i'm embarrassed for you: the effect of valuing and perspective taking on empathic embarrassment...

I’m Embarrassed for You: The Effect of Valuing andPerspective Taking on Empathic Embarrassment and

Empathic Concern

Eric L. Stocks1

University of Texas at TylerDavid A. Lishner

University of Wisconsin Oshkosh

Bethany L. Waits and Eirah M. DownumUniversity of Texas at Tyler

Much research has investigated the cognitive-perceptual factors that promoteempathic concern. However, little research has investigated such factors for a relatedemotion: empathic embarrassment. We suggest that 2 factors promote empathicembarrassment for a target in a compromising situation: liking the target, andimagining oneself in the target’s situation. Results revealed that liking a sociallycompromised target increases both empathic concern and empathic embarrassment(Experiment 1). Furthermore, imagining the person’s thoughts and feelings increasesempathic concern and a desire for future exposure to the person, whereas imaginingoneself in the person’s situation primarily increases empathic embarrassment(Experiment 2). Implications of these results for future empathy research and appli-cations for those who suffer from chronic embarrassability are discussed.jasp_699 1..26

Imagine overhearing two people conversing, during which details about arather unpleasant first date are recounted. Although you are not directlyinvolved in the situation, it is nonetheless possible to experience a range ofemotions for, or about, the person describing that unpleasant experience. Forexample, one might feel embarrassment on the other’s behalf. Or, one mightexperience compassion for his or her troubles. In some cases, one might feelnothing at all in response to the other’s plight. This rather commonplacescenario raises important questions about when—and for whom—one willexperience various empathic emotions in response to events in the lives ofothers.

Personal Embarrassment

Personal embarrassment is an unpleasant emotional response to publicfaux pas, social conspicuousness, and the like (Buss, 1980; Goffman, 1956;

1Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Eric Stocks, University ofTexas at Tyler, 3900 University Boulevard, Tyler, TX 75799. E-mail: [email protected]

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Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2011, 41, 1, pp. 1–26.© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Miller, 1996). This emotion elicits a coherent sequence of behavior (e.g.,blushing, averting one’s eyes) that is both unique to embarrassment andeasily recognized by others (Asendorpf, 1990; Edelmann & Hampson, 1981;Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Anderson, 2000). Research also has suggested thatstable individual differences exist in people’s tendency to experience personalembarrassment across a variety of social situations (for a review, see Miller,1996). For such individuals, the constant threat of experiencing embarrass-ment can have debilitating social consequences. Furthermore, observers highin personal embarrassability tend to overestimate the extent to which othersexperience embarrassment (Marcus & Miller, 1999), and score high on mea-sures of other personality traits that affect social behavior, such as publicself-consciousness, shyness, concern about negative evaluation from others,and low self-esteem (Miller, 1995a, 1995b).

Aside from the direct effects of embarrassing circumstances on theindividual subjected to them, research has suggested that witnessing anindividual in such circumstances may also affect observers. The social con-sequences of witnessing an individual in embarrassing circumstances includea reduction in perceived interpersonal transgressions exhibited by that indi-vidual, as well as increased trust, liking, and forgiveness of him or her(Keltner & Anderson, 2000; Miller, 1996). It also has been suggested thatadult observers express kindness, empathy, support, or other remedial strat-egies to allay the target’s concerns about committing embarrassment-elicitingfaux pas (e.g., Metts & Cupach, 1989). Taken together, the existing researchsuggests that embarrassment is an emotional response that has importantpersonal and social consequences, both for the victim of embarrassingcircumstances and for those observing him or her.

Empathy

The term empathy has been used as a label for a number of psychologicalprocesses and related consequences over the past century (Davis, 1994).According to Batson (1991), one of the most commonly used definitions ofempathy is “feeling a vicarious emotion that is congruent with but not nec-essarily identical to the emotion of another” (p. 86). This view of empathydistinguishes it from other emotions that one may experience, such as per-sonal distress or anger, in that empathy is felt on behalf of another person,whereas other emotions are generally felt on one’s own behalf (Batson,Early, & Salvarani, 1997).

It is important to note, however, that several unique manifestations ofempathy exist, and the specific form it takes depends on the eliciting situa-tion. Although empathy is typically construed as an emotion experienced

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when witnessing another’s suffering (e.g., Davis, 1994; Hoffman, 2000;Krebs, 1975), it also is possible to respond with empathic joy when the otheris experiencing positive states (e.g., Smith, Keating, & Stotland, 1989), withempathic anger when the other has been dealt an injustice (e.g., Hoffman,2000; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003), and so forth.Consequently, it is perhaps more appropriate to view empathy as a categoryof emotional responses that are felt on behalf of others, rather than as aunitary, prototypical emotion of the sort typically included in models of basicemotions.

Empathic Concern

One of the most widely studied consequences of empathy is its effect onprosocial behavior (for reviews, see Batson, 1991; Davis, 1994). The associa-tion between empathy for a person in need and an increased tendency to helphim or her has been well documented (e.g., Batson, 1991). Note that in thisconnection, the term empathy refers to an other-oriented emotional responseof compassion and concern caused by witnessing another’s need. Conse-quently, the term empathic concern is often used to distinguish this manifes-tation of empathy from other forms of vicarious emotional responses. Givenits association with prosocial behavior, empathic concern may be said toelicit an approach orientation toward the target whose circumstancesproduce the emotion (Davis, 1994; Heider, 1958; Lewin, 1938).

Empathic Embarrassment

Of concern in the present research is a relatively neglected manifestationof empathy: empathic embarrassment. In his seminal work on the issue,Miller (1987) demonstrated that humans are capable of experiencing embar-rassment for another person. Specifically, Miller found that participantsexperienced embarrassment while another person performed a series ofremarkably atypical public behaviors (e.g., singing, dancing, throwing atantrum in front of a stranger at the request of an experimenter). However, inthe ensuing two decades, empathic embarrassment research has generallyfollowed the same tack as research on personal embarrassment; that is, it hasfocused either on the individual differences that influence the extent to whichpeople experience it, or on its social functions and consequences for targetsand observers (Keltner & Anderson, 2000; Marcus & Miller, 1999; for areview, see Miller, 1996). The insights gained from this research are impor-tant, but many questions remain unanswered regarding the processesinvolved in generating empathic embarrassment.

