importance and consequences of the cold war

Importance and Consequences of the Cold War

• Wars: 1945-1990: 150 conflicts, 23 million dead• Superpower wars:

– Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan• Proxy Wars / Civil Wars:

– Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Somalia, Cambodia, Guatemala, Mozambique, Ethiopia

• Risk of nuclear war– Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962– Yom Kippur War 1973 (Egypt & Syria vs. Israel)– Reagan & “Second” Cold War, 1980s

On the brink

• US Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense, 1981: “The United States could recover from an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union in just two to four years... If there are enough shovels to go around, everybody’s going to make it. Dig a hole in the ground, cover with a couple of doors, and then cover the doors with three feet of dirt. It’s the dirt that does it.”– T. K. Jones

Importance and Consequences of the Cold War

• Risk of nuclear war– US war plans, 1982 committed US to fighting

and winning a nuclear war lasting up to six months: “A war in which the U.S. could prevail and force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States.”

• How did humanity bring itself to the brink of self-inflicted catastrophe?

• How has disaster been avoided - what explains the peaceful end of the Cold War?

The Cold WarKey Early Events

US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?)

US Marshall Plan

Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe - Poland / Czech coup 1948

Cold WarChurchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, 1946



US Marshall Plan

Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe

Truman & “Containment” policy (1947)

Cold WarTruman and Containment



US Marshall Plan


Truman & “Containment” policy (1947)

Czech coup 1948

Berlin Blockade, 1948-9



US Marshall Plan



1st Soviet Atomic bomb test, 1949

NSC-68, 1950

Cold WarNSC-68 & Korea, 1950



US Marshall Plan



1st Soviet Atomic bomb test, 1949

NSC-68, 1950

Korean War, 1950

US develops Hydrogen bomb 1952, Soviets 1953

Soviet 50 MT Nuclear Weapon, 1961

Nuclear Fireball Size

Outer Red line = Tsar Bomba test, 1961: 50 MT 4.6 km

World nuclear tests1030

715

210

45 456 6

0

200

400

600

800

1000

US Russia France PRC UK India Pakistan

Source: AJ Software & Multimedia

Nuclear Scare: 1950s

Importance of the Cold War

World stockpileof nuclear weapons

Year US USSR/Russia

UK France PRC TOTAL

1945 6 0 0 0 0 61950 369 5 0 0 0 3741960 20 434 1 605 30 0 0 22 0691970 26 492 11 643 280 36 75 38 5261980 23 916 30 062 350 250 280 54 8581986 23 410 45 000 300 355 425 69 4901990 21 781 37 000 300 505 435 60 0211997 12 000 23 000 260 450 400 36 110US Peak: 1966 32 193 warheadsUSSR Peak: 1986 45 000 warheadsNote: numbers include active and inactive warheads

Source: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53 (6).



US Marshall Plan



Korean War, 1950

NSC-68

US develops Hydrogen bomb 1952, Soviets 1953

Soviets Build Berlin Wall, 1961

Cold WarKennedy’s “ich bin ein Berliner” speech,

1963

Cold WarCuban Missile Crisis, 1962

• Consider: What does the Cuban missile crisis demonstrate:– Nuclear deterrence works (implication: go

nuclear for own security)

OR

– Unacceptable risk of nuclear war (implication: disarmament)

Cold WarCuban Missile Crisis, 1962

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962Overview

• October 12, 1962– Kennedy shown U-2 photos of Soviet missiles

in Cuba

• October 22, 1962– Kennedy speaks to the nation

Cold WarCuban Missile Crisis,1962

Cuban Missile CrisisOverview

• October 12, 1962– Kennedy shown U-2 photos of Soviet missiles in Cuba

• October 22, 1962– Kennedy speaks to the nation, announces blockade

• October 28, 1962– Khrushchev announces missiles will be removed

• Kennedy believed chance of nuclear war between 1 in 3 and even, McNamara 50-50

Cuban Missile CrisisLessons

• Conventional Lesson: Nuclear superiority and compellence prevailed (realism)– Soviets “blinked”– Implications:

• Nuclear Superiority matters

• Nuclear Arms Race

Cuban Missile CrisisLessons• Conventional Lesson:

