illegal alien workers in the united states

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Vol. 16, No. 3, October 1977

WALTER FOGEL”

Illegal Alien Workers in the United States

THIS PAPER is a synthesis of knowledge about illegal alien workers in the U.S.,’ regardless of the country of origin of the “illegals.”2 Within this general scope, Mexico receives the greatest emphasis because it is by far the greatest supplier of illegal aliens to the U.S. and most of the information available on this subject refers to Mexican illegals.

The overriding theme of the paper can be stated rather briefly. Because of its de facto past policy of expedient use of foreign labor supplies, especially Mexican, and because of the rising urgency of international population and economic differences, the U.S. now faces a flow of illegal immigration which it cannot control. This fact, together with the domestic and international contexts of the flow, is certain to produce changes in U.S. de jure immigration policy and may also produce fundamental changes in U.S.-Mexican relations as well.

Historical Background Illegal immigration to the U.S., especially that of Mexicans,

oProfessor of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles. ‘Much of this article is based upon the author’s Illegal Mexican Workers in the U.S. (Los Angeles:

Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1977). Another useful general examination of illegal immigration to the U.S. is: Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, Preliminary Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1976). The following briefer statements are also recommended: Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Mexican Migration and the U.S. Labor Market: A Mounting Issue for the Seventies (Austin, Texas: Center for the Study of Human Resources, University cf Texas, 1975); Wayne A. Cornelius, “Illegal Mexican Migration to the United States: A Summary of Recent Research Findings and Policy Implications” (Cambridge, Mass. : Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977, mimeo); and, especially for its insights into the U.S.-Mexico border situation, Ellwyn R. Stoddard, “A Conceptual Analysis of the ‘Alien Invasion’: Institutionalized Support of Illegal Mexican Aliens in the U.S.,” International Migration Review, X (Summer, 1976), 157-189.

*I shall use the term “illegal alien” rather than “undocumented workers,” the designation preferred by some. The latter is intentionally less pejorative than the former and, as used by some writers, implies that the Mexican-U.S. border is simply an artifact, established rather recently in the history of the area. The former term, however, more accurately conveys the fact that these aliens are violating U.S. immigration laws.

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is not a new phenomenon-but it is not an old one either, its history being confined largely to the twentieth century. Until legislation excluded Asian immigrants in the late nineteenth century, restrictions on the migration of people to the U S . had only been qualitative, banning criminals, persons with various diseases, and those who were thought unlikely to be able to earn a living in the US. The last qualification was interpreted loosely, because immigration policy until World War I was dominated by the desire to provide unskilled labor for America’s farms and industries. Able bodied workers were admitted when national unemployment was high as well as when it was low.

When the Immigration Act of 1924 established country of origin quotas, it also established the possibility of large-scale illegal entry to the U.S. Interestingly, however, illegal immigration became significant only from Mexico-a country whose people, at least according to the immigration statute, continued to enjoy the right of unrestricted entry to the U.S., a right held by the citizens of all Western Hemisphere nations until 1968 when a hemisphere limit of 120,000 was imposed. During the twenties, several hundred thousand Mexican workers and their families simply walked or swam across their northern border to join the nearly half a million of their countrymen who bothered to obtain visas for legal immigration in that decade. The fact of the matter is that U.S. government officials and employers alike made almost no distinctions in World War I and the twenties between Mexicans who were legally here (had obtained visas) and those who were not. Workers were needed for the war effort, and later for the business boom, and there seemed to be little point to taking a hard line toward the illegals, especially since most were eligible for visas anyway?

The story had changed completely by the Great Depression. Racial prejudice and fear of job competition produced Congressional bills to bring Mexico under the quota system. The bills were not passed, but legal immigration from Mexico was reduced to less than 30,000 in the decade of the thirties simply by administrative means involving rigorous enforcement by U.S. State Department consuls of provisions in immigration law, which banned persons likely to become public charges and required the submis-

3The history of Mexican immigration to the U.S. has not been extensively written. The two best sources are Manuel Gamio, Mexican Immigration to the United States (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chica- to Press, 1930), and Leo Grebler, Mexican Immigration to the United States: The Record and Its Implica- tions (Los Angeles, Ca.: University of California, Mexican American Study Project, 1966). See also, Rodolfo Acufia, Occupied America: The Chicano’s Struggle Toward Liberation (San Francisco, Ca.: Canfield Press, 1972). pp. 123-144.

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sion of various documents by visa applicants: Illegal immigration also dropped sharply in the decade, quelled by high unemployment in the U.S. and the massive deportation of Mexican Nationals to M e ~ i c o . ~

Illegal entry to the U S . did not again reach large numbers until after World War I1 when Mexicans were once more predominant. This “wetback” era, oriented largely to agricultural employment, was set off by a wartime Mexican-U.S. contract labor agreement and reached its peak in 1954 when over one million illegals were apprehended? The Mexican border was fairly well sealed against illegal entry for the next ten years, but this was accomplished only with the assistance of an expanded program of contract labor which supplied Mexican Nationals to U.S. agriculture, primarily in California and Texas. This so-called bracero program, initiated during World War I1 labor shortages, was attacked by organized labor and other groups and finally ended in December 1964.’ Predictably, illegal immigration immediately began to increase and the bracero was fully replaced by “greencarders” and illegals within one year? Our current problem of illegal entry began with the end of the bracero; however, other more fundamental causes brought it to today’s massive level.

The recent development of illegal entry can be observed by means of the figures in Table 1 on the apprehension of illegals, with the caveat that these figures suggest only the approximate rate of growth of the phenomenon rather than its absolute magnitude. Ninety thousand illegal aliens were apprehended in 1964, just prior to the end of the bracero program. Appre- hensions rose to 285,000 in 1969, 500,000 in 1972, and a 1976 level of

4Robert N. McLean, “Tightening the Mexican Border,” Survey, LIV (April 1, 1930), 28; Paul S. Taylor, “More Bars Against Mexicans?” Survey, LIV (April 1 , 1930), 27; and John Higham, “American Immigration Policy in Historical Perspective,” Law and Contemporary Problems, XXI (Spring, 1956),

the deportation of Mexican Nationals, much of it without regard for any civil rights of the de- portees, see Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1974).