EMPATHIC EMBARRASSMENT 3

Specifically, a moment’s reflection suggests that we do not experienceempathic emotions to the same degree for every target. In some cases, we mayfeel empathic concern; in others, empathic embarrassment; for some targets,we may feel neither or both. If this is true, what cognitive-perceptual factorsdetermine which, if any, empathic emotion will be experienced? Similarly, ifan empathic emotion is experienced, what factors determine its intensity?Also, existing research using self-report evidence (e.g., Metts & Cupach,1989) has suggested that participants claim to behave in a helpful mannerwhen observing others’ embarrassing circumstances, which suggests thatempathic embarrassment may elicit an approach orientation in the samevein as empathic concern. However, Miller (1996) noted that experiencingempathic embarrassment is aversive and, as a consequence, “people are oftenmotivated to avoid others’ embarrassments” (p. 176) and the situations thatcause them. Although Miller supplied no evidence to back up the claim, it is,on its face, a reasonable hypothesis. But if this is true, empathic embarrass-ment may not be associated with an approach orientation. These conflictingclaims suggest that the motivational and behavioral consequences ofempathic embarrassment remain unclear and, more importantly, that differ-ent manifestations of empathy may have different social consequences.

As an important step toward understanding the cognitive-perceptual andmotivational processes involved in empathic embarrassment, the presentresearch focuses on three issues. First, we examine the role of liking (or, whatsome researchers call “valuing the other’s welfare”) as an antecedent ofempathic embarrassment. We propose that liking the other enhancesempathic reactions toward him or her in general. That is, we hypothesize thatliking a victim of embarrassing circumstances increases empathic embarrass-ment for him or her. Based on recent research, we predict that liking the otherwill also increase empathic concern for him or her (Batson, Eklund,Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007).

Second, we examine the role of perspective taking as an additional ante-cedent of empathic emotions. We propose that the relative intensity ofempathic concern and empathic embarrassment is a function of the perspec-tive one adopts when witnessing the victim of embarrassing circumstances.Specifically, we hypothesize that imagining how the victim feels about his orher situation will tend to increase empathic concern, whereas imaginingoneself in the victim’s situation will tend to increase empathic embarrass-ment; that is, different perspectives produce different manifestations ofempathy.

Finally, we examine the motivational consequences of these empathicemotions. We propose that empathic concern will be associated with anorientation to approach the victim, whereas empathic embarrassment willnot be associated with an approach motivation. This predicted difference in

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motivational orientation is consistent with Miller’s (1996) claim that experi-encing empathic embarrassment is unpleasant, and people generally prefer toavoid situations that elicit it.

Experiment 1: Effect of Liking the Other onEmpathic Embarrassment and Empathic Concern

Miller (1987) demonstrated that observers experience empathic embar-rassment for a person performing an embarrassing task, regardless ofwhether prior interaction with the person was independent, cooperative, orcompetitive. In some respects, Miller’s prior-interaction manipulation couldbe construed as a weak manipulation of liking. If so, his results suggest thatthe positive (cooperative) or negative (competitive) nature of prior interac-tion has little, if any, effect on empathic embarrassment. It is important tonote, however, that Miller’s procedure manipulated cooperation and com-petition in a game-like setting, which may not have caused strong liking of, orantipathy toward, the target. Consequently, this research may not haveprovided a strong test of the effect of liking on empathic embarrassment.

In contrast, recent research by Batson et al. (2007) that used a muchstronger manipulation of liking (which they refer to as valuing the other’swelfare) suggests that liking a needy other is an important independentantecedent of another manifestation of empathy: empathic concern. Wesuggest that liking the other is also important for eliciting empathicembarrassment. To test this hypothesis, participants in Experiment 1 wererandomly assigned to receive positive or negative information about anindividual’s character in order to manipulate the degree to which they liked,or disliked, the target. This manipulation was adapted from Batson et al.’sprocedure. Participants then listened to a brief interview in which the targetdescribed a recent embarrassing event in his life, after which they reportedhow much empathic concern and empathic embarrassment they felt for him.We predicted that participants who liked the target would experience moreempathic embarrassment for him than would participants who disliked him.In line with research by Batson et al., we also expected to replicate the effectof liking on empathic concern. Thus, we expected that liking the target wouldproduce a range of empathic emotions.

Method

Participants

Study participants were 30 freshman and sophomore undergraduatestudents (24 females, 6 males) at the University of Texas at Tyler who


participated in Experiment 1 in exchange for extra credit. Participants wererandomly assigned to one of two conditions: liked target versus dislikedtarget. There are 2 females assigned to the disliked-target condition who wereexcluded and replaced because of equipment failure.

Procedure

Participants were run individually through a procedure lasting approxi-mately 30 min. Upon their arrival to the study, participants were escortedinto a private research cubicle and were asked to read an informed-consentstatement and an introduction to the study. Written instructions for the studywere as follows:

This study is being conducted by Professor L. Schmitt as aservice for the UT–Tyler Office of Student Transition. Studentswith different kinds of needs and experiences at UT–Tyler oftencontact the Office of Student Transition (OST). In order tomore effectively help these students, OST is interested in gaininga better understanding of the stresses and experiences faced bystudents during college.

For assistance in gaining this understanding, OST turned to Dr.Schmitt, an expert on issues of adjustment to stressful lifeevents. This collaboration led to the present study. OST wishesto know how typical the experiences of those students contact-ing the office are of students at UTT in general. Accordingly,among those students who have contacted the OST with diffi-culties, 20 incoming freshmen were asked to provide personalaccounts of what they had been through as they made thetransition to college life. Each of these students gave severalinterviews over a two-month period to chart their activitiesduring this time. Dr. Schmitt has received permission from thestudents to use excerpts of their interviews for the purpose ofthis project.

Some students supplied a written “diary,” other students sup-plied audiotaped interviews, and a few students supplied both.We are now in the process of determining the typicality of these20 accounts and, as a participant in this study, you will berandomly assigned to either read a transcript of an interview, tohear an audiotaped interview, or both from one of our studentvolunteers. Then, we would like to get your reactions to the

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interview and ask you to assess the typicality of what thisstudent has experienced compared to what students you knowhave gone through.

