneficiaries at the time but deemed nonessential. On visiting the shelters, researchers found that most beneficiaries had converted their kitchens to a prayer room, forcing them to cook outside.

“Beneficiaries confided that they didn’t put too much consideration into the design options at the time of relief. Their judgment was clouded by their need for a safe shelter as soon as possible ... they aspired to have a western, ‘civilised’ house design, whether it was appropriate to their climate or not.” — SaferWorld Communications, 2013

8 Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006). “Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami.”9 http://www.recoveryplatform.org/countries_and_disasters/disaster/15/indian_ocean_tsunami_200410 http://www.recoveryplatform.org/countries_and_disasters/disaster/15/indian_ocean_tsunami_2004

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Integration

SASY’s program included holistic support to marginalized Dalit and Adivasi communities. A significant component of its work focused on livelihood interventions such as establishing a carpentry workshop for young men and providing women with training in computer skills, candle making and tailoring. SASY faced challenges in introducing the Dalit community to new livelihood principles and possibilities. Community members believed that they were not able to participate in these activities, and it took more than four years of working with these communities to change this belief. The greatest achievement was the establishment of a cashew nut company run completely by Dalit women.

In addition to livelihood programs, SASY provided training on legal issues for groups of women and children. This included information on official support mechanisms for women in need and how these can be accessed, along with training on their legal rights in relation to sexual abuse, domestic violence and the Schedule Caste Schedule Tribe (SCST) Atrocities Act.

CASA’s housing program was also part of a holistic package of assistance that included relief items (during the first six weeks); construction of 30 communal toilets, repairing 250 fishing boats and provision of psychosocial support (during the first year); strengthening of community-based organizations; and the establishment of 80 disaster mitigation task forces, along with networking and advocacy on disaster risk reduction (for up to two years).

Project implementation

Economy and efficiency

SASY had no previous experience in shelter construction and hired a local architect and engineer to oversee construction. CASA supervised its construction process and brought in technical expertise from an engineering company with experience in disaster response. CASA sourced materials in bulk from local suppliers, which significantly reduced costs.

“The Indira Nagar female group was clear that had each family been given the money, they could not have generated similar or as effective homes.” — SaferWorld Communications, 2013

In both the SASY and CASA programs, construction was undertaken by masons and laborers from the surrounding

villages who had experience in concrete construction. Beneficiaries were not involved in construction, leaving them without the skills to maintain or extend their houses after the program ended. In CASA’s program, the beneficiaries were fishing communities and were adamant about not participating in the building process, stating that they did not have the necessary knowledge and refusing to learn the new skills. In SASY’s program, it is likely that the Dalit and Adivasi communities lacked the confidence to participate.

Project results

Effectiveness and impact

The aim of SASY’s program was the recovery and development of marginalized Dalit and Adivasi communities. SASY effectively achieved this aim through the provision of livelihood training, resulting in better incomes and lifestyles, along with training on their legal rights and the correct procedures to follow, which increased the capacity of the community to address their own social problems.

SASY’s community-driven approach to housing construction had a significant positive impact in terms of the social development of Dalit and Adivasi communities and generating ownership over the project. On the other hand, the small size of the houses and the choice to build them in concrete rather than a vernacular material means that families have rapidly resorted to building extensions to their homes for kitchens, toilets and additional living space using their old, unsafe building practices. In hindsight, SASY felt that it should have pushed for further funding to be able to produce larger houses of 32.5 square meters.

Interestingly, the most significant change from the project was related to infrastructure. The researchers noted that the development of an access road for one community, which is still in use, has caused social and physical conflicts to cease. A final significant aspect of the project was that beneficiaries were intended to become legal owners of their land and houses, but at the time of the research they had yet to receive official papers from the government.

CASA’s program provided structurally safe shelters, and local government administrators have encouraged other agencies to replicate CASA’s design in other areas. In general, interviewed beneficiaries were happy with the housing provided, knowing that they are safe from future disasters. The women in Indira

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Nagar felt that their status and prestige within their society had risen as a result of living in concrete housing. The concrete roof was referred to repeatedly; a tiled roof would not have given them the same satisfaction. Families also stated that the frequent expenditures on repairs and amendments needed in their old houses had been reduced significantly.

CASA’s use of paid laborers from outside the community means that community members themselves are not aware of safe construction techniques, and the maintenance, repair and extension of these houses will always need to be completed by others. Although these fishing communities might not require the skills to build, maintain or extend their own houses (given their location, financial resources and access to skilled labor), the researchers noted that greater emphasis on procurement

and oversight committees could have encouraged somewhat greater engagement of the beneficiary families. It would have also provided them with the skills to effectively manage paid laborers in the future and ensure that safe building techniques are incorporated.

In addition to the housing program, CASA’s psychosocial, disaster awareness and livelihood programs have all helped build the community’s resilience, leaving beneficiaries with the ability to deal with and respond to future disasters. This was tested during a recent tsunami alert in 2012, during which the new tsunami warning siren was put to the test. As a result of the warning, community members were said to have effectively evacuated their homes, gathering at the community hall built by CASA.

Homes that exceed humanitarian space standards are strong and demonstrate a sense of ownership in the way they are adapted, expanded and decorated.

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2 . Flooding (2006) in Rajasthan, India — Christian Aid

Context

Heavy monsoon rains on Aug. 16-25, 2006, engulfed several villages across 12 districts of Rajasthan, of which Barmer was the worst affected.

