implementation completion and results ... - all documents

Document of

The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: ICR00004513

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

<Credits 5111 and 5380>

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 29.6 MILLION (US$46 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND AN

ADDITIONAL CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 19.5 MILLION (US$30 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

Republic of Benin

FOR THE

Decentralized Community Driven Services Project

June 26, 2018

Social Protection & Labor Global Practice

Africa Region

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2017)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc (FCFA)

554 FCFA = US$1

US$1.42 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Pierre Frank Laporte

Senior Global Practice Director: Michal J. Rutkowski

Practice Manager: Jehan Arulpragasam

Task Team Leader(s): John Van Dyck

ICR Main Contributor: Matuna Mostafa

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACCESS Community and Local Government Basic Social Services Project (Appui aux Communes et Communautés pour l’Expansion des Services Sociaux - ACCESS)

ADV Village Development Association (Association de Développement Villageoise)

ADQ Quartier Development Association (Association de Développement de Quartier)

APL Adaptable Program Loan

ARCH Insurance to Strengthen Human Capital (Assurance pour le Renforcement du Capital Humain)

CAS Country Assistance Strategy

CDD Community Driven Development

CeFAL Training Center for Local Administration (Centre de Formation pour l’Administration Locale)

CGC Community Management Committee (Comité de Gestion Communautaire)

CONAFIL National Commission for Local Finance (Commission Nationale des Finances Locales )

CPS Social Promotion Centers (Centres de Promotion Sociale)

DAT Territorial Development Commission (Délégation à l’Amenagement du Territoire)

ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework

FADeC Commune Development Support Fund (Fonds d’Appui au Développement des Communes)

FM Financial Management

FY Fiscal Year

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GMT Grassroots Management Training

IDA International Development Association

INSAE National Institute for Statistics and Economic Analysis (Institut National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique)

IGAA General Inspectorate for Administrative Affairs (Inspection Générale des Affaires Administratives)

IGF General Inspectorate for Finance (Inspection générale des finances)

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MDGL Ministry of Decentralization and Local Government

NGO Non-governmental organization

PAD Project Appraisal Document

PDC Commune Development Plan (Plan de Développement Communal)

PDO Project Development Objectives

PIM Project Implementation Manual

PIU Project Implementation Unit

PNDCC National Community Driven Development Project (Projet National d’appui au Développement Conduit par les Communautés)

PSDCC Decentralized Community Driven Services Project (Projet de Services Décentralisés Conduits par les Communautés)

PONADEC National Policy on Decentralization and Deconcentration (Politique Nationale de Décentralisation et de Déconcentration)

SCRP-3 Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (Stratégie de Croissance pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté)

SSDCC Secretariat for Decentralized Community Driven Services (Secrétariat aux services décentralisés conduits par les communautés)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET ....................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 5

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................5

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) ..................................... 12

II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 14

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................ 14

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...................................................................................... 14

C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 18

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 21

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ............................................................................ 22

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 25

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 25

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 28

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 31

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 31

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 33

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 36

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 37

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 40

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 54

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 56

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 57

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 58

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING INFORMATION ................................................................................ 65

The World Bank Decentralized Community Driven Services Project (P117764)

Page 1 of 66

DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID Project Name

P117764 Decentralized Community Driven Services Project

Country Financing Instrument

Benin Investment Project Financing

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)

Related Projects

Relationship Project Approval Product Line

Additional Financing P146597-Benin Decentralized Community Driven Services Project - Addl Financing

27-Feb-2014 IBRD/IDA

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

Republic of Benin Secretariat for Decentralized Community Driven Services

(SSDCC)

Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO

To improve access to decentralized basic social services and to mainstream the CDD approach for such services.


Page 2 of 66

FINANCING

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)

World Bank Financing IDA-51110

46,000,000 45,999,058 44,901,790

IDA-53800

30,000,000 29,989,520 27,475,611

Total 76,000,000 75,988,578 72,377,401

Non-World Bank Financing

Borrower 0 0 0

Total 0 0 0

Total Project Cost 76,000,000 75,988,578 72,377,401

KEY DATES

Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing

03-May-2012 24-Jan-2013 30-Nov-2015 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions

29-Aug-2016 69.69 Change in Results Framework Reallocation between Disbursement Categories

KEY RATINGS

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Satisfactory Satisfactory Substantial

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual

Disbursements (US$M)

01 01-Sep-2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory .47


Page 3 of 66

02 18-May-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.70

03 31-Dec-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 19.56

04 15-Jun-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 19.56

05 18-Dec-2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 41.38

06 12-Jun-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 47.58

07 19-Jan-2016 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 69.69

08 02-Sep-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 69.69

09 23-Mar-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 69.85

10 31-Oct-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 72.28

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Public Administration 30

Sub-National Government 30

Education 30

Primary Education 30

Health 5

Health 5

Social Protection 30


Water, Sanitation and Waste Management 5

Water Supply 5


Page 4 of 66

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Public Sector Management 29

Public Administration 29

Municipal Institution Building 29

Social Development and Protection 33

Social Inclusion 22

Participation and Civic Engagement 22


Social Safety Nets 11

Urban and Rural Development 38

Urban Development 10

Services and Housing for the Poor 10

Rural Development 28

Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 28

ADM STAFF

Role At Approval At ICR

Regional Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Madani M. Tall Pierre Frank Laporte

Senior Global Practice Director: Ritva S. Reinikka Michal J. Rutkowski

Practice Manager: Lynne D. Sherburne-Benz Jehan Arulpragasam

Task Team Leader(s): John Van Dyck John Van Dyck

ICR Contributing Author: Matuna Mushfeqa Mostafa


Page 5 of 66

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Country Context

1. Following decades of authoritarian rule characterized by a centralized political and economic system, Benin’s 1999

National Conference led to a constitutional change, shifting from a centrally planned to a market-based economy.

Since then Benin has made good political and economic progress by embracing a multiparty democracy and holding

regular free and fair elections, at both central and local levels. Benin achieved a steady growth with an annual

average real GDP rate of around 4.4 percent during 2001–2008. During the 2008 global economic crisis, Benin

experienced deceleration in growth from 5.0 percent in 2008 to 2.7 percent and 2.6 percent in 2009 and 2010,

respectively. By 2011, the economy had begun to recover reaching an annual GDP growth rate of 3.0 percent.

2. At project appraisal, despite the relatively steady growth of the past decades, the economy had achieved little

structural change, and remained vulnerable to natural disasters (with extensive flooding in 2010) and an informal

economy (estimated at over 50 percent of GDP). During this time, Benin’s income poverty rose from 28.5 percent in

2002 to 35.2 percent in 2009. To support the poor, the Government of Benin administered several limited safety net

programs, including food for work, food aid, school feeding, and other health sector programs; however, these

programs were poorly targeted, lacked efficiency and coherence, and their effectiveness was uncertain. The 2008

global economic crisis adversely affected the poor, with the 2011 Household Living Conditions Survey (EMICoV 2011)

reporting a poverty headcount of 36.2 percent for 2011, while extreme poverty was estimated to be at 14.6 percent.

At the time of appraisal, there were also indications that Benin would not be able to achieve key human development

indicators to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), especially in the areas of child and maternal mortality

and education.

Sectoral and Institutional Context

3. Benin’s 1990 National Conference sought to provide more authority to “territorial collectivities” to administer

themselves under the supervision of the central government. However, it was not until 1999 that Benin was able to

adopt a set of laws to define the legal and institutional framework for the decentralization process. The new

framework consisted of one level of decentralized entity (the commune), and one level of deconcentration (the

department) from where central institutions would supervise and assist communes (local governments) to carry out

their new legal responsibilities. In total, 77 communes and 12 departments (prefectures) were created1. Four years

1 A commune is made up of arrondissements, below which are villages for rural communes and city districts (quartiers) for urban ones. There are thus 12 departments, 77 communes, 546 arrondissements and 5,290 villages or city districts. Three of the 77 communes have special status (Cotonou, Parakou and Porto-Novo) with larger responsibilities more than an ordinary commune. Special status is conferred on the basis of three criteria, namely, size, population and ability to mobilize local resources. Arrondissements, villages and urban districts are administrative but not legal entities and they do not have financial autonomy. In the context of this project, community is generally taken to mean either village or urban district (quartier).


Page 6 of 66

later in 2003, Benin’s first communal elections were held, which built the foundations for decentralization, with

communes mandated responsibility for the delivery of key basic services, including primary education health, water,

local roads and social assistance. A government organizational structure is provided in Annex 6.

4. With commune officials in place but disposing of little financial means, in 2004 the Government of Benin requested the Bank’s assistance to support local development. From 2005-2012, the International Development Association (IDA) supported the National Community Driven Development Project—in French, Projet National d’appui au Développement Conduit par les Communautés (PNDCC). The project financed health, education, water, market, and road infrastructure at commune and community levels. The PNDCC also supported line ministries, such as education, health, water and sanitation, agriculture, livestock and fisheries, to incorporate the Community Driven Development (CDD) approach into their sectoral strategies.

5. To support the decentralization process, in 2008 and 2009, the government of Benin established the Fonds d’Appui

au Développement des Communes (FADeC), a financial transfer mechanism to equalize and consolidate all transfers to communes. The Commission Nationale des Finances Locales (CONAFIL) was created with responsibility for examining the modalities, mechanism, criteria and amount of transfers to communes; setting up monitoring and evaluation of the performance of FADeC; and ensuring the proper disbursement of budgeted funds through FADeC. In 2009, the Government launched the Politique Nationale de Décentralisation et de Déconcentration (PONADEC), Benin’s strategic framework aimed at creating the institutional conditions for broad and sustainable development based on coordinated local governance, transparency, and local empowerment. The five key priorities of PONADEC included local development and decentralization, recognizing the role of the commune, fighting poverty through decentralization, and building capacity at all levels of government.

6. Despite significant results achieved, with the advent of FADeC, it was apparent that the PNDCC was no longer aligned

with the Government’s vision for decentralization which had significantly advanced since the project was initially prepared. It transferred resources directly from the PIU to communes and communities without passing by FADeC. There was also a major need for capacity building to support decentralization that PNDCC not designed to support. Benin’s 2010 Public Expenditure Review, which focused on decentralization, identified critical shortcomings with the decentralization process, including: weak implementation capacity of authorities at all levels; lack of predictability and delays in transfers; and burdensome and poorly known procedures for public expenditures. For externally financed expenditures, complicating factors included poor understanding of donor procedures, lack of predictability of funding, delays in mobilizing counterpart funds, and lack of ownership by the implementing ministry.

7. CDD was seen as a way to improve basic service delivery within decentralization. Benin’s poverty reduction strategy

for 2011-2015, Stratégie de Croissance pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté (SCRP3), demonstrated the Government’s commitment to promoting the CDD approach within Decentralization, and states in paragraph 342, “the CDD approach, which promotes participatory local development, will be used for the implementation of projects at the local level”. The new strategy also retained the same pillars as in SCRP-2, that is (i) accelerating sustainable growth and transforming the economy; (ii) development of infrastructure; (iii) reinforcement of human capital; (iv) improving the quality of governance; and (v) promoting equitable and sustainable national development.

8. Benin’s social safety net system was also insufficiently developed to mitigate the impact of global food, financial and

fuel shocks, and natural disasters. The floods of 2010 demonstrated that existing safety nets were small in scale (with the exception of school feeding), fragmented, poorly targeted and evaluated, and not easily scalable in times of crisis. For this reason, the Additional Financing for the PNDCC (July 2010) supported a review of Benin’s existing social


Page 7 of 66

safety net programs. The review, completed in May 2011, recommended the development of a new safety net program that could be scaled up rapidly in times of crisis. The program was to consist of two windows: unconditional cash transfers to chronically poor households unable to provide labor, and conditional labor-intensive public works for households with available labor. The AF also funded a feasibility analysis for the proposed safety net program.

Rationale for Bank Assistance. 9. In response to the rising poverty and findings of the Public Expenditure Review and recommendations of the May

2011 review of the existing safety net programs, the Government of Benin and the Bank agreed to further support decentralization, help local governments to align their development plans with SCRP3 and community priorities, and strengthen accountability and transparency in local decision making, in alignment with the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (Benin CAS FY09-12, Report No 46485), particularly the second pillar which aims to improve service delivery and social inclusion.

10. This project, the Decentralized Community Driven Services Project — in French, Projet de Services Décentralisés Conduits par les Communautés (PSDCC, the Project), initially designed as a long-term Adaptable Program Loan (APL) series of three projects, was a follow-up to the PNDCC with the aim to increase access to basic social services (including safety nets), and decentralize and promote CDD in Benin and mainstream it into government funding and implementation mechanisms. The CDD approach promotes civic participation, voice, and accountability in local government, and is known to deliver cost-effective and timely services within a decentralized context. This aligns with the subsidiarity principle, which states that the lowest-level actor that can effectively carry out any given activity should undertake it. That is, communities (villages or urban neighborhoods – “quartiers”) can be the most effective entities to manage construction and maintenance of simple, single-village facilities, such as small primary schools, whereas communes can better implement more complex multi-village infrastructure.

11. The Bank possessed the technical knowledge and long-term experience in supporting decentralization processes

embedded through the CDD approach, as well as cash transfer and public works programs in many IDA countries, including Benin. From supporting the PNDCC from 2005–2012, the Bank also possessed in-depth knowledge and experience about Benin’s decentralization and development processes, understands the problems inherent to Benin’s existing safety net programs, and had effective working relationships with the Government of Benin.

12. There were two main improvements to be introduced to the design of the PSDCC: (i) using the FADeC to channel IDA

resources to communes for commune-level and community-level investment projects to strengthen and mainstream the CDD approach to social services and align the project with the country’s decentralization reforms; and (ii) piloting a comprehensive social safety net program, including an unconditional cash transfer program to address chronic poverty, combined with labor-intensive public works to provide supplemental income during the lean season. The pilot aimed to set the groundwork for the design of a coherent and well-targeted cash transfer program and labor-intensive public works program that could be scaled up in times of crisis. The Project was also designed to build institutional capacity at all levels of government for social safety nets.


Page 8 of 66

Theory of Change (Results Chain)

13. During project preparation, the Government and Bank teams identified critical activities that would: (i) strengthen

decentralization, while improving capacity for community driven development and providing access to basic infrastructure, and (ii) support establishment of a safety net system that would provide poor and vulnerable households with income security, as well as income opportunities through labor works. Consequently, the project’s Results Framework articulated the project’s path from planned interventions to intended outcomes.