Each of these interviews will be read by only a few participantsin the study so that we can gain a range of responses. Yourreactions and assessments are very important to us. They willhelp OST more effectively meet the needs of students experienc-ing difficulties.

Next, participants read a brief transcript depicting a recent event in thelife of “Zack,” ostensibly a freshman making the transition into college life.(In reality, Zack, the information supplied in the transcript, and the contentsof the audio clip were fictitious.) The contents of the transcript depended onthe condition to which participants were assigned. Because the likingmanipulation was presented via computer, the research assistant was blind toparticipants’ assigned condition.

Liked-target condition. Participants who were assigned to the liked-targetcondition read the following written transcript:

You know what they say—sometimes a lot can happen in oneday. This was one of those times for me. Last Tuesday, I showedup to campus a little early for my 9:30 class. On the way here,there was this old woman in the middle of the sidewalk. Theweather was really bad that morning, and she was just standingthere, holding a bag of junk or something. She stopped me,looking really confused, and said she couldn’t find her house.She seemed really out of it. I asked her if she remembered heraddress. Fortunately, I sort of knew where it was—about threeblocks away. I told her not to worry, that I could take her there.It took a while to get her home because she couldn’t walk veryfast. But, when we got closer, she recognized the neighborhoodand calmed down a little. When she saw her house, she seemedreally happy. Once I got her inside, I said goodbye and took off.

This positive information about the target was supplied in order to causeparticipants to like Zack.

Disliked-target condition. Participants who were assigned to the disliked-target condition instead read the following written transcript:

[Same as before through “. . . seemed really out of it.”] I told herI had no idea where she lived and to get out of my way. But she


didn’t. She grabbed my arm and kept saying something aboutbeing lost. She wouldn’t let go of my arm. She didn’t seemto understand I was in a hurry. I told her to get the hell outof my way, and she just started to cry. I had no choice but tojerk my arm free. She fell down, her bag hit the ground andbroke, and things spilled everywhere. I told her she got whatshe deserved, and that she didn’t belong on campus anyway.Then I took off.

This information was supplied in order to cause participants to dislikeZack.

After reading the written transcript, the participants were promptedto listen to a brief audio interview with “Zack.” The script for the audiointerview, read by an actor hired for the study, was as follows:

I know other people are going to read this and think I am soweird, but when I volunteered for this research I promised to behonest—so here it goes. Last week I had one of those days whennothing goes right. I worked late that night and slept throughmy first class and barely made it in time for my second one. Ididn’t miss any tests or anything, but looking back I shouldhave known that my day wasn’t going to get any better.Anyway, even after missing my class, I was still in a great moodbecause my friend hooked me up with this super hot girl, and wewere going to have our first date that night. Me and Sarah metup at a party my friend Julie was having at her house.

Everything was going great. We all sat around and listened tosome music, ate some pizza, and watched a movie. Sarah and Italked a lot that night, and I thought I must be dreaming. Sarahtold a really funny joke, and we were both laughing really hardabout it. I was laughing so hard I blew Coke out of my nose,and that made us laugh even harder. As we were laughing, Iripped a big one, and it smelled really bad. And we both knewwho did it! She told me it was no big deal, but I could tell thatit bothered her. The next day she didn’t really talk to me. I waspretty bummed about it, but I think it will be ok.

Measurement of liking, empathic concern, and empathic embarrassment.Once they finished listening to the interview, participants completed a packetthat contained (a) an emotional response questionnaire designed to assessboth empathic concern and empathic embarrassment; and (b) a question-

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naire that contained checks on the value manipulation, along with otheritems consistent with the cover story. The emotional response question-naire contained 22 emotion adjectives, each rated on a 7-point scale rangingfrom 1 (none at all) to 7 (most intense imaginable), with the followinginstructions:

Please circle a number to indicate the degree to which you arefeeling each of these emotional reactions as a result of learningabout the student’s experiences. Do not indicate how you thinkother people might respond; just indicate how you are actuallyfeeling at this time.

An empathic concern index was created by averaging responses toemotion adjectives used by Batson (1991) in previous empathic concernresearch. Following Miller’s (1987, 1996) lead, empathic embarrassment wasassessed by participants’ response to the emotion adjective embarrassed ratedon the same 7-point scale.2 This strategy for measuring participants’ vicariousemotional responses has been used in dozens of previous experiments cover-ing a broad range of empathic emotions (for reviews, see Batson, 1991; Davis,1994).

Debriefing. When participants finished the questionnaires, they received averbal debriefing in which they were informed of the study’s purpose andeach element of the procedure. Participants were then thanked for their timeand excused.

2We attempted to create a multiple-item scale to assess empathic embarrassment, similar tothe ones used to assess empathic concern and distress. In a pilot study, we asked 22 UT–Tylerjuniors and seniors to report on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (would never use that word) to 9(would always use that word) the degree to which they would use each word on a list of 10 wordsto describe a time when they “either farted in front of a classroom full of people or fell out oftheir chair during class.” The list included embarrassed and several synonyms (e.g., abashed,chagrined, humiliated). Embarrassed was, by far, the most commonly used word (M = 8.54,SD = 1.01). With the exception of humiliated (M = 7.54), synonyms of embarrassment did notfare well (abashed, M = 1.36; chagrined, M = 1.18). More to the point, during the second part ofthe study, participants were asked to respond, using the same scale, the degree to which theywould use each word to describe how they felt when they “saw someone else engage in either ofthose behaviors.” Again, embarrassed was the clear favorite (M = 8.50), and none of the otheradjectives was rated above 2.50. We then held a discussion with the participants to understandwhy some of the synonyms were not rated higher. Specifically, when asked why humiliated wasnot rated higher, participants routinely noted that it feels “natural” to say “I’m embarrassed foryou,” whereas it is very uncommon to say “I’m humiliated for you.” Regarding the remainingsynonyms, the vast majority of participants (19/22) had neither heard of, nor used words likechagrined or abashed. As such, we adopted the same strategy used in all of the previous empathicembarrassment research of which we are aware and assessed this emotion with the single termembarrassed.


