implications of privatizing/deregulating alcohol retail sales: projections of alcohol consumption in...

IMPLICATIONS OF PRIVATIZING/DEREGULATING ALCOHOL

RETAIL SALES:Projections of Alcohol Consumption

in Ontario

MINGHAO HER*NORMAN GIESBRECHT

Center for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

ROBIN ROOMStockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

JUÈ RGEN REHMCenter for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

University of Toronto, Toronto, CanadaUniversity of Applied Sciences, Hamburg, Germany

World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland

ABSTRACT: Purpose: To project the consequences of privatizing or deregulating

current alcohol retail monopolies in Ontario, Canada. Methods: The projection is

based on a multiplicative model and applied to estimate per capita alcohol

consumption for four hypothetical scenarios, including both partial and complete

privatization for the Province of Ontario, Canada. Those scenarios are mainly

focused on the two dimensions of changes affected by privatization: alcohol

physical availability and economic availability (i.e., retail prices). Various

assumptions involving availability and prices are largely based on the Canadian

and international research literature on deregulation/privatization. Results and

Implications: The study showed that per capita alcohol consumption in the short/

medium term is expected to increase in all four hypothetical scenarios examined,

*Direct all correspondence to: Minghao Her, MA, Social, Prevention and Health Policy Research, Addiction

Research Foundation Division, Center for Addiction and Mental Health, 33 Russell Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5S

2S1, Canada; E-mail: [email protected]

JOURNAL OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE, Volume 10, Number 4, pages 355±373.

Copyright # 1999 by Elsevier Science Inc.

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

ISSN: 0899-3289

with the magnitude ranging from 11% to 27%. The sensitivity analysis also revealed

a similar increase in alcohol consumption, even though the magnitude of the

increase would be less for some scenarios. Therefore, any deliberations on

modifying alcohol control policies are well advised to proceed with caution, since

an increase in alcohol consumption is likely to be associated with elevated levels of

drinking-related problems.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s, privatization/deregulation of liquor control Ð or demonopolization Ð

has been discussed in many jurisdictions, and implemented in several (OÈ sterberg, 1992;

Edwards et al., 1994; Holder et al., 1995). In Ontario, the 1995 provincial election

campaign included reference to the options of privatizing provincial liquor stores and

allowing variety grocery stores to sell alcohol. The `̀ natural experiment'' literature

demonstrates that privatization or demonopolization of the alcohol distribution system

associated with an increase in the number and types of retail outlets, in hours of sales, in

advertising, in sales promotions, and changes of alcohol retail prices. In many instances,

this increased access to alcohol may lead to an increase in alcohol consumption and

alcohol- related harm (Her et al., 1999). The intent of this paper is to project the per capital

alcohol consumption rate in Ontario if a partial or complete privatization of the retail sale

of alcohol had been implemented in 1995.

The projection focuses on evaluating two dimensions of alcohol availability that are

commonly affected by privatization: physical availability and alcohol retail prices. All

scenarios and parameter assumptions are based on evidence acquired through international

and Canadian research in the past several decades. Recent drinking patterns among

Ontarians are also incorporated into this projection.

DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL

In this paper, a multiplicative model developed by Skog (1979, 1991) and Holder et al.

(1995) is used to estimate per capita alcohol consumption, where the changes in

availability and price are assumed to be two factors affecting alcohol consumption. For

the purpose of model testing, we assume that other macro-environmental factors (such as

other alcohol-related regulations, or life style changes) will be either stable or not be

directly affected by dismantling or restructuring the provincial alcohol retail monopoly,

i.e., a ceteris paribus assumption. The formula for estimating per capita alcohol

consumption can be specified as:

Cij � BAbiPeb

bj � WAwiPewwj � SAsiP

essj �A�

Here, Cij denotes the predicted alcohol consumption level in litres of absolute alcohol

per capita, 15 years and older, under availability scenario i and price scenario j. Abi,

Awi, and Asi denote the relative changes in consumption expected for beer, wine and

spirits under availability scenario i; Pbj, Pwj and Psj denote the effect of price changes

JOURNAL OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE Vol. 10/No. 4/1998356

in price scenario j, while reference points are the baseline scenarios of no change. For

example, Aw2 = 0.2 will mean that wine consumption will decrease to 20% of the

present consumption level under availability scenario 2; while Pw2 = 0.5 means the

price of wine is decreased to 50% of the baseline level under price scenario 2. Finally,

B, W and S denote the baseline sales volume of beer, wine, and spirits, in litres of

absolute alcohol per capita 15 years and older; and eb, ew and es denote the price

elasticities. Price elasticity is a standard term used by economists to describe the

responsiveness of the consumer to price changes, which is defined as the ratio of the

percentage change in quantity to the percentage changes in price. If the percentage

change in quantity is less than percentage changes in price, such price elasticity is

considered as `̀ inelastic.'' In other words, elasticity e = 0.5 means that consumption

will decrease by only 10% if price goes up by 20%, and the sign of price elasticity is

assumed to be negative at the theoretical level.

Assumptions on Availability Scenarios

The Ontario alcohol retail distribution system as of 1995 was comprised of 593 Liquor

Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) stores, six LCBO `̀ vintage'' outlets with extensive wine

selections, 94 agency stores acting for the LCBO in less-populated areas, 436 Brewers

Retail Stores and 321 Ontario winery stores. The LCBO is a provincial agency reporting to

the provincial Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations. At the retail level, all

spirits and imported wine can be purchased only at LCBO monopoly outlets or Agency

stores, which also sell beer and domestic wine. However most domestic beer and much

imported beer are sold through the Brewers Retail Chain of outlets, and Ontario winery

outlets sell only domestic wine. The latter two private systems are closely regulated by the

province. Thus, Ontario has a partially privatized system of winery retail stores and beer

stores, yet has the limited number of outlets and opening hours, and the LCBO maintains

the biggest market share, in retail dollar values, in the overall retail market (LCBO, 1995).