Theory of Change

Activities Outputs Intermediate Outcomes

PDO / Outcomes

Improving access to decentralized basic services

Increasing the volume of fiscal grants to decentralized levels

Financing of low- and medium- complexity infrastructure to be implemented by communes (either directly or through community associations)

Increased number of basic services infrastructure, i.e. primary schools, health posts, markets, water, sanitation, etc.

Increased access to decentralized basic social services

Project management, Financial management and procurement training provided to communes and communities

Improved commune performance on financial and procurement audits Improved capacity of communities to execute basic services infrastructure

More cost-effective and transparent construction of quality basic services infrastructure

Design and implementation of pilot social safety nets program

Provision of cash transfers to poor and vulnerable households Participation of poor and vulnerable households in labor intensive public works Provision of child care in labor intensive public works to encourage female participation

Improved access to social safety nets for poor and vulnerable households Improved access to temporary employment opportunities and income Successful pilot as proof of concept for later scaling up of safety nets

Underlying Assumptions: FADeC transfers are timely. Procurement and financial management training leads to improved project management. Process for identification of poor and vulnerable households has acceptable levels of inclusion and exclusion error.


Page 9 of 66

Mainstreaming of community driven development

Delegating responsibility for execution of sub-projects to communities

Community engagement in execution of sub-projects Expanded implementation capacity of communes (through community engagement)

Increased acceptance and recognition of community driven development as implementation approach Lower-cost, higher quality construction of basic services infrastructure

Greater capacity for, and utilization of, community driven development for basic social services

Capacity building activities including supporting preparation of Commune Development Plans and revision of FADeC manual

Commune Development Plans prepared in participatory manner with community involvement FADeC manual revised to include explicit procedures for using CDD approach to delegate implementation to community associations

Improved institutional framework for CDD

Underlying Assumptions: The Ministry of Decentralization and Local Government (MDGL) supports the CDD approach by encouraging communes to delegate grants and implementation responsibilities to local levels. Communes see CDD as a way to magnify their implementation capacity by enlisting community associations in project execution.

Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

14. The PDOs were to improve access to decentralized basic social services and to mainstream the community driven

development approach for such services.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

15. The Project aimed to strengthen basic social services delivery through a CDD approach by developing capacity at all

levels of government for implementing basic infrastructure projects and supporting targeting and monitoring of safety nets programs. The project appraisal document (PAD) stated that the achievement of the PDOs would be measured with regard to the following six indicators:

• Number of direct project beneficiaries (and percentage female);

• Share of resources transferred through FADeC that are executed by communities for basic social infrastructure through delegation of responsibility from communes;

• Timeliness of FADeC transfers to communes (average number of days’ variation from the published transfer schedule);

• Number of students enrolled in schools constructed/ rehabilitated under the project;


Page 10 of 66

• Number of people in rural areas with access to an improved water source constructed/ rehabilitated under the project; and

• Number of person-days created for temporary employment in labor-intensive public works subprojects.

Components

16. Component 1: Service Delivery Grants to Communes (Original US$36.0 million; AF US$19 million; Total US$55.0

million). The component supported strengthening of basic services delivery through a CDD approach at the decentralized level by providing increased fiscal transfers to Benin’s 77 local governments (communes) for infrastructure investment projects. Grants were transferred through the FADeC fiscal transfer system to support the construction/rehabilitation of infrastructure sub-projects identified and implemented by communes and communities in the areas of education, health, water, rural roads, and commerce (public markets and related infrastructure). The AF provided an additional US$19 million to scale up Component 1. This increased grant amounts for all 77 communes and supported additional basic infrastructure sub-projects at both the commune and community levels.

17. PSDCC grants through the FADeC passed through two windows:

• Sub-component 1.1: Grants for communal-scale infrastructure (US$11 million, or 20 percent of the component) — This subcomponent aimed to strengthen communal level capacity for the delivery of social services and financed the construction/ rehabilitation of infrastructure that benefitted multiple communities (villages or quartiers). Channeled through the non-earmarked window of FADeC, these grants were transferred to communes in the form of periodic fiscal transfers that were implemented directly by the communes for eligible infrastructure. All 77 communes received fiscal transfers, with CONAFIL allocating resources among the communes utilizing a FADeC formula that took into consideration population, poverty and performance (performance in implementation of prior year’s transfers).

• Sub-component 1.2: Grants for community-scale infrastructure (US$44 million, or 80 percent of the component). This subcomponent aimed to support basic community-level (single village or quartier) infrastructure investments. An earmarked window was created within the FADeC for these grants, which were transferred to communes before being passed on to community associations. The poorest 1,000 communities were targeted for infrastructure sub-projects with management oversight remaining with the communes, including 700 communities selected under the original credit and 300 communities added through the AF.

18. Prior to PSDCC approval of each communal and community infrastructure sub-project, line ministries approved the

projects and committed to follow through with staffing and equipment for the infrastructure. In the rare instances where the human resources and/or equipment did not arrive as planned, the SSDCC intervened with the line ministry concerned to push for the deployment of the required human resources or equipment.

19. Component 2: Pilot Social Safety Net Program (US$5.0 million). The objective of this component was to test an approach for a national social safety net program to increase income and consumption and improve the ability to cope with shocks among targeted vulnerable population groups. The Pilot benefitted 12,933 of the poorest households selected from 12 of the poorest communes from each one of Benin’s 12 departments. The SSDCC in


Page 11 of 66

collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs had overall implementation responsibility for the Pilot, with Community Management Committees (Comités de Gestion Communautaire - CGC) supervising the public works programs at the local level.

20. The Social Safety Net Pilot comprised of two elements:

• Unconditional cash transfer to all targeted households.

• Labor-intensive public works opportunities for the same households to supplement their income during the agricultural lean seasons in order to help beneficiary households avoid harmful coping practices, such as the sale of productive assets and school withdrawal for child labor. Eligible public works sub-projects included road maintenance, community agriculture, tree planting, and environmental improvement (trash collection and maintaining public space).

21. Component 3: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (Original US$5.0 million; AF US$5 million; Total US$10 million). At the national level, the Project supported MDGL and CONAFIL to enhance fiduciary controls, strengthen M&E, and further integrate CDD into the use of funds transferred to local levels. At the commune level, the Project developed procurement modules and supported delivery of procurement training through the Centre de Formation pour l’Administration Locale (CeFAL), the Government body responsible for delivering training to communes. Communes also received training on supervising the sub-projects they delegated to communities.

22. This component had four subcomponents:

• Subcomponent 3.1: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building for MDGL and CONAFIL to strengthen administration of the FADeC and mainstream the CDD approach.

• Subcomponent 3.2: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building for Communes to strengthen communes’ capacity to: (i) improve fiduciary performance, particularly procurement; (ii) improve participatory preparation of PDCs, (iii) implement poverty targeting; (iv) adopt the CDD approach for the implementation of small-scale community-level investment projects; and (v) implement social protection projects (safety nets).

• Subcomponent 3.3: Grassroots Management Training (GMT) for Communities to build capacity of communities to plan and implement infrastructure projects, covering community organization and sub-project identification, execution, financial management and procurement, monitoring and evaluation, and maintenance.

• Subcomponent 3.4: Social Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation. This subcomponent, eventually cancelled, aimed to test social accountability approaches and support monitoring and evaluation.

23. Component 4: Project Management (AF US$6 million). This component was introduced via the AF and supported

the separation of administrative and monitoring and evaluation expenditures from the costs of the project activities related to capacity building and technical assistance in component 3.


Page 12 of 66

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

24. The PDOs were not revised, however outcome targets were revised, as discussed below.

25. The PSDCC financing agreement was signed in June 2012; however, Project activities did not start until in March 2013. The delay was due to a delay in project effectiveness and difficulties accessing CDD materials developed under the previous project, PNDCC, from the archives of the ministry in charge of PNDCC. This meant that much of the CDD material had to be re-created or reprinted before the PSDCC could start.

26. Additional financing (AF). In February 2014, the World Bank Board approved AF of US$30 million, which became effective on 10 August 2014. The AF was used to scale up the PSDCC with a level 2 restructuring that included:

• US$19 million in increased resources that scaled up Component 1 activities;

• US$5 million in increased resource allocation that scaled up Component 3;

• Breaking out administrative costs (previously in Component 3) into a new component, Component 4: Project Management that supported the costs of project management to manage the scaled-up activities;

• The target value for the outcome indicator for the number of project beneficiaries was reduced from 429,200 to 270,000, a reduction of 159,200. The reason for this substantial reduction in beneficiaries is that this outcome indicator was defined as the sum of direct beneficiaries of schools, health posts, and water systems (Component 1), safety net beneficiaries (Component 2), and people receiving GMT (Component 3.3). At the time of project preparation, the large majority of beneficiaries were to be GMT beneficiaries, with the original plan to provide training to about 100 people from each of the 3,447 villages and quartiers for a total of about 344,700 GMT beneficiaries. After project preparation, the Government announced that the 3,447 existing villages and quartiers would be reorganized into 5,290 villages and quartiers through the splitting of some existing villages and quartiers. At restructuring, the Government and Bank decided that the GMT would be provided only in the 1,001 communities that received financing for sub-projects rather than all villages and quartiers of the country because of the increased costs of training almost 2,000 more communities than originally planned, to avoid disappointment in communities that were not eligible for community sub-projects, and to economize on training costs in order to devote more resources to sub-projects, safety nets, and capacity-building. In the end, 213,758 people participated in GMT training in 1,001 villages and quartiers, or an average of about 214 people trained per community compared to the estimate of 100 at preparation.

• Adjustment to other outcome indicators and intermediate indicators and target dates, primarily to take into account the activities to be completed with the additional resources; and

• Extension of the closing date by 18 months to 31 December 2017 to accommodate the scale up. 27. Level 2 Project Restructuring. At the Mid-term Review (MTR) in December 2015, a decision was made for a second

Level 2 Restructuring, which was approved on August 29, 2016 (at which point 100 percent of the original US$46 million credit and 90 percent of the US$30 million AF had been disbursed) that included:

• Reallocation of resources due to exchange rate gains (as the FCFA had depreciated by six percent against the SDR), as follows:


Page 13 of 66

o Component 1 – The allocation was decreased to enable reallocation of funds to components 2 and 3 (noting that sufficient resources in local currency remained in this component);

o Component 2A: Labor-Intensive Public Works — Increased allocation that increased wages for beneficiaries, as the originally envisaged wage of US$1.12 per day was found to be unacceptable and was raised to US$1.36 per day;

o Component 2B: Unconditional Cash Transfers — Increased allocation that supported increase in the monthly unconditional cash transfer per household from US$5.6 to US$5.94 and inclusion of approximately 800 households above the target of 12,000.

o Sub-component 3: Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building — increased allocation that supported additional procurement capacity building, of communes due to the weak performance of communes, through CeFAL.

• Revision of the targets for the two outcome indicators for students enrolled and people with access to an improved water source, to reflect the revealed community priorities which favored water infrastructure much more than anticipated during project preparation based on the PNDCC experience. The changes just shifted beneficiaries from education to water, with no net change in total beneficiaries, as shown in the table below. Targets for five related intermediate indicators were also adjusted at the same time.

Outcome Indicator Name AF and Restructure

August 2014: Revised Target

Restructure August 2016:

Revised Target

Change in Target Value

Number of students enrolled in schools constructed/rehabilitated under the project

90,000 58,000 -32,000

Number of people in rural areas with access to an improved water source constructed/ rehabilitated under the project

18,000 50,000 +32,000

Number of direct project beneficiaries (and female)

270,000

270,000 0

• Elimination of the community social accountability (SA) pilot, as: only technically acceptable bid to carry out the pilot (from an international NGO) was too costly and significantly beyond the budgeted amount. For this reason, and to ensure the PIU could effectively manage the already complex scaled-up Project, it was agreed to drop the SA pilot. The related intermediate indicator in the Results Framework, "Communities with scorecards on services provided" was eliminated.

Revised PDO Indicators 28. No PDO indicators were revised; however several outcome indicator targets were changed as described above.


Page 14 of 66

Revised Components 29. As previously stated, the AF and project restructuring in 2014 resulted in breaking out administrative costs (previously

in Component 3) into a new component, Component 4: Project Management, that supported the costs of project management to manage the scaled-up activities.

Rationale for Changes and their Implication on the Original Theory of Change

30. The changes were in line with SCRP-3, as outlined in paragraph 8 above, and the Bank’s FY13-17 Country Partnership

Strategy (CPS), and did not change the original Theory of Change.

• In line with the SCRP-3 and CPS, Component 1 was scaled up to accelerate the CDD approach to development and provided additional funds for investment projects that also increased the number of investment projects undertaken.

• The plan for the GMT was revised, as it was agreed that resources would be better utilized by providing GMT only in communities that received financing for infrastructure, as discussed above.

• Component 4: Project management was added by breaking up Component 3 to meet project management responsibilities resulting from the scaling up of Component 1. This separated administrative costs of project management from the costs of the project activities related to capacity building and technical assistance.

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

31. The Project’s objectives remain highly relevant to Benin’s current development priorities. This project was designed

as the first phase of a three-part APL series with the objective to increase access to basic services, mainstream the CDD approach into decentralization for delivery of social services, and to implement a well-targeted, efficient and coherent social safety net program by the end of the APL series. The Bank no longer utilizes the APL instrument for development lending; however, the goals of the series remain current, as access to services is still critically important; capacity building for decentralization, especially for procurement and financial management at the commune level remains a priority; and social safety nets remain relevant as a means to mitigate chronic poverty and build resilience against shocks for the poorest and most vulnerable in society. The project was well aligned with the strategic objectives of the Bank’s FY13-17 CPS, with Pillar II aiming to improve service delivery and social inclusion – goals that continue to figure in the Bank’s forthcoming Country Partnership Framework for FY19-23. The relevance of the PDO is rated High.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome 32. The Project was successful in achieving its PDOs. All outcome indicators exceeded targets, and all intermediate

indicator targets were met or exceeded. The progress against the PDOs was measured by assessing the


Page 15 of 66

contributions made to key performance indicators and targets, as set forth below. Moreover, although the Bank no longer supports the APL series instrument on which basis this project was prepared, approved and implemented, the project successfully met all five APL triggers required for approval of Phase Two. These achievements led to the development of a new project, the Community and Local Government Basic Social Services Project (Appui aux Communes et Communautés pour l’Expansion des Services Sociaux - ACCESS), designed as a continuation of the PSDCC. The new project has been prepared as an IDA Grant for US$40 million, with the objective to improve access to decentralized basic social services and social safety nets, including through CDD, and to strengthen the social protection system. The Bank Board will consider the new project on July 6, 2018.