Results and Discussion

Assessing the Effectiveness of the Liking Manipulation

Two items were included in the final questionnaire to assess the effective-ness of the liking manipulation. Means and standard deviations for theprimary manipulation checks and dependent measures are presented inTable 1. The first check on the liking manipulation asked participants torespond to the question “How would you describe the value you place on thisperson’s welfare?” on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very negative) to 7 (verypositive). Participants who were assigned to the liked-target conditionreported valuing the target to a greater degree (M = 4.80, SD = 1.66) than didparticipants who were assigned to the disliked-target condition (M = 3.73,SD = 1.03), t(28) = 2.11, p < .05 (all tests are two-tailed).

The second check on the manipulation asked participants to respond tothe question “How likable did you find the student whose interview youheard?” on a similar 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).Once again, participants who were assigned to the liked-target conditionreported liking the target to a greater degree (M = 4.60, SD = 1.55) than didparticipants who were assigned to the disliked-target condition (M = 3.33,SD = 1.59), t(28) = 2.21, p < .04.

Also included in this questionnaire were three items designed to assess thedegree to which participants (a) remained objective; (b) imagined themselvesin the target’s situation; or (c) imagined the target’s thoughts and feelings.The liking manipulation had no effect on any of these measures (all ts < .10,

Table 1

Means of Measures by Condition: Experiment 1

Measure

Disliked target Liked target

M SD M SD

Value target’s welfare 3.73a 1.03 4.80b 1.66Like target 3.33a 1.59 4.60b 1.55Distress 3.19a 1.21 1.97b 1.12Empathic concern 2.06a 0.71 3.26b 1.22Empathic embarrassment 2.53a 1.55 4.33b 1.99

Note. n = 15 per condition. Responses reported on a 7-point scale. Within a row,means with different subscripts are significantly different at p � .05 (two-tailed).

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all ps > .48). Thus, our manipulation effectively influenced the degree towhich participants liked the target, but it did not have an effect on theperspective that participants adopted toward the target.

Effect of the Liking Manipulation on Participants’ Emotional ResponsesToward the Target

Although not included as manipulation checks per se, several itemsincluded in the emotional response questionnaire provide additional evidenceof the effectiveness of the liking manipulation. For example, participants whowere assigned to the disliked-target condition reported experiencing moreoutrage at the target (M = 2.40, SD = 1.55) than did participants who wereassigned to the liked-target condition (M = 1.27, SD = 0.79), t(28) = 2.52,p < .02. Similarly, participants who were assigned to the disliked-target con-dition reported being more “pissed off” at the target (M = 2.20, SD = 1.42)than did participants who were assigned to the liked-target condition(M = 1.13, SD = 0.35), t(28) = 2.82, p < .01. Participants’ reactions towardthe target presumably were caused by his harsh treatment of the elderlywoman depicted in the written transcript, but both of the effects notedpreviously attest to the strength of the manipulation.

Effect of the Liking Manipulation on Empathic Concern, EmpathicEmbarrassment, and Distress

An empathic concern index was derived by averaging participants’responses to the emotion adjectives of compassionate, moved, softhearted,sympathetic, tender, and warm (Cronbach’s a = .85). Participants who wereassigned to the liked-target condition reported experiencing empathicconcern for the target to a greater degree (M = 3.26, SD = 1.22) than didparticipants who were assigned to the disliked-target condition (M = 2.06,SD = 0.71), t(28) = 3.29, p < .01.

Participants who were assigned to the liked-target condition also reportedexperiencing more empathic embarrassment for the target (M = 4.33,SD = 1.99) than did participants who were assigned to the disliked-targetcondition (M = 2.53, SD = 1.55), t(28) = 2.76, p < .01.3 As would be

3The small number of males in the sample resulted from a lack of males in the participantpool, which rendered parametric statistical analyses of potential gender differences inappropri-ate. However, the valuing manipulation appeared to affect the responses of men and womensimilarly, even though women tended to report higher levels of both empathic concern andempathic embarrassment overall. Women reported more empathic concern and empathic


anticipated by their similar susceptibility to the liking manipulation,empathic concern and empathic embarrassment were positively correlated(r = .62, p < .001).

As noted previously, we created an index of distress by averagingresponses to the emotion terms of disturbed, distressed, upset, and uneasy(a = .84). The results suggest that participants who were assigned to thedisliked-target condition reported experiencing distress to a greater degree(M = 3.19, SD = 1.21) than did participants who were assigned to the liked-target condition (M = 1.97, SD = 1.12), t(28) = 2.85, p < .008. This effect ispresumably a result of the target’s harsh and disturbing treatment of thewoman in the transcript. Distress was not significantly correlated with eitherempathic embarrassment (r = -.09, p > .60) or empathic concern (r = -.02,p > .90).

Overall, these results indicate that the liking manipulation was successfuland that participants in the liked-target condition experienced moreempathic concern and empathic embarrassment for the target than did par-ticipants in the disliked-target condition. Conversely, participants in thedisliked-target condition experienced more distress than did participants inthe liked-target condition. These findings support the proposition that thedegree and valence of liking a target is important in eliciting multiple mani-festations of empathy, not just empathic concern. Specifically, liking alsoseems to have a direct effect on the intensity of empathic embarrassment feltfor the target.

Experiment 2: Perspective-Taking Effects onEmpathic Embarrassment and Empathic Concern

In addition to liking the target, we propose that perspective taking also isan important antecedent of empathic embarrassment. Miller (1987) sought totest a similar idea previously. Specifically, Miller instructed participants inthe empathy condition to try to imagine what the actor was feeling, visual-izing how it feels to be performing the task while he or she performed anembarrassing task, whereas participants in the objective condition wereinstructed to simply observe the target’s behavior carefully (for a detaileddescription of the procedure, see Miller, 1996). Somewhat consistent with his

embarrassment for the positively valued target (Ms = 3.38 and 4.54, respectively) than for thenegatively valued target (Ms = 2.14 and 2.72, respectively). The same pattern was found for men,who reported more empathic concern and empathic embarrassment for the positively valuedtarget (Ms = 2.42 and 3.00, respectively) than for the negatively valued target (Ms = 1.84 and2.00, respectively). Thus, a sample that included more men might yield a statistically significantgender main effect.