As of the mid 1990s in Ontario, a proposed liquor liberalization plan included the

following: partial or complete privatization at the retail level, partial or complete

privatization at the wholesale level and complete privatization of the alcohol distribution

system at all levels (The Toronto Star, July 13, 1995). Selling beer and wine in corner stores

was also suggested. Based on the 1995 Ontario privatization proposal and similar

experiences in other jurisdictions (see Her et al., 1999), four hypothetical scenarios in this

study are developed, to project per adult alcohol consumption. Since each privatization

scenario involves a change in alcohol availabilities, the four privatization scenarios are thus

translated into four corresponding availability scenarios (see Table 1 for additional detail):

A0: No change in availability.

A1: Wine and beer sales are extended to all corner stores, convenience stores, small

and large grocery stores and supermarkets.

A2: Wine and beer are extended to corner stores, convenience stores and small grocery

stores, but not in large grocery stores or supermarkets.

A3: All alcoholic beverages are allowed to be sold only in independent private-

ly-owned liquor retail stores, and liquor board stores, beer stores and Ontario

winery stores are closed.

Privatizing Alcohol Sales, Projections of Changes 357

TA

BL

E1

Sum

mary

of

Hypoth

etic

alO

ff-p

rem

ise

Alc

oholA

vaila

bili

tyS

cenarios

Availa

bili

tyS

cenarios

Liq

uor

Contr

ol

Board

of

Onta

rio

Sto

res

[n=

593

+94

+6]

Bre

wers

Reta

ilS

tore

s[n

=436]

Onta

rio

Win

ery

Sto

res

[n=

321]

Corn

er

Sto

res,

Convenie

nce

and

Sm

all

Independent

Gro

cery

Sto

res

a

[n=

about

5700]

Larg

eG

rocery

and

Superm

ark

ets

a

[n=

about

1500]

Independent

Liq

uor

Reta

ilS

tore

sb

[n=

about

2000]

A0[statusquo]

[n=

1400]

spir

its,

win

e

and

bee

r

do

mes

tic

bee

r

and

som

eim

p.

Onta

rio

win

e

A1

[n=

8000±9000]

spir

its,

win

e

and

bee

r

do

mes

tic

bee

r

and

som

eim

p.

Onta

rio

win

ebee

ran

dw

ine

bee

ran

dw

ine

A2

[n=

7000]

spir

its,

win

e

and

bee

r

do

mes

tic

bee

r

and

som

eim

p.

Onta

rio

win

ebee

ran

dw

ine

A3

[n=

2000]

bee

r,w

ine

and

spir

its

A4

[n=

9000±10,000]

bee

r,w

ine

and

spir

its

bee

r,w

ine

and

spir

its

bee

r,w

ine

and

spir

its

Note

s.a

Ina

Canadia

nG

roce

rm

agaz

ine

surv

eyco

nduct

edin

August

,1994,

the

num

ber

of

that

chai

nco

nven

ience

store

s,co

rner

store

san

dsm

all

indep

enden

tgro

cery

store

sin

Onta

rio

was

esti

mat

edat

5708

(Condon,

1996),

and

the

tota

lnum

ber

of

super

mar

ket

san

dal

l-si

zed

gro

cery

store

sin

cludin

gco

nven

ience

store

sÐ

inO

nta

rio

are

esti

mat

edat

7236.

How

ever

,th

e

actu

alnum

ber

may

be

hig

her

when

takin

gco

nsi

der

atio

nco

rner

store

sth

atm

aynot

hav

ebee

nca

ptu

red

inth

esu

rvey

.T

hus,

7000

to8000

isuse

das

aco

nse

rvat

ive

esti

mat

ion

of

the

tota

l

num

ber

of

pote

nti

alsu

per

mar

ket

san

dgro

cery

store

s.T

he

dif

fere

nce

bet

wee

nth

etw

oes

tim

ates

,ab

out

1500,

isco

nsi

der

edto

be

the

num

ber

of

larg

egro

cery

store

san

dsu

per

mar

ket

s.bA

fter

pri

vat

izat

ion

of

the

liquor

reta

ilsy

stem

inA

lber

ta,

the

num

ber

of

liquor

outl

ets

incr

ease

dby

40%

inth

efi

rst

yea

r(A

LC

B,

1994).

Ifap

ply

ing

the

Alb

erta

model

toO

nta

rio

wer

eto

resu

ltin

asi

mil

arin

crea

sefr

om

the

rece

nt

figure

of

1440

(incl

udin

gL

CB

Ore

tail

store

s,A

gen

cyst

ore

s,O

nta

rio

Win

ery

store

san

dB

rew

ers

reta

ilst

ore

s),

apro

ject

ion

of

2000

is

esti

mat

ed.


A4: All alcoholic beverages are sold in supermarkets, grocery stores as well as

independent privately-owned liquor retail stores, and liquor board stores, beer

stores and Ontario winery stores are closed.

Assumption of Price Scenarios

The retail prices of all alcoholic beverages are currently regulated and controlled by the

LCBO. The prices are composed of three main components: (1) provincial or federal taxes,

(2) LCBO mark-up and (3) the supplier price. Under proposed de-regulated liquor retail

systems, alcohol retail price would be determined by various factors including the

following: (1) government revenue expectation (which can directly impact on the

provincial wholesale price level), (2) supplier price, (3) sale promotions, (4) competition,

(5) operational costs and (6) profit expectations. Two key assumptions of the models on

factors affecting price are as follows:

(1) Supplier prices are relatively stable in the short run. Higher supplier costs

might result from the privatization of the retail system due to increased adminis-

trative costs and increases in distribution costs from warehousing, delivery and

marketing. However, in the short run, due to the relatively stagnant nature of the

market and the price resistance from both retailers and consumers, it is unlikely that

the supplier price would increase much. Previous experience in Alberta (West, 1997)

indicated that supplier prices remained relatively stable or even declined in the post-

privatization period. We thus assume that the supplier's price would remain stable in

the short run.

