implementation completion and results report (icr) document€¦ · development strategy, the...

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: ICR00004352

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(4724-TZ, 4991-TZ and 4724-TZ)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 214.3 MILLION

(US$ 329 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

FOR THE

TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )

January 16, 2017

Transport & ICT Global Practice

Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective {Dec 27, 2017})

Currency Unit = Tanzanian Shilling (TZS)

TZS 2222 = US$1

US$ 1.42 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Bella Bird

Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen

Practice Manager: Aurelio Menendez

Task Team Leader(s): Yonas Eliesikia Mchomvu

ICR Main Contributor: Adam Stone Diehl

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AGL Airfield Ground Lighting

CAS Country Assistance Strategy

DVELA Driver and Vehicle Examination and Licensing Agency

ERR Economic Rate of Return

ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessments

ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plans

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GoT Government of Tanzania

GoZ Government of Zanzibar

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IDA International Development Association

Km Kilometer

MKUKUTA Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania (Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy for Mainland Tanzania)

MoID Ministry of Infrastructure Development

MoWTC Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication

NRSA National Road Safety Agency

NTP National Transport Policy

RAIS Road Accident Information System

TAA Tanzania Airports Authority

TANROADS Tanzania National Roads Agency

TSIP Transport Sector Investment Program

TSSP Transport Sector Support Project

US$ United States Dollars

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET ....................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 6

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................6

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) ..................................... 10

II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 13

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................ 13

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...................................................................................... 14

C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 19

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 20

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ............................................................................ 20

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 22

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 22

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 22

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 24

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 24

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 26

C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 28

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 29

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 30

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 33

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 44

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 46

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 47

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 52

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) ..................................................................... 53

The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )

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DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID Project Name

P055120 TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )

Country Financing Instrument

Africa Specific Investment Loan

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)

Related Projects

Relationship Project Approval Product Line

Additional Financing P126206-TANZANIA TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT - ADDITIONAL FINANCING

30-Jun-2011 IBRD/IDA

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND PLANNING TANROADS

Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO

The development objectives of the project are to improve the condition of the national paved road network, to lower transport cost on selected roads, and to expand the capacity of selected regional airports.


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FINANCING

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)

World Bank Financing IDA-47240

270,000,000 270,000,000 266,203,902

IDA-49910

59,000,000 59,000,000 54,404,588

Total 329,000,000 329,000,000 320,608,490

Non-World Bank Financing

Borrower 11,700,000 11,700,000 4,508,806

Total 11,700,000 11,700,000 4,508,806

Total Project Cost 340,700,000 340,700,000 325,117,296

KEY DATES

Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing

27-May-2010 01-Dec-2010 05-May-2014 30-Jun-2015 20-Jun-2017

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions

30-Jun-2011 43.74 Additional Financing Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost

22-Apr-2015 255.68 Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Financing Plan Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Legal Covenants

29-Mar-2017 318.10 Change in Loan Closing Date(s)


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KEY RATINGS

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Modest

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual

Disbursements (US$M)

01 12-Dec-2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0

02 18-May-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 43.74

03 27-Nov-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 43.74

04 07-Jun-2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 49.91

05 08-Jan-2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 100.28

06 20-Jul-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 125.44

07 03-Feb-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 169.63

08 05-Aug-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 210.72

09 30-Jan-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 251.03

10 03-Aug-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 267.31

11 26-Feb-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 303.81

12 12-Sep-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 310.89

13 22-May-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 318.10

14 30-Jun-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 320.61


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SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Transportation 100

Public Administration - Transportation 7

Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 72

Aviation 21

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Private Sector Development 19

Jobs 9

Job Creation 9

Public Private Partnerships 10

Public Sector Management 2

Public Administration 2

Transparency, Accountability and Good Governance

2

Urban and Rural Development 90

Urban Development 9

Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 9

Rural Development 81

Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 81

ADM STAFF

Role At Approval At ICR

Regional Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Makhtar Diop

Country Director: John McIntire Bella Deborah Mary Bird

Senior Global Practice Director: Inger Andersen Jose Luis Irigoyen

Practice Manager: C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Aurelio Menendez


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Task Team Leader(s): Dieter E. Schelling Yonas Eliesikia Mchomvu

ICR Contributing Author: Adam Stone Diehl


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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context 1. Although Tanzania had experienced strong GDP growth (seven percent per year, on average) in the

years leading up to the approval of the Transport Sector Support Project (TSSP), transport bottlenecks

remained a key challenge for continued growth. Translating this growth into poverty reduction had remained

a challenge. In the year before project approval, the global financial crisis had depressed GDP growth by 1.4

percentage points, impacting export sectors disproportionately. Many of the country’s key growth sectors,

such as mining, manufacturing and tourism, were impacted.

2. The transport sector had been rapidly progressing. Tanzania had implemented a series of reforms in

the sector, including delegation of regulatory and executive functions to autonomous authorities such as the

Tanzania Airports Authority (TAA) and the Tanzania National Roads Agency (TANROADS), the creation of the

Road Fund (an independent user financed funding mechanism for road maintenance), and the focusing of the

ministry responsible for the transport sector on policy setting and sector development.1

3. The roads subsector had been fundamentally reformed in the years leading up to project approval.

The road network included 88,472 km of classified roads, of which 29,847 km of trunk and regional roads were

managed by TANROADS with the remainder managed by Local Government Authorities. Only five percent of

the national network was in poor condition, thanks largely to the country’s well performing Road Fund. Yet,

there was still a backlog of rehabilitation on paved trunk roads, with 1,200 km estimated to be in urgent need

of rehabilitation. Local government roads still faced challenges, but were seeing improvements as well.

4. Despite significant increases in passenger traffic in the aviation sector, Tanzania’s air transport sector

was facing significant infrastructure deficiencies which hindered further growth. 368 aerodromes served the

country, 59 of which were owned, managed and operated by TAA. The Zanzibar International Airport (along

with other infrastructure on Zanzibar and Pemba islands) was managed by the Government of Zanzibar (GoZ).

Although demand was proven to exist, infrastructure bottlenecks had caused airlines to restrict and even

cancel flights to some regional airports. Such restrictions were of particular concern for Tanzania’s tourism

sector, a key source of revenue for the country2.

5. The project was aligned with Tanzania’s national development strategy and the World Bank’s

assistance strategy. Tanzania’s transport was identified as a key bottleneck for development, highlighted

explicitly in the “Growth Cluster” of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 2005-2010

(known as MKUKUTA). MKUKUTA was developed to support the achievement of the country’s long term

1 At the time of appraisal, transport was the responsibility of the Ministry of Infrastructure Development (MoID). During implementation, the structure of the country’s Ministries was revised several times. At project closure, transport had been under the oversight of the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication (MoWTC) since 2015. 2 Per the World Travel and Tourism Council, in 2016 tourism directly contributed 4.7% of GDP, and in total contributed 13.3% (including indirect contributions. 3.9% of jobs were in the tourism sector, while the total contribution (including indirect links) was 11.6% of jobs.


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development strategy, the Tanzanian Development Vision 2025. This overarching development vision outlines

key goals for reaching middle income status and highlights the need for infrastructure, with a focus on road

transport in particular. The Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania FY07-FY10 was drafted to guide development

partner support for MKUKUTA, including a clear focus on filling transport gaps. A National Transport Policy

guided investment in the sector. Aligned with MKUKUTA, the objectives of Tanzania’s National Transport Policy

were to (i) ensure optimal use of resources by investing in improved infrastructure in all modes of transport,

promote modal efficiency and enhance competition; (ii) recover some of the cost from users and support the

overall socio-economic development in a most cost effective manner; (iii) promote public-private partnership

(PPP) in the development of transport infrastructure, where the private sector can easily invest alone; and (iv)

attract private sector for investments in seaports, airports and railways.

6. To deliver on these objectives, the Transport Sector Investment Program (TSIP) was developed to

guide investments over a ten-year period from 2007/08 to 2016/17. This program included investments by

both the Government of Tanzania (GoT) and Development Partners such as the World Bank, African

Development Bank, DANIDA, and others. Three year rolling plans were prepared and updated annually to align

TSIP with the government’s Medium Term Expenditure Framework. TSSP was designed to support the first of

these rolling plans, contributing to its overarching goals of improving the country’s roads, aviation, rail and port

sectors.

7. TSSP built on the World Bank’s long standing partnership with Tanzania in the Transport sector. TSSP

was preceded by a series of other transport projects, and many of the components of TSSP built on work

prepared under these projects. Similarly, the engagement of the Sub-Saharan African Transport Policy Program

(a Bank Executed Trust Fund) in Tanzania for the fifteen years leading up to TSSP helped lay the institutional

groundwork for major transport reform and development programs.

Theory of Change (Results Chain) 8. The project was intended to support Tanzania’s economic growth and reduce poverty through

improving transport sector performance, including improved and safer roads, expanded air transport service,

and better operations in the rail and ports sectors. While the project primarily contributed to the roads and

aviation subsectors, it also provided some support to the ports and rail subsectors as well. To achieve this

objective, the project provided support for activities in road rehabilitation and maintenance, airport

infrastructure improvement, road safety institution building, and PPP capacity building in various subsectors.

These activities, in turn, supported the project’s three PDOs (described below), and the higher-level objective

of growth and poverty reduction through improved transport sector performance.

9. The project’s additional financing built on the same theory of change. Further expanding on the

contribution to the aviation sector, it added civil works strengthening the capacity of a fourth airport and a new

component reconstructing a jetty linking a small island with the rest of the country. Aspects included through

additional financing are included in italics in Figure 1 below.

10. As described in Section IV.A, the project’s results framework poorly captured the attribution of

TSSP’s activities to the PDOs and longer term outcomes. While the project’s activities and outputs did

contribute to its stated goals, many of the indicators included in the framework are only marginally impacted

by the project (due to a host of confounding variables), do not measure the PDO directly, or both. As such,


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while they are referenced in Figure 1 below, they are complemented by supplemental indicators of

achievement in Section II.B.

Figure 1: Theory of Change

Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 11. The original PDO as stated in the PAD and financing agreement was: to improve the condition of the

national paved road network, to lower transport cost on selected roads, and to expand the capacity of selected

regional airports.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 12. The project had three clear development objectives, each associated with one or more PDO indicators.

Table 1: TSSP PDOs and PDO Indicators

PDO Indicators

(i) To improve the condition of the

national paved road network • Roads in good and fair condition as a

share of total classified roads


Page 9 of 54

(ii) To lower transport costs on

selected roads

• Average vehicle operating cost on

Korogwe-Same road (US cents per km)

• Average vehicle operating cost on

Arusha-Minjingu road (US cents per km)

(iii) To expand the capacity of

selected regional airports

• Passenger volume at Bukoba

• Passenger volume at Kigoma

• Passenger volume at Tabora

Components 13. At approval, the project had five components, three focused primarily on civil works and two on

capacity building and institutional strengthening. The total estimated project cost was US$281.7 million, of

which $270 million was IDA and US$11.7 million was from GoT contribution to the airport component. The IDA

Crisis Response Window accounted for US$15 million of the IDA contribution under Component E, the

Emergency Road and Bridge Repair component.