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claim, Miller’s results revealed that women who were instructed to imaginehow a target feels about performing an embarrassing task reported feelingmore embarrassment for her than did women who were asked simply toobserve the target perform the task. However, this effect was found only ifthe target had competed with the women during an earlier interaction. Incontrast, male participants showed the opposite perspective effect on embar-rassment when they had competed with the target previously. These conflict-ing results make it difficult to assess the nature of the effect that perspectivetaking has on empathic embarrassment.

Furthermore, it is unclear how participants in Miller’s (1987) experimentattempted to imagine the other’s feelings. Previous research on empathicconcern has revealed a somewhat complex relation between an individual’sperspective-taking set and his or her emotional response to the plight ofanother in need. Specifically, remaining objective and detached tends tominimize an individual’s emotional response; imagining what the target isthinking and feeling tends to enhance relatively pure empathic concern; andimagining oneself in the target’s situation tends to enhance a mix of empathicconcern and self-oriented distress (Batson et al., 1997). With this issue inmind, it is not clear whether participants in Miller’s study imagined theother’s feelings directly (i.e., adopted an imagine-other perspective), imag-ined themselves in the person’s situation (i.e., adopted an imagine-self per-spective), or some mixture of the two. A detailed description of that studyprocedure (reported in Miller, 1996) suggests that participants may haveadopted a mixed perspective (viz. imagine the other’s feelings and imaginewhat it would be like to perform the tasks oneself). Consequently, theseresults do not clearly illuminate the potentially distinct effects of each type ofperspective taking on empathic embarrassment. To provide a clearer assess-ment of the issue, Experiment 2 used a more direct manipulation of theobjective, imagine-self, and imagine-other perspectives.

Experiment 2 also afforded us an opportunity to examine the relationbetween empathic embarrassment and a desire to approach its source.4 Asnoted earlier, the relation between empathic concern and an approach ori-entation has been well documented. There is also some self-report-basedevidence to suggest that those observing another in an embarrassing situationclaim to behave in a helpful manner toward the target on retrospectiveself-report measures (e.g., Metts & Cupach, 1989). However, for two reasons,it is not clear from existing research whether empathic embarrassment is

4This element was not included in Experiment 1 because the valuing manipulation wasexpected to have a direct effect on a desire to approach the target. In Experiment 2, no explicitcharacter information was provided, so the desire to approach would be a relatively directreflection of the predominant emotion experienced in each condition.


associated with an approach orientation. First, to our knowledge, noresearch has directly assessed the relation between empathic embarrassmentand approach behaviors. Second, although retrospective self-reports suggestthat helping a person in embarrassing circumstances may be a prominentresponse among observers, it is not clear that this response reflects anapproach orientation per se.

More importantly, it is not clear that helpful behaviors are a consequenceof empathic embarrassment, rather than other emotions that may be pro-duced by the situation. For example, helping may be a strategy to reduceone’s own unpleasant emotional experience stemming from the situation inthe only way available at the time. It is possible that those experiencingempathic embarrassment would prefer to escape the situation or avoid thetarget, and would do so if the situation allowed. However, in face-to-faceinteractions of the sort typically reported in the literature on empathicembarrassment, other motives may override a desire to avoid the source ofempathic embarrassment (e.g., desire to maintain the relationship, fear ofnegative social evaluation, empathic concern for his or her welfare). To assessmore clearly the motivational orientation associated with empathic embar-rassment, participants in Experiment 2 were given an opportunity to avoid orapproach the source of their embarrassment in a situation that would allowthem to do so without concern for harming a relationship, receiving a nega-tive social evaluation, and the like.

To test our claim that different perspective-taking sets elicit differentmanifestations of empathy, the participants in Experiment 2 were randomlyassigned to adopt one of three perspectives (i.e., objective vs. imagine whatthe other is thinking, and feeling vs. imagine yourself in the other’s situation)while listening to the interview described in Experiment 1. Participants thenreported the degree to which they experienced empathic concern andempathic embarrassment for the target. To determine the potentially differ-ent motivational orientations associated with empathic concern andempathic embarrassment, participants were given an unexpected opportunityto have continued exposure to the target for an extended period of time. Perour operationalization, seeking continued exposure would indicate anapproach orientation. A similar strategy has been used successfully in previ-ous research to assess the motives associated with empathic concern andempathic joy (Batson et al., 1991).

We predict that an objective perspective will minimize both empathicconcern and empathic embarrassment; an imagine-other perspective willelicit primarily empathic concern; and an imagine-self perspective will elicitprimarily empathic embarrassment. We also predict that empathic concernwill produce an approach orientation, whereas empathic embarrassment,given its relatively unpleasant nature, will fail to do so.

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Method

Participants

Study participants were 48 freshman and sophomore undergraduate stu-dents (35 females, 13 males) from the University of Texas at Tyler whoparticipated in Experiment 2 in exchange for extra credit. Participants wererandomly assigned to one of three conditions: objective versus imagine-selfversus imagine-other. Two participants (1 male assigned to the imagine-othercondition, 1 male assigned to the objective condition) were excluded andreplaced because they expressed suspicion about the verity of the interview.

Procedure

Participants were individually run through a procedure that lastedapproximately 30 min. Upon their arrival, participants were escorted into aprivate research cubicle. They were asked to read and sign an informed-consent statement and were given written instructions via computer. Theinstructions were identical to those employed in Experiment 1. After readingthe instructions, participants were asked to adopt one of three “listeningperspectives.” Because all information was presented via computer, theresearch assistant was blind to participants’ assigned perspective condition.

Objective-perspective condition. Participants who were assigned to theobjective-perspective condition were presented with the followinginstructions:

The way people take in information can affect the way theyprocess that information. As such, we would like for you toadopt the following perspective while you listen to the audiointerview. Please read the listening instructions carefully.

While you are listening to the audio interview, try to remain asobjective as possible about what has happened to the persondescribed in the interview and how it has affected his or her life.(To remain objective, do not let yourself get caught up inimagining what this person has been through or how he or shefeels as a result, or how you would feel if you were in thesame situation. Just try to remain objective and detached as youlisten to the contents of the interview.)

Imagine-self condition. Participants who were assigned to the imagine-selfcondition were given the same perspective instructions as were those in theobjective condition, with the following alterations:


While listening to the audio interview, try to imagine how youwould think and feel if the event described in the interview washappening to you. (Try not to concern yourself with attendingto all the information presented or with how the person in theinterview feels. Just concentrate on trying to imagine how youwould think and feel if the events described in the interviewwere happening to you.)