(2) Under privatization changes, the Government of Ontario would seek to maintain

revenue neutrality, whatever privatization model is adopted. Revenue neutrality means

that the provincial government would ensure that the post-privatization revenue will be

maintained at the pre-privatization levels, whether characterized as using leverages of

taxation, various mark-ups or wholesale prices. The detail of such operational features of

the term can, of course be a matter for political debate. Based on previous experiences,

revenue neutrality is typically built into initial privatization legislation, e.g., Alberta and

Iowa, as part of the calculus of what will prove to be politically acceptable as privatization

legislation. Therefore, we assumed that any deregulation efforts would ensure that the

government would continue to maintain certain wholesale monopoly arrangements where

the level of wholesale prices are determined by the former monopolistic agency's (LCBO)

operational efficiency. A recent LCBO annual report indicated that its operational

expenses are approximately 17% of total net sales (LCBO, 1995). Thus, potential cost

savings associated with the deregulation of LCBO, expressed as a percentage of total

LCBO revenue, is expected to be less than 17%. Thus, in this paper we assume that

wholesale prices of all privatized alcohol beverages would be on average 12% below the

current LCBO prices.

Based on these assumptions, with each privatization scenario (A1±A4), a corresponding

price scenario is proposed;

P0: No change in retail price.

P1: The retail price of beer decreases 5%; the retail price of wine increases 6%; the

retail price of spirits remains constant.


P2: The retail price of beer increases 6%; the retail price of wine decreases 5%; the

retail price of spirits remains constant.

P3: The retail price of beer increases 6%; the retail prices of wine and spirits

increase 14%.

P4: The retail price of beer decreases 5%; the retail price of wine increases 6%; the

retail price of spirits increases 14%.

In the next section, an evaluation and discussion for the four different privatization

scenarios involving assumptions of availability and price are provided. In other words,

parameters Pbj, Pwj, Psj, Abj, Awj, and Asj will be assigned values on the basis of the

Canadian and international research findings.

JUSTIFICATION OF PARAMETER VALUES

Availability Scenarios

A0: Status quo. No change in availability.

A1: Wine and beer sales are extended to all corner stores, convenience stores, small

and large grocery stores and supermarkets.

There are no studies from North America on the effect of deregulation on beer

consumption. However, three studies were conducted in Nordic countries. In 1969, in

Finland, medium-strength beer was introduced to 17,431 grocery stores compared with

prior sales in only 132 state-owned monopoly stores. The consumption of medium-

strength beer in Finland rose 240% within a year and overall alcohol consumption

increased by 50% (OÈ sterberg, 1992). A similar situation in Sweden also resulted in a

increase of 15% in alcohol consumption (Noval and Nilsson, 1984). In 1989, the

ending of beer prohibition in Iceland increased total alcohol consumption by 23%

(Olafsdottir, 1993).

In Ontario, in 1995, people purchased domestic beer from 436 privately-owned

Brewers Retail outlets, as well as from LCBO managed outlets. Thus, if beer sales were

extended to supermarkets and numerous grocery stores of various sizes, possibly 7000 to

8000 new potential outlets (see Table 1) may be expected. There would be an increase in

consumer convenience and `̀ one-stop shopping.'' On the other hand, the level of beer

consumption has been leveling off or slightly decreasing (Her et al., 1996). Thus, by

taking account of literature and overall market performance of beer, the retail demono-

polization of beer may be expected to produce a 30% increase in beer sales (Ab1 = 1.30).

A series of wine privatization studies conducted in North America has indicated that

wine consumption increased dramatically following the introduction of wine into grocery

stores, although some controversies exist with regard to the long term impacts of such

privatization (Her et al., 1999). The magnitude of the effects on wine consumption were

ranged from 15% in New Hampshire to 150% in Idaho (MacDonald, 1986; Wagenaar and

Holder, 1991, 1995). Like other `̀ beer drinking'' countries, wine constituted a low

proportion of overall alcohol consumption in those US states. In Ontario in 1994 (LCBO,

1995), wine constituted 15% of overall consumption. This privatization scenario would

also result in a very dramatic increase in access to wine from about 900 current outlets in


1995 to as many as 7000 to 8000 new outlets (see Table 1). The medium value of

previous evaluation research suggests that wine consumption has a great potential to

increase Ð as much as 60% (Aw1 = 1.6). Overall, wine retail sales in Ontario are not

considered to be a mature market. Therefore, sales of wine are likely to expand more than

other alcoholic beverages.

In the US, Wagenaar and Holder (1991) found that privatization of table wine produced

a decline of spirits consumption of 5% for Iowa and 13.8% for West Virginia. For Ontario,

the consumption of spirits is projected to decrease 10% on the assumption that the

dramatic increase in retail availability of wine and beer will result in a certain substitution

effect for spirits (As1 = 0.90).

A2: Wine and beer are extended to all corner stores, convenience stores and small

grocery stores, but not in large grocery stores or supermarkets.