Project design

Relevance

The Sustainable Environment or Ecological Development Society, or SEEDS India, received funding from Christian Aid to implement a six-month intermediate shelter program for 300 socially excluded households. Where possible, shelters were built on or close to their original location (allowing people to continue their livelihoods), except in one community where land ownership problems and government intervention forced the community to be relocated.

Appropriateness

Community participation was the foundation of SEEDS India’s project design in Barmer. After communitywide orientation about the project, a representative Village Development Committee was formed. This committee helped to ensure that all viewpoints of the affected communities were voiced throughout the design, procurement and construction process and generated a sense of ownership of the final outcomes. SEEDS worked with the community to develop an “improved vernacular” form of construction that was appropriate to the local climate and culture. The design maintained the traditional circular house plan (which is resistant to sandstorms and earthquakes), used improved mud bricks, had a thatched roof for thermal comfort, and introduced foundations and structural bands for strength.

Integration

SEEDS’ shelter program placed a significant emphasis on livelihoods training. Twenty-three community members were trained in block making and safe construction techniques for flood and earthquake-prone areas. After the training, most of the houses were built by these masons themselves. The shelter program also included construction of seven community water storage tanks to replace those damaged in the floods,

and the introduction of rainwater harvesting and solar power. SEEDS also attempted to tackle sanitation issues, because open defecation is a widespread practice in Barmer. Five dry pit community latrines with attached bathrooms and water tanks were built, training that highlighted the importance of improved sanitation was provided to women, and women’s groups were established to manage the facilities.

Project implementation

Economy and efficiency

A key focus of the project in Barmer was to ensure that beneficiaries could maintain safe building processes once SEEDS had left. Accordingly, readily available materials such as mud and straw were the main form of construction, with limited amounts of cement and tools acquired from local sources. The project aimed to improve upon vernacular mud brick construction through introducing stabilized, interlocking earth block technology, in which a small amount of cement is added to earth before it is compressed in a block-making machine. The use of “interlinking” blocks also cut out the need for mortar. Local masons were chosen for construction to ensure that knowledge of the building techniques remained within the community. Beneficiary families were also involved in the on-site construction activities. Under the guidance of trained staff, the foundations and roofs were built and completed by the families themselves.

Project results

Effectiveness and impact

The outputs of the project were the provision of structurally sound and sustainable shelters that are in keeping with local livelihoods and building practices. Although they were intended as “transitional” shelters (built quickly and with limited funding), the appropriateness of the design, material choice and construction means that these shelters have been able to continue to be used for a longer period, contributing to the long-term development of the assisted communities. Revisiting Barmer six years after the project, the researchers noted the following long-term outcomes from the SEEDS transitional shelter program:

• All the shelters visited in most villages (except for the relocation settlement) were well-maintained and happily inhabited. There were few complaints from beneficiaries besides the request for additional space and the

Appendices | Synthesis Report 37

complications of the thatched roofing that needs repair every couple of years (although beneficiaries knew about this at the time of construction).

• Although government-built permanent housing was under construction for those families below the poverty line, the new housing did not incorporate vernacular building traditions, so beneficiaries preferred to continue living in the temporary shelters provided by SEEDS, where levels of thermal comfort were greater.

• Training local masons in safe building techniques had been effective in building their skills, and some resilient building features were being replicated in new construction. The researchers found that the trained masons still present in the village clearly remembered and demonstrated the principles they had learned, and many others had moved on to other villages. Community members stated that neighboring villages had shown interest in learning similar techniques and designs, and this has led to wider dispersal of

the knowledge within the mason community in the region. However, this effect could not be verified within this study.

• In the one relocation community (of 65 households), the site had subsequently become a government mining location. More than half of the houses built were no longer occupied, because the families had either left to find other places to live and work or used their new houses as stores.

• The program intended to generate livelihood opportunities by leaving the mud-block-making machines with the community, but the researchers found no evidence of their continued usage. This was thought to be because the short timeframe and limited scale of the initial project were not sufficient to change local practices and establish demand and supply chains for the new material. The stabilized compressed block technology has been practiced only in a very limited way by another NGO operating in the region and not by communities themselves.

A new house improved through the addition of robust foundations, earth blocks stabilized with cement, and a thatched roof for thermal comfort.

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• The provision of communal (rather than individual) toilets was not popular with communities, and the short time frame of the project was not enough time to make long-term changes to behavior. Consequently, the new facilities were in use only while the local women’s groups managed them, and they gradually went out of use. The same was true of other new technologies introduced during the program. The researchers found that the batteries of solar lights had not been replaced and damaged water tanks had not been repaired.

3 . Earthquake (2009) in West Sumatra, Indonesia — Habitat for Humanity

Context

Two consecutive earthquakes hit the provinces of West Sumatra and Jambi on Sept. 30 and Oct. 1, causing buildings to collapse and triggering massive landslides. Thirteen out of 19 districts in West Sumatra were affected, the worst being Kota Padang (Padang City), Kota Pariaman (Pariaman City) and Kabupaten Padang Pariaman (Padang Pariaman District). More than 1,100 people lost their lives, and an estimated 250,000 families (1.25 million people) were affected by the earthquake through the total or partial loss of their homes and livelihoods. Approximately 14 percent of the pre-earthquake housing stock was destroyed (115,000 houses). An additional 17 percent (135,000) suffered some level of damage11.