– Nuclear superiority and compellence prevailed (realism)• New Lessons:

– Risk of nuclear war was higher than realized• Misperceptions: N readiness & local launch authority in Cuba• Bureaucracy: Accidents / Loss of Control

– Compromise / cooperation / reassurance helped resolve crisis, rather than compellence (liberalism) – US missiles in Turkey

– US nuclear superiority didn’t matter– Conclusions:

• Minimum or “existential” deterrence worked, only a few N needed for mutual deterrence, arms race unnecessary

• nuclear weapons also cause of crisis in first place: made each side more insecure & raised risks

• If too terrible to use even one, why have them? Paradox of deterrence

• So, are they worth the risk?

Cuban Missile Crisis: Aftermath & Consequences

• Soviet N superiority

• Crisis Management: “Hot-Line”

• Era of “Détente” & Arms Control:– Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963)– Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)– SALT Treaties (1970s) / BTWC (1975)

Final Exam

• Thursday December 10, 12:00

• Wesbrook Building100

Reagan & the “Second” Cold War

US President Reagan:

•1981 calls USSR “evil empire” and announces plans to “leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history”

•1983 “Star Wars” speech: SDI

•1984 (sound check for radio address): “My fellow Americans. I’m pleased to tell you today that I’ve signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.”

Gorbachev and Reagan sign INF Treaty 1987

Gorbachev and Bush sign START Treaty 1991

End of the Berlin Wall & Cold War: Hammers, not Tanks / Missiles

End of the Cold War

• Learning objectives: – How did it end without major conflict? – What lessons do we draw from this major

change in the international system?– Was it due to US military spending ‘bleeding

the Soviets dry”? – At stake: implications for policy if above is

correct

End of the Cold WarExplanations

• System Level:– Balance of Power (Realist): Imperial Over-Stretch

– Problems: What does this leave unexplained? • 1) Why was it the USSR and not US that became overextended?

• 2) No great power war to change system = anomaly for balance of power theory

• “There is nothing in the character or tradition of the Russian state to suggest it could ever accept imperial decline gracefully. None of the over-extended empires… ever retreated to their own ethnic base until they had been defeated in a Great Power war….” Paul Kennedy, 1987

• Timing: why 1989?

Did “Peace Through Strength” Work? • Reagan’s “Peace Through Strength” (Realist): Spend Soviets

into the ground with SDI and massive military budget• Problems:– Reagan’s policy change: agreed to arms control agreements– Made it almost impossible for Soviet reformers, legitimized

hard-liners: Arbatov• End of Cold War came about despite US policies• cf. Iranian reformers & W. Bush’s “axis of evil”

– Soviet reasons for policy changes:• Dobrynin: “It was not the strain of matching Reagan’s

“huge arms build-up that led to the collapse of the Soviet Empire. … The troubles in our economy were the result of our own internal contradictions.” (Marxist/Critical)

End of the Cold WarExplanationsDomestic Level:

• Soviet Union– Economic decay

– Dissent and challenges to ideological legitimacy

• Eastern Europe– Civil Society: “People Power”

mobilizing dissident groups (“bottom-up” explanations)

• Berlin Wall

• Lech Walesa & Solidarity, Poland

• Vaclav Havel & Civic Forum, Czechoslovakia

Civil Society – “People Power” and the Velvet Revolution, Czechoslovakia, 1989


• Domestic Level: Soviet / European domestic factors– “People Power”: Civil Society in

Eastern Europe, mobilizing dissident groups

• Puzzle: Why weren’t these efforts crushed with force?

Vaclav Havel and Czechoslovakia, 1989


• Individual level: Gorbachev– Domestic Reform: “Glasnost” &

“Perestroika”– Foreign policy

• Strategy:

– “Common security”

– “Reasonable Sufficiency”

– “Sinatra doctrine”

Gorbachev Initiatives

• Foreign policy– 1987: INF Agreement / Test Ban Moratorium

– Unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops

– Announce withdrawal from Afghanistan Feb. ‘88, complete by Jan. ‘89

– May ‘89 Sino-Soviet summit

– 1990-91 Gulf War: UN Security Council authorization

– May ‘91 established relations with Israel

– May ‘91 Cubans out of Angola

Gorbachev effects• Europe

– June ‘89 elections in Poland (1990 Walesa President)– Feb. ‘89 independent parties in Hungary; May ‘89 border

barricades w/Austria removed; EGermans flee to WGer via Hungary Sept. ‘89; elections Mar/Apr. ‘90

– Oct. 6 ‘89 Gorbachev visits East Germany: “Policies which affect the GDR are decided not in Moscow but in Berlin.”