This scenario is very similar to the previous one, except that the overall retail density of

beer and wine outlets is smaller by about 1500 outlets (see Table 1). In the US and Quebec,

small grocery retailers use beer as a loss leader to attract consumers. In Ontario, corner

store retailers are likely to adapt a similar marketing strategy for beer sales in order to

attract neighbourhood customers. In addition, due to corner stores' convenient location

and longer hours of operation, the overall convenience of purchasing beer under this

scenario can be expected to be comparable to that under the previous scenario. The

magnitude of increase of beer consumption may therefore be the same as under A1; i.e.,

beer consumption may be expected to increase by 30% (Ab2 = 1.3).

On the other hand, since wine availability is smaller than under A1, the increase of wine

consumption is projected to increase 50%, which is 10 percentage points lower than in A1

(Aw2 = 1.5). Accordingly, consumption of spirits is projected to decrease by only 5% (As2 =

0.95) on the assumption that the availability of wine and beer in the current scenario is

likely to produce a more modest substitution effects for spirits.

A3: All alcoholic beverages are sold only in independent privately-owned liquor retail

stores, and liquor board stores, beer stores and Ontario winery stores are closed.

In this scenario, the alcohol retail system is completely privatized in the sense that

consumers have equal access to all three alcoholic beverages, both imported and domestic

products in almost 2000 outlets. However, the number of alcohol outlets is expected to be

greater than in the current LCBO system, but much less than in the scenario put forward

under A1 and A2 (see Table 1). In addition, this privatization scenario is expected to

produce substitution effects across all three beverages. In the full privatization in Iowa,

consumers' attention to new products was only focused on one particular product at a time.

However, in our current hypothetical scenario, consumers are exposed to all three

beverages in private retail stores. Consumers do not necessarily focus on one particular

kind of alcoholic beverages in a particular outlet but all three types. Therefore, some

beverages are expected to substitute for other beverages because of simultaneous

availability of all three beverages.

Under scenario A3, the increase in consumption of wine and beer is thus likely to

be smaller, i.e., beer consumption is proposed to increase by 15% (instead of 30%,


i.e. Ab3 = 1.15). Following the same reasoning, the increase in wine consumption is

projected to increase by 40%, which is slightly lower than in the previous scenario

(Aw3 = 1.4). With regard to the impact on consumption of spirits, Holder and Wagenaar

(1990) found such consumption increased by 9.5% after the Iowa government

eliminated its monopoly on the retail sale of spirits. In Ontario, per adult spirits

consumption has steadily declined since the 1980s, and its share of total absolute

alcohol volume was reduced from 38% in the 1980s to 28% in 1994 (see Table 4 in

Her et al., 1996). This implies that a potential exists for an increase, but at a modest

level; spirits consumption is projected to increase by 10% (As3 = 1.10).

A4: All alcoholic beverages are allowed to be sold in supermarkets, grocery stores as

well as independent privately-owned liquor retail stores; and liquor board stores,

beer stores and Ontario winery stores are closed.

Under this scenario, the availability of wine and beer is largely similar to A1 except that

spirits are introduced into private retailing, and LCBO, Brewary Retailing and winery

stores are replaced by independent retail stores. The total number of liquor outlets is

estimated as 9000 to 10,000 (see Table 1 also). Considering the potential substitution

effects expected among the three beverages as discussed in the last scenario, the magnitude

of the impacts of privatization on consumption of beer and wine is assumed to be slightly

smaller than in A1. Beer consumption is projected to increase by 25% (instead of 30% in

A1) and wine consumption may increase by 55% (instead of 60% in A1). The consumption

of spirits is expected to increase slightly more than in A3 due to the dramatic increase in

availability. By considering overall trends in the consumption of spirits exhibited in recent

years, privatization in this scenario may lead to a 15% increase in consumption of spirits.

Price Scenarios

According to the earlier discussion, we assume that all liquor retailers would purchase

privatized liquor beverages at a uniform governmental wholesale price, which is set 12%

below the current LCBO prices. The formula for calculating the change of retail prices

from the status quo is as follows:

Assume:

Retailer's gross margin:

M � �xÿ 8:8�x

100%

Current LCBO monopolistic price: $10.00

LCBO discount price to the retailer: $8.80 (12% reduction from above)

Projected retailer's selling price: $x


Retailer's selling price:

x � 8:8

1ÿM

Projected percentage change of retailer's price from current LCBO price:

y � xÿ 10

10100% �

8:81ÿMÿ 10

10100% � 10M ÿ 1:2

10�1ÿM� 100% �B�

For example, if the projected retailer's gross margin is 20%, i.e., M = 20%, substituting

into Formula B, then yield y = 10.0%. In other words, the projected retail price of the

alcoholic product would thus increase by 10%, compared with current LCBO mono-

polistic price. The following scenarios (P1, P2, P3 and P4) are the price assumptions under

various availability scenarios.

P0: Status quo. This scenario serves as a reference point and no change in prices is

presumed under this scenario.

P1: Partial privatization scenario A1 (see Table 1), where the retail price of beer

decreases approximately 5%; the retail price of wine increases approximately 6%;

the retail price of spirits remains constant.

Generally speaking, supermarkets are large, low cost, low margin, high volume,

self-service stores that carry a variety of food, plus side items. Supermarkets and

large grocery stores (including chain outlets and independent stores) account for

approximately 80% of the market share (Condon, 1996). Due to their high volume

and high turnover, supermarkets can operate on a low gross margin and mark-up. Thus,

the entry of supermarkets into the retail sale of alcoholic beverages would likely to result

in a large market share in the overall retail market, which would affect the average price

level as a whole, including also other grocery stores and convenience stores. The

average gross margin for supermarkets is approximately 20% (Statistics Canada 1992,

pp. 63±224). However, individual retailers tend to set low mark-ups on fast-selling

items and high mark-ups on items that sell less frequently (McCarthy and Shapiro,1994).