Project design

Relevance

Habitat for Humanity chose to focus its assistance in Padang Pariaman, a district with higher than average levels of poverty and one of those most severely affected by the earthquake (approximately 6,200 houses were damaged). The project prioritized supporting displaced families living in tents or evacuation sites, female-headed households, the elderly, households with disabled family members, and households whose homes had been destroyed or were located in high-risk areas.

Based on a shelter needs assessment and the availability of donor funding, Habitat developed a shelter assistance program that included incremental cash grants, materials and technical assistance for 465 families to repair their own homes; in-situ construction of 417 core homes for families whose houses were destroyed; four schools; and core homes, toilets, potable water systems and surface water drainage for 55 families who needed to be relocated (supporting about 15 percent of families whose houses had been destroyed or damaged). Despite living in one of the most earthquake-prone regions of the world, the local population had limited knowledge of safe housing construction techniques. A key objective of Habitat’s project was therefore to raise awareness of unsafe construction practices and train families in disaster-resilient building techniques.

Habitat was the first nongovernmental organization to obtain Indonesian government approval for the construction of core houses in West Sumatra, and the entire program was completed within 30 months. Local government officials noted that Habitat’s approach was systematic and timely, and that it worked in a participatory manner with communities and local officials. Habitat’s project staff highlighted that their response could have been more effective if they had been able to access reserve funding to respond immediately to the disaster. Habitat did not have much experience in building schools before the program, but the need for school construction meant that Habitat engaged in this activity through the assistance of technical volunteers.

Appropriateness

Habitat developed several shelter options based on its previous, more general experience in Padang and Indonesia. Core homes were 21 square meters and had two rooms, meeting the Sphere minimum standard for space and privacy for a household of up to six people. Core homes were designed so that families can easily expand the size of their houses according to their needs. Although the community was not actively involved in the housing design process, they were consulted regarding the design of the house and toilet, and toilets were located internally or externally, depending on the preference of the household.

11 BNPB, Bappenas the Provincial/City Governments of West Sumatra and Jambi Provinces, and International Partners (2009). “West Sumatra and Jambi Natural Disasters: Damage, Loss and Preliminary Needs Assessment.” Available from http://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr.org/files/documents/GFDRR_Indonesia_DLNA.2009.EN_.pdf.

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Habitat adopted a strong participatory process, involving affected communities throughout the project cycle. There was also a transparent beneficiary selection process and a well-established complaint and grievance mechanism. A representative Community Reconstruction Committee was established in each village to assist in family selection, material distribution and supervision of construction as well, and to facilitate two-way communication between Habitat and the community members. Each household was also expected to contribute 22 hours of “sweat equity” (voluntary labor) during construction

(approximately one hour per day), and although these hours were not recorded formally, community members frequently assisted with construction activities by helping to flatten soil, providing drinks for the laborers, mixing cement, etc.

Integration

Habitat’s program in Padang took a holistic approach to community recovery and development, including house repairs and new construction, school construction, improved water and sanitation, community engagement and training, fruit tree

Habitat decided not to provide temporary shelter or tents, instead building 21-square-meter core houses with earthquake-resilient design that can lead to permanent houses.

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planting and composting (in the relocation settlement), and local sourcing of materials. A substantial number of community members were engaged in paid employment. About 12 people were employed as daily laborers, two men were employed as loaders, and one female community member worked as an administrator in Habitat’s warehouse office. Community members were recruited through the Community Reconstruction Committee (based on descriptions of the positions and skills required), contracts were three to 12 months in duration, and payment was above minimum wages for West Sumatra.

Project implementation

Economy and efficiency

Habitat’s entire program cost US$2,141,244, with 43 international, national and individual donors contributing. Adopting a multidonor funding strategy was viewed as a significant achievement of Habitat’s response, but it resulted in challenges meeting the varying donor requirements for disbursement of funds, project completion, frequency and timing of reporting, etc. Habitat initially aimed to build 2,500 core homes within 30 months after the disaster, in addition to schools, water, sanitation and other infrastructure. However, limited availability of donor funding reduced the scale of the program, with Habitat eventually supporting 937 families through a combination of core homes and support for repairs, plus infrastructure and four schools. A significant strength of Habitat’s program was its commitment to reducing the cost of construction, maximizing the use of locally available resources, and supporting economic recovery and long-term resilience through encouraging families to use salvaged materials for repair or to extend their core homes, purchasing materials as locally as possible, and locally sourcing laborers for construction.

Building on their disaster response experience in Aceh, Habitat’s staff recognized the importance of partnerships to achieve their objectives. From the beginning of the response, Habitat played an active role in the Shelter Cluster, attending regular coordination meetings to provide project updates and share information relating to their housing design and process with other humanitarian agencies. Habitat also established positive relationships with the local government, including construction of an access road for the relocation settlement and advocacy to the National Electricity Agency for subsidized electricity connections from the Department of Public Works and provision of water for housing construction from the Fire Department.

Project results

Effectiveness and impact

The short-term benefit of Habitat’s program was the rapid provision of support for permanent housing, enabling families to move out of evacuation centers or tents and into permanent homes. The intermediate outcomes were different for families who had received in-situ assistance (core homes or support for repairs) and those who had been relocated. Families who had received assistance in-situ reported:

• Reduced health problems.

• Stronger relationships with their neighbours and improved community organization through community committees.

• Both positive and negative effects on livelihood opportunities. Some families needed to migrate because of a lack of employment opportunities, while others had extended their houses to open small shops.