6An incisive analysis of the era is Eleanor M. Hadley, “A Critical Analysis of the Wetback Problem,” Law and Contemporary Problems, XXI (Spring, 1956), 334357.

’For a history of the bracero program for an involved observer, see Ernest0 Galarza, Merchants of Labor (Santa Barbara, Ca. : McNally and Loftin, 1974). An astute analysis of the politics of the program is Ellis W. Hawley, “The Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue, 1950-65,” Agricltltural History, XL (July,

“his term, named for the, then, color of the Alien Registration Receipt Card provided by the Immi- gration and Naturalization Service, refers to persons who have been admitted as permanent resident immigrants to the U.S. A number of Mexican “greencarders” prefer to live in Mexico and commute on a seasonal or more frequent basis to jobs in the U.S. The legality of this practice has been challenged, but was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Chicanos and Rural Poverty (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 33-42. On the replacement of the bracero, see William E, Martin, “Alien Workers in United States Agriculture: Impacts of Production,” American Journal of Farm Economics, XLVIII (1966), 1143; and Phyllis Groom, “Today’s Farm Jobs and Farm- workers,” Monthly Labor Review, XC (April, 1967), 1.

231-232.

1966), 157-176.

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over 850,000. The U.S. recession of 1974-1975, with unemployment ex- ceeding 9 per cent of the labor force in some months, brought a halt to the long-term annual increases in apprehensions, but apparently did not reduce their absolute magnitude. Recovery from the recession was accompanied by a record number of arrests in 1976. It should be noted that the fairly high U.S. unemployment of 1972 and 1973 (annual rates of 5.9 and 5.6) had no discernible effect on illegal entry as viewed through apprehension data.

TABLE 1

ILLEGAL ALIENS APPREHENDED, 1945-1976 (IN THOUSANDS)

Fiscal years Total Mexican

1945-1949 16ga 15ga 1950-1954 696a 688" 1955-1959 1 o o a 85a 1960-1964 85a 35a 1965 110 55 1966 139 90 1967 162 108 1968 212 152 1969 284 202 1970 345 266 1971 420 348 1972 506 430 1973 656 577 1974 788 710 1975 764 680 1976 866 781

Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. *Annual average.

Before proceeding to the issues of the current illegal phenomenon, I wish to draw several conclusions from this limited though essential historical overview. First, illegal entry has been and continues to be largely from Mexico, although a significant volume now appears to be coming from other nations (especially the Western Hemisphere). Second, illegal immigration from Mexico has been an integral part of a de fucto U.S. policy with respect to use of Mexican labor. Bluntly stated, the de facto policy has been- bring them in when they are needed, send them back when they aren't. But this policy is no longer working, Present statistics and expert opinion suggest that the flow of illegal immigration cannot now be shut off, even with increased enforcement efforts and high levels of unemployment in the U.S.


Causes of Increased Illegal Entry The bracero program during its peak years annually employed

over 400,000 Mexican workers who had to be replaced when the program ended in 1965. Western growers had been able to obtain cheap foreign labor throughout the twentieth ~ e n t u r y ; ~ consequently, it was predictable that they would employ illegal Mexican workers to replace their braceros. Indeed, after 1965, many former braceros entered the U.S. .illegally and regained their old jobs. The end of the contract labor program initiated our current flow of illegal immigration, but several other influences brought it to its present massive level.

One of these influences has been the population growth of Mexican border cities - especially Tijuana, Mexicali, Ciudad Juarez, and Nuevo Laredo, which had population increases of almost ten fold between 1940 and 1970, bringing the four city total to 1,300,000.10 Tremendous growth in these border cities occurred because: (1) they became places of embarka- tion for braceros, illegal entrants, and “greencard” commuters; (2) they experienced increased commerce with U.S. border cities (the local economies of the U.S.-Mexican border areas are very much intertwined in spite of the artifact of a mutual border); and, ironically, (3) as a result of Mexico’s Border Industrialization Program, which was designed to provide border city jobs for unemployed braceros and to offer wage incentives and favorable import tax treatment to U.S. firms establishing plants in Mexican border areas. In spite of the fact that most of the jobs created went to women, the accompanying expansion of local economies has greatly increased population within Mexico to the border areas.” More generally, the population of Mexico has been growing rapidly and will continue to do so, from 62,000,- 000 in 1976 to an estimated 134,000,000 by the year 2000.12

This tremendous population growth (produced by an annual rate of increase of 3.5 per cent) must be placed in the context of standard of living differences between the U.S. and Mexico in order to glimpse the true potential for illegal US. immigration. Per capita income in Mexico is roughly one-seventh of that in the U.S., but more pertinent differences in welfare are suggested by the $2.00-2.80 average daily earnings of employed

Osee Carey McWilliams, Factories in the Field (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1934). ’OThe 1940 figures used for this calculation are from Julian Samora, Los Mojados: The Wetback

Story (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), p. 10. The 1970 figures, thought to be conservative, are from IX Censo General De Poblacion (Mexico City: 1970).

“See U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Industrial and Employ- ment Potential of the United States-Mexico Border (Washington, D.C. : 1968), and Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Business Reoiew (July, 1975), 1-7.

12Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, op. cit., p. 46.

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landless workers in rural Mexican communities in comparison to the U.S. statutory minimum hourly wage of $2.30 in man~facturing.’~ The 1976 devaluation of the peso, which temporarily raised the purchasing power in Mexico of the US. dollar, added to the substantial wage incentives already existing for migrating to the U.S.

Perhaps the most important proximate cause of the present level of illegal immigration was the tight job market which prevailed in the U.S. in the late sixties, with annual unemployment rates from 1966-1969 all below 4 per cent of the labor force. Many industrial employers began to hire illegal immigrants in this period, not so much because they couldn’t find native workers, but because the illegals were usually more reliable and productive. A cumulative effect then began to operate, bringing more and more illegals and employers together as a result of their mutually satisfactory experiences.