Therefore, when beer and wine are introduced into supermarkets, presumably, retailers

would use a small selection of best selling brands of beer and wine as loss leader prices

to attract customers. Thus, overall, the average mark-up is expected to be 5% ±10% for

beer and 15% ±20% for wine. Based on the proposed wholesale price level and a

translated Formula B, the retail price of beer is likely to decrease by approximately 5%

(ranging from 2.2% ±7.4%), while the retail price of wine is expected to increase by

approximately 6% (ranging from 3.5% ±10%).


P2: Partial privatization scenario A2 (see Table 1), where the retail price of

beer increases 6%; the retail price of wine decreases 5%; the retail price of

spirits remains constant.

Convenience stores/corner stores are small stores which are located near residential

areas and carry a limited line of high turnover goods. They tend to offer consumers'

convenience rather than assortment. Thus, convenience comes at the cost of higher prices

to compensate for higher operating costs and lower sales volumes; prices are usually

10% ±20% higher than in supermarkets (McCarthy and Shapiro, 1994). Thus, average

price mark-ups used by corner store retailers are expected to be 30% ± 40%. When the sale

of beer and wine is introduced to corner stores, then presumably operators will use beer as

a loss leader to attract neighborhood customers, which is the price strategy used by Quebec

small grocery store retailers and their US counterparts. Thus, the mark-up for beer can be

expected to be 15% ±20%, which is lower than the average mark-up for other items within

the store. The average mark-up for wine is even lower Ð likely to be 5% ±10% Ð since

competition among corner stores and LCBO outlets would likely result in a lowering of

prices. The assumption made here is that although the number of LCBO outlets will be

much lower than the number of convenience stores, there will be a strong enough market

force to exert a significant influence on the retail price of wine. According to the Formula

B, we project that the final retail price of beer would increase approximately 6% (ranging

from 3.5% ±10%) and the final retail price of wine would decrease approximately 5%

(ranging from 2.2% ±7.4%).

P3: Complete privatization scenario A3 (see Table 1), where the retail price of beer

increases 6%; the retail prices of wine and spirits increase 14%.

Under this scenario, the price margin of these independent outlets would likely be

higher than in supermarkets or large grocery stores because these outlets are specialized in

the sale of liquor and they do not have a large variety of other products to sell at a higher

margin. An examination of general retail business performance in Canada in 1993 showed

that the average gross margin for the retail industry was 27.36% (Statistics Canada 1993,

pp. 63±236); and for supermarkets and grocery stores the margin was 20%, which was

among the lowest categories in all retail industries. Therefore, the independent liquor

outlets in general would be expected to operate on at least a 20% average gross margin in

order to cover their higher operating expenses and longer operating hours. This situation is

particularly true for small liquor outlet operators.

On the other hand, the alcohol market has generally been very stagnant in recent years.

Consequently, if the Alberta model is adapted to Ontario, an increase in the number of

alcohol outlets, though not as many as in Scenarios A1 and A2, would still result in intense

retail competition. Liquor retailers would be forced to minimize costs while at the same

time increasing various promotional activities in order to make a profit. These factors

would ultimately exert pressure on the price retailers could charge for liquor products.

Considered as a whole, a conservative estimate of the average gross margin for

independent liquor retailers would be 15% ±20% for beer and 20%±25% for wine and

spirits. The consequent retail price would likely increase by approximately 6% for beer

(ranging from 3.5%±10%) and 14% for wine and spirits (ranging from 10%±17.3%).


TA

BL

E2

Estim

ate

sof

Short

/Mediu

m-t

erm

per

Adult

Alc

oholC

onsum

ptio

nU

nder

Diff

ere

nt

Price

and

Availa

bili

tyS

cenarios

P0

(Price)

No

Price

Change

P1

(Price)

Beer,

5%#

Win

e,

6%"

Spirits

,C

onsta

nt

P2

(Price)

Beer,

6%"

Win

e,

5%#

Spirits

,C

onsta

nt

P3

(Price)

Beer,

6%"

Win

e,

14%"

Spirits

,14%"

P4

(Price)

Beer,

5%#

Win

e,

6%"

Spirits

,14%"

A0=

statusquo

7.3

2(s

tatu

squo)

7.3

77.2

77.0

27.1

7

A1=

wineandbeerin

supermarkets

andgrocery

stores

[Ab1=

1.3,A

w1=

1.6,A

s1=

0.9]

9.0

5(2

4%

)9.1

1(2

4.5

%)

9.0

0(2

3.0

%)

8.6

2(1

7.8

%)

8.9

2(2

2.0

%)

A2=

wineandbeerin

corner

convenience

storesandsm

all

grocery

stores

[Ab2=

1.3,A

w2=

1.5,A

s2=

0.95]

9.0

6(2

4%

)9.1

2(2

4.6

%)

9.0

0(2

3.0

%)

8.6

3(1

8.0

%)

8.9

3(2

2.0

%)

A3=

wine,

beerandspiritsin

independentliquorstores

[Ab3=

1.15,A

w3=

1.4,A

s3=

1.1]

8.5

9(1

7.3

%)

8.6

4(1

8.0

%)

8.5

4(1

6.7

%)

8.1

5(1

1.4

%)

8.4

2(1

5.0

%)

A4=

wine,

beerandspiritsin

supermarkets,grocery

stores

andindependentliquorstores

[Ab4=

1.25,A

w4=

1.55,A

s4=

1.15]

9.2

5(2

6.4

%)

9.3

1(2

7.2

%)

9.2

0(2

5.7

%)

8.7

8(2

0.0

%)

9.0

7(2

4.0

%)

Note

s.T

he

calc

ula

tions

are

bas

edon

the

low

esti

mat

esof

pri

ceel

asti

citi

es(B

eer:ÿ0

.3,

Win

e:ÿ0

.6,

Spir

its:ÿ0

.8).