Imagine-other condition. Participants who were assigned to the imagine-other condition were given the same perspective instructions as were those inthe objective conditions, with the following alterations:

While listening to the audio interview, try to imagine how theperson in the interview feels about what has happened and howit has affected his or her life. (Try not to concern yourself withattending to all the information presented or with how youwould feel in the person’s situation. Just concentrate on tryingto imagine how the person described in the interview feels.)

After reading the perspective-taking instructions, all of the participantslistened to the same audio interview with “Zack” used in Experiment 1.Unlike Experiment 1, no explicit liking manipulation was used in Experiment2. However, we did measure liking to assess the degree to which adopting oneperspective or another might influence liking, which, as reported in Experi-ment 1, has a direct effect on empathic embarrassment.

Measurement of perspective taking, empathic concern, and empathic embar-rassment. Once they finished listening to the interview, participants com-pleted (a) an emotional response questionnaire designed to assess bothempathic concern and empathic embarrassment; and (b) a second question-naire that contained checks on the perspective-taking manipulation embed-ded among other items consistent with the cover story. The emotionalresponse questionnaire was identical to the one used in Experiment 1. Thesecond questionnaire included several items designed to assess the effective-ness of the perspective-taking manipulation, each rated on a 7-point scaleranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The items “While listening to theinterview, to what extent did you imagine how you would feel if this situationhappened to you?” and “While listening to the interview, to what extent didyou imagine how the student facing this situation felt and how it is affectinghis or her life?” were included to check the extent to which participantsadhered to their assigned perspective instructions.

Measurement of approach orientation. Once they completed the secondquestionnaire, participants were instructed to read a letter from the Office of

16 STOCKS ET AL.

Student Transitions (OST) concerning the progress of each interviewedstudent. In part, this letter reads as follows:

We have decided to prepare updates on the progress of eachstudent who allowed us to use their case for this study. Theupdates, similar to the interview you just heard, will be preparedeach week for a period of six weeks. None of these updates willbe used in this study. However, I thought some of the studentswho participated in this OST study might wish to follow theprogress of the student whose interview you heard as we at theOST work with him or her to resolve any difficulties he or shemay be experiencing.

If you wish to receive weekly updates, please write either youre-mail address or your mailing address in the space below (toensure anonymity, do not write your name). I will send a newupdate via e-mail or via postal mail each week for the next sixweeks. If you do not wish to receive weekly updates, please leavethe line blank. Regardless of your choice, remove this letter, foldit, and seal it in the envelope provided. The OST research assis-tant will forward all sealed envelopes directly to my secretary.

Thus, participants had the option of receiving or not receiving weeklyupdates as to Zack’s welfare, which provided them an opportunity to seek oravoid continued exposure to information about Zack for an extended periodof time. This measure served as an indicator of participants’ preferencefor approaching the source of their empathic embarrassment or empathicconcern.

Debriefing. When participants finished the questionnaires, they received averbal debriefing in which they were informed of the study’s purpose andeach element of the procedure. Participants were then thanked for their timeand excused.

Results and Discussion

Assessing the Effectiveness of the Perspective-Taking Manipulation

The effectiveness of the perspective-taking manipulation was assessed bytwo items included in the set of questionnaires completed by participantsafter listening to the audio interview. Means and standard deviations forthe primary manipulation checks and dependent measures are reported inTable 2. These manipulation checks were subjected to an ANOVA with


planned orthogonal contrasts to compare the imagine-self and imagine-otherconditions to the objective condition, which constituted a baseline forcomparison.

The first manipulation check assessed the degree to which participantsimagined themselves in the target’s situation. Participants who were assignedto the imagine-self condition reported imagining themselves in the target’ssituation to a greater degree (M = 6.25, SD = 0.86) than did participantswho were assigned to the objective condition (M = 3.69, SD = 2.27), F(1,45) = 17.14, p < .001. However, the comparison of the objective condition tothe imagine-other condition (M = 4.68, SD = 1.81) on this measure was notstatistically significant, F(1, 45) = 2.62, p > .11.

The second manipulation check assessed the degree to which participantsimagined the target’s feelings about his situation. Participants who wereassigned to the imagine-other condition reported imagining the target’s feel-ings to a greater degree (M = 5.50, SD = 1.15) than did participants who wereassigned to the objective condition (M = 3.93, SD = 1.77), F(1, 45) = 7.24,p < .01. However, the comparison of the objective condition to the imagine-self condition (M = 4.75, SD = 1.91) on this measure was not statisticallysignificant, F(1, 45) = 1.85, p > .17.

Given the effect of liking on empathic emotions reported in Experiment 1,we also assessed the degree to which the perspective-taking manipulation

Table 2

Means of Measures by Condition: Experiment 2

Measure

Objective Imagine other Imagine self

M SD M SD M SD

Imagined self 3.69a 2.27 4.68a 1.81 6.25b 0.86Imagined the other 3.93a 1.77 5.50b 1.15 4.75a 1.91Personal distress 2.13a 1.16 2.31a 1.53 3.58b 1.76Empathic concern 2.04a 0.98 3.20b 1.28 2.78a 1.23Empathic embarrassment 2.06a 1.57 3.00a 2.16 5.06b 2.21Proportion requesting

continued exposure.19a .38b .19a

Note. n = 16 per condition. All responses reported on a 7-point scale except forProportion Requesting Continued Exposure, which was reported on a dichotomousscale (0 = do not want contact; 1 = do want contact). Within a row, means with differ-ent subscripts are significantly different relative to the objective condition at p � .05.

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influenced liking in Experiment 2. The results suggest that there were nosignificant differences across condition on the item “How likeable did youfind the person in the interview?” (all Fs < 2.95, all ps > .10). Although somepast research has reported an effect of different perspectives on liking thetarget, it was not the case in the current experiment. Thus, any effects on theremaining dependent variables cannot be attributed to liking.