Another factor thought by some observers to have provided great impetus to illegal immigration was the 1985 Immigration This law established a Western Hemisphere ceiling for immigration to the U.S. of 120,000 persons a year (effective in 1968), on a first come, first served basis. The ceiling itself, however, has not caused illegal immigration to the U.S. to increase, since most Western Hemisphere nations supplying illegal entrants have experienced increases in legal U.S. immigration under the Act. Mexico, for example, had about 40,000 people a year immigrate to the U.S. prior to 1968 (when only qualitative rules governed), but the figure is now running over 70,000 a year.l5

The 1965 Act probably has had a small effect on illegal entry through making immigration by a Western Hemisphere person who is not a relative of a U.S. citizen or legal resident alien exceedingly difficult. Almost all adults who do not enjoy such a relative status are eligible for immigration only after they have received a job offer from a U.S. employer who has obtained for that job a “labor certification” (a Department of Labor deter- mination that there are no resident workers available for the job and that employment of an immigrant in it will not have an adverse impact on local labor market wages and working conditions). Both job offers and labor certifications are hard to obtain; the former because employers do not want

13The Mexican earnings are from Wayne A. Cornelius, “Mexican Migration to the United States: The View From Rural Sending Communities” (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976, mimeo), p. 11.

I4See Elliott Abrams and Franklin S. Abrams, “Immigration Policy-Who Gets In and Why?” The Public Interest, XXXVlII (Winter, 1975), 3-29; and Stoddard, op. cit., p. 183.

15U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, various years).


to wait the two and a half years for the immigrant to show up (the current waiting period for a visa in the Western Hemisphere), and the latter because there are many unemployed resident workers looking for jobs. No doubt, some Western Hemisphere citizens who have little if any chance of legally immigrating to the U.S. under current immigration law do enter illegally, or, alternatively, enter on a tourist visa with the intention of violating its conditions by taking a job. Ludicrously, once they are working in violation of immigration law, they stand a good chance of receiving a labor certification and, ultimately, a permanent immigrant status.16 The labor certification requirement should be removed from our immigration law. It does not protect the labor market, since more than four-fifths of all immigrants enter without it,’7 and it does encourage unlawful behavior. But its removal will not end illegal entry by any stretch of the imagination. The fact is that the demand for entry to the U S . is now well in excess of the immigration places available under law (290,000 a year plus another 100,000 or so which are exempt from hemisphere ceilings) and immigration outside of the law is not very difficult or hazardous.

The Enforcement Problem Why can’t illegal immigration be stopped or at least controlled

through better law enforcement? The two answers to that question are first that it is easy to break immigration law and escape detection, and second that there is apathy and reluctance on the part of U.S. institutions for enforcement of immigration law.

The most widely known method of illegal entry is simply to walk or swim across one of the U.S. borders, principally the border with Mexico. This kind of entry simply cannot be controlled by the Border Patrol with any methods now considered feasible. Probably the most widely used method of entry currently is with a border crossing card which permits entry to the U.S. for 72 hours for purposes of business or pleasure, but prohibits employment.18 Mexican nationals who enter in this fashion and wish to

loDavid S. North, Immigrants and the American Labor Market (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Research Monograph No. 31,1974), p. 10. For a full study of labor certification, see David S. North, Alien Workers: A Study of the Labor Certification Program (Washington, D.C.: U . S . Department of Labor, 1971).

”Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, op. cit., p. 20, Over one-half of the immigrants who receive a labor certification switch occupations within two years. Thus, the Domestic Council Committee estimated that less than 5 per cent of all immigrants are “meaningfully screened for their labor market impact.”

‘*Paul Sultan and John Virgo, The Legal and Illegal California Farmworker: Some Implications for Unemployment Insurance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1974), p. 144. Sheldon L. Creene, “Operation Sisyphus: Wetbacks, Growers, and Poverty,” Nation, October 20, 1969,404.

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work simply mail the card back to Mexico, to avoid the risk of its seizure by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) personnel, and then look for a job. Other illegals are smuggled into the U.S. or use false documents to get through entry stations. Some tightening of port-of-entry procedures against these methods of entry are possible but the magnitude of that task is great -in part because each year there are almost 200,000,000 border crossings (of both Mexican and U.S. citizens) from Mexico to the U.S. The San Ysidro entry station south of San Diego admits a daily average of 100,000 persons, The flow across the several El Paso entry points is even greater.lg

One other increasingly used method of becoming an illegal immigrant is that of entering legally as a tourist or student and then violating the entry visa (thus, the term "visa abuser") by accepting employment or overstaying the length of stay permitted. It is not now possible to trace down the people who do not report a departure from the U.S. under a nonimmigrant visa (many tourists leave without notifying U.S. officials); but, INS officials believe that 10 to 20 per cent of those who enter each year under nonimmigrant visas (about 7,000,000) may overstay their period of admission (often to accept jobs).

Because of the ease of illegal entry, enforcement of immigration law under any circumstances would be exceedingly difficult. Under existing circumstances, a legal and institutional aura of apathy and even opposition to stopping illegal immigration limits effective law enforcement.

First of all, the penalties for being caught as an illegal alien are weak or nonexistent. The law specifies punishment by fine and imprisonment for illegal immigration, but it is rarely applied because prosecution of hundreds of thousands of cases a year is impractical, and punishment of people whose only crime is crossing an international border to improve their poor liveli- hoods has little public support.2O Consequently, most illegals who are apprehended suffer nothing more than a free bus ride (voluntary deportation) out of the country. This can be painful, of course, depending on individual circumstances, but for many it is anticipated and for some, welcomed.2l Even smuggling of aliens, when convictions are obtained, is punished lightly -a couple of months in prison and fines of a few hundred dollars.22

Secondly, U. S. courts have increasingly restrained the interrogation and

W . S . Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report, 1974, p. 79. "U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Illegal Aliens: A Review of Hearings

Conducted During the 92nd Congress by Subcommittee No. 1, 1973, pp. 20-21. 2'U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 1, Illegal Aliens

(Hearings), 1971, p. 475. 221bid., 1973, pp. 31-32.


search activities of the INS in the last few years, adversely affecting the agency’s enforcement efforts in the opinion of agency officials. The judicial rulings have applied due process constitutional rights to either limit or halt massive “surveys” and arrests in “barrios,” interrogation of individuals in public places, “surveys” of employers, and the use of checkpoints and patrols on h igh~ays .2~ These decisions may have lessened intervention of INS officers into the lives of law abiding Hispanic citizens and resident aliens (who must necessarily bear the brunt of INS inquiry and search so long as most illegal aliens are Hispanic), but they have also improved the illegal alien’s chances of avoiding detection once he has made it through the border area.