33. The PDO statement contains two dimensions against which the performance of the project can be judged:

a. Improving access to decentralized basic services b. Mainstreaming the CDD approach for decentralized basic services

a. Improving access to decentralized basic services

Outcome Indicator Name Baseline Original Target

AF and Restructure

August 2014: Revised Target / Target Date


Revised Target /

Target Date

Actual Achievement

at Completion

Number of direct project beneficiaries (and female)

0 429,200 (40%)

270,000 (40%)

No change 310,349 (48.18%)

Timeliness of FADeC transfers to communes (average number of days’ variation from the published transfer schedule)

16 days 15 days

30 June 2016

No change

30 June 2017

No change

31 December 2017

5 days

Number of students enrolled in schools constructed/rehabilitated under the project

0 60,000 90,000 58,000 64,475

Number of people in rural areas with access to an improved water source constructed/ rehabilitated under the project

0 12,500 18,000 50,000 92,500

Number of person-days created for temporary employment in labor intensive public works subprojects

0 1,296,000

30 June 2016

No change

30 June 2017

No change

31 December 2017

1,515,528

34. By Project closure, all intermediate targets for communal and community sub-projects were either met or

exceeded. All 77 communes executed at least one multi-village subproject, while communities completed 1,235 projects by Project closure, and an additional 10 lagging projects by May 2018, for a total of 1,245 projects supported against a targeted 1,000. These subprojects resulted in the construction/ rehabilitation of 1,367 classrooms, 61 health facilities, and 370 water points, exceeding all targets by 18 percent, 22 percent


Page 16 of 66

and 85 percent respectively. The funds transferred by PSDCC through FADeC did not substitute for resources that the Government would have otherwise transferred through this channel, as the Government transferred 4.62 percent of domestic revenues to communes through FADeC by the end of the project, against a targeted 3.4 percent which represented the baseline level at the beginning of the project. The project also supported building procurement capacity by training 705 local government officials. This training, combined with (i) the project’s insistence on communes fully staffing procurement organs as a condition to receive financing, (ii) regular procurement audits financed by the project with communes required to develop action plans to address deficiencies, and (iii) sanctioning of non-compliance by Government, led to improved performance of communes in procurement (see Figure on page 36) with only 10 percent of communes being rated fully non-performing by project closing as opposed to 50 percent at the outset.

35. The PSDCC successfully established a scalable Social Safety Net Program in all 12 communes, including in 125 of the poorest communities, and all intermediate targets were exceeded. The cash transfer program took the CDD approach for identification of beneficiaries and execution of labor-intensive public works. The Pilot was the largest social safety net program ever implemented in Benin, and the unconditional cash transfer component benefited 12,933 people (including 6,803 female beneficiaries), and 12,063 of these same beneficiaries (or a designated family member) also participated in and benefited from the Public Works Program (against a targeted 10,800). About 99.6 percent of beneficiaries were selected from the bottom two quintiles against a targeted 70 percent. The Pilot provided unconditional cash transfers of 3,500 FCFA per month over 24 months, and additional income for four months per year during the agricultural lean seasons through the public works program. Many more community members, who are not counted among the beneficiaries of the project, indirectly benefitted from the roads rehabilitated, public areas cleaned, etc. from public works projects. The public works program achieved a labor intensity rate of 83.52 percent (against a targeted 70 percent). For both unconditional and public works, cash transfers were timely and predictable, with 94.68 percent of transfers made within 5 days of when they were due (against a targeted 80 percent). In addition, significant institutional capacity for safety nets was developed, including a national methodology for targeting poor households, and a pilot National Social Registry. The National Social Registry grew to not only incorporate households that were administered the PMT through PSDCC, but also households surveyed and administered the PMT through an IDA Health project. It will be scaled up to cover the entire country under ACCESS.

b. Mainstreaming the CDD approach for decentralized basic services

Outcome Indicator Name Baseline Original Target

AF and Restructure

August 2014: Revised Target / Target Date


Revised Target /

Target Date

Actual Achievement

at Completion

Share of resources transferred through FADeC that are executed by communities for basic social infrastructure through delegation of responsibility from communes

0 15%

30 June 2016

No change

30 June 2017

No change

31 December 2017

17.66%


Page 17 of 66

36. FADeC is the channel used by the Government of Benin for transferring resources to communes for basic services delivery. The project aimed, and succeeded, in significantly boosting the share of FADeC resources using CDD. The outcome indicator above, by demonstrating that the use of CDD (in the form of community execution of infrastructure sub-projects delegated to them by communes) increased from zero to over 17 percent of all resources transferred through the FADeC over the life of the project, shows the progress made by the project in mainstreaming CDD. The FADeC transfer mechanism is operating well for fiscal transfers and auditing for both earmarked and non-earmarked funds, enabling the Government, PSDCC and other donors to trace disbursement of resources. It has been showcased as best practice to other countries in the region for decentralization and fiscal management.

37. While CDD is often imagined to be incompatible with strengthening local governments, the PSDCC demonstrated that decentralization, CDD, and building local government capacity can go hand-in-hand. The project has shown that using communities as sub-contractors can enlarge the commune’s implementation capacity beyond what it can achieve with its own limited capacity. The CDD approach has also improved communes’ ability to orient investment decisions to match citizens’ priorities, leading to improved relations between commune officials and communities and increased responsiveness to citizen demands. Significant institutional capacity building was achieved in communes during the rollout of the CDD approach, including on how to supervise communities during the execution of their sub-projects and in participatory approaches.

38. Moreover, the project also made other significant steps to ensure the sustainability of the mainstreaming of CDD, which will continue to be supported by the ACCESS project, the next phase of the series of projects initiated by PSDCC.

• First, the project supported the revision of the FADeC Manual to mainstream the CDD approach. This manual lays out the procedures by which FADeC funds are to be spent. The new version of the manual now describes in detail the procedures for the delegation of non-complex infrastructure projects to communities by communes. While Benin’s law always permitted project execution by communities, the incorporation of the CDD approach in the FADeC Manual is a sign of the Government’s endorsement of the method as one to be mainstreamed by communes for low complexity infrastructure projects.

• Second, the project also partnered with donors to ensure that all communes have prepared a participatory (‘second generation”) Commune Development Plan (PDC) that is prepared with community participation. Having a participatory second generation PDC ensures that community priorities are reflected in the local government’s planning, and that non-complex activities in the Plan can be tagged for delegation to communities.

• Third, the project pioneered the use of the community-driven approach in safety nets activities. The inclusion of the social safety net Pilot also demonstrates how community organizations can support beneficiary targeting and public works programs, and improve local basic infrastructure in line with community priorities. To identify safety nets beneficiaries, the PSDCC initiated the use of a two-step process, which consisted of community driven identification of the poorest households in the locality followed by a proxy-means test (PMT) to verify eligibility. This process has been endorsed by Benin’s Council of Ministers as the national methodology for identifying poor households, and is now being used for ACCESS and the Government’s flagship universal health insurance program, called Insurance


Page 18 of 66

for Strengthening Human Capital (Assurance pour le Renforcement du Capital Humain, ARCH). The PSDCC also set the precedent of putting communities in the driver’s seat in the choice of the type and implementation of labor intensive public works activities in their locality.

• Finally, the project contributed to the development of capacity in communities that can be mobilized for use in future CDD activities. In total, 213,758 community members received refresher or full Grassroots Management Training (GMT) against a targeted 100,000 people. This training covered 1,001 villages and quartiers in Benin, almost one-fifth of all villages and quartiers in the country. In the course of the training, 3,300 community-based experts capable of carrying out community training have become accredited as community trainers by the SSDCC, and their expertise will be tapped to expand the GMT program on a sustainable basis. This capacity is now available to be mobilized to carry out activities outside of PSDCC.

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

39. The overall efficacy is rated as Substantial. The rating is based on the achievement of all outcome indicators

for both aspects of the PDO, (a) Improving access to decentralized basic services, and (b) Mainstreaming the CDD approach for decentralized basic services.

C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

40. The overall efficiency of the project can be evaluated across several dimensions: (i) cost-effectiveness of

activities relative to alternatives; (ii) project administrative costs; and (iii) project innovations that allowed for increased efficiency. Cost-effectiveness

41. Projects constructed by communities were cheaper and of better quality than alternative approaches. A key

rationale for the project was to increase the efficiency of public expenditures for decentralized basic services, and the project succeeded in this regard. The project was able to implement at a large scale (more than 1,200 community infrastructure sub-projects) a mechanism that enabled construction of primary schools, water points, health posts, and market/transport infrastructure at a lower cost and with higher quality than any other alternative available in the country.

42. The cost-effectiveness of the project was demonstrated through a ‘natural experiment’ that occurred during

the course of the project. During implementation, it was found that three communes had incorrectly signed contracts for the construction of three village schools that was only allowed under community sub-projects without clearance from the Project Task Team Leader (TTL). The TTL agreed to allow this one instance of digression in order to assess costs between commune and community implemented projects. The findings showed that primary classrooms built directly by communes cost 11 percent more than comparable classrooms built by communities, even when taking into account the costs of training communities. In comparison, those built by contract management agencies recruited by the Ministry of Maternal and Primary Education under a separate Global Partnership for Education (GPE) financing cost 63 percent more.


Page 19 of 66

Benin: Unit cost of classroom construction (m2)

Source: What drives the unit cost of school construction? Second cost-driver:

Implementation arrangements. World Bank, 2017.

52. Community sub-projects were of a higher quality and more sustainable: According to the procurement audits, 92

percent of communities had carried out procurement in a satisfactory manner, while the technical audit found community sub-projects to be of a higher quality and without structural defects, whereas a number of commune sub-projects were found to have such defects. Further analysis is provided in Annex 4.

53. CDD led to higher allocative efficiency. Participatory decision-making at the local level ensured that scarce resources were applied most efficiently in response to local priorities, promoted local ownership of sub-projects, which combined with other complementary activities of the PSDCC (such as capacity building) made the sub-projects sustainable and also is expected to extend the life of the investments’ benefits. Project administrative costs

54. The management costs for the project were less than most similar projects. The administrative costs of project

management for the PSDCC were US$7.6 million, which accounts for 10.5 percent of total disbursements (US$72.4 million) and is at the low end of the range for such projects. For example, an IFAD study comparing administrative costs of CDD projects found costs ranging from 10 to 24 percent, with average administrative costs of 16 percent. The Togo Community Development Project (2008-2013) spent 15 percent on project management2, whereas the Second Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project (NUSAF2, 2009–2016) achieved a rate of 16 percent3.

2 ICR for World Bank financed project P110943 3 World Bank financed project P111633


Page 20 of 66

Project innovations that allowed for increased efficiency

55. Innovative contracting methodology resulted in cost efficiencies for community subprojects in the water sector.

The PAD included the construction of water points for community sub-projects in its list of acceptable projects. The project’s planning assumed that these water points would be large-diameter wells, which had been financed under the PNDCC. However, after project approval the Ministry in charge of water informed the Project that Benin’s national water supply policy was changed to discourage wells, and instead that deeper, more costly boreholes were the preferred option for remote communities. Only a small number of operators have the skills and equipment to drill boreholes in Benin, and they are accustomed to bidding on large contracts rather than individual borehole sub-projects in remote communities. Therefore, the Project decided to synchronize tenders for water sub-projects for communities that were in close proximity geographically to increase companies’ opportunities to win several subprojects in the same area in order for them to reduce the cost of service, particularly through the deployment of the drilling machines only once to a geographical area. This procurement and implementation process promoted lower bids from contractors, and realized time and cost efficiencies for the Project.

56. Cost-efficiencies were also realized in the targeting methodology used to select safety-net beneficiaries under

Component 2. The database developed by INSAE under Component 1, which ranked all 5,290 villages and quartiers in all 77 communes (by access to basic social infrastructure) was used to select the poorest 12 communes from each one of Benin’s 12 prefectures. From these, 125 of the poorest communities were selected. Community Identification Committees then pre-identified the poorest households in these communities and a PMT survey was applied only to the pre-identified households, instead of all the households within the 125 communities, to select beneficiaries for the Pilot. A total of 12,933 beneficiary households (on average 100 households from each community) were then selected following a two-phase process: first, Community Identification Committees visited every hamlet in the community and pre-identified the poorest households in these communities and ranked them based on need; second, PMT application. This targeting methodology eliminated the need to survey all households within the selected communities and realized cost efficiencies, in terms of financial resources and time for the Government.

57. Restructuring of Component 3 realized cost-efficiencies. A decision was made to provide Grass-Roots Management

(GMT) training only to communities that participated in investment projects under Component 1.2. This resulted in cost-efficiencies, as only the 1,001 communities participating in community level investments were provided the training, instead of all 5,290 villages and quartiers in the country, which would have required considerably more Government resources and time. In the future, the nationwide scaling up of the GMT program will be much cheaper and more feasible, as more than 3,300 community-based experts have emerged and their expertise will be tapped to expand the GMT program on a sustainable basis. The elimination of the sub-component on social accountability, due to the high bids received from interested NGOs, also resulted in cost savings.

58. Implementation delays 59. While the closing date of the project did not need to be extended except as a result of the Additional Financing, the

project did face several implementation delays that arose from:

• Initial low procurement capacity of the vast majority of communes, which required the Procurement Specialist to provide direct support to bring communal capacity to meet national procurement standards;


Page 21 of 66

• The need to re-create or reprint much of the CDD materials. Due to changing the implementation ministry from the PNDCC to PSDCC, the project lost access to some CDD-related materials developed under the PNDCC. To resolve this issue, the Project was able to hire the same community training specialist as the PNDCC, enabling some of the documents to be recovered. Nevertheless, this resulted in serious delays, as much of the CDD materials had to be re-created or reprinted.

• Communes temporarily channeling PSDCC funds to make other payments while delaying transfer of funds to community infrastructure sub-projects, which in turned delayed implementation of such projects;

• Recruitment of a new M&E Specialist following the resignation of the previous one;

• The need to switch from financing large-diameter wells to deeper boreholes due to Government policy change required developing a novel approach to procuring boreholes, which required synchronization of the tender process to elicit bids from drilling companies.