• The small size of the house meant that some children were limited in using the house as a space to study at home.

Families who had been relocated reported:

• That relocation to a less hazardous area and the provision of permanent, safe homes had provided psychological comfort for the families.

• A restored sense of stability facilitated a resumption of normal activities, including schooling and efforts to restore their damaged livelihoods.

• Strengthened community cohesion and capacity for self-help.

• Improved hygiene and sanitation practices as a result of the installation of household-level latrines and training from Habitat and Islamic Relief. However, the researchers noted that further training was required on latrine maintenance, as fewer than half of the latrines visited were clean.

• Improved access to public infrastructure and services such as markers, transportation, schools and health facilities. Discussions with these communities highlighted that this is likely to result in long-term savings in transportation costs for home partners, along with a potential increase in children’s school attendance rates.

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There are many positive outcomes from Habitat’s program, but it lacked a strategy for the sustainability of outcomes after the completion of Habitat’s activities. Although the water management committee at the relocation settlement was still active at the time of the assessment, there was no mechanism in place for the sustainability of the Community Reconstruction Committees, and committee members lacked a clear understanding of what their future role in their community will be, nor did they have any agreed upon work plan for continuing their awareness-raising activities.

Limited funding meant that specific livelihood development activities were not included in the project design. This was a missed opportunity, as the loss of livelihoods in the earthquake and the lack of livelihood opportunities for relocated families could threaten prospects for long-term, successful settlement or integration in their new homes and communities.

Finally, although the involvement of local laborers in construction might offer long-term benefits to the workers after the project, and home partners evidently have increase construction skills capacity, some of the finer details and key principles of disaster-resilient construction were perhaps lost in translation.

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4 . Earthquake (2010) in Haiti — Christian Aid

Context

The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti killed more than 220,000 people and damaged or destroyed more than 180,000 homes. Many affected families moved from damaged neighborhoods into available spaces across the city and surrounding area, and more than 1.5 million people were provided with emergency shelter in over 1,500 camps. The high volume of rubble, damage to key infrastructure, and high levels of informal land occupation hindered attempts to provide shelter assistance. The urban context, lack of building codes and challenges of engagement with the government contributed to a complex operating environment. Recovery was challenged by political uncertainty, annual risks due to rain and hurricanes, and an outbreak of cholera at the end of 2010.

Project design

Relevance

Christian Aid’s earthquake response programs focused on rural areas in Haiti. This was in part in support of the government’s strategy to decentralize Port-au-Prince, and partly at the request of Christian Aid’s local partners to continue supporting the communities in which they already worked. Working in rural areas also meant that Christian Aid’s partners could engage in permanent reconstruction from the outset without facing the challenges of insecure or disputed land tenure, which delayed permanent shelter programs in urban areas. Five of Christian Aid’s 14 local partners chose to provide shelter assistance: Servicio Social de Iglesias Dominicanas, or SSID; Support Group for Refugees and Repatriated Persons, or GARR; Aprodema; Koral; and Haiti Survie. Collectively, they provided shelter assistance to more than 400 families in three years after the earthquake: 40 through SSID, 80 through GARR, 20 through Aprodema, 138 through Koral, and 130 through Haiti Survie.

Appropriateness

The programs of Christian Aid’s local partners in Haiti had a strong focus on community participation and accountability, with beneficiaries expressing “satisfaction with their new housing and the process through which it was provided.” Christian Aid’s partners worked through existing local organizations to identify beneficiaries and carry out training. They also built model houses to get feedback from communities and provide construction training for local laborers. To encourage ownership, households were asked

to contribute raw materials, but many people reported an inability to contribute even these minimal amounts because of a lack of capital or the physical ability to collect it themselves. In another case, where a steel frame was used rather than the typical concrete block construction, Christian Aid worked with communities to ensure that it was still readily accepted. Despite high levels of beneficiary satisfaction with their “proper housing,” the researchers noted that it is unclear if the house structure is designed or constructed to withstand earthquakes. Christian Aid’s local partners also experienced difficulties in defining an appropriate size for their houses, with sizes ranging from 24 to 52 square meters.

“If 24 square meters was an adequate solution, it is unclear why (larger houses were needed) ... and whether that was worth the additional direct cost as well as the opportunity cost of not building more houses.” — Arup ID, 2013.

Integration

The availability of flexible funding through the Disasters Emergency Committee and private appeals enabled Christian Aid’s local partners to engage in shelter as part of a larger program including livelihoods support, community-based disaster risk-reduction activities, and environmental protection through tree planting. In addition to more general livelihoods support, Christian Aid’s partners aimed to hire 75 percent of their workforce from within local communities. In many cases, it proved difficult to find local staff with sufficient skills and experience, but through training and employment, Christian Aid’s partners built the capacity of the local population and organizations, increasing their ability to find additional employment and opportunities beyond the Christian Aid program.

Haiti Survie is one of the local partners that helped Christian Aid provide shelter assistance in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake.

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Project implementation

Economy and efficiency

All of Christian Aid’s local partners were new to shelter and had varying experience and capacity in project management and logistics. This meant that implementation of the shelter programs was slow and relatively costly, despite their small scale. The lack of shelter expertise within Christian Aid, and the lack of funding for technical staff within the project budget, meant that limited technical support on housing design and construction was

provided. Additionally, building houses in dispersed locations in remote rural areas made on-site monitoring difficult, and the technical drawings were not detailed enough to ensure quality control. Materials were bought locally where appropriate, but high-quality materials were difficult to source in remote rural areas, and these were later sourced from further away. Fluctuating costs of materials and transportation made budgeting very difficult and led to delays in project implementation as budgets were reworked.