Finally, the INS has little support from other institutions in its enforcement effort, and a number of institutions indirectly assist alien violation of immigration law. Local police departments provide the most help by notifying the agency when they arrest illegals for criminal offenses, but this practice is not uniform.24 Employers provide by far the most important institutional aid to illegal aliens by hiring them. Other institutions such as welfare agencies, schools, and hospitals provide services to illegals,25 albeit to a small proportion, which facilitate their stay in this country. Cer- tainly the ideal of community shared responsibility for upholding the law is not approached in the area of illegal immigration. This cannot be explained by unpopularity of the laws which restrict immigration: a recent Gallup poll disclosed that 89 per cent of those polled were in favor of either keeping immigration (legal) at its current level or reducing itF6

It is evident that illegal immigration cannot now be controlled with existing law and enforcement efforts; the incentive structure is stacked against it. The potential income benefits for breaking the law are great, the chances of getting caught are slight, and the penalties if one is caught are practically nonexistent.

The Numbers The first fact needed by those in a position to make policy on

illegal immigration is the numbers involved; unfortunately that fact is not available. It will become available at about the same time that we learn how many people shoplift or steal from their employers!

23For a brief discussion of some of these rulings, see Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens,

Z4See County of San Diego, A Study of the Socioeconomic Impact of Illegal Aliens on the County of

*5111egal Aliens, (Hearings), 1971, pp. 118-148. Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens,

2aLos Angeles Times, April 28, 1977.

OP. n’t., pp. 84-87.

San Diego, pp. 92-115; Illegal Aliens (Hearings), 1971, p. 477.

op. cit., pp. 192-200.

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“Estimates” of the numbers of illegals in the U.S. do exist, but there is no evidence in support of their reliability, and some support against it. Furthermore, the somewhat casual way in which numerical estimates of illegals have been developed and used by officials of the INS, for the pur- pose of building public concern, has caused some people to reject the claim that a serious problem does exist.

In 1972, the then Commissioner of the INS told a House of Representa- tives subcommittee that there were at that time approximately one million illegal aliens in the U.S.27 This guess probably erred on the low side. It was certainly irreconcilable with the 1974 statement of his successor (Leonard F. Chapman) that the true number was “on the order of five, six, or seven million,”28 In 1975, a Washington consulting firm employed by the INS used sophisticated statistical assumptions together with some “educated guesses’’ to arrive at an estimate of 8,200,000 illegal aliens in the U.S., 5,200,000 of Mexican origin.”9

My own view is that these figures, which are now being used in INS press releases, err significantly on the high side. It is hard to believe that there are almost as many illegal Mexicans in the U S . as there are lawful Mexican- origin residents (6,700,000 as estimated by the Census Bureau in 1975, including both the native and foreign born). It is also hard to believe that roughly 40 per cent of all males aged 15-44 who lived in Mexico in 1970 migrated to the U.S. by 1975, another implication of the estimate that the INS is now using.“O

The major source of error in the INS figures on illegals in the U.S. is from failure to take account of return migration of illegals to Mexico:31 a large proportion of illegal entrants from Mexico return to that country within six months of their entry date.32 One student of the border area believes that only about 1,000 of each year’s Mexican illegal entrants settle permanently in the U.S.”3 This is almost certainly a substantial underestimate,

c

27U.S. House of Representatives, Illegal Aliens: A Review of Hearings.. . , p. 4. 2nU.S. News and World Report, July 22, 1974, p. 27. 29Lesko Associates, “Final Report. Basic Data and Guidance Required to Implement a Major Illegal

Alien Study During Fiscal Year 1976,” prepared for INS, Washington, D.C., October 1975, mimeo- graphed.

30The Lesko procedure (note 29) used as a base point an estimate of the Mexican illegals who were in the U.S. in 1970, and then estimated the additions to that illegal population through 1975.

?IThe Leako estimate (p. 10) assumed that of the illegals who enter the U.S. in a given year, only 2 per cent a year emigrate over the next ten years. This is a gross underestimate of return migration to Mexico.

Wornelius, “Illegal Mexican Migration ...,” p. 2. David S. North and Marion F. Houstoun, The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market: An Exploratory Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1976), pp. 84-86; Samora, op. cit., p. 87.

”“Of the tens of thousands of wetbacks who attempt to immigrate illegally each year, only a small proportion become successful, permanent immigrants, probably somewhat less than 1000 a year.” John A. Price, Tijuunu: Urbanization in a Border Culture (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), p. 18.


but it does illustrate the existing wide range of disagreements over the numbers of illegals.

If forced to guess, I would say there are between three and six million illegal aliens in the U.S., with two to four million in the labor market. These numbers have only a flimsy empirical base, however - that of apprehension statistics; and there is no reliable way to estimate the total population of illegals from the number who are caught.

Casual evidence on the increasing presence of illegals is easily available in almost all large cities of the country, and practically everywhere in the Southwest, from observation of non-English speaking workers in restaurants, hotels, car washes, domestic service, and other low-wage enterprises. Casual evidence is of little value for scholarly research, but it can affect the legislative process if it is accessible to large number of people. In the matter of illegal immigration, such evidence may have an impact on p0licy.3~

Characteristics of Illegal Aliens Although everyone agrees that Mexico sends far more illegal

immigrants to the U.S. than any other nation, there is some disagreement about the relative size of the Mexican share. Disageement can exist because there are now a large but unknown number of illegals in this country from other countries of the world, particularly Canada, the West Indies, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Greece, China, and nations of Central and South America. Presumably, most illegals from these countries enter the U.S. legally on tourist or student visas and then simply overstay their time limits. But Mexico sends far more people to the U.S. under tourist and student visas than any other c0untry,3~ so it seems likely that Mexicans still probably comprise at least two-thirds of all illegal aliens in the U.S. This is below their 90 per cent share of all apprehensions because the latter figure results from the concentration of INS officers on the U.S.-Mexican border.