N.B

.:T

he

figure

inpar

enth

eses

repre

sents

the

per

centa

ge

of

incr

ease

from

stat

us

quo.


TA

BL

E3

AS

ensiti

vity

Analy

sis

on

Estim

ate

sof

Short

/Mediu

m-t

erm

per

Adult

Alc

oholC

onsum

ptio

nunder

Alte

rnativ

eV

alu

es

of

Availa

bili

tyP

ara

mete

rs

P0

(Price)

No

Price

Change

P1

(Price)

Beer,

5%#

Win

e,

6%"

Spirits

,C

onsta

nt

P2

(Price)

Beer,

6%"

Win

e,

5%#

Spirits

,C

onsta

nt

P3

(Price)

Beer,

6%"

Win

e,

14%"

Spirits

,14%"

P4

(Price)

Beer,

5%#

Win

e,

6%"

Spirits

,14%"

A0=

statusquo

7.3

2(s

tatu

squo)

7.3

77.2

77.0

27.1

7

A1=

wineandbeerin

supermarkets

andgrocery

stores

[Ab1=

1.15,A

w1=

1.3,A

s1=

0.9]

8.0

7(1

0.2

%)

8.1

3(1

1%

)8.0

2(9

.5%

)7.6

8(4

.1%

)7.9

4(8

.5%

)

A2=

wineandbeerin

corner

stores,convenience

stores

andsm

allgrocery

stores

[Ab2=

1.15,A

w2=

1.25,A

s2=

0.925]

8.0

7(1

0.2

%)

8.1

2(1

1%

)8.0

1(9

.5%

)7.6

8(4

.1%

)7.9

4(8

.5%

)

A3=

wine,

beerandspiritsin


[Ab3=

1.075,A

w3=

1.2,A

s3=

1.05]

7.9

5(8

.6%

)8.0

0(9

.2%

)7.9

0(7

.9%

)7.5

4(3

%)

7.8

9(7

.8%

)

A4=

wine,

beerandspiritsin


storesand


[Ab4=

1.125,A

w4=

1.275,A

s4=

1.075

8.2

9(1

3.2

%)

8.3

5(1

4.6

%)

8.2

4(1

2.6

%)

7.8

7(7

.5%

)8.1

2(1

0.9

%)

Note

s.T

he

calc

ula

tions

are

bas

edon

the

low

esti

mat

esof

pri

ceel

asti

citi

es(B

eer:ÿ0

.3,

Win

e:ÿ0

.6,

Spir

its:ÿ0

.8).

N.B

.:T

he

figure

inpar

enth

eses

repre

sents

the

per

centa

ge

of

incr

ease

from

stat

us

quo.


TA

BL

E4

AS

ensiti

vity

Analy

sis

of

Estim

ate

sof

Short

/Mediu

m-t

erm

per

Adult

Alc

oholC

onsum

ptio

nunder

Alte

rnativ

eV

alu

es

of

Price

Ela

stic

ity

P0

(Price)

No

Price

Change

P1

(Price)

Beer,

5%#

Win

e,

6%"

Spirits

,C

onsta

nt

P2

(Price)

Beer,

6%"

Win

e,

5%#

Spirits

,C

onsta

nt

P3

(Price)

Beer,

6%"

Win

e,

14%"

Spirits

,14%"

P4

(Price)

Beer,

5%#

Win

e,

6%"

Spirits

,14%"

A0=

statusquo

7.3

2(s

tatu

squo)

7.3

47.2

96.7

46.9

7

A1=

wineandbeerin

supermarkets

andgrocery

stores

[Ab1=

1.3,A

w1=

1.6,A

s1=

0.9]

9.0

5(2

4%

)9.0

6(2

4.0

%)

9.0

3(2

3.4

%)

8.4

0(1

4.8

%)

8.7

3(1

9.3

%)

A2=

wineandbeerin

corner

stores,convenience

storesand

smallgrocery

stores

[Ab2=

1.3,A

w2=

1.5,A

s2=

0.95]

9.0

6(2

4%

)9.0

7(2

4.0

%)

9.0

3(2

3.4

%)

8.4

1(1

4.8

%)

8.7

2(1

9.1

%)

A3=

wine,

beerandspiritsin


[Ab3=

1.15,A

w3=

1.4,A

s3=

1.1]

8.5

9(1

7.3

%)

8.6

0(1

7.5

%)

8.5

7(1

7.1

%)

7.9

1(8

.1%

)8.1

9(1

1.9

%)

A4=

wine,

beerandspiritsin


storesand


[Ab4=

1.25,A

w4=

1.55,A

s4=

1.15]

9.2

5(2

6.4

%)

9.2

6(2

6.5

%)

9.2

3(2

6.1

%)

8.5

3(1

6.5

%)

8.8

4(2

1.0

%)

Note

s.T

he

calc

ula

tions

are

bas

edon

hig

her

esti

mat

esof

pri

ceel

asti

citi

es(B

eer:ÿ0

.3,

Win

e:ÿ1

.0,

Spir

its:ÿ1

.5).

The

figure

inpar

enth

eses

repre

sents

the

per

centa

ge

of

incr

ease

from

stat

us

quo.


P4: Complete privatization scenario A4 (see Table 1), where the retail price of

beer decreases 5%; the retail price of wine increases 6%; the retail price of spirits

increases 14%.

It is assumed that supermarkets and grocery stores will likely sell a wide selection of

high volume, low priced beer and wine products, while independent liquor retailers are

expected to concentrate more on selling spirits and exclusive lines of wine and beers.