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Project results

Effectiveness and impact

The short-term benefits identified by beneficiaries interviewed during the fieldwork were improved living standards, including improved sleep, increased peace and privacy, increased feelings of physical and psychological security, and improved status. In the longer term, community members felt that the program had contributed to the social capital of the community and were hopeful that this would support livelihood development. They also noted that the quality and size of the houses provided had improved the status of the area, that people now wanted to live in these communities, and that land prices in recent sales had increased. However, many interviewees still highlighted the lack of income as a key area of concern, stating that many communities remain economically and environmentally vulnerable to hazards.

Christian Aid’s methodology of working through local partners had increased the partners’ capacity to handle new, different and challenging projects, and developed their skills in fundraising, logistics and project management. Although Christian Aid’s approach to shelter — viewing it as part of a holistic package of support to affected communities — has many benefits, the researchers noted that there seems to be lack of attention to the optimization of the home in the context of the overall program. The researchers also noted that beneficiaries felt reliant on receiving more assistance rather than seeing the programs as a steppingstone to catalyze their own self-directed recovery. Researchers recommended that Christian Aid and its local partners do more to ensure that in providing assistance they work in an empowering way, focusing on the participant’s role in the process and beyond.

5 . Earthquake (2010) in Haiti — Habitat for Humanity

Context

The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti killed more than 220,000 people and damaged or destroyed more than 180,000 homes. Many affected families moved from damaged neighborhoods into available spaces across the city and surrounding area, and more than 1.5 million people were provided with emergency shelter in over 1,500 camps. The high volume of rubble, damage to key infrastructure, and high levels of informal land occupation hindered attempts to provide shelter assistance. The urban context, lack of building codes and challenges of engagement with the government contributed to a complex operating environment. Recovery was challenged by political uncertainty, annual risks due to rain and hurricanes, and an outbreak of cholera at the end of 2010.

Project design

Relevance

Habitat for Humanity responded to the immediate shelter need through the distribution of 500 emergency shelter kits in the first four weeks after the disaster through a partnership with CARE Haiti that was quickly established because of prior links between the CEOs of each organization. After this pilot, Habitat used a network of local partners to distribute 23,000 kits over the following year. Habitat also used pre-existing relationships to secure funding for transitional shelter programs in Cabaret and Léogâne. Habitat provided 440 families in Cabaret and 472 families in Léogâne with transitional shelters between the end of March and the end of August 2010 and 1,500 families in Léogâne with “upgradable” shelters between August 2010 and August 2011, but the researchers questioned whether the choice of transitional shelter support was driven by beneficiary or donor requirements.

“The choice of providing (transitional shelters) in both Cabaret and Léogâne appears to have been influenced by the availability of donor funding as much as specifying local needs and desired outcomes and what support to beneficiaries was necessary to achieve them.” — Arup ID, 2013

Appendices | Synthesis Report 45

Between March 2011 and December 2012, Habitat implemented a permanent housing program for 255 landless households in the Santo community, along with repairing and retrofitting 108 houses. Habitat also worked in Simon-Pelé, an informal area of Port-au-Prince, with funding from UN-HABITAT, adopting a “neighborhood approach” to community recovery and development. Between September 2011 and September 2012, this project supported 175 families with repairs and 106 households with improved infrastructure and basic services, along with training community members in construction, disaster response, gender equity, financial literacy and health awareness, and providing financial support to small businesses and improved infrastructure.

Appropriateness

The contents of Habitat’s emergency shelter kits were based on Habitat’s experience responding to other disasters within the region and initial monitoring reports. The kits included a tarpaulin, rope, saw, roofing nails, wire, hammer, pliers, chisel, pry bar, duct tape, dust masks and leather gloves. On the whole, beneficiaries were satisfied with the kits, although the majority said that they could have used them much earlier.

Habitat had several different transitional shelter designs. The first had a split roof and bucket foundations, while later shelters had a double pitch roof and precast concrete pile foundations. Transitional shelters were clad in tarpaulin and had a covered floor area of 18 square meters, including a 6-square-meter covered porch. The upgradable shelters were clad in plywood and had permanent foundations that block walls could be built on.

Although Habitat’s transitional shelter program in Léogâne did include community engagement, it focused on strengthening community organization rather than involving affected households in the design of their shelters. In Léogâne, the length of time that affected families are likely to remain in their “transitional” shelters means that the “upgradable” shelters are more appropriate, although assumptions made about recipients’ ability to upgrade their shelters might have been unrealistic.

Habitat’s reconstruction programs in Santo and Simon-Pelé both adopted more participatory approaches, and consequently more appropriate programs:

• In Santo, beneficiaries were involved in settlement planning and house design with input from surrounding neighborhoods. The core homes are 24 square meters, with a base in concrete block and upper walls made of timber. The floors are raised slightly to mitigate against flooding, and there is one internal division. There is a covered porch, and latrines are provided separately. Access to electricity is included, and site drainage has been planned. They are laid out in blocks, each managed by a community committee, and space has been designed for core home expansion.