Because Mexicans predominate in illegal entry, most illegal aliens are concentrated in California and Texas, near the border. But the southwestern labor markets which are open to the illegals have become rather saturated, causing many to go farther north to Deuver, Portland, Seattle, Kansas City,

34The Secretary of Labor, F. Ray Marshall, himself a student of international worker migration (“Em- ployment Implications of the International Migration of Workers,” National Council on Employment Policy, Illegal Aliens: An Assessment of the Issues (Washington, D.C.: 1976), pp. 52-65) stated early this year that “. . . it (illegal immigration) doesn’t need any more studies.” Los Angeles Times, February 22,1977. Marshall i s right in the sense that, due to the clandestine nature of the phenomenon, additional research will only add small increments to knowledge about illegal immigration. Nevertheless, more research on aspects of the phenomenon, especially the labor market impact, could be useful.

3s1.8 of 6.9 million people in 1974. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report, 1974, p. 60.

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Milwaukee, Detroit, and especially Chicago. (Chicago already ranks behind only Los Angeles, San Antonio, and, possibly, El Paso in the size of its Mexican origin In the East, the New York and Washington metropolitan areas are the most frequent destinations of illegal aliens, though practically all of them originate from countries other than Mexico.

There have been several surveys of illegal aliens themselves (most of whom were under arrest when questionned).37 Consequently, we have a fair amount of information about the characteristics of this population. Most are young, male, and support several dependents in their home country. As would be expected from these characteristics, the dominant reason for illegal entry is to obtain employment, and few fail to do s0.3~ Few illegals are accompanied by their families. Mexicans have very little schooling, are unskilled, and have little facility with the English language. They tend to stay in the U S . for less than a year, but frequently re-enter this country illegally several times. Non-Mexican illegals have more schooling and usually settle in the U.S. more or less permanently.

Probably not more than 20 per cent of all illegals are now employed in farm work.39 Their predominant employment is in all types of low wage nonfarm firms, with concentrations in apparel and textile manufacturing, food processing and preparation, and other services. A small minority are able to get fairly good jobs in construction and durable goods manufacturing. Average 1975 earnings of the illegals surveyed by North and Houston were $2.34 an hour for Mexicans, $3.05 for those from other Western Hemisphere countries, and $4.08 for those from the Eastern Hemisphere.4O Even in the Southwest, where almost all illegals are Mexican, considerable variation in wage rates was found: $1.74 an hour in the border counties, $1.98 in the total Southwest, and $2.60 in California.

Effects of Illegal Aliens Much controversy surrounds the question of illegal alien

36U.S. Census of Population, 1970, Subject Reports, Persons of Spanish Origin, Table 13. 37The most useful of these, because of its sample size, comprehensiveness, and locational coverage,

is North and Houstoun, op. cit. An earlier, informative survey is reported in Samora, op. cit. A smaller survey, but one that is uniquely valuable because it interviewed respondents in their home villages in central Mexico is Cornelius, “Mexican Migration.. . .” Useful survey results are also contained in County of San Diego, op. cit.; Jorge A. Bustamante, “The Impact of the Undocumented Immigration from Mexi- co on the U.S.-Mexican Economies: Preliminary Findings and Suggestions for Bilateral Cooperation,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association, 1976; W. Tim Dagodag, “Source Regions and Composition of Illegal Mexican Immigration to California,” International Migration Reoiew, IX (Winter, 1975). 499-511, and Joan W. Moore, e t al., Illegal Immigration and Economic Assimilation, paper delivered to the Pacific Sociological Association, Victoria, British Columbia, April 18,1975.

”Cornelius, “Illegal Mexican Migration.. . ,” p. 5; North and Houstoun, op. n’t., pp. 97-98.

4”North and Houstoun, op. cit., pp. 115-118. 39~0ge1, OP. cit.


impacts on the U.S. Disagreement is possible, in part, because the number of illegals in this country is impossible to estimate accurately. Beyond the numbers, there is dispute over fact -for example, do illegals displace legal resident workers (and values) if there is displacement, does that justify legislation aimed at illegal entry.

The impact least subject to factual dispute is that on population.4l U.S. annual population growth is now running at about 1,600,000. Thus, legal immigration at an annual rate of nearly 400,000 accounts for one-quarter of the total, while illegal immigration accounts for another one-quarter or so, depending on one’s estimates. However, if “zero population growth” is achieved through equalization of births and deaths (and this appears likely at some future date) then immigration, legal and illegal, will account for all of the growth in the U.S. population. The resulting growth rate will be very small, most likely less than 0.5 per cent a year; nevertheless, ad- herents of tight population control are already zeroing in on illegal immigration as the major potential factor in population growth of the U.S.42

The impact of illegals on direct social welfare costs is subject to greater factual dispute, although most people who have studied the matter tend to agree that this cost is Several studies have found that very few illegals collect unemployment compensation, go on welfare, receive food- stamps, or use medicaid.44 Some do use free public hospitals and send their children to public schools, but the incremental costs involved are probably ~rna11.4~ On the tax revenue side, it is clear that most illegals do have social security and federal income taxes withheld from their pay, although a size- able proportion apparently pay less than their legal obligation of the latter.4e

The very low incidence of social welfare payments to illegals is not a mystery. These payments are usually made only to the unemployed and most illegals are working:’ When they are not, fear of detection and deportation keeps them from applying to benefit programs. Thus, the direct social welfare costs of illegals are low. But this says nothing about the indirect costs

~~

“See Richard Irwin and Robert Warren, “Demographic Aspects of American Immigration,” in U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, Demographic and Social Aspects of Popu- lation Growth (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 170-177. This article analyzes the immigrant component of population change from 1950 to 1970.