Table 2: Project Components at Approval3

Components Description Amount Allocated

Component A:

Rehabilitation and

preparation of

designs for the

rehabilitation of

paved trunk roads

Rehabilitation of two sections of paved trunk roads

(172km from Korogwe to Same, and 98km from

Arusha to Minjingu) and preparation of design and

bidding documents for an additional 911 km of

additional paved trunk roads for future rehabilitation.

IDA financing:

US$186.5 million

Component B:

Improvement of

regional airports

Paving and rehabilitation of the runway at Kigoma

regional airport; rehabilitation of the runway at the

Tabora regional airport; and extension, rehabilitation

and resurfacing of the runway and construction of a

new terminal, apron, and other facilities at the

Bukoba regional airport.

IDA financing:

US$57.5 million

GoT financing:

US$11.7 million

Component C:

Improvement of road

safety

Support for the establishment of a National Road

Safety Agency (NRSA), Driver and Vehicle

Examination and Licensing Agency (DVELA), and Road

Accident Information System (RAIS)

IDA financing:

US$6.0 million

3 See Table 3 – Revised Components for actual expenditures


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Component D:

Promotion of Public-

Private Partnerships

Capacity building for the implementation of PPP

projects, feasibility studies of potential PPP projects

(including a Civil Aviation Master Plan and PPP

feasibility assessments for TAA airports, a Freight

Centre feasibility study, a study for removal of

bottlenecks on local government roads, assistance to

prepare a bankable central rail project), and

transaction advisors for any projects identified as

feasible.

IDA financing

US$5.0 million

Component E:

Emergency Road and

Bridge Repair

Emergency repair for just over 100 damaged sections

of roads and bridges throughout the country resulting

from severe flooding at the time of appraisal. In line

with the World Bank’s Rapid Response to Crisis and

Emergencies Guidelines (OP 8.00), this included

retroactive financing of 40% of the component

amount and accelerated, consolidated and simplified

procurement and safeguards.

IDA financing:

US$15 million

(from the IDA

Crisis Response

Window)

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets 14. The PDO was revised slightly as part of an additional financing approved in June 2011 (just over a year

after the original project’s approval). The revised PDO is to (i) improve the condition of the national paved road

network, (ii) to lower transport cost on selected roads and to Songo Songo Island, and (iii) to expand the

capacity of selected airports.4 The revisions included reference to the addition of a component to rehabilitate a

jetty on Songo Songo Island, and expansion of PDO (iii) to include not only regional airports, but the airport on

Zanzibar as well.

Revised PDO Indicators 15. A PDO indicator measuring passenger traffic volume at the Zanzibar airport included during the

additional financing. No other changes to indicators or baselines were made.

Revised Components 16. The additional financing included two changes to the project’s components, a revision of Component

B to include civil works at the Zanzibar International Airport (US$57.0 million) and addition of a new

Component F to include rehabilitation of the Songo Songo Island Jetty (US$2.0 million). In line with the higher-

level objectives of the original project, and PDO (iii) in particular, it was decided to use an additional financing to

address some of the largest bottlenecks at the Zanzibar airport, where the extent and condition of the existing

4 Changes made through the additional financing marked in Bold.


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taxiway and apron greatly limited the flow of aircraft through the airport. The new Component F was included

as a social mitigation measure for the Bank’s closed Songo Songo Gas Extraction Project (P002797). This earlier

project had taken over an existing jetty used by the local population, and had constructed a new jetty for their

use. However, after the project closed, it was determined that the new jetty was not sufficient, submerging

during high tides and becoming dangerously shallow during low tides. To address these challenges, it was

agreed that rehabilitation and extension of the jetty would be included under TSSP.

Table 3: Revised Project Components5

Components Description of change Amount Allocated Actual Expenditure

Component A: Rehabilitation

and preparation of designs

for the rehabilitation of

paved trunk roads

No change IDA financing: US$186.5

million

IDA financing: US$191.7

million

Component B: Improvement

of selected airports

Expansion of initial

component to include

rehabilitation and

expansion of the

taxiway and apron at

the Zanzibar airport

Initial IDA financing: US$57.5

million

GoT financing: US$11.7 million

IDA Additional Financing:

US$57.0 million

Total IDA financing:

US$101.7 million

GoT financing: US$4.5

million

Component C: Improvement

of road safety

No change IDA financing: US$6.0 million IDA financing: US$4.6

million

Component D: Promotion of

Public-Private Partnerships

No change IDA financing US$5.0 million IDA financing: US$3.4

million

Component E: Emergency

Road and Bridge Repair

No change IDA financing: US$15 million

(from the IDA Crisis Response

Window)


million

Component F: Songo Songo

Island Jetty

New component,

including rehabilitation

and extension of the

Songo Songo Island

jetty

IDA Additional Financing:

US$2.0 million


million

5 See Annex 3 for detailed project costs by component


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Other Changes 17. In addition to the Additional Financing, the project was restructured twice. A level 2 restructuring was

approved by the Country Director on April 22nd, 2015 to extend the closing date by 21 months (from June 30th,

2015 to March 31st, 2017) and allow for a reallocation of US$2.0 million between categories. The extension of

the closing date was intended to allow for completion of one of the project’s road contracts, and finalize some

additional works under road safety and Songo Songo jetty components. A second level 2 restructuring was

approved by the Country Director on March 29th, 2017 to extend the closing date to June 20th, 2017. This

extension allowed for works at the Tabora airport to be completed, including paving of the second runway and

apron and installation of Airfield Ground Lighting (AGL), and completion and furnishing of the Tumaini Primary

school in Bukoba (as explained under Component B below).

18. In addition to the formal changes described above, the project underwent a series of changes within

its components. The most significant of which included:

19. Component A:

• During the liability period for the first lot of the Korogwe-Same road, it was determined that a

failure in the pavement mix design had led to premature failure of the road surface in many areas.

To address these issues, an independent consultant was hired to determine responsibility for

remediation. After it was found that the contractor was responsible, repairs were agreed and

implemented.

• On the Arusha-Minjingu road segment, it was determined that existing culverts in one location were

insufficient and that the road required closure due to flooding during the heaviest rains. Using

remaining project funds, the drainage structure was redesigned and reconstructed.

20. Component B:

• After the original project works were completed at the Tabora airport (including paving and

extension of the runway), the project team and implementing agency partners determined that the

existing second runway (serving as taxiway to the main runway) and apron facilities were

insufficient for the larger aircraft which could now use the airport due to the improved runway.

From existing project funds (the bids received under the subcomponent were much lower than

expected in project design), it was agreed that the secondary runway (which is partly a taxiway for

the main runway) and apron would be rehabilitated and paved under the project. In addition, AGL

and Doppler Very-High-Frequency Omnidirectional Range (DVOR) were installed. Taking advantage

of Tabora’s central location in the country, this equipment allows the airport to serve as a diversion

location case of emergency, strengthening the safety of the air transport sector in Tanzania. Fencing

was also added to the airport to protect the local community from entering the airport.

• In Bukoba, two major changes were made to the original plan. First, after runway extension, it was

found that the rising water levels had destroyed a walkway on the lake side of the runway, causing

local population to cross through the airport grounds instead, presenting a danger to themselves

and air traffic. To address this concern, a walkway was built around the end of the airport to provide


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safe passage. In addition, it was determined that a primary school was too close to the end of the

runway, and airport operations presented a threat to the students. To address this, an alternate

school was constructed in a nearby safe location, and the original school demolished and land

demarcated.

• In Zanzibar, in order to help the airport meet International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

standards, it was agreed that the project would support the purchase/rehabilitation of firefighting

and maintenance equipment out of remaining project funds.

• Finally, although Component B had initially planned to receive US$11 million in co-financing from

GoT, this was reduced during implementation to accelerate construction, with IDA providing the

entirety of the support from that point on.

Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change 21. Approved just over a year after the original project, the additional financing took advantage of an

unexpected opening in the IDA envelope to expand the project in line with its original goals. When a project

scheduled for delivery in Eritrea was removed from the yearly approval plans, the TSSP project team was able to

prepare and deliver an additional financing package within a very brief Fiscal Year window. This was possible

because the Zanzibar airport component had already been planned and designed as part of an earlier project.

The inclusion of the Zanzibar airport under Component B was very much in line with the theory of change,

simply expanding the scope of the project’s impact in this area. As described above, the small Songo Songo jetty

component also built off of an earlier project and contributed to the original long term objectives of TSSP,

helping to improve transport services to an underserved population.

22. The two restructurings were approved to provide the necessary time to complete all works under the

project, utilizing nearly all project funds to meet the project’s objectives. The implementation of the project

was characterized by an iterative approach, identifying subsequent bottlenecks to meeting project goals after

initially planned works were completed. As such, extensions were required to provide enough time to carry out

these works. The major additions to the project (eg. remediation and additional works along the road lengths,

additional runway/ taxiways and apron in Tabora, the relocation of Tumaini Primary School, safety and

maintenance equipment in Zanzibar) were all in line with the theory of change outlined above, addressing major

bottlenecks to fully capitalizing on the project’s investments.

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating 23. The project’s PDOs continue to be highly consistent with the country’s growth and poverty reduction

strategy. The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 continues to be the country’s overarching strategy for growth

and poverty eradication. As this Vision has been in place throughout the life of the project, it remains relevant.

To support this vision, Tanzania has continued to develop five-year development plans, starting with MKUKUTA.

The current plan, National Five Year Development Plan 2016/17 – 2020/21, continues to highlight the need for


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transport infrastructure, focusing on how it can support improvements in other sectors. It specifically highlights

the need to leverage PPPs, to invest in local/regional airports, rehabilitate roads, and improve port

infrastructure, all in line with the TSSP project’s three PDOs.

24. The PDOs are also consistent with the World Bank’s support strategy for Tanzania. At project closure,

the World Bank was in the process of developing a new Country Partnership Strategy for Tanzania. The most

recently approved Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) had been approved for the period of FY12-FY15, and then

extended for an additional year by its Progress Report6. The CAS identifies the need to “Build Infrastructure and

Deliver Services” as one of its for strategic objectives, and “increased access to and quality of transport services”

as one of its eleven targeted outcomes. This focus was strengthened by the progress report, with a stated focus

on two strategic clusters. Under the first cluster, “Productive Investments for Growth of Labor-Intensive

Industries and Job Creation”, transport investment was identified, including objectives of reducing transport

costs and crowding in private investment through PPPs. These objectives are in line with those of TSSP, with

reduction of transport costs a PDO, and improving the environment for PPPs addressed through a project

component.