• In Simon-Pelé, Habitat adopted a community-driven approach and supported beneficiaries through the process of enumeration, prioritizing the needs and the actions to be taken, the formation of the community council, and project implementation.

In general, Habitat relied on maintaining good relationships with communities and the presence of project staff in the field to collect feedback on their programs. However, there was no evidence of more formal accountability mechanisms, and it was unclear what responsibility Habitat had toward beneficiaries after completion of the program.

A transitional shelter provided by Habitat for Humanity in Cabaret, Haiti.

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Integration

It was recommended that Habitat’s future emergency distributions include training on how to use the materials. The transitional shelter programs included training in disaster risk reduction and hygiene promotion, but they were less holistic than the permanent housing programs, which included community organization and training in health education, conflict resolution, gender equity and financial literacy. Partnerships were established to undertake more complex programs, such as engaging Architecture for Humanity to undertake participatory settlement planning in Santo and working with Rayon in Simon-Pelé to provide health education. Habitat’s work with the USAID/OFDA-funded Emergency Community Assistance and Planning, or ECAP, program’s value chain analysis recruits and places experts from the Haitian diaspora to help the Haitian government make critical decisions related to shelter and settlement. Through ECAP, 13 resident advisers have been placed in Haitian government institutions to provide community-focused technical support. Training of carpenters and masons also demonstrated a holistic approach toward supporting the wider construction sector.

Project implementation

Economy and efficiency

Habitat’s approach was to support the local economy wherever possible through local procurement and community contracting. Habitat’s partners in Haiti were pleased to have worked with

them, but some mentioned organizational issues in Habitat such as internal inefficiency, delayed deliveries due to poor forward planning, or late payments that affected their ability to carry out their own work. Inflation rose above the allocated contingencies, which meant that some projects were forced to reduce their final outputs. For example, the number of upgradable shelters was reduced from 2,000 to 1,500. This resulted in long negotiations with donors over realigning funding to address price changes and delays in implementation.

Project results

Effectiveness and impact

By providing safe and resilient shelter, Habitat’s programs had a positive short-term impact on the physical improvement of living conditions. Households interviewed as part of the research stated that their new shelters (both temporary and permanent) allowed them to feel safer and more secure, and gave them dignity and privacy, but access to livelihood opportunities remained a problem. In the “upgradable” shelter program, incorrect assumptions had been made about households’ abilities to upgrade their shelters. Families who had not been able to make improvements to their shelters because of a lack of capital complained about their living conditions, despite recognizing that they had initially been improved. The researchers noted that “the shelter had not addressed their overall situation, and their ‘temporary’ home appeared likely to become permanent.”

Habitat’s reconstruction programs in Santo and Simon-Pelé took a more holistic approach to settlementwide engagement and intervention. Focus group participants gave positive feedback on their level of involvement and the opportunity to learn new skills, particularly highlighting the value of training in improving the overall quality of life and security in the area and raising their confidence and feeling of inclusion in society. Livelihood support (either through construction training as part of the shelter program or other training) was also well-received, but recipients mentioned a lack of opportunities to use the training they had received outside the direct opportunities being provided by Habitat.

Permanent reconstruction in the Santo community of Léogâne, Haiti.

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6 . Severe Tropical Storm Washi (2011) in the Philippines — Habitat for Humanity

Context

Severe Tropical Storm Washi (known locally as Sendong) caused flash flooding and landslides in the Philippines on Dec. 16, 2011. The cities of Cagayan de Oro and Iligan City in Northern Mindanao were affected the most. In Cagayan de Oro, approximately one-third of the population of 602,088 were directly affected, 5,801 houses were destroyed, and 12,635 houses were partially damaged12. Within weeks of the disaster, the government announced a relocation program for more than 8,500 households in Cagayan de Oro, relocating families from the most hazardous areas (classified as “no-build zones”) to land already owned by the government or donated by churches and universities.

Project design

Relevance

Habitat chose to work in Cagayan de Oro, the hardest-hit area. In the first few days after the disaster, Habitat Philippines distributed more than 1,000 shelter repair and cleaning kits in three communities with partially damaged houses away from the high-risk areas. With land and funding for permanent housing made available by the government, Habitat was able to begin implementing a permanent housing program within weeks of the disaster. The first houses were completed within months of the disaster, and 4,000 had been completed by the time of the assessment (October 2012), with plans for a much larger program to follow.

Appropriateness

Although the availability of land and funding allowed rapid provision of housing, Habitat was under pressure from the government to deliver physical outputs as fast as possible. Consequently, the core home design was determined by the master plans and budgets of government and donors, often

before beneficiaries had been identified, rather than responding to the needs and aspirations of affected communities. Habitat had two types of house design: “row houses,” which are long rows of terraced housing at 50 square meters per unit, and “quadruplex houses,” which are groups of four houses built together at 40 square meters per unit. The quadruplex houses were dark and not designed to encourage cross ventilation, and beneficiaries complained that they were too small and lacked internal divisions. Both the quadruplex and row houses had limited opportunities for expansion, because houses were built very close together. Even if greater space had been left between houses, the expansion of these types of houses would result in extremely poor conditions of internal lighting and ventilation.

Integration

Habitat provided some construction training for affected families and worked with the Department of Social Welfare and Development to provide a cash-for-work project, while other organizations were responsible for community organization activities. The speed and scale of construction

Habitat for Humanity “row houses” in Lumbia, Philippines.