‘*See the testimony of John Tanton, Vice-president, Zero Population Growth, Inc., in Illegal Aliens (Hearings), 1975, pp. 253-282.

43Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, op. cit., pp. 149-151. *‘See, especially, North and Houstoun, op. cit., pp. 140-149; and County of San Diego, op cit., pp.

45County of San Diego, op. cit. 4EDomestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, op. cit., pp. 151-152. “North and Houstoun, op. cit., p. 98, estimated an unemployment rate of about 10 per cent for their

118-143.

sample of illegal aliens.

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which they may produce by displacing domestic workers from employment to various social welfare programs.

Before discussing possible displacement and wage impacts, a relatively new impact of illegals, that of crime, should be mentioned. Generally, criminal activities by illegals appears to be no greater than can be expected from any population of young, single men who are living away from their homes. Recently, however, there have been reports of crimes committed by illegals as a direct result of their illegal entry. Some of this activity, especially robbery and violent assault, has been along the border, particularly in the San Diego region, causing that city to employ a special police task force to try to stop the predatory activity that goes on against illegals, by citizens of the U.S. and among illegals themselves. Organized burglary rings of illegals have also been reported in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. The stolen goods are said to be transported to Mexico for resale. The significance of these criminal activities is not in the amount of crime committed by illegals-on the whole they are probably at least as law abiding as U.S. citizens, aside from their illegal entry-but in the public wrath against illegal immigration which can be fanned by their description in the press.

Labor Market Impact The economic impact of illegals clearly depends upon the

state of the economy. During periods of full employment, immigrant workers, legal or illegal, are largely complements of resident workers and produce mainly economic benefits. By increasing the amount of labor available, immigrants provide lower production costs and prices, higher profits, and greater general economic growth. The wages of most native workers will increase as the presence of illegals employed in low skilled jobs permits the occupational upgrading of natives. These consequences are ascribed to much of the historical immigration to the U.S.48 and are also the rationale for the use of “guest” workers in northern Europe.49

But it is evident that even in the best of times, those native workers who have no better alternative than competition with immigrants will suffer lower incomes because of their availability. Historically, in the U.S. the major groups hurt by immigration have been blacks, browns, and low skilled whites living away from urban areas.5O

48See Joseph J. Spengler, “Some Economic Aspects of Immigration into the United States,” Law and Contemporary Problems, XXI (Spring, 1956), 236-255.

’!‘Charles P. Kindleberger, Europe’s Postwar Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); Vera Lutz, “Foreign Workers and Domestic Wage Levels with an Illustration from the Swiss Case,” Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Quarterly Review, LXV (March, 1963), 3-68.

50See M. W. Reder, “The Economic Consequences of Increased Immigration,” Review of Economics and Statistics. XLV (August, 1963), 221-230; Spengler, op. cit., p. 250.


In the polar case of high unemployment, immigrants are simply substitutes for domestic workers and, consequently, produce only economic costs. These costs fall principally on the resident workers whom they displace, but are also borne by all citizens to the extent that they contribute to the social welfare programs which support the displaced resident workers.

The above analysis does not differentiate between legal and illegal immigrant workers. Both will have a similar labor market impact, depending on the degree to which they are complements or substitutes for native workers. In actuality, illegal immigrants tend to be more productive and docile than do lawful workers, in order to offset their insecure status.51 These characteristics appeal to many employers and provide a competitive advantage to illegals in labor markets where long tenure of employment is not important. The exploitable status of illegals also produces an effect on labor standards.

The economy of the U.S. since World War I1 has been characterized by something between full employment and massive unemployment; therefore, it is not surprising that much public discussion of the impact of illegals involves the empirical question - do illegal aliens really displace domestic workers? More sophisticated discussions examine wage as well as displacement effects.

Unfortunately, an empirically based answer to these questions cannot be given because the necessary research has not been done and probably won’t be done given the nature of the problem. There are a couple of pieces of evidence that illegals do lower wages in labor markets where they are concentrated, but the nature of this evidence is not strong. The author found that within California, wage rates increased from the south (the border) to north for unskilled manual occupations (where illegals tend to be employed), but not for most skilled Another study, after controlling for individual differences in human capital, found incomes of resident workers (especially Mexican American) lower in Texas border cities than in Houston 150 miles away from the border.53 The problem with both findings is that influences other than illegal aliens are also plausible explanations.

It is also very difficult to get evidence on the displacement of resident workers by illegals. The presence of illegals in labor markets which employ them in large numbers presumably has lowered relative wages and working conditions in these markets to the point where few resident workers are interested in these jobs, given some alternative income possibilities. Those

S*Illegal Aliens (Hearings), 1975, pp. 79-187; and field research of the author. 52Fogel, op. cit. 53Barton Smith and Robert Newman, “Depressed Wages Along the U.S.-Mexican Border: An Empirical

Analysis,” Economic Inquiry, XV (January, 1977), 51-66.

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resident workers who might seek employment in the jobs held by illegals- youth and others well down in employment queues - tend to be discouraged from doing so because they are seen by employers as less productive than the illegals. Thus, it is often true that resident workers do not appear to be available for the jobs held by illegals.

That fact, however, says nothing about the availability of resident workers if illegals became unavailable. In the latter event, certain wages would rise and the employment of residents increase. No doubt some firms would switch to labor saving technologies and some would go out of business. Cost and price increases would occur in affected industries.

The displacement debate tends to be carried out in “either-or” terms which are not enlightening. A complete removal of illegals tomorrow would certainly not result in their one-for-one replacement by resident workers; the amount of replacement would be governed by the wage elasticities of labor supply and demand, Not knowing these elasticities, it still seems safe to say that removal of illegals would result in some re-employment of the nearly seven million people who are now unemployed in the U.S.