60. Efficiency is rated as Substantial. The rating is based on the numerous cost efficiencies realized by the Project;

although there were some implementation delays, these were mostly beyond the control of the Project and did not result in an extension of the project beyond the additional time provided in the Additional Financing paper to utilize the additional resources.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

61. As mentioned earlier, the Project’s outcome indicator targets underwent restructuring twice, at Additional

Financing in August 2014, and at a second Project Restructure approved in August 2016, about 17 months before Project closure. According to the OPCS ICR Guidelines, the project efficacy should be assessed against both the original and revised indicators and targets, as set out in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Overall Outcome Rating — Split Evaluation

Dimension Before

Restructuring

After Restructuring through Additional

Financing (August 10, 2014)

After second Restructuring

(August 29,2016)

Relevance of Objective High

Efficacy (PDOs) Substantial

Efficiency Substantial

1 Outcome ratings Moderately satisfactory

Satisfactory Satisfactory

2 Numerical value of the outcome ratings

4 5 5

3 Disbursement 20.24 46.77 2.68

4 Share of disbursement 29% 67% 4%

5 Weighted value of the outcome rating (Row 2 X Row 4)

1.16 3.36 0.19

6 Final Outcome Rating Satisfactory

5 (rounding from 4.7)


Page 22 of 66

62. Following the split evaluation, the overall outcome rating for the PSDCC is Satisfactory. This is based on ‘High’ relevance of the PSDCC throughout implementation, and ‘Substantial’ levels of efficiency realized by the Project and both dimensions of the PDO achieving or exceeding outcome and intermediate targets. The second restructuring was undertaken late in the Project in order to make several changes in one efficient manner, including (i) changing outcome and intermediate targets resulting from the AF, and (ii) reallocating currency gains arising from on-going exchange rate changes.

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

Gender 61. The impact of the Project on women was positive, particularly due to the safety-net pilot where women were 53

percent of beneficiaries, as well as being employed to deliver childcares services, and participate in public works programs. Women also received GMT that fostered skill development and empowerment. For example:

• Women were recruited to key leadership positions. About 55 percent of community members in positions of responsibility in community sub-project implementation committees were female. In addition, in the 1,001 community associations supported by the PSDCC, about 259 of the Presidents (26 percent), 169 of the Secretaries (17 percent), and all 1,000 Treasurers (100 percent) were female.

• The Project facilitated women getting GMT. Of the 213,758 people who participated in the GMT training, 49.3 percent were female. Participants were empowered by participatory decision-making, and built skills for social service delivery, targeting beneficiaries for public works and cash transfers, prioritizing different types of public works interventions, procuring contractors, and monitoring the implementation of public works projects. Initially, women’s participation in classroom training for community associations was low, especially in the north, and in Borgou where only 14 percent of participants were women. To remedy this situation, senior trainers and the Community Development Agents were asked to discriminate positively in favor of women in the selection of community leaders that increased their participation to 39.5 percent by Project closure. The participation of women in the restitution sessions in the villages was also strong, amounting to 51 percent and thus exceeding the rate of 41.8 percent reached under the PNDCC.

• Women benefited directly from the safety net pilot, as 6,803 (53 percent) beneficiaries were female. The

unconditional cash transfers ensured a steady income that provided food security, increased spending on health and education, and helped to build or maintain household assets.

• The Public Works Program facilitated women getting jobs. Women were able to work on the public works

infrastructure sub-projects that developed their skills and provided supplemental income during agricultural lean months. Some women were also hired to provide childcare services and were paid at the same rate as other workers, which allowed mothers with young children to also participate in the public works program. Seven of the 12 communes initiated childcare services, while the remaining five did not due to the long distance of the PWP sites from the participant villages. Consequently, 4,119 women participated in subprojects where nurseries were provided, accounting for nearly two thirds or 6,471 of all the women employed through the PWP.


Page 23 of 66

• Women were also direct beneficiaries of the commune and community level infrastructure projects, which included construction/ rehabilitation of schools, water points, market infrastructure, transport infrastructure, and health facilities. This increased their access to public services and facilities, which are very limited in Benin.

Institutional Strengthening

The Project’s technical assistance (components 3 and 4) contributed significantly to the institutional building in the following areas:

62. Ministry of Decentralization and Local Government, and Administration and Development of the Territory (MDGL). MDGL, which had overall responsibility for the project, benefitted from the creation of the Secretariat for Decentralized Community Driven Services (SSDCC in French, Secretariat for Decentralized Community Driven Services) to implement, and maintain fiduciary oversight of the Project. The secretariat was formed by recruiting, staff, including a Coordinator (Secrétaire Exécutif), a financial management specialist, a procurement specialist, and a grassroots management training specialist. The capacity of the SSDCC was built and a computerized accounting system was incorporated for financial management. Efficient arrangements were put in place for providing technical advice and capacity for mainstreaming CDD, coordinating with communes and communities on implementation of subprojects, and for overseeing implementation of the safety net project. Capacity was also strengthened enabling SSDCC to provide key sectoral ministries with technical assistance to implement activities in their sectors through the CDD approach. The establishment of the SSDCC has strengthened MDGL’s technical and financial capacity to ensure the quality of decentralized investments in Benin.

63. Commission Nationale des Finances Locales (CONAFIL): CONAFIL, under the aegis of MDGL, is mandated to administer the FADeC transfer mechanism to equalize and consolidate all transfers to communes under Component 1. Capacity building was provided to strengthen administration of the FADeC (including improving the transparency of the calculation of allocations, fiduciary controls, and monitoring and evaluation). This also helped to significantly improve the timeliness and predictability of transfers from the Treasury to communes, and monitoring and reporting on the execution of funds by communes.

64. Institut National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique (INSAE). The Bank provided technical assistance (TA) to INSAE to develop a national database ranking all 5,290 villages in all communes of Benin by their degree of access to basic social infrastructure. This enabled geographical targeting for community infrastructure and safety nets sub-projects by communal councils, as INSAE provided baseline data on the poverty levels of villages and neighborhoods within all communes, based on indices of income poverty, non-income poverty, and food insecurity calculated using the 2002 Census and relevant household surveys. In addition, the Bank provided TA for the development of a Proxy Means Test (PMT) to target households for the safety-net project. The targeting methodology was validated by the Government’s National Social Protection Platform Committee, a multi-sectoral body representing ministries implementing social protection programs and will be used for national poverty targeting for other programs.

65. National Local Government Training Center (Centre de formation pour l’administration locale, CeFAL. The capacity of CeFAL, the Government body responsible for delivering training to communes, has been enhanced to strengthen the capacities of the actors in the procurement chain of the communes. The SSDCC signed an agreement with CeFAL to provide seven modules of tailored procurement training to address the defciencies observed at the commune level, including on preparation of public procurement plans, request for proposals, evaluation of proposals, and contract


Page 24 of 66

managment. The trainings were conducted between December 2015 and mid-July 2017 and benefited 705 commune officials, including mayors and their deputies, heads of departments in charge of financial affairs, economic affairs, planning and development and tax collectors. An assessment of the training program conducted by CeFAL and CONAFIL in late 20174, concluded that the training had a positive impact on public procurement in all 77 municipatlities and corrected the numerous deficiencies and irregulatireis that were noted by the audit of the procurement system of communes, commissioned by the PSDCC in 2013.

66. Ministry of Social Affairs. The development of the pilot National Social Registry Database and PMT, the capacity

building provided to INSAE to administer these instruments, along with the GMT provided to communes and communities to administer the PMT surveys, enables better identification of the poorest households for development programs. The National Social Registry grew to not only incorporate households that were administered the PMT through PSDCC, but also households surveyed and administered the PMT through an IDA Health project. Upon request from the Ministry, the Project provided training and bought transport (motorbikes) to enhance its capacity to monitor implementation of the social safety net pilot.

Strengthening M&E and Capacity Building 67. Strengthening Procurement Capacity, Accountability and Transparency. A procurement specialist hired for the project

contributed significant TA to build the procurement capacity of all levels of government. At the start of the project procurement capacity was assessed to be very low and capacity was built at all levels of government through training, and development of procurement guidelines, plans and templates. To address procurement irregularities identified later through audits, including collusion and fraudulent practices at the communal level, the MDGL, CONAFIL and SSDCC developed an action plan to address the problems. The Project developed procurement training modules for communes, and supported delivery of the procurement training through CEFAL. These steps increased procurement capacity, transparency and accountability at all levels of government.

68. Strengthening internal audits and internal controls. The Project manual and the FADeC manual guided the appropriate segregation of duties and responsibilities for internal audits and controls. An internal audit consultant was recruited to provide a risk map of the Project and the MGDLAAT. The auditor supported the Government’s internal audit institutions, the Inspection générale des finances (IGF) and the Inspection Générale des Affaires Administratives (IGAA), to apply a risk based approach that strengthened government institutions’ capacity for internal audits and controls, including by subjecting all community level operations to undergo quarterly reviews by the regional Treasury agent in order to prevent possible diversion of funds.

69. Social Accountability. A Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) was piloted for Component 2 in seven of the 12

communes participating in the safety net pilot. In total, 24 Local Units of the Complaint Management Mechanism and a Complaints Management Body were established. Two training courses and action training on conflict management and mediation were provided and the Operational Guide for Complaint Management developed. A formal assessment conducted in December 2017 found that the newly established mechanisms reduced the prevalence of conflict risk in the implementation of Project activities. Still, the design of the GRM, requiring significant community training and involvement of SSDCC officials, proved too complex to enable scaling of the pilot before the end of the project. A

4 The assessment report is: Suivi post formation des acquis du programme de renforcement des capacites des acteurs

communaux de la chaîne de passation des, Rapport deMmission, Ministere de la Decentralisation et de la Gouvernance Locale, Republic of Benin, Janvier 2018.


Page 25 of 66

lesson for ACCESS, the successor project to PSDCC, is to build on the experience of the PSDCC GRM, but in a way that makes the GRM simpler and more scalable to enable full coverage near the beginning of the project. Finally, as mentioned before, the social accountability scorecard to measure impact on beneficiaries of the safety net program was eliminated because of the high price of the lone bid with sufficient technical quality.

Mobilizing Private Sector Financing

70. The focus of the Project was to strengthen fiscal transfers to decentralized levels and strengthening capacity of all

levels of government. Therefore, mobilization of private sector financing was outside the scope of the Project.

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

71. While it was not possible to measure the project’s impact on poverty rates, it is likely to have had a significant impact

on both monetary and non-monetary poverty. The access to basic services financed by component 1 is expected to have decreased non-monetary poverty by improving access to education, health, water, transport, and markets.

72. The safety net pilot is likely to have significantly reduced monetary poverty among beneficiary households through regular non-conditional cash payments and the opportunity to supplement their income opportunities during the agricultural lean months through the labor-intensive public works programs. The public works programs were offered as per the agricultural lean months in the north and south of Benin. These strategies helped the households in the pilot to avoid negative coping decisions, such as selling assets, pulling children out of school and sending children to work.

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

73. The harmonized targeting methodology and National Social Registry of the poorest households developed for the

social safety-net pilot gained traction among multiple actors across sectors and was presented as good practice at the 2015 South-South Forum on Social Protection in Beijing, China and to the francophone Africa Safety Nets Community of Practice. The project also hosted delegations from Niger, Togo, and Chad who visited Benin to learn about how the project operated. The PMT and social registry developed by the PSDCC are now being used by the Government of Benin for its flagship health insurance program called Assurance pour le Renforcement du Capital Humain (ARCH).

74. The project created a novel smartphone -based sub-project construction monitoring system that has inspired similar systems in Togo and Djibouti and will be continued under ACCESS.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

75. The Bank and Government used the lessons of the PNDCC to inform project prearation, and developed a project


Page 26 of 66

design using sound background analysis; and a thorough understanding of the varying degrees of commitments of ministries to the CDD approach, capacities of decentralized levels, and the shortcomings of Benin’s existing safety net programs. The team also considered lessons learned from the previous project and other decentralization, CDD and social protection operations at the time, as well as potential risks and mitigation measures. Key factors that influenced preparation are highlighted below.

76. Soundness of background analysis in project design: The Project design built on the sound analysis of CONAFIL’s previous experience administering fiscal transfers to communes through the FADeC funding mechanism and by identifying the critical elements that required development and significant adjustments to mainstream community driven development of social services and delivery of safety net programs. Significant improvements introduced included: (i) streamlining processes for fiscal allocation of government and donor funds through the FADeC earmarked window; (ii) finalization of a relative poverty index for communes and communities by INSAE; (iii) use of the geo-referenced database to monitor communal and community sub-projects and (iv;) use of geographic, community and self targeting of the poor5 for the safety net program. Elements developed in the context of safety nets included: (i) a national social registry; (ii) proxy means test to identify the poorest households; and (iii) inclusion of non-conditional cash transfers and conditional labor-intensive sub-projects. This strategy was based on global experience, which indicates that community driven development is more cost-effective and efficient for the provision of social protection services. The Project successfully filled in gaps in Benin’s decentralization process and provided the tools to scale up a national safety net program.

77. Project preparation: The technical merits of the Project and the capacity of Benin’s government at all levels were examined throughout preparation, allowing the design to benefit from experience and experts in the social services sector in the Africa and other regions.

78. Lessons learned from previous country and Bank-wide experience with CDD approach to social service delivery: The Bank placed strong emphasis on the lessons learned during the implementation of the PNDSS, as well as from related social protection projects in Benin, and from best practice programs around the world, including Ethiopia and Tanzania. Based on implementation experience of the PNDCC, the Bank understood the need to build project management and procurement capacity of implementing agencies. At Project appraisal, the capacity of MDGL and CONAFIL were assessed. The Bank advised the establishment of the SSDCC, as discussed above, to implement the project through recruitment of staff and provision of TA to support capacity. The lessons learned were as follows:

a) It was essential to develop a program that would have some degree of success in mainstreaming the

CDD approach for the delivery of nation-wide social services. In the context of Benin, the CDD approach would promote participatory decision making and help build capacity at all levels for the identification, planning and implementation of much needed basic infrastructure and social services delivery. The CDD approach, based on the subsidiarity principle, is a cost effective way to promote local development, creates local ownership, and extends the life of the investments’ benefits.

b) To address rising poverty and inequality, Benin needed to develop a well-targeted income support system that would increase income and consumption, and enhance food-security of the poorest and most vulnerable. The non-conditional cash transfer program would alleviate food insecurity, while the

5 Geographic targeting was guided by INSAE’s poverty map and poverty data base and the PMT developed by INSAE for the Project


Page 27 of 66

PWP, supporting short-term, well-targeted, labor-intensive infrastructure sub-projects, would help the transient poor over the short run to deal with systemic shocks. Such targeted interventions can assist the poor to deal better with chronic poverty and systemic shock, develop access to local infrastructure and services, and have a strong impact on the well-being of the broader community.

c) Investments in monitoring and evaluation systems and essential management and planning tools

facilitate sub project evaluation process advances transparency and accountability, and provides feedback and necessary information to improve targeting, service delivery and efficiency.

d) Continued emphasis on financial management, procurement, and auditing systems reduces political capture, fraud and corruption, and enhances impact, efficiency and sustainability. Standardization of bidding / reporting processes, forms, and procedures facilitates procurement of goods and works, promotes efficiencies, and improves quality of goods and services produced.

e) On-going investment on technical quality, including environmental and social screening processes, enhances impact and sustainability. Standardization of environmental safeguards and technical designs for similar infrastructure simplifies sub-project preparation and implementation and assessment processes improves the quality of sub-projects and enables participation of poorer communities.