12 Hirano, S. (2012). “Learning from Urban Transitional Settlement Response in the Philippines: Housing, Land and Property Issues.” Reflections from CRS’ Post-Tropical Storm Washi (Sendong) Response in Cagayan de Oro.

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meant that Habitat’s role developed into that of a design-and-build contractor working on behalf of its donors, rather than a developmental organization addressing the needs of affected communities holistically. That holistic approach is of particular importance when communities must be relocated. Habitat played a key role in the Local Inter Agency Standing Committee (a coordination mechanism), but it did not use its developmental housing expertise to encourage government and other actors to take a more holistic approach.

“As the program develops, Habitat for Humanity plans to diversify its activities to take account of the longer-term needs of communities and become more engaged with the homeowners, (but) it is not clear how this will be achieved, especially as the program continues to expand.” —Arup ID, 2013

Project implementation

Economy and efficiency

Habitat for Humanity built on pre-existing relationships to rapidly build internal capacity and partner with other organizations. Positive relationships with partners enabled Habitat to deliver an exceptionally efficient program, access additional funding and create opportunities to expand the program. It also ensured accurate cost control by including a 30 percent allowance for contingency in its project planning and by negotiating fixed rates with local material suppliers for itself and its partners. But the schedule of Habitat’s core home-building program was not aligned with infrastructure. Houses were completed before roads, drainage and utility connections, because the utility companies had been affected by the disaster and were not given assistance to rebuild their capacity. The homeowners were delayed in moving into the core houses, because they were able to move in only after connections had been made to water and electricity.

Project results

Effectiveness and impact

Habitat’s program has reduced the physical vulnerability of households to natural hazards and crime through relocation to less hazardous areas and the provision of new housing. At the time of the research — 10 months after the disaster — the long-term outcomes of Habitat’s program could not be assessed, but households interviewed as part of the research felt that the program had a negative impact on livelihood opportunities and social cohesion. The researchers commented that these aspects could have been improved through better selection of resettlement sites, greater participation of affected households in design and construction processes, and greater integration of supporting programs.

“The focus on rapid construction in the short term ... (means that) opportunities may have been overlooked thus far which would contribute to the overall (long-term) sustainability and resilience of the new community.” — Arup ID, 2013

“Quadruplex” Habitat for Humanity houses in Indahag, Philippines.

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Appendix B: Findings from previous research

Christian Aid’s programs in response to cyclones Sidr and Aila, Bangladesh

In 2010, SaferWorld Communications carried out a review of Christian Aid-funded shelter programs in response to cyclones Sidr (2007) and Aila (2009) in Bangladesh. This review covered the work of several Christian Aid local partners, including Christian Commission for Development in Bangladesh, or CCDB; Islamic Relief; Madaripur Legal Aid; Nagarik Udyog (Citizen Initiative); and Shushilan. The recommendations of the review were to:• Support recovery holistically, integrating shelter programs

with water and sanitation, livelihoods support, and any other needs of the community.

• Take a long-term perspective. View post-disaster shelter as undertaking development work during an emergency time frame. Promote permanent house construction — incrementally if required — instead of the construction of intermediate shelters, which often become permanent.

• Avoid imported technology and use indigenous housing materials and technologies where possible, since they are low-cost, widely available, suitable to local needs and climatic conditions, have low environmental impact, and are easier for households to maintain. Small improvements in existing local technologies can result in significant improvements in the quality of shelters constructed, while remaining acceptable and suitable to local needs and conditions.

• Incorporate disaster risk reduction into all aspects of the program, base recovery planning on risk assessments, make sure houses and infrastructure incorporate principles of disaster risk reduction, and train masons and families in safe construction techniques.

• Encourage the participation of the community in all aspects of the program, from early decision-making and design through to construction. Participation helps develop skills

and livelihoods and aids the psychosocial recovery of the affected families and communities.

• Respond flexibly to the needs and priorities of communities and allow them to modify what is provided to them. Small and inexpensive design changes can turn houses into homes if families are involved in the design process.

• Ensure that vulnerable people are identified and included in the project, and that their specific requirements are taken into account.

• Engage and work through local institutions, including government, civil society and the private sector, to build capacity and support economic recovery.

• Support capacity building and cross-learning between partner organizations through knowledge-sharing during the reconstruction process and partnerships with technical experts and academic institutions.

• Coordinate with other actors before and during a disaster to undertake research and training and develop a common assistance strategy. Advocacy for appropriate shelter strategies might be more effective than engaging in construction.

How resilient is disaster risk reduction?

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Habitat for Humanity’s post-tsunami housing reconstruction programs

Habitat built, rehabilitated or repaired homes for 25,000 families in four countries in the five years after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. In 2009-10, Habitat commissioned Arup ID to carry out an assessment of its post-tsunami housing reconstruction programs in India, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia.

Overall, the assessment found that Habitat’s housing reconstruction programs since the Indian Ocean tsunami had made a significant contribution to the development of sustainable communities and livelihoods. Habitat’s housing program had replaced houses that had been destroyed in the tsunami, often to a higher standard and (in most cases) complete with access to services and social infrastructure. The provision of high-quality core homes (physical assets) had reduced household vulnerability and increased the standard of living, with benefits to health and well-being (human assets) while Habitat’s participatory process had increased community cohesion (social assets). Habitat’s program had also contributed to the development of positive relationships between communities and a range of external actors (institutional structures and processes), and, to a lesser extent, to supporting environmental and economic recovery (natural and financial assets).