Why do some people disagree with this conclusion? One reason is that they accept at face value statements by employers of illegal aliens, especially growers, that domestic workers are unavailable. But it is always in the self interest of employers to increase the supply of labor available to them. This is especially true when the workers in question are productive and relatively powerless to oppose the working conditions which are offered. Growers in the fifties and sixties exaggerated the unavailability of domestic workers because they preferred to employ braceros.54 Similar preferences often lie behind the current employment of illegal aliens.

Many people also believe that illegal aliens earn only the statutory minimum wage and that domestic workers will not work at that wage level, in part because of the availability of unemployment compensation and welfare. While it is true that Mexican illegals usually earn from $1.80 to $2.80 an hour, most others earn substantially more, as cited earlier. But it is likely that domestic workers are available, even for the jobs held by Mexican illegals, or would be if the wages for them were to increase.

If illegals were no longer available to growers and apparel manufacturers, for example, these employers would be forced to recruit resident workers. It is hard for me to believe that they would not find some, if not at currently prevailing wage rates, then at somewhat higher wages. And it would not obviously be a “bad” thing for farm and apparel wages to increase, even if there were corresponding increases in prices.

”‘Galarza, op. cit.


In sum, there is no precise knowledge of the market effects of illegals, nor even certain knowledge of the direction of the effect. My own view is that in the slack economy which has prevailed in the U.S. over the last few years, many illegals have been substitutes for resident workers and, consequently, have produced significant displacement of the latter while their cost and price benefits have been limited.

The final impact of illegals that I will mention is on labor standards. Because they are reluctant to support collective bargaining or seek enforcement of labor statutes, they help to maintain substandard labor conditions in some labor markets. These markets are frequently referred to as “second- ary” and are characterized, among the other well known attributes of such markets, by frequent violation of wage and hour statutes and weak employee power relative to that of employers.55

Policy It will not be easy to develop widely accepted policy on the

illegal immigration phenomenon. First, as indicated in these pages, important factual information on the number and effect of illegals is missing. Secondly, difficult “value” questions are involved. These include our society’s relative emphasis on economic growth, full employment, population control, equality of income distribution, elimination of poverty, and international relations, especially with Mexico. Ethical questions are also involved concerning our obligation, if any, to (especially poor) people outside of the U.S., relative to our internal obligation^.^^ If one believes, as I do, that illegals are substitutes for a good deal of resident labor, then the ethical question becomes a liberal dilemma, where a choice must be made for one of two poor populations - the inside poor or the outside p0or.5~

The experience of northern European countries toward their “guest” workers (12,000,000 of them in 1973), who are rather analogous in economic terms, at least, to illegal aliens in the U.S., might be instructive for policy

550n the high incidence of minimum wage violations among illegals, see North and Houstoun, op. cit.,

5eFor an ethical view which stresses internal obligations, see Garett Hardin, “Living on a Lifeboat,” Bioscience, XXIV (October, 1974), 561-569.

57Some scholars would contend that this is a specious conceptualization, that the real problem is exploitation of all workers by capitalist institutions, and that the latter foster false conflict between groups of workers, Chicanos and Mexical illegals for example. See Jorge A. Bustamante, “Commodity Migrants: A Structural Analysis of Mexican Immigration to the United States,” paper prepared for the Conference on Contemporary Dilemmas of the Mexican-United States Border, The Weatherhead Foun- dation, San Antonio, April, 1975. Space is not available to discuss this view. I will merely note that at least three Eastern European countries which are not noted for their capitalist institutions, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, are now employing imported labor. Los Angeles Times, February 18, 1976.

pp. 126-137.

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making purposes except that no settled policy has been arrived at by these countries. Until rather recently, the northern European policy has been one of controlled recruiting and encouragement of foreign workers in order to perpetuate robust economic growth in the face of very low rates of domestic unemployment. The receiving European countries have also attempted to control the immigrant workers by registering them with their governments, restricting their employment, discouraging their relatives from coming, and preventing their permanent settlement in the host These policies have not been entirely effective, which accounts for some of the disillusion- ment with the use of “guest” workers which now prevails in Eur0pe.5~

The ultimate solution to our problem of illegal immigration-namely, an equalization of living standards in the Western Hemisphere and eventually the world-is easily agreed upon, but this is a very long-run solution which provides little immediate help. Even a long-run policy of encouraging economic growth must face some thorny issues. With respect to Mexico, for example, is there a way for the U.S. to aid that country’s development within its prevailing political rhetoric which stresses the “revolution” and independence from the U.S.? Mexico already has achieved rapid economic growth-7 per cent a year from 1960 to 1970. Its greater economic problems are the distribution of income and population increases. Could the U.S. couple aid to Mexico with pressure for distributional equity and birth control programs? The single answer, which must suffice here because of space limitations, is no, the Mexicans would not allow it. Yet, economic aid without population control as a minimum response, would not reduce the Mexican emigration potential. Another solution, an open border for capital and labor is not now feasible, but this idea will begin to receive serious attention if alternative policies for dealing with illegal immigration are unsuccessful.

Possibilities for immediate solutions. Proposals for more immediate policies can be divided into two groups by the criterion of whether they favor or oppose legislation which would assess criminal or civil penalties against employers who hire illegal aliens!” Legislation of this type (the Rodino Bill)

”S. Castles and C. Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); Philip Martin, “The Evaluation of Labor Flows in Western Europe,” paper presented to the Western Social Science Association Meetings, Tempe, Arizona, April 1976; and Suzanne Paine, Exporting Workers: The Turkish Case (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), Chap. 1.

“Martin, op. cit., p. 2 . BuFor the particular views of those favoring such legislation, see the works previously cited of Brims,

Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, Fogel, Marshall, and North and Houstoun. For the views of those opposed, see the previous citations for Bustamante and Cornelius; Wendell Gordon, “A Case for a Less Restrictive Border,” Social Science Quarterly, LVI (December, 1975), 485-491; and Michael 1. Piore, “Illegal Immigration in the United States: Some Observations and Policy Suggestions,” in Nation-


has twice passed the U.S. House of Representatives, but has not come before the Senate -purportedly because of the opposition of Senator James Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to employer penalties unless a bracero type program is re-established.