Following reasoning similar to that discussed in previous scenarios, the gross margin for

beer is projected to range from 5% ±10%; the gross margin for wine would range from

15% ±20% and the gross margin for spirits would range from 20% ±25%. Therefore, the

retail price of beer is likely to decrease by approximately 5%, while the retail prices of

wine and spirits are expected to increase by approximately 6% and 14%, respectively.

In laying out these four scenarios for changes from the status quo we have tried to

project the most likely consequences for retail prices for each particular privatization

scenario. In Table 2, which follows, the projected results for these scenarios are shown on

the diagonal. However, in this table we have also included projected results for scenarios

which involve other combinations of an A-value (availability scenarios) and P-value (price

change profiles), to give a sense of how the projected alcohol consumption changes with

price profile changes and separately also with availability scenario changes (see also

Tables 3±5.)

RESULTS

Per adult alcohol consumption (see Table 2) is projected by applying model Formula A

and substituting those parameter assumptions with low price elasticity (see Her et al.,

1996). Note that the left-hand corner of the table (no price change, no availability

change) is the actual per adult alcohol consumption value for 1994±1995 in Ontario and

TABLE 5Estimates of Long-term per Adult Alcohol Consumption under Full Privatization Scenarios

P0 (Price)No PriceChange

P1 (Price)Beer, 5%#Wine, 5%#

Spirits, 10%#

P2 (Price)Beer, 10%#Wine, 10%#Spirits, 20%#

A0 = no change 7.32 (status quo) 7.62 7.94

A3 = wine, beer and spirits in

independent liquor stores

[Ab3 = 1.15, Aw3 = 1.4, As3 = 1.1]

8.59 (17.3%) 8.94 (22.1%) 9.30 (27.0%)

A4 = wine, beer and spirits in

supermarkets, grocery stores

and independent liquor stores

[Ab4 = 1.25, Aw4 = 1.55, As4 = 1.15]

9.25 (26.4%) 9.62 (31.4%) 10.00 (37.0%)

Notes. The calculations are based on the low estimates of price elasticities (Beer: ÿ0.3, Wine: ÿ0.6, Spirits: ÿ0.8).

N.B: The figure in parentheses represents the percentage of increase from status quo.


the area below the first row (A0) contains the short/medium-projections for different

privatization scenarios.

As can be seen in the model in Table 2, in general an increase in availability is projected

to produce an increase in alcohol consumption. This is seen by comparing scenarios (A1,

P1) and (A4, P1) where alcohol consumption rises from 9.11 to 9.31 l. Here, A1 represents

partial privatization with beer and wine introduced into supermarkets and various grocery

stores, and A4 is the complete privatization scenario where all alcoholic beverages may be

sold in independent liquor stores in addition to supermarkets and grocery stores.

Furthermore, even within the same privatization scheme, different degrees of privatization

may result in different levels of alcohol consumption. In scenario A4, privatization is more

liberal, and alcohol consumption increases to 9.31 in A4 from 8.64 in A3. The table also

shows that an increase in price may result in a reduction of alcohol consumption as

observed in scenarios (A4, P2) and (A4, P3).

Considering a partial privatization scenario (A2, P2), in which the sale of beer and wine

is confined to corner stores, convenience stores and small grocery stores, but not

supermarkets or large grocery stores, while wine and spirits continue to be sold in LCBO

stores, per capita consumption of alcohol is likely to increase by approximately the same

magnitude as in scenario (A1, P1). This similarity might be due partly to the relative

similarity of the consumer convenience in those two availability scenarios and partly to

consumers' low price sensitivities towards beer and wine.

For a conservative full privatization scenario (A3, P3), the initial Alberta model may be

used as a reference for constructing Ontario privatization plan in the early phase. Under

this assumption, all three alcoholic beverages are permitted to be sold only in independent

liquor stores and the prices of all alcoholic beverages increase by about 6%±14%. In this

scenario, per capita alcohol consumption is estimated to increase by 11.4%. Considering a

more liberal full privatization scenario (A4, P4), in which alcohol availability is higher and

prices are lower, per capita alcohol consumption is projected to increase by 24% and its

magnitude is 10% higher than in the conservative scenario. Thus, the results of our

analyses indicate that the greater the combination of increased physical and pricing access,

the greater is the projected increase in alcohol consumption.

An exception is found through a comparison of scenarios (A1, P1) and (A4, P4). Here A1

is partial privatization and A4 is the comparable, more liberal version of complete

privatization. Projections reveal that the impact of privatization on alcohol consumption

in A4 is slightly lower than in A1. This result is explainable because the effects of increased

availability in A4 are partly counterbalanced by the increased prices in that scenario.

Another likely contributing factor is the substitution effect caused by the simultaneous

introduction of all three types of beverages into the private retail market.

SENSITIVITY ANALYSES AND LONG-TERM SCENARIOS

The estimates of the change in consumption levels for different availability scenarios are a

relatively conservative reflection of the findings in the empirical literature. But there is

considerable variation in those findings, and room for debate about the applicability of the

literature to Ontario. Previous research shows that the effects of increased availability are

strongest for wine, but several of the studies are for jurisdictions where wine was a smaller


segment of the alcohol market than in present-day Ontario. While wine does not

predominate among alcoholic beverages in Ontario, the wine market here is relatively

mature, so the response to greater availability may be somewhat dampened. Studies of the

effects of increases in the availability of beer are all from Scandinavian countries, and

represent changes from a relatively low initial consumption level for beer. The Ontario

market may not react as strongly to an increase in availability.

We then conducted a sensitivity analysis where the parameters estimating effects were

varied, to examine the sensitivity of the end results of the statistical model to the values of

the parameters. In this analysis, we halved the estimates of the effects for the four

availability models (A1±A4) used in Table 2. The results shown in Table 3 are obtained.