The following sections summarize the strengths of Habitat’s tsunami-response program and suggest areas for improvement in future programs where small changes in design or implementation (at limited additional cost) could increase the long-term impact of Habitat’s work.

Site selection and settlement planning

Habitat’s focus on in-situ reconstruction meant that households maintained their access to existing social networks, employment opportunities and social infrastructure (social, economic and physical assets). The physical assets of relocated communities were less vulnerable to natural hazards, but households reported reduced access to education and employment opportunities, along with less community cohesion. This highlights that if relocation has to occur after a disaster, it must be viewed holistically, with sufficient infrastructure and adequate support for community and livelihood development. Two key areas for improvement in Habitat’s future housing programs are to more

broadly incorporate communitywide hazard assessment and settlement planning into the community engagement process — preferably linked to wider government planning policies — and to include disaster risk reduction infrastructure and activities at a settlement level.

House design and construction

The policy to provide a simple core home that could later be extended enabled Habitat to rapidly provide large numbers of permanent houses. The design of Habitat’s core home enabled people to easily adapt or extend their houses, but the fact that many households had made similar changes to their houses soon after completion also might indicate the limitations of the original core home design. Habitat’s commitment to negotiating tenure security for each household was a significant benefit of the program, as was the incorporation of household-level hazard assessment and mitigation. However, greater emphasis could have been placed on climatically appropriate design. In several instances, Habitat introduced new construction materials or techniques, and although these examples show the organization striving to innovate, this assessment found that these were easiest for households and laborers to understand and replicate themselves when they were incremental improvements on existing techniques.

Access to services

Water supplies were typically reinstated by other actors, but Habitat provided toilets for each household. Although the provision of toilets was a positive aspect of Habitat’s program, many families had not previously had access to improved sanitation and did not understand the importance of using their new toilets or know how to maintain them. This highlights the importance of an integrated approach to water, sanitation and hygiene, with improvements in future programs needed to ensure understanding at the household level, along with a strategy for operation and maintenance of the facilities provided. Similar challenges with household understanding, acceptance and maintenance of new technologies were experienced where Habitat introduced solar technologies to communities without access to main-grid electricity. Habitat’s program also resulted in indirect benefits such as improved levels of education as result of greater disposable income, private areas for children to study

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Habitat’s core home design in one community in Indonesia (far right), which incorporated the reuse of a timber transitional shelter as a kitchen (right) and later extensions using a combination of timber and other materials (center and left).

with electric lighting, and increased motivation and well-being. The program also may have contributed to decreased use of timber and charcoal as fuel, both reducing the use of local timber for fuel and improving indoor air quality, with long-term benefits to health.

Community engagement

Habitat’s community engagement process had significant benefits in terms of increased community cohesion (social assets). However, the limitations of the core home design and the challenges experienced by Habitat in introducing new construction materials, seismic detailing, sanitation and solar technologies indicate that greater participation in decision-making — such as selection of construction materials and technologies — is required to ensure Habitat’s programs meet the needs of the communities they intend to support. The assessment found that the more households and communities were involved during construction, the greater the benefits in terms of livelihood diversification and equipping communities with the knowledge and skills to adequately maintain, adapt and extend their houses. It also highlighted that opportunities

for employment generation during construction — in material supply or construction labor — were missed in many of Habitat’s programs, suggesting the need for a more holistic approach to livelihood support and diversification at the household, community and sector levels.

Relationships with other actors

Habitat developed positive working relationships with a range of external actors in challenging situations — although partnerships with academic institutions were notably lacking. Habitat’s focus on working in partnership with communities, government and other NGOs meant that the project had improved linkages between communities and external actors and developed a more supportive enabling environment. In many cases, Habitat also established positive relationships with material suppliers, laborers and larger contractors, supporting wider economic recovery during the reconstruction process and enabling Habitat to scale up its programs through cost-sharing arrangements. Although many of these partnerships were successful, this assessment suggests that there is greater potential for partnerships in future reconstruction programs to complement Habitat’s experience

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in housing construction with the specialist expertise of other actors in order to address some of the challenges raised in this assessment and maximize the impact of the work.

Recommendations

Every disaster response operation poses unique challenges as humanitarian organizations strive to support the unique needs of individuals, families and communities in different geographical, climatic, cultural and political contexts. Prescriptive recommendations for future programs (such as “use vernacular materials” or “avoid relocation”) are therefore less useful than approaches that can be adopted in any context. Based on this assessment, the authors propose the following recommendations for Habitat’s future disaster response operations:

• Greater participation is needed in decision-making throughout project design, construction, maintenance and replication to ensure that programs really meet the needs of the families and communities they intend to serve.

• It is important to consider the long-term use of houses, infrastructure, construction materials, techniques or technologies from the outset. Will families be able to maintain, adapt, extend or replicate any new interventions themselves?

• To reduce risk, it is vital to ensure that it is not just houses that are rebuilt, but also communities, complete with infrastructure and spaces for education, health care, livelihoods and recreation.

• It is important to take a holistic approach to the recovery of people’s lives and livelihoods, maximizing the contribution of all humanitarian interventions to social, economic, physical, environmental, cultural and political recovery and resilience.

Flooded houses in Indonesia at the time of the assessment.

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INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS: 121 Habitat St. Americus, GA 31709-3498 USA 229-924-6935 800-HABITAT fax 229-928-8811 publicinfo@habitat.org habitat.org 50

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