The major institutional support for employer penalties comes from the AFL-CIO, because illegal aliens undercut the efforts of some of its affiliates, especially those in apparel, textiles, and food manufacturing.61 Opposition to employer penalties comes principally from growers’ organizations and other employer groups, civil rights organizations, most notably the American Civil Liberties Union, and some Chicano groupse2 The latter argue that a Rodino Bill would increase the employer discrimination which already exists against Hispanic workers in the U.S.

The Carter Administration very quickly announced its support for employer penalties, apparently based on the judgment that displacement efforts of illegals greatly exacerbate U. S. unemployment and hinder policies aimed at reducing it.B3 This position appears to be also politically sound. A recent Gallup poll found 86 per cent of its respondents in favor of outlawing the employment of illegal aliens, and 12 states have now passed legislation to this effect.64 Some students of the problem say that employer penalties won’t but this is an assertion which should be tested before it is accepted.

A work card has been proposed as a means of both simplifying enforcement of an employer penalty law and preventing job discrimination against Hispanics.66 Employers could then easily meet their responsibility for not knowingly hiring illegal aliens by asking to see this card. Since all job applicants would have to show it, there could be no discrimination against Hispanics on the grounds that they might be illegal aliens. Their possession of the card would immediately establish their legal right to employment. The attractiveness of a required work card is enhanced by the fact that it would add little to existing requirements under the OASDI system. Almost all workers are now required to have a social security number and almost

a1 Council on Employment Policy, Illegal Aliens: An Assessment of the Issues (Washington, D.C.: 1976),

61See the testimony of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO in &gal Aliens (Hearings), 1975, pp. 191-211.

ezIllegal Aliens (Hearings), 1975, pp. 282-295 and 315-330; U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration 1976 (Hearings), 1976, pp. 174-190, 244-247, and 255-258.

pp. 25-35.

6 3 L ~ ~ Angeles Times, February 2 and April 20,1977. e‘Ibid., April 28 and 30, 1977. e5Piore, op. cit., p. 27; Cornelius, “Illegal Mexican Migration.. . ,” p. 18. 66The Carter Administration initially favored a required work card, but subsequently decided not to

support it. The AFL-CIO opposes a required work card. See Illegal Aliens (Hearings), 1975, pp. 208-209.

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all employers are required to record that number on payroll records. The use of a counterfeit-proof, nontransferable social security card, which would not be issued to illegal aliens, would merely tighten existing regulations somewhat.

One objection to a work card is the cost and inconvencience which would be involved in developing and issuing 100,000,000 This problem could be lessened by limiting the card requirements to those who apply for new jobs or to employees of those industries known to employ large numbers of illegal aliens. The major objection to a required work card is on the grounds that it could become a kind of national passport, required for identification purposes, and consequently used to restrict civil liberties. This objection will probably prevail because it seems to strike a sensitive nerve among many Americans, in spite of the legislative prohibitions which could be placed on use of a work card for identification purposes, our existing requirements for the possession of driver’s licenses and Selective Service cards, and the common use of identification documents in European countries.

Another thorny policy question is that of “amnesty”- the legalizing of illegal entry which occurred prior to some cut-off date. My own position is for a liberal amnesty, up to a quite recent date, in order to make the illegal alien problem prospective rather than retrospective. Few illegals who have been in the U.S. for any length of time are apprehended anyway, and I can see no reason to maintain a fugitive status for the illegals already here in order to deport a relatively small number. This policy would also avoid the administrative burden of adjudicating the “equity” status of illegals on a case-by-case basis if amnesty were granled only up to an earlier data- 1970 for example. Liberal amnesty would also be well received by Chicanos and might help reduce their opposition to tighter control of illegal entry.

In the last regard, I believe that any policy on illegal immigration should recognize that Mexico requires special treatment. The need for special treatment exists because of history, the forceful acquisition of much of the southwestern U.S. from Mexico, because of the 2,000 mile border which joins the two countries, and because of the greater differences in standards of living between the two countries. The appropriate special treatment is not a new bracero program which would make Mexicans wel- come only part of each year while they perform the lowest paid jobs in our society, but, rather, an increase in the numbers permitted to immigrate permanently to the U.S. The number of permanent immigrants annually

6 7 M ~ ~ h of the opposition to a work card on these bases comes from the U.S. Social Security Adminis- tration. See Illegal Aliens (Hearings), 1975, pp. 220-238.


permitted to enter from Mexico should vary with the level of unemployment in the U.S. In years of low unemployment, 100,000-125,000 seems to me to be a reasonable number.

Appallingly, our most recent policy move was in the opposite direction. In October 1976, the Congress passed and the President signed an Amend- ment to the Immigration Act which adopts the Eastern Hemisphere immigration provisions for all countries of the Western Hemisphere. Among other provisions this means that a 20,000 annual immigration limit now applies to all Western Hemisphere countries. Most affected by far is Mexico, whose immigration to the U.S. under the total Western Hemisphere numerical limitation of 120,000 had been running at an annual rate of about 45,000 in the seventies.68

Thus, there has been a very rapid shift in immigration policy toward our southern neighbor -from the complete absence of quantitative restrictions which existed before 1968 to a 20,000 limit in 1977. This change is insensi- tive to the widespread poverty of the Mexican people, and it also insures the continued existence of an illegal alien problem for the U.S.

The illegal flow, in a broad perspective, is simply one manifestation of the instability which is inherent in a world of great wealth disparities among and within its nations. Despite the hopes of national policy makers for the last 10 years, the problem will not go away; it will simply get worse if it continues to be neglected. Policy changes will come, but it is not clear whether they will occur in a reasoned, timely fashion or will be put off until catalyzed by some kind of visceral reaction, possibly in a period of national crisis. The Carter Administration shows signs of attempting to deal creatively with the problem. If it fails to do so, the seeds of domestic and international malaise, already well sown by the illegal flows, will continue to sprout.

88An additional 25,000, or so, Mexicans have immigrated to the U.S. annually in the seventies as close relatives of U.S. adult citizens. This immigration is not numerically restricted and will presumably continue under the 1976 Amendment.

illegal alien workers in the united states

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