25. Tanzania’s current Systematic Country Diagnostic (approved in February 2017) also highlighted the

continued need for transport investments. Although the World Bank’s new Country Partnership Strategy was

still under development at the time of project closure, a Systematic Country Diagnostic had been prepared to

guide its development. This Diagnostic identified nine specific priority areas, one of which was to “Strengthen

rural-urban connectivity through enhanced rural transport and market linkages between villages and secondary

cities”. All three of TSSP’s PDOs and its various component contribute directly to this priority area.

26. Rating: High. As outlined above, the PDOs continued to be strongly aligned with the Bank and

borrower’s strategy.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome 27. There are three separate PDOs, each measured by a series of indicators and supported by various

project components. They are assessed individually below:

Revised PDO (i): to improve the condition of the national paved road network

28. TSSP contributed to the quality of the national road network through various activities. The works

under Component A included 268 km out of the more than 6400 km of national paved roads in the country.

Including the 641 km of road, 212 culverts and 2 bridges in 19 of the 31 Regions across Tanzania receiving

emergency maintenance under Component E, TSSP performed rehabilitation or maintenance on 909 km, or

approximately 14% of the total national paved road network. Repairing these locations and bringing them back

6 See Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the United Republic of Tanzania for the Period of FY12-FY15. p9.


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to good condition was necessary to make portions of the road network functional post flooding, and contribute

to the PDO.

29. The project’s capacity building components also contribute to the overall management and condition

of the road network. Component C on road safety should contribute to the safe operation of the road network,

providing a governance structure for improving road safety outcomes, a system for ensuring vehicle fleet

condition and proper driver behavior, and the RAIS system to identify blackspots to be addressed by road

planners. While some progress may be made in this area going forward, by project closure, only the RAIS system

had been implemented (see further discussion of Component C in Section III.B below). Based on feedback from

various stakeholders, the RAIS system is focused on the most serious cases. Component D contributed to this as

well, through a study on identifying and removing on local government managed roads, such as drainage or

pavement failures, which impede access of the population to the wider transport network. In addition,

Component D has supported the feasibility study and design for a potential 140km toll road which had just

reached the bidding stage at project closure.

30. TSSP was part of TSIP, a larger initiative aimed at achieving this objective. As outlined in section I.A.,

the activities included in TSSP were identified as part of a larger series of engagements between GoT and

various development partners, with no one single organization able to deliver on the scale required to meet the

country’s road rehabilitation needs. As such, while it is impossible to solely attribute achievement of the PDO to

the project, it was designed to play a part in the broader set of engagements which were able to meet this

objective.

31. This PDO was tracked during implementation through

the PDO Indicator “Roads in good and fair condition as a share

of total classified roads”. As described in Section IV.A, the

definition of this indicator was changed informally during

supervision and the results are not reliable. However, as the

PDO identifies a much narrower subset of roads it is possible to

identify an alternate data set to track the achievement of the

PDO. More directly measuring the wording of the PDO, an

assessment of only the national paved roads shows that the

condition of the network increased slightly (from 75% listed as in

good condition at approval to 76% at project closure), in line

with project outputs. In addition, the road lengths included in

the project are some of the most important in the country. The Korogwe-Same road forms part of the North-

East Corridor, the major road link between Dar es Salaam, the economic activity and tourist destinations in the

North, and on to Nairobi. The Arusha-Minjingu road makes up part of the great African North-South axis, from

Cairo to Cape Town, while also being vital to the tourism industry linking the Serengeti and other national parks

with Arusha and the Kilimanjaro International Airport.

Revised PDO (ii): to lower transport costs on selected roads and to Songo Songo Island

32. This PDO is assessed through two PDO indicators, “Average vehicle operating costs on Korogwe-Same

road” and “Average vehicle operating cost of Arusha-Minjingu road”. Although transport costs can be

Target

0

20

40

60

80

100

20

10

20

11

20

12

20

13

20

14

20

15

20

16

20

17

Figure 2: Share of Classified Road Network in Good or Fair Condition (as reported in ISRs)


Page 16 of 54

impacted by a range of factors, vehicle operating costs (VOC) are a strong proxy, other factors being the same.

Following project closure the road lengths were reassessed to calculate VOC, with new data collected on traffic

volumes (and types) and road roughness. Based on this data, an HDM-4 analysis was conducted on both road

lengths, with VOC calculated for each in line with World Bank supported methodologies. The reduction in VOC

along the Korogwe-Same road length was in line with pre-project expectations, falling from US$ 0.34 to US$0.22

per km and achieving the indicator target of US$ 0.23 per km. The Arusha-Minjingu road has seen a similar

decrease in VOC, from US$ 0.45 per km at appraisal to US$ 0.27 per km and in line with the targeted value of

US$ 0.25 per km. In addition to the dramatic decrease in VOC, the road rehabilitation has contributed to traffic

volumes more than doubling along the route, with the largest increases in public transport options.

33. While no specific data is available on Songo Songo island transport costs, the rehabilitated jetty can

be reasonably assumed to have lowered transport costs by enabling continuous transport service to the

island. The jetty rehabilitation was necessitated by the existing jetty’s inoperability during high and low tide.

During these periods, alternate means of transport were necessary which were less efficient and more costly.

These issues have been rectified through TSSP activities, and uninterrupted service is now available for the

residents of the island.

Revised PDO (iii): to expand the capacity of the selected airports

34. The project used the annual number of passengers passing through each airport as a proxy for airport

capacity. In aggregate, the annual passenger traffic target was achieved (1.26 million versus a target of 764

thousand passengers per year). At the sub-indicator level, the target was only reached in 1 of the 4 airports

(Zanzibar) at the time of completion, with the Bukoba airport very likely to reach its target once final 2017 data

is available. As Zanzibar is a much larger and economically important airport than the other three, with more

than six times the passenger volume of the other three airports combined at appraisal, achieving the PDO target

there was the most important in meeting the PDO.

35. Despite uneven increases in passenger traffic, the capacity of each airport to handle additional and

higher quality service was expanded.7 Airport capacity (as referred to in the PDO) has many facets, but is

generally defined as the hourly throughput that an airport’s runways can sustain during high demand. While

the number of passengers per year can be a proxy of capacity, it is heavily dependent on other factors outside of

the airport’s control, such as passenger demand, airline operations, and economic growth. Therefore, in

addition to the project’s PDO indicator (number of annual passengers), capacity at the four airports is assessed

below through a variety of additional factors.

7 Monthly passenger data received from TAA through the end of September, 2017 and annualized based on a linear projection of the remaining 3 months.


Page 17 of 54

36. The Zanzibar International Airport has seen increasingly higher traffic volumes and has greatly

surpassed its indicator target. By far the largest and most important of the airports included in the project, this

is the main gateway to one of Tanzania’s most important tourist destinations, Zanzibar and its Stone Town (a

UNESCO World Heritage Site). From a baseline of

500,000 passengers, the airport has seen steadily

increased passenger volumes, reaching 946,905 in 2016

and expected to surpass 1.6 million by 2020. The

Zanzibar airport works included expansion and

rehabilitation of the taxiway and apron. While the

indicator target had already been met by the time

works began, the airport was severely constrained and

would have struggled to meet further demand. The

project’s works addressed some of the most pressing

bottlenecks restricting continued traffic growth and

allowed the airport to continue to meet the rapidly growing demand for additional passenger traffic. The

extended taxiway enables planes to enter or exit the runway at the end without having to taxi along the actual

runway to reach the terminal. This extension greatly reduced the time each airplane occupies the runway, and

thus significantly increases the throughput of the airport. The previous apron was insufficient to handle the

increased international traffic, with larger aircraft overwhelming the apron space and blocking portions of the

taxiway, rendering it unusable at times of high traffic. The expansion has relieved some of the pressure,

although further expansion may be necessary in the future. In addition, the purchase of additional fire tenders

allowed the project to meet emergency firefighting standards and prevented a need to reduce service.

37. The Bukoba airport saw substantially increased traffic with the PDO indicator target likely to be fully

achieved. Of the three regional airports included in the project, Bukoba accounted for the largest share of

expenditures (37%) and works - including extension of the runway; paving of the runway, taxiway and apron;

construction of a new terminal building; and construction of access roads and parking among other more minor

works. During preparation, the indicator target was set at 34,000 passengers per year, up from a baseline of

26,628. As of the latest available data during the ICR

review 33,379 passengers had already used the airport

in 2017 (end September), nearly meeting the target.

Projecting a similar level of traffic through the end of

the year, the airport is expected to serve more than

44,000 passengers, with continued growth projected

into the future. Tanzania’s Civil Aviation Master Plan,

developed under Component D of the project,

estimates demand at the airport to continue increasing

at 4.2% per year, reaching 60,000 passengers per

annum by 2033.8 In addition to numbers of passengers,

the capacity of the airport has expanded in other ways.

8 Tanzania’s Civil Aviation Master Plan, Final Report Volume I, Air Transport Sector & Air Traffic Demand Forecasts

0

200000

400000

600000

800000

1000000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 3: Zanzibar Airport Annual Passenger Traffic

Project Works

Target

-

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

Figure 4: Bukoba Airport Annual Passenger Traffic

Project Works

Target


Page 18 of 54

The extended and paved runway has allowed for larger aircraft and additional airlines to serve the airport. After

the project, the airport was assess as having an Aerodrome Reference Code of 2C, able to accommodate the

ATR-42 being commonly used for commercial service in Tanzania. Both Precision Air and Air Tanzania have

begun service at the rehabilitated airport, and the average number of passengers per plane increased from 8.6

in 2009 to 18.6 in 2017. In addition, as the old terminal had been damaged in an earthquake and been

condemned, the newly constructed airport was necessary for any continued commercial airport operation.

38. The Tabora airport has not yet met its PDO indicator targets as the extended duration of works has

restricted operations, however airport capacity has expanded. As discussed in Section III, after completion of

the initially planned works, it was decided that remaining funds under the subcomponent would be used to

pave the additional runway and taxiway. Completion of these works required project extension and were only

finished just before project closure, with full testing and operationalization to be completed by the end of 2017.

The extensive works required severe restrictions on operations during construction, depressing traffic

significantly. Although data was only available for several months of operations following completion of phase 2,

there are clear signs that traffic will rebound. From an average of 1,022 passengers per month during the first

half of 2017, passenger traffic nearly doubled following completion of phase 2, averaging 1,950 passengers per

month since June. Looking forward, traffic is expected to grow by an estimated 4% per year (although estimates

started from a 2015 baseline, depressing future projections).9 Furthermore, despite this lower than projected

traffic by project closure, the capacity of the airport can be assumed to have greatly increased. Paving the

runways has allowed the number of passengers per flight to increase slightly, from 10.1 in 2009 to 11.1 in 2017.

In addition, due to Tabora’s central location in Tanzania it is important to the overall safety of the Tanzanian

aviation sector, serving as a potential diversion airport

for flights crossing the country. By paving the airport’s

two runways, the project improved its condition and

reliability, and the addition of AGL and DVOR will enable

night-time operations. It also provides services such as

refueling unavailable at many other Tanzanian airports.