80. Use of Poverty Maps, Poverty Database and Poverty Indexes in Project design: Given that the CDD approach

was to be streamlined throughout the country, it was essential that funds were allocated to all 77 communes for communal-level infrastructure projects and weighted in favor of the poorest communities within the poorest communes for the construction/ rehabilitation of infrastructure. To improve the chances of sub-projects improving access to basic social services of the those least able to protect themselves, the locations of sub-projects were selected using Benin’s poverty map and poverty index taking into account the capacity and readiness for implementation. These instruments, along with the application of the PMT, were used to target beneficiaries for the safety-net pilot, including for participation in public works that improved living conditions by alleviating food-insecurity and built/ rehabilitated much needed basic infrastructure.

81. Assessment of Risks and Mitigation Measures: The Project was prepared and implemented in a relatively

steady period of economic growth and political stability. The CDD approach was well established in Benin, however the Bank had not channeled IDA resources through the FADeC mechanism, and communes and communities lacked experience and capacity to design and implement decentralized development projects. The overall risk rating for the Project was rated ‘Substantial’ due to serious concern over the capacity and governance, inadequate systems for monitoring sub-projects at all levels of government, and issues related to the commitment of government agencies to the CDD approach and sustainability of donor funding.

82. Mitigating measures to address these risks included, inter alia: (i) the Project design focused on building capacity of the implementing agency as well as decentralized levels, including establishment of the SSDCC; (ii) fiduciary safeguards to ensure effective oversight of flow of funds and procurement procedures; and (iii) the commitment of MDGL to fully internalize the CDD approach within the central government, communes, communities and line ministries for funding sustainability.


Page 28 of 66

83. Fiduciary risks were substantial due to substantial gaps in the capacity for financial management, procurement, and contract management, especially at the local levels. Mitigating measures included: (i) hiring an experienced Financial Manager, Procurement Specialist and international Auditor and Accountant to assess and build capacity and monitor conformity with procedures for financial management and procurement processes for selection of consultants for infrastructure projects; (ii) developing, updating and distributing the PSDCC Project Implementation Manual, Administrative and Financial Procedures Manual, and Procurement Manual to ensure clear definitions of roles and responsibilities and consistent of procedures; (iii) building capacity of communes; and (iv) provision of procurement training to all communities as part of the GMT.

84. With an overall risk rating of ‘Substantial’, the Bank held regular supervision efforts, including additional

missions during the third year of implementation, and including sectoral and fiduciary team members and an engineering specialist to ensure compliance of MDGL, SSDCC and CONAFIL with the application of the mitigation measures.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

85. Positive factors during implementation

a) Government commitment: The Government and MDGL were highly committed to the Project, and

publically promoted the importance of the CDD approach to development, and the need to support the poor overcome chronic food-insecurity and create income opportunities, especially in the poorer communes of Benin and during the agricultural lean months to reduce inequality. On March 30, 2017, the Minister of State for Planning and Development held a National Awareness Day on Social Safety Nets, which helped to share the results of the social safety net pilot program, while drawing attention of donors and advocating to the authorities at the highest level.

Component 1: Service Delivery Grants to Communes b) Coordination and engagement: At the outset, the SSDCC organized six regional workshops to raise

awareness about the project and its implementation arrangements, and its staff continued to travel frequently to all communes to ensure coordination. It worked closely with: INSAE on developing a targeting methodology; CeFAL to improve procurement capacity of communes, mayors and their staff; and Department of Social Affairs on the design and implantation of the cash transfer pilot. The SSDCC also coordinated with all relevant parties, including auditors, to monitor status of sub-project implementation, which allowed early detection of procurement and project management issues.

c) Utilization of the FADeC fiscal transfer mechanism: The allocation of funds for infrastructure sub-projects

were guided by the FADeC formulas, based on population, poverty and performance with funding weighted in favor of poorer communes and communities, and this reduced political capture.


Page 29 of 66

d) Respect of principle of subsidiarity: This principle states that the lowest-level actor that can effectively carry out any given activity should undertake it. Once the communes’ procurement capacity met national procurement standards, they were allowed to launch procurement of contractors for implementation of commune sub-projects for infrastructure covering multiple villages (i.e. infrastructure not suitable for execution by community associations). The majority of communes followed this procedure, however during the first phase of implementation three communes signed contracts for primary school rehabilitation projects which were single-village in nature (and hence should have been delegated to communities under project procedures). This error was identified by the TTL, who agreed to allow these contracts to be executed in order to compare cost differences between communal and community implemented projects. The identification of this mistake ensured that similar further errors did not occur in the following phases through further training and communication.

e) Utilization of the geo-referenced database to monitor communal and community sub-projects: The

development of the geo-referenced database, updated by smartphone data entry in the field, enabled SSDCC to monitor the communal and community infrastructure sub-projects, including status of implementation.

f) Communal procurement capacity has been strengthened. The capacity of all communes was raised to meet national procurement standards, whereas at the start of the Project the vast majority of communes were assessed to be non-compliant. Despite the fact that by the end of the project 92 percent of communes were judged to have carried out procurement in a moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, or highly unsatisfactory manner, the procurement and project management capacity of all communes were moderately improved through CONAFIL’s close project monitoring and training provided by CeFAL. Procurement capacity of communes were also enhanced by additional steps taken by CONAFIL and MDGL, including black-listing of unscrupulous contractors and preventing them from applying for future PSDCC contracts, requiring site inspectors to be hired as per Bank recommendations and Grant application rules, freezing further financial installments to the communes concerned until all misused funds were reimbursed, and prosecuting proven cases of malfeasance to discourage such practices in the future. These steps also strengthened MDGL and CONAFIL’s willingness and ability to take appropriate measures to deal with inappropriate and fraudulent practices.

Component 2: Pilot Safety Net Program g) Application of poverty targeting instruments: As noted earlier, the Project supported INSAE to develop

the targeting tools and methodology for the safety-net beneficiaries, including INSAE’s poverty map, poverty database poverty index, pre-identification of the poorest households by Community Identification Committees, and application of the PMT formula. This methodology had several important benefits, as it: (i) reduced the possibility of political capture; (ii) supported political buy-in, as the beneficiaries were selected from all 12 of Benin’s prefectures; (iii) eliminated ineligible people from the list produced by the community through the application of the PMT, resulting in 99.6 percent of beneficiaries being classified as poor by the PMT, (the 0.4 percent not classified as poor were single person elderly households that the PMT was not calibrated to pick up, were included to offset the shortcoming of the PMT); (iv) realized cost efficiencies, as discussed earlier; and (v) the targeting methodology was validated by the Government’s National Social Protection Platform Committee, a multi-sectoral body representing ministries implementing social protection programs and will be used


Page 30 of 66

for national poverty targeting for other programs.

Component 3: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building

h) Training of newly elected mayors and staff: Following the local elections, training was provided to newly

elected mayors and their deputies to strengthen project management and procurement capacity. CeFAL conducted all seven GMT modules for stakeholders in the municipal procurement chain. These trainings benefited 705 commune officials, including mayors and their deputies, heads of departments in charge of financial affairs, economic affairs, planning and development and tax collectors.

86. Negative factors during implementation

a) The scaling up of service delivery grants to communes, and the simultaneous rollout of the community

sub-projects together with the safety nets program, which was the first of its type in Benin, stretched the resources of the PIU very thin and resulted in delays in preparation and implementation.

Component 1: Service Delivery Grants to Communes b) The selection of different types of infrastructure sub-projects necessitated the development of standard

environmental and social safeguard plans for each type of infrastructure in the eligible list of sub-projects (i.e. schools, water, health) and incorporate them in community training and Local Call Record Documents DAOL), which delayed implementation.

c) Delays in the flow of Project funds to communes from the Treasury led to delays in the implementation

of sub-projects, until the Bank negotiated with the Treasury to ensure timely flow of funds.

d) The 2015 audit revealed that some communal officials diverted earmarked project funds to provide

temporary liquidity when the Ministry of Finance did not make cash available on time to cover its obligations to communes through the general FADeC. The Bank and Government agreed that if one more instance of this violation of procedures occurred the project would create separate accounts for its earmarked funds in each commune. In addition, the Project team obtained firm commitments from the Chief of Staff of the Minister of Finance, the Director General of the Treasury and the Receiver General for Finance to ensure compliance with these rules, failing which the Bank would request separate accounts to be opened in order to track the resources better. The issue did not recur.

e) Procurement audits conducted during 2014–2016 found irregularities with procurement processes and contracts executed by a large number of communes. Some of these findings indicated that: some communes did not consistently respect all the stages of procurement; many communes received only the minimum offers as required by the Procurement Plan; often a site controller had not been recruited; some communes refused contractors the purchase of the tender dossier on the pretext that they were no longer available; and in many cases the amount of the lowest bid corresponded exactly to the amount of the communal grant. As discussed above, CONAFIL and MDGL took a wide range of measures to improve procurement capacity and practice, and punished malfeasance in order to discourage such practices in the future.


Page 31 of 66

Component 2: Pilot Safety Net Program

f) Two financial institutions were contracted for the delivery of payments: MTN provided electronic

transfers to beneficiaries in Cotonou, while FECECAM used conventional methods for delivery of payments for beneficiaries in other parts of the country. Performance issues of FECECAM were identified and included, inter alia: occasional disrespectful treatment of program beneficiaries; disruption of smooth payment transactions by the rainy season, especially in May and June; non-computerized record-keeping which slowed compiling information on payments made; delays in FECECAM’s reporting about the timeliness of cash-transfers hampered the proper monitoring of the program; and errors in beneficiaries’ cards and cumbersome processes to correct these. To compensate, the Bank and the SSDCC decided to mobilize the Social Promotion Center managers, who monitored the payments, to send a copy of the statements paid by the FECECAM directly to the SSDCC, so that information about payments are made more regularly. The SSDCC also provided significant assistance ot FECECAM in the correction of errors and issuing corrected beneficiary cards.

g) The public works program sites lacked clear procedures for validating the attendance lists for each day of work on the sites. The Bank team recommended roll calls at the beginning and end of each day and the public validation of the attendance list at the end of the day. This allowed each worker to know exactly how many days they had worked. By the end of the project this had been resolved.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design

86. 87. The M&E system was designed to operate at the national, regional and community levels and built on and enhance

existing systems. The SSDCC had primary responsibility for tracking indicators. For Component 1, the Treasury helped SSDCC track the flow of funds and execution by communes, including transfers from communes to communities. The communes were responsible for providing CONAFIL information on execution of sub-projects executed at the commune level, including procurement, financial execution of contracts and physical construction of infrastructure, commissioning of works, and closing of contracts. For sub-projects delegated to communities by communes, the communes were responsible for providing details about the financing agreement, and information on the execution of the agreement by communities. Communities were responsible for providing communes information on the progress of the execution of the agreement with the commune, including details of procurement and financial management of contracts, each item/service procured, and physical progress made on the works, and financial management of contract.

88. Monitoring of Component 2 was tasked to the SSDCC through periodic and final reports produced by the safety nets

expert, consultants and the Ministry of Social Affairs. To monitor the quality of technical assistance, capacity building and project management training were provided through components 3 and 4, and the Community Development Agents and Senior Trainers were regularly subjected to normative evaluations to ensure they achieved performance objectives and delivered the desired quality of training.


Page 32 of 66

89. The project originally envisioned a randomized control trial (RCT) impact evaluation of the safety nets component.

However, idea of the RCT was eventually dropped, and the Bank and Government opted for a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) impact evaluation in order to avoid the complexities, extensive time and higher costs associated with an RCT as well as to reduce the burden on the PIU which was already overstretched with launching the Project. The RDD evaluation design, overseen by an international consultant paid by the Bank, aimed to detect differences between the beneficiaries who narrowly qualified with PMT scores just blow the cut-off for eligibility, with non-beneficiaries with PMT scores just above the cut-off. The Project paid for the recruitment of surveyors for data collection. However, the RDD did not produce meaningful results to show impact or lack of impact of the program due to methodological and data problems.

M&E Implementation

90. The SSDCC performed well in monitoring agreed Project activities. The resignation of the first M&E Specialist, in May 2014, slowed progress of M&E enhancements. The Bank supported the project with an international M&E consultant to ensure adequate M&E systems and to mentor the new M&E specialist. The upgrading of systems to track project performance indicators put the M&E activities back on schedule by May 2015. At the decentralized levels, monitoring and evaluation training was provided through the GMT to all 1,000 PSDCC participating villages in three phases.

91. In terms of evaluation, the project carried out of two technical audits to assess the technical quality of the works carried out by the communes and communities about the cost-effectiveness of the audited operations; annual procurement audits that examined the degree to which procurement by communes and communities complied with the national procedures; two environmental and social safeguards audits; and an assessment of the GMT to evaluate the gains to communities in terms of governance and grassroots management. These reports were shared with MDGL, relevant ministries and the Bank, and the conclusions of the assessments were also shared with all relevant parties (ministers, communes, and communities). M&E Utilization

92. Appropriate data collected by MDGL, SSDCC and CONAFIL was evaluated and used during supervision missions and

for decision-making. Based on analyzed M&E data discussed at the MTR in December 2015, the Bank successfully restructured the Project by revising the Results Framework to align PDOs with actual delivery and project outcomes. Audit reports were analyzed to identify the reasons for implementation delays and to take appropriate corrective measures where necessary, such as abnormal procurement practices by communes. Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

93. The overall quality of M&E is Substantial and is attributed to the effective design, and the use of different but complementary monitoring instruments used by SSDCC and CONAFIL, and utilization of real-time data collection, including the smartphone geo-referencing tool for monitoring sub-projects. The auditing procedures implemented by the Project and preparation of timely monitoring reports which kept track of project status at any given time and enabled timely identification of issues and appropriate response. The relatively flexible design made it also possible to adjust sub-projects to reflect community demand, and for indicators and target values to be adjusted during implementation through two Level 2 Project restructuring.


Page 33 of 66

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

Environmental and Social Safeguards

94. Environmental assessments were undertaken at project appraisal. The project’s environmental category was

classified “B”, as potential negative environmental impacts from sub-projects were expected to be limited and manageable. The assessment triggered: (i) Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4.01; (ii) Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4.12; and (iii) Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7.50. The restructuring under the AF was assessed and no new social or environmental safeguard policies were triggered requiring additional safeguards arrangements. Effective planning and actions were taken to address the safeguards triggered.