– Nov. 9, ‘89 Berlin Wall falls– Gorbachev accepts principle of reunification Jan. ‘90; elections

Mar. ‘90; Oct. 3, ‘90 German unification; Warsaw Pact dead by Mar. ‘91

– Havel elected President of Czechoslovakia Dec. ‘89– Communist leader Ceausescu overthrown by force in Romania,

Dec. ‘89; elections May ‘90 won by Illiescu’s National Salvation Front

• Internal Soviet empire– 1989-91 fifteen Soviet republics declare sovereignty, then

independence– June ‘91 Yeltsin elected President of Russia– Aug. ‘91 attempted coup; Dec. ‘91 Gorbachev resigns (Nobel

Peace Prize 1990)

Power of Civil Society: Failed Russian Coup 1991

Lessons & Implications of the End of the Cold War:

• Can major economic reform (towards capitalism) take place without accompanying political reform towards greater democracy? – China

• Civil Society & People Power: Global spread of democratic ideas– 1989-90 EEurope / Soviet Union


• Civil Society & People Power– 1989-90 EEurope / Soviet Union– October Revolution Serbia 2000– Orange Revolution Ukraine (Dec 2004)

But


• Civil Society & People Power– 1989-90 EEurope / Soviet Union– October Revolution Serbia 2000– Orange Revolution Ukraine (Dec 2004)

But• “Saffron Revolution” Burma 2007

• Iran election protests 2009

– Global spread of democratic ideas• Transnational activist networks & technology

Lessons & Implicatoins of the End of the Cold War:

• 3) Who won and why? – US won / USSR lost

• Due to aggressive US policy of militarized containment (realism)

• Is this right in this case? Even if so, will it work to apply in other contexts?

Lessons & Implicatoins of the End of the Cold War:

• 3) Who won and why? – US won / USSR lost

• Due to aggressive US policy of militarized containment (realism) OR

• Despite this strategy which prolonged the cold war and at unnecessary cost

– Ideas & individual leadership (liberalism)

– Internal contradictions (critical theory)

– Inevitable superiority of capitalism & democracy (liberalism)?

• “End of History” - Fukuyama

Lessons of the Cold War

The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947, Foreign Affairs

“X” (George Kennan)“…it is clear that the main element of any US policy

toward the USSR must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important…that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward “toughness.”

The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947

“X” (George Kennan)

“…If anything were ever to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the [Communist] Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies… Soviet power…bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.

… To avoid destruction, the US need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation”

Lessons of the Cold War:• Why was the Cold War not “hot”? Did nuclear weapons

“keep the peace”?– If so, would suggest the advantages of nuclear proliferation

(implication: obtain WMD).– If not, their risks might outweigh their advantages (non-

proliferation).

• Implications: Do nuclear weapons & other WMD provide security? – Do they prevent (nuclear/conventional) war?– Will they be used? Why or why not? Why haven’t WMD been

used more often?– Are they counterproductive for state security in an era of

terrorism?– Is the use / possession of nuclear weapons morally acceptable?

A Nuclear Revolution?

“We knew the world would not be the same…

...I am become death, the destroyer of worlds”

Robert Oppenheimer

Has there been a nuclear (WMD) revolution?

• "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

• Albert Einstein, 1946

• Was he right? • Or has humanity adapted and

learned?