The airport’s capacity will be further expanded in the

future, as agreement has already been reached with

European Investment Bank to construct a new terminal,

leveraging the improved runway, taxiway and apron

facilities developed under TSSP.

9 Ibid.

- 5,000

10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000

Figure 5: Tabora Airport Annual Passenger Traffic

Phase 1 Phase 2

Target


Page 19 of 54

39. The Kigoma airport has not yet met its PDO indicator targets, despite expansion of airport capacity.

The Kigoma airport accounts for the smallest share of the three regional airports in terms of expenditure and

works (23% of expenditures). Primary works included

the paving of the main runway, dramatically

improving its condition. Traffic through Kigoma has

been largely driven by refugee operations near the

town. In addition, at project approval, it was being

used to supply UN forces stationed in the Democratic

Republic of Congo. After 2009 these supply runs were

moved to the Entebbe airport in Uganda. In addition,

as with other airports, improvement of other

transport modes, especially roads, has provided

additional options for travelers. While the total

number of passengers has plateaued after returning

to pre-project levels, future projections indicate a return to growth, returning to an average of 7.1% growth and

upwards of 100,000 passengers per year by 203310. In addition, some other indicators of capacity have

improved. Reflecting the capacity to handle larger flights, the number of passengers per flight has risen from

14.7 in 2009 to 23.9 in 2017. Furthermore, additional airlines have begun operation, with Air Tanzania having

recently relaunched service. The airport has been assessed as having an ICAO Aerodrome Reference Code of 3C.

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating 40. The overall efficacy is rated as Substantial. As described above, the project largely met its objectives,

with some minor shortcomings. Although PDO (i) shows some challenges with attribution, the project

contributed its share to the larger TSIP program and addressed failures in important road lengths. PDO (ii) was

achieved, with VOC targets met and 24-hour access to Songo Songo Island established. PDO (iii) was also

achieved, with airport capacity greatly expanding at all 4 airports. Although passenger targets had only been

met at 2 of the 4 airports by project closure, this is only weakly associated with airport capacity and in Tabora, is

due to the recent re-establishment of full operations at the airport.

C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating 41. An ex post economic analysis was conducted on the project, replicating the analysis done during

preparation to the extent possible. An assessment of the road rehabilitation component finds that both road

sections are economically viable, with similar Economic Rates of Return (ERR) as calculated at appraisal. For the

Korogwe-Same road length, the ERR was assessed as 19 and 19.9 percent (for the two lots) while it was found to

be 17.1 percent during the ex post assessment. Although the cost of the road works was within the envelope of

Component A, construction costs were significantly more than used in the economic analysis during appraisal,

reducing the calculated rate of return. The Arusha-Minjingu length was projected to have an ERR of 15.2

10 Ibid.

-

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

Figure 6: Kigoma Airport Annual Passenger Traffic

Project Works

Target


Page 20 of 54

percent at appraisal, but reached 16.3 percent by closure. Although construction costs were also higher than

predicted during appraisal, the dramatic increase in traffic along the route led to the higher than expected ERR.

For the airports component, lower than expected traffic volumes have reduced the ex post ERRs for 2 of the 3

assessed airports. In Bukoba, where traffic has seen strong growth and costs were somewhat lower than

expected, the ERR was calculated at 18.3 percent, up from the expected ERR of 15 percent at appraisal. In

Kigoma, while traffic has not met expectations, significantly lower costs resulted in an ERR of 8.5 percent.

Although this meets the World Bank’s new norm of 6 percent, it is well below the appraised value of 23 percent.

In Tabora, the ERR was calculated ex post as -9.6 percent. As explained in section II.V above, the airport had just

reopened for full operation at project closure. As such, the ERR value for this airport is very preliminary, with the

uncertainty of traffic growth leading to uncertain results. A detailed efficiency analysis is included in annex 4.

42. The project had several aspects in its design and implementation which impacted its efficiency. The

project was extended twice to allow for project activities to be completed, leading to additional supervision

costs. Although economically justified based on its ERR, within the road component delays and additional costs

arose from procurement, design errors, disagreement over responsibility for remedial works, etc. See section III

for more information on these factors. While the road costs were higher than expected in the economic analysis

conducted during appraisal, they were in line with other roads in the region constructed during the project

period. The airport components were constructed at significantly less cost than estimated during appraisal, with

the remaining funds used to expand the planned works (in Tabora especially). While the project delays led to

some additional costs, the additional time allowed for TSSP to expand its outputs in the aviation component

greatly.

43. The Efficiency Rating is Modest. While the project was able to achieve most of its planned outputs, the

above factors highlight that the efficiency was mixed, with delays and other factors bringing down the ERR and

increasing some costs of various components.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

44. The overall outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory. As described above, the project’s

relevance is rated as high, its efficacy is substantial, and the efficiency is moderate. Although the PDO was

changed with the project’s additional financing, no ‘split rating’ was deemed necessary as the scope of the

PDO was simply expanded to include the additional works.

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

Gender 45. The project did not explicitly incorporate a gender dimension into its design or implementation, and

thus did not include any actions or indicators to specifically target the mobility needs of women. See section

IV.B for more information on the project’s social impacts.


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Institutional Strengthening 46. As discussed above, Components C was intended to develop capacity within the GoT for road safety.

The most significant achievement was the development and launch of a RAIS system, allowing the police to

enter road crash information into a national database for use by transport planners, TANROADS, police speed

enforcement, and other aspects. At project closure, Tanzania was under discussions on how to build on this

system, including training of additional police or integration of mobile data entry to improve information

capture. The other two major aspects under this component (establishing a NRSA and DVELA) had not been

achieved as of project closure. Their creation required the passage of a Road Safety Act in Parliament. As this act

did not pass, they could not be created as envisioned. While these agencies would not have contributed directly

to the project’s PDOs, they are important for the long-term road sector in Tanzania. As of the ICR, discussions

were still ongoing within the GoT, with World Bank support, for moving forward on this agenda,

47. Under Component D, the project provided for PPP capacity building within the GoT. Approximately

140 representatives of relevant agencies were trained in PPP aspects and a working manual was developed. See

below for more information on these activities.

48. In addition, the project contributed to the institutional capacity of TANROADS. It supported the hiring

of additional procurement staff and a contract management specialist, all of whom have remained with the

agency beyond the end of the project.

Mobilizing Private Sector Financing 49. Component D was intended to help jumpstart the introduction of PPPs into the transport sector,

providing for training of government officials, studies in a variety of transport modes, feasibility studies for

potential projects, and support through the bidding stage of any identified projects. Tanzania’s previous

experience with PPPs has been mixed, with failures due at least partially to weak capacity on the part of the

public sector to design, negotiate and manage PPP arrangements. The project was intended to build on this

capacity. While some success was achieved and, as of project closure, one transaction had reached bidding (a

toll road), there was a general mismatch between the level of resources provided to this component and its

goals. Namely, conducting the subsector wide research, establishing the enabling environment for PPPs,

developing government capacity for their management, and supporting specific transactions would require

much more than the US$ 5 million allocated by the project. However, the outputs which were achieved may lay

the ground work for future successes.

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

50. While the project was not explicitly designed to have a distributional impact on the poor, the

investments made under the project support the county’s poverty reduction strategy. As described in section

II.A, the project supports Tanzania’s vision for the future and poverty reduction strategies. By enabling improved

access to services, opportunities, and employment in some of the more remote areas of the country, TSSP

should be expected to drive both growth, and poverty reduction. This said, no data was collected by the project

to validate such an impact.


Page 22 of 54

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

51. Scope of the Project – TSSP was initially envisioned as more widely scoped engagement, with

additional components in other transport subsectors (including rail and ports). Following the project’s

Concept Note stage, it was decided to streamline the project’s scope, simplifying the design and focusing

on subsectors ready for investment. While the initial design reflected the interlocking nature of the

national transport system and the broad objectives of the TSIP guiding overall investments, such a wide-

ranging project would have proved infeasible to implement. Reflecting TSIPs overarching goals, many of

the considered components have been included in subsequent World Bank projects, such as in the

Tanzania - Intermodal & Rail Development Project (P127241) and the Dar es Salaam Maritime Gateway

Project (P150496).

52. Use of Emergency Response Window – The works under Component E (emergency road and

bridge repairs) were financed through Crisis Response Window funds, taking advantage of availability for

retroactive finance and accelerated, consolidated, and simplified procedures for streamlined procurement

and safeguards. The use of this tool enabled the project to rapidly meet wide spread failures in the road

network, and reestablish reliable connectivity throughout the country. These works were largely

completed during the first year of implementation.

53. Preparation Time – While the project built on previous engagements, it was prepared in less

than a year, a relatively short time period for such a complex infrastructure program. Due to abbreviated

preparation time, some of the project components struggled through implementation due to poor or

incomplete designs, necessitating a series of changes within nearly every component – for instance the

relocation of the Tumaini Primary School in Bukoba, pavement issues which arose in Tabora, incorrect

volumes of materials specified for the Korogwe-Same road. While many of these issues are addressed in

Section III.B below in more detail, they share a common root related to poor or rushed preparation. The

additional financing was also prepared and approved in a very short time to take advantage of available

IDA funds.

54. Results Framework Design – The results framework was not designed in such a way as to inform

or improve implementation. PDO indicators such as condition of the road network and airport passenger

data are largely driven by forces outside of the project, while vehicle operating costs were only intended

to be assessed at project design and ICR. Intermediate indicators are largely of the “yes or no” variety,

tracking whether subcomponents are completed.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

55. TSSP underwent a long series of changes during implementation, with nearly all components

seeing at least minor changes. The key factors impacting the project included:


Page 23 of 54

Factors Subject to Government and/or Implementing Agency Control

56. The Parliament was unable to pass the Road Safety Act, which prevented the creation of the

NRSA and DVELA. Without the passage of this Act and accompanying political will behind the creation of

these agencies, much of the work under Component C was stalled, never having the momentum to

progress beyond the discussion stage. While there are multiple reasons why the Act was never passed, a

significant challenge was due to a lack of coordination among relevant agencies and potential

disagreement on responsibility for road safety among various Ministries and agencies. Never the less, as

described under section II.B the RAIS system was implemented and is operating across the country. The

WB and GoT continue to work together to deliver on this agenda.

57. The project relied on a wide range of implementing agencies. Although TANROADS was

identified as the principal implementing agency for the project, many other GoT and GoZ agencies had

responsibility for implementing various components (TAA for Component B-regional airports, GoZ for

Component B-Zanzibar airport, two separate Divisions within the MoWTC for Components C and D, etc.).

TANROADS was responsible for overall coordination of the project, reporting, financial management, and

procurement.