95. During the preparation of the PSDCC, the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) of PNDCC was revised and updated with lessons learned from the PNDCC for the PSDCC and was disclosed prior to appraisal. The Bank notified the Niger Basin Authority about the project and received the no objection of the NBA to proceed with the project with the understanding that the Project might support some small-scale water investments in the basin of certain tributaries of the Niger River or trans-boundary aquifers. To address potential involuntary resettlement (trigger OP/BP 4.12), the Resettlement Policy and Population Compensation Framework (CPRP) of the PNDCC was also adapted for the PSDCC and disclosed prior to appraisal.

96. The responsibility for oversight and implementation of safeguards was placed under SSDCC, with communal

technical staff members also given responsibility to ensure that sub-projects complied with environmental safeguards. The SSDCC retained a safeguards consultant throughout the project to help monitor the implementation of the ESMF and CPRP Standard Environmental Management Plans were developed for the different types of infrastructure that were eligible for grants (i.e. education, health, water, roads and public markets) and incorporated into the training provided to MDGL, PSDCC community trainers, communes, and communities. Overall, the SSDCC carried out its monitoring responsibility and followed up to ensure that implementation of sub-projects was carried out in conformity with the environmental safeguard plans and environmental guidelines. An independent assessment of compliance commissioned by MDGL and completed in May 2018, reports that 98 percent of communal subprojects adhered to the required environmental safeguards, compared to 100 percent for community subprojects. Nonconformities related to communal management of waste (solid and liquid), as some communes left waste in the open, and the visible discharge of water from the sink in some classrooms due to the close proximity to the garbage disposal site on the lagoon of Comè and poor condition of the material used, which contradicted Benin’s articles 8 and 68 of Decree 2003-332 of 27 August 2003 and Decree 2001-109 of 4 April 2001, respectively. An action plan was formulated In the light of the audit findings and the non-compliances identified. The two environmental and social safeguards audits did not raise any major issues but provided recommendations to the SSDCC team to manage better the environmental and social aspects of the projects.

Fiduciary compliance

97. Financial Management. The MDGL along with CONAFIL and SSDCC were responsible for financial management

and reporting, using systems and procedures acceptable to the Bank under OP/BP10.02. As MDGL had limited experience with IDA financing and Bank operations, TA was provided to increase its understanding of Bank processes and rules. CONAFIL had overall responsibility for fiduciary management of Component 1 and signed sub-grant agreements with all 77 communes under Component 1 and Component 2 (public works programs).


Page 34 of 66

The SSDCC had responsibility for components 2 and 3, for which an experienced and qualified Financial Management Specialist and an accountant were recruited. The project procedures manual was finalized and validated, and the financial management software was put in place. At the decentralized level, the responsibility for fiduciary control over expenditures initiated by Communes remained with the Public Treasury agents, who coordinated with six Finance Controllers, hired at the communal level, to support signing of agreements between communes and communities, and ensure compliance with agreed time limits for funds transfers, adequate execution of budget, and recording of expenditures. Project records were retained per the generally accepted accounting principles and audited annually, following international standards on auditing, by a qualified independent external auditor.

98. The SSDCC submitted quarterly Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) and Annual Financial Statements for the PSDCC. These were generally of good quality. The Project manual and the FADeC manual outlined duties and responsibilities for internal audits and internal controls. Regular internal audit missions were completed by the Government’s internal audit institutions (IGF and IGAA), which placed a strong focus on activities at decentralized levels. Annual reviews were undertaken of a sample of sub-grants and disbursements under the social safety net component that monitored the appropriate use of community grants; and technical audits were conducted every two years of infrastructure and safety net sub-projects. Financial audits found no major misuses of project funds.

99. An internal audit consultant was hired, who assisted the institutions to develop risk mapping and implemented

strategic audit plans to strengthen the project’s control environment. Overall, the internal control arrangements were in place, and a financial management system and disbursements were maintained adequately.

100. Procurement. The SSDCC under the MDGL had responsibility for all procurement activities for the Project,

including for sub-projects executed by the communes and communities. A Procurement Specialist was recruited and supported SSDCC to ensure conformity of implementation according to the World Bank’s 2011 “Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits” and 2011 “Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers”, the provisions of the Financial Agreement.

101. A key objective of Component 1 was to improve the procurement capacity of communes and communities

by ‘learning by doing’. At the decentralized levels, a consultant was hired who assessed the procurement capacity of all 77 communes and proposed action plans. As the majority of communes did not have the structures in place to carry out procurement in conformity with national laws, the project provided TA to help communes comply with the law, which was a condition to receive project funding. Communities received procurement training as part of the GMT, and following the 2015 elections, the project provided procurement training to 705 commune official including mayors. All contracts executed were to local vendors and were required to comply with the provisions of Benin’s Code of Public Contracts and follow National Competitive Bidding (NCB) procedures using sample form of bidding documents and contract Evaluation Reports developed by the Bank. Ex-post procurement reviews of SSDCC conducted by the Bank found no major procurement issues in contracts signed by the SSDCC.

102. Four procurement audits were undertaken during the life of the Project that assessed whether communes met adequate standards of national procurement laws. The audits found strong compliance with procurement procedures among communities, with 92 percent of community sub-project having satisfactory procurement


Page 35 of 66

performance. On the other hand, the audits showed challenges at the commune level. Still, the PSDCC fostered moderate improvements in the procurement capacity of communes, with only 10 percent of communes being rated fully unsatisfactory by project closing as opposed to 50 percent at the outset. These gains were achieved by instituting regular procurement audits and requiring communes to take actions to address deficiencies, sanctioning non-compliance including through the CONAFIL freezing FADeC transfers to communes with deficiencies, and education and training (procurement training for 705 commune officials was financed by the project). While all commune sub-projects were completed, the weak procurement performance in communes may have resulted in higher costs.

Evolution of procurement performance of communes, 2014-2017

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

103. Project preparation focused on critical gaps and opportunities for intervention in Benin’s public sector

and social services sector when government levels lacked capacity at all levels and the country was going through rising poverty and inequality. During preparation and appraisal, the Bank considered the adequacy of Project design and all major relevant aspects, such as technical, financial, and institutional capacity, including procurement and project management. Major risk factors and lessons learned from the previous PNDSS, country experience, and Bank-wide experience with CDD approaches to decentralization processes and safety-net programs were considered and incorporated into the Project design. While adjustments were inevitably required during project implementation, the project design was generally of good quality and the approach remained sound throughout project implementation. Quality of Supervision

0

20

40

60

80

100 First Mission(2014 Audit)

Second Mission(2015 Audit)

Third Mission(2016 Audit)

Fourth Mission(2017 Audit)


Page 36 of 66

104. Notwithstanding initial implementation delays, particularly the unexpected need to recreate many CDD materials, the Bank was proactive and identified issues and worked closely with MDGL, SSDCC and CONAFIL to find solutions. The Bank’s technical, safeguard and fiduciary teams provided regular support, particularly during the development of the poverty database and PMT for the targeting of safety-net beneficiaries. Supervision focused on maximizing the Project’s development impact and resulted in continuous adjustments, including additional financing and two Project restructuring. The Bank used adequate resources including dedicated technical support safeguard, FM, procurement and safety net experts.

105. The Bank carried out regular supervision missions to work closely with Project stakeholders, and produced clear and detailed aide-memoires and followed-up with government when required. Project locations and sites were visited on a regular basis to conduct physical inspections with the participation of appropriate sectoral and technical experts. The World Bank conducted regular missions for project review, and went on several site visits, and participated in the National Forum on Social Protection from 10-11 December 2015 in Cotonou. Regular Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) were produced which were candid, detailed, outlined important issues and contained relevant information and actionable items and helped to advance Project activities. Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

106. The overall Bank performance is considered to be Satisfactory. The Bank performance in the identification, preparation and appraisal led to the development of a sound project design, with sufficient steps to build project management, procurement and financial management capacity at all decentralized levels. The auditing and monitoring procedures enabled timely identification of issues, and the Bank provided clear and candid response, including innovative solutions such as the synchronization of borehole drillings, and training for newly elected mayors and their staff.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

107. The PSDCC was originally designed as an Adaptable Program Loan (APL) series, adopting a three-phased long-term approach to fully streamline CDD into the country’s decentralization process. From the onset it was recognized that that mainstreaming CDD, creating sustainability and ownership, and scaling up the safety nets in Benin would be a long term phased process and something that could be achieved through a stand alone project. During implementation however, the World Bank Group discontinued using the APL as a financing instrument. The PSDCC by achieving all triggers for APL Phase II financing demonstrated to the Bank the benefits of continuing decentralization and cash transfer programs in Benin. Accordingly, the PSDCC is being continued through the Community and Local Government Basic Social Services (ACCESS) Project, as a continuation of the PSDCC (World Bank Board consideration on July 6, 2018), with the objective to improve access to decentralized basic social services, expand the social safety net program, and strengthen the social protection system. While no longer part of an APL series due to the discontinuation of APLs, ACCESS was structured as the second project in a Series of Projects. Therefore, the phased implementation design to mainstream CDD into basic social service delivery is highly likely to continue.

108. The infrastructure assets, including roads, wells, schools, garbage collections created/rehabilitated under

the Project, have been handed over to the respective communes. With legal ownership of the infrastructure, communes are responsible for their maintenance. For a transition period, communities will use the small remaining funds in their accounts after completing the public works program and infrastructure projects for


Page 37 of 66

maintenance of infrastructure. It is expected that the increased organization and capacity of community associations as a result a GMT will help them to lobby commune officials for effective maintenance of the infrastructures built under the project.

109. The Project financing resulted in 1,001 instances of communes delegating sub projects to communities, which has never been done in Benin before, with 20 percent of all villages in the country implementing infrastructure sub projects. The PSDCC mainstreamed CDD in a forced and not sustainable way. Through the provision of GMT and formation of Community Associations however, the communities are better organized to appeal to communes and government authorities to appeal more effectively for funds for the construction/rehabilitation/upkeep of local infrastructures. In addition, the ACCESS project includes incentives in its design such that the first set of communes to use external resources to fund community driven infrastructure projects will receive a bonus, and thus promote mainstreaming.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

110. Decentralization and CDD approach complement development of basic social services. This project

succeeded in marrying capacity-building support for local governments with community empowerment. Often CDD approaches are cast aside as local governments are strengthened through decentralization processes that may also lead to the loss of citizen engagement mechanisms. This project however successfully promoted decentralization with traditional CDD for infrastructure projects and CDD for the safety net program. Additionally, the safety net program and CDD were effectively integrated, as community associations developed through the Project played important roles in targeting beneficiaries, selecting public works programs, and overseeing their implementation. This also provides a strong rationale for integrating the CDD approach in safety net programs.

111. The FADeC transfer mechanism effectively transferred fiscal funds to decentralized levels for CDD. The use

of the FADeC has proved to be an effective transfer mechanism that has already been showcased to other countries in the region as best practice. Other donors support the FADeC and minor adjustments to improve it, as it has enabled traceability and auditing of resources, and sanctioning and freezing of funds when communes have used funds inappropriately.

112. Managing communal and community projects improved communal project management capacity through ‘Learning by doing’. While community sub-projects—as expected—produced higher quality infrastructure at lower cost and greater adherence to procurement procedures, communes learned by implementing sub-projects under the umbrella of the project. The communes now have put in place all structures to carry out procurement according to national laws, and improved their procurement performance over the course of the project. This justified the allocation of 20 percent of Component 1 funds to communes to directly implement infrastructure subprojects; while the bulk of the funds (80 percent) were provided to communes to oversee community implemented subprojects. This is a good way to balance the twin objectives of creating basic services infrastructure at low cost with community engagement, while strengthening local government capacity.

113. The CDD approach proved to deliver more cost effective low-complexity basic service infrastructure than

conventional methods. As demonstrated by comparisons of schools built/ rehabilitated by communes and communities through the PSDCC, and those built by contract management agencies that cost substantially


Page 38 of 66

more. Moreover, low-complexity basic service infrastructures implemented by communities are more economical and of higher quality than similar infrastructure implemented by communes. The communities took ownership of the projects they implemented, executed lower priced contracts, and constructed/ rehabilitated basic social infrastructure in a more cost-effective manner that were of a higher quality than similar projects implemented by communes. Further details provided at Annex 4.

114. Flexibility to accommodate community priorities is essential. The infrastructure sub-projects that

communities identify as critical may be very different from those planned by central, prefecture or communal levels. Even the project team did not anticipate the greater than expected demand for water from communities that materialized over the course of the project, which required the adjustment of the results framework to increase the target value of water beneficiaries and reduce the expected number of education beneficiaries. As community needs differ, additional time should be built in for developing different infrastructure plans, standard environmental and social safeguard plans for each type of infrastructure for sub-project needs.

115. Inclusion of social services in public works programs increased women’s participation. Including day care in public works programs increases female participation in public works programs by participating in both day care services and infrastructure projects.

116. Public works program reduced stigmatization of safety net beneficiaries and increased political

acceptability of the transfers. The implementation of activities that improved the living conditions of the whole community, such as by improving village tracks, and agricultural investments, and reconciled solidarity between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and reduced stigmatization as part of the transfer was in exchange for work.

117. CDD approach has empowered communities. Participation in the CDD program, GMT and the formation

of community associations have raised the level of social awareness and given voice to beneficiaries and communities about local development priorities.

118. Simple and practical tools are key to GMT effectiveness. The provision of simple and practical manuals and

easy tools for monitoring communal and community projects enhanced local capacity and improved the quality of infrastructure projects implemented. These tools were adapted for instruction of illiterate community members in local language.

119. Shared understanding and synergies developed through immersion workshops and site work. The

immersion workshops brought together contractors, their site managers and site controllers, and fostered shared understanding of the tools and their usage; while site work harmonized practical knowledge of construction techniques. The synchronization of the GMT modules with the relevant stages of implementation of community sub-projects harmonized links between training and project activities, and between members of the beneficiary communities; thereby strengthening the sustainability of the projects completed and community capacity.

120. Retaining the same trainers improved training. Retention of the same communal and community trainers

throughout implementation fostered their understanding of beneficiary needs, developed their own skills, and enabled them to provide appropriate training during the refresher workshops. The use of periodic self-assessments by trainers to evaluate their own performance and understanding of the GMT modules and PSDCC


Page 39 of 66

requirements throughout the GMT cycle increased facilitators’ level of understanding of the CCD approach.

121. Synergies can be derived from including safety net programs in the same approach as traditional CDD infrastructure projects. Through this approach many of the same processes and procedures, such as the community training, can be developed in such a way that it supports both the CDD infrastructure component and the CDD safety net component. In addition, including training for both infrastructure and safety net projects can build multiple capacities, reduce costs, and leverage multiple development outcomes for communities.

.