Effect of the Perspective-Taking Manipulation on Empathic Concern andEmpathic Embarrassment

An empathic concern index was derived by averaging participants’responses to the same emotion adjectives used in Experiment 1 (a = .89).Participants who were assigned to the imagine-other condition reportedexperiencing empathic concern for the target to a greater degree (M = 3.20,SD = 1.28) than did participants who were assigned to the objective condi-tion (M = 2.04, SD = 0.98), F(1, 45) = 7.78, p < .01. Participants who wereassigned to the imagine-self condition (M = 2.78, SD = 1.23) reported slightlymore empathic concern than did participants who were assigned to theobjective condition, but this effect was not statistically significant, F(1,45) = 3.20, p > .09.

In addition to empathic concern, participants reported the degree towhich they experienced embarrassment for the target. Participants who wereassigned to the imagine-self condition reported experiencing more embar-rassment for the target (M = 5.06, SD = 2.21) than did participants who wereassigned to the objective condition (M = 2.06, SD = 1.57), F(1, 45) = 19.62,p < .001. Participants who were assigned to the imagine-other condition(M = 3.00, SD = 2.16) reported slightly more embarrassment for the targetthan did participants who were assigned to the objective condition, but theeffect was not statistically significant, F(1, 45) = 1.96, p > .17.5 As was thecase in Experiment 1, ratings of empathic concern and empathic embarrass-ment were positively correlated with one another (r = .33, p < .03).

Participants also reported the degree to which they experienced distress,using the same index described in Experiment 1 (a = .91). Participants who

5Again, only a small number of males were sampled, which renders parametric statisticalanalyses of potential gender differences inappropriate. However, the perspective manipulationappears to have affected the responses of men and women similarly. Both women and menreported more empathic concern in the imagine-other condition (Ms = 3.04 and 3.67, respec-tively) than in the objective (Ms = 2.14 and 1.80, respectively) or imagine-self (Ms = 2.68 and3.08, respectively) conditions. Similarly, both women and men reported more empathic embar-rassment in the imagine-self cell (Ms = 5.08 and 5.00, respectively) than in the objective(Ms = 2.55 and 1.00, respectively) or imagine-other (Ms = 2.83 and 3.50, respectively)conditions.


were assigned to the imagine-self condition reported experiencing moredistress (M = 3.57, SD = 1.76) than did participants who were assigned tothe objective condition (M = 2.13, SD = 1.15), F(1, 45) = 7.56, p < .01. Par-ticipants who were assigned to the imagine-other condition (M = 2.31,SD = 1.53) reported slightly more distress than did participants who wereassigned to the objective condition, but the effect was not statistically signifi-cant, F(1, 45) = 0.15, p > .70. Also, participants in the imagine-self conditionreported significantly more distress than did participants in the imagine-othercondition, F(1, 45) = 4.69, p < .04. Unlike Experiment 1, ratings of distresswere weakly correlated with empathic concern (r = .24, p > .10) and weresignificantly correlated with empathic embarrassment (r = .61, p < .001). Thelatter correlation lends support to Miller’s (1996) claim that empathicembarrassment may be a distressing experience.

Differing Consequences of Empathic Concern and Empathic Embarrassment

In addition to reporting their emotional responses and completing themanipulation checks, participants were also given a chance to reportthe degree to which they (a) would like to see the target receive help from theOST while making the transition to college life; and (b) wished to receiveupdates as to the target’s welfare each week for a period of 6 weeks. Theseitems show different patterns of association with empathic concern andempathic embarrassment. A positive association between empathic concernand a desire to see the target receive help emerged (r = .42, p < .003), whereasthe association between empathic embarrassment and this measure wasnearly 0 (r = .05, p > .74).

Participants’ preference for receiving future updates as to the target’sprogress was subjected to a logit loglinear analysis with planned compari-sons. The results suggest that the proportion of participants who requestedfuture exposure to the target was significantly higher in the imagine-othercondition (.38) than in the objective (.19) or the imagine-self (.19) conditions,c2(1, N = 48) = 10.89, p < .001.6 Furthermore, a statistically significantassociation between the dichotomous measure of preference for future infor-mation and empathic concern emerged (rpb = .53, p < .001), whereas the asso-ciation between preference for future contact and empathic embarrassmentwas close to 0, (rpb = .08, p > .61).

Taken together, these results suggest that empathic concern leads todifferent motivational and behavioral consequences than does empathic

6Note that the chi square reported here is based on a comparison of the imagine-othercondition to either the objective or the imagine-self condition.

20 STOCKS ET AL.

embarrassment. Although the current studies cannot empirically tease apartthe nature of the motivational underpinnings of each emotional response(viz. whether each evokes an egoistic, as opposed to an altruistic motive),these results indicate that empathic concern is associated with increaseddesire for further exposure to the target. In contrast, empathic embarrass-ment is not. Equally important is the relation between different forms ofperspective taking and each empathic emotion. Relative to remaining objec-tive, imagining what the target is thinking and feeling in a socially compro-mising situation primarily enhances empathic concern, whereas imaginingoneself in the target’s situation primarily enhances empathic embarrassment.Overall, these results are consistent with the possibility that the desire toapproach future exposure to a victim of embarrassment is a function ofempathic concern, but not empathic embarrassment.

General Discussion

The present research demonstrates that liking a target who is embroiled inan embarrassing situation produces a heightened degree of empathic embar-rassment and empathic concern relative to what is experienced for a dislikedtarget. Also, imagining what a target is thinking and feeling primarilyenhances empathic concern, but not empathic embarrassment. Interestingly,imagining oneself in the target’s predicament has the opposite effect.Empathic concern appears to elicit a desire for continued contact with itssource (i.e., an approach orientation), whereas empathic embarrassmenteither elicits a much weaker approach orientation or fails to evoke such anorientation at all. This difference in the strength or type of motivationalorientation evoked by these two manifestations of empathy may be a result ofthe degree of unpleasantness-associated emotion, but, at present, we have nodata of direct relevance to the issue.

One limitation of the present research is the relatively small number ofmen versus women in the sample. As reported in Footnotes 3 and 5, the datasuggest a possible main effect of gender in Experiment 1, but the patternsacross conditions in both experiments do not indicate a clear interaction ofgender with either manipulation. Thus, the influences of liking and perspec-tive taking investigated here do not appear to be affected by gender. It is,however, an open question as to whether women experience more intenseempathic emotions, compared to men. This effect could be a result of genuinegender differences in the experience of empathic emotions; how men andwomen use self-report measures; or differences in how men and womenpresent themselves to others or to themselves (for a discussion of these issues,see Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). Further research into this matter would be a


useful contribution to our understanding of various manifestations ofempathy.