58. Pavement design and construction proved an issue under several sub-components. The

pavement mixture in Lot 1 of the Korogwe-Same road showed significant failure along its length,

necessitating significant remediation. Soon after completion of the works along the segment, major

deformations began to appear. As the implementing agency and contractor could not agree on

responsibility for correcting areas of failure, a third-party consultant was hired to evaluate the pavement,

with both sides agreeing to abide by the findings. The review determined that the pavement mix was at

the root of the failures. As the mix was contractually the responsibility of the contractor, the contractor

performed the necessary remediation. While the mix failure was not due to the original design, the

experience has led to a change in how TANROADS designs pavement (switching to the SuperPave mix

design system). Along the Arusha-Minjingu road, issues with pavement core testing led to delays in

starting works, as the specified test was not possible with the locally available materials used in the road.

In Tabora, the original pavement design was based on an assumption that the airport would be fully

closed during construction. As it was only partially closed, issues arose in the pavement used for the first

half of the runway, with aircraft causing some damage to the freshly laid pavement. To rectify this, the

pavement design was changed halfway along the runway, with lessons learned applied in Bukoba as well.

59. Lower than expected bids under Components B provided significant space for financing

additional works. The largest of these included the phase 2 of works in Tabora. After completion of phase

1, it was recognized that the apron and secondary runway, which also serves as the main taxiway, would

need to be paved and expanded to leverage the investments already made. As the cost of the runway

paving and expansion was much lower than expected, these works could be readily financed through the

project. The addition of AGL and the DVOR further capitalized on the gains already made under the

project. Similarly, the need to include emergency and maintenance equipment in Zanzibar was facilitated

by unused project funds. In Bukoba, the relocation of the school, addition of fencing around the airport,

and construction of a walking path to enable passage of pedestrians around the end of the runway was

financed through similar modalities.


Page 24 of 54

60. The co-financing from the GoT for the airports component (US$11 million) was reduced, with

IDA financing supporting the entire project cost from that point forward. During implementation, slow

disbursement of these funds led to potential delays under Component B. As the bids received for airport

works were significantly below their allocation during design, it was determined that the entire remaining

works, including the additional works under the phase 2 in Tabora, could be financed through the IDA

allocation.

Factors subject to World Bank control

61. The World Bank project team remained heavily engaged throughout the project life. As the

project TTLs were based in the Dar es Salaam office throughout preparation and supervision, the World

Bank could provide effective support to the project. Being closely located to the project enabled the Bank

team to stay engaged with the implementing agencies on a regular basis, helping to mitigate any potential

issues with lack of coordination or cooperation and providing ready support as needs arose. In addition,

although the project had 3 Task Team Leaders (TTL) over its lifespan, all TTLs were involved in the project

team from approval, smoothing handovers.

62. To encourage a wider variety of bids, the World Bank removed requirements for pre-

qualification and developed more standardized bidding documents. These steps enabled the project to

receive bids substantially lower than expected, freeing up project funds for additional works, such as the

Tabora phase 2 or the culvert added to the Arusha-Minjingu road. The project used an International

Competitive Bidding process. Before the project, the Tanzania context section of the bidding documents

was not standardized, so one aspect was to ensure consistency on that side. In addition, the team worked

with the implementing agency/consultants working on the various components to identify best practices

and areas where we could align the documents (for instance on assumptions, inclusion of certain clauses,

etc.).

Factors outside of the control of government and/or implementing agencies

63. During implementation, the domestic airline industry in Tanzania went through a difficult

period, with the National carrier (Air Tanzania) drastically reducing or eliminating flights, including to the

project’s airports. This made it increasingly difficult to meet PDO (ii) targets. In addition, the shifting of

demand from Kigoma to Entebbe reduced demand on that airport. Finally, the expansion of other modes

of transport (roads in particular) has reduced the demand for air transport to some extent.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design 64. Although PDO indicators were established to track progress against each of the PDOs, and all

components were associated with at least one intermediate indicator, the project’s M&E design was

generally insufficient to monitor and assess the project. PDO indicators suffered from either poor attribution to


Page 25 of 54

the project or an inability to be assessed during implementation, eliminating their use as a feedback mechanism

to implementation.

65. Indicators with poor attribution included the “share of classified road network in good or fair

condition” and the “passenger traffic at selected airports”, both of which rely only modestly on the project to

be achieved. In the case of the road network, the length of the classified road network included in the PDO

(more than 80,000 km) was highly mismatched with the PDO itself (assessing the approximately 6,400 km of

paved national roads) and the actual works of the project 268 km under Component A and 641 km under

Component E). Achievement of project outputs was unlikely to noticeably impact the PDO indicator. It should be

noted that this indicator was a Core Sector Indicator at the time, and was included in nearly all World Bank

roads projects. To a lesser extent, passenger traffic at the selected airports may also be driven by factors

exogenous to the project

66. Vehicle operating costs, included as PDO indicators to assess progress against PDO (ii), were only

calculated at project design and during ICR preparation. As such, while they may give some sense of

achievement of outcomes, they were unavailable to inform the project during development. In addition, this

indicator also relies as much or more on factors outside of the project (such as fuel costs, fleet makeup and age,

tire wear, etc.) as it does road condition.

67. Intermediate indicators primarily served as a checklist for project implementation. Most intermediate

indicators were structured as “yes or no” questions, or as a simple tally of road kilometers completed. In the

case of the PPP component, the associated intermediate indicator was poorly matched to the scope of the

works. Due to Tanzania’s nascent PPP market and the relatively small size of the component, establishing the

indicator of number of transactions to reach bidding stage was overly ambitious, and provided some incentive

to try to bypass the very necessary steps of capacity building to move on to transaction identification and

bidding.

M&E Implementation 68. TANROADS was responsible for collecting and aggregating Results Framework data for the project. It

provided biannual updates through the implementation of the project, reporting on project works and indicator

status. This arrangement worked well, with data collected from TAA, MoWTC, and GoZ and provided in

aggregate to the World Bank team.

69. As described in Section II.B, the “share of classified road network in good or fair condition” indicator

was not monitored consistently throughout implementation. Initially conceived as the share of the total

classified road network in good or fair condition (over 80 thousand km), baselines and targets reflected this

definition. However, early in implementation the definition was informally changed, with reported condition

data reflecting only the national and regional roads (approximately 30 thousand km). While the change was

made throughout the TSIP program, to address a challenge with unreliable data for local roads, it was never

officially changed in TSSP reporting. This change in the definition is solely responsible for the rapid increase in

reported data, and invalidates indicator results.

70. Other indicators suffered from minor shortcomings. For instance, the additional PDO indicator on

Zanzibar airport traffic was not fully incorporated into project reporting until most works had already been

completed, with the baseline data repeated as the current value from additional financing approval in 2011


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through 2016 when updated data was included. In addition, the airport traffic indicators were depressed due to

construction (especially in Tabora), which makes it difficult to realistically assess future traffic numbers at the

time of the ICR.

71. The M&E was not adjusted during the life of the project, despite an additional financing and several

restructurings. Although the additional financing was approved early in the project’s life, and so may have been

too early to identify and address failures in the M&E framework, the Mid Term Review and two restructurings

all provided potential openings to strengthen the results framework.

M&E Utilization 72. The project’s results framework was used as a checklist during implementation, allowing the project

team and implementing agency a way to formally track progress of outputs. The project’s M&E was otherwise

not used to inform or course-correct its implementation. Furthermore, the project’s M&E relied on data already

incorporated into TANROADS and TAA’s regular reporting, and had no impact on either of these institutions

M&E systems going forward.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E 73. The project’s M&E is rated as modest. Although data was collected on a regular basis, and provided

some use in tracking the project’s progress and as a source of information for preparation of the ICR, it had

severe shortcomings, including design (mismatched indicators, PDOs, and components), implementation

(unreliably monitored road condition), and utilization. Overall, while it did provide a measure of outputs, the

M&E did not provide a clear metric to assess the project’s outcomes and achievements.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

74. The project’s environmental management was satisfactory. The project was rated with an

Environmental Assessment category of B. All sub-projects under Components A and B (those including

major civil works) were subjected to Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs), which

concluded that all potential impacts could be mitigated through implementation of Environmental and

Social Management Plans (ESMPs), which were generally adhered to during project implementation.

Deficiencies detected during implementation were addressed. TAA developed and adopted in November

2015 an “Environmental Management Manual” that provides guidelines on how to comply with

international environmental management and occupational health and safety standards. This manual

gives clear instructions on implementation of best practices on environmental management aspects and

has helped TAA to assume its responsibility under the ESMPs. At project closure, the only environmental

measure still to be completed was verification that all asbestos has been removed from the site of the

former Tumaini primary school. While all visible materials had been removed, final verification through

soil testing had not yet been completed.

75. The project’s social safeguard management was satisfactory. As described above, relevant

major civil works were subjected to ESIA and addressed through ESMP. The implementing agencies

substantially addressed social safeguards issues under the project. Some key factors included:


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• The project required resettlement under Component B. Under the airport component, RAPs

were prepared for all airports, although no resettlement was required at Tabora and Kigoma.

In Bukoba, five resettlement cases remained pending at project closure. Four of the cases

were pending court deliberations, with the fifth resolved through the project’s Grievances

Redress Mechanism with payment of the entitlement agreed and pending from TAA. TAA

agreed to continue submitting project progress reports to the Bank until the remaining cases

are resolved. Resettlement was also required at the Zanzibar airport, and successfully

completed.

• Under component A, the road lengths were completed within existing alignments and no

resettlement determined to be required. As resettlement would have been required for the

short segment of the Arusha-Minjingo road within Arusha town (approx. 7 km), during project

preparation it was decided to exclude these kilometers from civil works, although detailed

designs were completed for future rehabilitation. During implementation, a request for

relocation was received from several families living near an existing quarry utilized by the

Arusha-Minjingo contractor. Their request was fulfilled and they successfully relocated.

• Construction of a new primary school was required at the Bukoba airport. During

implementation, it was determined that the Tumaini Primary School was located within the

flight path of the extended runway. A public primary school, Tumaini serves students from the

area around the airport, including

hosting a unit serving more than 50

disabled children. When the risk was

identified, the airport was put under a

flight restrictions, with operations only

allowed in the opposite direction of the

school. To address this concern it was

determined that the school would have

to be relocated. Empty land was

contributed by the local government

and a new school buildings were

constructed. Both students of the former school and new students began attending classes in

the new location. Although there were some students whose commute was made more

challenging, the move was largely successful. TAA and the Bukoba airport management have

committed to continue supporting the school going forward.

• HIV/AIDS prevention measures were put in place in project areas. With the influx of people

during civil works, there is always a risk of HIV/AIDS infections. To prevent such issues,

construction companies were required (and successfully implemented) education and

sensitization plans, including voluntary testing, in collaboration with district health officers.