Page 40 of 66

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

57 RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Improving access to decentralized basic services

Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised

Target

Actual Achieved at Completion

Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 429200.00 270000.00 389766.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017

Female beneficiaries Percentage 0.00 40.00 40.00 49.30

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): See Annex 6 for calculation


Target


Timeliness of FADeC transfers to communes (average number of days’ variation from the published transfer schedule)

Days 16.00 15.00 15.00 5.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Jun-2017 31-Dec-2017


Page 41 of 66

Comments (achievements against targets):


Target


Students enrolled in schools constructed/rehabilitated under the project

Number 0.00 60000.00 58000.00 64475.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Target


Number of people in rural areas provided with access to Improved Water Sources under the project

Number 0.00 12500.00 50000.00 92500.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Target


Temporary employment created in labor intensive public works sub-projects (number of person-days)

Days 0.00 1296000.00 1296000.00 1515528.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017


Page 42 of 66


Objective/Outcome: Mainstreaming the CDD approach for decentralized basic services


Target


Resources transferred through FADeC that are executed by communities for basic social infrastructure through delegation of responsibility from communes

Percentage 0.00 15.00 15.00 17.66

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Jun-2017 31-Dec-2017


A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Component 1: Service Delivery Grants to Communes


Target


Community subprojects for basic infrastructure completed

Number 0.00 700.00 1000.00 1245.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Page 43 of 66


Target


Communes having executed at least one multi-village subproject

Number 0.00 77.00 77.00 77.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Target


Number of additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions.

Number 0.00 1200.00 1160.00 1367.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Includes 13 classrooms built under commune sub-projects


Target


Health facilities constructed, renovated, and/or equipped (number)

Number 0.00 70.00 50.00 61.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Includes 13 health facilities built under commune sub-projects


Page 44 of 66


Target


Improved community water points constructed or rehabilitated under the project

Number 0.00 50.00 200.00 370.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Includes 16 water points built under commune sub-projects


Target


Percent of total cost of transferred competencies transferred by Government to communes through the FADeC

Percentage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Jun-2017 22-Mar-2013

Comments (achievements against targets): Data was to be collected from studies led by another donor which did not materialize


Target


Percent of domestic revenues transferred by Government to communes through the FADeC

Percentage 3.30 3.40 3.40 4.62

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Jun-2017 31-Dec-2017


Page 45 of 66



Target


Resources transferred through FADeC that are executed by communities for basic social infrastructure through delegation of responsibility from communies

Percentage 0.00 15.00 15.00 17.66

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Target


Students enrolled in schools constructed/rehabiltated under the APL series

Number 0.00 60000.00 58000.00 64475.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017


Component: Component 2: Pilot Social Safety Net Program


Target



Page 46 of 66

Beneficiaries of social safety net programs

Number 0.00 12000.00 12000.00 12933.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017

Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - Female (number)

Number 0.00 6000.00 6000.00 6803.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017

Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - Unconditional cash transfers (number)

Number 0.00 12000.00 12000.00 12933.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017

Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - Cash-for-work, food-for-work and public works (number)

Number 0.00 10800.00 12063.00

31-Dec-2011 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Target


Communities implementing safety nets program

Number 0.00 120.00 120.00 125.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Page 47 of 66


Target


Public works schemes completed with satisfactory technical quality

Percentage 0.00 90.00 90.00 100.00

31-Dec-2016 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Target


Proportion of total cost of public works subprojects allocated to wages

Percentage 0.00 70.00 70.00 83.52

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Target


Transfer payments made within 5 days of when they are due, according to the annual payment calendar

Percentage 0.00 80.00 80.00 94.68

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Page 48 of 66


Target


Proportion of total safety nets transfers received by households in the bottom two quintiles on the national consumption distribution

Percentage 0.00 70.00 70.00 99.60

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Jun-2017 31-Dec-2017



Target


Communes with scalable decentralized safety net program in operation

Percentage 0.00 12.00 12.00 16.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): 12/77=16%

Component: Component 3: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building


Target


Communes with up to date financial audits with published action plans to correct any revealed deficiencies

Percentage 0.00 90.00 90.00 100.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017


Page 49 of 66



Target


Communes with second generation Community Development Plans (PDCs) which were prepared in a participatory process

Percentage 79.00 90.00 90.00 100.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Target


Communities that have received Grassroots Management Training (refresher or full GMT)

Number 0.00 3447.00 1000.00 1001.00

31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Target


Beneficiiaries of Grassroots - Number 0.00 344700.00 100000.00 213758.00


Page 50 of 66

Management Training 31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2016 31-Dec-2017 31-Dec-2017



Page 51 of 66

B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT By Project closure, all intermediate output targets were either met or exceeded.

Component 1: Under Component 1, the construction/ rehabilitation of infrastructure sub-projects had to be also service oriented, for example: essential operating equipment was to be funded as part of the sub-project, if required (i.e. the first medical endowment of a health post); and sanitation was to be ensured (i.e. the evacuation of rainwater from constructed market halls). Component 1 achieved the following benefits for municipalities and local communities, inter alia: well-positioned traffic signs, development of rural roads, development of market gardening and rice perimeters, regular monitoring and maintenance of cashew plants, fully-equipped dispensaries meeting the required standards and well equipped, the construction of shops and hangars in markets, and human powered water pumps. Commune implemented infrastructure outputs:

No. Activities Unit

1. Total no. of communal sub-projects for infrastructure completed 237

2. No. of communal water points constructed/improved 16

3. No. of additional classrooms built/rehabilitated at the primary level 13

4. No. of market infrastructure constructed/rehabilitated (market hangars, boutiques, and storage facilities)

817

5. No. of health facilities constructed, renovated, and/or equipped 11

6. No. of rural transport infrastructure constructed /improved 23


Page 52 of 66

Community implemented infrastructure outputs:

No. Activities Unit

1. Total number of community subproject for basic infrastructure completed (total)

1,245 (1,235 completed by project closure, and an additional 10 sub-projects completed by end May 2018).

2. No. of market infrastructure constructed/rehabilitated (construction and development of markets)

159 sub-projects (13 percent of community subprojects) resulting in 137 market hangars and 83 storage facilities

3. No. of additional classrooms built/rehabilitated at the primary level (construction of classroom modules, latrines and equipment)

599 subprojects completed (48 percent of community subprojects), resulting in 1,354 additional classrooms being built/ rehabilitated.

4. No. of health facilities constructed, renovated, and/or equipped (construction of health Centers, latrines and equipment)

81 sub-projects completed (7 percent of community subprojects) resulting in 50 health posts being built/rehabilitated as well as others being upgraded.

5. No. of community water points constructed/improved 298 sub-projects completed (24 percent of community subprojects) resulting in 354 water points

6. No. of transport infrastructure built/improved (construction and maintenance of streets)

108 sub-projects completed (9 percent of community subprojects)


Page 53 of 66

Component 2: Public works infrastructure and services outputs:

No. Activities Unit

1. Kilometers of rural roads maintained 900 linear km

2. Community plantations developed 198.6 ha

3. Paddy rice produced 80 tons

Maize produced 1,800 kg

4. No. of child care service centers provided at PWP sites 63

Components 3 and 4: Capacity building and training outputs:

No. Activities Unit

1. No. of communes having put in place procurement structures required by national procurement standards

77 (all)

2. No. of communities that received refresher or full Grassroots Management Training

1001

3. No. of local officials provided procurement training 705

4. No. of people who received Grassroots Management Training 213,758


Page 54 of 66

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name Role

Preparation

Supervision/ICR

John Van Dyck Task Team Leader(s)

Mathias Gogohounga Procurement Specialist(s)

Angelo Donou Financial Management Specialist

Phillippe George Pereira Guimaraes Leite Team Member

Africa Eshogba Olojoba Environmental Safeguards Specialist

Sylvie Charlotte Ida do Rego Team Member

Paivi Koskinen-Lewis Social Safeguards Specialist

Gbetoho Joachim Boko Team Member

Abdoulaye Gadiere Environmental Safeguards Specialist

Lydie Anne Billey Team Member

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost

No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)

Preparation

FY10 3.661 14,176.36

FY11 11.275 65,571.37

FY12 26.323 221,383.54

FY13 0 - 43.28


Page 55 of 66

FY16 0 1,061.80

Total 41.26 302,149.79

Supervision/ICR

FY12 0 11,821.38

FY13 35.901 106,966.66

FY14 24.836 138,466.50

FY15 22.975 99,559.84

FY16 23.822 107,560.15

FY17 21.565 123,230.83

FY18 2.767 58,728.82

Total 131.87 646,334.18


Page 56 of 66

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

* Component 4 was not created until the Additional Financing. Prior to the Additional Financing, Project Management costs were budgeted under amount at approval for Component 3. Consequently, it is not possible to calculate the percentage disbursed relative to the total approved amount.

Components Amount at

Approval (SDR)

Additional Financing

(SDR)

Total Approved

(SDR)

Actual Disbursed by Closing

(SDR)

Percentage of Approval

(US$M)

1. Service Delivery Grants to Communes

23,200,000 12,300,000 35,500,000 32,202,109 91%

2. Pilot Social Safety Net Program

3,200,000 0 3,200,000 4,610,049 144%

3. Technical Assistance and Capacity Building 3,200,000 *

3,300,000 6,500,000 7,115,986 NA *

4. Project Management

3,900,000 3,900,000 5,163,877 NA *

Total 29,600,000 19,500,000 49,100,000 49,092,021 100%

Components Amount at

Approval (US$)

Additional Financing

(US$)

Total Approved

(US$)

Actual Disbursed by Closing

(US$)

Percentage of Approval

(US$M)

1. Service Delivery Grants to Communes

36,000,000 19,000,000 55,000,000 47,476,248 86%

2. Pilot Social Safety Net Program

5,000,000 0 5,000,000 6,796,693 136%

3. Technical Assistance and Capacity Building 5,000,000 *

5,000,000 10,000,000 10,491,248 NA *

4. Project Management

6,000,000 6,000,000 7,613,213 NA *

Total 46,000,000 30,000,000 76,000,000 72,377,401 95%


Page 57 of 66

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Comparison of cost of infrastructure projects demonstrates that implementation of projects delegated to communities was cheaper and of better quality than alternative approaches. During implementation, it was found that three communes had incorrectly signed contracts for the construction of three village schools without clearance from the Project Task Team Leader (TTL), which was only allowed under community sub-projects. The TTL agreed to allow this one instance of digression in order to assess costs between commune and community implemented projects. The findings showed that under primary classrooms built directly by communes cost 11 percent more than comparable classrooms built by communities, even when taking into account the costs of training communities. In comparison, those built by contract management agencies recruited by the Ministry of Primary Education under the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) financing cost 63 percent more.

Benin: Unit cost of classroom construction (m2)

Source: What drives the unit cost of school construction? Second cost-driver:

Implementation arrangements. World Bank, 2017.

In addition, the PSDCC technical audit (2017) showed that community-executed infrastructure was of better quality than those implemented by communes: in communities, 91.1 percent of community infrastructure was of acceptable quality, 8.9 percent was structurally sound but required corrections, and no infrastructures had major structural flaws. In commune-executed projects, 56.7 percent of infrastructure was acceptable, 16.7 percent structurally sound but requiring corrections, and 26.6 percent had major structural flaws. The difference can be attributed to the increased transparency and respect of procurement procedures at the community level. A procurement audit pointed to serious weaknesses in procurement performance of communes, which prompted the Government to take corrective action in the form of temporary freezes of FADeC transfers to certain communes, removal of some commune-level staff, and procurement training for local officials financed by PSDCC.


Page 58 of 66

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

(This section presents a translated summary of the Borrower’s completion report) BACKGROUND A. Project Background. 1. The PSDCC financing agreement was signed in June 2012; however Project activities started in

March 2013. The delayed start was due to difficulties related to accessing CDD materials developed under the previous project, PNDCC, from the previous ministry’s archives. In 2014, the first grants to communes were implemented for multi-level village subprojects and community subprojects. As per the recommendations of the PSDCC mid-term review (MTR), a restructuring of the Project was carried out with adjustments made to some target indicators. In total the SSDCC received 13 World Bank supervision missions.

PSDCC DESIGN, IMPLEMENATION AND RESULTS B. Component 1: Service delivery grants to communes 2. This component relates to grants to the communes via the FADEC for the provision of basic social

services following the CDD approach. This component aims at strengthening the provision of basic services at the decentralized level as per the Communal Development Plan (PDC). Transfers operated through two windows of the FADEC: (i) Non-earmarked funds for the implementation of communal (multiple villages) sub-projects; and (ii) Earmarked funds allocated for the implementation of community subprojects. The allocation to communes were made according to a FADeC formula administered by CONAFIL and followed the PSDCC transfer schedule. The grants were linked to specific investments provided for in the PDCs, which allowed their traceability and related to the education, health, drinking water and market infrastructure sectors, and were required to adhere to environmental and social safeguard policies.

B.1.1: Sub-component 1.1: Grants for communal-scale infrastructure 3. The five-year project’s interventions for the construction of community infrastructure covered 1,001

villages and city districts in the 77 communes. Procurement activities by the communes followed Benin’s Public Procurement Code. By 31 December 2017, the level of completion of multi-village subprojects was 99.96 percent, with last project completed by 31 May 2018, bringing the completion rate to 100 percent (237 projects). The PSDCC is part of a demand driven strategy. When the Project was implemented, demand for education sector infrastructure subprojects was lower than initially forecasted, while the opposite occurred for the drinking water sector. The 237 communal subprojects completed include the following infrastructures: 186 (78.48 percent) markets; 7 (2.95 percent) schools (classrooms and literacy rooms.); 11 (4.64 percent) health posts (maternity, dispensary and equipment); 23 (9.70 percent) rural transport (service road, culverts); and 10 (4.22 percent) water for drinking. In total, the PSDCC transferred 5.040 billion FCFA for the completion of at least one multi-village sub-project by the communes, including: 3.6 billion FCFA from the initial funding; and 1.440 billion FCFA from the Additional Financing (AF).


Page 59 of 66

B.1.2: Sub-component 1.2: Grants for community-scale infrastructure 4. This component supported community investments consistent with the PDCs. The communes

delegated communities responsibility for the execution of simple infrastructure projects. Funds were transferred to the communes through the "Earmarked" window of FADeC belonging to MDGL, following the signing of a financing agreement between the commune and the beneficiary community. The allocations favored the poorest communes, as identified by a poverty index developed by INSAE. A total of 20.108 billion FCFA were transferred to 1,001 eligible communities over three years. As per the MTR recommendations, 108 million FCFA of additional funds were provided to a number of communities for the execution of sub-projects on difficult sites. As at end December 2017, the PSDCC transferred 20 billion FCFA, including 14 billion FCFA from the initial credit and 6.108 billion FCFA from the AF. The types of subproject sectors implemented by communities included: drinking water (26 percent), education (48 percent), markets (12 percent), public health (7 percent), and rural transport (8 percent). A total of 1,110 Site Controllers for community subprojects were hired. As of 31 May 2018, a total of 1,245 community sub-projects have been completed, 14 have not yet started and 32 are being implemented, of the 1,291 approved. The average implementation rate of the subprojects for which procurement has been completed (1269) is 98.66 percent at May 31, 2018, compared to 98.47 percent as at 31 December 2017.