Effects of nuclear weapons

Effects of Nuclear Weapons

The Power of Nuclear Weapons• Hiroshima = 15-20 kilotons

(atomic bomb)

• Today’s nuclear weapons:– 1 Ohio (“Trident” )

Submarine:• 24 Trident missiles: 8475

kilotons (8 megatons) each

– Each sub = 6,080 Hiroshima bombs

– US has 14 Trident subs

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

Yield 10KT 500KT 1MT 20MT

Radius (Miles)

Fireball 0.1 0.5 0.65 2.2Maximum Overpressure

Mortality (92psi) 0.15 0.55 0.7 1.9Severe Lung Hemorrhage 0.3 1.1 1.4 3.8Threshold Lung Hem. 0.54 2.0 2.5 6.8Glass Windows Shatter 2.8 10.4 13.0 36.0

Winds200mph 0.77 2.8 3.6 10.0100mph 1.3 4.8 6.0 16.0

Thermal Radiation1st Burns - Severe Sunburn 1.7 8.5 12.0 35.02nd Burns - Blistering 1.2 6.8 9.0 30.03rd Burns - Full Skin Gone 0.95 5.7 7.5 25.0

Dose from Radioactive Fallout10 rad/hr - ill 24hrs, 50% mortality in 2 days

68 393 537 209630rad/hr - ill 4 hrs, death probable in 1 day

45 262 358 1379300rad/hr - ill 30min, death probable in 1 day

13 74 101 3891000rad/hr - death in 1 hr 5 30 40 155

One-megaton nuclear explosion

Source: Mansbach, Global Puzzle, 2nd edition, p. 377

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

• Nuclear / Radiological

• Chemical Weapons (CW)

• Biological Weapons (BW)

Biological Weapons

Use of WMD • Nuclear Weapons– Hiroshima & Nagasaki, 1945

• Chemical Weapons – WWI / Italy in Ethiopia 1937 / Iraq vs.

Iran/Kurds 1980s– Terrorist attempts

• Japan 1995 (Sarin)

• Biological Weapons– Japan in Manchuria, 1930s– Terrorist attempts

• US anthrax 2001

Puzzles: Why WMD Restraint?

• Why haven’t nuclear, chemical and biological weapons been used more frequently?

Explaining the Non-Use of WMD

• Realism:– Deterrence: Fear of Retaliation– Interests (utility): Only useless weapons

restrained / technical obstacles– Cicero: `inter arma silent leges'

Laws of War

Explaining the Non-Use of WMD• Realism: Problems:

– Why no WMD use when WMD state in war vs. non-WMD state?

• Why no US nuclear use in Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War, Iraq when faced no nuclear retaliation? UK Falklands / USSR Afghanistan. No mutual deterrence, but still no use.

• Why no CW use by US in Vietnam? By USSR in Afghanistan?

– Questionable Utility/technical limitations

• Best for BW

• False for CW/N

– E.g, WWI used massively / modern CW

– US assessment of CW utility vs. Japan 1945

Explaining WMD Restraint

• Neo-liberalism (rationalism): Cooperation & Compliance with treaties. – Self-interest and Reciprocity

• Treaty Verification and Compliance (to overcome cheating):– Geneva Protocol 1925 / Chemical Weapons

Convention (CWC 1997)

– Biological & Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC 1975)

Compliance and International Law: USSR & Biological Weapons Convention

Explaining WMD Restraint• Realism: Deterrence (fear of retaliation)

– Problem: Many cases of non-use with no fear of retaliation

• Neo-liberalism (rationalism): Treaties– Verification and Compliance– CWC, BTWC, NPT– Problems:

• Cheating (realism)– USSR and BTWC– Iraq, Iran, North Korea and NPT

• Non-parties - Pakistan, India, Israel, NKorea withdrew 2003

• BUT even non-parties and cheaters on possession have mostly not used their WMD

– There is no international treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons: Nuclear Weapons Convention & “Global Zero”?


• Constructivism: Power of Moral Norms and Identity– Personal belief

• “I / we just don’t do that kind of thing…”

– International / domestic costs of breaking taboos

• Reputation (social power, not material)

Moral Norm vs. CW• WWII

– US President Roosevelt: “I have been loath to believe that any nation could be willing to loose upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons. . . I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the [first] use of such weapons...”

– British Major-General Henderson: ‘such a deplorable departure from our principles and traditions would make us wonder if it mattered which side won.’