The first row (A0) of Table 3, of course, is the same as the first row of Table 2. Varying the

assumptions about availability effects does result in substantial differences in the estimated

change in consumption; the projected rise in consumption is reduced to one-half of the

projected increase in Table 2, and for some scenarios is reduced closer to one-third of the

projected rise in Table 2. For all scenarios with new parameters, projected alcohol

consumption rises, but the rise varies with the scenario from 3.0% to 14.6%. Table 4,

on the other hand, showed the effects of using the higher end of the estimated elasticities:

ÿ0.3 again for beer, but ÿ1.0 for wine and ÿ1.5 for spirits. For the majority of other

scenarios, there is less projected change from the current situation with the higher price

elasticities. Overall, however, we conclude that our models are not very sensitive to

variation in wine and spirits price elasticities.

The current projections can be regarded as either short-term or medium-term.

However, in the long run, political and economic environments may change and have

a direct or indirect impact on the alcohol retail market. For example, private retailers

may put political pressure on the government to lower alcohol excise taxes or

wholesale mark-up (as happened in Iowa). As well, if the private retail system results

in aggravated smuggling activities, the private sector may again push the government

to lower taxes on spirits. Also, the new retail system would gradually gain the

economy of scale, which will likely further reduce costs of distribution and promotion.

Considering these factors, we proposed two long-term price scenarios and conducted a

similar analysis for both full privatization scenarios. Our results (Table 5) indicate that

in the long term, if beer, wine and spirits are available in supermarkets, grocery stores

and independent liquor stores, per capita alcohol consumption can be expected to

increase by 26%±37%, while in the short- or medium-term, the corresponding figure is

11% to 27% (see Table 4 as well). Thus, the long-term impact of full privatization of

alcohol sales may be an even greater rise in consumption.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Results from our main analysis, using the best available estimates of parameters in the

short or medium-term, showed that in all four of the privatization scenarios examined, the

per adult alcohol consumption could be expected to increase, the magnitude ranging from

11% to 27%. Hence, this study suggests that liberalizing access to alcohol is likely to result

in an increased consumption of alcohol, even if some of the availability effects might be

counterbalanced by increased price. It is noteworthy that with the same model, the


magnitudes of projections in Nordic countries (Holder et al., 1995) are much greater than

they are for Ontario. The variations are largely attributed to differential assumptions on

alcohol prices in the post-privatization period, since alcohol retail privatization in Nordic

countries is likely to result in substantial price reductions.

Unlike other privatization studies which predominately use a time-series design, we

have taken into account price changes, which could also have an impact on alcohol

consumption. Based on a series of assumptions and the research evidence on alcohol

availability policies, we project that an increase in alcohol availability, as outlined in four

scenarios, could result in an increase in alcohol consumption while an increase in price

may result in a decrease in alcohol consumption. When changes in availability and price

occur simultaneously, as might be expected with major deregulation scenarios, the effects

on consumption are more ambiguous, especially when the increase in availability is

accompanied by a rise in price (projected in hypothetical privatization scenarios provided

above). In this study, these interactive factors are examined using a multiplicative model

and we found that dramatic increase in availability has a stronger influence on consump-

tion levels than price. In other words, even with an increase in prices as a outcome of

privatization, a very substantial increase in physical availability of alcohol (i.e., new types

of outlets and increased geographic density) is still likely result in a net increase in alcohol

consumption.

Since the research evidence has shown some divergent results (Her et. al., 1999), the

main analysis was also complemented with a series of analyses in which the assumptions of

the analysis were systematically varied. Using higher rather than lower estimates of the

price elasticities for wine and spirits, we found projected results for some scenarios are

slightly reduced while for others they are slightly raised. Arbitrarily halving the estimated

effects of increases in availability produced substantially lower projections of increased

consumption. On the other hand, projections from the most likely scenarios for long-term

effects produced substantially higher projections of increased consumption. However, for

all scenarios examined, some increase in alcohol consumption was projected.

The research literature is clear about the implications for public health and public order

of an increase in alcohol consumption. With regards to the potential impacts of the recent

privatization deliberation in Nordic countries, Holder et al. (1995) projected that 1 l

increase in the consumption volume per adult was expected to result in a 9.5% increase in

alcohol-related mortality in Sweden and a 9.7% increase in Norway, with alcohol-related

assaults expected to increase by 9% in Sweden and 9.6% in Norway. For Ontario, the

projected increase of 10%±25% in the per adult consumption rate, would involve an

increase of about 0.9 to 2.25 l of absolute alcohol per adult. Based on Ontario's current

level of alcohol consumption, we may expect that an increase in consumption, all else

being equal, will result in increased rates of chronic disease, of alcohol dependence, traffic

and other casualties and violence and social problems (Bruun et al., 1975; Single, Morgan

and de Lint, 1981; Edwards et al., 1994). Therefore, any deliberations on modifying

alcohol control policies are well advised to proceed with caution.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: Preparation of this paper was supported in part by the funding from the

Ministry of Health, Government of Ontario, Canada. The authors would like to thank a number of

persons for their comments on an earlier document in developing this paper: Susan Bondy, Philip

Cook, Perry Kendall, Harold Mulford, Gerald Fitzgerald, Jussi Simpura, Kalervo Leppanen, Eric


Single, Tim Stockwell and Douglas West. The authors would also like to thank Rowland Dunning,

Rob Hinrichsen, Christiane Dini and Alexander Wagenaar for discussions of the issues related to the

topic of this paper. The views and opinions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the

policies of the institutions with which they are affiliated or the perspectives of persons who provided

advice. An earlier version of this paper, by the same authors, appeared as part of the following

document: ARF Research Document Series No. 128 (1996), `̀ Projected Effects on Alcohol

Consumption Resulting from Privatization/Deregulation of Liquor Control in Ontario.''

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