B.2: Component 2: Social Safety Net Pilot 5. The social safety nets pilot (Pilot) tested a social protection approach composed of two windows: (i)

unconditional cash transfers to about 13,000 of the poorest beneficiary households targeted after community pre-identification and PMT surveys; and (ii) conditional cash transfers as part of a public works program (PWP), which provided work opportunities to the same beneficiaries during the lean season from March to June each year in central and southern Benin. The Pilot was conducted in 12 communes of Benin, one commune per department, including 125 villages. The implementation of the Pilot resulted in an overall disbursement of 3.054 billion FCFA, of which 2.569 billion FCFA (84.11 percent) were used to pay the conditional and unconditional cash transfers. As part of the public works projects (PWP), work was carried out in 125 villages.

B.2.1: Sub-component 2.2: Unconditional cash transfers 6. With World Bank technical assistance, a single guide for targeting poorer households was

developed, followed by a validation workshop and 85 actors were trained, including 21 women. The GMT trainers assisted the communities to set up Village Identification Committees (CVI). A total of 997 community members have been designated as CVI members for targeting, and pre-identified poor households for the Pilot. A Village General Assembly validated the list. Following this, PMT surveys were conducted on the households identified by the CVIs. The validation process of the PMT lists in the 125 participating communities was completed on 6 February 2015, following which the first payments were made. Two payment agencies were contracted to deliver unconditional cash transfer payments to the 13,000 beneficiary households, including: FECECAM which used traditional transfer mechanisms, and MTN which provided electronic transfers to beneficiaries in Cotonou.

B.2.2: Sub-component 2.2: Conditional cash transfers through PWPs 7. A consultant was hired to develop an initial list of eligible activities under the PWPs, which was

finalized and validated by the National Committee of Social Protection. The PWPs achieved the


Page 60 of 66

following: more than 80 tons of paddy harvested through the subproject 'rice perimeter'; 901Km (linear km) of rural tracks maintained; 58,765 cashew trees planted on 96 hectares of plantation; 34 dumpsites destroyed; 4.25 ha of market gardening improved for additional revenue opportunities at the community level; 9 ha of community plantation maintained; and 1,8387 square meters of public places maintained.

B.3: Component 3: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building 8. This component consisted of four parts: (i) technical assistance and capacity building of MDGL,

CONAFIL and other key ministries; (ii) technical assistance and capacity building of municipalities; (iii) Grassroots Management Training (GMT) for communities, building community capacity to participate in the development planning process and to assume responsibilities for implementing development projects; and (iv) project management. At MTR, it was decided to postpone the Community scorecardactivity due to the high bid proposed by the contractor.

B.3.1: Subcomponent 3.1: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building for MDGL 9. This component aimed at strengthening the capacity of MDGL and CONAFIL to pilot the PSDCC

based on a capacity building plan for CDD ownership. In addition, Prefectural Cells for Community-Led Decentralized Services were set up.

B.3.2: Subcomponent 3.2: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building for Communes 10. The activities carried out to reinforce the capacities of the communes to adopt the CDD approach

included: (i) updating the methodological guide for the development of 3rd generation PDCs and integrating the CDD approach under the leadership of MDGL; and (ii) training 705 local elected officials and municipal administrators on procurement. The CeFAL was contracted to provide training to communes with the objective to enhance grassroots democracy and local development in communities. Within the training framework, seven modules were rolled out including (i) Filing of procurement files, (ii) Preparation of public procurement plans, (iii) Preparation of tender documents for supplies and works, (iv) Preparation of requests for proposals for intellectual services, (v) Analysis and evaluation offers for goods and services, (vi) Analysis and evaluation of offers for intellectual services, and (vii) Contract management. The training benefitted 705 mayors, elected officials, and other actors in the procurement chain from the 77 municipalities, and led to gradual improvement of the quality of procurement, as noted in the latest procurement audits.

B.3.3: Subcomponent 3.3: Grassroots Management Training (GMT) for Communities 11. The objectives of the GMT program were to strengthen the capacities of communities to participate

in the planning process and assume the responsibilities of implementation of development projects delegated by the communes through the CDD approach. The GMT included three strategic intervention components: (i) the ‘learning’ component, implemented in three phases: coaching community leaders, classroom sessions, and village-level feedback sessions; (ii) the ‘practical’ component providing technical assistance to the communities for the implementation of their community sub-projects; and (iii) monitoring and evaluation. As of 31 December 2017, GMT was provided to the 1,001 beneficiary communities, including 12,007 individuals (49.75 percent women), with an aggregate total of 213,758 individuals (49.26 percent women) for both classroom training and restitution sessions. On average a community member attended five restitution sessions, and the GMT benefited around 100,000 people.


Page 61 of 66

12. The GMT tools developed are: (i) Community Plantation Management, (ii) Landscaping Perimeter

Development, (iii) Rice Perimeter Development, (iv) Garbage Collection and Treatment, (v) Rural Road Maintenance, (vi) Maintenance of Public Places, (vii) Community Plant Maintenance, (viii) Daycare, (ix) PWP Specific Procurement, and (x) PWP Financial Management. The assessment of the GMT shows that 67 percent of Senior GMT Consultants have a satisfactory overall level of performance, which is higher than the overall average of 77 percent, with 17 percent of Senior GMT Consultants rated ‘highly satisfactory’. On the other hand, 34 percent of senior GMTs had an overall performance level below the average of 77 percent. With regard to field training, 19.72 percent of the community development facilitator (CDF) workforce had a cumulative overall performance rating as ‘moderately satisfactory’. A more rigorous follow-up of the intervention of the CDFs is necessary to guarantee the effective adoption of the CDD tools by members of the beneficiary communities.

13. The results of the GMT achievements and beneficiary satisfaction surveys revealed that knowledge

acquired rose by 0.5 points from the first assessment that had an average of 84/100, and in general the performance of women was higher than that of men. Overall, the various beneficiaries surveyed are very satisfied with the GMT, identifying the following strengths: the anchoring of the GMT in the local culture is effective; the GMT was conducted in an inclusive way; the training curricula were relevant to beneficiary communities and adapted for adults; the program contributed to (i) job creation, (ii) the enhancement of the social status of beneficiaries and community trainers; and (iii) the construction of key infrastructure; effectiveness of the communes delegation of the contracting authority to the beneficiary community; and community empowerment in decision-making.

B.3.4: Subcomponent 3.4: Social Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation 14. This subcomponent included: (i) the establishment of the Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM); and

(ii) the use of Community Scorecards. At the MTR, a decision was taken to replace the establishment of Community Assessment Sheets and instead set up a Complaints Management Mechanism. A total of 24 local units of Complaint Management Mechanisms, one Complaints Management Body composed of a General Assembly (which includes the SSDCC, the MDGL and CONAFIL) and a Technical Secretariat (composed of the Secretary of Direction and a Communication Specialist) have been set up. The members of the local units benefited from training on Conflict Management and Mediation Techniques, and on the content of the Operational Guide for Complaint Management.

B.4: Component 4: Project Management 15. This component was developed with the AF and separated out project management costs from

administrative costs under Component 3, and supported coordination, monitoring and evaluation, and communication activities to ensure and strengthen the performance of the Project.

a. Implementation of communication strategy 16. The main objective of the communication strategy was to develop a system that could provide

relevant information on CDD approaches, PSDCC implementation and results, fund flows, and activities and performance of all Project stakeholders. Implementation included: information dissemination about the Project through multiple channels (radio, TV, tabloids, social media); promoting of the CDD approach via radio and mobilizing support of communes and communities to


Page 62 of 66

achieve the objectives of the PSDCC; and sharing the successes, performances and innovations, best practices and lessons learned from the CDD approach. The following were achieved: partnerships with 33 radio stations that broadcast 2,303 hours of project GMT materials in 31 languages; 6 documentary films produced and broadcast on two national prime-time media; 2 magazines produced and distributed to beneficiaries; 2 field visits with the press followed by the production of articles about the Project; creation of a website; and development of an interactive documentary film about CDD implementation through the GMT cycle. The partnership with local radio stations had the most impact on the communities, as this facilitated the administration of GMT, increased understanding of the CDD approach, gave voice to beneficiary communities, and facilitated citizen engagement in the monitoring of infrastructure subprojects.

b. Environmental and social safeguards management 17. The PSDCC executed the sub-projects in line with the ESMF and CPRP. Tools were designed and

made available to the stakeholders in charge of the infrastructure subprojects and PWPs, and the responsibilities for the various activities were defined. These measures were specified in the sub-project file approved by the CDCC and included in the Local Bidding Documents (DAOL) and standard contract of works with implementing companies. At the end of the Project, a compliance review rated safeguards compliance at 80 percent, which is considered ‘satisfactory’.

c. National Procurement Management (SSDCC) 18. A procurement review was conducted for the period January 2013 to December 2017. As of

December 31, 2017, out of a total of 71 non-consulting supplies and services contracts, 48 contracts have been fully completed and their contracts have been signed and approved. For consulting services contracts, out of 72 planned contracts, only 47 were signed and approved. Several difficulties were noted throughout Project implementation, such as: delays in developing ToRs; obtaining answers to the verification letters sent to the DGID, and in evaluating tender documents; and lack of LMGL officers and associated structures for procurement activities.

d. Financial management of the PSDCC 19. The cumulative disbursements as at 31 December 2017 amount to 38.338 billion FCFA out of a total

financing estimated at 36.480 billion FCFA. The resources mobilized are spread over the two sources of funding: 22.375 billion FCFA from the initial financing, and 15.964 billion FCFA from the AF. The resource mobilization rate for both sources of funding is 105.09 percent. The difference is due to foreign exchange gains.

e. Audits and reviews of compliance 20. Audits, compliance reviews of environmental and social safeguards, GMT assessments, and

satisfaction surveys were conducted as part of the PSDCC. The reports from these studies reported compliance to be ‘satisfactory’. Although the procurement capacity of communes has generally improved in recent years with support from the PSDCC and other partners, most of them are not yet fully compliant with national procurement procedures, since they have moved up from the ‘non-performing’ to only ‘moderately non-performing’. Annual audits show that the contracts awarded by the communities were ‘universally compliant’. Compliance satisfaction was assessed as ‘moderately satisfactory’ for all communities, characterized generally by transparent and free access given to tenderers for the purchase of consultation files and the submission of tenders.


Page 63 of 66

21. The non-compliance issues observed include the following indiscretions: unjustified extension of

tenders; non-compliance by the awardees with all the qualification criteria; non-application of all the qualification criteria; and rejection of offers for unjustified and/or unproven reasons. Other observations related to procurement include: significant subproject implementation delays by the contract holders without concrete actions being taken to remedy them; delays in payments due to non-transfer of resources to the community accounts by the communes, the lack of liquidity at the Receiver-Collector level; not meeting deadlines; and prefectural units failing to notify communities once the authenticity of administrative documents have been verified.

C. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

C.1 Lessons 22. Learned from implementation of Component 1

• Providing communities with simple, practical and easy tools for monitoring implementation of community and communal infrastructures improved the quality of their achievements;

• The development of standards for environmental and social safeguards and incorporating them in DAOLs and infrastructure project contracts have facilitated the application of these measures;

• The immersion workshops that brought together the contractors, building managers and site controllers harmonized understanding of the tools and their use;

• The on-site clinics put on by the project gave the actors (masons, scrap metal workers, laborers, building managers, site controllers, and contractors) better understanding of different construction techniques;

• The systematic assessment of all sites before the start of works, geotechnical studies by laboratories, and test reports significantly helped to improve structures;

• Key control point data sheets improved Site Controllers’ monitoring of subproject implementation.

23. Lessons learned from implementation of Component 2

• Conditional cash transfers strengthened solidarity and supported reconciliation of beneficiaries. The beneficiaries brought a ‘plus’ for their community by improving the living conditions of the whole community through the PWP activities, which also reduced stigmatization.


• Empowerment of communities through ‘learning by doing’ have been real levers for achievements made and the high degree of beneficiary satisfaction.

• The synchronization of the GMT modules with the management of the community sub-projects developed synergies among the different actors and fostered lasting links between various members of beneficiary communities, guaranteeing sustainability of the project's achievements.


• Broad and repeated radio broadcasts raised awareness and visibility of the PSDCC's approach and performance;

• The self-assessment of the program facilitators increased their understanding of the CCD approach through the GMT cycle; and

• CDD-focused programming has given voice to beneficiaries and raised social awareness.


Page 64 of 66

C.2 Recommendations

• Correct weaknesses in (i) infrastructure implementation tools; (ii) supervisory bodies operating in the field; (iii) materials used for infrastructure;

• Update implementation plans for sectors that have revised their standards (i.e. Ministry of Health).

• The social safety net program should be extended to other municipalities with increases to transfer amounts. A ‘complementary’ component should be introduced to strengthen the capacities of beneficiaries for income generating activities.

• Encourage municipalities to allocate part of the FADEC funds for the implementation of activities following the CDD approach;

• Assess the possibility of scaling up the GMT at the ministerial level.

• Continue building the capacity of stakeholders at all levels to capitalize on the achievements of the PSDCC in order to obtain better results for the follow up project;

• Refine the project strategy for the dissemination and ownership of the CDD approach with line ministries;

• Renew contracts with the radio hosts who were involved in the PSDCC radio strategy for the follow up project to benefit from their experience;

• Increase radio coverage to increase understanding and ownership of CDD by communities;

• Consider including production costs, bonuses or reimbursable expenses for program managers to better guarantee the quality of their productions in new contracts with radio stations; and


Page 65 of 66

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Project Beneficiaries Overall, the project’s total beneficiaries were calculated as follows:

Beneficiaries

Grassroots Management Training 213,758

Education 64,475

Water 92,500

Health 6,100

Safety Nets 12,933

Total 389,766

Government of Benin organizational structure

Benin Central Government

Deconcentrated level

12 Departments / Prefectures

Decentralized level 77 Communes

Administrative but not legal entities

and without financial

autonomy

546 Arrondissements

5,290 Communities

[villages for rural communes and city districts for urban communes]

Hamlets (numerous)