Moral Norm vs. Nuclear Weapons

• Korea: • General Ridgway: N as “the ultimate in

immorality” • Truman: “I could not bring myself to order

the slaughter of 25 million”• Vietnam - Sec. of State Rusk: “We never seriously

considered using nuclear weapons”• Iraq, 1991 - Colin Powell: “Let’s not even think

about nukes. You know we’re not going to let that genie loose.”


• (Liberal) Constructivism: Power of Moral Norms and Identity

• Problems:– While states and decision-makers are socialized

by norms or abide by them for their own interests, (suicidal) terrorists not constrained by norms.

Implications of WMD

• So where to from here? Should / can the proliferation of nuclear weapons be stopped? If so, how? What are the implications for dealing with terrorism?

• Realism: Spread of nuclear weapons is

– Inevitable

• Wouldn’t you know it? Now the Hendersons have the bomb.

The Davy Crockett

• smallest nuclear device ever deployed

• 76 lbs.• 1.25 to 2.5 mile range• variable yield (10 to

20 tons TNT)• deployed 1961-71

Implications of WMD• Realism - Spread of WMD is

– Inevitable

– Desirable (Mearsheimer): Cold War -> India & Pakistan

• Con:

– Not inevitable

• Only 9 nuclear states (due to treaty verification / power of nuclear taboo)

• Many states reversed nuclear arsenals and programs– Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, South Africa / Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, etc.

– Not desirable: Risks

– Assumes rationality– Risk of accidental nuclear war / loss of control

(Bureaucracies / Organizational Theory / Misperceptions)

• Human or technical error -> accidental / unauthorized detonation

• Hey! What does that clown think he’s doing?

Dangers of Nuclear ProliferationOrganizational Theory (Domestic level, bureaucracy) &

Individual level

• Pro-proliferation argument assumes rationality

• Risk of accidental nuclear war / loss of control

– Human or technical error

• Accidental detonation

• False alerts

Threat of Nuclear AccidentsNorwegian Rocket Incident, 1995

Dangers of Nuclear ProliferationOrganizational Theory (Domestic level, bureaucracy) &

individual level

• Proliferation as stability argument assumes rationality

• Risk of accidental nuclear war

– Human or technical error -

• accidental detonation

• false alerts

– Loss of control: Command and control

– Smuggling, theft, loss of materials or weapons -> use by terrorists

• 1500 incidents 1993-2008, 30% occurred 1993-95

Significant cases of nuclear smuggling 1992-95

• 1992: 1.5 kg of highly enriched (90%) uranium stolen in Podolsk, Russia

• July 1993: 1.8 kg of enriched (36%) uranium stolen from naval base in Andreeva Guba, Russia

• November 1993: 4.5 kg of enriched (20%) uranium from naval base in Severomorsk, Russia

• May 1994: 6.15 g of highly purified (99.75%) plutonium discovered by German police in garage of a businessman in Tengen, Germany

• June 1994: 800 mg of highly enriched (87.7%) uranium powder bought by undercover agents in Landshut, Germany

• August 1994: 363 g of weapons-grade plutonium and 200 g of lithium seized in suitcase in Munich airport

• December 1994: 2.72 kg of highly enriched (87.7%) uranium discovered in back seat of a car in Prague, Czech Republic

• June 1995: 2 kg enriched (2-4%) uranium to be bought in sting operation in Moscow; shootout prevents seizure or arrests

• November 1995: Chechen rebels place small amount of Cesium-137 in Ismailovsky Park, Moscow

Source: Frontline, Loose Nukes

Source: Frontline, Loose Nukes

Dangers of WMD Proliferation“Suitcase bombs”

Implications of WMD• Can or should proliferation of WMD be stopped?

– Realism: Proliferation of N inevitable / desirable

– Critics: Not inevitable / Risks of proliferation• Human / Technical Error

• Loss of Control

• Smuggling / Terrorism

Implications and Prescriptions of dangers of proliferation

– Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs / G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of WMD

• $20 billion over 10 years to secure Russian nuclear materials (Canada pledged $650 million)

•

What kind of world ought we strive to live in? Is that world possible?

importance and consequences of the cold war

Documents

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