An additional issue is worth noting. The embarrassment-eliciting situa-tion used in the current experiments differs from those used in most previousresearch (e.g., Miller, 1987). Specifically, in previous research, participantobservers were asked to witness other participants engage in an atypicalbehavior (e.g., singing the National Anthem, dancing) at the request of theresearcher. In contrast, we had participants listen to an audiotaped interviewin which a student described a socially awkward personal experience (i.e.,passing gas on a date). Conversations with the first author’s undergraduatestudents revealed that many students have experienced a similar event them-selves or at least “know” someone who had. Although this anecdotal evi-dence suggests that passing gas while on a date is (hopefully) not the norm,it is definitely an event that happens in everyday life and is not a directreflection on the character of the actor used in the present research. Further-more, because of the widespread use of various forms of interpersonal com-munication (e.g., cell phones, e-mail) it is not unusual to encounter someonedescribing personal, and potentially embarrassing, events of this sort (e.g.,relationship problems, public faux pas).

The present research contributes to the empathic embarrassment litera-ture in several important ways. First, the embarrassing event occurred inde-pendently of the observer who experienced empathic embarrassment, whichdemonstrates that direct contact with the socially compromised target isnot necessary to experience empathic embarrassment for him or her.Second, the stimulus was standardized such that all participants wereexposed to exactly the same information. Unlike other strategies that relyon face-to-face encounters between different sets of individuals, ourapproach reduces error variance and allows for a test of the hypotheseswith fewer participants. Third, the situation reported here was relativelynatural and spontaneous. Unlike strategies in which an experimenter tells aparticipant to do something intentionally and purposefully embarrassing infront of a stranger, hearing another student describe an event in his lifeis a more commonplace event that may better reflect situations thatproduce empathic embarrassment outside of the laboratory context.Finally, by avoiding direct, face-to-face contact between the target and theempathically embarrassed individual, we have reduced the likelihood thatsome portion of the embarrassment is actually personal embarrassmentcaused by being part of, or contributing to, the target’s unfortunatepredicament.

Some may see our embarrassing situation as a methodological liabilitybecause it is different from the face-to-face encounters used in previousresearch, but our choice in selecting such a stimulus was entirely intentional.

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We sought to examine the potential antecedents of valuing and perspectivetaking against a strong, but relatively natural eliciting event. The resultsreported here support our hypotheses, even though the situation had thepotential to overwhelm our somewhat subtle manipulations. It may be thecase that, compared to the situation we used in the present research, weakereliciting events, or those that are farther removed from day-to-day life, maybe even more susceptible to the effects of valuing and perspective taking.Testing the power of these antecedents against weaker eliciting stimuli wouldbe a fruitful avenue for future research.

As noted previously, we report evidence that liking a target and imaginingoneself in the target’s situation elicits empathic embarrassment. However,there is reason to believe that these are but two of many causes of empathicembarrassment. For example, it seems likely that empathic embarrassmentcould be “caught” by simply observing an embarrassed target, even if onedoes not imagine oneself in his or her situation or value the target’s welfare.In such circumstances, a certain level of emotion sharing or matching mayoccur as a result of motor-mimicry-based emotional contagion processes(Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993; Hoffman, 2002).

Another possibility is that in some contexts, the display of empathicembarrassment serves a communication function in that displaying it for anembarrassed target conveys support for his or her troubles, much as display-ing empathic concern may indicate to a sad target that “I know how you feel”(Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1986). In such cases, empathic embar-rassment displays may simply reflect a communication of understanding,rather than a distinct emotional response per se. Each of these possibilitieswould provide fruitful avenues for future research.

Miller and colleagues’ (e.g., Marcus & Miller, 1999; Miller, 1987) researchdemonstrates stable individual differences in embarrassability, which makessome individuals more vulnerable to personal embarrassment than others.Personal embarrassment in general is almost certainly an unpleasant experi-ence that people presumably would rather not experience. If empathic embar-rassment has a similar negative valence, it is possible that it has differentmotivational consequences than do other manifestations of empathy, such asempathic concern.

Indeed, the results reported here suggest that empathic concern is associ-ated with an approach orientation, whereas empathic embarrassment isnot—or, at the very least, is not as strongly associated with such an orienta-tion. Although the data reported here suggest that people do not intention-ally seek out the experience of empathic embarrassment, it remains unclearwhether such behavior reflects active avoidance of those who elicit theemotion. Further research is needed to tease apart more directly the motiva-tional underpinnings of different manifestations of empathy.


From an applied perspective, individuals who are particularly susceptibleto either personal embarrassment or empathic embarrassment may benefitfrom further understanding the causes of their emotional response. As notedpreviously, some individuals experience both forms of embarrassment tosuch a degree that it has a detrimental effect on their lives. Because mostresearch on empathic embarrassment has adopted a personality-traitapproach, little attention has been given to simple strategies these individualscan use to reduce the experience of embarrassment for others. Aside frompersonality traits associated with chronic embarrassability (either personalor empathic), which may not be particularly amenable to attempts atmodification, we suggest that individuals may be able to reduce their levelof embarrassability by simply adopting a different perspective towardthe embarrassment-eliciting target (e.g., remaining objective). Or, one couldtransform empathic embarrassment into empathic concern by imaginingwhat the other must be thinking and feeling as a consequence of the situation.As an alternative, the chronically embarrassed individual could modify thevalence or degree to which he or she likes the target (e.g., by temporarilyfocusing on the negative characteristics of the target).

Chronic embarrassability is certainly not a widely publicized condition.However, those who cannot escape embarrassment are nonetheless suffering.Yet, psychologists have devoted very little attention to helping these indi-viduals. The strategies reported here may help individuals with high embar-rassability minimize the extent to which empathic embarrassment affectstheir day-to-day lives. More importantly, we hope that the research reportedhere will generate more interest among researchers on this important, yetrelatively neglected aspect of the human social experience.

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i'm embarrassed for you: the effect of valuing and perspective taking on empathic embarrassment...

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