• During preparation, it was determined that the project triggered the cultural property

safeguards policy (OP 4.11). To address this concern, the project was expected to secure the

services of an archeologist to assess any chance finds. While no archeologist was secured, as

Figure 7: TSSP Project Team, TAA representatives, and School Officials at the new Tumaini Primary School


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very little undisturbed land was utilized, no chance finds were identified during construction.

At the Zanzibar airport expansion of the taxiway necessitated relocation of a cemetery. This

was satisfactorily achieved.

76. The project’s financial management was satisfactory. During preparation, TANROADS was

identified as the agency best placed to handle all fiduciary responsibilities for the project. A World Bank

financial management specialist based in the Tanzania country office supported the project through

implementation. Reporting was provided on a timely basis and all audits were unqualified.

77. The project’s procurement performance was satisfactory. As institutional capacity was

identified during preparation as a potential risk to implementation, the project required the hiring of

three additional procurement staff within TANROADS. In addition, as the roads sector in Tanzania had

been plagued with higher than expected bids, the team developed standardized bidding documents and

waived requirements for pre-qualification, expanding the pool of potential contractors and leading to bids

significantly lower than expected in many cases.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

78. TSSP was prepared as part of the much larger TSIP, necessitating a wide view of the country’s

transport needs and engagement of many stakeholders. As part of this larger program, TSSP was strategically

aligned with the country’s development strategy. In addition, the inclusion of studies and capacity building for

all transport modes under Component D (such as the rail study, civil aviation master plan, dry port feasibility

study, toll-road development, etc.) provided for the success of the wider program.

79. As described under Section III.A, the project leveraged various agencies and Ministries from across

the GoT. This necessitated effective engagement and trust development with a variety of stakeholders during

preparation, establishing a strong implementation framework for the project.

80. The project suffered from a number of technical oversights during preparation. As described in Section

III.A, these led to delays in implementation and additional costs in some components. In addition, the poor

quality of the M&E framework created a challenge for the project throughout its life (and made the preparation

of an ICR more difficult and costly).

Quality of Supervision 81. The project team should be commended for great flexibility in its supervision, allowing the project to

overcome some challenges inherited from preparation and adapt to the changing reality. Very few aspects of

the project occurred as initially planned, with additional subcomponents included throughout as needs and

resources were identified. Design and construction of the school in Bukoba highlights the flexible and careful

approach to supervision. As described in Section III.A, the Bank team being based in Dar es Salaam allowed a

close working relationship with the implementing agency, and rapid response to evolving challenges. In

addition, reflecting the flexible approach, during the project’s grace period after closure the World Bank


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lowered the minimum disbursement amount, from US$ 200,000 to US$ 40,000 to enable direct payments to

various service providers.

82. Project documentation was filed appropriately, with ISRs and a Mid-Term Review completed as

expected. Issues identified in the Mid-Term Review appear to be those most relevant to successfully achieving

the project. ISR ratings appear to well reflect project status over time, and risks to development outcomes were

identified and addressed.

83. The M&E remained poor throughout the life of the project. As outlined in the M&E section above, the

M&E could have potentially been improved at several stages of implementation, including the additional

financing, two restructurings or the Mid-Term Review.

84. The World Bank’s transport team in Tanzania has established a broad engagement in the sector,

effectively leveraging ongoing projects to lay the groundwork for future, related, engagements. This was

exemplified by the decision to overlap the TSSP ICR mission with the project identification mission for a

potential follow-on effort, incorporating lessons from TSSP directly. Furthermore, TSSP was based around

designs prepared under other earlier projects, and it in turn has laid the foundation for its successors. This

approach to design and implementation has created a robust, holistic, and integrated sectoral engagement.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance 85. The overall Bank performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. Although there were significant

issues with preparation of the project, the team’s flexible implementation approach enabled such challenges to

be overcome during supervision.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

86. There remain some risks to the project’s outcomes. As the project is integrated into the

broader TSIP program, is in line with GoT investment plans going forward, and is supported by a well-

coordinated group of development partners, there a high likelihood of continued expansion on the goals

of the project.

87. Continued achievement of PDOs (i) and (ii) are ensured by Tanzania’s Road Fund. Established

by Parliament, the Road Fund provides stable revenue, collected from fuel levies and other road user fees,

to ensure sustainable maintenance of the road network. With revenues increasing year over year for a

2016/2017 fiscal year total of nearly US$350 million11, the Fund is well placed to maintain the country’s

growing paved road network. This is reflective of a general approach which has been adopted, of

maintaining those roads already improved before continuing expansion of the network. Although

11 Tanzania Roads Fund, Roads Tolls Collections for the Period July 2016 - June 2017


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priorities may change in the future, the GoT has shown sustained commitment to ensuring its roads are

maintained.

88. Risk to the capacity of the supported airports is driven by a lack of clarity in responsibility and

resources for maintenance. All four airports supported by the project are expected to see increasing

demand going forward. The Civil Aviation Master Plan’s outlook on growth suggests that the Tanzanian

aviation sector will continue to expand, as improvements in infrastructure unlock tourist traffic and

economic growth and rising incomes enable an increasing share of the population to afford air travel.

Both factors are reinforced by the country’s competitive and growing low cost carrier industry. The key

risk to continued success is a lack of clarity on responsibility and resources for maintenance. At project

closure, a decision had been made to move responsibility for construction of mainland airports from TAA

to TANROADS. The agencies were in the process of determining which would have the responsibility for

future maintenance, but no final decision had been made at the time of the ICR. Furthermore,

maintenance budgets are not guaranteed, and proper resources may not be available to maintain the

infrastructure. Although aviation generally generates revenue, Tanzania does not have a set percentage to

be retained by the airports for operations and maintenance, with airport budgets allocated from a central

account based on annual requests. In Zanzibar, a percentage is retained for maintenance, but it is

insufficient to meet maintenance needs. Without such a dedicated maintenance structure (like the Road

Fund in the road sector) maintenance needs may not be met, threatening the airports’ capacity over the

long term.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

89. The following lessons learned and recommendations from the project are intended in inform

future World Bank Group operations:

90. Institution Building:

• Ensuring implementing agencies have strong contract management capacity can help prevent minor issues from arising, or more rapidly address them once they appear. At the Bank’s suggestion, TANROADS hired a contract management specialist to monitor the project’s contractors. Prior to bringing the specialist on, several minor issues had led to delays and additional costs within Component A. Implementation proceeded much more smoothly afterwards. Building this capacity has transferred to other projects as well.

• Establishing standardized bidding processes and removing requirements for pre-

qualification can create a more competitive bidding process and result in lower costs. Earlier

World Bank transport projects in Tanzania had suffered from increasingly high bids for civil

works, to the extent of the Bank canceling bidding processes. By streamlining the bidding

documents and standardizing relevant sections, as well as opening up bidding from pre-

qualification, the number of bidders was greatly increased, with bids received from

contractors from a wide range of countries. The increased competition drives down the costs


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of received bids. The project could address a much wider range of challenges due to the funds

made available by the lower bids.

91. Project Design:

• Airport projects should be built on a well-designed airport master plan to ensure all

components are well integrated. The decision to initiate phase 2 of the Tabora airport was

recognition that the initial investment could not be fully leveraged without additional works.

In Zanzibar, while the TSSP works addressed severe bottlenecks, poor integration with a

separate project being financed by the China Exim Bank may prevent the best possible

outcome for both investments in the future. In Bukoba, better planning could have identified

the need to relocate the primary school. In addition, security fencing was not included in the

original designs of the regional airport, but during implementation it was determined that

residents of the local areas were crossing through the airport area, risking harm. Fencing was

included as part of the revisions.

• Road safety should be fully integrated into road projects to avoid treating it as an

afterthought. During the remediation activities along Lot 1 of the Korogwe-Same road (see

section III.B for more information) the road safety measures were removed from this part of

the project’s road works. As safety was not identified as a key objective of the project, and

the safety of the road lengths was not monitored under the project, there was little incentive

for the contractor to retain these measures. Furthermore, identification of safety as a priority

during road design and identifying pedestrians as road users equal to those in vehicles may

have encouraged road designs to incorporate footpaths or wider shoulders in areas with

settlement. As these sorts of road safety works have been more frequently included in recent

World Bank road projects, additional attention should be given to older, legacy projects under

supervision. Political will was also lagging to pass the necessary legislation for creation of a

NRSA and DVELA.

• Consultations with those living in the area around an intervention can be vital, both during

preparation and supervision. The Arusha-Minjingu road runs through an area frequently used

by nomadic Maasai herdsmen. As the road had the potential to impact their animal’s ability to

move between grazing areas, the contractor did significant consultations and provided

signage and earthworks in identified areas to improve the safety and ease of herds crossing

the road. In Bukoba and Tabora, the airport works blocked walking paths traditionally used by

local residents. To ease their travel, and prevent the safety risk of their incursion into the

airports, the impacted residents were involved in planning an alternate path to be

constructed by the project. In both cases, users expressed appreciation for the new routes.

• Monitoring and evaluation design should be directly linked to the project’s theory of

change. Although the project’s theory of change logically flows from activities to outputs to

outcomes, its indicators did not measure aspects strongly tied to project achievement. For

instance, in the aviation sector, if improved airport capacity is the targeted outcome PDO

indicators should be selected which measure capacity (such as ICAO Aerodrome Reference


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Codes where available, or maximum throughput of the airport). Projects should select

indicators which are “SMART”, meaning they are Specific, Measurable, Attributable, Realistic,

and Time-Bound. The TSSP project, for instance, would have benefited from indicators which

were more specific (specifically measuring the PDOs), attributable (measuring something the

project could actually impact), and timebound (with data available during implementation to

guide supervision and results fully available by project closure, in the case of the airport

traffic).12

92. Strategic Engagement:

• Including preparatory works for future projects can help build a strong and lasting

engagement in a sector. TSSP was based on design works largely done under earlier projects.

Furthermore, the Zanzibar additional financing component was only feasibly developed and

approved under such a tight timetable because nearly all of the preparation had already been

done for an earlier engagement. Looking forward, TSSP has continued this strategy, with

designs for 918 km of additional roads prepared under Component A, and studies done for

prioritization of future airport investments under Component B. Finally, the Tanzania

transport team used the ICR mission to also begin discussions of follow-on projects, using the

lessons of TSSP to inform the next engagements. This sustained engagement not only helps

engender additional projects, but contributes to sustaining capacity development endeavors

and the success of subsequent operations’ implementation.

. .

12 For more information, see World Bank, OPCS, Results Framework and M&E Guidance Note.


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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: To improve the condition of the national paved road network

Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised

Target

Actual Achieved at Completion

Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads

Percentage 66.00 70.00 86.00

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Unclear. Inconsistency in how the indicator was measured makes it difficult to assess actual achievement of the indicator.

Objective/Outcome: To lower transport cost on selected roads and to Songo Songo Island


Target


Average vehicle operating costs on (b) Arusha - Minjingu Roads

Amount(USD) 0.45 0.25 0.27

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 01-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. VOC were recalculated using updated road and traffic information at project closure. The result was in line with the original target and represents a dramatic reduction from the baseline.


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Target


Average vehicle operating costs on (a) Korogwe-Same

Amount(USD) 0.34 0.23 0.22

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 01-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. VOC were recalculated using updated road and traffic information at project closure. The result was in line with the original target and represents a dramatic reduction from the baseline.

Objective/Outcome: To expand the capacity of selected airports


Target


Passenger Volume at airports Number 78399.00 104000.00 764000.00 1026329.00

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 06-Jun-2011 02-Jan-2017

- Bukoba Airport Number 26628.00 34000.00 33138.00

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017

- Kigoma Airport Number 28859.00 40000.00 29781.00

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017

- Tabora Airport Number 22912.00 30000.00 16505.00

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017


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Annual passenger volume at Zanzibar airport

Number 500000.00 660000.00 946905.00

01-May-2011 06-Jun-2011 02-Jan-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. Although only the Zanzibar airport surpassed the targeted passenger volume, in aggregate the airport component achieved its goals. Although annual data is only available for 2016, preliminary 2017 data indicates that Bukoba will also well exceed passenger targets.

Unlinked Indicators


Target


Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 5150000.00 5700000.00 6000000.00

31-Mar-2009 31-Mar-2009 06-Jun-2011 28-Feb-2017

Female beneficiaries Percentage 0.00 50.00 50.00 50.00

31-Mar-2009 31-Mar-2009 06-Jun-2011 28-Feb-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. The number of beneficiaries was assumed based on the estimated number of users of the transport facilities. Its achievement is assumed based on the completion of all civil works.

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Component A: Rehabilitation of paved trunk roads


Target



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Design and bidding documents for rehabilitation prepared

Kilometers 0.00 911.00 918.00

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015

Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. All designs and bidding documents were developed as planned.


Target


Roads rehabilitated, Non-rural

Kilometers 0.00 270.00 268.40

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 29-Jan-2016

Korogwe-Same Road Kilometers 0.00 172.00 172.00

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017

Arusha-Minjingu Road Kilometers 0.00 98.00 96.40

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. All roads were completed as intended.

Component: Component B: Improvement of airports


Target


Three Regional airport Yes/No N Y Y


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Runways paved and Zanzibar airport taxiways and apron improved

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2014

Bukoba Runway paved, terminal building, access road and car parking constructed

Yes/No N Y Y

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015

Kigoma Runway paved Yes/No N Y Y

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2014

Tabora Runway paved Yes/No N Y Y

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2014

Zanzibar taxiways and apron rehabilitated and extended

Yes/No N Y Y

01-May-2011 11-May-2011 14-Dec-2014

Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. All planned works were completed within the project, as well as additional works determined necessary during the project's implementation.

Component: Component C: Improvement of road safety


Target



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Road Accident Information System established and operational

Yes/No N Y Y

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 31-Dec-2014

Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. the RAIS was established, police were trained in its use, and was operating at the time of project closure.


Target


Driver and Vehicle Examination and Licencing Agency (DVELA) established and operational

Yes/No N Y N

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 20-Jun-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Not Achieved. The DVELA was not established due to the lack of passage of the requisite Road Safety Act by Parliament.


Target


National Road Saftey Agency (NRSA) established and operational

Yes/No N Y N

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2016

Comments (achievements against targets): Not Achieved. The NRSA was not established due to the lack of passage of the requisite Road Safety Act by Parliament.


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Component: Component D: Promotion of public-private partnerships


Target


Transport Sector PPP transactions which have reaqched bidding stage

Number 0.00 2.00 1.00

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 20-Jun-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Partially achieved. As of project closure, one transaction had reached bidding, the Dar es Salaam to Chalinze Toll-Road. While other transactions have had preliminary work done, they have not yet reached bidding.

Component: Component E: Emergency road and bridge repair


Target


National Road/Bridge sections improved

Number 0.00 100.00 109.00

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015

Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. These emergency works were completed within the first year of the project.

Component: Component F: Songo Songo Island jetty


Target


Songosongo jetty Yes/No N Y Y


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rehabilitated 01-May-2011 01-May-2011 30-Jun-2016

Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. The jetty was rehabilitated as planned and is providing service to the residents of the island.


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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome 1: To improve the condition of the national paved road network

Outcome Indicators 1. Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads (%)

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Design and bidding documents for rehabilitation prepared (#) 2. Roads rehabilitated (km) 3. National Road/Bridge Sections Improved (#) 4. Road Accident Information System established and operational (Y/N) 5. Driver and Vehicle Examination and Licensing Agency (DVELA) established and operational (Y/N) 6. National Road Safety Agency (NRSA) established and operational (Y/N) 7. Transport Sector PPP transactions which have reached bidding stage (#)

Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)

1. Component A. Rehabilitation and Preparation of Designs for Rehabilitation of Paved Trunk Roads. -Rehabilitation/upgrade of the Korogwe-Same Road (172 km) -Rehabilitation of the Arusha-Minjingu Raod (98 km) -Preparation of Detailed Design and Bidding Documents for the Rehabilitation of about 911 km of Paved Trunk Roads 2. Component E. Emergency Road and Bridge Repair -repair of roads and bridges at more than 100 locations 3. Component D. Promotion of Public Private Partnerships -Dar es Salaam Chalinze Toll Road feasibility study and bidding 4. Component C. Improvement of Road Safety -Establishment of NRSA -Establishment of DVELA


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-Creation and operationalization of RAIS

Objective/Outcome 2: To lower transport cost on selected roads and to Songo Songo Island

Outcome Indicators 1. Average vehicle operating costs on (b) Arusha - Minjingu Roads 2. Average vehicle operating costs on (a) Korogwe-Same

Intermediate Results Indicators 1. Roads rehabilitated (km) 2. National Road/Bridge Sections Improved (#) 3. Songo Songo Island rehabilitated (Y/N)


1. Component A. Rehabilitation and Preparation of Designs for Rehabilitation of Paved Trunk Roads. -Rehabilitation/upgrade of the Korogwe-Same Road (172 km) -Rehabilitation of the Arusha-Minjingu Raod (98 km) 2. Component F. Songo Songo Island Jetty

Objective/Outcome 3: To expand the capacity of selected airports

Outcome Indicators

1. Passenger volume at airports -Bukoba Airport -Kigoma Airport -Tabora Airport -Zanzibar International Airport

Intermediate Results Indicators 1. Three Regional Airport Runways paved and Zanzibar airport taxiways and apron improved (Y/N)


1. Component B: Improvement of Airports -Bukoba: paving and extension of runway, taxiway, and apron; construction of a new terminal building -Tabora: Paving and extension of main and secondary runway and


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apron; installation of AGL and DVOR -Kigoma: Paving of runway -Zanzibar: Paving of taxiways and apron, purchase of fire tenders and maintenance tractors


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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name Role

Preparation

Dieter Schelling Task Team Leader

Gisbert Joseph Kinyero Procurement Specialist

Naima Hasci, Godfrey Kamukala, Helen Shahriari Social Safeguards Specialists

Theonestina Kaiza-Boshe Environmental Safeguards Specialist

Bella Diallo, Luis Schwarz Financial Management Specialists

Philip Beauregard Councel

Felly Kaboyo Team Member

Fang Xu Team Member

Yonas Eliesikia Mchomvu Team Member

Grace Mayala Team Member

Nina Jones Team Member

Supervision/ICR

Yonas Eliesikia Mchomvu Task Team Leader

Negede Lewi Task Team Leader

Gisbert Joseph Kinyero, Wangwe Magige Mwita Procurement Specialists

Michael Eriu Okuny, Mercy Mataro Sabai Financial Management Specialist

Mary C.K. Bitekerezo Social Safeguards Specialist

Shri Vasantt Kumar Jogoo Environmental Safeguards Specialist

Jane A. N. Kibbassa Social Safeguards Specialist

Faith-Lucy Matumbo Team Member

Julie Rieger, Philip Beauregard Counsel

Judith Elimhoo Mziray Team Member

Allen David Natai Team Member


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Grace Mayala Team Member

Alexander Birikorang Team Member

Adam Stone Diehl ICR Author

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost

No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)

Preparation

FY05 36.170 303,354.59

FY06 30.563 204,342.05

FY07 23.117 113,263.65

FY08 36.341 202,717.35

FY09 47.837 264,359.78

FY10 42.734 233,932.75

FY11 0 0.00

Total 216.76 1,321,970.17

Supervision/ICR

FY10 0 8,780.69

FY11 28.725 119,497.76

FY12 29.605 118,293.65

FY13 26.330 115,764.03

FY14 22.425 124,193.03

FY15 23.525 98,474.91

FY16 19.290 83,517.14

FY17 18.544 101,982.55

FY18 6.400 52,773.05

Total 174.84 823,276.81


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ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components Amount at Approval

(US$M) Actual at Project

Closing (US$M) Percentage of Approval

(US$M)

A - Rehabilitation and Preparation of Designs for Rehabilitation of Paved Trunk Roads

186.5 191.7 103%

B - Improvement of Regional Airports

69.2 56.5 82%

C - Improvement of Road Safety Management

6.0 4.6 77%

D - Promotion of Public Private Partnerships

5.0 3.4 68%

E - Emergency Road and Bridge Repair

15.0 13.9 93%

F - Rehabilitation of the Songo Songo Island jetty. (New component added) - Addtional financing

2.0 2.2 110%

B2: Rehabilitation and extension of Zanzibar airport taxiways and apron. (Scale up of the airport component) - Addtional financing

57.0 50.7 89%

Total 340.7 325.0 95%


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ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Background

1. To improve the condition of the national paved road network and to expand the capacity

of selected regional airports, the project included two types of large investment components: (i)

Rehabilitation of two trunk roads (172 km from Korogwe to Same, and 98 km from Arusha to

Minjingu), and (ii) Rehabilitation of three regional airports at Bukoba, Kigoma and Tabora, and

one international airport at Zanzibar. The rehabilitation and expansion of Zanzibar Airport was

added by the additional financing approved in 2011.

2. The current ex post analysis is focused on the road rehabilitation component and the three

regional airport rehabilitation works, for which necessary data that are needed for evaluation are

available. These road and airport investments amounted to about US$292 million and accounted

for 73 percent of the actual total project expenditure.

Road rehabilitation component

3. For the road component, HDM4 was used at appraisal. The model computes the expected

road user cost savings because of road improvement by the investment. With investment costs,

traffic data and vehicle operating costs updated, the model was rerun separately for Korogwe–

Mkumbara–Same and Arusha–Minjingu Road.

4. Investment costs. Based on the HDM analysis comparing different investment options,

the Project adopted a road standard of 50 millimeter AC surfacing for 6.5 meter carriageway

with 1.5 meter DBST shoulders. For Arusha–Minjingu Road, reprocessing of the existing base

course and strengthening by new crushed stone base were also included. The works costs were

initially estimated at US$81 million for Korogwe–Same and US$47 million for Arusha–

Minjingu Road. The actual costs turned out higher than estimated: US$119 million and US$58

million, 47 percent and 22 percent cost overruns, respectively.

5. Traffic. The actual traffic is consistent with or greater than expected. The annual average

daily traffic on Korogwe–Same increased by 37 percent, from 1,332 in 2009 to 1,826 in 2017.

The Arusha–Minjingu experienced a much more significant increase in traffic, 1,300 to 3,261

vehicles per day.

Table 1. Traffic along the project roads: Before and after the project

Korogwe - Same Arusha - Minjingu

2009 2017 2008 2017

Cars 182 263 88 413

Pickups 270 390 588 1049

Minibus 158 74 178 832

Large bus 61 106 71 199


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Small truck 166 89 66 138

Medium truck 65 105 135 120

Heavy truck 211 73 55 80

Truck trailer 219 215 89 108

Subtotal 1,332 1,315 1,270 2,939

Motorcycle 0 511 30 322

Total 1,332 1,826 1,300 3,261

6. Vehicle operating cost parameters. In addition to the traffic data, the underlying fleet

characteristics and vehicle operating unit costs were also updated. The underlying data are

slightly different but practically the same between the two road sections.

Table 2. Fleet characteristics: Korogwe–Same

Cars Pickups Minibus

Large bus

Small truck

Medium truck

Heavy truck

Truck trailer

Passenger car space equivalent 1 1 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8

No. of wheels 4 4 4 6 4 6 10 18

No. of axles 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 Annual operating length (km) 25000 50000 30000 120000 60000 100000 120000 120000

Working hours 590 1600 1050 2720 1800 3260 3660 3660

Average life (years) 13 15 15 15 12 15 15 15

Private use (%) 50 50 10 0 50 0 0 0

No. of passengers 4 4 15 50 1 1 1 1

Work related trip (%) 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33

Table 3. Economic unit costs: Korogwe – Same

Cars Pickups Minibus

Large bus

Small truck

Medium truck

Heavy truck

Truck trailer

New vehicle 18360 17200 24000 114660 15900 55900 84900 121390

Replacement tire 68 125 125 316 154 250 316 359

Fuel (per liter) 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.74 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47

Lubricating oil (per liter) 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 Maintenance labor (per hour) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Crew wages (per hour) 0.5 0.5 0.95 1.6 0.95 0.95 1.1 1.6

Annual overhead cost 450 470 580 2840 520 1720 2780 3260

Annual interest (%) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

Time value (per hour): Passenger 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 Non-working passenger 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05

Cargo 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11


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7. Results. The HDM4 was rerun separately for the two road sections, based on the above

data, while keeping the other assumptions the same as the appraisal. Both road investments are

found to be economically viable, given the actual costs and current traffic trend. The rate of

return for the Korogwe–Same section is estimated at 17.1 percent, slightly lower than the IRR at

appraisal. While the traffic is generally consistent with the projection, the rehabilitation work

costs increased by nearly 50 percent, which reduced efficiency in investment. For Arusha –

Minjingu Road, the IRR is estimated at 16.3, higher than the estimate at appraisal. The

rehabilitation costs increased by 22 percent, but the traffic also increased substantially along this

road. Assuming that the traffic would continue increasing steadily, the investment is

economically justifiable.

Table 4. Summary of economic analysis: Road component

Length (km)

Traffic 1/ Investment ($ mil) IRR (%) NPV ($ mil)

2009 2017 Appraisal Ex post Appraisal Ex post Appraisal Ex post

Korogwe - Same

Korogwe - Mkumbara 76 1,332 1,826

37.8 61.7 19.0 17.1

19.5 27.98

Mkumbara - Same 96 43.0 57.6 19.9 27.7

Arusha - Minjingu 98 1,300 3,261 47.2 57.7 15.2 16.3 21.5 12.80

1/ Traffic varies from section to section. The AADT on Korogwe-Same Road was 920 to 1,756 vehicles before the project. For Arusha Minjingu, it varied from 700 to over 14,000 vehicles.

Airport rehabilitation component 8. For the regional airports, the economic analysis at the appraisal stage was focused on

economic values that additional passenger and cargo traffic could bring in. While the details are

unclear in PAD, it seems to have assumed that the airports could not have handled any more

passengers or cargo without the project. Thus, the project’s benefits primarily stem from the

expected growth in airport passengers and cargo. The economic analysis at appraisal took into

account the following benefits: (i) spending by additional tourists and business persons, (ii) value

added to additional freight cargo, (iii) growth impacts, including new jobs and agricultural

production; and (iv) airport service revenue.

9. The current ex post assessment follows the similar approach but ignore one of the above-

mentioned factors, i.e., growth impacts, since the underlying assumptions are not clear in PAD.

Therefore, technically speaking, the following results are not perfectly comparable to the

appraisal assessment but should be considered to be more conservative.

10. Airport traffic. Before the projects, the three airports had experienced 10 to 20 percent

traffic growth in air passengers. The appraisal assessment assumed significant and steady growth

in both passengers and cargo. For Bukoba Airport, for instance, it was assumed that passengers

would increase by 9 percent per annum, tapered off to 4 percent over time. For Kigoma, it was

assumed that passengers would initially grow by 40 percent because of the project. The actual

traffic growth has been much modest in reality. In addition, the prolonged works on runways and

taxiways restricted airport services, which was not taken into account in the economic evaluation


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at the appraisal stage. Particularly for Tabora Airport, this has been significantly impacting

passenger and freight traffic.

11. The current ex post assessment reflects the actual passenger and cargo traffic up to 2016.

For the remaining period, on the other hand, the traffic growth rates assumed at appraisal are

used as they are. Therefore, passenger and cargo traffic is assumed to growth at 3 to 5 percent

and 2 percent, respectively. For Tabora, an initial passenger growth of 30 percent is also assumed

in 2017, because the rehabilitation work has just been completed. This is consistent with the

recent traffic: The traffic at Tabora Airport has been picking up since 2015. The number of

passengers increased from 10,100 in 2015 to 16,500 in 2016 and 17,200 (est.) in 2017.

Figure 1. Airport passenger traffic: Actual and forecast at appraisal

12. Economic benefits. To assess the benefits from spending by additional tourists and

business persons, the same assumptions are used as the appraisal assessment. Ideally, the

passenger composition and the amount of expenditure per person should be updated after the

project. Unfortunately, however, such data are not available. In addition, the same benefit from

increased cargo traffic is also assumed (i.e., US$18 per ton). For Bukoba Airport, an additional

airport revenue of US$12.5 per passenger is assumed. As mentioned above, the growth impacts,

including new jobs and additional agricultural production, are not taken into account because of

the lack of data.

Table 5. Traveler composition and spending per person

Traveler category (share) Spending (US$ per person)

Bukoba Kigoma Tabora Bukoba Kigoma Tabora

Business 0.40 0.35 0.35 258 258 258

Tourist 0.30 0.35 0.35 707 707 707

Visiting relatives 0.03 0.01 0.02 430 430 430

Government 0.22 0.29 0.22 0 0 0

Other 0.05 0.00 0.06 0 0 0


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13. Results. The summary of the results is shown in the table. At appraisal, the IRR were

estimated at 15 percent for Bukoba, 23 percent for Kigoma and 15 percent for Tabora Airport,

respectively. Given the current traffic and actual project costs, the ex post IRR for Bukoba is

estimated higher at 18.3 percent. This is because of its relatively strong growth of traffic and

slightly lower costs. Assuming that the future traffic would continue growing, the investment is

considered to be economically justifiable.

14. For Kigoma, the ex post IRR is estimated at 8.5 percent. This is largely because the

actual costs turned out substantially lower than expected, despite the fact that the current traffic

remains modest. It is below the traditional 12 percent threshold but exceeds the Bank’s new

norm, i.e., 6 percent. For Tabora, the IRR is estimated to be negative. It is too early to assess its

project viability: The rehabilitation work has just been completed. However, the current traffic is

significantly lower than expected. Note that in the current assessment, it is assumed that the

traffic would increase by 30 percent, as assumed at appraisal. In addition, the actual costs were

lower than planned. Economic viability of the investment in Tabora Airport is crucially

dependent on the future growth of airport traffic in the next couple of years.

Table 6. Summary of economic analysis: Regional airports

Passenger traffic Investment cost ($ mil) IRR (%) NPV ($ mil)

2008 2016 Appraisal Ex post Appraisal Ex post Appraisal Ex post

Bukoba 23,673 33,138 20.4 19.3 15 18.3 20.6 6.7

Kigoma 28,859 29,781 26.7 11.8 23 8.5 42.1 -4.2

Tabora 22,912 16,505 19.1 16.6 15 -9.6 22.2 -24.9


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ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

Borrower Comments:

1. The flexibility with which the Bank exercised in the implementation of TSSP has made it possible to disburse all the funds allocated. For instant, it was possible, during the grace period of closure of the project, to change the minimum withdraw application from US$ 200,000.00 to US$ 40,000. this enabled direct payments to various services providers whom could not be possible to make payment to them of the approach was not adopted.

2. The decision by WB to extend the closure of the project to June 20, 2017 is commendable because this has enable to spend, the money that otherwise would not have spent. construction of Kisongo Box culvert and rehabilitation of second runway are example of the activities that benefited from the Bank's decision.


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ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)

10 Year Transport Sector Investment Programme (TSIP), Phase I 2007/08 – 2011/12. United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Infrastructure Development. Aide Memoires, Implementation Status reports (ISRs), and project documents for the Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project (P055120), World Bank. The Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 14. International Civil Aviation Organization. Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the United Republic of Tanzania for the Period of FY12-FY15, World Bank. Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) for Investment Project Financing (IPF) Operations, World Bank Guidance, Catalogue Number OPS5.03-GUID.140. Issued July 5, 2017. Key Implementation Challenges for the World Bank Financed Projects. Tanzania National Roads Agency. September 2016 Mid-Term Review, Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project (P055120), World Bank. National Five Year Development Plan 2016/17 – 2020/21. United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Finance and Planning. National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MUKUKUTA), United Republic of Tanzania Vice President’s Office, June 2005 National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II, United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, July 2010. Project Appraisal Document, Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project (P055120), Report No: 53152. World Bank. Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Credit, Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project (P055120), World Bank. Report No: 60183-TZ Restructuring Paper, Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project (P055120), World Bank. Report No: RES15765. April 18, 2015 Results Framework and M&E Guidance Note, World Bank. OPSPQ. 2014 Roads Tolls Collections for the Period July 2016 - June 2017, Tanzania Roads Fund. Tanzania Development Vision 2025, United Republic of Tanzania Planning Commission


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Transport Sector Support Project Civil Aviation Master Plan, United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Transport, April 2015 United Republic of Tanzania Systematic Country Diagnostic. World Bank. February 23, 2017.